P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

12. Coming now to the merits of the case, from a perusal of its history, which has been reproduced above, it would appear that no orders, one way or the other, have, so far, been passed on the application dated the 1st December 1959, submitted by petitioner No.

1. The failure on the part of the relevant authorities to dispose of that application, on merits, amounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction which vested in them and, there fore, on this short ground, the petitioners are entitled to succeed The respondents, however, contended that as petitioner No. 1 was not an allottee of one of the rooms in the property in dispute and as on this ground alone his application dated the 1st Decem ber 1959, was based, the writ asked for cannot be issued on any such ground. To support this contention Mr. Ishaq Muhammad Khan referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court delivered in Mian Rahmat Khan Bhatti v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, and others (Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 145 of 1959). Their Lordships while declining to grant special leave to appeal 2bs:rved as follows in that case :‑ "The review petition, therefore, has no chance of success and merely on this technical ground the issue of the writ would be an act of supererogation. The simple order, dismissing the review petition as incompetent, would make the writ ineffec tive." The review petition in that case was liable to be dismissed because of the limited power of review conferred by subsection (5) of section 11 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956, and it was in that context that their Lordships observed that the review petition bad no chance of success. The position in the present case is entirely different, because the application dated the 1st December 1959, cannot be dismissed on such a technical ground and will have to be disposed of on merits, after giving an oppor tunity to the petitioners of being heard and after going into the facts, some of which may and some may, not be disputed.

13. It was further contended on behalf of the respondents that the application dated the 1st December 1959, is liable to be dismissed, because, as a matter of fact, petitioner No. 1 is not holding allotment of a room in the. property in dispute in his own right. This statement, in my opinion, is factually wrong, because from*a perusal of the order dated the 31st May 1950, a copy of which (annexure `A') has been placed on this record; it appears that on the aforesaid date, possession of one room, which bad been previously sealed, was delivered to Ch. Altaf Husain, petitioner No. 1, as an allottee. No doubt, the house in which that room is situated has been described, in this order, as bearing No. 1454/1, but this appears to be mis-descrip tion of the property in dispute as this was not the only occasion when the property in dispute was described by such a number. A reference to the orders dated the 10th November 1959 and the 1st December 1959, passed by the Deputy Settlement Commis sioner and the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, would show that this property was described by these officers as bearing No. 1454 although, admittedly, both the orders related to the property in dispute. In my opinion, therefore, the order dated the 31st May 1950, relates to a portion of the property in dispute and, hence, one room in it had been allotted to petitioner No. 1, Ch. Altaf Husain, and that allotment was not disturbed when the rest of the property, in his occupation, was allotted to his son, in the year 1953. This conclusion of mine is strengthened. by the fact that in the. order dated the 17th December 1959, passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, (copy annexure `F') and in the order dated the 5th June 1960, passed by the Settlement and‑ Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, Division, (copy annexure `H') it has been clearly stated that one room in this house, containing the belongings of the evacuee owner, was sealed and, later on, allotted to petitioner No. 1 separately. In the second‑mentioned order it has been stated further that the sealed room, containing the belongings of the evacuee owner "stood allotted" to the petitioners.

14. The contentions raised by the respondents in this respect have, therefore, no force, and being an allottee of a portion of this property, as well as being a claimant, petitiner No. 1. was entitled to have the property transferred in his favour, in accord ance with ttie provisions of, paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The application dated the 1st December 1959, in which such a[ claim had been made by petitioner No. 1, not having been) disposed of on merits and the orders dated the 5th June 1960,11 and the 16th September 1960, having been passed in utter disregard of that application, both the orders are liable to bell quashed on this short ground.

15. Faced with this situation, Mr, Ishad Muhammad Khan on behalf of respondent No. 3, contended that Mr. Bashir Ahmad, who had admitted the application dated the 1st December 1959, was not competent to do so, and as the period for the filing of such applications had expired, this application, if heard, will be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone. The position taken up by the representative of the Settlement Department, to say the least, appears to be very strange. Mr. Bashir Ahmad, who, at the relevant time, was holding the office of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, admitted this application and directed that it be sent to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for consideration on merits. No officer sitting above Mr. Bashir Ahmad, in exercise of appellate or revisional power, has, so far, disputed the validity of the order dated the 1st December 1959, nor has that validity been challenged by respondent No.

1. It is, therefore, not open to a representative of this department to say, at this stage, that as Mr. Bashir Ahmad was not competent to admit this time‑barred application, it is liable to be dismissed on the short ground of limitation. Even the objection that the application was time‑barred and that Mr. Bashir Ahmad was not competent to entertain it is factually wrong. A reference to a notification dated the 19th May 1959, issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner,' Pakistan, which had been printed at page 305 of the official. Manual of Settlement Law and Procedure (1960 Edition) would show that applications from claimants, for transfer of properties under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, were invited and those applications were to, b% submitted by the 15th July 1959. After the 19th May 1959, several notifications and press notes were issued by the Settlement Department, inviting similar applications. These press notes and notifications will be found at pages 73, 100, 118, 133 and 157.East‑mentioned press note, which bears the date 12th July 1960, is warded as follows :‑ "The Chief Settlement Commissioner has decided that the entertainment of belated applications for the transfer of houses and shops should be totally stopped after 15th July 1960. No application in Forms CH, NCH, KCH, KNCH, CS, NCS, KCS, KNCS, and LH,' will be entertained after that date by the Additional Settlement Commissioners or by any officer at the Headquarters Office, Lahore, Applications in Form `A' or `KA' will continue to be entertained by the Additional Settlement Commissioners concerned until further orders in cases where claims are verified i)y the Claims Organiza tion in future." It was, therefore, wrong' on the part of Mr. Ishaq Muhammad Khan, to say that Mr. Bashir Ahmad was not competent to admit the application submitted by Ch. Altaf Husain, peti tioner No. 1, on the 1st December 1959.

16. Another contention raised by Mr. Ishaq Muhammad Khan, in this connection, was that as the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, by means A` his order's dated the 1st December 1959, had transferred the property in dispute in favour of Mr. Shabbir Hussain, respondent No. 11 petitioner No. 1, without disclosing this fact, submitted a second application on the 1st December 1959, after the case had been disposed of, and that, therefore, not having come with clean hands, the relief asked for should not be granted to him. To support this contention he referred to a case decided by the Karachi Bench of this Court, which has been reported as Dalmia Cement Limited v. District Local Board, Karachi and others (1). The contention raised by. the representative of the department is of no avail to him, because there is nothing on this record to indicate that the application dated the 1st December 1959, had been presented after the Additional Settlement and Rehabilita tion Commissioner had ordered the transfer of this property in favour of respondent No.

1. Even if this fact be assumed to be correct, as the order passed by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had not become final and was challenged by means of a revision petition, the failure on the part of Ch. Altaf Hussain to disclose this fact to the Settlement Commissioner was not very material. Reference may be made, in this connection, to a case of the Lahore High Court reported as Obedur Rahman and others v. Darbari Lal and others (A I R 1927 Lah. P L D 1958 Kar. 211) in which it was held that where there has been an appeal, ,the matter is no longer res judicata but is res sub judice.

17. For reasons given above, I am inclined to grant the petitioners the relief asked for, on the short ground that the application dated the 1st December 1959, has not yet been disposed of and, therefore, there has been refusal on the part of the Settlement Authorities to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law, but as two intricate questions of law had been raised and argued before me at full length, it would be proper, for me, to deal with those points before disposing of the case on merits.

18. The first point is about the correct interpretation of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compen sation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. This provision of law is worded as follows :‑ "A house in possession of a claimant or a parent, son, daughter or spouse of the claimant, being a house which such parent, son, daughter or spouse does not claim under the provisions of the Schedule, and if there is more than one such house, then any one of the houses which the claimant desires to retain, shall be transferred to him at a price determined on evaluation basis: "Provided that if a house or a part thereof is in possession of more than one person and one of them is a claimant, then the house shall be so transferred to the claimant "Provided further that if a house or apart thereof is in possession of more than one claimant, then the house shall be so transferred to the claimant who obtained prior possession." The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that as a portion of the property in dispute was in possession of Javed Iqbal Altaf, as an allottee, as Javed Iqbal Altaf had permitted his father to apply for transfer in his favour and as Javed Iqbal Altaf had been allotted this property some live years before a portion of it was allotted to Mr. Shabbir Hussain respondent, the latter was not entitled to its transfer and the whole of it should have gone to petitioner No.

1. On the other hand. the conten tion of the respondents is that as the case is covered by the first proviso to this paragraph, as the expression "possession", referred to in that proviso, means actual possession and not possession through somebody else and as the contest was between Mr. Shabbir Hussain and Javed Iqbal Altaf, the .former was entitled to the whole of this property in preference to the latter, because Mr. Shabbir Hussain was a claimant and Javed Iqbal Altaf was not. So far as the factual position is concerned prior to the 30th December 1959, Javed Iqbal Altaf had not given any applica tion for transfer, on the basis of his own claim. If the applica tion dated the 30th December 1959, was to be excluded from consideration, on the ground that it had been 'filed after the property had been transferred, Javed Iqbal Altaf, being a non claimant, and Mr. Shabbir Hussain being a claimant, the latter was entitled to get the whole of the property, to the exclusion of Ch.' Altaf Husain petitioner, because Altaf Husain petitioner could not be deemed to be in "possession" of any part of this property. The respondents, for this purpose rely, on the inter pretation placed on this paragraph by the Settlement Department. Reference may be made, in this connection, to paragraph 3 of the memorandum dated the 22nd October,1959, which has been printed at pages 68 to 70 of the Official Manual of Settlement Law and Procedure. This paragraph is worded as follows :‑ "A claimant in occupation of a house or shop, who is entitled to the transfer of the, property will, however, have preference over a claimant who applies on the basis of the occupation of such house or shop by his parent, son, daughter or spouse." Though the, interpretation placed on the wordings of paragraph I by the Settlement Department cannot have the force of law, that interpretation, in my opinion, appears to be correct. The expres sion "possession" which has been defined in subsection (6) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita tion) Act, 1958, does not mean possession of a person who is not in actual occupation of any property. If the intention of the Legislature had been that a person who is not in actual occupation of any; property and whose parent, son, daughter or spouse is in possession should also be deemed to be in possession of that property, for the purpose of paragraph I of the Schedule to the Act, they would have made it quite clear, either by suitably g amending the definition of possession, or by using appropriate words in paragraph

1. As this was not done, the expression "possession" referred to in the proviso to paragraph 1 can only mean "possession" as defined in the Act itself. That possession would be of a person who is actually occupying a property and not possession of someone else.

19. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to a large number of authorities to support his contention that the interpretation which the department is placing on this paragraph is not correct and that the intention of the Legislature was that a claimant who is not in possession should be deemed to be in possession, if his parent, son, daughter or spouse was: As the propositions of law laid down in these authorities are not disputed, it is not necessary to make a reference to all of them. I would confine my attention only to few of these authorities. In In the matter of Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot (P L D 1950 Lah. 12) a Bench of the Lahore High Court, dealing with the question of the inter pretation of statutes, quoted with approval, the following passages from certain well recognised authorities :‑ "There is no rule that the first or enacting part is to be construed without reference to the proviso. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest. "The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpreta tion and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together, is to prevail. "A proviso is of great importance when the Court has to consider what cases come within the enacting part of a section, and it is always to be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. "Where an enacting clause which is general in its language and objects, is followed by a proviso that proviso must be construed strictly." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with this subject, subject, observed as follows in Reference by the President (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 219) :‑ "While there is considerable similarity between an exception and a proviso‑each restrains the enacting clause and operates to except something which would otherwise fall within the general terms of the Statute,‑there is a technical distinction between them, although even that is frequently ignored and the two terms used synonymously. The exception, however, operates to affirm the operations of the Statute, to all cases not excepted and excludes all other exempts ; that is, it exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the Statute. A proviso, on the other hand, is a clause added to enactment for the purpose of acting as a restraint upon, or as the qualification of the generality of the language which it follows. Sometimes, however, as a precautionary measure, it is used to explain the general words of the Act and to exclude some ground of misinterpretation which would extend it to cases not intended to be brought within its operation or purview." In a case decided by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court which is reported as Martand Jiwaji Patil and another v. Narayan Krishna Gumast Patil and others (A I R 1939 Bom. 305), it was held that when any rule or statute takes away some rights or privileges of a man, it should be strictly construed and should not be extended to include those rights and privileges which are not expressly mentioned or neces sarily implied. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, while dealing with the functions of a proviso, observed as follows in Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality (AIR1944 PC 71) :‑ "The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the inter pretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms." All these rules of interpretation will have to be applied only if the language of the relevant paragraph is susceptible of more than one meaning. If the language is unambiguous, effect will have to be given to it whether it leads to reasonable results or not. This is what Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 2, says "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.*** When the intention is expressed, the task is one of verbal con struction only ; but when the statute expresses no intention on a question to which it gives rise, and yet some intention must necessarily be imputed to the legislature regarding it, the interpreter has to determine it by interference grounded on certain legal principles." There would be no scope for the application of these principles if the language is unambiguous and capable of one meaning, nor would the Court; in such a case, be at liberty to supply omissions by adding any words to a statute. This is what Maxwell says at page 12 "It is but a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or to be taken from a statute, unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express." Further, at pages 250 and 275 the learned author observes as follows :‑ "An omission which the context shows with reasonable certainty to have been unintended may be supplied, at least in enactment which are construed beneficially, as distinguished from strictly." "The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature."

20. Another learned author (Craies) dealing with the power of a Court to add to a statute, for the purpose of finding out the intention, observes as follows, at pages 99 and 103, of his book on Statute Law, 5th Edition:‑ "The words of a statute never should in interpretation be added to or substracted from, without almost a necessity." "If the meaning of a statute is not plain, it is permissible in certain cases to have recourse to a construction by implication, and to draw inferences or supply obvious omissions. But the general rule is `not to import into statutes words which are not to be found there'." As in the present case the language of paragraph I of the Schedule is unambiguous and is not capable of more than one meanings, it is not necessary to have recourse to the principles enunciated above for finding out the intention of the Legislature. The intention which the Legislature had in mind was quite clear,1 namely, that if there is only one application for a house and the applicant is not in possession of the property, he can take the benefit of possession of his parent, son, daughter or spouse and get the property transferred, at a price determined on evaluation basis. If, however, there are more than one applicants, then the one who is a claimant will have preference, as against the one4 who is not. If both are claimants and both are in possession,, the claimant who had obtained prior possession, will get preference over the other. In either of such cases the applicant will not be entitled to take benefit of the possession of his parent, son, daughter or spouse. It is, no doubt, true that paragraph I and the two provisos are not comprehensive enough to cover all cases, for instance, if there are two claimants and neither of them is in possession, but the parent, son, daughter or spouse of those claimants are in possession, paragraph 1 will have no application to such a case and it would be decided in accordance with the provisions of the remaining paragraphs. The omission to provide for all such cases and to give complete benefit of the possession of the parent, son, daughter or spouse of a claimant, even where there are more than one applicants for a property, would not necessarily mean that the intention of the Legislature was that a claimant not in possession will be deemed to be in possession in all cases, if his parent, son, daughter or spouse was so in posses sion. If that had been the intention, as stated above, the Legisla ture would have expressed that intention in clear language and would have felt no difficulty in saying that a claimant not in l possession shall, in such circumstances, be deemed to be in posses sion. As this was not done and as the expression "possession', had been defined clearly in the Act itself, possession of a person will have to be considered to have been used in the sense of actual possession and in no other sense. On this view of the case, petitioner No. 1 was not entitled to get the property transferred on the basis of the possession of his son, when there was another K applicant for the same property.

21. The position of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 is different from that of petitioner No.

1. These two persons alleged that they are "claimants", within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. One, of them, namely, Javed Iqbal Altaf, was in possession of the property also, and his possession was prior in date to that of Mr. Shabbir Hussain. If they had applied in time, there would have been no difficulty for them to get the whole of the property transferred. A difficulty, however, arose because the application was given by them was as late as the 30th December 1959, and. was admitted subject to the condition that the property in dispute was not in the earmarking list, or had not been other wise disposed of. The argument advanced by Khan Farzand Ali Khan, in his order dated the 5th June 1960, for rejecting the claim of these petitioners, was that this property had been transferred before the application dated the 30th December 1959, was submitted. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the words "or otherwise not disposed of" occurring in the order dated the 30th December 1959, passed by Mr. Bashir Ahmad had been added afterwards, but there is nothing on this record to support this contention. He also contended that Mr. Bashir Ahmad was not competent to impose any such condition on the admission of the application. In advancing this contention the learned counsel overlooked the fact that if the property had already been transferred to someone, even if such a condition had not been imposed, the applicant could not get it transferred, unless he had filed an appeal or revision against the order of transfer. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as the order of transfer passed by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner was being challenged by means of a review petition, it had not become final and, as such there was no legal bar to the application of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 being disposed of on merits. This contention, in my opinion, is not entirely without force, and as I propose quashing' the order dated the 16th September 1960, passed by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, and also the order dated the 5th June 1960, after the case goes back, there would be no legal bar to the application dated the 30th December 1959 being dealt with on merits.

22. The question of divisibility of the house, which was argued before me at some length, remains to be dealt with. In accordance with the first proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the Chief Settlement Commissioner is empowered to declare whether any building, or premises, consists of more than one residential units. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, by means of a notification dated the 14th October 1959, has delegated his powers under this provision of law to all Settlement Commissioners, Additional Settlement Commissioners and Deputy Settlement Commissioners in West Pakistan and Karachi.. Each such offcer was, therefore, competent to declare whether the property in dispute consists of more than one residential unit or not. The property in dispute, as will appear from its plan which has been placed on this record, consists of six big rooms, six small rooms and a number of bath rooms, besides two verandas and a big courtyard. Even before the date of the partition it was in occupation of two different families, ,a portion being in occupation of the evacuee owner and the rest being in occupation of Mr. B. T. Miller. Since the year 1958, when Mr. Shabir Husain, took possession of a portion of it as an allottee, it has been in occupation of two families. The portion occupied by respon dent No. 1 contains two big rooms, two small rooms, two bath rooms and a store, besides portions of verandas on two sides ; the rest of the property being in possession of the petitioners. On its two sides, i.e., towards the north and east, is a big lawn and adjoining the lawn is the main road. The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, has held the property to be indivisible, on the ground that both parties admitted that the house could not be divided into two parts. When the matter came up before the Chief Settlement Commissioner in revision, the property was inspected by the Settlement Commis sioner (Policy), who recorded a note to the effect that the house was not divisible. No reasons have been given by either of these officers for holding that the property is not divisible, but respon dent No. 1 in paragraph No. 14 of his written statement has referred to certain admissions made by petitioner No: 1 to the effect that the property was not divisible. I was taken through the record of this case and was not shown a single admission made by peti tioner No. 1 to the effect that the property in dispute was not divisible, although it is true that he had applied for the transfer of the whole of it. At a subsequent stage, of the proceedings, when the matter was` before Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, the petitioners had contended that if the whole of the property could not be transferred in their favour, at least the portion occupied by them could be so trans ferred. Considering all the circumstances of this case and the manner in which this property was being utilised, it is not under standable how the officers of the Settlement Department have come to the conclusion that this property is not divisible. No doubt, the law has conferred authority on these offcers to decide whether the property is divisible or not and if their decision is based on good grounds and is not arbitrary or capricious no interference can be M made by this Court, in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The decision of this question, however, is not based on any ground, what to say of reasonable ground, and appears to be arbitrary and capricious. In these circumstances, this Court would be justified in interfering by issuing an appropriate writ. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on certain English authorities. In The King v. The Registrar of Companies (1)I the Court observed as follows :‑ "The Registrar having to exercise a discretion in the matter, the Court would not be justified in interfering by mandamus unless either the Registrar had not in fact exercised any discretion in the particular case, or had exercised it upon some wrong principle of law, or had been influenced by extraneous considera tion which he ought not to have taken into account." In Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947 All. E L R Vol. 2, p. 680), it was held that the Court was entitled to inves tigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether it had taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or, conversely, had refused to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. It was further observed that once that question was answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, had come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, and in such a case the Court can interfere.

23. Although this Court is not called upon to substitute its own judgment for that of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the contention is that the conclusion of that officer is so unreason able that no reasonable person could have ever come to it and, o hence, interference in the matter is called for. This contention in my opinion, is supported by authorities and, hence, on this ground also the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is liable to be quashed. The legality of the order dated the 16th September 1960, passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner is also being challenged on the ground that no notice was given to the petitioner before that order was passed. To support this contention the learned counsel referred to Byrne and another v. Kinematograph Renters Society, Ltd., and others ((1958) All E L R Vol. 2, p. 579), in which it was held that the requirements of natural justice, in a case of this kind, were (a) that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made ; (b) that he should be given an opportunity to state his case ; and (c) that the tribunal should act in good faith. The learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to a case of the Supreme Court as Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45), in which it was held that it was a principle of natural justice that no one should be dealt with to his material disadvantage, or deprived of his liberty, or property, without having an opportunity of being heard and making his defence. On behalf of the opposite side reliance was placed on a recent decision of this Court in Mst. Amir Begum v. Umar Din and others (Letters Patent Appeal No. 217 of 1960). Dealing with the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise orders under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the Court expressed the opinion that it is not obligatory for the Chief Settlement Commissioner to hear the petitioner if he did not wish to interfere in revision. In view of this clear authority of this Court, I feel bound to hold that it was not obligatory for the P Chief Settlement Commissioner to give a notice to the petitioner before disposing of the revision petition. His order, therefore cannot be challenged on the ground of want of such notice.

24. The only question that remains to be decided is as to the nature of the order which this Court should pass. The representative of the department, who appeared on behalf of respondent No. 3, contended that as by means of this writ petition the order dated the 5th of June 1960, passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, is not being challenged and only the order dated the 16th September 1960, passed by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner is being challenged, no writ can be issued with regard to the first mentioned order and the relief to be granted to the petitioner should be confined to the second mentioned order. To support this contention reference was made to a case of the Supreme Court as Pakistan v. Ali Afzal (PLD 1960 SC1). In this case the petitioner had asked for a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, requiring the Government of Pakistan to let the respondent continue in office as Joint Secretary, National Assembly, for a further period of two years. The writ which was issued was not in accordance with this prayer and the Government had been restrained from interfering with the rights of the respondent as an employee for the remaining period of his service, which, in substance, was a writ of prohibition. Their Lordships held that the relief prayed for by the petitioner had ceased to be available to him, because the post of the Joint Secretary to the National Assembly, which the petitioner wanted to retain for another two years, had been abolished before the announcement of the judgment and, hence, the proceedings had become infructuous. On this ground the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the petition was dismissed. The facts of that case being entirely different, the decision given therein is of no help to respondent No. 3, in con tending that no writ can be issued for quashing the order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. Reliance was also placed on certain observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC (Pak). 437), and it was contended that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner not having acted quasi‑judicially, this Court is not competent to issue any of the writs asked for. In my opinion, this contention is also without any force, because the proceedings, taken by the various officers of the Settlement Department, at different stages, were in the nature of quasi judicial proceedings and, hence, the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs is attracted to such proceedings. On behalf of the petitioners reference was made to a case of the Supreme Court as Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty (P L D 1961 S C 119), in which, their Lordships held that the rule that the Court will not entertain a writ petition when other appropriate remedy was yet available was not a rule of law barring the jurisdic tion of the Court, and that it was a rule by which the Court regulated the exercise of its own discretion. It was held further that where an order was challenged on the ground that it was wholly without jurisdiction, a petition for a writ appeared to be a more appropriate remedy. Reliance was also placed on a case of this Court as Muhammad Ismail v. Rehabilitation Commissioner Peshawar (P L D 1960 Lah. 194). in which, under similar circumstances, it was held that if orders passed by an Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner being without jurisdiction were set aside, the subsequent orders of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, which were only in confirmation of these orders automatically failed.

25. Keeping in mind the views expressed in the various authorities and the facts of this case, as discussed above, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioners have been able to make out a case for the grant of a writ of certiorari. I, therefore, accept this petition and issue a writ of certiorari, quashing the order dated the 16th September 1960. Although no separate prayer has been made for quashing the order dated the 5th June 1960, passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, as that order was armed by the Chief Settle ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, by means of his order dated the 16th September 1960, and as the last mentioned order has been quashed, I also issue a writ of certiorari, quashing the order dated the 5th June 1960. The result of this decision is that the review petition dated the 17th December 1957, which was dismissed on the 5th June 1960, will be deemed to be still pending and will have to be disposed of on merits, in the light of the decisions given in this case.

26. As I do not find the petitioners to be, in any way, at fault, I direct that they shall get costs of these proceedings from the opposite‑party. A. H. Writ of certiorari granted.