P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

20. The above provisions could appear to be inconsistent with the principle of the bounty of the Crown See Lucas and Lucas ((1943) 2 All E R 110), but no reference was made to them in I. M. Lall's case and the learned Judges of our Supreme Court have held in the State of Pakistan v. Mehrajuddin (P L D 1959 S C 147) that:‑ "the mere fact that there is a statutory provision enabling the attachment of a part of the salary of a public servant does not affect the ,principle that the claim of the public servant himself against the State is not for a contractual debt, but can be addressed only to the bounty of the State, and may there fore be pressed only by an appeal of an official or political kind." Their Lordships have also pointed out that the law laid down in L M. Lall's case‑ "has been the law of the country at any rate since the year 1948. It was enacted in the Government of India Act, 1935, that the law laid down by the Federal Court and the Privy Council should be binding upon all the Courts of the sub continent of India, and after 1947 that law remained applicable to the Courts in Pakistan." The same view was expressed more emphatically in Government of West Pakistan v. Fazal‑e‑Haq Mussarat (PLD 1960SC208) as follows:-- "We do not find the slightest ground for thinking that the position has been altered in the least by the fact of the partition and the consequent constitutional changes."

21. The above pronouncements are completely binding on me and make my task easy. I accept them with all respect. But after those pronouncements, a few significant changes have taken place in the political structure and constitutional continuity of this country, to which I most humbly refer for consideration. One important change is the revolution which took place on the 7th of October 1958, bringing in its wake the Martial Law regime which has ended with the proclamation and enforcement of the present Constitution in 1962. The revolution marks a complete break in the continuity of the association of the British Crown with Pakistan: It demarcates the establishment of a new alliance with the United Kingdom without any allegiance to the British Crown. Common Law is no longer the reservoir of our law and Article 130 of the present Constitution completes its disconnection as a source of our law. As enjoins an important change in the administration of law, as follows: "No Court shall have any jurisdiction that is not con ferred on it by this Constitution or by or under the law." The Principle of the bounty of prerogative of the Crown is now foreign to the concept of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The sovereignty of Pakistan does not belong to him‑See the Preamble of the Constitution of 1962. The earlier judgments of the superior Courts now correctly reflect the outmoded law. It is, therefore, respectfully suggested that I. M. Lall's case in so far as it seeks to enforce the Scottish or Common Law principle of the bounty or prerogative of the Crown, is no longer good law in Pakistan.

22. The above discussion answers the second objection. The third objection should be understood and appreciated by keeping in view the circumstances which are the creation of the attitude of some officers and departments of the state towards the duty of honouring the liability of the State in contrast with the conditions that prevail in England. There the need for a Court to issue orders for payment of salaries has not existed. It is true that objections to such orders were raised on the basis of the prerogative or bounty of the Crown and were upheld by placing reliance on public policy or on an implied term of contract; but such objections and their acceptance by Courts of law created no adverse repurcussions on the rights of the claimants who ,were able to recover their dues by following a special procedure known as the Petition of Right. That procedure is now replaced by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. It is a different Procedure, but in the words of G. P. Wilson in cases and Materials on Constitu tional and Administrative Law: "Although the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, has gone some way towards putting the Crown in the position of an ordinary litigant and made it possible to sue the Crown for the torts of its servants, it is still necessary to treat the Crown sepa rately from other public authorities because of the special privileges it enjoys both as regards procedure and substantive law." Service under the Crown has been called a paradox by Prof. Wade who has explained it as follows:

"The Courts have to a large extent abrogated jurisdiction over contracts of service under the Crown. But Crown service, though legally the most precarious of all employments, is in reality the most secure. This is merely convention, but in the Civil service the convention is so deeply ingrained that there are probably better grounds for complaining that civil servants are excessively protected than for criticising the extra‑legal nature of their status."

23. There is thus a contrast between the security that exists in England for Civil employees of the Crown and the state of affairs which prevailed in India soon before its partition in 1947 and which has continued to prevail in this country there after. In Venkata Rao's case (AIR 1937 PC31) their Lordships of the Privy Council had noted that‑- "there happen to have arisen for their Lordships' considera tion two cases where there has been a serious and complete failure (of the Government) to adhere to important and indeed fundamental rules" applicable to government servants, but those lapses were not regarded as sufficient for altering their Lordships' opinion that the Central and Provincial Governments of India will ever bear in mind the need of bestowing supreme care on adherence, in letter and spirit, to the rules. That hope has not been fulfilled because even after such lapses were rectified by Courts, attempts have been made to evade liabilities. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have expressed in Government of West Pakistan v. Fazal‑e‑Haq Mussarrat, their‑- "grave concern at what appears to have developed into a fixed practice with Government Departments of evading the financial implications of declaration decrees wile purporting to accept them in form. They have explained the above remarks by pointing out that‑-- "This is by no means the first case of its kind Which has come before us. The judgment in Mehrajuddin's case cited above, contained reference to three similar cases involving another Department and there has been a number of other cases as well. The frequency with which such cases a come before the High Court might perhaps in appear to have some measure explain the attempted extension of the writ jurisdiction of that Court to the enforcement of declaratory decrees of the nature here in question. We have held in the case of Mehrajuddin that this extension cannot be supported in law but with growing experience. of these cases, we find it impossible to withhold our sympathy from the unfortunate subjects whose desperate condition very probably inspired the initiative taken by the High Court."

24. About a year after the above case their Lordships had again to deal with the plight of Government e1nployees. See the remarks made by them in Pakistan v. Naseem Ahmad (PLD 1961 SC445). " . it will not be inappropriate to point out' that the pitiable plight in which the respondents now end themselves cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely. Under the decrees of competent Courts of Law they were treated as being in the employment of the State and all the disadvantages and liabilities attaching to such employment continued to bind them, as for example they could not seek employment elsewhere and possibly could not even acquire any property. On the other hand by the authorities' failure to respect and honor the decrees passed by the Courts of the State they came to be placed in the deplorable position that they neither received any salary from the State nor were free to earn their livelihood elsewhere. It may be that they erroneously believed that the benefits of the declaration in their favour enured for all these years and they were entitled to be treated as if in service throughout but at the same time this State of affairs should not have been allowed to continue. It would, therefore have been only just and equitable on the part of the authorities concerned to have treated the temporary employees concerned as hav ing been in employment until the dates on which the sanctions for their respective posts lapsed, as .was indicated in the case of Noorul Hassan v. The Federation of Pakistan. This was unfor tunately not done. But even now, it will not be unreasonable to expect that the authorities will do what they ought to have done then and take steps to relieve the respondents of their plight and treat them with compassion, may even With generosity by honouring the decrees in their favour and giving to them at least the salaries which they would have received, had they continued in service during the periods the sanction's' for their respective posts lasted, for, after that they could not, in any event claim to remain in service. We can but hope that the bounty will not be unduly begrudged to the respondents."

25. If the conditions that prevail in this country had obtained in England the Courts would certainly have altered their opinion about what to expect from the Departmental attitude. They would have enforced fair and. straightforward deals. In the words of Prof. Wade: "The Crown should be an honest man and if driven to break its contract ought to pay damages." According to the author "a learned Judge has said: "The Crown is under no obligation to accept the services of an officer . . . where the engagement is for a fixed term and the Crown wishes to dispense with the services of the officer before the agreed date, there is nothing to prevent it from suspending the officer and.. . paying him his agreed remune ration for the reminder of the contract period. The efficiency of the public administration would not be thereby impaired and the Crown would be acting in accordance with one of the most famous maxims of law, pacta sunt servanda. As it is, the Crown saves the public purse a relatively infinitesimal amount at the price of conduct which would be condemned in an individual."

26. The contrast that exists between the state of affairs of England and this country, makes the pleas that are founded on common law and on the immunities of the Crown unreal as well as far fetched in our country. In the present case the respondent was removed from service in 1957 and obtained a declaratory, decree in 1958 that he was in service, but no com pensation was offered to him until the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 ordered the payment of a certain amount of wages to him. The attempts of the applicant to evade the financial liability of the declaratory decree was the cause of action of the respondent to invoke the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. That was distinct and different from attemp ting to execute the declaratory decree itself. This is the first part of the answer to the third contention of the applicant.

27. The second part of the answer is more technical. It is that the contention lost its force when it was conceded on behalf of the applicant that the applications of the respondent made under section 15 of the Payments of Wages Act, 1936 were maintainable. The proposition that they were maintainable could not be questioned in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R., Lahore v. Muhammad Sharif (P L D 1963 S C 340). Section 3 of the Act makes "every employer", includ ing the State, responsible for the payment "of all wages required to be paid under the Act." In third contention is accord ingly rejected.

28. Now, I turn to the first contention which was pressed by Mr. Suhrawardy in terms of section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The section lays down 30. days as the period of limitation for appeals ; therefore, counsel contended that the District Judge could not upset the order of the 26th of March 1960, but conceded that this objection had no force in these proceedings, in view of the scope of section 115, C. P. C. as explained in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment of the Supreme Court given in Muhammad Swaleh v. United Grain and Fodder Agencies (PLD1964SC97), if, in the opinion of this Court, that was a bad order.

29. Counsel for the parties, therefore, agreed that the crux of the present controversy, after the disposal of the four conten tions which have been discussed above, is the determination of the quantum of wages in terms of the rules that may be applicable to this case. On this question the Additional Advocate General has addressed the leading arguments. He said 'that there are three rules, out of those which are applicable to the employees of the Railway, which need examination for finding out as to which of them is strictly applicable. They are Rules Nos. 2044 (F. R. 54) 2126 (F. R. 85) of the Pakistan Railway Establish ment Code, Volume II, and Subsidiary Rule 9(v) of the Rules which are contained in Advance Chapter No. 5, which have been framed under Rule 1726 of the Pakistan Railway Establish ment Code Volume I. All of them are reproduced below with some of their words, in italics to specially draw attention to them: "2044 (F. R. 54) Pay after reinstatement.‑When the suspen sion of a railway servant is held to have been unjustified or not wholy justifiable; or when a railway servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated;' the revising or appellate authority may grant to , him for the period of his absence from duty‑ (a) If he is honourably acquitted, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and by an order to be separately recorded, any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension; or (b) if otherwise, such proportion of such pay and allowances as the revising or appellate authority may prescribe. In a case falling under clause (a), the period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty. In a case falling under clause (b), it will not be treated as a period spent on duty unless the revising or appellate authority so direct. "2126 (F. R. 85). Extraordinary Leave.‑

(a) Extraordinary leave may be granted in special circumstances (1) when no other leave is by rule admissible, or (2) when, other leave being admissible, the railway servant concerned applies in writing for the grant of extraordinary leave. Such leave is not debited against the leave account. No leave‑salary is admissible during such leave. (b) The authority which has the power to sanction leave may grant extraordinary leave as in clause (a) in combination with, or in continuation of, any leave that is admissible, and may commute retrospectively periods of absence without "leave into extraordinary leave." "Rule 9(V) of Advance Chapter No. 5.

9. Procedure for removal.‑-- (a) .. (b) .. (c) .. Subsidiary.‑ (i) .. (ii) .. (iii) .. (iv) .. (v) If a Railway employee who has been removed from service or dismissed, files a declaratory suit in a Court of law and brings the decree to the effect that the orders of the admi nistration are ultra vires, void and inoperative and that such Railway employee continues to be in the service of the Railway, the employee in such cases should be put back to duty and dealt with afresh, the period of his absence from the date of removal from service or dismissal to the date on which he is put to duty being treated as 'qualifying service for all intents and purposes but no pay or allowance should be paid to the employee for the period of his absence. Competent authorities have power to direct that the period of extraordinary leave (which was beyond the Railway employee's control) be counted for increments, vide proviso under Rule 2022(b)‑R." Rule 1726, Pakistan Railway Establishment Code Vol. I. "1726.‑The General Manager and the Financial Adviser (Communications) may, in respect of non‑gazetted railway servants under their respective administrative control, make subsidiary rules, not inconsistent with the rules in this section for the purpose of giving effect to them."

30. The Additional Advocate‑General contended that Rule 2126 was not applied by the Supreme Court, and that Rule 2044 has been repeatedly applied by their Lordships to cases of rein statement consequent upon Civil decrees. See, for instance, Ghulam Mustafa Shah v. Pakistan (P L D 1963 S C 268) and the Divisional Superin tendent N. W. Railway, Lahore v. Muhammad Sharif. In the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Rule 2044 was applied in preference to Rule 2126 without much discussion because the Advocate‑General had conceded that the latter rule did not apply and that the former did. The Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was not con sidered in it. In the case of the Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R., Lahore, it was found that‑ "any sum which is payable by reason of the termination (of service) is also wages for the purpose of the (Payment of Wages) Act. Therefore, when the service of an employee is terminated without notice, in such a case the sum which is payable to him in lieu of notice will be considered as wages though he may not render any service during that month. Enough has been said to show that the definition of `wages' cannot be confined to `earned wages' only, and that the claim of the respon dent would thus be clearly covered by the definition in the Act. The facts of this case, however, present no difficulty. The order of removal from service was cancelled and the claimant was reinstated to his old post. Thus the relationship of the employer and employee was not in dispute. As the employee was all along challenging the legality of the order of his removal from service, it could be said that he was all along ready and willing to render service to his employer. Hence the Authority, rightly held that the mere fact that the employee was not given work by the employer will not derogate his right to receive wages." In the above circumstances it was open, in terms of the Judgment, to the Railway Administration to make an order under Rule 2044. If it did not do so then the authority could order the payment of full wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. 1 quote their words: "The Railway Administration, however, did not elect to make any order under this rule after re‑instatement of the employee. In these circumstances the Authority was justified to hold that the claimant was entitled to the payment of full wages for the relevant period." Rule 2126 was not applied because that plea had not been taken at the proper time and no evidence was led in support of it. Overruling the objection based on that rule their Lordships held: "We are also unable to accede to the contention that this respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the Payment of Wages Act." In the present case too the Railway Administration did not, in the beginning, make an order under Rule 2044. Moreover, counsel for the applicant has conceded that Rule 2126 is not applicable because the question before the Administration was not as to what kind of leave was admissible, nor could the question other wise arise in this case because the respondent did not ask for leave at all. He could be granted Extraordinary leave only if he asked for leave when no other kind of leave was admissible, or if he applied, in writing, for such leave in preference to other kinds of leave. The rule is not meant to be used for sending employees on compulsory leave merely with the object of not paying their wages.

31. If one of the above quoted rules must be applied to this case than Rule 2044 and the Subsidiary Rule 9(v) are much more suitable than Rule 2126. The learned Additional Advocate General pointed out that the question of comparative suitability of all these provisions was not before the Supreme Court, nor was apparently anything urged before their Lordships as to the inapplicability of Rule 2044 after the Advocate‑General had conceded in Ghulam Mustafa Shah's case that it was applicable in preference to Rule 2126. He said that F. Rule 54 (a), which corresponds to Rule 2044, was held by the Government of India in 1938 with the concurrence of the Auditor‑General to be applicable to cases of departmental punishments and not to those of punishments by the Courts of law; therefore, in the latter class of cases granting full pay for the entire period of absence was treated as justified. That view is mentioned at page 6 of Volume II of the Fundamental Rules and the Supplementary Rules, as follows:-- "A question arose whether the action of the reinstating authority was covered by F. R. 54 (a) and was in order. The Government with the concurrence of the Auditor‑General have decided that F. R. 54 applies to departmental punishment and not to cases of punishment by a, Court of law for an alleged offence which has nothing to do with his official duties . . . In such cases the proceedings might be considered to have terminated on the date preceding the date on which the official was reinstated and the action of the reinstating authority in granting him full pay for the entire period of his absence treated as in order." Moreover, he contended that Subsidiary Rule 9(v) which was framed under Rule 1726 itself proved that Rule 2044 was not applicable to cases in which Courts declared dismissals or removals to be void, for otherwise it would have been a redundant exercise to frame the subsidiary rule.

32. The Indian Courts have held that the language of Rule 2044 makes it inapplicable to those cases in which removals or dismissals have been declared by civil Courts to be void. In terms the rule applies to cases in which an employee is reinstated, but there is no re‑instatement in law where the removal or dis missal is declared to be void or inoperative. Moreover, the rule contemplates reinstatement by the departmental appellate or revisional authority, and not by the decree of a civil Court. See Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R. v. Nand Lal Dubey (A I R 1963 All. 123) and Risal Singh v. Union of India (A I R 1958 Pb. 155).

33. Additionally, the rule requires that "acquittal" referred to in it, should be held to be honourable or otherwise. It cannot be applied without such a decision. The word "acquittal" is applicable in its widest sense to release from criminal as well as civil obligations, but a sense of hour is difficult to associate with cases in which the removal or dismissal of an employee is held by civil Courts to be void and inoperative. In such cases the Courts ordinarily do not pronounce judgments on the correctness or otherwise of the charges that were departmentally framed for removing or dismissing employees.

34. A Division Bench of this Court has examined, with reference to criminal law, the meaning of the expression "honour able acquitted" in Sardar Ali v. Pakistan (P L D 1961 Lah. 664) as follows: "The expression `honourably acquitted' is not defined in the rules or anywhere else. We shall, therefore, give the same meaning to it as it conveys. in its ordinary and natural sense. Its ordinary meaning is that it has been found that the person concerned had been accused of the offence maliciously and falsely, and that after his acquittal no blemish whatsoever attaches to him. In cases where the benefit of the doubt is given to him or where he is acquitted because the parties have compromised or because the parties on account of some extraneous influence have resiled from their statements, then we think that in spite of the acquittal the person con cerned cannot be deemed to have been 'honourably acquitted'. This expression is not recognised in the Code of Criminal Procedure. There only the word `acquittal' is used. It is, therefore, obvious that it is not the function of the Crimi nal Court to declare that the person concerned has been honourably acquitted of not. Having regard to the scope and meaning of the aforesaid rule, we think that it is for the revising or appellate authority to form its opinion on the material placed before it whether such a person has been honourably acquitted or not." The underlying consideration of the above passage is that when somebody is charged with an offence there is a challenge to him to remove that cloud from his name in a straight contest, and not merely to meek out of the situation. When this idea is extended to charges of civil nature it must be taken to refer to a sense of honour like that of the gentlemen who at one time fought duels, irrespective of whether they wronged somebody or were themselves wronged. Their honour demanded the vindi cation of their point of view by defeating the challenge of oppo sition in an undeviating fight. If a declaratory decree given in favour of an employee is to be judged in this sense, as honourable or otherwise, then the methods of attack or defence of the employee, the conduct of the proceedings by or on his behalf as well as the material used by Court for giving the verdict in his favour, are to be judged by "the revising or appellate Authority" for applying this rule. If the departmental officers did not elect to do so under Rule 2044 then, in the words of the Supreme Court, the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 would be justified‑ "to hold that the claimant was entitled to' the payment of full wages for the relevant period." Let me recall that in‑ this case the railway officers had originally failed to do so.

35. They did attempt to apply the rule when they were directed to do so and. allowed to the Respondent 1/10th of his salary. But the original department record or a copy of the order is not before me, nor has it been disclosed as to whether the officer who made the order was exercising the revisional or appellate powers. Additionally, there is nothing to show whether the respondent was at all held in terms of the rule, to have been acquitted honourably or otherwise.

36. Counsel for the applicant contended that it was immaterial as to what decision the departmental officers took in this respect because a Division, Bench of this Court has decided in Sardar All's case (cited above) that "It is left to the absolute subjective discretion of the autho rity. If the authority takes the decision by using its discretion and judgment, that the person concerned has not been honourably acquitted, then in exercise of writ jurisdic tion this Court cannot convert itself into a Court of Appeal and substitute its opinion for the opinion of the com petent authority." In view of the above observations, I called upon counsel to satisfy me that a competent authority had in fact decided in this case that the respondent was not acquitted honourably. He replied that official acts could be presumed to have been regularly done; but this presumption applies to the regularity l of an act that is admitted or proved to have been done, and not as a substitute for the proof of that act itself.

37. Here my attention was drawn to the following further observations of the above‑mentioned Division Bench of this Court: "According to the rule, it is left to the discretion of the com petent authority to grant full pay or not, to the employee concerned for the period of his absence from duty, even though the authority may come to the conclusion that he has been honourably acquitted. The reason for this rule is so patent, that it need not detain us for long. During the period of absence, the employee does not perform any duty. The authority concerned is bound to suspend such a person because Rule 1711 of Pakistan Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, provides that as soon as a railway servant is arrested or committed to prison, he shall be suspended. The suspension in these circumstances cannot, therefore, he said to be unjustified, and no blame can be attached to the Railway Department for it." The justification for not allowing full pay as contained in the above passage is that the employee did not perform. his duties. The trend of the pass4ge shows that this view was regarded as correct beyond any shadow of doubt; but their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in appeal, viz. Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R., Lahore, that when an employee damand wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, his claim cannot be resisted on the ground that he had not earned them. See the quotations in paragraph 30 above. One of the Judges who constituted that Bench had earlier held in Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R., Lahore v. Muhammad Sharif that: "If the employee was willing to perform his part of the contract, but was not allowed to do so by the employer, it cannot be said that the employee had not fulfilled the terms of his contract and was, therefore, not entitled to any wages for the period during which he was not allowed to work," The above view was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the said appeal.

38. As absence from duty as a justification for withholding wages has been overruled by the Supreme Court I am perhaps free not to agree with the view that the authorities of the Railway Administration had the discretion to grant full pay or not to the employee‑ "even though the authority may come to the conclusion that he has been honourably acquitted." I was told by counsel that the reason behind the above view of the‑Bench is the word "may" which occurs in the earlier part of Rule 2044. I have italicised it in paragraph 29 above. But that word is not intended to confer discretion. It is meant to simply serve as a part of the verb "grant" which precedes the two possibilities contemplated at (a) and (b) of the rule for granting the full pay or not. The directions for making payment are contained in the last part of the rule and their mandatory nature is made plain by the words "will be treated" and "will not be treated." There seems 'to be no discretion left in that.

39. Further, the revisional and appellate authorities are not free, in terms of the rule, after coming to the conclusion that the employee was not honourably acquitted, to grant any proportion of‑pay they like under part (b) of the rule because they have to grant‑ such proportion of pay and allowances as the revising or appellate authority may prescribe." The word "prescribe" should be noted. It means, according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary: "To write or lay down as a rule or direction to be followed." According to Balle ntine's Law Dictionary, it means: "To lay down before hand as a rule: ordain, appoint, define authoritatively. To lay down authoritatively as a guide, direction, rule of action." Admittedly, no portion had been prescribed before the order.

40. The conclusion of the above discussion is that Rule 2126 is not applicable to this case. Rule 2044 is not applicable either. Rule 1726 merely confers the power to make such subsidiary rules as are not inconsistent with‑- "the rules in this section for the purpose of giving effect to them." Thus the only rule, out of those which have been quoted above, that remains to be examined in Subsidiary Rule 9 (v). It was admittedly framed under Rule 1726 and is inconsistent with Rule 2044. Moreover, the case of the applicant is not that the respondent is not entitled, in terms of subsidiary rule, to any pro portion of pay and allowances. On the contrary, this rule was brought to my notice by the Additional Advocate‑General merely to support his contention that Rule 2044 was not regarded by the Railway Administration itself to be applicable to a case of the present type in which declaratory decrees are obtained from Court. My conclusion, in humility, therefore, is that none of the rules govern this case.

41. It follows from the foregoing discussion of fact and law that this revision application cannot be accepted, but before parting with this case I may mention that, according to counsel for. the applicant, the Railway Administration feels that the lower grade employee who are removed or dismissed by the 1st grade officers of their respective departments are mostly of the undesirable type, because by and large the higher officers are not interested in harming them; yet owing to the exigencies of litiga tion that is conducted in an impersonal manner by big depart ments against individuals who have personal stakes, they succeed in obtaining declatatory decrees and come back victorious to the Railway Administration after their duties were for years per formed by others and they had been merely setting undesirable examples. This is the chagrin and annoyance of the Railway Administration whose experience does not let it believe that success ful litigants are necessarily good people. The Administration, therefore, feels morally justified in finding ways and means to convince its good employees that bad examples are not worthy of emulation. I am glad that this aspect was explained, for otherwise the Administration appeared to indulge in unmitigated evil. But it reveals that at the bottom of the moral justification there is a sense of defeat in respect of such litigation owing to a certain type of departmental inefficiency. Actually, the Railway has many advantages over individual employees parti cularly those who were removed or dismissed. But defeatism that springs from inefficiency can only be cured by removing its cause. If machinations are employed to circumvent its harmful effects, then they might bring moral defeat too. I hope to be excused for referring to these platitudes on the ground that departmental rules ultimately reflect the departmental attitude.

42. I am convinced that this revision should be dismissed. It is hereby dismissed with costs. K.B.A. Petition dismissed.