P L D 1950 F (PLP)

ABDUR RAHMAN, J.‑--This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore dismissing a petition presented under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the release of one Maulana Abdul Aala Maudndi who had been arrested and detained for a period of one month to start with on the 4th October, 1948, in pursuance of a warrant issued by Zul Qarnain (an officiating Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department) under the provisions of the Punjab Public, Safety Act (Punjab Act 11 of 1947), hereafter referred to as the Act. It might be mentioned in passing, that inasmuch as all the powers vested by or under the Government of India Act, 1935 in the Provincial Legislature to make law had been assumed by the Governor of the Punjab under section 93 of that Act, the Act (Punjab Act No. II of 1947) was enacted by him and received the Governor‑General's assent on the 20th March, 1947. The Maulana's arrest was, as required by section 3 (2) of the Act, reported to the Provincial Government on the same date on which he was arrested and the Maulana was, under order No. 21047‑BDSB., dated the 20th October, 1948, issued at the instance of the Governor of West Punjab, under section (4) of section 3 of the Act, committed to the custody of the Inspector‑General of Prisons of the Province of West Punjab. Under this order the Maulana was to be kept under detention up till the 3rd April, 1949. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 3 of the Act read as follows: ‑‑ "(3) The Provincial Government may by order in writing commit any person arrested by it or on its direction to such custody as the Provincial Government may deem fit.". (4) No person shall, unless the Provincial Government by special order otherwise; directs, be detained in custody for a period exceeding one month. (5) No person shall be so detained in custody for a period exceeding six months. An Ordinance [the West Punjab Safety (Amendment) Ordinance IV of 1948] was, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 88 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, promulgated by the Governor of West Punjab on the 10th December, 1948 by which the following subsection was substituted for subsection (5) of section 3 of the Act:‑ "(5) No order made by the Provincial Government under the provisions of subsection (3) shall remain in force for a period of more than six months, but the Provincial Government may before the expiry of such period, renew such order and thereafter such order shall remain in force for a further period not exceeding six months unless before the expiry of that period it is similarly renewed or cancelled." In view of this amendment, the Maulana was under order No. 5490 BDSB, dated the 24th March 1949, ordered by the Governor to be detained for a further period of six‑months, i. e. up till the 3rd October 1949. It may, however, be observed here that the Punjab Legislative Assembly was dissolved on the 25th January, 1949. The Act of 1947 expired on the 15th August, 1949, and since the Governor of West Punjab had, in pursuance of a proclamation issued by the Governor‑General of Pakistan under section 92‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935, assumed on behalf of the Governor‑General all powers vested in or exercisable by the Provincial Legislature under the said Act, in the meantime, another enactment entitled, the West Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, (West Punjab Act XVIII of 1949) was brought into being by the Governor of West Punjab. This was declared to have come into force immediately on the expiry of the Act of 1947. Subsection (5) of section 3 in West Punjab Act XVIII of 1949 reads as follows:‑ "(5) No order made by tire Provincial Government under the provisions of subsection (3) shall remain in force for a period of more than six months, but the Provincial Government may before the expiry of such period, renew such order and thereafter such order shall remain in force for a further period not exceeding six months unless before the expiry of that period it is similarly renewed or cancelled. Another order (Order No. 14747‑BDSB) was passed under subsections 4 and 5 of section 3 of the West Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, at the instance of the Governor of Wept Punjab on the 28th September 1949, under which the Maulana was to be detained tip till the 3rd April 1950. This was followed by still another order No. 3850‑BDSB, dated the 2nd April, 1950, issued. at the instance of the Governor of the Punjab renewing the order of the Maulana's detention made under subsection (4) of section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, for a further period of six months, i. e , up till the 3rd October, 1950. The petitioner (whether he was a follower of the Maulana or merely interested in him as a friend it is needless to ascertain) moved the High Court of Judicature at Lahore on the 5th February 1049, under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, for the release of the Maulana. His detention was in the petition challenge on the grounds‑(a) of its being males fide (b) of its being a fraud on the Act and (c) that the Maulana had never acted or intended to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or to the Maintenance of public order. These were all questions of fact and were repelled for lack of proof by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court, who had heard the petition. Let it not, however, be understood that the result mould have been any different if the allegation in regard to (c) had been substantiated for under section 3 (1) of the Act, it was for the Provincial Government, the District Magistrate or any other servant of the Crown authorised in this behalf to be satisfied whether it was necessary to arrest the Maulaha `with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order' and it was not possible for a Court to Usurp this function or to substitute its judgment for that of any of the authorities referred to in the section. See the decisions in Liversidge v. John andersou, Green v. Secretary of‑State for Home Affairs, and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji. To resume the narrative: it appears that during the course of his arguments before the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, counsel for the petitioner raised two other objections:‑

1. That not being competent to legislate with respect to `public safety' but with respect to 'public order' alone as referred to in entry No. 1 of the Provincial Legislative List (List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, (1935), the Act was ultra vires the Provincial Legislative authority, (i. e., in this case, the Governor of the Punjab who bad passed it)

2. That not being a District Superintendent of Police in the city of Lahore but merely a Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Intelligence Department, Wes, Punjab, Zul Qarnain was not entitled to act tinder the Act and was, therefore, not competent to issue a warrant for the Maulana's arrest or to order him to be detained in tile Central Jail at Lyallpur. These contentions were also negatived by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court with the result that the petition was dismissed by him on the 24th February, 1999. But as a certificate was granted to the petitioner under section 205 of the Govern ment of India Act, 1935, on the 4th March 1949, he preferred the present appeal on the 23rd March 1949. From what has been stated it would be clear that the period for which the Maulana had been ordered to be detained by the Governor of West Punjab under order No. 21047‑BDSB , dated tile 29th October 1949, had not expired even when the appeal had been filed in this Court. It has, therefore, submitted by the 'Advocate‑General of the Punjab that in deciding this appeal we may confine our attention to the legality of the Act as it had been enacted by the Governor of the Punjab early in 1947 and not concern ourselves to either the Ordinance (IV of 19413) promulgated by the Governor of West Punjab on the 10th December 1948 or any other orders or legislation passed or enacted by the Governor subsequently. The arrest of the Maulana under Zul Qarnain s orders on the 4th October 1948, his detention in the Central Jail at Lyallpur on the same day and the order No. 21047‑BDSB, issued at the instance of the Governor on the 29th October 1948, ordering the Maulana to be detained up till the 3rd April 1949, had all been passed prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance IV of 1948, and this Court need not therefore, in his submission, consider the legality of the Maulana s detention under any order or orders passed subsequently to the filing of the petition under section 491, Criminal Procedure Code. It was, therefore, urged that although it may be open to the petitioner to make a fresh application under that section to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore for the Maulana's release on such grounds as may be open to him, it would not be fair to the Crown to be ordered to meet such contentions as had not been or could not have been raised by the petitioner in his application before the High Court. Indeed it was contended that in view of the subsequent orders of detention, which could not be legitimately assailed or their validity impugned in the present appeal, this appeal Dust be held to have become infructuous. Counsel for the appellant on the other hand submitted that this Court should take notice of all that has happened during the pendency of the appeal filed in this Court for the mischief had, according to him, started originally with the Maulna's detention under the Act and has been continued from time to time on the expiry of various periods for which the orders of detention had been renewed either by promulgating the Ordinance (IV of 1948) and thus amending section 3 (5) of the Act of 1947, or under the West Punjab Public Safety Act (XVIII of 1949), which although a fresh Act, was virtually a continuation of the Act of 1947 after its expiry in August 1919. The object of the petition under section 491 to the High Court was to secure Maulana's release from what lie regards as an illegal detention and if the legality of the various orders passed front true to time arts not allowed to be questioned in the present appeal, the so object of the petition would be frustrated not because those orders were found to be legal or justified but purely on a technical ground that the period of the origin al detention had expired during the pendency of this appeal and fresh orders of detention were served on the Maulana in the meantime. The first contention advanced by counsel for the petitioner relates to the Act being ultra vices the Governor of the Punjab, in order to appreciate this contention it would be better to reproduce entry No. 1 of the Provincial Legislative List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. It reads as follows :‑ -- "

1. Public order (but not including the use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power) ; the administration of justice ; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein ; preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order ; persons subjected to such detention." Relying on the absence of the words 'public safety' from this entry and finding the expression 'with a view to preventing him from acting. in any manner .prejudicial to the public safety employed in section 3 (1) of the Act and having regard to what has been laid down in section 100 of the Constitution Act, it was contended that the Governor of the Punjab was not competent to legislate in regard to any of the matters which had not been expressly enumerated within the Provincial Legislative List (List II) or in the Concurrent List (List III) and the Act is, therefore, ultra vices. Since it was assumed that `public safety' could only be endangered by an external act of aggression, our attention was first drawn to entry No. 1 of the Federal Legislative List (List I) the relevant portion of which is as follows : "preventive detention in British India for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs or the discharge of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States‑" And secondly to section 104 of the Constitution Act which .enables the Governor‑General to empower‑ the Federal Legislature or a Provincial Legislature to exercise residual powers of legislation with respect to any matter not enumerated in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935, and it was urged that laws to secure public safety could either be made by the Federal Legislature as falling within entry No. 1 of List or by the Federal or Provincial Legislature if authorised by the Governor‑General under section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935. There can be no manner of doubt that public safety (which must be, in the absence of any definition of these words in the Act, taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary sense and to convey 'freedom of people, state or community from danger or risks') may also be endangered by external aggression‑but it would be incorrect to suggest that it could not be endangered in any other manner. It may equally be endangered by an internal commotion or disturbance as well as by various other causes, too numerous to enumerate, which may have nothing whatsoever do with any act of external aggression and may have no relation to any "reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs or the discharge of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States". Moreover 'public safety', in our way of reading, was merely a' result which was meant to be achieved and it would depend on the circumstances existing at the time whether it was being disturbed or was in danger of being disturbed by any act of external aggression or by internal commotion. If it was being endangered by an act of external aggression the matter would fall within the ambit of entry I of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, but if it was endangered by any internal commotion or on account of violation of public order, it would fall within the category of the subjects referred in entry No. I of List II. It may possibly be that at any given time both such causes may exist simultaneously. In such a case, it would fall both within List I and List II and while the Federal Legislature would be competent to legislate with regard to preventive detention for reasons of State connected with defence or external affairs, it would be open to a Provincial Legislature to pass a similar legislation but for reasons connected with the maintenance of .public order. The words "but not including the use of His Majesty's. Naval,' Military or Air Force in aid of civil, power" after the words Public Order' in entry No. 1 of List II are significant for laws in regard to them, whether raised or maintained by the Federation or merely attached to or operating with any of .the armed forces of the Federation, could only be made by the Federal Legislature as falling within the compass of entry No. 1 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. It is true that the words with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety 'precede the words' 'the maintenance of public order' in section 3 (1) of the Act but that was either with the object of emphasizing the important result which was intended to be achieved or used in that sequence on account of the name given to the Act. We do not, however, attach any importance to the order in which the two expressions have been used in the section, for it seems to be quite clear that the prevention of a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety was one of the main objects of the maintenance of 'public order' and could not in the context be taken to refer to public safety endangered by other causes. It was pointed out by their Lordships of‑ the Judicial Committee in Prafulla Munzar Mukherjee v Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna that it was not possible to make so clear a cut between the powers of various Legislatures that they would never overlap. In order, therefore, to find out the true nature and character of an enactment and the list in which it would fall, one must, as suggested by their Lordships, ask the questions as to 'what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what List is its true nature and character to be found ? In order to answer these questions, one has to briefly examine the provisions of the Act. The preamble of the Act does not indicate the object for which it was being enacted' It comprises of six chapters and 46 sections. The first chapter relates to preliminary matters. Chapter 11 contains 18 sections and deal with Emergency Powers. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act relate to arrest, detention and control of suspected persons if the authorities referred to in these sections are satisfied that it is necessary to arrest or detain a person with the object of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order. Sections 5, 6 and 7 empower the authorities to control educational institutions, publications and the entry of newspapers in the Punjab, while sections 8 and 9 are designed to control supply of commodity of general use water and electric supply. Sections 10 and 11 confer the power to prohibit and regulate the use of vehicles or animals and drilling. Sections 13 and 12 empower the authorities to prohibit meetings or processions and to secure reports about them. Sections 14 to 15 deal with service of, orders, power to issue search warrants, make searches, photographs, suspected persons and provide for execution of orders. Chapter III deals with offences and penalties. Section 20, provides a penalty for evading orders for taking possession of property. Section 21 was meant to ‑prevent dissemination of rumours. The other sections put boycott of public servants, participation in mock funeral ceremonies molestation, membership of quasimilitary organisations, tampering with public servants, sabotage in the category of offences and provide punishments. Chapters IV, V and VI relate to procedure. A perusal of the various provisions in this Act leaves no doubt that they relate to matters covered by either List. II or 'List III and that none of them fall within the subjects enumerated in List

1. As to sections 3 and 4, we have already held that the public safety‑referred to in these sections was not independent of the maintenance of public order but closely connected with it and in fact a consequence which was intended to follow from ft. Obviously it does not fall within the subject enumerated in entry No. I of List I of the Seventh Schedule. Nor is it such as can be found not to have been provided in List

11. A reference to section 104 of the Government of India Act appears to be out of place. Relying on the principles enunciated by their Lordships in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee`s case, we would hold that in pith and substance the true nature and character of the Act was to provide for subjects enumerated generally in List II or in some cases in List III. In our judgment, there seems to be no fear of an encroachment by the Provincial Legislative authority on the sphere of the Federal Legislature in the present case. The two entries in Lists I and 11 do not overlap and were meant to authorise the Provincial and Federate Legislatures to legislate within their respective Spheres freely And when we remember that wide meanings' lave to be given to words conferring, a power to legislate on any Legislature while construing a Constitution Act and that a Legislature must be held to possess an unrestricted and even a sovereign power while legislating within its own ambit, and "that each general word should be held" as pointed out by Gwyer, C. ‑ J. in The United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum "to extend to all ancillary or subsidary matters. which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it," even a semblance of doubt which was attempted to be thrown on the right of the Provincial Legislative authority to legislate in respect of 'public safety' when the authority in entry No. 1 of List II was in regard to 'public order' and 'preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order' disappears. For the above reasons we see no force in the first contention. The second contention advanced by counsel for the petitioner was that not being a Superintendent of Police in the cite of Lahore as contemplated by the Indian Police Act, or in other words, not being a District Superintendent of Police, but being a Superintendent of Police attached to the Criminal Intelligence Department, West Punjab, he was not entitled to act under the Act and was, therefore, not competent to issue a warrant for the Maulena's arrest or to order him to be detained in the Central jail at Lyallpur. Under Notification No. 4264‑HG‑47/40770, dated the 2nd July 1947, the Governor of the Punjab had authorised "all District Magistrate and all Superintendents of Police to exercise specified in the said subsection [subsection (1) of section 3 of the Act] within their respective jurisdictions in the Punjab". That the Superintendent of police could have been so authorised and could arrest a person without warrant an‑d could direct the arrest of a person without warrant admits of no doubt. This is clear from the terms ‑of section‑ 3 (1) of the Act, which reads as follows :‑‑ ‑ ‑ "3. (1) The Provincial Government, the District Magistrate or any servant of the Crown authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Provincial Government if satisfied with respect to‑any particular person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order it is necessary so td do, may arrest such person without warrant, or may direct the arrest without warrant of such person and in making such arrest any means that may be necessary may be used". The only questions that arise for determination therefore are‑ (a) Whether Zul Qarnain Khan was a Superintendent of Police within the meaning of the Notification No. 4264‑HG 47/40770, dated the 2nd July 1947, and: (b) whether his jurisdiction extended to Lahore or to be exact Ichra‑a suburb of Lahore‑where the Maulana had been arrested on the 4th October 1948. At to (a) counsel for the petitioner referred us to section 4 of the General Police Act (Act V of 1861) and to rule 1.8 of the Punjab Police Rules (Vol. 1) which declares that the superintendent of Police is the executive head of the District Police Force and makes him directly responsible for all matters relating to its internal economy, training and management and for the maintenance of its discipline and the efficient performance of all its duties. It also mentions that in every district there shall be one‑more Superintendents and such number of Assistant Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, Inspectors, etc., as the Provincial Government may direct. Section 4 of the General Police Act is as hereunder :‑ "

4. The administration of the Police throughout a General Police District, shall be vested in an officer to be styled the Inspector‑General of Police, and in such Deputy Inspector‑ General and Assistant Inspectors‑General as to the Provincial Government shall deem fit. The Administration of the Police throughout the local jurisdiction of 'the Magistrate of the District shall, under the general control and direction of such Magistrate, be vested in a District Superintendent and such, Assistant District Superintendents as the Provincial Government shall consider necessary. The Inspector‑General and other officers above‑mentioned shall from time to time be appointed by the Provincial Govern ment, and may be removed by the same authority". A perusal of this section would show that while paragraph I refers to the administration of a General Police District which has been defined in section 1 of that Act to embrace "any Presidency, Province or place or any part of any Presidency, Province or place" in which that Act had been ordered to take effect, paragraph 2 merely refers to the administration of the Police throughout the local jurisdiction of the magistrate of the district', which term has also been defined in section 1 to mean the Chief Officer charged with the executive administration of a district (as distinguished from General Police District') and exercising the powers of a Magistrate, to be vesting in a District Superintendent under the general. control and direction of such (District) Magistrate. General. Police District may thus be divided into two or more smaller districts whose executive administration would be vesting in District Superinten dents of Police. The executive administration of a District must, therefore, be distinguished from the administration of a General Police District, whose superintendence has by paragraph 1 of section 4 of that Act been ordered to vest in the Inspector‑General of Police. It is true that the entire Police establishment under a Provincial Government has, for the, purposes of the Police Force according‑ to section 2 of that Act, but this does not mean that this Police Force cannot be divided for administrative purposes into various branches. Indeed section 12 of the General Police Act authorises the Inspector‑General of Police to frame orders arid rules, subject to the approval of the Provincial Government, 'relative to the organisation, classification and distribution of the Police Force ...the particular services to be performed by them...the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information. Such rules have been framed and the Provincial Police General District has been under rule 1'3 divided into various administrative establishments (a) A Training School including the Provincial Finger Print Bureau ; (b) A Criminal Intelligence Department, and . (c) District Police Establishments. And since the Punjab was for purposes of section 3 of the Police Act (V of 1861) divided into Provincial and Railway General Districts, the Railway General District was divided‑ into a Central investigating Agency and such number of Sub‑Divisions as the Provincial Government may from time to time authorise. The Criminal Investigation Department was,‑ in Accordance with rule 1.4, to be administered by a Deputy‑Inspector General, who was also to supervise the Finger Print Bureau. Having brought a Criminal Investigation Department into existence, the rules for that department have been framed and are contained in a Manual‑which had been ordered by us to he sent for, produced in Court and allowed to be perused by counsel for the petitioner in spite of the respondent's objection on the ground that it was 'strictly confidential and was for the use of Criminal investigation Department, Officers and Clerks only'. According to this Manual, the Criminal Investigation Department is divided into a Crime Branch under the immediate control of an officer of the tank of Superintendent of Police, whose official designation is Superin tendent of Police Crimes, and the Special Branch which is similarly under the immediate control of an officer, whose official designation is Superintendent of Police Special Branch, Criminal Investigation Department. A perusal of Chapter II from this Manual leaves no scope for any argument that Superintendents of Police are attached to Criminal Investigation Department and [this brings us to question (b)] that they have jurisdiction not in any particular district, but in the whole of the Province. See also the decision in Muthukumaraswami Pillai v. Emperor, where a majority of the judges of the Madras High Court held that an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department was legally competent to investigate in the whole of the Presidency as the work of the Criminal Investigation Department was not confined to any particular district in the Presidency. We have therefore no hesitation in accepting the finding of the High Court and holding that Zul Qarnain was a Super intendent of Police and since he had been attached to the Criminal Investigation Department, his jurisdiction was not confined to any particular district, but extended to the whole of the Province of the Punjab. And in so far as there was nothing in the Notification No 4264‑HG‑47/40770 to limit the authority to a District Superintendent of Police only, a Superintendent of Police, who being attached to the Criminal Investigation Department, had jurisdiction over the whole of the Province and was legally competent to act under section 3 (1) of the Act. Thus the objections by counsel for the petitioner that there can be no Superintendents of Police attached to the Criminal Intelligence Department, or that there are no Superintendents of Police apart from the District Superintendents of Police, or that a new cadre of Superintendents of Police had been created for the purpose of this case or that Zul Qarnain's jurisdiction did not extend to Lahore and its suburbs, must be found to be devoid of any force and are accordingly overruled. The third contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner was the Maulana's arrest and detention were illegal on the ground that none of the charges leading to his arrest and detention could form the subject‑matter for legislation by the Governor under entry No. I of List II. It was submitted that even if one of the reasons for which the Maulana had been arrested and detained was such as for which he could not have been ordered to be detained by the Governor of West Punjab under the Act, the evidence of other reasons which would justify his detention or arrest would not prevent them from being invalid. Reference in this con nection was made to the 5th ground of appeal which reads as follows:‑-- "

5. That on the facts of this case it is established that the arrest and detention of Maulana Abdul Aala Maudoodi have been ordered for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs or the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States." Reliance was placed in this connection on the doubt expressed and the observations made by Gwyer,‑C. J. in Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, when the Federal Court of India was hearing an appeal from the judgment of the high Court of Bombay which were to the following effect :‑ "We doubt whether this is a correct statement of the law. If a detaining authority give four reasons for detaining a man, without distinguishing between them and any two or three reasons are held to be bad, it can never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two, good reasons bad been before them." This dictum was followed in re: Rajdhar Kalu Patil‑Applicant and in M. R. S Mani v. District Magistrate. The question is pct free from difficulty and would need to be examined carefully when it arises for decision. It was unnecessary, in this cash for Zul Qarnain to give any reasons for the action he decided to take in ordering Maulana's arrest and detention under section 3 (1) of the Act, and he never disclosed to his evidence any of the reasons which had satisfied him as to the necessity or ordering Maulana's arrest and detention. In his examination‑in‑chief, Zul Qarnain had only de posed to the following effect :

" Soon after the establishment of Pakistan the Police began to take note of the activities of the Maulana. Before the 3rd October 1948, no Minister of the Punjab Government asked me to arrest the Maulana. No such orders or instruction were given to me by any officer of the Punjab Government, I got the Maulana arrested when I was convinced that it was necessary in the public interest to arrest him. I have not brought to Court my notes relating to the reports that I received about the Maulana." The reports do not; in my view, necessarily refer to the reasons which had satisfied the witness and which had convinced him that it was necessary in the public interest to arrest the Maulana. After the examination‑in‑chief, but before the cross‑examination certain questions were put by the Court to the witness. The answers given by the witness were as follows :‑ 2. "Some of the reports (naturally referred to the reports to which he had referred towards the end of the examination in‑chief) were to the effect that the Maulana vas dissuading persons from joining the Pakistan armed forces till it was declar ed that the Constitution of Pakistan would be based on Islamic Laws. It was reported to me that the Maulana was against Government servants taking an oath of loyalty to the Pakistan Government until they were assured that the Pakistan Constitution would be based on Islamic Laws. It was reported to me that the Maulana was of the opinion that the Muslims by taking part in the Kashmir activities were not conducting Jehad. There were similar other allegations made against the Maulana in the reports submitted to me." It is quite true that the witness had referred to Borne of the reports received by him, but there is nothing on, the record to show that these were the reports which had convinced him that it was necessary in the public interest to arrest the Maulana. It was open to counsel for the appellant to put a question, especially after this statement had been made by the witness in answer to questions put by the Court; as to whether these were the reasons which had convinced the witness that it was necessary in the public interest for him to arrest the Maulana. Nothing of the kind was, however, done. The cross‑examination proceeded first as to whether the witness had been officiating as Superintendent of Police. A few questions were then put to show that God was the roaster of all creation and that the Muslims believed that the sovereignty of the world vested in the ‑ Almighty alone. Some, questions were then put to show whether the witness had receive instructions to watch the activities of the Maulana, which the witness denied. He denied, in answer to a question, the suggestion put by counsel for the appellant that he had held any consultation with any officer before the arrest of the Maulana. Even the last words of the witness's statement that he had not received "any report to the effect that Maulana Maudoodi had been preaching that it was the duty of every man and woman to defend Pakistan with lives" had nothing to do with the case. That is the whole of the statement made by the witness. It is impossible to argue, in our judgment, that the witness had given any reasons which had led Ina, to arrest the Maulana, or had convinced hip: that it was necessary in the public interest to arrest the Maulana. I know that the reasons which had led the witness to arrest the Maulana could not be asked from him, but that would rather go to show that the witness was not deposing to the reasons which had led him to arrest the Maulana. There is no other evidence on the record to show as to what were the reasons which had led the witness to arrest the Maulana. We would, therefore, hold that the appellant has failed to establish that the Maulana teas arrested by Zul Qarnain for reasons for which he could not have been arrested or detained by Zul Qarnain ; or in other words, that the reasons for the Maulana's arrest were such as fell within the category of any item in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution Act. In this view, it is unnecessary to examine the question as to whether the reports received by the witness fell within the ambit of entry No. I of List No. II or not. We would, for the above reasons overrule the third objection as well. There was, however, another aspect of the case which was not argued until the Court itself drew the attention of the Advocate‑General to it. Ordinance I V of 1948 was as already observed, promulgated by the Governor of West Punjab on the 10th December, 1948; under section 88 of the Constitution Act at a time when the Legislature of the Province was not in, session, Tile Governor could, therefore, promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appeared to him to require if he was satisfied that an immediate action by him was necessary. But under sub section (2) of section 88 such an Ordinance had to be laid before the Provincial Legislature and were to cease to have any operation It the expiration of six weeks from its re‑assembly or if a resolution disapproving it was passed by the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly of the Punjab was dissolved on the 25th January, 1949, and Proclamation No. 18 (1) Cord/49 was issued by the Governor‑General on that date. It was declared in this Proclamation that the Governor‑General was satisfied that a situation had arisen in which the Government of West Punjab could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 92‑A of the Constitution Act, he, therefore, directed the Governor of West Punjab to assume on his behalf all powers vested in or exercisable by the Provincial Legislature and suspend ed the operation of section 88 of the Constitution Act along with certain other sections. If, therefore, the power of pro mulgating an Ordinance had been taken away from the Governor on the 25th January 1949 and the Ordinance IV of 1948, already promulgated by him on the 10th December, 1948, could not be laid before the Legislative Assembly before its dissolution, questions might. arise as to whether the Ordinance could, after all the powers vested in or exercisable by the Provincial Legislature had been assumed by the Governor himself, remain in force at any rate without any further action by him ?, or was the continuation of the Legislative Assembly's existence essential for the validity of the Ordinance ? A still more important question would be as to how the Maulana could be kept in detention after the expiry of six months under the Act of 1947, when subsection (5) of section (3) of the Act did not, after its amendment by the Ordinance IV of 1948, apply to him for he had not been, according to Zul Qarnain's statement, arrested or detained either by the Provincial Govern ment or under its direction, and the provisions of subsection (3) of section 3 could not, therefore, be attracted in his case. And the same question would arise in regard to subsection (3) of section 3 of the Punjab Safety Act, 1949. These questions might, on examination, be found of some importance but they do not strictly arise in this appeal for the order No. 21047‑BDSB., passed by the Governor on the 29th October under the Act of 1947, had not expired even on the date when the appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Lahore was filed in this Court. We ark aware of the prayer made by counsel for the petitioner to take notice of the subsequent detentions in this appeal. But since a number of questions, which could not have been raised in respect of the orders of detention made on the 4th and 29th October, 1949, may arise for consideration and these could not have been considered by the High Court of Lahore, we would not allow them to be raised and canvassed in the present appeal. For the above reasons this appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed. A.H Appeal dismissed