1997 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

(c) the orders including that of dismissal and charge‑sheets issued by the respondents as impugned be cancelled and struck down as illegal, void ab initio and of no legal effect; (d) permanently restrain the respondents from taking action to enforce the said orders and charge‑sheet or take any action mala fide in a manner and with a view to illegally harass the applicant; (e) pending disposal of this revision suspend the operation of all impugned actions, charge‑sheets and orders including the impugned judgment/decree of the Additional District Judge;. (f) grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper; (g) award costs; (h) pending disposal of the main suit before the Civil Judge grant a status quo ante‑order before 7‑1‑1995 including payment of salary, perks and benefits and other utilities including the car and bills of the applicant or pass a just order also allow amendment of the main suit, if necessary." Mr. M. Farogh Nasim, learned counsel for the applicant, has assailed the impugned orders of the two Courts below, as also the enquiry proceedings and order of dismissal. He has raised the following objections and arguments: (a) the order of suspension dated 22nd January, 1995 has been passed without a show‑cause notice. Also the service rules of respondent No. 1 do not provide for any suspension pending enquiry; (b) upon suspension the applicant's salary and perks were reduced by 50 % and thereafter completely discontinued during the pendency of the suit. No reduction of salary and perks was provided for by the service rules and in any event the said action is void and against the injunctions of Islam mitigating against Article 2‑A of the Constitution; (c) the entire proceedings were farcical, fanciful, premeditated and mala fide, proper opportunity has not been given while the entire exercise has been conducted without any evidence or date which has not been furnished to the applicant despite repeated requests; (d) the applicant had formulated a reply to the final charge‑sheet. However, the respondent passed the order of dismissal without a speaking order and without at all giving any explanation as to why the applicant's reply was not considered satisfactory. The dismissal is also completely without complying with the requirements of natural justice;

12. On the other hand Mr. Arif Khan, the learned counsel for the respondent No.l has maintained that the revision application has to be dismissed in view of the following:‑ (a) The relief sought is beyond the ambit of the revision as after the judgment of the learned A.D.J. and before institution of the revision application, the applicant had been dismissed from service. Revision is accordingly not maintainable since it also aims to call into question the dismissal order which was not the subject matter of the suit before the learned Civil Judge or even the appeal before learned A. D. J. (b) The applicant was himself not serious about the revision application since he had himself filed C.M.A. No.90/1996 under Order 23 read with section 151, C.P.C. praying for withdrawal of the main revision application with permission to file a fresh Constitution petition or civil suit. Although the applicant had withdrawn the said C.M.A. as not pressed, he stood estopped from maintaining the instant revision application as he himself conceded that he was not entitled to any relief; (c) No relief can be accorded to the applicant as PHOL has stood privatized and the matter thus pertains to a relationship of master and servant, and at best the applicant could maintain a civil suit of damages for wrongful dismissal, Also the relief sought for declaration is barred under the Specific Relief Act, hence the suit is not maintainable. Both the learned Advocates for the parties cited a number of authorities and decisions which shall be considered hereinafter.

13. After having gone through the record and the case‑law cited at the Bar, I think the foremost question in the instant case is to examine the objection advanced by the respondent that since M/s. PHOL stands privatised, no suit or legal proceedings seeking a declaration for reinstatement are maintainable and the matter only concerns a relationship of master and servant. In this respect, Mr. Arif Khan has relied upon Amin Ahmad v. Ministry of Production PLD 1996 Karachi 27, where a Division Bench of this Court has observed that where persons are employed by private companies and wish to sue their employers the only remedy available is a suit for damages. Mr. Muhammad Farogh Nasim on the other hand has contended that at all material times the applicant was employed by respondent No. 1, which was wholly controlled by the respondent No. 2, the Ministry of Production. Also at the time of filing of suit respondent No. 1 through a letter dated 20‑12‑1994 had transferred the applicant from PHOL with direction to report to the respondent No.

1. The learned counsel for the applicant has further pointed out that at page 3 of the counter‑affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, there is an admission to the effect that all actions taken against the applicant have been taken upon the recommendation of respondent No. 3, the F.A.C.C and upon directions of respondent No. 2, the controlling Ministry in respect of respondent No. 1 and its projects. The contention of Mr. Muhammad Arif Khan that the applicant is employed by a privately owned corporation is thus against the record. This brings me to the objection of Mr. Arif Khan that the matter between the applicant and respondent No. 1 is essentially based on a contractual relationship governed by the principle of master and servant, which implies that the only remedy against an illegal termination is a suit for damages and not for declaration. Review of the case‑law on the subject reveals that where the employer is a completely private person having no nexus with the Government the aforesaid rule applies without any exception. However, where the employer is an entity controlled by the Government the rule of master and servant does not apply:‑ (a) where the rules of service are gazetted or statutory in nature (e.g. See Evacuee Trust Board v. Muhammad Nawaz 1983 SCMR 1275); (b) where an action is taken against the employee in violation of principle of natural justice as the rules of natural justice have been equated with, law which would imply that a breach of the rules of natural justice amount to breach of law (See Anisa Rehman v. PIAC 1994 SCMR 2232); (c) where the action complained of by the employee is mala fide, since a mala fide action is reckoned to be fraud on the statute and completely without jurisdiction (See K.D.A. v. Wali Ahmed Khan 1991 SCMR 2434; Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. S.A. Rizvi, 1992 SCMR 1309). Since the applicant in this case has complained against actions falling under the later two exceptions i.e. breach of natural justice and mala fide, the objection that the matter pertains to a contractual relationship governed by the principle of master and servant ex facie is not sustainable (for further elaboration on the point see paragraphs 13, 14, 17, and 18 below). As regards the objection of Mr. Arif Khan that the applicant lacks a legal character and hence no relief under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act can be accorded the same is also not sustainable. Mr. Arif Khan in this respect has placed reliance on Qari Yar Muhammad v. Anjuman‑e‑Islamia, 1987 SCMR 1776. In the said case the employer was a school run by a private institution and accordingly the suit was found to be hit by sections 21 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act. In the present circumstances the employer is respondent No. 1 which admittedly in respect of the employment of the applicant and otherwise is wholly controlled by the respondent No. 2, the Ministry of Production, the Government of Pakistan. In Anwar Hussain v. ADBP PLD 1984 SC 194 there is a suggestion that in matters of service where the employee possesses certain statutory or legal safeguards i.e. where statutory rules govern his relationship with his employer, the employee would possess a legal character for the enforcement of such safeguards and would not be merely governed by the principles of master and servant. The' safeguards embedded in the principle of natural justice and in the presumption that all actions taken by the Government and its functionaries should not be mala fide, are on such a higher plane that they stand equated with legal and statutory safeguards. The reason for this being that our, Supreme Court in Anisa Rehtnan has equated breach of natural justice with breach of law, while in K.D.A. v. Wali Ahmed and Republic of Pakistan v. S.A. Rizvi the statement of law that all mala fide actions are frauds on the statute and without jurisdiction and thus illegal has been reiterated with precision in service matters as well. Accordingly, in the present case there can be no cavil that the suit filed by the applicant; and the declaration sought therein was not barred under sections 21 or 42 of the Specific Relief Act as the applicant possessed the legal character in seeking to enforce the aforestated safeguards.

14. The next contention that warrants consideration is whether at the time of filing of this suit the applicant had any cause of action. The learned counsel for the applicant pointed out that the entire series of actions were mala fide, without proper opportunity of hearing and without any merit. He further contended that suspension was not only made without a show‑cause notice, the same is also not provided for in the service rules. The entire enquiry proceedings were premeditated, a smoke screen, sham, and a colourable device to dismiss the applicant. Furthermore at the time of filing of the suit the applicant's salary and perks were reduced by 50 per cent which by itself had given a cause of action. Also during the pendency of the suit the applicant had moved an interlocutory application under Order 39; Rule 2(3) of the C.P.C. bringing to the Court's knowledge that in defiance of the ad‑interim order the salary/perks were completely discontinued. In Government of N.‑W.F.P. v. I.A. Sherwani PLD 1984 SC 72, a Full Bench of the Shariat Appellate Court had been pleased to observe that any unilateral and arbitrary reduction of salary without any fault having been proved against the employee is itself repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. In the present context the charges, if any, had first to be established against the applicant before penalising him with a reduction and then complete stoppage of salary. The fact that the salary/perks were reduced by 50 per cent. and then completely stopped is not denied by the respondent No. 1 in its counter‑affidavit. This is further augmented by the fact that the service rules also do not provide for any reduction of salary pending enquiry. The plaint in the suit at page 4 clearly raises this objection of reduction of salary while complete stoppage thereof .was brought to the knowledge of the learned Senior Civil Judge in the interlocutory application under Order 39, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. In the appeal before the learned A.D.J. this aspect is pleaded as ground No. 2 in the Memo. of appeal. Apart from this the applicant had also called into question the impugned actions of the respondents on grounds of mala fide. In K.D.A. v. Wali Ahmed Khan, (referred above) a Full Bench of the Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that mala fide action being fraud on the statute is wholly void. In this case an employee of the K.D.A. was terminated from service. The High Court had upset the order of termination on inter alia, grounds that the entire action was mala fide despite the arguments that the relationship of the employees and the employer were that of master and servant and the only remedy available was by way of a suit for damages. The Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal and maintained the judgment of the High Court. In the present case the appellant specifically pleaded the aspects of mala fide in the suit before the learned Senior Civil Judge, inter alia on grounds that during the enquiry proceedings no witnesses were examined or evidence led. The enquiry proceedings were also disbanded sine die. Also at the intimated date and time i.e. 16th March, 1995 at 11‑00 a.m. by the Chairman, F.A.C.C. the respondent No.3, when the applicant travelled all the way from Karachi to Islamabad for hearing, the said Chairman did not meet him. This fact is also not denied by the respondent No. 1 in their counter‑affidavit, while no counter‑affidavit in this regard has been submitted by the other respondents. Also appearance of a news item in respect of allegations against the applicant which were a subject matter of suit, in the daily Dawn on 10th May, 1995 (which happened to be a Eid day) prima facie establishes a case of mala fide intent on the part of the respondents. Both the learned subordinate Courts have thus committed material irregularities by not appreciating the facts and the pleas of applicant.

15. I accordingly hold that at the time of institution of the suit and thereafter at the time of filing of the appeal, the applicant had come up with triable cause of action which both the Courts below had failed to appreciate. The Shariat Appellate Court in Government of N.‑W.F.P v. I.A. Sherwani having declared reduction of salary prior to establishing guilt illegal and hence actionable and the Supreme Court in K.D.A. v. Wali Ahmed Khan having confirmed mala fide action to be an exception to the rule of master and servant.

16. The next issue to which I shall address myself is as to whether this Court, while sitting as a revisional authority under section 115, C.P.C. could take cognizance of the order of dismissal passed by the respondents after the judgment/decree by the A.D.J. and before institution of the revision application. The learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon Mst. Amina Begum v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir, PLD 1978 SC 220 for the proposition that the Court under section 151, C.P.C. in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings with a view to shorten litigation could mould relief according to altered circumstances, to do complete justice between the parties, in the larger interest of justice. The issue as to whether the Court sitting in a revisional capacity can invoke the inherent powers contained in section 151 of the C.P.C., has also been judicially recognized in Surbeswar Mondal v. Fakir Chand Sarkar PLD 1963 Dacca

462. In this case the Dacca High Court has taken the view that in order to meet the ends of justice, where a party was free to move the Court, under section 115, C.P.C., it cannot find itself precluded from seeking justice under section 151, C.P.C. On the facts and circumstances of the case the Court found that the applicability of section 151 of the C.P.C. could not be thrown away. In view of these decisions, I feel that whether cognizance can be taken of an order subsequent to disposal of the appeal by the learned A.D.J. would much depend on whether such cognizance would be essential to do complete justice, and whether any special equities lie in favour of the applicant to do so. This would accordingly require looking into the facts leading to the order of dismissal. Subsequent to the institution of the appeal before the learned A.D.J. and passing of the ad‑interim order dated 24‑4‑1995, the respondent No.l in the meantime issued fresh charge‑sheet/show‑cause notice dated the 26th September, 1995 (though letter has been wrongly dated as 26th September, 1996), repeating the same allegations as had been levelled in the earlier show‑cause notice dated 18th February, 1995. Also compliance was ordered to be made within 7 days. The applicant through reply dated 3rd October, 1995 raised a number of objections including the fact that 7 days time was too short and while no evidence was furnished with the show‑cause notice. Also requests were made to provide copies of information, data and documents to facilitate reply. The applicant also objected that the allegations against him were vague, conjectural irrelevant and inadequate while recording severe protest. The respondent No.l surprisingly instead of substantiating the charges by evidence and supplying relevant copies of the data relied upon, issued a notice of enquiry through letter dated 8‑10‑1995, while treating the applicant's objection dated 3‑10‑1995 to be an explanation of the show‑cause notice/charge‑sheet dated 26‑9‑1995 while also taking the plea that the former (i.e. reply dated 3‑10‑1995) was far from satisfactory. The applicant immediately objected through letter dated 9th October. 1995 that his earlier letter dated 3‑10‑1995 could not be treated as a letter of explanation as therein he had required information and data from the respondent No.

1. The applicant in the said, letter also challenged the entire proceedings to be mala fide and aimed at nothing but harassing the applicant. In the meanwhile the applicant through letters dated Nil and 2nd October, 1995 (Annex Y‑3) made desperate attempts to seek an interview with the Chairman of respondent No. 1 but without any consequence. In response to the applicant's protest, the respondent No. 1 through letter dated 12th October, 1995 stated that Mr. Asad A. Siddiqui, the General Manager of the respondent No. 1, had placed before the applicant the entire record and evidence on 2nd October, 1995 at 4‑30 p.m. and that the applicant only further requested for supply of the report of F.A.C.C. Mr. Asad A. Siddiqui, the General Manager of the respondent No.l also through letter dated 12th October, 1995 confirmed that on 2nd October, 1995 at 4‑30 p.m. the entire record was shown to the applicant and report of F.A.C.C. and was also furnished to him. The applicant, however, through letter dated 12‑10‑1995 addressed to Mr. Asad A. Siddiqui expressed his complete and utter surprise over the letters respondent No. 1 and Mr. Asad A. Siddiqui both dated 12‑10‑1995. The applicant in his letter verified that although he attended the office of Mr. Asad A. Siddiqui on 2nd October, 1995 at 4‑30 p.m it was impossible for him to have inspected the entire record within half an hour as the office of respondent No. 1 closed at 5‑00 p.m. He emphatically denied the record to have been shown to him and further insisted that copies of documents evidence, data and information were also not submitted despite his repeated requests. Only a copy of the F.A.C.C. report was sent to him. The applicant thereafter through another letter dated 15th October, 1995 to the respondent No. 1 challenged the entire proceedings as mala fide and once again reiterated non‑supply of data, information, record or evidence. He once again maintained that Mr. Asad Siddiqui had not shown him any evidence or record and only a copy of the F.A.C.C. report had been given to him. He also challenged the enquiry proceedings as no Enquiry Officer had been formally notified as per the service rules. On 16th October, 1995, however the enquiry proceedings commenced comprising Ainuddin Siddiqui, the Chairman of respondent No. 1, Qazi Wajihuddin and Asad A. Siddiqui. The applicant also attended. However, it appears that no progress was made except for recording attendance as per the minutes enclosed. No witnesses were called or examined. It transpires from another letter annexed at page 283 (Annexure Y‑7) written by the applicant to the respondent No. 1 that on 16th October, 1995 at the meeting/enquiry proceedings Mr. Asad Siddiqui had furnished copies of eight payment vouchers and had stated that he was not in possession of any other evidence, data, record in respect of the charges and allegations. Confirmation in writing was also sought through this letter, however, no such confirmation or reply was given. Thereafter the applicant under protest also submitted the reply to the charge‑sheet while clearly stating that the reply is to be read in the contest that despite requests, documents, data and supporting evidence have not been supplied by the respondent No.

1. The applicant also through letter dated the 20th November, 1995 challenged the entire proceedings and clarified that the burden of proof was on the respondent No. 1 Subsequently, the respondent No 2 through letter dated the 26th November, 1995 communicated to the respondent No. 1 that the applicant had been dismissed from service with immediate effect and the said dismissal was communicated to the applicant through letter dated 27th November, 1995. No reasons whatsoever were specified in the impugned dismissal order which is completely vague.

17. The record amply reveals that the entire enquiry proceedings were a mere eye wash, premeditated, sham, a smokes screen, mala fide and colourable exercise to dismiss the applicant. Data, evidence and documents relied upon by the respondents were not confronted to the applicant nor copies thereof supplied to him, nor any attempt made to prove the charges as genuine, correct and reliable. The stand by the respondent No. 1 that their General Manager, Asad Siddiqui, had shown all the documents on the 2nd October, 1995 at 4‑30 p.m. looks very suspect as: (a) the same had been repeatedly and effectively challenged by the applicant; (b) admittedly the respondent No. 1's office closed on or about at 5‑00 p.m. Looking through the entire documentation in half an hour is also quite implausible; (c) admittedly copies for the relevant documents were not supplied to the applicant; (d) hypothetically speaking even if the documents had been shown to the applicant as alleged, there would be no harm in showing the said documents a second time especially in view of the fact that applicant has repeatedly with consistence challenged this aspect; (e) the applicant had written a letter to the respondent No. 1 dated Nil attached at page 283 (Annexure Y‑7) confronting the concerned respondent to the effect that in the enquiry meeting of 16th October, 1995 Mr. Asad Siddiqui, the General Manager had categorically stated that apart from the eight payment vouchers he was not possessed of any evidence. Confirmation in writing in this regard was sought while no such confirmation or denial thereof was issued; (f) finally the applicant through letter dated 12th October, 1995 addressed to respondent No. 1 stated therein that he would attend the enquiry meeting on 16th October, 1995 at 10‑00 a. m. and requested the respondent to keep all copies of evidence, documents or data ready. There was however no evidence listed or furnished. Also no evidence was brought on record before this Court by the respondents to establish that they were in possession of and they had confronted the applicant with the data evidence etc.

18. In light of the above, the applicant's version that he was not confronted with any evidence or data purportedly relied upon by the respondents and there was in the first place no such evidence or data seems to be plausible. A number of decisions in this respect have been relied upon by Mr. Muhammad Farogh Nasim. In Errington v., Minister of Health (1935) 1 KB 249 it was held that objectors at public inquiries must be given a fair opportunity to meet adverse evidence even though statutory provisions do not cover the case expressly. In Kanda v. Government of Malaya, (1962) AC 322 the Privy Council held that if the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused person to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him, and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them. In this case a police officer was dismissed after a hearing before an adjudicating officer. The dismissal was declared void by the Privy Council on grounds that the adjudicating officer was in possession of a report of the board of enquiries which made charges of misconduct but was not made available to the Police officer. The House of Lords similarly in Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 1 WLR 1155 granted remedies of unlawful dismissal to a police probationer who was asked to resign by the Chief Constable, on account of allegations about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The enquiry proceedings in the present case do not appear to have been conducted at all. On 16th October, 1995 neither any evidence has been led nor the applicant given a chance to cross‑examine or rebut the same. There is also no enquiry report. This amply is borne out from the copy of the minutes of the enquiry proceedings.. In light of this it can hardly be visualized that any enquiry was at all conducted and that the applicant given a proper opportunity to rebut the adverse allegations. On the contrary, whenever the applicant had requested for supply of the information and data upon which the case against him has been made, the Respondent No. 1 has replied in a completely arbitrary manner by treating such requests as the applicant's explanation while observing that same to be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, also no reasons have been addressed for coming to the conclusion that the applicant's replies were unsatisfactory. Even the letter of dismissal is hardly a speaking order giving no reasons at all. It also appears that the applicant's explanation was not considered at all. Letter of respondent No.2 dated 26‑11‑1995 communicating that the competent authority has dismissed the applicant is also questionable. The identity of the competent authority is neither revealed nor the said competent Authority has heard the applicant before passing the order. The dismissal is thus also completely without, jurisdiction and against the principles of natural justice. In this background the following arguments and decisions addressed and cited by learned counsel for the applicant are relevant:‑ (a) "where the order in a departmental inquiry neither stated the manner in which adverse conclusions were arrived at nor indicated whether the entire material against the petitioner was considered and the petitioner's witnesses were not examined and certain documents which he wanted the inquiry officer to obtain were not summoned, the order was void: 1968 Cr.L.J. 476" as per Vol. 3, MU, p. 99 (1992 Ed.); (b) in disciplinary proceedings there ought to be a speaking order in case of removal from service as held by the Indian Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1978 SC 1277 at page 1280, , (c) "departmental proceedings are not in the same category as criminal prosecutions or even a civil proceeding in Court and the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply. Nevertheless the ordinary principles of proof and also the rules of natural justice must be applied. The charges must be proved by the prosecution, and it is not the duty of the delinquent to prove any part of it. The delinquent must be given every opportunity of testing the evidence adduced. Wherever, in such proceedings no witnesses are called and nothing is proved and the matter is decided on all kinds of speculation the proceedings are not in accordance with law and are liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari along with the order of removal: 63 C.W.N. 702"; as per Vol. 3, page 99 (1992 Ed.); (d) in disciplinary proceedings before a forum the requirements of natural justice are to be observed. Such requirements include arrival of finding based upon concrete evidence, while mere suspicion and speculation do not suffice. The inference of guilt should be the only irresistible conclusion, (See Union of India v. H.C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 SC 364; 1969 Labour I.C. 896 quoted in Volume 3 MU, page 100, 1992 Ed, AIR 1964 Calcutta 503 also quoted in Vol. .3, MLJ,, page 103 1992 Ed)."

19. In the recent decision of Mst. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. 1994 SCMR 2232 a breach of natural justice has been equated with breach of law and in Chairman, Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation v. Nasir Ahmed 1995 SCMR 1593, the Supreme Court has yet again categorically reiterated its commitment to strike down actions in service matters when found to be against the dictates of natural justice. Recently, a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Ittehad Chemicals v. Mushtaq Ahmed, I.C.A. No.217 of 1994 dated 27th November, 1995 while following Anisa Rehman hay annulled an order terminating service in breach of natural justice. In Hazir v P.I.A.C. 1993 MLD 1308 a Division Bench of this High Court ha; categorically expressed the view that an order in breach of natural justice i void.

20. In the present case, since the entire enquiry, proceedings and the consequential order of dismissal are mala fide and against the principles of natural justice, I think special equities lie in favour of the applicant warranting this Court to take cognizance of the order of dismissal in order to shorten litigation, mould relief and meet the ends of justice, while invoking the principles of law enunciated in Mst. Amna Begum v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 SC 220 and Surbeswar Modal v. Fakir Chand Sarkar, PLD 1963 Dacca 462 (see paragraph 13 supra). It would also not be out of place to observe that where the initial proceedings are found to be mala fide and void the subsequent and consequential order of dismissal based upon it can also not be sustained. (See Central Insurance v. C.B.R. 1993 SCMR 1232 at p. 1266 (S) and Kamran Industries v. Collector of Customs PLD 1996 Karachi 68 at page 108).

21. I accordingly set aside the two judgments below and allow the revision application with cost. In doing so I also grant a status quo ante as at 7‑1‑1995 with regard to payment of salary and benefits and perks attached thereto (which would mean that the applicant shall also have to be paid all his dues not paid after 7‑1‑1995 without any delay) and as at 22nd October, 1995, the date of judgment of the A.D.J. with regard to all other matters. In relation to the grant of status quo ante I am aware that such orders are made in exceptional circumstances, however, the present case falls under such a category as the entire proceedings against the applicant are a mere eye wash, mala fide and in breach of natural justice. An objection in respect of such a direction that such mandatory directions cannot be given at an interlocutory stage as the same would dispose of the final issue, is also not sustainable in view of the exceptional facts and circumstances of the matter. In this regard also I am fortified by Government of Pakistan v. M.I. Cheema 1992 SCMR 1852. In any event such direction will not dispose of the entire controversy in hand. The directions as above would mean that the interlocutory applications in Suit No. 520 of 1994 pending before the learned Senior Civil Judge shall stand disposed of who is then directed to decide the main suit after framing issues and leading the necessary evidence. I may clarify that the status quo so granted would not stand in the way of parties to reach of settlement or compromise. Also in case the respondents wish to assign the applicant with jobs or duties, the status quo would not jeopardize such aspirations. I would also clarify that in case the respondents wish to proceed with any further enquiries they may do so and proceed strictly in accordance with law and service rules after proper opportunity to the applicant. However, no adverse decision or order shall be taken or passed against the applicant in pursuance of such enquiry (See K.D.A. v. Wali Ahmed Khan 1991 SCMR 2434 at page 2449) wherein such interim order passed by the High Court was endorsed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court). Since directions as above dispose of, inter alia the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2; in Suit No. 520/1994 before the Senior Civil Judge. I would venture to dilate upon the requirements of law in this respect. The applicant has made out a case albeit prima facie that the impugned proceedings and orders are mala fide and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The latter has been equated, as stated above, with breach of law. This would mean that the applicant has prima facie established the case of breach and violation of law. There can be no cavil with the proposition that where the applicant makes out the case of violation of law he is taken to have established a strong prima facie case. With regard to the other _requisites of irreparable loss and balance of convenience, the same also lie in favour of the applicant as any reduction or stoppage of salary could well‑force the applicant to face impelling and extreme conditions. While in the present case the applicant has satisfied the requirements of irreparable loss and balance of convenience as well, the need for satisfaction of these requirements could be obviated. The Lahore High Court in Jamil Ahmed v. Provincial Government of West Pakistan PLD 1982 Lahore 49 has held that where the impugned action is prima facie ultra vires the other requirements of balance of convenience and irreparable injury would stand automatically satisfied and the injunction should be issued, while any refusal to issue the injunction would be oppressive to the plaintiff and not to the defendant. In the present case the argument that the in function should only be issued in respect of status of the employee and not in relation to the monetary benefits i.e. salary, is also not tenable. Mere adequacy of a subsequent monetary compensation or recovery would also be clearly against the spirit of law and justice. In any event the power under section 151, C.P.C. is wide enough to allow the Court to grant injunctive reliefs in all matters in order to foster the cause of justice even if the case does not strictly fall within the four corners of the well‑settled principles of Order.39, Rules 1 and 2 (See Balagamwala Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Shah Karachi Trading A.G PLD 1990 Karachi 1; Muhammad Usman Khan v. Mairajudin PLD 1978 Lahore 790). It is needless to say that where actions are completely ultra vires and without jurisdiction and the case does not strictly fall within the parameters of Order 39 the Court can grant injunctive relief under section 151, C.P.C. to do complete justice. In the interest of justice the applicant is also allowed to amend his suit from all facets and angles and the concerned learned District Judge is directed to place the suit for disposal before a Senior Civil Judge other than the incumbent who decided the suit earlier.

22. Eventually I take up the respondent's objection that the applicant had himself filed an application for withdrawal of the main revision application and as such he has conceded that he is not entitled to relief. Again this argument is devoid of any force. Before the application for withdrawal could be decided or acted upon the applicant withdrew the same by not pressing it. This is borne out from order-dated 11‑2‑1996. No appeal was filed against that order by the respondents. As such the same has attained finality. Also no estoppel against the applicant could be invoked as the applicant had not acted upon such withdrawal application, which could only be if the withdrawal application were pressed by the applicant. Mere moving of the application is not enough.

23. It is needless to mention that factual observations as aforesaid are of tentative nature and the learned trial Court has to decide the matter on the preponderance of evidence. A.A./L‑6/K Order accordingly.