1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER)‑By virtue of the present appeal the appellant seeks to challenge the order of termination of his service passed in consequence of disciplinary action taken against him for misconduct and conveyed to him by a letter dated the 6th of August, 1984. To facilitate the appreciation of the case properly it may be of advantage to set out the relevant documents in extenso. The appellant while working as Sales Officer in the Respondent's Sales Office in Rawalpindi was served with a charge‑sheet dated May 31, 1984, which reads as under:‑ Name Mr. F. M. Shamsi Staff No P‑24122 Designation Sales Officer Department Marketing Section Sales Date and time of misconduct 30‑5‑1984 Investigation ordered by District Manager, RWP Admin. Manual clause under which charged 15‑03‑01 (b) Nature of misconduct (give here in brief the facts of the case... ) It has been reported by Asstt. Manager Vigilance, Rawalpindi that on 30‑5‑1984 a passenger Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed reported at Briefing Counter, Islamabad Airport at 0915 hours and presented a ticket (No.214‑4406‑147‑089) with O.K. sticker No.2500088 for boarding PK‑301/300584 for sector ISB‑KHI. At the counter it was noticed/ detected by Mr. M. M. Akhtar, Traffic Officer that the said ticket was in the name of Mrs. Komalia Afia‑B and not in the name of passenger Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed. Further investigation revealed that the said ticket was originally issued at OSLO (Norway) on 29‑2‑1984 for sector OSLO‑CPN‑ISB‑LHE‑KHI in favour of Mrs. Komalia Afia‑B. The international sector OSLO‑CPN‑IS B had already been utilised in March 1984. On further questioning, passenger Ashfaq Ahmed revealed and confirmed in a written statement dated 30‑5‑1984 which was recorded by Assistant Manager Vigilance in your presence and in the presence of Ticket Office Manager, Mr. Tariq Mahmood and Traffic Officer, Mr. M. M. Akhtar, that you had taken a sum of Rs.900 illegally, and fraudulently gave the said ticket of Mrs. Komalia Afia‑B to passenger Ashfaq Ahmed for his illegal travel by PK‑301/300584. It is also alleged that this booking was also made by you with computer No.5SFJ

3. The above statement of the passenger recorded in your presence was also duly signed by you in the presence of the passenger and the above named two witnesses.

2. You have thus committed an offence of fraud and dishonesty in connection with the Corporation business (Admin. Manual Clause 15‑03‑01 (b) which renders you liable to disciplinary action as per Corporation rules.

3. You are, therefore, required to explain reasons why disciplinary action should not be instituted against you for fraud and dishonesty. Your reply should reach the undersigned within 72 hours from the receipt of this charge‑sheet, failing which ex parte action will be taken against you. Sd/ - AGHA ARSHAD ALI District Manager. The appellant denied the allegation levelled against him in his reply dated June 3, 1984, which is reproduced below:‑ "I humbly submit the following reference, to subject charge- sheet:‑ (1) That a bare perusal of the facts/events as narrated in the charge‑sheet would show that the same has been issued as a result of grave misunderstanding and mistake. (2) That the charge‑sheet gives the impression as if I somehow or the other gave the ticket in question to Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed. This is wrong as the charge‑sheet itself narrates the ticket was in fact issued at OSLO (Norway) on 29‑2‑1984 on which date I was very much at Rawalpindi and could not have issued the said ticket. The story told by Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed is, therefore, totally false and baseless. (3) That the true facts are that on 27‑5‑1984 Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed came to the Reservation Office and presented the said ticket for reserving a seat in PK‑301 on 30‑5‑1984. The ticket presented by the said passenger was valid for Islamabad Lahore‑Karachi‑Lahore‑Islamabad and Copenhagen. Consequently I made a computer check availability of seats and reserved the seat in PK‑301 on 30‑5‑1984. Obviously there was no other course open to me but to confirm the seat in the circumstances. (4) Your goodself is well‑aware that it is not necessary that the ticket is presented for reservation by the person in whose name the ticket has been issued. It is a daily routine the persons other than the ticket‑holders (such as employees' relatives etc.) present tickets for reservation and confirmation. (5) I deny it most vehemently that I took Rs.900 or any other amount from Ashfaq Ahmed or anyone else in respect of the said reservation. In fact there was no question for me to ask for the said amount or for the said Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed to pay the same. How on the earth, could I help him to travel on a ticket issued in a woman's name sitting at the Reservation Office when the final checks and security checks are made while boarding the flight. This again shows the faults of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed story. (6) That the allegation that the statement of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed was recorded in my presence is wholly false and incorrect. The fact of the matter is that on 30‑5‑1984 at about 11 a.m. while I was 'on duty I was called to the Vigilance Office by Mr. Abdullah, Vigilance Officer. When I reached the Vigilance Office the said Mr. Abdullah produced a statement in his own handwriting and threatened me with dire consequences if I did not sign the statement. No statement either in writing or verbally was recorded in my presence. Without so much as giving me any opportunity to read or understand the said statement, I was forced to put my signatures on the piece of paper which allegedly contained the statement of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed. No witnesses signed in my presence. The entire illegal act was perpetrated in order to unlawfully shield the persons responsible at the Briefing counter and make me the scapegoat. I categorically deny that I signed the statement with my own free will and voluntarily. The said Mr. Abdullah is inimical towards me. (7) That l am absolutely innocent, never before had any disciplinary or other proceeding been taken against me. (8) That it is ironical that the said Ashfaq Ahmed has been set free and I have been made the scape‑goat for no fault of mine. (9) That the allegations, as such do not constitute misconduct legal or otherwise. It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the charge‑sheet may kindly be withdrawn with an opportunity of personal hearing. Yours Obediently (Sd.) F.M. SHAMSI):' An enquiry was then held and the Enquiry Officer in his findings held the appellant guilty of misconduct. Thereon a second show‑cause notice dated June 19, 1984 was served upon the appellant, which reads as under: ‑ Subject: SECOND SHOW CAUSE An enquiry was held against you for fraud and dishonesty in connection with Corporation business. You received/ recovered from Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed a passenger Rs.900 for providing him an international ticket (No.214‑4406‑147‑089), for sector ISB/KHI, said ticket was in the name of Mrs. Komalia Afia and while you confirmed said ticket for sector Islamabad/ Karachi on flight No.PK‑301 dated 30‑5‑1984, apart from placing sticker (No.2500088) from the book issued to you, you also placed rubber stamp on 'S' and confirmed seat in the name of Mrs. Komalia Afia. Consequently you were found guilty of the charges levelled against you in charge‑sheet No.PER/P‑24122/112/84 dated 31‑5‑1984. Under the circumstances you are required to show cause within 72 hours of receipt of this second show cause as to why you should not be subjected to suitable punishment in accordance with rules applicable to Corporation. In case you fail to submit your explanation within the stipulated period, action will be taken as per rules. Apart from the foregoing you are hereby provided with an opportunity of personal hearing with Director Marketing, PI AC, Karachi and you are advised to see him on 26th June, 1984, at 1000 hours in his office to explain your conduct in person and make verbal submissions if any. In case you fail to avail this opportunity, it will be presumed that you do not want to make any verbal submission in person and the case will be decided on merits accordingly to law. Copy of appraisal of evidence is enclosed." Sd. (District Manager) To the above show‑cause notice the appellant submitted the following reply on 21‑6‑1984:‑ "This is with reference to your No.PER/P‑24122/112/84 dated 19‑6‑1984. I have not been provided with copy of the statements of the witnesses recorded against me and other inquiry proceedings. In the circumstances I may be provided with the copies of inquiry proceedings as the "appraisal of evidence" it is submitted with respect, does not depict truly the evidence which was recorded during the course of inquiry. I respectfully submit that the entire inquiry stands vitiated. I am being accused of taking money from the passenger and providing him with an international ticket. The entire basis of the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is the alleged statement of the passenger. However, this passenger was never examined as a witness in the inquiry and I was never given a chance to cross‑examine. Your goodself will also appreciate that there is no reference in the appraisal of evidence as to how have I been found guilty of handing over the ticket the passenger. There is no evidence that I issued the tier... or that it was ever in my possession. Regarding the statement of Mr. Abdullah my earlier reply may kindly be referred. There is no evidence that statement of the passenger was recorded in my presence. There is clear discrepancy in this behalf. On the "other hand the record would show that the said statement was written by Mr. Abdullah and was also changed latter. In any case that statement in the absence of cross‑examination is of no use and cannot be made basis for my conviction. It is, therefore, prayed that the notice may kindly be withdrawn. It is further prayed that I be given an opportunity of personal hearing." Thereafter, the appellant was heard personally on 26‑6‑1984 by the Director, Marketing who on July 10, 1984, passed the following order:‑ "Reference Preceding Minutes and enquiry proceedings. I have gone through the enquiry proceedings which have also been veffed and cleared by Law Officer. Rawalpindi at M‑1. ,Mr. F.M. Shamsi, P‑24122 who was involved in the case of dishonesty and fraud has been provided following opportunities: (1) Charge‑sheet dated 31‑5‑1984. (2)Second show‑cause notice dated 19‑6‑1984. Mr. F.M. Shamsi also appeared before the Enquiry Officer and the enquiry proceedings were accordingly conducted in his presence. He has been found guilty of the charges of dishonesty and fraud. District Manager, Rawalpindi has also recommended his dismissal from PIA service. He has been provided opportunity of personal hearing with undersigned on 26‑6‑1984 to explain his conduct in person but he failed to prove his conduct to my satisfaction. However in view of his 15‑years service with PIA, I hereby order his termination from PIA service with immediate effect alongwith normal terminal benefits. Director Administration may kindly see before termination orders are implemented. Sd. (KHURSHEED ANWAR) Director Marketing. DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATION: Pl see that legally it is in order. Initial 14/7 ML (P) Mr. Asmatullah Khan Law Officer Please examine and advise: Initial 15/7" The above order was then conveyed to the appellant by a letter dated the 6th of August, 1984. Aggrieved thereby he filed a departmental appeal which was disposed of by the following order:‑ Subject: APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF TERMINATION PASSED BY THE DIRCTOR MARKETING PIAC. Dear Sir, This has reference to your appeal dated 2‑9‑1984 addressed to Managing Director PIAC Karachi on the abovenoted subject. Since your appeal, referred to above against termination order has no merit for consideration, we therefore regret to inform you that your request has not been acceded to by the management." The appellant thereafter served a grievance notice dated 4‑11‑1984 under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was rejected by the Respondent‑PIAC vide their letter dated November 8, 1984, which reads as under: ‑ Kindly refer to your grievance notice dated 4th November, 1984 for reinstatement in service with back benefits. Please be informed that Essential Services (Maintenance) .act 1952 is applicable to all the employees of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. In view of the applicability of the said Act, your grievance notice is legally incompetent, misconceived and untenable, as such the same is rejected. Without prejudice to the aforesaid legal position, we wish to inform you that we have re‑examined your case on merits and considered the points raised in your aforesaid notice but found them devoid of any force. The enquiry proceedings in which you participated were conducted in accordance with the provisions of law and principles of natural justice. There is sufficient evidence against you which fully establishes your guilt. An opportunity of personal hearing was also afforded to you with the competent authority to explain your conduct in person, but you also failed to prove your innocence before the said authority. Although the charge proved against you was of grave nature, the punishment warranted was that of dismissal (without benefits) for which we were justified to inflict upon you, but keeping in view your long service with the Corporation, the competent authority has taken a lenient view and terminated your services with normal benefits. In view of the foregoing, it is to inform you that the request for re‑instatement made in the aforesaid notice cannot be acceded to by the management." The appellant then filed a grievance petition for his reinstatement into service before the Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi, which was returned to him for presenting before the proper forum vide judgment of the said Court dated 14‑10‑1985 and the appellant accordingly filed the present appeal on 15‑10‑1985. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned order on several grounds of law and facts. He, first submitted that the charge‑sheet and the second show‑cause notice was signed and issued by the District Manager who was not competent to do so and as such the whole proceedings are incompetent. It was, on the other hand submitted on behalf of the respondent Corporation that according to the Schedule of Administrative and Financial powers in force at the relevant time the District Manager was competent to initiate a disciplinary action and to award the punishment of censure, withholding of increment, reduction to lower scale and recovery from pay of a loss caused to the Corporation. A reference to the Schedule referred to by the respondent and the relevant Administrative Order have shown that although the disciplinary action against the appellant could be initiated and punishment of censure or recovery could be imposed by the District Manager but the punishment of demotion to a lower grade or the dismissal could be imposed only by the Director concerned in concurrence with the Director Administration. Thus the District Manager could issue a charge‑sheet to the appellant and could also impose on him minor penalties stated above. It, therefore, follows that the charge‑sheet in this case was competently signed and issued by the District Manager. However, in order to determine the competence of the District Manager to issue the second show‑cause notice it may be of advantage to reproduce the relevant provisions thereof which reads as under: ‑ 15.04.13. If as a result of the appraisal of evidence, the enquiry officer in his report finds the employee concerned guilty of all or any of the charges levelled against him in the charge‑sheet, then the competent authority shall issue to the employee concerned a notice to show cause as to why appropriate punishment as per rules and regulations of the Corporation shall not be inflicted upon him in view of the misconduct on his part. The show‑cause notice shall be issued to the employee concerned in the manner as per current pro forma. Although the show‑cause notice, the competent authority shall make available to the employee concerned a copy of the appraisal of evidence and report of the enquiry officer. The show‑cause notice will contain a directive to the employee concerned to submit his explanation within a period of 72 hours of the receipt thereof and also offer him an opportunity of a personal hearing before the competent authority to explain his conduct and cause. A bare perusal of the above provision would show that the authority issuing the show‑cause notice has to come to a conclusion of guilt and to provisionally determine the penalty before it issues the show‑cause notice. In the present case since it was intended to impose a penalty of dismissal from service, which is awardable by a Director only, the authority competent to issue show‑cause notice was Director. The proper procedure to be followed was that when the District Manager found it a case of major penalty he should have forwarded the case to the Director concerned who alone was competent to issue the show‑cause notice. In my view, therefore, the show‑cause notice served by the District Manager was void and from this point onwards the proceedings, being in‑competent, vitiated, as enunciated in P L D 1966 S C 253 (relevant portion at page 257 B & C). It was next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that by the impugned order the penalty of termination of service has been imposed on the appellant while this penalty is not included in the prescribed penalties to be imposed for mi conduct and as such the impugned order is without lawful authority. To appreciate the contention it may be proper to reproduce below the relevant provision of the Administrative Manual then in force which reads as under: ‑ 15.04.15. An employee found guilty of misconduct shall be liable to any of the following punishments: (a) Reprimand or warning. (b) Fine in the manner prescribed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936), upto three paisa in the rupee of the wages payable to him in a month. (c) Withholding of increment or promotion for a period not exceeding one year. (d) Reduction to a lower post, not exceeding one year, or (e) Dismissal without payment of any compensation in lieu of notice. A reference to the above provision will show that termination of service as such has not been prescribed as a penalty for misconduct I and as such could not be imposed on the appellant. The case of the respondent, however, appears to be that it was a case of termination simpliciter and by the impugned order the appellant was not penalised but was discharged with normal terminal benefits. A reading of the impugned order has made it quite clear that the Director Marketing had come to a finding that the appellant was guilty of misconduct liable, to a punishment of dismissal from service, and had on that ground passed the order of termination of service with normal terminal benefits. However, termination of service which is based on a finding of misconduct carries with it a stigma and is quite different in its effects from a simple order of termination of service. If charges are framed and an enquiry is conducted and findings are recorded, then a penalty prescribed for misconduct only can be imposed, and it cannot be substituted by an order of termination simpliciter, which has to stand on its own legs. The impugned order is, therefore, without lawful authority and incompetent (P L D 1966 SC 253 relevant portion at page 258 D, refers). To conclude, the aforesaid legal infirmities vitiated the impugned order, which is liable to be set aside for this reason alone. Notwithstanding the aforesaid legal infirmities of the impugned order, I shall proceed to examine the case on merits also. The findings of the Enquiry Officer on which the impugned order is based are reproduced below: ‑ (11) From the above statement made by prosecution witnesses and the accused as well as the evidence produced by the witnesses, it appears that: (1) Mr. Shamsi is the neighbour of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed passenger and gave the ticket of Mrs. Komalia Afia‑B to Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed for his travel on PK‑301130th May, 1984 against this ticket. (ii) Reservation was made and the sticker was put on the ticket by Mr. Shamsi. Although Mr. Shamsi has denied having put the stamp on the letter 'S' of 'MRS' in the ticket. However, since the reservation was made by Mr. Shamsi in the name of Mr. Komalia Afia. It is possible that the stamp on letter 'S' of 'MRS' on the ticket was also put by Mr. Shamsi, so that Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed could travel on the ticket of Mrs. Komalia Afia‑B u n‑noticed. (iii) From the statement of the witnesses and the accused, Mr. Shamsi has not taken sum of Rs.900 from Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed in cash. However, as stated by (PW‑II and PW‑III), as per passenger's subsequent statement the amount of Rs.900 was to be adjusted against the money borrowed by Mr. Shamsi from Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed. (iv) Based on the above statements and evidence I find Mr. F.M. Shams i, P‑2412 2, Sales Officer, PIA, Rawalpindi, guilty of fraud and dishonesty, which amounts to misconduct under Corporation rules. The finding at (i) above is based on a so‑called statement of Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed allegedly recorded at the time of incident and before the issue of the charge‑sheet. The said Ashfaq Ahmed was however, not examined by the Enquiry Officer during the enquiry proceedings though the accused appellant made a request to him in this behalf, and in reply to the second show‑cause notice has explained that the entire basis of the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer is the alleged statement of the passenger who was never examined as a witness and the appellant was never given a chance to cross‑examine him. It may be pertinently added that the said Ashfaq Ahmed has sworn in an affidavit which is available on the record of the present appeal, wherein he has clearly averred that he has not recorded any statement before any staff of the PIAC and whatever they have attributed to him is not correct. He has further averred that the appellant had neither given him the ticket nor he had taken any money from him, and‑in fact he had obtained that ticket from one of his friends. Although 'in a counter‑affidavit sworn by Raja Muhammad Younis, Law Officer of the respondent Corporation it has been averred that it seems that now the appellant has been able to win over Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed and has procured a false affidavit to save his own skin, the position remains that despite a clear request of the appellant to the Enquiry Officer for examination of the said Ashfaq Ahmed in his presence, the said Ashfaq Ahmed was not called and examined by the Enquiry Officer and still the finding was based on a so‑called statement of the said Ashfaq Ahmed allegedly recorded prior to the initiation of enquiry. It is a well‑settled legal position that any statement recorded or evidence taken before the initiation of the regular enquiry cannot be taken into consideration and the finding of the Enquiry Officer is to be based only on the evidence recorded during the enquiry proceedings in presence of the accused. The Enquiry Officer has thus committed a patent error in basing his finding on the alleged statement recorded prior to the initiation of the enquiry proceedings. In my view, therefore, this finding is not based on valid evidence and could not therefore be made a basis for imposing any penalty upon the appellant. The plain reading of the finding recorded at (ii) above would show that it is based on conjectures and surmises and not on any evidence. Therefore, this finding also could not be made a basis for penalising the appellant. It is to be seen that in the finding recorded at (iii) above the Enquiry Officer has in fact exonerated the accused from the main charge levelled in the charge‑sheet and the show‑cause notice of taking Rs.900 in cash by the appellant from Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed and has planted a new version that Rs.900 was to be adjusted against the money borrowed by Mr. Shamsi from‑Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed. This conclusion of the Enquiry Officer is not only based on surmises and conjectures but also has created a material contradiction in the prosecution's case, which rendered the finding dubious and unbelievable. The above analysis has shown that the finding of the guilt recorded against the appellant is not based on valid evidence and the charges against the appellant could not be substantiated as to have called for imposition on him of any punishment muchless the punishment of dismissal from service, which is a capital punishment in the Service Laws and can be imposed only when it is proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused has committed a capital offence. I am, therefore, led to the conclusion that on factual plane also, the impugned order is totally unjustified, unwarranted and cannot be sustained. A preliminary objection regarding limitation was raised on behalf of the respondent. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation that by Ordinance No. III of 1984 it was declared that the employees of the PIAC shall be deemed to be civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, with effect from the 15th November, 1984, but the appellant instead of filing appeal against the impugned order before this Tribunal in time filed first a Grievance petition before the Labour Court wherein an objection was raised on behalf of the respondent Corporation on 2nd March, 1985, that in view of extension of the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to the PIAC employees the said learned Labour Court has no jurisdiction. It was emphasised by the learned counsel of the respondent Corporation that when in its objection the respondent Corporation made it clear to the appellant on 2nd March, 1985, that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction, he should have withdrawn the petition therefrom and should have filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal without any loss of time, which was not done and the appellant waited till 14th October, 1985 when the grievance petition was returned to him by the Labour Court for want of jurisdiction. It was urged by the learned counsel that as soon as the position in respect of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was made clear to the appellant he should not have waited for order of the Labour Court thereon and should have at once come to this Tribunal. On the other hand an application for condonation of delay has been filed on behalf of the appellant. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the position about the exclusive jurisdiction of this Tribunal could be made clear to the appellant only by the order of the Labour Court on 14‑10‑1985 and the appellant on the very next day i.e. 15‑10‑1985 filed an appeal in this Tribunal. It was submitted that the appellant had no option but to wait for the orders of the Labour Court. The explanation furnished by the appellant is acceptable. It may be mentioned that in case of WAPDA Employees the jurisdiction of this Tribunal was extended by Act No.LXXXIV promulgated in 1975. Yet the position about the exclusive jurisdiction of this Tribunal remained rather confusing and petitions by WAPDA Employees were being entertained by the Labour Court till early 1983 when in F.U. Malik's case the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan clearified the position. If in the case of WAPDA Employees the correct position could not be understood by the Bar and the Labour. Courts for a long period of about 8 years then if the appellant and his counsel waited for the order of the Labour Court for a few months, they had ample justification for doing so. I, therefore, hold that prior to filing the present appeal, the appellant was prosecuting another proceedings, namely the Grievance petition filed before the Labour Court with due diligence and under the bona fide impression that the impugned order was appealable before that forum. The provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act could, therefore, be invoked in seeking condonation of delay. The delay occurred in filing the present appeal is, therefore, condoned and the objection of the respondent in this regard is repelled. Another preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent Corporations that at the time of termination of the appellant's services Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 was applicable to the respondent Corporation whereunder the appellant had to seek his remedy from the authority as contemplated in section 7 of the said Act, which the appellant failed to avail before filing the present appeal and as such the present appeal is not competent. It may be of advantage to reproduce section 7 of the said Act which reads as under: ‑ 7.‑(1) Any person found guilty of an offence under this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a :term which may extend to one year and shall also be liable to a fine. (2) Where the person accused of an offence under this Act is a Company or other body corporate, every Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence, be liable to the punishment provided for the offence. (3) No Court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except upon complaint in writing made by a servant of any Government in Pakistan authorised in this behalf by the Central [Government]. It would suffice to say that a plain reading of the above provision .makes it quite clear that thereby no remedy is provided to an employee of the respondent Corporation against the termination of his service, Quite obviously the provision relates to a prosecution of an offender and that too initiable by a Government servant authorised in this behalf by the Federal Government, and not by an employee of the Corporation. This preliminary objection is, therefore, misconceived and frivolous and is accordingly repelled. In view of the foregoing, the appeal is accepted, the impugned order is set aside and it is directed that the appellant shall be reinstated in service with all admissible back benefits. S.Q. /40 1 /Sr. F Appeal accepted.