P L D 1973 Lahore 500 (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.

‑The dispute relates to a piece of land situate within the municipal limits of Bhera, Tehsil Bhalwal, District Sargodha. It was proposed in the name of Abdul Rashid, respondent No. 1 on the 3rd of October 1964 and was confirmed to him by the Chairman, Allotment Committee on the 13th of February 1965. Abdul Rashid sold away the land in dispute to Shaukat Mahmood, respondent No. 2 in 1965 and the mutation was sanctioned by the Revenue Authorities. It turned out that the land in dispute was an evacuee trust property and that it could not be allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, because it did not form part of the compensation pool. However, the President of Pakistan in the exercise of his powers under para. 19(j) of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Evacuee Property attached to Charitable, Religious or Educational Trust or Institution, accorded approval "to the sale of evacuee trust agricultural land, utilized in satisfaction of claims of one Abdur Rashid in Bhera, Tehsil Bhalwal, District Sargodba to the Settlement Commissioner at the rate of Rs. 8.00 per produce rode: unit", and conveyed it to the Secretary though letter No. F. 16(4)/68‑SLII, dated the 28th of January 1969. The Secretary was also advised to approach the Settlement Organisa tion "to make payment for these lands".

2. The Central Government had earlier taken a decision for sale of Evacuee Trust Land which had been allotted against verified claims in various Districts of West Pakistan at the rate of Rs. 8.00 per produce index unit and it was conveyed to the Trust Board by Government of Pakistan, Rehabilitation and Works, through their letter No. F. 3(1)/63‑N, dated the 25th of May 1964. The latter reads as : "I am directed to forward herewith a copy of D. O. Letter No. 1410‑54/1887‑Rt.L), dated the 11th April 1964, from the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore on the above subject and to say that in exercise of the powers conferred under para. 19(j) of the Scheme for the management and disposal of evacuee property attached to charitable, religious or educational trust or institutions, the Central Government are pleased to accord sanction for the outright sale to the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner of the Evacuee Trust land measuring about 18,000 acres allotted against verified claims in various districts of West Pakistan at the rate of Rs. 8.00 per produce Index unit."

3. The Anjuman‑i‑Araian, Bhera through one Faiz Muhammad filed Writ Petition No. 574‑R of 1970 praying that the allotment of Abdul Rashid respondent be declared to be without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect and that all subsequent transactions "especially the final order of approval by the President of Pakistan be declared to be void and inoperative." The petition was dismissed in limine by our learned brother Aslam Riaz Hussain, J., by his order dated the 29th of September 1970, on the ground that the Anjuman was not an aggrieved person and, therefore, had "no locus standi whatsoever to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 98 of the Constitution." This is a Letters Patent Appeal.

4. The facts have been fully stated in the order of the learned Single Judge. It is not necessary to restate them. The case depends on the determination of the question whether or not the Anjuman had the locus standi to file the petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution. The learned counsel for the parties have not advanced their cases beyond what they contended before the learned Single Judge. The contention of the respondent was noticed in para. 6 of the Judgment as :‑ "Major Ishaq M. Khan, counsel for respondent No. 3, submitted that on its own showing the Anjuman is a trespasser on the land in question ; that it is neither an allottee nor a transferee of the said land ; that it is not even an applicant for its transfer and has not expressed any hope that the same might ultimately be transferred to it ; and that the only right that the Anjuman claims with respect of the land in question is that it has constructed a Masjid and a Madrassa over it, without any authority or right whatsoever and even without getting the plan thereof sanctioned from the relevant Municipal Committee. He argued that on these facts, the Anjuman cannot be regarded as an aggrieved party'. The case of the appellant, as was advanced by its counsel Mr. Mujaddid Mirza before the learned Judge, was that to be an 'aggrieved party' within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitution, one need not have a 'legal' right in the property in question and it Is enough if the person Invoking the jurisdiction is in any manner hit or adversely affected by the impugned order. He admitted that the Anjaman was neither a transferee of the land nor had it applied for its transfer. He did not contend that a Masjid and Madrassa were built on the land in question in pursuance of any right 'vested' in the Anjuman or that the plan thereof had been got sanctioned from the relevant Municipal Committee." The learned Judge having considered the contention of the parties in this behalf held in paragraph 13 of the Judgment "Anjuman Araian in the present case, however, had no legitimate right whatsoever over the land in dispute. Its status, by its own admission, is only that of a trespasser. It entered the land in question without the permission of the relevant authorities and started using for its own purpose. Subsequently, it constructed the Mosque and the Madrassa without any right whatsoever and without obtaining permission from the relevant authorities. It did not care even to get the plan thereof sanctioned by the relevant Municipal Authorities. No doubt the impugned order is not to the Anjuman's liking. The Anjuman would have liked to usurp the land and become owners of the same by adverse possession, but it certainly does not have legitimate right, vested or otherwise, in the land in question which would entitle it to maintain a writ petition". The appellant has not placed anything on the record, nor has it been contended before us that the facts on which reliance has been placed by the learned Judge to hold that Anjuman is a trespasser were incorrect. The appellant indeed in para graph 13(viii) of the grounds of appeal alleged "that the con struction of the mosque as well as the Madrassa was duly approved to the Municipality Bhera on 20‑3‑1967." But it is only an assertion without any proof. There is no sanction of the Municipal Committee, Bhera in favour of the appellant.

5. The learned counsel for the Anjuman contended that since it had constructed mosque and Madrassa on a part of the land, it had acquired an Interest in it and was bound to be adversely affected by the impugned sale. In other words, the contention is that although the Anjuman is not the owner of the land, yet by the fact that it has built a mosque and school on it, it has acquired an interest in it. The question, therefore, arises whether a mosque can be constructed by usurping the land of another person and if it is so constructed, can it be used as a mosque ? The educational institution to impart religious instructions, of course, has not the same importance as a mosque has. 1T the construction of the mosque and its user is unauthorised and Irreligious, the construction of the unauthorized Madrassa will, of course, create no right or interest in the Anjuman.

6. In Al‑Hadis, an English translation of Mishkat‑al‑Masabih, Part Il, Chapter XIV by Alhaj Maulana Faaiul Karim, the usurpation is explained as : "Gasb in its literal sense means forcibly taking a thing from another without the consent of the owner 9n such a manner as to destroy the owner's possession of it".

7. It is reported in Fatawa‑i‑Alamgiri, Vol. I :--‑ If somebody built a mosque on his own share of the land which was a joint property and subsequently it was revealed that a part of it belonged to another shareholder, it would no longer remain a mosque owing to the proprietary nature of the land under it. We may refer to Majmuatul Fatawa by Maulana Abdul Hayee, Vol. I where it is stated "It is not proper to offer prayers in a mosque built on the outer wall of a mosque for the reason that the latter belongs to the public and does not vest exclusively in God, the Almighty. It is just like offering prayers in a Mosque built on a property unlawfully seized from its owner." In connection with the conditions and qualifications of a valid Waqf it is mentioned In Fatawa‑i‑Alamgiri, Vol. I :‑ "One of such conditions is that at time of dedication of the property the creator of the trust should be its absolute owner. If at the time of the creation of Waqf he forcibly seized the land belonging to somebody else and then dedicated it for the purpose of Waqf, the Waqf would not be validated even if subsequently he has paid the price of the land to the owner and has arrived at some settlement with him in lieu of some money." In Fatawa‑i‑Alamgiri, Vol. III it is stated :--‑ lf somebody took forcible possession of land belonging to another and planted trees in it or constructed a house thereon, he will be told to demoilsh the construction, remove the trees and return the land to its owner. If the domolition of the structure or removal of trees result in damage to the. land, its owner will be entitled to retain them on payment of their price. In Bukhari and Muslim it is said :--‑ "Whosoever unlawfully seized land belonging to another to the extent of one span of hand, on the Day of Judgment all the seven earths will be hung round his neck with their full weight." Doubtless the act of the members of the appellant‑Anjuman. In occupying the land in dispute is usurpation (Garb). They bad taken possession of the land without the permission of the Evacuee Trust Board In whom the property had vested. If they had intended to construct the mosque, the proper course for them was to have applied for its transfer from the Trust and they could also approach the Central Government und,‑r` para. 19(j) of the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of the Evacuee Properties attached to Charitable, Religious of Educational trusts. They did not take any steps to acquire the property lawfully. Since they took over the possession in an illegal and unauthorized manner, it is an act of usurpation. In Al‑Hadis an English translation of Mishkat Al‑Masabih, Part II, Chapter XIV by Alhaj Maulana Fazalul Karim, usurpa tion is condemned at page 229 in these words :‑ Usurpation is unlawful. Any parson knowingly and wilfully usurping the property of another is held to be a criminal and a sinner, and therefore he becomes liable for compensation. The object of Islam is peace. By encroachment of the rights of another, peace is disturbed and therefore a sin is committed. Forcible possession is an oppression in an extreme form of which there is a strong condemnation both in the Holy Quran and Hadis. A usurper will be hurled down unto seven earth on the Resurrection Day‑4 : 15, 14 : 12, and he shall be made to bear the burden of earth that he usurped

14 : 295 W. A marauder is not a follower of the Prophet, and Islam enjoins no compulsion in any action‑1 : 70, Riot and loot are strictly unlawful‑14

0. Prophet even instructed not to take a staff of his brother out of joke. In Bukharl Salem from his father reported : Whose extorts any portion of land unjustly will be sunk down unto seven earths on the Resurrection Day. In Baihaql Darqutni Abu Hurrah al‑Raqqashi from his uncle reported that the Messenger of Allah said : Behold ! oppress not. Behold I the property of a man is not lawful except with his voluntary consent. In Ahmad Ya'la‑b‑Murrah reported that I heard the Messen ger of Allah say :‑ "Whoso encroaches upon a land without title therein will be put to bear the burden of its earth on the Congregation Day. Same reported : I heard the Messenger of Allah say "Whoso takes a span of land by oppression the Glorious and Almighty Allah will give him the trouble of digging it till he reaches the last of the seven earths, and then he will be thrown down up to the Resurrection Day till he will be brought for judgment among men‑Ahmed. We may also refer to Verses 108 and 109 of Sura Tauba translated by Marmaduke Pickthall

108. Never stand (to pray) there. A place of worship which was founded upon duty (to Allah) from the first day is more worthy that thou should stand (to pray) therein wherein are men who love to purify themselves. Allah loveth the purifiers 41109. Is he who founded his building upon duty to Allah and His good pleasure better, or he who founded his building on the brink of a crumbling, overhanging precipice so that it toppled with him into the fire of hell ? Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk." We may again refer to Al‑Hadis (English Translation by Maulana Fazalul Karim) where while dealing with the Civil Liabilities of a usurper it was observed :‑ An usurper of land is liable for any damage occasioned by the cultivation of it, and a trespasser usurper acquires no right in a property."

8. The precise question was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust (P L D 1969 S C 223) and it was held that "under the Muslim Law; both Hanafi and Shiah Schools ; it is a condition that the property dedicated should be the Wakif's otherwise the Wakf is not valid. Ameer Ali in his Muhammadan Law, Volume I, p. 134 states that `the subject‑matter of dedication must be the property of the Wakif at the time the Wakf is made, that is he must be in a position to exercise dominion over it. To make a valid dedication it is essential that the person dedicating must be vested with full proprietary right at the time of dedication, for, even the susequent acquisition of such a right will not validate it unless the proprietor also ratifies."

9. The appellant has failed to establish any legal right. Doubtless, it has no right in the juristic sense. It has also not been able to show that the sale has resulted "in the loss of some personal benefit" to it. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trurt and Montgomery Flour & General Mills Ltd. v. Director, Food Purchases (P L D 1957 Lab. 914). These authorities are of no avail to him for the reason that by the impugned sale the Anjuman has not suffered C any legal wrong, nor have its interests been in any way affected. Even if the sale had not been made in favour of the respondent, the appellant was not entitled to the transfer of the property, nor had the Anjuman a right to lawfully remain in its possession. The Anjuman, in the circumstance, cannot challenge transfer in favour of the respondent. In Imdad Ali Malik v. The Settlement Commissioner etc. (Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 172 of 1964) it was held by the Supreme Court: "We declined to hear Mr. Muhammad Bakhsh Meer, who appeared for the petitioner, when he attempted to argue that the house could not, in law, go to the informer. It is clear that the petitioner has no vested right in house, and that he has other wise no locus standi, in these proceedings, to question the disposal of the house by the Settlement Authorities." In Sardar Muhammad v. Pakistan (1970 Law Notes Lab. 736) the petitioners had constructed the shop over the property and on a notice of ejectment served by the Municipal Committee they challenged the order in writ petition wherein it was held that the petitioners had no right or title to remain on the property and. therefore, cannot act in a manner so as to perpetuate unlawful possession. In Masitullah v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (P L D 1965 Lab. 672) it was observed by Anwarul Haq, J. (as he then was, and now the Chief Justice) that "according to the provisions of the Act itself, the appellant before us is not entitled to claim the property in dispute under the earmarking scheme. In these circumstances it can hardly be urged that he has a vested right in this property. It has been repeatedly held by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court that if a petitioner has no locus stand! In the matter, the Court is under no obligation, at his instance, to examine the entitlement of the respondent." It was further observed : "For the reason given above we are of the view that the appellant Masitullah has no locus standi in the matter of the transfer of the house in dispute. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to examine whether the house has been rightly transferred to the respondent, Major Bashir Ahmad. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed." In Zebun Nisa Kureshy v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (P L D 1962 Pesh. 186) it was observed: "Before concluding we may mention that Mr. Zafar expressed his intention of bringing what he considers to be the illegal allotment and transfer of the property in dispute in favour of respondent No. 2 to the notice of Enforcement Staff. This, however, is no reason why we should help him by giving a finding as to the status of respondent No. 2 when such a finding is unnecessary in deciding the fate of the present petition." In Karim Bakhsh v. Muhammad Ashraf (1939 S C M R 740) where the facts of the case were that Karim Bakhsh petitioner challenged the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner before the Additional Settlement Commissioner on the ground that Muhammad Ashraf had been transferred two shops whereas in law he was entitled to only one. The Additional Settlement Commissioner referred the matter to the Settlement Commissioner recommending that one of the shop should be taken from the said respondent. The Settlement Commissioner agreed with the Additional Settle ment Commissioner and set aside the order of one shop. Karim Bakhsh challenged the order in the High Court which took the view that the petitioner had no locus standi in the matter "for an informant has no place in the Scheme of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and in any event the present case did not involve any irregular transfer." The petitioner then moved a Review petition which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by observing: "The petitioner now seeks review on the ground that even if he had no locus standi in the matter, the Settlement Commissioner could, under subsection (2) of section 20 be deemed to have taken suo motu action in the matter, particularly since there is no dispute that they were two shops which had been transferred to one person in contravention of the Scheme framed by the Settlement Authorities themselves. Even if he had done so, the petitioner would not have had any right to its transfer. Therefore, in either event, the petitioner bad no locus standi in the matter." In Muhammad Ismail Shah v. Mst. Jaferi Begum (1969 S C M R 34) it was observed: "Indeed he does not lay claim to the disputed property, but attempted to act pro bono publico on the allegation that Mst. Jafferi had not filed a proper Settlement form and was not in possession of the property transferred to her. The High Court has, in the circumstances, rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner to call in question the transferor in favour of Mst. Jafferi Begum." In Haji Adam v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (P L D 1968 Kar. 245) it was held: "Now in the light of these authorities let us examine whether the appellant who was the petitioner in the Court below can be said to be aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitution. It has already been noted that he had never applied for the transfer of the shop. He could not have done so being a local. He had not even moved for the sale of the shop by auction because he had given a no objection with regard to the transfer of it In favour of Mukhtarunnisa. That, however, might not by itself be very material. It may further be noted that he was not a party to any of the proceedings with regard to the transfer of the shop by the Settlement authorities. It was only when he was asked to pay rent after the final transfer order to Bahauddin that he moved this Court under Article

98. The sole ground on which he claimed to be an aggrieved party was that if the property was put to public auction he would be able to bid at it. But as observed by the Supreme Court that right is shared by every other citizen of this country. Can it be said that every such person who might have been able to bid if an auction had been held would have a vested right in the matter of the transfer of such a property, and if it was transferred otherwise than by auction be could claim to have suffered injury and say that he was directly aggrieved. In other words, can it be said that he was legally aggrieved. The answer to that question in our opinion, must be in the negative." In Abdul Hamid v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (1971 S C M R 711) it was held: "The mere desire to bid for a property at an auction does not carry a vested right to bring such property to auction." In Doaba Goods Forwarding Agency Ltd. v. Province of Punjab (1971 S C M R 527) it was held: "the High Court's function under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 is not pronounced upon the validity of laws or Notifications, etc., as merely an academic exercise but it is only where a person is aggrieved, that is to say, adversely affected by such a law that he may invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court and then the High Court would in a concrete case deal with the legal position." In Abdul Qayyum v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (P L D 1968 S C 362) it was held: "Another aspect of the case is that Kirpa Ram building having been declared a big mansion neither appellant had entitlement to its transfer. This affected their locus standi to challenge the transfer In favour of respondent No. 2" and that "as to the locus standi of Ch. Abdul Qayyum 1t has been earlier brought out that he did not file any settlement form for the transfer of the Kirpa Ram building. He had, therefore, no right to challenge the transfer in favour of the respondent No. 2." In Ghulam Mohy‑ud‑Din v. Government of Pakistan (1971 S C M R 747) it was observed that the appellant "has no entitle ment to the disputed shop and consequently no locus standi to challenge the order of the Central Government transferring the shop to respondent No. 3." Reliance was also placed on Farida Khan v. Chairman, Karachi Municipal Corporation (1971 S C M R 109) where it was held that an owner had no locus standi to challenge the order of assessment for house for the reason that the tax was payable by the tenant. In Mst. Ammenabai v. Karachi Municipal Corporation (1971 S C M R 80) the Municipal Corporation had, by its resolution dated the 8th of June 1965, decided to sell the land in dispute to respondent No. 3 at the rate of Rs. 150 per sq. yd. The petitioner challenged the order in appeal which was dismissed by the Commissioner. She then filed the Writ Patition which was also dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had no legal right to the grant of land under Article 98 of the Constitu tion. She challenged the order fn the Supreme Court and it was held: "We are of the view that the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution was clearly not maintainable as the petitioners had no legal right to the grant of the land which they could assert by way of a petition under the said Article". In this view of the matter the learned Judge in Chambers' had rightly held that the appellant had no locus standi to file and petition under Article 98 of the late Constitution.

10. The appellant had objected to the sale in favour of the respondent on the ground that the Central Government had acted arbitrarily in selling the property in favour of Abdul Rashid. The Government of West Pakistan, the Chief Settle ment Commissioner and the Evacuee Trust Board in their written statements controverted this position. It was claimed by all of them that the Central Government was competent to sell the property to Abdul Rashid under paragraph 19(j) of the Scheme of Management and Disposal of Evacuee Property attached to Trust. It was stated in the report of the Central Government that "the Central Government having satisfied itself that the disposal of property is the best course allowed the sale". Learned counsel does not dispute the fact that the Board could, with the previous sanction of the Central Govern ment, sell the property. He, however, contends that the property was not uneconomic and therefore, could not have been sold under paragraph 19(j). On behalf of the Government, the Trust and the Chief Settlement Commissioner it was pleaded that the property was uneconomic and at any rate, the power to sell under the said paragraph extended not only to uneconomic properties but also to any other Trust Property in respect of which disposal by . . . sale appears to be the best course. Whether or not the Central Government should have sold, the property is a matter which does not call for determination in these proceedings, for the reason that the appellant had no locus stands to file the writ petition. The appellant, moreover., trespassed on the land and was, therefore, not entitled to any relief under Article 98 of the Constitution. In Muha Yaqoob v. Municipal Committee (P L D 1971 Lah. 664) it was observed : "This finding is enough to dispose of the matter fn so far as it concerns the ten petitioners who are mere trespassers on the land, having no relationship of lessees or licensees with the E respondent‑Committee which has been admittedly in control of this property since 1954. Whatever the nature of the notices served upon them by the Municipal Committee, It is clear that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court cannot be exercised so as to perpetuate their illegal possession over property to which they have no right or title of any kind whatsoever." In Abdul Ghafoor v. Settlement Commissioner (1968 Law Notes 71) it was held that a trespasser has no right to move the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. In Muhammad Juran Mondal v. A. 11.1 Chaudhry (P L D 1969 Dacca 516) ft was observed : "the jurisdiction that we have been called upon to exercise is not one which can be invoked by one who is guilty of bad faith and unconscionable conduct. The right is in the nature of ex debito justitiae, but will only be granted if the petitioner can show (hat his conduct has not been such as to disentitle him of such a relief".

11. The learned counsel for the respondent also contended that the writ petition in the form in which it was filed was not competent and the appeal having been filed in the same form was also not maintainable. Since we have decided to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order of the learned Single Judge on the question of locus standi is unexceptionable, therefore, even if the contention is untenable, it would not affect the decision in the appeal. However, we have examined this question. The petition under Article 98 could be filed by an aggrieved party, and by "party" it means one who is competent to maintain an action. The Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to proceedings under Article 98 as hold in Hussain Bakhsh v Settlement Commissioner (P L D 1970 S C 1). The writ petition could be filed either by a person, a number of persons 1 a corporate body, or a firm. The appellant‑Anjuman is admittedly not registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It is also not a corporation and does not fall under rule I of Order XXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only an unregistered society and, therefore, could maintain an action under rule 3 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows :‑ "8.‑‑(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest 9n one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sae or be sued, or may defend in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiff's expense, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or, where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (2) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is Instituted or defended under sub‑rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made to a party to such suit." There are, according to the showing of the appellant himself 300 members of the Society. They were not impleaded as parties nor were steps taken to make the petition a repre sentative one. In Panchafti Akhara v. C. V. Gauti Kuar ((1898) 20 All. 167) it was held : "In a suit by an unregistered unicorporated society the names of the members of the company must be disclosed. If this is not done and if the society is neither a corporation nor a company authorized to sue or be sued in the name of an officer or of a trustee, so as to make the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 435, applicable, the plaint is a bad plaint."

12. In the case of unincorporated associations, the Secretary or other officers of the club cannot sue or be sued except by obtaining permission under Order I, rule

8. In Narumal Mulchand and others v. Rais Hashim and others (A I R 1940 Sind 63) where a Panchayat consisting of numerous persons brought a suit and all the members of the Panchayat were not on the record, nor had those on the record obtained permission under Order I, rule 8 to represent the other members of the Panchayat. It was held that it was "a suit akin to that brought by an unregistered society or by a club" and since the provisions of Order I, rule 8 were not complied with, the suit had rightly been dis missed. In Kumaravelu Chettiar v. T. P. Ramaswami (A I R 1933 P C 183) the question of representation under Order I, rule 8, C. P. C. was considered at length and It was observed : "Order I, rule 8 formulates an exception to the general principle that all persons interested in a suit shall be parties thereto." In Atma Ram Babaji Chowgale v. Narayan Arjun Dere (A I R 1922 Born. 109) the facts were that the president of a caste authorised under a resolution passed by the Managing Committee of the caste elected by the com munity under caste rules for the Management of caste properties filed suits for ejectment in his own name. It was held that "there being numerous members of the community, having the same interest in the suit, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons as well as the permission of the Court is necessary for filing the suit as provided in Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code." If the members of the Anjuman wanted to file the writ petition the proper procedure to follow was to obtain the leave of the Court under Order I, rule 8, C. P. C.

13. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. K. B A. Appeal dismissed.