1999 PLP 320 (PLC)

(9). For the purpose of holding secret ballot to determine the collective bargaining agent, the Registrar shall‑‑ (a). fix the date of the poll and intimate the same to each of the contesting trade unions and also to every employer; (b) on the date fixed for the poll so place in the polling station set up the purpose the ballot boxes which shall be sealed in the presence of the representatives of the contesting trade unions as to receive the ballot papers; (c) conduct the poll at the polling station at which the representatives of the contesting trade unions shall have the right to be present; (d) after the conclusion of the poll and in the presence of such of the representative of .the contesting trade unions may be present, open the ballot boxes and count the votes; and (e) after the conclusion of the Court (certify) the Trade Union which has received the highest number of votes to be the collective bargaining agent: Provided that no trade union shall be (certified) to be the collective bargaining agent for an establishment or group of establishments unless the number of votes received by it is not less than one‑third of the total number of workman employed in such establishment or group: Provided further that, if no trade union secures such number of votes. in the first poll a second poll shall be held between the trade unions which secure the two highest numbers of votes in the first poll and the trade union which secures a majority of the votes cast at the second poll shall be certified in the prescribed manner to be collective bargaining agent; Provided further that, if the number of votes secured by two or more trade unions securing the highest number of votes is equal, further poll shall be held between them until one of them secures a majority of the votes cast at such further poll. (9‑a) If no trade union indicates under clause (a) of subsection (3) that it desires to be a contestant in the secret ballot, the Registrar shall certify the trade union, which has made the application under subsection (2) to be the collective bargaining agent. (10) Where a registered trade union has been (certified) under clause (e) of subsection (9) to be the collective bargaining agent for an establishment or group of establishments, no application for the determination of the collective bargaining agent for such establishment or group shall be entertained within a period of two years from the date of such (certification) except where the registration of such a registered trade union is cancelled before expiration of that period. (13) The Registrar may authorise in writing an officer to perform all or any of his functions. The reading of entire section 22 demonstrates that to its own strength it is restricted to the determination of C.B.A. In an establishment or group of establishment within a province. Its provisions on its own do not apply to the Industrywise Trade Union, which has got its establishments in more than one province. Under this section the Registrar is empowered to hold ballot for determination of C.B.A. Registrar has been defined in section 2(XXII) of the Ordinance which is as under:‑‑ " 'Registrar' means Registrar of Trade Unions appointed under section 12." The appointment of Registrar is done by the Provincial Government as envisages under section 12 of we Ordinance which is as under:‑‑ (12) Registrar of trade unions.‑‑For the purpose of this Ordinance the Provincial Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette appoint as many persons as it considers necessary to be Registrars of trade unions and where it appoints more than one Registrar, shall specify in the notification the area within which each one of them shall exercise and perform the powers and functions under this Ordinance. The Registrar as envisaged under this section is not only concerned with the Registration of the Trade Union within a Province but also determination of C.B.A. as well. This fortifies the view that it is the Registrar appointed by the Provincial Government who determines C.B.A. in respect of establishment or group of establishments in a Province. However, procedure for the Registration of Industrywise Trade Union and determination of the E C.B.A. is otherwise. The terms/expression Industrywise Trade Union has been defined in the explanation to section 22‑A of the Ordinance in the following words:‑‑ "Explanation.‑‑In this section and in (the succeeding provisions of this Ordinance) the expressions Industrywise trade union, 'federation of such trade, unions,' and 'federation at the national level' refer to a trade union the membership of which extents to establishments in more than one Province and a federation of the unions whose members in extends to registered trade unions in more than one Province." The Commission i.e. N.I.R.C. has been constituted by the Federal Government as reflected from section 22‑A of the Ordinance. The following among others are the functions of Commission under subsection (8) of section 22‑A of the Ordinance:‑‑ (d) to register Industrywise trade unions, federation of such trade unions and federation at the national level; (e) To determine the collective bargaining agents amongst industrywise trade unions, federation of such trade unions and federations at the national level." The chairman N.I.R.C. in the exercise of his power under section 22‑B of the Ordinance constitutes Full Bench as well as other Benches for the performance of the function of the Commission. Respecting Industrywise trade unions the Benches of the Commission are empowered to perform function as are performed by the Registrar appointed under section 12 of the Ordinance for the trade union in a Province. Subsection (3)(b) of section 22‑B of the Ordinance makes this point very clear which is in the following words:‑‑ "(3)(b). In relation to industrywise Trade Unions, Federations of such trade union, federation at the national level and cases referred to the Commission, perform such functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Registrar, a Labour Court or a Tribunal in relation to Trade Unions and federations of trade unions within a Province. and for this purpose, any reference in this Ordinance to a Registrar, Labour Court, or, as the case may be Tribunal shall be deemed to be a reference to the appropriate Bench of the Commission to which such functions are assigned: Provided that, in the performance of those functions and in the exercise of those powers, the Benches shall unless otherwise provided in this Ordinance, follow the procedure laid down in the regulation to be made under section 22‑F." The reading of this subsection makes it clear that the Benches of the N.I.R.C. have been empowered to perform‑ such function respecting Industry Wise trade union as are performed by the Registrar in a Province under section 22 of the Ordinance. This shows that the determination of C.B.A. in an Industrywise Trade Union extending over more than one Province is the function of the Commission, which is performed by this Benches. As already stated the Benches of N.I.R.C. would perform all such function and exercise all such power respecting Industrywise Trade Union which in a Province are exercised by the Registrar in relation to Provincial Trade union under section 22 of the Ordinance. Further the determination of C.B.A. qua Provincial Trade Union is performed by the Registrar so appointed under section 12 of the Ordinance while respecting Industry Wise Trade Union functions are assigned to Bench or Benches of N.I.R.C. An important feature is to be noted over here that section 22 of the Ordinance has given complete procedure and methodology regarding the determination of C.B.A. in a Provincial trade union. However, the procedure and methodology to be adopted by the Bench or Benches of N.I.R.C. is totally different. In view of the Proviso of subsection (3)(b) of section 22‑B of the Ordinance, the Benches have to follow the procedure laid down in the Regulation made under section 22‑F. Reference to some of the provisions of section 22‑F of the Ordinance would be relevant which are as under:‑‑ (22‑F). Power to make regulations.‑‑(1) Subject to the Provisions of this Ordinance the Commission may with the prior approval of the Federal Government, make such regulations relating to its procedure and the performance of its functions as it may deem fit, and the regulations shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Evidences Act, 1872 (I of 1872) the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898) the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Act V of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:‑‑ (a) Registration of industry wise trade unions, federations of such trade unions and federations at the national level and the procedure for such registration; (b) Determination of collective bargaining agent from amongst the industrywise trade unions, federations of such trade unions or as the case may be, federations at the national level and the procedure there for." In exercise of these powers National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Function) Regulation 1973 were framed on 18‑4‑1973. Chapter IV of the regulation, which is captioned Collective Bargaining Agent to which reference would be made subsequently is a complete Code laying down the Procedure and Methodology to be followed in the determination of C.B.A. by the Bench/Benches of N.I.R.C. Now the stage is set and it is amply clear that the Chairman N.I.R.C. is the Registrar for the purpose of Industrywise trade union whose membership extends to more than one Province. In the case in hand the Chairman/R.I.T.U. in exercise of his power derived under section 22(13) of the Ordinance authorised in writing Mr. Muhammad Athar, Deputy Registrar to conduct referendum in Pakistan Telecommunication Company. In this regard after the authorization, the latter strictly followed the procedure laid down in Chapter IV of the Regulation for holding the referendum on 14‑4‑1998 in 133 Polling Stations throughout Pakistan. He submitted a detailed report on 20‑4‑1998 after compilation of the entire result to the Chairman N.I.R.C. The Deputy Registrar issued C.B.A. certificate on 21‑4‑1998 under the direction of the Chairman/R.I.T.U. as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. This shows that the determination of C.B.A. was an act of Chairman/R.I.T.U. himself. Against this decision an appeal is provided before the Full Bench of N.I.R.C. under section 22‑D of the Ordinance which is as under:‑‑ "(22‑D). Appeals.‑‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this ordinance or in any other law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by an award or decision given or (a sentence or order determining any certifying a Collective Bargaining Unit) passed by any Bench of the Commission, other than a Full Bench may within 30 days of such award, decision, or (sentence or order) prefer an appeal to the Commission. (2) An appeal preferred to the Commission under subsection (1) shall be disposed of by the Full Bench of the Commission, which shall‑‑ (a) if the appeal is from an order determining and certifying a Collective Bargaining Unit, have the power to confirm, set aside, vary or modify such an order; and ...." I have gone through the judgments relied upon by Mian Bashir Zafar for ouster of jurisdiction. With outmost respect I hold the different view. Simply by saying that since appeal is specially provided qua determination of Collective Bargaining Unit (CBU) under section 22‑D of the Ordinance and non‑mention of C.B.A. would not oust its jurisdiction. The concept of Collective Bargaining Unit which is a geographical entity was first introduced under Act XVI of 1975. Its determination is also done by N.I.R.C. by virtue of section 22‑EE of the Ordinance. Since it was specially included as such by this newly added amendment an appeal is also provided before the Full Bench against the order of determination of C.B.U. However, as said above under section 22‑D of the Ordinance appeal is also provided to an aggrieved person against an "award" or a "decision" given or a "sentence" passed by any Bench of the Commission other than the Full Bench. The determination of Collective Bargaining Agent is definitely a decision as the same is determined after following an elaborate methodology and procedure laid down under the law and the Regulation. The procedure in this respect for determination of C.B.A. is provided in Chapter IV of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Function) Regulation 1973, which is a complete Code in itself. It has provided a detailed procedure for the determination of C.B.A. in the industry wise trade union. Chapter 3 of the Regulation has provided for the registration of Industry wise trade union and in Chapter IV as already stated a detailed procedure is provided right from the supply of list of members of the trade union till its conclusion. Reference to Regulation 16 sub‑Regulations (8), (9), (10), (15), (16) and (21) would be relevant which are as under:‑‑ (8) Appointment of Polling Officer and Balloting Officers, etc. The Commission may appoint as many Polling Officer, Balloting Officers and other staff as it may deem necessary for conducting and supervising the ballot who shall perform all such duties and exercise all such powers as are assigned to them by the Commission. (9) Appointment of Polling Agents.‑‑(a) The contesting trade unions may appoint one polling agent at a time of each booth and given notice thereof to the polling officer half and hour before the commencement of the polling; Provided that failure to nominate an agent shall not delay the commencement or affect the conduct of the ballots. (b) The polling agents will witness the voting and assist the Polling Officer in identification of votes. (10) Commencement of ballot.‑‑Before commencement of ballot the polling officer shall in the presence of all the polling agents satisfy himself that the ballot h,)x is empty and thereafter, seal the ballot box in the presence of the polling agents and record a certificate to this effect in Form N. (15) Commencement and closure of ballot.‑‑(a) No person shall be given the ballot paper before or after the hours fixed for ballot, except those persons who are within the polling booth at the closing time who shall be given the ballot papers and allowed to vote. (b) After all the persons present within the polling booth at the closing time have cast their votes, the Polling Officer shall forthwith seal the opening provided for dropping the ballot paper in the ballot box in the presence of the polling agents and will record a certificate to this effect in Form O. (16) Unsealing of the ballot box and counting of votes (a) after the ballot box has been sealed under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (15) the Polling Officer shall unseal it in the presence of the polling agents and record a certificate to this effect in Form 'P' provided that the absence of a polling agent shall not affect or delay the unsealing of the ballot boxes. (b) After the ballot box has been unsealed under subparagraph (a) the Polling Officer shall in the presence of polling agents, count the votes and record the result in counting along-with a certificate in Form 'Q' duly signed by the Polling Agents. (21) Declaration of Collective Bargaining Agent. On receipt of he result from the Polling Officers the Commission or its authorised agent shall declare the trade union which has received the highest number of votes to be the Collective Bargaining Agent in accordance with clause (e) of subsection (9) of section 22 and issue a certificate to this effect in Form 'T'. The employer is also associated fully in the conduct of the election. He is to provide the list of the workmen so as to verify the authenticity of the list submitted by the trade union. It is also to be seen before issuance of the certificate whether the trade union has secured required number of votes of total number of workmen employed in the establishment. All these aspects involve resolution of disputed question of facts which as already stated are conducted according to the methodology and procedure prescribed under the aforesaid regulations. The word "decision" has not been defined either in the Ordinance or in the regulations. It has got no fixed legal meaning. It is not restricted to judicial acts. It is a comprehensive term and may include even the ministerial determination. In Black's Law Dictionary 32 (6th Edition) it has been defined as under:‑‑ Decision. A determination arrived at after consideration of facts and in legal context law. A popular rather than technical or legal word; a comprehensive terms having no fixed legal meaning. It may be employed as referring to ministerial acts as well as to those that are judicial or of a judicial character. A determination of a judicial or quasi judicial nature. A judgment, decree, or order pronounced by a Court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of authoritative answer to the question raised before it. The term is broad enough to cover both final judgments and interlocutory orders. And through some time limited to the sense of judgment, the terms is at other rimes understood as meaning simply the first step leading to a judgment, or as an order for judgment. The word may also include various rulings well as orders, including agency and commission orders U.S.V. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 40 S.Ct. 289, 291, 64 Ed.

333. In Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan M.N.A. (PLD 1976 SC 57) at page 104 it has been defined as under:‑‑ "In the technical judicial terminology the word 'decision' may connote determination of judicial nature as a judgment or decree pronounced by a Court in settlement of a controversy submitted to it and by way of authoritative answer to the questions raised before it (vide Black's Law Dictionary), yet it is a comprehensive terms having no fixed legal meaning and may equally well be employed as referring even to ministerial acts but when read in conjunction with the word 'matter' which Black's Law Dictionary defines 'as the subject‑matter of controversy' or substantial facts forming the basis of a claim or defence then it becomes the subject of litigation that it to say the 'lis' itself. Therefore, a final decision is a decision which leaves nothing open to further dispute and which sets at rest the causes of action between the parties from which no appeal or writ of error can be taken. " Similarly in Corpus Juris Secundum the word decision has been defined in the following terms: "A popular and not technical or legal word, and a very comprehensive term having no fixed legal meaning. It has been said that a decision necessarily involves a dispute, actual or potential and the reaching of a conclusion. In its common use, the word has been defined as meaning act of deciding, settling, or terminating, as a controversy by giving judgment on the matter at issue; determination or result arrived at after due consideration, as of a question or doubt settlement or conclusion. Strictly speaking it is intended to embrace the last act of the Court, in other words, the judgment, a decision of the case for or against one of the parties, and as used in particular statutes, may mean of final decision and in its broad generic sense it means a final determination of the rights of the parties in the action. (Vol. 26 PPA1 & 42).' Reference is also to be made to Haji Khan Bhatti v. Dr. Munir Ahmad Mughal etc. (1992 PLC 632) were it was held as under:‑‑ "In this case the impugned order has been passed by the Registrar under section 8(4) in relation to Industrywise trade union and, therefore, while exercising his powers and performing his functions as such, he shall be deemed to have exercised the power of a Labour Court under clause (b) subsection (3) of section 22‑B of the Ordinance, therefore, the Labour Court cannot hear an appeal against the order which is passed by any Bench or the Commission as Labour Court. In such a case, the decision given by a Bench of the Commission is appealable before Full Bench of the Commission as provided under section 22‑D." Apart from this it must be stated here that the petitioner Pakistan Telecommunication Company Lions Staff Union cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. In its Civil Petition 122 of 1998 before the High Court of Balochistan it was specifically stated that an appeal was provided against the determination of C.B.A. the Full Bench under section 22‑D of the Ordinance but the Constitutional jurisdiction according to the petitioner was invoked as Full Bench was not available for want of appointment or members. Here before this Court the petitioner took a complete somersault and has denied the right of appeal before the Full Bench. ' As already stated by judging from every angle the determination of C.B.A. of Industry wise trade union by the Chairman/R.I.T.U. by following the exhaustive procedure provided under section 22 of the Ordinance read with National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulation, 1973 is a decision, as such, appeal is provided under section 22‑D of the Ordinance. It would be an anomalous situation if appeal is only confined against the determination of C.B.U. as provided through an amended Act XVI of 1975 and not respecting determination of C.B.A. The former i.e. C.B.U. is merely a geographical entity determined by the Commission under section 22‑EE of the Ordinance so as to set the area of jurisdiction for the exercise of power by C.B.A., the ultimate body for the settlement of the terms and conditions of the employees. At the cost of repetition the determination of C.B.A. by the Commission is a "decision" against which appeal is provided under section 22‑D before the Full Bench. The argument of the learned counsel that the votes were not counted by the Registrar himself as mandated under section 22(9)(d) of the Ordinance which has provided that after the conclusion of the polls the ballot box would be opened by the Registrar in the presence of the representative of the contesting trade unions is totally without force. In the preceding paragraphs it has been pointed out that whatever functions are performed by the Registrar in respect of the trade union or federation of trade union within a Province, the same function in respect of Industrywise trade union are performed by a Bench of the Commission. Reference in this regard to section 22‑B (3)(b) of the Ordinance has already been made. The procedure to be followed by the Registrar respecting the Provincial Trade Union would not be applicable to the Benches. Instead National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulation reference to which has already been made framed in the exercise of powers under section 22‑F would be applicable. In this view of the matter the argument that the counting has not been done by the Registrar is without any force and reference has already been made to some of the provisions of the Regulations, which have provided that the Polling Officer in the presence of the agents would count the votes. In the case in hand the election has been held strictly within the procedure laid down under the Regulation as such no exception can be taken to the same. It is pertinent to mention over here that the election in this case was held at 133 polling stations throughout Pakistan. I fail to understand how the learned counsel for the petitioner has made a reference to section 22(9)(d) of the Ordinance when the mandate of section 22‑B(3)(b) read with its proviso is otherwise. It has specifically been provided that the Benches in the performance of their functions and in the exercise of their power would follow the aforesaid regulations. Apart from this I must say over here that even if the strict compliance as stated by Mian Bashir Zafar Learned counsel is adhered to, in this case too the votes were counted not., by the Chairman/R.I.T.U. but by Mr. Mumtaz Hussain, Administrator under his direction. In these circumstances the argument of the learned counsel that the votes were not counted in accordance with section 22(9)(d) losses all its force. These writ petitions merit dismissal on an other score that the Chairman N. I. R. C. /R. I. T. U. could not have sit on his own judgment. It was he who in the exercise of his power under section 22(13) of the Ordinance authorised the Deputy Registrar Mr. Muhammad Athar in writing to conduct the refrendum for determination of C.B.A. of P.T.C.L. The Chairman N.I.R.C. in his order, dated 15‑7‑1998 has himself stated that he authorised Deputy Registrar (Registration) to hold the secret ballot under section 22(13) of the Ordinance after complying with the relevant provisions of law. The Deputy Registrar not only conducted the referendum under his specific authorization but also issued certificate of C.B.A. under his very direction. This being the position for all intents and purposes the certificate of C.B.A. was issued by the Chairman N.I.R.C./R.I.T.U. Once a certificate of C.B.A. was issued on 21‑4‑1998 by the order of the Chairman N.I.R.C. thereafter, he became functus officio and could not have entertained the objections. It is not denied that the Deputy Registrar conducted the referendum in 133 Polling Stations spreading all over Pakistan strictly in conformity of the law and rules. After the election he sent the result sheets with his detailed report to the Chairman on 20‑4‑1998 whereupon the latter passed the following order:‑‑ "Issue the certificate to the winning union." Resultently the Deputy Registrar on receipt of this direction of the Chairman N.I.R.C. issued the C.B.A. certificate, on 21‑4‑1998. Any act of the Deputy Registrar subsequent to the authorisation would be deemed to be an act of the Chairman/R.I.T.U. In this background the Chairman was not supposed to sit on his own judgment. Reliance in this respect has been placed upon Ghulam Rasul and others v. Crown (PLD 1951 FC 62), Ahmad v. Crown (PLD 1951 FC 107), Manik Lal, Advocate v. Dr. Prame Chand Singhvi (PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 346) Bharat Tewari v. Mr. N. Hussain and others (PLD 1959 Dacca 48), Muhammad Mohsin v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 64) and Ijalas Ahmad Siddiqui v. Municipal Committee Multan (PLD 1967 Lah. 408). Apart from this the Chairman/R.I.T.U. could not have set aside the C.B.A. certificate issued on 21‑4‑1998 either in the exercise of his review powers or under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is not denied that the power of review is substantive in nature and until and unless it is conferred by the express provision of law, the same cannot be exercised. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has failed to point out any provisions under the Ordinance authorising the Chairman to review his earlier order. It has been held in Haji Khan Bhatti v. N.I.R.C. and others (1992 PLC 594) as under:‑‑ "It hardly requires to be emphasized that the power of review was a substantive power which no Tribunal, or Court or Authority could exercise unless it had been provided by the relevant statute. There was no provision enabling respondent No.2 either to review or recall the order passed by him on 19‑6‑1989. Even if he had reserved the right to recall the same, there was no basis for such a reservation. No authority, Court or Tribunal was competent to arrogate authority to itself, which otherwise was not available under the law. This would amount to embarking upon the field of legislation which no system of Judiciary permits. The only course open to‑the opposite party was to seek his remedy in accordance with law." "As already stated above, the said Registrar has the power to refuse or register but has no powers to review or recall any order passed by him under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 stated above. It could not be pointed out on behalf of the respondents that there was any provisions of law that empowers the said respondent No.2 to recall or review any of his orders. It is a settled principle of law that the power to review is substantive in nature and that it has to be expressly conferred by statute on the authority/forum/Court, as the case may be, for it to exercise the same. In this respect, strength is' sought from Mst. Maqsoodan Bidi v. Mst. Bhano (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lahore 1983), wherein it was held as follows:‑‑ "Right of review is like a right of appeal a substantive right and it is not available unless it is expressly conferred by a statute'. " Reference is also made to Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner Rawalpindi etc. (PLD 1970 SC 1) and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1981 SC 94). The other ground that the earlier other passed by the Chairman/R.I.T.U. could be amended or withdrawn by him in the exercise of his power vested under section 21 of the General Clauses Act is also without any force. Reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on section 21 of the General Clauses Act would not be helpful as after the issuance of C.B.A. certificate a valuable right had accrued in favour of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Employees Union and the same could not have been withdrawn in the exercise of such powers under General Clauses Act unless and until the same was the result of either fraud or was I issued by lacking the jurisdiction. It has been held in The Engineer‑in‑Chief, Branch through Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and another v. Jalaluddin (PLD 1992 SC 207) wherein it was held as under: "Locus poenitentiae is the power of receding till a decisive step is taken. But it is not a principle of law that order once passed becomes irrevocable and it is past and closed transaction. If the order is illegal then perpetual rights cannot be gained on the basis of an illegal order." Reference is' also made to Shahbaz v. The Crown (PLD 1956 FC 46), Pakistan v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407) and National Bank of Pakistan v. N.I.R.C. (PLJ 1975 Kar. 85). A further argument of the learned counsel that the Chairman N.I.R.C. in exercise of his powers of general superintendence over the affairs of the Commission under section 22‑B of the Ordinance which are akin to the powers of superintendence over subordinate Courts enjoyed by the High Court under Article 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is competent to withdraw or modify earlier order because of the irregularities committed in the conduct of the referendum is devoid of any force. It was argued that C.B.A. certificate was issued by committing many irregularities as such in the exercise of powers of superintendence the Chairman through his judgment, dated 15‑7‑1998 has set aside the certificate as having been issued without adhering to law. This argument too would also not help the petitioner. Section 22‑B is as under:‑‑ ' "(22‑B). Benches of the Commission etc.‑‑(1) The Chairman of the Commission shall exercise general superintendence over its affairs. (2) For the efficient performance of the functions of the Commission the Chairman shall constitute‑‑ (a) a Full Bench of the Commission which shall consist of not less than three members of the Commission; and (b) as many other Benches of the Commission consisting of one or more members of the Commission as he may deem fit." The Chairman enjoys such powers so as to regulate the affairs of the Commission. In the exercise of these powers he has got administrative control over the functioning of the Benches. He has the powers to constitute Benches and Full Bench for the efficient performance of the functions of the Commission. These powers cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as akin to the power exercise by the High Court. Under Article 203 of the Constitution the High Court not only supervise but also control all the subordinate Courts. The Chairman on the other hand does not have get such vast powers. As regard the supervisory powers of the High Court it has been held in S. Zahid Ali v. Mst. Mubarik Bano (PLD 1976 Kar. 68) which is as under: ‑‑ "It merely confers on the High Court the power of supervision and control over its subordinate Courts. This power has nothing to do with grievances of parties or with doing justice to them. The High Court is under this Article concerned with its lower Courts only and has to keep and eye on them so that they may not fail to do their own duties apart from the problems and interest of the parties. Article 98 of the Constitution is one of the provisions which provides a remedy to the aggrieved party. Section 151, C.P.C. gives over all powers to Court for doing justice. But Article 102 merely empower the High Court to supervise and control the Courts which are subordinate to it so that they may be guided, kept in check and even encouraged to act and conduct themselves rightly as Courts. If a party applies to the High Court under the Article it merely bring the failure, faults or dereliction of duty to the notice of the High Court and if the High Court takes action on such an application it does so for keeping the administration of justice pure and not to help the appellant. 'This duty is to be performed (by the High Court) irrespective of whether anybody has been harmed or not and irrespective or whether anybody will be benefited by it or not'. It is easy to imagine that an action take under this Article may be against the liking and even the private interests of both the parties to a proceedings." In Mst. Safia Begum v. Abdul Hamid (PLD 1968 Lah. 1358) the learned Judge while interpreting the supervisory power under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 of Pakistan which was similar to Article 203 observed as under:‑‑

"No doubt the power is unlimited but it does not have the effect of converting the High Court into a Court of appeal or revision regardless of the limitation imposed by law on those, power. I, however, agree with the view that the power is to be exercised only in very rare and exceptional cases and may be used act debito justitiae, where there is no other remedy available under the ordinary law. The case before me is of that description and the circumstances are such that I feel persuaded to invoke the extraordinary power of superintendence under Article 102 of the Constitution. I, therefore, direct that the suit entitled under Courts. ' Abdul Hamid v. Mst. Safia Begum' pending in the Court of Sh. Saeed Ahmed, Family Judge, Lyallpur, be transferred to the Court of Mr. Hasan Nawaz Senior Civil Judge Lahore, for hearing alongwith the petitioners' suit entitled 'Mst. Safia Begum v. Abdul Hamid'." As already stated under the powers of general superintendence the Chairman has got administrative control over the affairs of the Commission. However, by invoking supervisory powers the Chairman N.I.R.C. cannot upset his own order of determination of C.B.A. If such a power is allowed to the Chairman it would create chaos and judicial anarchy in the Commission. Lastly even if the order of the Full Bench, dated 31‑8‑1998 is considered to be void even then in this case I would not exercise my Constitutional jurisdiction as it would tantamount to perpetuating the illegality committed by the Chairman N.I.R.C. in upsetting the C.B.A. certificate given to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Employees Union on 21‑4‑1998. The petitioner union i.e. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Lions Staff Union fully participated in the referendum and did not raise a single finger. But once the result was announced against them with a margin of number of votes, objection petition was filed simply to frustrate the result. The Chairman who' himself authorized Mr. Athar Mehmood, Deputy Registrar (Registration) to conduct the referendum recalled the C.B.A. certificate issued by him on 21‑4‑1998 in an illegal manner without having any jurisdiction. Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that no appeal was provided before the Full Bench even then in the circumstances of this case I would not exercise my jurisdiction as already stated it would tantamount to perpetuating the illegality committed by the Chairman N.I.R.C. through his judgment, dated 15‑7‑1998. Reliance in this respect is placed upon Messrs Airport Support Services v. the Airport Manager, Quaid‑e‑Azam International Airport, Karachi and others (1998 SCMR 2268) wherein it was held as under:‑‑

"The jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution being discretionary, the Court, where equities require, may, even in the best of cases, choose to decline interference. Even since the principle was recognized in Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali's case, (PLD 1973 SC 236), the same has frequently been resorted to. This is one such case where, even though the respondents are found liable, redress need not follow. For such reasons, I am constrained to hold that this appeal should fail:" Reliance is also placed upon Chief Settlement Commissioner Lahore v. Muhammad Fazal (PLD 1975 SC 331). For what has been stated above I do not find any force in these writ petitions which are dismissed with no order as to costs. Before parting with there cases after going through the judgment, dated 15‑7‑1998 of the Chairman N.I.R.C. and the judgment, dated 31‑8‑1998 of the Full Bench both subject‑matter of these Constitutional petitions one comes to an irresistible conclusion that there is a judicial anarchy in the working of the N.I.R.C. The Full Bench as quoted the observation of my learned brother Ihsan‑ul‑Haq Chaudhry, J. qua the working of N.I.R.C. reported in Nishat Group of Industries and another v. Chairman N.I.R.C. and others (1997 PLC 622) which is in the following terms:‑‑ "It is a matter of great regret that the Government makes appointments to such sensitive posts recklessly. The Government, if serious to keep these institutions for the industrial peace in the country then these Tribunals have to be manned by persons of integrity and quality otherwise it would amount to sheer wastage of public funds." Learned counsel appearing for both the sides have also made reference to such an atmosphere prevailing in the Commission I myself fully subscribe to the view of my learned brother quoted above that the working of the Commission is on decay and if some steps at the earliest are not taken to arrest this deteriorating situation it would be then too, late in the day to mend the same. Office is directed to send the copy of the judgment to the Secretary Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (Justice Division) Islamabad and Ministry of Labour, Man-powers and Overseas Pakistanis, Islamabad. Q.M.H./P‑67/L Petitioner dismissed.