P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

17. But the question arises whether the position of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, is the same under Martial Law as it would be under the ordinary Law. As far as I am aware, there are no hard and, fast rules on the subject, because Martial Law in the ordinary sense being neither more nor less than the will of the Commander of a conquering Army, no hard and fast rules could be laid down for the exercise of this will, as orders which the circumstances make necessary, will have to be passed. If the Martial Law which is now in force in Pakistan had been the Martial Law of the ordinary type, laws made by an authority other than a Martial Law Authority who has the right to make laws by reason of‑the fact that he happens to be a member of an army which has subjugated the people to whom he issues orders, would have ceased to have application if an order issued by a Martial Law Authority went counter to it and there can be no manner of doubt that the provision contained in paragraph 15 of Zone 'B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 would have had to be enforced by Courts notwithstanding the fact that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, was in force at the time when the above‑mentioned Regulation was passed. However, as I have already clearly shown, Pakistan is not under Martial Law of the ordinary kind and, therefore, I 'am of the opinion that the Regulation under consideration must give way before the Order of the President. My main reason for this view is that it is clear from the statement issued by the President of Pakistan and the Chief Administrator of Martial Law of Pakistan, between the 7th and 27th of October 1958, that each of them was in complete agreement with the actions of the other and it must, therefore, be presumed that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, had the blessings and approval of the Chief Administrator of Martial Law with .the result that no law made by an authority other than the President .of Pakistan or the Chief Administrator of Martial Law could amend the Laws (Continu ance in Force) Order, 1958 which has been described in at least one judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to be the present Constitution of Pakistan. The matter does not rest at that alone, because there are some other considerations which strengthen my view that a Martial Law Regulation issued by an Administrator of Martial Law of a Martial Law Zone cannot amend the Laws (Continuance iii Force) Order, 1958. As already mentioned by me, General (now Field‑Marshal) Muhammad Ayub Khan, who was from the 7th to the 27th of October 1958, the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law in Pakistan, took over as the President of Pakistan on the night of the 27th of October 1958, and has, in his capacity of President of Pakistan, passed many an order amending the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, but nowhere has he said anything which may indicate that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, could be amended or altered by any authority other than the President of Pakistan or the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. In these circumstances, the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 can be safely held to be a measure which has the approval of the Chief Administrator of Martial Law and as under the Regulations issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law no Administrator of Martial Law can issue a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order which runs' counter to a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, I find no diffi culty in inferring that under the Martial Law as in force in Pakistan at the present time the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 cannot be amended, added to or abrogated by any authority other than tire President of Pakistan or the Chief Administrator of Martial Law in Pakistan.

18. What I have said in the last paragraph will become clear by the examination of the question from another angle. Some parts of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 were inserted by the present President of Pakistan. If the position. in law, as at present obtaining in Pakistan, were that the Martial Law Administrator for a Zone could repeal, vary or amend an Order passed by the President, an Administrator of Martial Law for a Zone could repeal, vary or amend an order passed by Field‑Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan in his capacity of the President of Pakistan though, if he had passed the same order by means of a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order in his capacity of the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, no Administrator of Martial Law of a Zone could have made that provision inapplicable to his Zone. If Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan wants to amend, add to or abrogate the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, two courses will be open to him. He can, as the President of Pakistan, pass an Order amending, adding to of abrogating the, Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 or he can issue a Martial Law Regulation for the purpose and that too will have the same effect as an Order passed by, him in his capacity of President of Pakistan. It will be a very anamolous position if a provision in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 could be repealed, added to or amended by a Martial Law Administrator of a Zone if it had been made law by the President of Pakistan, though it could not be amended, added to or repealed by a Martial Law Administrator of a Zone if it happened to have been made law by the President of Pakistan who was in addition the Chief Administrator of Martial Law also. It follows from what I have said above that paragraph 15 of Zone `B' Martial Law Regulation No. 9 does not abrogate and could not have been intended to abrogate clause (4) of Article 2 of the Laws (Conti nuance in Force) Order, 1958 with the result that notwithstand ing the above‑mentioned paragraph 15, the power given to this Court of issuing a writ by clause (4) of Article 2 of the Order would subsist.

19. There is yet another consideration which could support what I have already said about the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ to a Border Allotment Committee appointed under paragraph 4 of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 not having been taken away by paragraph 15 of that Regulation. I find it difficult to believe that the Martial Law Administrator of Zone `B' had given to all actions of two public servants, one of whom was the representative of the Civil Department as dis tinguished from a Military Department, complete immunity from scrutiny by Courts if they did anything when sitting together. Can anyone seriously urge that though Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9, by virtue of which Border Allotment Com mittees were set up, gave jurisdiction to them only in an area within five miles of the Borders of Pakistan, the order of any of such Committee, even if it was with regard to an area very much beyond the limits of five miles fixed by the Regulation, was intended to be immune from scrutiny by Courts? When a law, and I would say the same about Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders, confers powers on a person or an authority, it has generally also the effect of defining the powers unless it says that the powers are not trammelled at all. If, for example, a Border Allotment Committee were to order wholesale slaughter of people living within an area of five miles of the borders of Pakistan, because they would not leave the property the Committee wanted them to vacate, it cannot be urged that the committee's acts were immune from scrutiny by ordinary Courts on account of paragraph 15 of the Martial Law Regulation under which the Laxen is no doubt an extreme case, but if the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts in a case of that type is not taken away, I cannot see how it can be held that though the Martial Law Regulation under which a Border Allotment Committee purported to act had been ignored, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts to look into the matter would be taken away on the ground that the act which is intended to be scrutinised was done by a Committee set up under Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 and, therefore, paragraph 15 of that Regulation deprived the Courts of all jurisdiction to look into any acts of the Border Allotment Committee. It would, perhaps, be open to a law‑maker of a country to declare lawful even those acts which cannot be con sidered to be proper by any standard, but before Courts can infer that intention the words by means of which that intention is expressed must be absolutely clear on the point. I can find nothing in the language of paragraph 15 of Zone `B', Regulation No. 9 which would take 'away the jurisdiction of this Court to scrutinise the acts of a Border Allotment Committee appointed under paragraph 4 of the Zone `B , Martial Law Regulation No. 9 and to pass appropriate orders if the acts were entirely outside the scope of the Regulation which gave the committee the jurisdiction to exercise certain powers. If the Border Allotment Committee had been a Martial Law Authority, the jurisdiction of this Court would no doubt have been ousted on account of Regulation No. 88 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law on the 22nd of June 1961, but, as I have already shown, that Regulation is not applicable to a Border Allotment Committee of the kind under consideration which cannot be deemed to be a Martial Law Authority. While determining what the intention of the Martial Law Authority was when issuing a‑Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order of which the language is open to more meanings than one, Courts have, as held by a Division Bench of this Court comprising my brother Anwar‑ul‑Haq, J. who sits on this Bench with me and myself in Ghulam Mustafa K v. State (P L D 1960 Lah. 364) to keep in view the circumstances prevalent at the time when a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order was passed. That, as pointed out by .the learned Attorney -General, extreme care was required regarding `the selection of persons who should live near the borders of a country cannot be doubted by any right‑thinking person, but the inference cannot be drawn that the Administrator of Martial Law for Zone B' felt that this important consideration will be overlooked by anyone other than a person chosen by the Military Authorities because if he had thought that, he would not have left the selection of one of the members to the Rehabilitation Depart ment. If a representative of the Rehabilitation Department was not considered incapable of keeping the safety of the country in view, why should it be presumed that persons who manned ordinary Courts, which even the Martial Law Authorities have kept alive, were believed to be persons .of that incapability. The argument of the learned Attorney‑General for Pakistan based on considerations relating to the safety of the State must also fail on another ground which is that this Court will not by its writ, if issued, direct that allotment shall be made to its nominee, because such an order would be entirely without jurisdiction. If a writ is issued, it will only direct that the provisions, under which powers purport to be exercised, should be complied with and the selection of persons to whom land should be allotted will still be made by the Border Allotment Committee.

20. So far I have dealt with the question from the point of view that a law‑maker cannot be presumed to break the law which binds him, but the question whether the Court is debarred from questioning the validity of the Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 needs consideration and I will, before proceed ing further, deal with it. Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, on which alone reliance could be placed in this behalf is worded as follows :‑ "

3. No Court or person shall call or permit to be called in question‑ (i) the proclamation ; (ii) any order made in pursuance of the proclamation or any Martial Law Order or Martial Law Regulation ; (iii) any finding, judgment or order of a Special Military Court or a Summary Military Court." Two questions arise with regard to the interpretation of clause (ii) of the Article. The first of these is whether the Martial Law Regulations and the Martial Law Orders mentioned in the clause mean only the Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or also those of an Administrator of Martial Law of a Zone or persons acting under his authority such as Sub‑Administrators of Martial Law, and the second is whether in view of the provisions of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, it is not open to this Court to ignore a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by Martial Law Administrator of a Zone on the ground that it comes in conflict with an Order of the President or a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law.

21. A good deal can be said in favour of the view that the expressions "Martial Law Regulation" and "Martial Law Order", which occur in clause (u) of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, mean only the Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. In this connection, one of the relevant matters is the language employed in clause (1) of Article 2 of the Order itself wherein the Chief Administrator of Martial Law alone has been given the power to pass Orders which come in conflict with what is stated in clause (1) of Article

2. Another thing which points in this direction is the language employed in Article 5 of the Order. This Article reads as follows :‑ "5. (1) The powers of a Governor shall be those which he would have had, had the President directed him to assume on behalf of the President all the functions of the Government of the Province under the provisions of Article 193 of the late Constitution and such powers of making Ordinance as he would have had and within such limitations had Article 106 and clauses (1) and (3) of Article 102 of the late Constitution been still in force. (2) In the exercise of the powers conferred by the previous clause the Governor shall act subject to any direction given to him by the President or by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or by any person having authority from the Chief Administrator. (3) Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the, operation of any Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or by any person having authority from the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law to make, Martial Law Regulations and where any Ordinance or any provision thereof made under clause (1) of this Article is repugnant to any such Regulation or part thereof the Regulation or part shall prevail". It cannot escape notice that clause (3) of the above‑reproduced Article 5 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 does no` content itself with using the expression "Martial Law Regulation" but takes care to mention that Regulations ' made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or any person having authority from the Chief Administrator of Martial Law to make Martial Law Regulations are to be preferred to the Laws passed by the Governor of a Province. It is difficult to believe that though the President of .Pakistan, who promulgated the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, meant by Article 3 that a Martial Law Order or a Martial Law Regulation was to mean Martial Law Order or Martial Law Regulation issued by any authority competent to issue them, he felt doubts that the same meaning will be attached to the expression "Martial Law Regulation" when used in clause (3) of Article 5 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. I am of the opinion, therefore, that only the Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders passed by the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law fall within the ambit of clause (ii) of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958.

22. The second .of the two questions mentioned in the last paragraph but one may now be dealt with. Nobody can doubt that under the Martial Law as in force in Pakistan the powers of ' an Administrator of Martial Law of a Zone are not unlimited. While considering whether a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by the Martial Law Administrator of a Zone could take away powers given by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Odder, 1958 I have expressed the view that it could not. If a Martial Law Regulation or an Order issued by a Martial Law Administrator of a Zone cannot amend the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 1 do not see on what reasonable principle of interpretation of laws it should be held that though a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by the Martial Law Administrator of a Zone could not amend the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 the question could not be raised in any Court in spite of the fact that the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 which was the interim Constitution of the country, said that the Courts shall continue in their jurisdiction and the Superior Courts of the country, namely, the High Courts and the " Supreme Court, were to have the powers to issue writs mentioned in the Order except in cases specified in the Order itself. The position of a Martial Law Order issued by the. Administrator of Martial Law of a Zone was considered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Ayub Khuro v. Pakistan (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 237) and the remarks made in this connection by Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, with which all his four colleagues concurred, are instructive. These remarks which occur at pages 246 and 247 of the law report read as follows : -- "Before reverting to the principal question so far left unanswered, we may here dispose of Mr. Nazir Ahmad Khan's 'other contention that Martial Law Order No. 10 is in law a `Regulation' within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, and that therefore it has affected, the pre‑proclamation jurisdiction of this Court as well as that of the High Court. The argument in support of this contention is to be found in some decisions of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore particularly Chaudhri Manzur Ilahi' v. The State P L D 1959 Lah. 243, but we find ourselves unable' to accept it. No definition of a Regulation or an Order is found anywhere in the Martial Law legislation. In his proclamation of Martial Law dated the 7th October 1958, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces declared in paragraph 2 of the Proclamation `Martial Law Regulations and Orders will be published in such manner as is conveniently possible. Any person contravening the said Regulations or Orders shall be liable under Martial Law to the penalties stated in the Regulations'. It would appear from this provision that while the Regulations prescribe the penalties the Orders merely provide the method of enforcing the Regulations, and in Martial Law terminology that is the correct distinction between the two. A Regulation lays down the: principle and policy of the law and the penalties for its infringement; it may further lay down a broad outline of the procedure, jurisdictional and processual, for the enforcement of the low. But since the area over which Martial Law may operate may be vast and unmanageable by the central agency, a wide discretion is sometimes given to the Administrators and Sub‑Administrators of Martial Law in different regions from time to time to issue Orders for the enforcement of the Regulations. This position was envisaged in Martial Law. Regulation No. 1 which divided the Martial Law area into three Zones, appointed an Administrator for each Zone and provided in clause (c) `Orders under these Regulations and Additional Regulations hereinafter known as Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations may be issued by me or by an Administrator or by any other officer authorised by me.' Thus a general authority was given to the Administrators to issue Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations but this 'authority was to be exercised consistently with the Orders and Regulations issued by the Chief Administrator, Martial Law. In this manner the main legislative authority was kept by the Chief Martial Law Administrator with himself while the Administrators and other officers were to exercise a kind of delegated legislative authority. This authority could, of course, extend to the making of Orders, determining the manner in which the principle and policy of a Regulation was to be carried out and the penalties prescribed therein enforced. Of course, the Chief Martial Law Administrator could himself issue Orders but it would be incorrect to suppose that such Orders had the status of Regulations." It cannot be doubted that the Supreme Court declared a Martial Law Order issued by the Administrator of a Martial Law Zone to be a law made by an authority to whom powers had been delega ted: This is the law laid down by the Supreme Court which, because of clause (3) of Article, 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 is binding on all Courts in Pakistan. An authority having delegated powers of legislation cannot exceed the powers delegated to it. No Regulation of the Chief Administrator of Martial Law authorised the Martial Law Administrators of Zones to pass Regulations or Orders which may set at naught any provision of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 and it follows, therefore, that if the jurisdiction give to Courts had been taken away by means of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9, the power to pass that Regulation did not flow from the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. It may possibly be thought that the view expressed by the Supreme Court N cannot be considered to be the law laid down by the Supreme Court, because the case was ultimately decided on another point. That a Court of ultimate jurisdiction can give findings on question of law though they may not directly arise in the case in which those findings were given is hardly open .to question. Another example of giving a finding on a question of law which may appear not to arise in the case in which the finding was given is to be found in the Supreme Court's judgment dated the 14th of September 1961 in Mian Ifiikhar‑ud‑Din, etc. v. Mr. Muhammad Sarjraz, etc. (PL D 1961 S C 585) to which a reference has been made in paragraph

13. I allude to the last paragraph but two of the Supreme Court judgments and that part of it which brings out my point reads as under :‑ "In view of what has been stated above, Civil Appeal No. 49 of 1961 and Writ Petition No. K‑3 of 1961 fail and are dismissed. Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 55 of 1961 has become infructuous and has to be dismissed as such; but a decision was given in this case by the High Court on an important question relating to the applicability of the Martial Law Regulation No. 72 with which we are not in agreement and we would briefly record the reasons for our disagreement." Can any‑one assert that, in spite of what the Supreme Court has said to the effect, that Regulation No. 72 did not allow the issue of a writ, any Court in Pakistan could say that a writ did lie to enforce an order passed under Regulation No. 72 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Incidentally, I might point out that what the Supreme Court said, supports the view expressed by me in paragraph 13 that a writ can issue to enforce a . Martial Law Regulation unless the power to issue one has been specifically taken away as was the case in relation to Regulation No. 72.

23. But before I part with this aspect of the case, I might make a reference to another reason which supports my view that the Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders mentioned in clause (ii) of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 mean Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders which are in accordance with the law that governs them. In support of this view, I refer to what I said in the case decided on 16th January 1959, and Manzoor Illahi v. State (P L R 1959 Lah. 771 P L D 1959 Lah, 243) which was concurred in with my brother Masud Ahmad, J. who sat with me, I said therein that Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 did not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ against an order of a Summary Military Court if the order happened to be either with regard to a matter in which the Summary Military Court had no jurisdiction or was not in accordance with the law that gave the Military Court the jurisdic tion to hear cases. Two courses were open to the Martial Law l Authorities after that decision. One was to question its correctness by an appeal to the Supreme Court and have that decision set aside and the other was to change the law. They chose to follow the latter course and on the 4th of February 1959, the Chief Administrator of Martial Law added clause 8 to Regulation No. 61 issued by him. This clause is in the following terms :‑ "The constitution or jurisdiction of any Military Court whether designated as a Special Military Court or as a Summary Military Court and the proceedings before any such Court, and orders passed or sentences imposed in any such proceedings, shall not, on any ground whatever, be called in question in any Court, including the High Court and the Supreme Court." I cannot bring myself to believe that the Chief Administrator of Martial Law had passed a Regulation which, if the judgment in Manzoor Elahi v. State, was incorrect, would be entirely unneces sary, and the inference, therefore, is that the view that is only the orders of Military Courts, which are within their jurisdiction, that are immune from scrutiny by ordinary Civil Courts under Article 3 (iii) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 was accepted as correct. It is not, perhaps, without interest to mention that it was with regard to certain remarks made by me in Manzoor Elahi v. State that the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ayub Khuro v. Pakistan said that laws made by Administrators of Martial Law Zones could be deemed to have been passed under delegated powers of legislation. Is it possible to conceive that the Supreme Court entered into a discussion of the binding nature or otherwise of Martial Law Orders and Martial Law Regulations issued by the Administrator of a: Zone if it was incompetent for Courts to consider their validity by reason of Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 for the purpose of deciding whether a certain act which purports to have been done under such Regulations or Orders should be upheld?

24. Here a reference may profitably be made to some other observations made by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ayub Khuro v. Pakistan (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 237). At page 248 of the report, their Lordships are reported to have said as under :‑ "There is one point more which should be mentioned in this connection. Regulation I which distinguishes a Regulation from an Order came into force on 7th October; the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order was published on 10th October ; and Martial Law Order No. 10 was notified on, 18th October. It is reasonable to presume that the draftsman of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order was aware of the distinction between a Regulation and, an Order and that the author of Martial Law Order No. 10 was cognizant of the difference in the phraseology of Articles 2 and 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order. If, therefore, Martial Law Order No. 10 was issued as an Order and not as a Regulation, the intention could only be that it was not to affect the jurisdictions of the Courts which had been subject to any Regulation by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, preserved by Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order". The plain meaning of these observations is that, if juris diction of Courts could be taken away by the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law by means of a Regulation, an Order issued by him could not be held by Courts to have been intended to take away jurisdiction of Courts. This is precisely the way in which I have dealt with the question regarding the applicability of Article 3, of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958.

25. Another aspect of the question calls for consideration. Jurisdiction of ordinary Courts has been taken away with regard to matters dealt with in Regulation No. 72 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Clauses 2 and 3 of this Regulation, which alone are relevant for the present purpose, are in the following terms :‑ "

2. Notwithstanding anything in the aforesaid Order, no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings, whether by, way of writ petition or otherwise, shall lie in any Court, including the High Courts and the Supreme Court, against Government, or any person acting under the authority of Government, for anything done or to be done, or intended, expressed or purported to be or to have been done under the aforesaid Act on or after ‑the aforesaid day, and any such suit, prosecu tion or other legal proceedings pending before any such Court shall abate forthwith, and no Court shall proceed with them.

3. No provision of this Regulation shall be called in question in any Court, including the High Courts and the Supreme Court." It was on the interpretation of the language used in this: Martial Law Regulation that the Supreme Court of Pakistan said in Mian lftikhar‑ud‑Din, etc. v. Muhammad Sarfraz, etc. to which I have made a reference in paragraph 13 that the jurisdiction to issue a writ in cases covered by Regula tion No. 72 had been taken away. The words used regarding exclusion of jurisdiction in Regulation No. 72 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law and in Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 are so different from each other that both could not' have been intended to have the same object and the same has to be the inference when one compares the language used in paragraph 15 of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 and clause 8 of Regulation No. 61 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, which clause has been reproduced by m: in paragraph

23. No doubt, Martial Law Regulations No. 61 and .72 mentioned above on the one hand and Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 were issued by different Martial Law Authorities, but as far as I know the draftsman for both these authorities is the same. But even if the draftsmen are different, I can safely presume that the one entrusted with drafting the Regulations and Orders issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator has more experience than the other. In view of what I have said on the subject, I am of the view that Regulation No. 9 has not taken away the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ to the Border Allotment Committees appointed under that Regulation. The fact that someone oil behalf of the Zone B', Martial Law Authorities has expressed the view that Regulation No. 9 has taken away the jurisdiction of this Court is not at all relevant, because when the matter is in Court, the Court has to interpret the law and the law‑maker's opinion is not final.

26. Though a contention to that effect was not raised either by the learned Attorney‑General or the Advocate‑General, evidently because it could not receive any support from the language used in the Regulation, I have considered the question whether Regulation No. 88 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law had the effect of validating in so far as scrutiny by ordinary Courts went, all Martial Law Regulations or Martial Law Orders passed by a Martial Law Authority deriving powers to issue such Regulations or Orders from the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, because I would not like this Court to exercise a jurisdiction which does not in fact vest in it. The words used 'in Regulation No. 88 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law on the 22nd of June 1961 make it abundantly clear that they are meant to apply to things done and orders passed by Martial Law Authorities and it is manifest that the Regulation was not intended to validate, even as far as ordinary Courts were concerned, those Martial Law Regula tions or Martial Law Orders passed by Martial Law Authorities subordinate to the Chief Administrator of Martial Law which would not be valid under a Martial' Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or under a law which could not be added to, amended, or repealed, by a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order passed y any Authority other than, the Chief Administrator of Martial Law that the Chief Administrator of Martial Law is competent to pass an order that even if the legislative measures of any of the Martial Law Authorities subordinate to him contravene his own Regulations and Orders or any other law in force in Pakistan by reason of those Regulations or Orders is hardly open to doubt, but the question for consideration is whether in the absence of clear words to that effect in Regulation No. L8 issued by the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law on the 22nd of June 1961 it can be held that though the trend of the Regulation was that it was applicable to orders and not to legislative measures, the Regulation was applicable to legislative measures as well. I cannot bring myself to believe that the Chief Administrator of Martial Law had by his 88th Regulation permitted Martial Law Authorities subordinate to him lo pass orders which contravened his own and resulted in, amending, adding to or abrogating the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958; and the Orders amending it tom time to time or the laws which were Inept in force by those Orders. If a subordinate authority is allowed to change orders passed by a superior authority, the result can be nothing but chaos and uncertainty and in view of what has happened during Martial Law, now in force in Pakistan which I have distinguished from ordinary Martial Law in paragraphs 11 and 12, I cannot, in the absence of clear words to that effect, bring myself to believe that in order to avoid the orders of Martial Law Authorities being scrutinised by ordinary Courts, the Chief Administrator of Martial Law had, without saying a single word to the effect that Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 Q and, his own Regulations and Orders were amended in the relevant regard; made sacrosanct Martial Law Regulations and Martial Law Orders issued by an authority subordinate to him.

27. In view of what I have said above, I would hold that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ regarding the actions and orders of a Border Allotment Committee appointed under paragraph 4 of Zone `B' Martial Law Regulation No. 9 is not absolute. While dealing with the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ to such Committees, I have not made any reference to the facts of the case. This omission is not due to negligence, but to design. For the purposes of determining whether or not a Court has jurisdiction in a certain matter, it is not necessary to deal with the facts though dealing with them is imperative for the purposes of determining whether the jurisdiction which exists should or should .not be exercised. It is for this reason that I have refrained from making any reference to the assertions of fact in Writ Petition No. 265 of 1961. Having held that this Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ to a Border Allotment Committee acting under paragraph 4 of Zone B' of Martial Law Regulation No. 9, I have dealt with the point that the Full Bench had to adjudicate upon, and would, therefore, direct that the case will now go to a Division Banch for consideration of the question whether the case is a fit one for exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court.

28. I now pass on to the consideration of the question whether or not a writ can issue to the Chief Land Commissioner and to Land Commissioners who exercise powers by virtue of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 called the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959. The question whether this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs to the above‑mentioned authorities has been taken away by Martial Law Regulation No. 88 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law has already been answered in the negative when considering the effect of that Regulation on the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ to a Border Allotment Committee exercising powers by virtue of paragraph 4 of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 and nothing more need be said regarding that matter. The only question that now requires determination in Writ Petition. No. 714 of 1960 is whether the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writs to the Chief Land Commissioner and the Land Commissioners has been taken away by clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 which has been reproduced in paragraph 4.

29. Under paragraph 4 (1) of Chief Martial Law Adminis trator's Regulation No. 64, a body called the West Pakistan Land r Commission was to be set up and one of its members could be nominated by it as the Chief Land Commissioner under para graph 4 (3) while under paragraph 4 (6) the Commission could delegate some of its powers to other authorities. It is in pursuance of these powers that the Chief Land Commissioner and Land Commissioners were appointed. The contention of the learned Advocate‑General for West Pakistan was that the Chief Land Commissioner and Land Commissioners appointed under Regula tion No. 64 were persons who exercised their powers in the relevant regard by virtue of Regulation No. 64 issued by the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law and, consequently, they fell within the four corners of clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 with the result that no writ could issue to them. The reply of Mian Muhammad Shafi, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960, was that the Land Commissioner, Multan, against whose order dated the 4th, of June 1960, which was affirmed by the Chief Land. Commissioner on the 2nd of August 1960, this writ petition was directed had passed a patently wrong order and neither he nor the Chief Land Commissioner fell within the ambit of clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. The question whether or not the impugned orders were ‑wrong and, therefore, a good case for issue of a writ was made out has to await determination till the disposal of the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ. If it be held that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ, the consideration of the ques tion whether the impugned orders were right or wrong will not arise because, the Court being deprived of the power of issuing the order prayed for, it would be futile for it to look into the merits of the case. The question of jurisdiction must, therefore, be taken up first.

30. I have already said that the Chief Land Commissioner was appointed by the Land Commission for West Pakistan and the question naturally arises whether he, having been appointed by an authority other than the Chief Administrator or a Deputy Chief Administrator of Martial Law, could be deemed to be acting under the authority of either of them, and was, therefore, by reason of clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 19.)8 not subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the matter under consideration. I am clear in my mind that the fact that the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, was appointed by the Land Commission does not mean that it was under the authority of the latter that he was exercising the jurisdiction which a Chief Land Commissioner for West Pakistan had under Regulation No. 64.. The appointment of the Chief Land Commissioner for West Pakistan has to be made by the Governor of that Province but once the appointment was made the Chief Land Commissioner got the jurisdiction to exercise powers mentioned in Martial Law Regulation No. 64 as the powers of the Chief Land Commissioner and I find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the powers were exercised by him under the authority of Chief Administrator of Martial Law and not that of the Land Commission, West Pakistan. The position of the Border Allotment Committees, which has been considered in Writ Petition No. 265 of 1961, is entirely different from that of the Chief Land Commissioner. The difference is that while powers of a Border Allotment Committee appointed under Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation called the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, are conferred by that Regulation which was issued by a Martial Law Administrator of ‑a Zone, the powers of the Chief Land Commissioner were conferred on him by Martial Law Regulation No. 64 called the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, which was issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Mian Muhammad Shafi, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960, contended that even if the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, got his authority from the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ in the case under consideration was not taken away, because the Chief Land Commissioner was not acting on the Regulation which he is bound to follow but on some rules or instructions made by another authority. That the Chief Land Commissioner is acting on some instructions which would appear in some regard to go counter to the provisions of the Regulation under which they purport to have been issued does not appear to be an entirely rash assertion, but it appears to me that even if that be so, no jurisdiction to issue a writ exists. Clause (5) of Article 2, when translated so as to apply to the Chief 'Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, would mean that no writ could issue to the Chief Land Commissioner when he is exercising powers given to him by the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation. No one would issue a writ if the powers conferred on a person are being exercised in accordance with the provisions of law which gives these powers, because if a Court did issue a writ in those circumstances it would be directing a breach of law and not its enforcement and that no Court will do or is competent to do. It follows, therefore, that clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, s 1958 would be applicable even though the Chief Land Commis sioner, West Pakistan, was committing errors in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on him by Regulation No. 64 issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, in view of this the remedy of a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Chief Land Com missioner, West Pakistan, is not by an application for issue of a writ but by some other process of getting redress.

31. What I have said regarding the appointment of the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, by the Land Commission West Pakistan being irrelevant for determination of the question whether the Chief Land Commissioner falls within the four corners of clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, applies to Land Commissioners and the fact that the appointment of the Land Commissioners has to be made by the Land Commission does not make clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 inapplicable to him. Bui even if the Land Commissioner, Multan, whose order dated the 4th of June 1960, was attacked in the writ petition had been held to be a person to whom clause (5) of Article 2 did not apply, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 714 could not have benefited because the order of the Land Commissioner, Multan, was confirm ed by the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, on the 2nd of August 11 60 and no writ would have issued to the Land Commis sioner, Multan, because such a writ would have been futile would, therefore, hold that no writ can issue in Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960.

32. Having held that no writ can issue in Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960, I proceed to consider what order the Full Bench should pass in that case. When a point is referred to a Full Bench in a civil, matter, the Bench has to concern itself with the point that has been referred to it, but I am of the view that this rule should not be applied where the point referred to a Full Bench concerns the question of jurisdiction of the Court. If the decision of the Full Bench be that this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter, it would be a useless enforcing of a technicality to send the case to the Bench at whose instance the hatter was referred to the Full Bench, because the Bench would have to do no more than say that in view of the decision of the Full Bench the writ petition was dismissed. I would consequently dismiss Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960, but would leave the parties to bear their own costs.

33. The answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that a writ cannot issue to the Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, or a Land Commissioner both of whom exercised jurisdiction by virtue of the powers given to them by the west Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, issued by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, Pakistan, but one can, in an appro priate case, issue to a Border Allotment Committee which exercises jurisdiction by virtue of powers given to it by the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, .issued by the Administrator of Martial Law, Zone 'B'. As. already indicated by me, Writ Petition No. 265 of 1961, which is directed against a Border Allotment Committee, will go to a Division Bench for consideration of the question whether or not the facts alleged call for issue, of a writ. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.‑I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Shabir Ahmad, Acting Chief Justice and concur with the order he proposes to‑ make in these two writ petitions before the Full Bench.

2. For the reasons set out by my learned brother with which I am in complete agreement a Border Allotment Committee consti tuted by the Provincial Government under Martial Law Regulation No. 9 and the Land Commission set up under Martial .Law Regulation No. 64 are not Martial Law Authorities within the purview of Martial Law Regulation No. 88, so as to take away the jurisdiction of this Court to issue appropriate' writs to them by virtue of clause (4) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. The case of the Land Commission, however, stands on a different footing as clause (5) of the same Article provides that no writ shall issue to the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, or the Deputy Chief Administrator of Martial Law, or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under the authority of either. It was not disputed before us that the Land Commission exercised jurisdiction and powers under the authority of the Chief Adminis trator of Martial Law by virtue of Regulation No. 64 promulgated by him on the 7th of February 1959.

3. The next question before the Full Bench as to whether the Zonal Administrator of Martial Law could take away jurisdiction of Courts conferred on them by clause (4) of Article 2 of the aforesaid Order presented considerable difficulty in view of Article 3, which in peremptory terms provides that no Court shall call or permit to be called in question any Order made in pursuance of any Martial Law Order. The anamolous results envisaged by the Acting Chief Justice which might flow from giving effect to this clause no doubt call for serious consideration but speaking for myself they do not influence interpretation of Article 3 for we are not concerned with the policy or impolicy of laws. I was, therefore, inclined to adopt a contrary view, but the observations of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ayub Khuru's case, reproduced in the judgment of the Acting Chief Justice, have solved the difficul ties envisaged by me. In that case Regulation No. 10 promulgated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator on the 18th of October 1958 was relied upon by the Attorney‑General to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court to' interfere with the conviction of the accused. In disposing of the contention their Lordships after reviewing the Laws (Continu ance in Force) Order and the scheme of Martial Law legislation concluded that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Court by clause (4) of Article 2 could be taken away only by a Martial‑ Law Regulation promulgated by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or by an order of the President. In view of this decision section 15 of the Martial Law Regulation No. 9 promulgated by the Zonal Administrator is inoperative and ineffective to take away the jurisdiction of this Court to issue an appropriate writ to a Border Allotment Committee if the merits of the case so dictate.

4. On the last question raised before the Full Bench, viz., the scope and interpretation of section, I S of the Martial Law Regulation 9 with great respect, I beg to differ with the Acting Chief Justice. On the difference of language of section 2 of Regulation No. 72 and section 15 of Regulation No. 9 he has found that independent of the provisions of clause (4) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order this Court had the jurisdiction to bring before it an order of a Border Allotment Committee to determine whether it was passed with or without jurisdiction. The words used in the two Regulations may be different but their intention and the object desired to be achieved by their author is unmistakably the same. It leaves me in no doubt that the Administrator of Martial Law, Zone B' in enacting section 15 of Martial Law Regulation 9 wanted that no order of the Border Allotment Committee, right or wrong, with or without jurisdiction shall be brought before the High Court or Supreme Court for scrutiny. It is,, however, a different matter that the section is inoperative on account of its being repugnant to the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order.

5. Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960 in which relief is sought against the Chief Land Commissioner is, therefore, dismissed while the other writ petition in which writ is sought against a Border Allotment Committee shall now go before a Division Bench for decision on merits. In the circumstances of the case and difficult questions of law involved in its determination, there shall be no order as to costs. ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑I have had the benefit of reading through the very elaborate judgment proposed to be delivered in this case by my Lord, the Acting Chief Justice and I find myself in respectful agreement with the conclusions reached by him, namely, (a) that "the exclusion of the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ regarding the actions and orders of a Border Allotment Committee appointed under paragraph (a) of Zone B, Martial Law Regulation No. 9 is not absolute" and, therefore, the case (W. P. No. 265 of 1961) should go back to the Division Bench for consideration of the question whether it is a fit case for exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court ; and (b) that no writ can issue to the Chief Land Commissioner acting under Chief Martial Law Regulation No. 64 in view of the provisions of clause (5) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, and for that reason the Writ Petition No. 714 of 1960 should be dismissed':

2. I wish, however, to add a few remarks on some aspects of the case.

3. The jurisdiction of this Court was denied on the following grounds :‑ (a) That a Border Allotment Committee as well as the Chief Land Commissioner and his subordinates were Martial Law Authorities and accordingly their actions were immune from scrutiny by Courts in view of the recently promulgated Regula tion No. 88 which came into force on the 22nd of June 1961 i.e. during the pendency of these petitions, (b) That in accordance with Article 2 (5) of the Laws (Con tinuance in Force) Order, 1958 no writ could issue against the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or the Deputy Chief Administrator of Martial Law or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under the authority of either, and (c) That the Regulations themselves, namely, Regulation No. 9, issued by the Martial Law Administrator, Zone `B' and Regulation No. 64, issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator under which the Border Allotment Committee and the Chief Land Commissioner, respectively, were functioning contained an express bar to the jurisdiction of Court.

4. In order to determine the applicability of Martial Law Regulation No. 88, the first question which fell to be decided was regarding the meaning of the phrase "Martial Law Authority" used in this Regulation, for the reason that this Regulation extends immunity to all acts of a Martial Law Authority in pursuance of a Martial Law Regulation or Martial Law Order irrespective of the fact whether the order or the thing done is within the scope of the Regulation or Order or not, or whether the Authority making the Order or doing the thing had jurisdiction in the matter or not. The phrase in question does not appear to have been defined anywhere in the Martial Law Regulations, or Orders, nor does it appear to have been used frequently in Regulations or Orders issued prior to Martial Law Regulation No.

88. Even the learned Attorney- General and the Advocate‑General of West, Pakistan were not able to produce an agreed definition of this term.

5. There can be no doubt that primarily the term "Martial Law Authority" is intended to connote the hierarchy of Martial Law Administrators who are responsible for enforcing Martial Law in the country and for that purpose have the authority to issue Martial Law Orders and Regulations. It is also clear that the term "Martial Law Authority" would include any person or Authority who may be declared to be such by the Chief Martial Law Administrator or any of the subordinate Administrators of Martial Law having authority in this behalf. The term cannot, however, be interpreted to include functionaries or officials who may either be created by various Martial Law Regulations or Orders or who may be entrusted with the performance of certain duties under these Orders or Regulations, unless the Orders or Regulations in question specifically say so. To put it differently, one might say that a Martial Law Authority can be regarded generally as being the creator of a Martial Law Regulation or Order and not its creation. This position appears to emerge from a perusal of Martial Law Regulation No. 68 'in which the term "Martial Law Authority" has been used, before it was employed in Martial Law Regulation No.

88. According to Regulation No. 68, Martial Law Authority may declare certain persons as absconders and proceed to deal with them according to the manner prescribed in the Regulation. The Regulation thus presumes the existence of a Martial Law Authority and does not purport to create one.

6. If the term "Martial Law Authority" were interpreted so as to include "any person who is clothed with powers to do a certain act by a Martial Law Regulation or Martial Law Order" as canvassed by the learned Advocate‑General, or to include "any person or Authority appointed under a Martial Law Regulation or Order if the Martial Law Regulation or Order lays down a procedure in pursuance of which such a functionary is empowered to act", as contended by the learned Attorney- General, the result would be that a countless number of civilian officials of all levels would have to be regarded as Martial Law authorities whose actions would be immune from scrutiny by the Courts of the country. As pointed out by my learned brother Shabir Ahmad, J., under such an extended definition a Magistrate deciding a case under a Martial Law Regulation would have to be regarded as a Martial Law Authority. Similarly, one might add that a Naib‑Tehsildar or a Field Qanungo seeking to give possession of land to ail allottee of the Border Allotment Committee or a Revenue Patwari implementing an order of the Chief Land Commissioner passed under Regulation No. 64 will have to be regarded as Martial Law Authority. It is clear to me that this could not have been the intention of the Chief Martial Law Administrator, as such a definition would tend to do away with the basic distinction which exists between the Martial Law Authorities and the civil administration in the country. There is no doubt that the civil administration is an instrument in the hands of the Chief Martial Law Administrator for enforcing his will, but the civil administration by itself does not become a Martial Law Authority when obeying the commands of the Chief Martial Law Administrator or of persons authorised by him to issue such commands.

7. For these reasons; I respectfully agree with the definition of the expression "Martial Law Authority" given by Shabir Ahmad, J., namely, a civil or Military Authority which can issue, a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order or an Authority which has. been declared to be a Martial Law' Authority either by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law or by someone authorised by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law to make such a declaration. The Border Allotment Committee or the Chief Land Commissioner do not fall within this definition and cannot, therefore, be regarded as Martial Law Authorities which alone are protected under the terms of Martial Law Regulation No. 88.

8. As regards the immunity conferred by Article 2 (5) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, I have nothing to add to the observations made by my learned brother Shabir Ahmad, J, and have no hesitation in holding that the Border Allotment Committee acting under a Regulation issued by the Zonal Martial Law Administrator does not fall within the category of persons to whom a writ cannot issue. The case of the Chief Land Commissioner is clearly distinguishable from that of the Border Allotment Committee for the reason that the Chief Land Com missioner acts under the authority of the Chief Martial Law Administrator conferred through Martial Law Regulation No. 64.

9. Finally we come to the bar of jurisdiction contained in paragraph 15 of Zone `B' Martial Law Regulation No.

9. In the first place, there can be no doubt that this paragraph conflicts with Article 2 (4) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 which expressly confers writ jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and the High Courts, and also with Article 2 (1) of the same Order which clearly provides that the terms of that Order cannot be varied except by an Order of the President or a Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. The question whether the provisions of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9, would be protected by Article 3 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 has rightly been answered in the negative by my learned brother, whose views in that connection find unambiguous support from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Ayub Khuhro v. Pakistan (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 237).

10. Even if the provisions of paragraph 15 of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9 were not in conflict with the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, thus bar of jurisdiction contained therein could not have been regarded as absolute in view of the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Zafar‑ul -Ahsan's case (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 113). The following observations made in that case are directly relevant for our present purpose:‑ "If a statute provides that an order made by an Authority acting under it shall not be called in question in Court, all that is necessary to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is that the Authority should have been constituted as required by the statute, the person proceeded against should be subject to the jurisdiction of‑the Authority, the ground on which action is taken should be within the grounds stated by the statute, and the order made should be such as could have been made under the statute. These conditions being satisfied the ouster is complete even though in following the statutory procedure some omissions or irregularities might have been committed by the Authority. If an appellate Authority is provided by the statute the omissions or the irregularities alleged will be a matter for that Authority, and not for a Court ‑of law. Of course where the proceedings are taken mala fides and the statute is used merely as a cloak to cover an act which in fact is not taken, though it purports to have been taken, under the statute, the order will not, in accordance with a long line of decisions in England and in this sub‑continent, be treated as an order under the statute."

11. It is correct that in a recent judgment, naively, Mian Iftikhar‑ud‑Din, etc. v. Muhammad Sarfraz, etc. (P L D 1961 S C 585.) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were not pleased to approve of a decision given by a Division Bench of this Court, of which two of us, namely, Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J. and myself, were members, to the effect that this Court had jurisdiction to enforce a duty cast on the Government under Chief Martial Law Administrator's Regulation No.

72. A perusal of the reasoning adopted by their Lordships, however, makes it clear that they were basing their decision on the express language employed in Martial Law Regulation No. 72 which is much more exhaustive than that used in M. L. R. No. 9, and were not purporting to depart from the principles enunciated in Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan's case. It was strenuously contended by Mr. Nazir Ahmad, the learned Attorney‑General, that a Martial Law Regula tion could not be regarded as a statute in the ordinary sense and therefore, principles pertaining to the interpretation of ordinary statutes could not be extended to the interpretation of a Martial Law Regulation. I do not see any force in this contention for the reason that a Martial Law Regulation is clearly a statute, inasmuch as it is one of ~ the modes of legislation at l V present obtaining in Pakistan. The principles laid down in Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan's case cannot be construed to be restricted to what the learned Attorney‑General calls "ordinary statutes". Even in that case their Lordships were not dealing with an Act made by a Legislature or a Parliament, but with an Ordinance issued by the President in exercise of the powers assumed by him ' Under the Proclamation of the 7th of October 1958. After all, these principles do not amount to saying anything other than this. If the Authority empowered to act under a law acts within the four corners of that law, then the jurisdiction of Courts is completely ousted, but if the Authority flouts the law under which it is empowered to act, the Courts will have jurisdiction to interfere. I cannot see why such a principle should not be applicable to the functioning of authorities created by a Martial Law Regulation; as it could not be the intention of the framers of the Martial Law Regulations that the Law made by them should not be observed by the authorities concerned. The result, therefore, is that the bar of jurisdiction embodied in paragraph 15 of Zone `B', Martial Law Regulation No. 9, cannot be regarded as absolute and this Court will have the jurisdiction to interfere in appropriate cases, where it is shown that the Border Allotment Committee has not acted within the terms of the law. A. H. Order accordingly. ADDENDA WRIT PETITION No. 265 of 1961 Present Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad Khan, Attorney‑General, Pakistan. M. Anwar, Advocate General, West Pakistan. In order to determine what the meaning of the words "Martial Law Authority" occurring in Martial Law Regulation No. 88, issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator on the 22nd of June 1961, is, we consider it necessary to have the interpretation which the Attorney‑General and the Advocate‑General, West Pakistan, want the Court to put on that expression. We have, therefore; requested the Attorney‑General and the Advocate-General to dictate their definition to the stenographer. STATEMENT OF CHAUDHRI NAZIR AHMAD KHAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PAKISTAN :‑ So far as I know, the words "Martial Law Authority" have not been defined in terms by any Martial Law Regulation. If I am correct in my submission, an attempted definition can be as follows. This will have reference to Martial Law Regulation No. 1, clause (c) and to Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, Article 2(5) :‑ "A Border Committee appointed under Martial Law Regula tion No. 9 issued by the Zonal Administrator, Zone `B' as empowered by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Pakistan, would be included in the term "Martial Law authority" if the relevant Martial Law Regulation or Order lays down a procedure in pursuance of which that Border Committee is empowered to act." STATEMENT OF MR. M. ANWAR, ADVOCATE‑GENERAL, WEST PAKISTAN :‑ According to me the definition of the words "Martial Law Authority" is as follows :‑ "An Authority which is clothed with powers to do certain acts by a Martial Law Regulation or a Martial Law Order would be a Martial Law Authority for the purpose of clause (1) of Regulation No. 88."