P L D 1950 Peshawar 22 (PLP)

KHUDA BAKHSH, J.‑

Shad Muhammad, a detenu in the Dera Ismail Khan Central Prison, submitted a petition to this Court through the jail authorities, representing that he had been a leader and a zealous worker of the Muslim League for not less than 10‑12 years. He had also been a member of the Working Committee of the Provincial Muslim League for about half a dozen of years. As far as his actual services in the cause of the Muslim League were concerned, he said that he had thrice toured the Province, conveying the message of the League to every hearth and home. Due to his zeal, be had to put up with various hard ships and troubles, but in spite of and these difficulties he had not swerved an inch from the right course. He ' was amazed, the petitioner continued to say, and quite unable to understand why he had been arrested under section 3 of the North‑West Frontier Province Public Safety Act, and ordered to be detained in prison for a year. he concluded the petition by adding that he desired an opportunity to put up his case in open. Court, so that he may be able to clear his position and to 'remove any misunderstanding under which the Government maybe labouring, for it will be in the interest of both himself and the Government. In accordance with his prayer Shad Muhammad was personally summoned to Court, where he appeared in custody on 12th March 1949, and was also represented by Mian Zia‑ud‑Din, Bar‑at‑law. It was contended on behalf of Shad Muhammad that clauses (i) (iv), (vi) and (vii) of section 2 (c) of the North‑West Frontier Province Public Safety Act. 1948, dealt with subjects on List I (Federal) of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the Pakistan (Provisional ' Constitution) Order, 1947, and, therefore, the said Act was ultra vires of the Provincial, Legis lature. The Act was also attacked on the ground that it went far beyond the scope of its preamble. Referring to section 12 of the Act, it was said that the powers of the High Court under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code stood abrogated, whereas section 23 Prima facie indicated the restoration of the very powers. The importance of the legal questions involved n the case led to its being heard by a Bench. At the outset an affidavit was presented to the Court on behalf of the petitioner wherein he solemnly affirmed that he had been actually arrested on kith January 1949 at his village, and then detained in the Dera Ismail Khan Jail: So far "be had not been informed or supplied with the grounds of his arrest and deten tion." He called his arrest and detention as unlawful and stated that the low under which his arrest had, come about was also ultra vires. He reiterated in the affidavit the original assertion that he was a loyal supporter of Pakistan, and an old worker of the Muslim League, and had not committed, nor, was likely to commit any act, which could be "'considered unlawful or wrong." The affidavit concluded with the allegation that his de tention had ulterior motives behind it and was "utterly wrongful." It is significant that in the course of `two days' arguments the learned Counsel, who argued the case on behalf of the petitioner did not make even a passing reference to the ulterior motives, which found a place in the affidavit. The learned Advocate‑General placed before us the original order dated 27th January, 1949, as well as the subsequent order dated 4th May, 1949, both relating to the arrest and detention of the petitioner. The first one stated that the Governor. N‑ W. F. P. with a view to prevent Maulvi Shad Muhammad of Turlandi, Mardan District, from committing any prejudicial act as defined in clause 2 of N.‑W F.P. Public Safety Act (XXI) of 1948, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under section 3 of the said Act. was pleased to order the arrest without warrant of the said Maulvi Shad Muhammad. Then followed the sen tence, which contained a direction for his committal to custody in the Dera Ismail Khan Prison for a period of one year. The order wound up with instructions on the subject of maintenance, etc. The subsequent order is in greater detail and says that the Governor, N.‑W. F. P., being satisfied that with a view to prevent Maulvi Shad Muhammad of Turlandi, Mardan District, from endangering public safety and maintenance of public order in the N.‑W. F. P. and from bringing into hatred and contempt and from exciting disaffection towards Government established by law in the N.‑W. F. P. it was necessary to arrest him without warrant ...... .. The rest of the contents of the new order were exactly the same as those of the previous one. It came to our notice that the Governor N.‑W. F. P. had promulgated an Ordinance.(III of 1949) on 12th May, 194,), to amend the N; W. F. P. Public Safety. Act (II of 1948) for certain purposes. The perusal of the Ordinance disclosed that while it introduced certain amendments in section 2 of the Public Safety Act, it repealed section 25 in toto. The Ordinance was to be "deemed to have had effect as from the date when the N.‑W. F. P. Public Safety Act itself came into force " The new Ordinance was the first subject of criticism at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was contended that the Ordinance itself was ultra vires because it repealed section 23, and thereby enacted something, which was repugnant to the Federal laws as obtaining in the Province. To establish his point of view, the learned counsel drew our attention to section 12 of the Act, which laid down that no order under sections 3 to 8 and 10 " shall be called in question in any Court and no‑ Court shall have power to make any order under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in respect of any order made under this Act or in respect of any person against whom such an order has been made." Section 12, according to the learned counsel, categorically did away with the powers of a High Court to entertain a habeas corpus petition under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code and, thus, expressly aimed at repealing the said provision of law. At this stage the learned counsel read out section 23 of the Act, which said that the provisions of the Act " shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other Act, Ordinance, Regulation for the time being in force." What the Act, added the counsel, took away with one hand in the shape of section 12, it restored to the citizens and the Courts of law with the other by enacting section

23. Illustating his point, the learned counsel said that the Public Safety Act had to operate not in derogation of the provisions of other laws, e.g , section 491 Criminal Procedure Code, but had to be enforced in addition to them. Hence the two sets of laws, one being the Public Safety Act and the other, the rest of the laws, existed side by side. Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code being a central law thus did come into conflict with section 12 of the Public Safety Act, and was to override section

12. The new Ordinance by repealing section 23 put an end to the operation of all the laws, which had been kept alive by the Public Safety Act, and, thus, it was repugnant to certain important enactments, e.g., Criminal Procedure Code, Indian Penal Code, etc., which were the concurrent Legislative List of the Government of India Act. Such a repealing Ordinance could not be promulgated by the Governor without obtaining the previous instructions of the Governor‑General as contemplated by the proviso to section 88 (1) of the Constitution Act. No such ins tructions appear to have been issued by the Governor‑General, and, therefore, the said Ordinance was void. " The learned Advocate‑General argued that the co‑existence of sections 12 and 23 of the Public Safety Act had made the position somewhat awkward, and consequently as a matter of necessity the repealing Ordinance had been promulgated. He did not assert that any instructions of the Governor‑General within the meaning of section 88 of the Constitution Act had been issued, nor did he contend in so many words that the proviso to section 88 (1) was inapplicable in the present case. His view was that section 23 was not an important part of the Act, and its having been repealed did not make any material difference at all. It is very difficult to subscribe to the argument of the learned Advocate‑General, because the conflict between sections 12 and 23 is so obvious that it cannot be safely ignored. The learned Advocate‑General at one stage of his arguments went to the extent of saying that section 12 as it stood did not take away the powers of a High Court to entertain a habeas corpus petition under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code, but we are afraid the view of the learned Advocate‑General is in glaring contrast with the very words of section 12, and cannot, therefore, be considered to be at all tenable. To us section 23 of the Public Safety Act was an integral part of the scheme underlying the legislative measure. We see much force in the position taken up by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and hold that the repeal of section 23 having been effected without the instructions of the Governor‑General, is inoperative in law, and, therefore, section 23 stands where it was, and to this extent the mew Ordinance is void. To cut short the matter, the learned Advocate‑General frankly conceded that under the law as it stood the present habeas corpus application under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code was competent. The above discussion dealt with one portion of the Ordinance, which to us appeared to‑ have a far reaching effect. The rest of the ordinance related to, as already remarked, the introduction of certain changes in the definitions as contained in section 2 of the Public Safety Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not assail seriously this portion of the Ordinance, and to us too, the amendments made consist mostly of certain words which have been inserted in section 2 of the Public Safety Act, and do not touch any of the items on the Concurrent or Federal Legislative List of the Constitution Act. The next subject of discussion before us was the Public Safety Act itself, which, as maintained by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature. Here, the learned counsel supported his criticism by dilating upon the scope of the preamble of the Act, which was to the effect that whereas it is expedient to empower, the Provincial Government to take action against certain persons and organisations, in the interest of Public Safety in the N.‑W. F. P He took up the phrase " against certain persons and organizations " and said that by using these words the preamble delimited the scope of the provisions of the enactment, and if in the body of the measure itself the sphere was extended, then to that extent the whole Act would stand vitiated. He pointed out that in sections 3 and 10 the , limitation inherent in the phrase " certain persons and organisations " had been overstepped by using the words " any person ". What was special in application according to the preamble has been made general in the body of the Act. To back up his argument the learned counsel failed to refer us to any law in the shape of a statutory provision or judicial precedent. There is, however, authority in support of the view that though preamble may be considered to be a key to the Act itself, it cannot normally be applied to explain the Act, except where the provisions contained in its body are otherwise vague. In a Full Bench ruling of‑ the Allahabad High Court, reported as A. I. R. 1936 Allahabad page 507, it has been held that no doubt a preamble could be looked at when the section was ambiguous and it supplied a key to the mind of the legislature and indicated what its intention was, but where the language of the section was clear, the preamble could not control its provisions. To us, therefore, the so-called discrepancy between the words of the preamble and those employed in the body of the Act does not appeal' to be of any consequence. The learned counsel for the petitioner then addressed himself to section 2 of the Public Safety Act, and here against himself he selected only sub‑clauses (i), (iv), (vi), and (vii) of clause (c) to section 2: It was sub‑clause (vii) which was dilated upon first; and in regard to that it was asserted that it conveyed no sense whatsoever, The sub‑clause, read with the opening words of the clause, was to the effect that `prejudicial Act ' shall include any act, which is intended or is likely to associate itself with any movement pre judicial to the interest of Pakistan. On the very face of it we must hold that the sub‑clause conveys absolutely no meaning whatsoever. The learned Advocate‑General could not but concede the position, and in fact Sub‑clause (vii) has been repealed by the amending Ordinance. Sub‑clause (1) did originally contain a reference to "the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any State, foreign power or tribal area adjacent to the North‑West Frontier Province", while sub‑clause (iv) dealt with the promotion of Frontier Province", of enquiry and hatred between classes of people in the North West Frontier Province or any State or Tribal Area'. In an attempt to connect the repercussions in a tribal area or foreign territory with the apprehension of breach of peace in the North‑West Frontier Province, certain words have beers added in sub clause (i), but sub‑clause (iv) has strangely been left intact, It is significant that the same sort of words have also been inserted In sub‑clause (vi), which concern the disruption of the integrity of Pakistan. The explanation to clause (c) has also been treated in a similar manner by effecting certain Change of words. The object underlying the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this subject appeared to be that the definition of a prejudicial act" transgressed the limits of the Provincial Legislative List and encroached upon the Federal List. He could not conned this assertion with all the sub‑clauses of the clause in question, but said that taken as a whole the clause itself offended against the Federal List and was, thus, ultra vices of the Provincial Legislature. He had to concede that sub‑clauses (ii) and (iii), if taken by themselves, were not repugnant to any central measure, and did not trespass into the Federal List. On the other hand the learned Advocate‑General contended that the definition was covered by the comprehensive words "Public order" as contained in item (1) of the Provincial Legislative List, and did not go beyond the scope of the, words used at the end of the said item "preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of ‑public order, persons subjected to such detention. According to the view expressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first item on the Federal Legislative List wag, the governing factor in the 'resent case, inasmuch as there also the words "preventive detention for reasons of State connected with defence or external affairs," did occur. He tried to make great capital out of the words "State, foreign power or tribal area used to the sub‑clauses which he had picked up for criticism. To us item 1 on the Federal List stands qualified, by the words "connected with defence or external affairs. The public Safety Act, with which we are dealing, does nowhere contain ally reference to "defence or external affairs". The words like foreign power or State" do occur in some portion of the definition of "prejudicial Act", but it is not difficult to see that the Act does not really aim at legislating for their internal administration. A similar point seems to have arisen before the Patna High Court, where also some sort of overlapping was noticed in the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (V) of 1947. In the ruling reported as A I R 1949 Pat, p. 1 (F B), it was laid down that the scope and purpose of the Act as a whole was to be taken into consideration, and all the words 'employed , in it were to be interpreted with reference to the context. It was further said that in spite of, certain words used in the Act, there appeared to their Lordships no encroachment on item 1 of the Federal Legislative List, which dealt with inter alia preventive detention in British India for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs, etc. It is the pith and substance of a legislative measure which is to be taken into consideration and one has not solely to depend upon the casual use of words here anti there, pointing in a different direction. This view found favour with their Lordships of the judicial Committee in A I R 1947 (P C) p. 60, who observed as follows: "It is not possible to make a clean cut between the powers of the Federal and Provincial Legislatures. They are bound to overlap, and where they do; the question to be considered is what is the pith and substance of the impugned enactment and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. The extent bf invasion by the Province into subjects in Federal List is an important matter not because the validity of a Provincial Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion, but for determining the pith and substance of the impugned Act. The question is not has it trespassed more or less but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as to show that the pith and substance of impugned Act is not a Provincial matter but a Federal matter. Once that is determined the Act falls on one or the other side of the line and can be ‑seen as valid or invalid according to its true import'. The problem which is to be tackled in the present case is not whether the obvious meaning of certain terms used is repugnant to tile Federal List. What we are concerned with is the ascertainment of the object underlying the Act, or in other words, to find out the pith and substance of the measure in question. Reading the Public Safety Act as a whole, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that its sole aim was to maintain peace and tranquility within the limits of the North West Frontier Province. Reference to a territory other they the Frontier Province appears to us to be nothing more than ark ancillary one and this is the test which has also been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the ruling cited just above (vide para. 39 appearing at page 65). On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed upon the view expressed by their Lordships of the Federal Court in two cases reported at pages 1 and 75 of A.

1. R. 1943 (F. C.). The first ruling defines only the scope of the authority to make rules under the Defence of India Act, and cannot afford any guidance as far as the point before us goes, while in the latter case we find certain remarks, which do support the view just expressed by us. Their Lordships have observed at page 80, that if the subject of legislation by the Province was only incidental or ancillary to one of the classes of subjects enumerated in the Central List and was properly within one of the Subjects enumerated in the Provincial List, then the legislation by the Province was competent unless and until the Central Legislature chose to occupy the field by legislation. The Allahabad High Court had to deal with a similar question of a conflict between the Provincial and the Federal Lists, and following the Privy Council view enunciated above A I R 1947, P C 60, it was held vide A I R 1948 All. p. '469 (F B) that "section 10 U. P: Communal Disturbances Ordinance, 1947, is not ultra vices the powers of the Governor on account of the fact that it relates to one of the matters enumerated in item 29 of List I (Federal)". Their Lordships further held that the pith and substance of the Ordinance was the prevention of communal disturbances, a matter which fell within item Public Order in List 2, and was within the legislative field of the Provincial Legislature, and, therefore, of the Governor. The fact, their Lordships added, that such legislation incidentally touched upon the subject, which lay within the Federal Field, was not material". Any way the definition of the "prejudicial act" also contains certain items, namely, 2 and 3, which, as it will be clear later on, are our immediate concern, and these items themselves in no way offend against the Federal List at all. Here we may with advantage refer to the view of the Federal Court, as contained in A I R 1941 p. 47, at p. 59, that part of an Act cars be held valid and another part invalid, if they are severable. Here the definition of the `prejudicial act` having been divided into several sub‑clauses satisfies the test laid down by the Lordships of the Federal Court. Before leaving the subject, the learned counsel for the petitioner adversely commented upon the way in which the term "prejudicial act" has been defined in the Public Safety Act, He said that it was not a definition in the true sense of the term, because it only said that "prejudicial act P1 would include such and such element and never said that it will mean this or that. The learned counsel went on to say that the definition as worded left a great scope for the Provincial Government to hold any act, which was not pleasant to them, as prejudicial, to the detriment of the citizens. To him the said definition was merely inclusive and extensive, and by no means certain or well demarcated. We think that the point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot carry any weight, inasmuch as such definitions are met with in almost all legislative measures, and the present Act has introduced nothing new. For instance, the registration Act (XVI of 1908) has defined the terms Book, District Court, Endorsement and immovable property, in an identical manner by not using the word "means" but only employing the, word "includes". A word if not highly technical has always a meaning known to the common man, and it is that meaning to which other connotations of the words are added for purposes of a specific law. "Prejudicial act", is a phrase which conveys a definite sense to even a man in the street, and that sense did not stand in need of being expressed in so many words, it being only necessary to add to it by using the word "includes" certain elements essential for purposes of the Public Safety Act. The matter was not left here, but it was pointed out that section 12 of the Public Safety Act debarred all Courts from entertaining any question arising out of an action taken by the Provincial Government under it. The learned counsel for the petitioner said that here the functions and the privileges of the Federal Court were also not spared, and that, according to him, was clearly repugnant to the Federal Legislative List, which alone included an item pertaining to the Federal Court. This argument too, does not advance the cause of the petitioner any further, inasmuch as no question can initially be taken cognizance of by the Federal Court, and it is only after a matter has passed through several initial and intermediary stages that it can reach the said Court, if it is certified to be a fit one under section 205 of the Government of India Act. The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is, thus, not at all affected, and it is only the subordinate Courts, which come within the ambit of section

12. A reference was also made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to section 10 of the Public Safety Act, which empowered the Provincial Government to order forfeiture of property in certain cases. The learned counsel invoked the aid of section 299 of the Government of India Act urged that the conditions laid down therein had not been fulfilled, and thus section 10 also was ultra vices. In face of the view taken by us above, we do not feel called upon to adjudicate upon this question, because the point is not at all material so far as the present case is concerned. This brings us to the real question in issue, and that relates to the validity of the two orders of detention brought on the record by the learned Advocate‑General. As far as the order dated 27th January 1949 goes, the learned Advocate General has not contended that it fulfilled the require ments of section 3 of the Public Safety Act, under which it purported to have been issued. The discussion was thus narrowed down to the second order dated 4th May 1949. The first and foremost question which arose for our considera tion was whether such an order could be brought on the record 'by the Provincial Government at this stage to resist an application under section 491 Criminal Procedure Code. The position appears to us to have been placed beyond all doubt by their Lordships of the Federal Court in a case reported as A I R 1945 (F C) page 18, where their Lordships observed as follows:‑ "'It was finally contended that as the previous order of this Court directed any inquiry into the validity of detention under order of 19th March 1942, the decision of' the High Court must be limited to that question, and that it was not open td the High Court to base its decision on the subsequent order of 3rd July 1944. This contention proceeds on a misapprehension of the nature of habeas corpus proceedings. The analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings cannot be invoked here. If at any time before the Court directs the release of the detenu a valid order directing his detention is produced, the Court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention. The question is not whether the latter order validates the earlier detention, but whether in the face of the latter valid order the Court can direct the release of the petitioner." The appeal before their Lordships of the Federal Court arose out of a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported as A I R 1945 Patan page 44, in which the latter order, which was held to be a valid one, was considered sufficient for holding that the detention of the petitioner before them was lawful, and dismissing the habeas corpus petition. In the Federal Court the course adopted by the Patna High Court was upheld. The question is thus reduced to the consideration of the validity of the order dated 4th May 1949. On the face of it the order does express that the Governor was satisfied that a certain situation had arisen for him to take steps under section 3 for the Public Safety Act against the petitioner. The reasons for satisfaction, which have been summarized in the beginning of the judgment, do also find place in the order. The main ground of attack against the order; as put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that while under detention, it was meaningless to re arrest the petitioner under the new order. According to the counsel, the petitioner ought to have been released first, and then rearrested under the new order, for that, according to him, would introduce realism into the business. This argument can carry no weight whatsoever, in view of the sure and certain dictum of the Federal Court quoted above. In the case with which their Lordships had to deal, a person had been detained, and on the Failure of his habeas corpus application in the High Court, he went on appeal to the Federal Court, which remanded the case for inquiry to the Patna High Court. But before the Panta High Court could complete the inquiry, the new order was brought to light, and it was based upon the old material. The High Court as well as the Federal Court did not consider the release of the petitioner as a condition precedent to the validity of the new order. Thus, the theory of release and arrest, on the face of it, has no basis in law. It was also urged that the new order failed to mention the place where the detenu actually was at the time when the order was issued It speaks of him as Maulvi Shad Muhammad of Turlandi, Mardan District, and does not say that he was already under detention in the Dera Ismail Khan Central Prison. In support of this argument reliance was 'placed on A I R 1949 Bombay. page. 75 and it was stressed that an error creeping, into the order was quite sufficient to mar its validity. The facts of the case before the Bombay High Court were of a typical nature, and quite distinct from those of the present: one. The order which formed the subject‑matter of that case contained a recital that the person concerned was inciting a section of labourers of Tata Air India, Bombay to use violence against the officers of "rata Air India", and that he was also inciting this section of workers to acts of sabotage. Their Lordships observed that it was a patent fact, which bad not been disputed by the Commissioner of Police in his affidavit that there was no such Company in existence as "Tata Air India". What the Police Commissioner was meaning according to him was " The Air India Ltd.", and he very naively said in his affidavit that he used the expression " Tata Air India Bombay " because according to him the " Air India Ltd." belonged to Tata's. Their Lordships held the statement contained in the affidavit as incorrect and remarked that the Court must investigate the grounds given in the order vigilantly in order to find out whether that degree of care and caution had been exercised by the detaining authority, which the law required. An error, added their Lordships, had crept into the order, and that error was by no means trivial and showed want of .due care and caution on the part of the detaining authority. In the result the detenu was released. Here the person to be detained was already fully known to the Provincial Government, and his description as given in the new order was definitely correct, and the grounds upon which the order was based were in no way misleading like those which had found place in the order dealt with in the Bombay case. The person as well as his actions were graphically before the Governor, who after his satisfaction issued the second order, The fact that the order in question was on a printed form; also came in for some comment on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He called it a mechanical process and urged that the mind of the issuing authority cannot be considered to have moved to the contents of the order at all. This argument is manifestly against the law as contained in section 59 'of the Government of India Act, which lays down that the validity of an order or instrument authenticated in the prescribed manner shall not be called in question, on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. The order before us stands authenticated by the Chief Secretary, and that places the matter beyond all doubt under section

59. The last grievance, which was ventilated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. was that the Provincial Government had failed to comply with the provisions of section 11 of the Public Safety Act, inasmuch as they have not so far disclosed the grounds o‑f the order of detention to the detenu. The learned counsel maintained that the omission of the Provincial Govern ment in this behalf rendered the detention of the petitioner illegal. He, however, failed to specify whether the failure in question made the order of detention void ab initio, or was only a supervening factor, which made the further detention unlawful. In support of this argument reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the case reported as A I R 1949 Pat. page

1. On the other hand the learned Advocate‑General contended, that section 11 of the Public Safety Act did not make it incumbent on the Provincial Government to disclose to the detenu they grounds of detention. It only gave the person detained a qualified right to receive intimation in respect, of the grounds only if their disclosure was not in the opinion, of the Government against public interest. To us the point raised does merit scrutiny, arid this we propose to do By examining the law, which their Lordships of the Patna High Court had to interpret in regard to the non disclosure of the grounds to the detainee. The interpretation of one law can afford guidance for the interpretation of another law, if there is any similarity between the two. On the other hand, if the two provisions of law in question are‑absolutely dissimilar then no question of reasoning by way of analogy would arise. Having this test before us, we have referred to the judgment of their Lordships of the Patna, High Court, and have found that it is based upon the view which they took of the legal position as arose‑out of the interpretation of section 4 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public. Order Act (V) of 1947. To bring the point into bold relief the said section tray be reproduced here in extenso :‑‑ " Where an order is made in respect of any person under Clause (a) of subsection (1) of section a, as soon as may be after the order is made, the authority making the order shall communicate to the person affected thereby so far as such communication can be made without disclosing facts which the said authority considers 'it would be against the public interest to disclose, the grounds on which the order has been made against him and such other particulars' as are in the opinion of such authority sufficient to enable him to make if he wishes a representation against the order and such person may at any tithe thereafter make a representation in writing to such authority against the order and it shall be the duty of such authority to inform such person of This right of making such representation and to afford him the earliest practical Opportunity of doing so." The very words of the section show that if was imperative upon the Government not only to supply the grounds of detention to the detenu, but also to furnish such particulars as may enable him to represent his case to the Government. A further obligation was also imposed ‑upon the Government to inform the nelson concerned of his right of making such 'representation. The sphere of the duties of the Government was also extended to affording' the detenu the earliest practical , opportunity to submit the representation. The provision of law with which we have to deal in the present case stands on an absolutely different footing. Section. 11 of the North‑West Frontier Province, Public Safety Act is not only differently worded, but also does not expressly make it imperative for the Government to perform any of the functions, which have been assigned by the Bihar Act to the provincial Government there.' Section 11, only says that " any person against whom an order under section 3, subsection (1) or under section It, subsection (1) is made or who is affected by any order made under section 5, or whose property is forfeited under section 10, shall be entitled to receive intimation only in respect of those grounds on which such order or declaration is made which in the opinion of the Provincial Government would not be against the public interest to enclose." While according to the Bihar Act time‑factor was an essential feature at every step, nothing of the sort has found place in section 11 of the North‑West Frontier Province Public Safety Act. Here the Government can supply such information as is not con sidered to be against the public interest and no time‑limit, how ever, has been fixed for doing so The position being as discussed above, we do not agree that the Patna Ruling can afford any guidance for the determination of this question, and consequently hold that the petitioner has no valid grievance on this account. For the above‑mentioned reasons we are of the opinion that the detention of the petitioner is neither illegal, nor improper, and consequently we dismiss the petition. The case does not involve any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution Act or any Order in Coun cil, and therefore, we refrain from giving a certificate under section 205 of the Government of India Act for appeal to the Federal Court. Orders Announced. A.H. Petition dismissed.