P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, r. 9‑Club registered under Companies Act (VII of 1913)‑May be sued against in Club's name through Secretary‑President or members of Managing Committee not necessary or proper parties‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXIX, r. 2‑Companies Act (VII of 1913), S. 38 fRatan Lal, Advocate v. Jagadhri Light Railway Co. Ltd. and others A I R 1946 Lab. 193 ref.] (b) Club‑Expulsion of member‑Suit by member expelled against club contesting expulsion‑When maintainable. Held that the suit contesting expulsion from membership of a club is maintainable and that the civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit as well as to grant relief if the following conditions laid down in judicial authorities are found to be present. A club is an autonomous institution and a Court of law will not lightly interfere with its action in expelling a member unless it has violated the recognised rules of procedure in that connection or those of natural justice. Interference by the Court to prevent expulsion would not be justified if the rules providing for expulsion have been strictly observed, the member has had due notice, and full opportunity of answering the charges made against him there has been no want of good faith in the exercise of the powers of expulsion, and the decision arrived at is not manifestly absurd. The important question is whether there has been due enquiry. V. N. Bhajekar v. K. M. Shinkar and others A I R 1934 Bom. 243; Ramkumar Potdar v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. A I R 1934 Bom. 427; Ambala Sarabhai and others v. Phiroz H. Antia A I'R 1934 Bom. 35; Royal Calcutta Turf Club, Calcutta v. Kishan Chand Manchanda A I R: 1942 Lab. 179; Shiv Ram Ratta v. The Punjab Textile Mills Ltd. and others P L D 1949 Lab. 143; N. D. Qureshi v. Abbotabad Club Ltd. and others P L D 1950 Pesh. 55; Faridsons Ltd. v. The Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. P L D 1956 Kar. 315 and D. M. Malik v. Jockey Club of Pakistan and others P L D 1960 Kar. 325 ref. (c) Club‑(Expulsion of member)‑

Opportunity of a hearing before calling upon member to resign‑Essential‑Natural justice Rule requiring recording of reasons before so calling upon member implies necessity of affording opportunity of hearing. (d) Club‑Expulsion of member)‑--Grant of opportunity of hearing before expulsion‑Such opportunity, if granted at final special general meeting of club, convened on requisition of members, after Managing Committee had already decided that it was undesir able that person concerned should continue as member, held, sufficient‑--[Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and two others P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 104 distinguished.] (e) Club‑(Expulsion of member)‑--(Relief)‑Question : whether it would be right and proper for a Court of law to impose a member on a club against wishes of majority of members. [p. 1021E Saeed Akhtar an Kh. Muhammad Afzal for Plaintiff. S. M. Shafiq for Defendants. The plaintiff Khawaja Muhammad Saeed, Manager of the Pakistan Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, has instituted the present suit for a declaration that the decision of the Managing Committee of the Cosmopolitan Club, Lahore, dated the 21st of February 1962 removing him from membership of the Club is illegal and inoperative. As a consequential relief he has prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the exercise of his rights as a member of the said Club. The suit was first instituted on the 18th of April 1962 in the Court of Mr. Ishaq Rahim Bakhsh, a Civil Judge at Lahore, but on the 30th of April 1962 it was transferred to the High Court on the original side by the late Chief Justice M. R. Kayani, mainly for the reason that one of the defendants, i.e., the President of the Club, Mr. Justice Shabir Ahmad, was at that time a serving Judge of the High Court and it would have been embarrassing for a subordinate civil Court to deal with the suit. Unfortunately, it has taken a long time to serve the defendants and to complete the other formalities in the suit and for that reason, the disposal of the suit has been considerably delayed.

2. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that he joined the Club as an ordinary member in 1953; in 1958 he was unanimously elected as Honorary Joint Secretary of the Club, which office he held until 1959; and in 1961 he was elected a Life Member of the Club on payment of the requisite fee. On the 10th of January 1962, an incident took place which has led to the present suit. The main facts of the incident are brought out in a complaint recorded by the plaintiff that very night in the complaint book kept at the Club. A copy of this complaint is Exh. P.1 and runs as follows:‑ "Mr. President, while I was playing billiards today (January 10) with four other members of the Club the Page Boy removed the heater from the room saying it was requires by the Secretary Sahib. When I protested he replied that would light a fire in the fire place. This happened at 7‑45 p.m Till 9‑00 p.m. when I left the Club the fire had not been because, I was told there was no fuel wood in, the Club. " consider this an act of extreme rudeness and" would like to b assured that such incident is not repeated. And I think I am not unjustified in demanding an apology for the insult."

3. A few days later the plaintiff received an intimation fro the Secretary to attend the meeting of the Managing Committee to be held on the 17th of January 1962 to discuss the complain lodged by him. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, which gives details of the discussion which took place between him and the members of the Managing Committee, it is stated that at the end of the discussion the then President of the Club, Mr. Justice Shabir Ahmad, recorded a note in the complaint book to the following effect:‑ "The tenor of the complaint would show that the complaint is against the Secretary but Khawaja M. Saeed states that he has no intention of making any complaint against the Secretary. If the complaint is not against the Secretary, I do not see what action is called for." (A copy of this order is Exh. P. 2).

4. It is not stated specifically in the plaint itself, but it appears that after the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the order reproduced above, the plaintiff left the meeting of the Managing Committee which, however, continued its deliberations and passed a Resolution (bearing No. 9 dated the 17th o: January 1962) to the effect that the Committee considered the plaintiff's complaint malicious and called upon him to tender an unconditional apology in writing within ten days failing which the Committee will have to consider whether or not to take action under Article 29 of the Club Articles against the plaintiff. A copy of this Resolution is Exh. D.

1. This Resolution was conveyed to the plaintiff by means of letter Exh. P. 3 dated the 18th of January 1962. Besides making oral representations to the President of the Club, the plaintiff sent a written reply vide his letter Exh. P. .4 dated the 27th of January 1962 refusing to apologize and calling upon the Managing Committee to unconditionally withdraw its letter dated the 18th of January 1962 within ten days. The Managing Committee, however, instead of withdrawing its earlier Resolution of the 17th of January 1962 and the consequent letter of the 18th of January 1962, proceeded to pass afresh Resolution (namely, No. 8 of the 21st of February 1962) calling upon the plaintiff to resign from the membership of the Club as he was considered undesirable for lodging a malicious complaint. The Managing Committee further decided that in case the plaintiff did not resign himself, he would cease to be a member after the expiry of eight days from the date of the decision. A copy of this Resolution is Exh. D. 6 and it was conveyed to the plaintiff vide letter Exh. P. 5 dated the 26th of February 1962. The plaintiff, however, did not resign and accordingly ceased to be a member under Article 29 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club after the expiry of the stipulated period.

5. In the meantime, some further developments also took place in this behalf when on the 22nd of February 1962 ten members of the Club requisitioned a Special General Meeting, under Article 28, of the members of the Club to consider the letter of the Managing Committee dated the 18th of January 1962 sent to the plaintiff (ie., Exh. P. 3). This meeting was held on the 31st of March 1962 at 5‑30 p.m. at the Club. The record of the proceedings which took place at this meeting is contained in Exh. D.

5. From this document it appears that the members who had requisitioned the meeting proposed a resolution expressing "their sense of shock at the attitude the Managing Committee took and the intimidating manner in which it acted". The Resolution further proposed that the letter dated the 18th of January 1962 asking the plaintiff to apologize and in the alternative threatening him with action under Article 29 of the Club should be withdrawn unconditionally. The Chairman read out this Resolution, and then the plaintiff Kh. Muhammad Saeed, who attended the meeting by special permission, was allowed by the President to address the House and he explained his case. It is recorded further that in reply the Secretary of the Club read out a statement of facts on behalf of the Managing Committee. A copy of this statement was attached to the proceedings. After some discussion, the minutes go on to say, "the President asked for the motion to be formally moved before the House . . . . . The Resolution was then put to vote by show of hands. Chairman counted the number of votes in support of the Resolution and declared the number of such votes to be fourteen. He then asked the House to indicate by show of hands those who intended to vote against the Resolution. He counted such votes up to the figure of 54 and then stopped them counting any further and declared the Resolution defeated by an overwhelming majority".

6. It is contended by the plaintiff that the decision of the Managing Committee dated the 17th of January 1962 is arbitrary and illegal as it is based on an incorrect finding that the plaintiff's complaint was malicious. It is further stated that the decision is in violation of Article 29 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club which makes it imperative for the Managing Committee to record its reasons for such a decision. Another ground of attack mentioned in the plaint is that under Article 29 of the old Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club which remained in force until 1961, the Managing Committee had no power to expel any member of the Club and it could only refer the matter to a Special General Meeting of the members where the decision was to be taken by a three‑fourth majority of the members present. It is stated that the amendment of the old Article 29 by a Special General Meeting of the members of the Club held in May 1961 was unwarranted and illegal and thus the nevi Article 29, under which the Managing Committee has purported to act in the present case, has no legal effect. Lastly, it is asserted in the plaint that the expulsion of the plaintiff is mala fide and against the principles of natural justice as the plaintiff has no been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

7. In the joint written statement filed on behalf of defendant Nos. 1, 3, 4, '8, 9, 10, 13 and 14, most of the facts narrated in the plaint are admitted, but with regard to the proceedings of the meeting of the Managing Committee held on the 17th of January 1962, it is stated that the plaintiff was given full hearing by the Managing Committee before it came to the conclusion that the complaint appeared to be malicious. With regard to the Resolution of the Managing Committee dated the 21st c February 1962, it is stated that the decision was taken in view c the objectionable tone of the plaintiff's letter dated the 27th c January 1962 in which he had attributed malice and coercion to the whole of the Managing Committee. The written statement the deals with the Special General Meeting of the Club held on the 3lst of March 1962, and it is stated that the plaintiff did a good deal of canvassing on his behalf by sending letters to the members of the Club, and he was given full opportunity to explain his position before the House. Finally, it is averred in the written statement that there is no question of any mala fides on the part of the Managing Committee or the general membership of the Club against the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had full opportunity of being hard on more than one occasion, that the suit is not maintainable as it relates to the internal affairs of the Club, and that the only necessary and proper party in the suit was the Club and all the other defendants are not necessary.

8. On the above pleadings of the parties, the following agreed issues were framed: (1) Whether the defendants 1 to 13 are necessary and proper parties? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable and whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain it? (3) Whether the new Article 29 is invalid? (4) Whether it was essential to hear the plaintiff before removing him from membership of the Club? (5) If issue No. 4 is decided in the affirmative, then was the plaintiff not heard? (6) Whether the decision of the Managing Committee dated the 21st of February 1962 is arbitrary, illegal, void and inoperative? (7) Whether the plaintiff is entitles to the discretionary relief in view of the over all proceedings and Resolution dated the 31st of March 1962 ?

9. My findings on these issues are as follows:‑ Issue No. 1.‑Whether the defendants 1 to 13 are necessary and proper parties? A copy of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club has been placed on the record as Exh. D. 7, and it shows that the Club is registered under the Companies Act (VII of 1913). Article 20(a) printed on page 11 of Exh. D.‑7 states that "the management of the Club shall vest in the Managing Committee and the Secretary and/or the Joint Secretary shall have the power to sign, verify pleadings, engage counsel, institute and defend suits and other proceedings, enter into a compromise and to do all other things on behalf of the Club incidental and ancillary thereto". It would be seen that according to this Article the present suit could have been brought against the Club through its Secretary and it was not necessary for the other defendants to be cited. The order of the Managing Committee by which the plaintiff is aggrieved is an order of the Club and, therefore, only the Club was the necessary party. The same position emerges from rule A of Order XXIX, C. P. C. which prescribed that "subject to an statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served (a) on the secretary, or any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, or (b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if' there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business".

10. In Ratan Lal, Advocate v. Jagadhri Light Railway CO. Ltd. and others (A I R 1946 Lah. 1932), the question was considered whether in. an application under section 38 of the Companies Act the Directors of the company were necessary parties or not and it was held that: "as a matter of law the Directors of a company who are in charge of the management and business of the company are not necessary and proper parties to an application under section 38".. The present suit can be compared, in substance, to an application under section 38 of the Companies Act and, therefore, the principle laid down in the authority just cited would appear to apply in the present case. I consider, therefore, that the President and members of the Managing Committee were not necessary of proper, parties to the present suit. However, this finding has no effect on the fate of the suit for under Order I, rule 9, C. P. C., misjoinder ‑of parties cannot defeat the suit. The issue is decided accordingly.

11. Issue No. 2.‑Whether the suit is maintainable and whether the civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain it? The learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on more or less the same authorities as laying down the principles with regard to the maintainability of a suit of the present kind, and the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to grant the relief prayed for. The authorities referred to are N. Bhajekar v. K. M. Shinkar and others (A I R 1934 Bom. 243), Ramkumar Potdar v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. (A I R 1934 Bom. 427), Ambala Sarabhai and others v. Phiroz H. Antia (A I R 1934 Bom. 35), Royal Calcutta Turf Club, Calcutta v. Kishan Chand Afanchanda (A I R 1942 Lah. 179), Shiv Ram Ratta v. The Punjab Textile Mills Ltd. and others (P L D 1949 Lah. 143), N. D. Qureshi v. The Abbotabad Club Ltd. and others (P L D 1950 Pesh. 55), Faridsons Ltd. v. The Karachi Cotton Association Ltd. (P L D 1956 Kar. 315) and M. Malik v. Jockey Club of Pakistan and others (P L D 1960 Kar. 325). It does not appear necessary to quote from all these authorities as the general principle which has been laid down in these authorities relating to cases of expulsion from membership of clubs is appro priately summed up in Ambala Sarabhai and others v. Phiroz H. Antia. It was observed in that case that: "A club is an autonomous institution and a Court of law will not lightly interfere with its action in expelling a member unless it has violated the recognised rules of procedure in that connection or those of natural justice. Interference by the Court to prevent expulsion would not be justified if the rules providing for expulsion have been strictly observed, the member has had due notice, and full opportunity of answering the charges mad against him, there has been no want of good faith in the exercise of the power of expulsion, and the decision arrived at is not manifestly absurd. The important question is whether, there has been due enquiry."

12. I am in respectful agreement with the principle of law reproduced above, and hold that the suit is maintainable and that the civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit as well as to grant relief if the conditions laid down by the authorities, as mentioned above, are found to be present.

13. Issue No. 3.‑Whether the new Article 29 is invalid? This issue was given up by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.

14. Issue No. 4.‑Whether it was essential ‑to hear the plaintiff before removing him from membership of the Club? The only rule dealing with disciplinary action against members of the Club is contained in Article 29 which is in the following terms: "If in the opinion of the members of the Managing Committee it is undesirable that a particular person should continue as a member, the Managing Committee may ask him to resign for reasons which shall be recorded in the minute book. In case of his refusal he would cease to be member after the expiry of eight days from the date of the aforesaid decision of the Managing Committee." It will be seen that the above rule does not contemplate in specific terms the holding of any inquiry by the Managing Committee before forming an opinion that "it is undesirable that a particular person, should continue as a member", nor does the rule provide that the member concerned shall be given an opportunity of being heard before the Managing Committee forms the requisite opinion; but the rule does prescribe that when calling upon the member to resign, the Managing Committee shall record its reasons in the minute book. The provision regarding the recording of reasons in the minute book clearly shows that what the rule contemplates is not an arbitrary and capricious action by the members of the Managing Committee, but a judicious and reasonable approach before forming the opinion that the continuance of any particular person as member of the Club is undesirable. Such being the case, the elementary requirement of natural justice that the person proceeded against should be given an opportunity of being heard is clearly implied in the rule and must be deemed to be a part thereof. Even if the rule had not included a provision regarding the recording of reasons for the opinion arrived at by the members of the Managing Committee, it is clear that, as laid down by judicial authorities, such a rule would have offended against the elementary principles of natural justice and could not have been upheld by a Court of law. My answer, therefore, to issue No. 4 is that it was essential to hear the plaintiff before calling upon him to resign from the membership of the Club in accordance with Article 29.

15. Issue No. 5.‑

If issue No. 4 is decided iri the affirmative, then was the plaintiff not heard? From the narration of events given in the earlier part of this judgment it will be seen that the plaintiff admits that he was invited to appear before the Managing Committee on the 17th of January 1962, and that a discussion took place between the plaintiff and the members of the Managing Committee on the subject of the complaint recorded by the plaintiff in the complaint book on the 10th of January 1962. It is, however, asserted by the plaintiff that the only talk which he had with the Members of the Managing Committee was on the question whether his complaint was directed against the Secretary of the Club and on his stating that it was not, the President of the Club proceeded to record an order that the complaint did not call for any action. In other words, the contention of the plaintiff is that the only question on which he was heard was about the contents of the complaint lodged by him and he was not heard on the question whether his complaint was malicious and whether it called for action against him under Article 29 of the Article of the Club. This assertion of the plaintiff is denied by the defendants and reliance in this behalf is placed by them on the report which was presented by the Secretary of the Club at the Special General Meeting held on the 31st of March 1962. It has already been stated that this report of the Secretary forms an enclosure to Exh. D.‑5 which ‑is a copy of the proceedings of the Special General Meeting. This report was read out by the Secretary before the Special General Meeting of the Club and I see no reason to doubt its correctness. According to this report, a detailed discussion took place between the plaintiff and the members of the Managing Committee regarding the substance of the plaintiff's complaint and at the end of the discussion it was suggested to the plaintiff by one of the members of the Managing Committee, namely Mr. Sattar, that in view of the expression of regret conveyed to the plaintiff by the President, the plaintiff might withdraw the second paragraph of his complaint in which a reference to insult and rudeness has been made, or in the alternative, he might care to put it in some other words conveying inefficiency or incompetence on the part of the staff. The report goes on to add that Mr. Saeed (i.e., the plaintiff), however, remained adamant and offensively refused to accept the suggestion, although in the proceedings of the Committee he was made fully aware of his untenable stand. The report further states that "it is also to be noted that Mr. M. Saeed, having admitted that he had prevented the Billiards Marker from making a fire in the room, could not have justifiably made a complaint because the absence of the fire from the room was due to his own orders to the Billiards Marker not to leave the room. It means in other words that Kh. Sahib at the time he made the complaint was in a frame of mind which indicated that a complaint he must make. This clearly shows that Kh. Sahib was merely seeking for an opportunity to create a situation in which an unhappy controversy should developed so as to enable him to show the seed of discord in the calm and friendly atmosphere of the Club." This, according to the report presented by the Secretary, was the background of the Resolution passed by the Managing Committee on the 17th of January 1962 (Exh. D. l) calling upon the plaintiff to tender an unconditional apology in writing within ten days for the reason that the Committee considered the plaintiff's complaint to be malicious. In this Resolution it was clearly indicated that if the plaintiff did not tender an unconditional apology as demanded by the Managing Committee, the latter would consider whether or not to take action against him under Article 29 of the Club. It seems to me that in the light of the plaintiff's own admission that he was heard by the Managing Committee in connection with his complaint on the 17th of January 1962 and in the light of the detailed report by the Secretary of the Club to the Special General Meeting on the 31st of March 1962 with regard to the proceedings which took place between the plaintiff and the members of the Managing Committee on the 17th of January 1962, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff was not given a hearing before the Managing Committee reached the conclusion that the complaint of the plaintiff was malicious and called for an apology, or in the alternative, action under Article

29. It is not for the Court to judge whether, in fact, the complaint was malicious or not, as that judgment must remain with the Managing Committee which was charged with the duty of running the affairs of the Club. The Managing Committee has given its own reasons for reaching the conclusion in question, and the conclusion has been reached after giving due hearing to the plaintiff.

16. The matter, however, does not rest here. The letter issued to the plaintiff on the 18th of January 1962 conveying to him the conclusion reached by the Managing Committee as to the nature of his complaint, was not the final word, as the question whether or not action should be taken against him under Article 29 of the Club had still to be decided. That decision was not taken until the Committee had considered the plaintiff's letter dated the 27th of January 1962 (Exh. P. 4), in which the plaintiff had refused to tender apology and instead called upon the Managing Committee to withdraw unconditionally its letter under reference within ten days and make suitable amends for the insult against which he had complained. The plaintiff concluded this letter by saying that if the Committee does not act as desired by him, he would have to consider whether or not to seek remedy under Article 35 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Club. This letter of the plaintiff was duly considered by he Managing Committee before passing Resolution No. 8 on the 21st of February 1962 to the effect that in the opinion of the Managing Committee it was undesirable that Kh. M. Saeed should continue as a member of the Club. Here again, the question before the Court is not whether the opinion expressed by the members of the Managing Committee was justified or not, the question is whether before forming this opinion the members had given an opportunity to the plaintiff to explain his position. It is clear to me that such an opportunity was given to the plaintiff not only when he was heard by the Managing Committee on the 17th of January 1962 but also when he was called upon to tender an apology to the Committee. The plaintiff's letter dated the 27th of January 1962 was clearly a presentation of his side of the case hich was considered by the Managing Committee before passing its Resolution of the 21st of February 1962. The reasons for the opinion of the Committee that it was undesirable that Kh. M. Saeed should continue as a member of the Club, are sufficiently clear from the proceedings which had commenced on the 17th of January 1962 and culminated on the 21st of February 1962. For these reasons, I would decide issue No. 5 against the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff was duly heard before the Committee recorded its opinion as required by Article 29.

17. Issue No. 6.‑Whether the 'decision of the Managing Committee dated the 21st of February 1962 is arbitrary, illegal, void and inoperative? In view of my finding on issue No. 5 that the plaintiff was duly heard and that the decision‑of the Managing Committee dated the 21st of February 1962 fulfils the requirements of Article 29, the answer to the present issue is clearly in the negative.

18. Issue No. 7.‑Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief in view of overall proceeding and Resolution dated the 31st of March 1962? In view of my findings on issues Nos. 5 and 6, this issue hardly arises, as on these findings the plaintiff is clearly not entitled to any relief in the suit. However, that conclusion also flows from a consideration of the proceedings which took place at the Special General Meeting held on the 31st of March 1962. It has already been stated that this meeting was requisitioned by ten members of the Club, including the plaintiff himself, and they moved a resolution in favour of the plaintiff, and condemning the Resolution of the Managing Committee dated the 17th of January 1962. When the meeting took place the Managing Committee had already taken its decision dated the 21st of February 1962 and, therefore, it was obviously within the knowledge of all the members participating in the Special General Meeting that Kh. M, Saeed had ceased to be a member of the Club as it lead been held by the Managing Committee that his continuance as such was undesirable. The Resolution of the Managing Committee dated the 17th of January 1962 was no doubt the basis of the action taken against the plaintiff. I have referred to these facts only to show that when the Special General Meeting took place, all these participating therein were fully aware of the implications of the Resolution dated the 17th of January 1962 and were also further aware as to what final action had been taken against the plaintiff. With this background of knowledge the members proceeded to consider the entire case of the plaintiff who was given opportunity to address the members present. It is also in evidence that before the meeting the plaintiff had addressed letters to the members of the Club, explaining his own position. After the plaintiff had explained his case the Secretary of the Club presented the view point of the Managing Committee. Thus the members had full opportunity of learning the respective view points of‑the contesting parties, and after acquiring this knowledge the Special General Meeting decided against the plaintiff by an overwhelming majority. It is clear, therefore, that the General membership of the Club endorsed the decision of the Managing Committee. It may be stated here that under Article 35 of the A.rticles of the Club the Special General Meeting was fully competent to set aside any decision of the Managing Committee, but a majority of the members present decided against such a course of action.

19. Even if I had held that the plaintiff had not been given an opportunity of being heard by the Managing Committee, I would have been inclined to hold that the requirements of natural justice were fully met in this case when the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity of addressing the members at the Special Genera Meeting in support of his complaint and his claim to continue as a member of the Club. It was contended by Mr. Saeed Akhtar that this ratification of an otherwise illegal act could have no effect as all subsequent acts based on a nullity would have to be treated as a nullity in the eye of law in the light of the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and two others (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 104). 1 cannot subscribe to this conten tion for the reason that in the instant case we are dealing not with any violation of law and prescribed procedure but with the elementary requirement of natural justice that a person should not be condemned unheard. Now in the present case, the final authority was the Special General Meeting and if after hearing the plaintiff at length this meeting decided not to intervene on his behalf, I would consider that the requirements of natural justice were fulfilled. However, in view of my earlier finding that even the Managing Committee had afforded the plaintiff an opportunity of being heard, the question now being discussed is more of ail academic nature and need not detain us any further.

20. It will be seen that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Club have made it clear that they are not in favour of the plaintiff continuing as a member of the Club. In these circumstances, the question arises whether it would be right and proper for a Court of law to impose a member on a club against the wishes of the majority of its members. A social club, by its very nature and purpose, is a place for recreation and friendly intercourse and a Court would be reluctant to create conditions which may interfere with the fulfillment of the very object of the Club. For this reason also, I would hesitate to grant any relief to the plaintiff, by way of an injunction that he must continue as a member.

21. In view of my findings on the issues which arise in this case, the plaintiff's suit has no merit and is hereby dismissed with costs. A. H. Suit dismissed.