P L D 1976 Karachi 1121 (PLP)

Plaintiff Muhammad Afzal son of Fasihullah who brought this suit died-: on 20-7-1973, during the pendency of the suit and therefore his heirs were brought on record.

2. The admitted facts are that plaintiff was appointed as Quantity Surveyor in the service of defendant House Building Finance Corporation, on 11-2-1953 and was later confirmed in due course. He was given officiating promotion as Engineer (Class I) and later confirmed on 30-4-1959. After revision of pay scale and his earning one increment he was drawing a salary of Rs. 1,085 per month.

3. On 13-12-1966, the plaintiff was served with Office Order terminating. his services with effect from 20-12-1966 (Exh. 1/F). The plaintiff challenged the termination order on the ground of male fides attributed to the Managing Director Mr. Raza Ali, who it was alleged, was instrumental to having the post abolished. Further the plaintiff challenged the validity of the order on the ground that there was no quorum in the meeting of Board of Directors held on 3-12-1966 when the resolution abolishing the post held by the plaintiff was passed and the subject was not on the agenda of the meeting.

4. The defendants resisted the suit and contended that the Managing Director has the authority to terminate the services of Class I employees of -the Corporation. It was their case that the service of the plaintiff was duly terminated in accordance with Regulation No. 11 of the Service Regulations which vests the Corporation with the power of termination of service of permanent employees by giving 3 months' previous notice without assigning any reason or in lieu thereof, a sum equivalent to pay for 3 months. The allegations of mala fides were strongly denied and it was acserted that the resolution abolishing the post was properly adopted.

5. On the death of the plaintiff, the defendants further raised the question that the suit had abated and the right to sue did not survive to the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff.

6. On the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed by the Court Consent Issues (1) Were the services of the plaintiff terminated in accordance with the se,-vice Regulations of the House Building Finance Corporation? If so, is this suit maintainable in law? (2) Is the suit bad for misjoinder of causes of action? (3) Is the plaintiff entitled to any relief? (4) What should the decree be? (5) Whether the action of the defendant-Corporation in abolishing the post of an engineer which the plaintiff was holding was mala fide? (6) Whether on 3-12-1966 the meeting o! the Board of Directors of House Building Finance Corporation was validly convened, was quorum thereof in order and the agenda properly circulated? Additional Issue Whether the right to sue does not survive to the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff Muhammad Afzal, and hence the suit abates?

7. The plaintiffs have examined P. W. Muhammad Amin, son of the deceased plaintiff and on behalf of defendant-Corporation, its present Superintendent Mr. Allah Dad Muhammad has been examined. Both witnesses have produced several documents relied upon by the parties in support of their respective cases.

8. The suit as originally brought was for a declaration that the order terminating the service of plaintiff Muhammad Afzal was illegal and further that he continued to be in service. By way of consequential relief the plaintiff bad sought the relief of payment of arrears of salary from the date of termination up to the time he is re-instated in service. However, on the death of the plaintiff, his heirs only claim a money decree for the amount of salary up to the period ending with his death on 20th July, 1973.

9. The defendant has not pressed issue No. 2 and therefore it is not necessary to give a decision thereon.

10. Issues Nos. 1, 5 and 6 can be conveniently considered and decided together.

11. The plaintiff has assailed the termination order of his service on the ground of mala fides as well as on legal grounds. So far as mala fides is concerned, as stated earlier, the allegation is that the impugned action was the result of machinations of the then Managing Director Mr. Raza Ali, who wanted to get rid of the plaintiff and his counterpart in what was then East Pakistan.

12. Admittedly plaintiff's service was terminated on account of the abolition of the post of Engineer under a resolution by the Board of Directors of the defendant Corporation in their meeting hold on 3rd December, 1966. This was communicated to the plaintiff and others concerned through Office Order No. 113 (Exh. 1-G) which reads as follows "Office Order No. 113 On abolition of their respective posts the services of Mr. M. Afzal, Engineer, Zonal Office, H; B. F. C , Karachi and of Mr. Abdul Kasem, Engineer, Zonal Office, H. B. F. C., Dacca are hereby terminated under Regulation 11 of the House Building Finance Corporation Service Regulation, 1957, with effect from the date they will be relieved of their respective charges by the General Manager concerned. They shall be paid each a sum equivalent to their respective substantive pay for three months in lieu of three months' previous notice. The above order of the termination is issued in terms of the resolution of the Board of Directors in their meeting held on the 3rd Decem ber, 1966. (Sd.) M. Raza Ali, Manager Director, House Building Finance Corporation."

13. This was followed by Order No. 246 of the Zonal Office at Karachi, which is Exh. 1-F on the record and is in the following terms "Order No. 246 In pursuance of Office Order No. 113 dated 13th December, 1966, the services of Mr. M. Afzal, Engineer, H. B. F. Corporation, Zonal Office, Karachi have been terminated with effect from 20th December, 1966 (afternoon). He will be given substantive pay for three months in lieu of three months' previous notice. Mr. Noor Ahmad Senior Assistant Engineer, will take over all the records and documents on charge of the Engineering Branch from Mr. M. A. Afzal, immediately on a proper handing/taking over, certificate countersigned by the Assistant General Manager. (Sd.) Lt: Col. S. A. H. Durrani, General Manager."

14. P. W. Muhammad Amin, in an attempt to substantiate the allega tions of mala fides, has stated that the post was abolished in order to do away with the services of the counterpart of the deceased plaintiff in East Pakistan. He said that the post was not actually abolished and was still continuing. Further he has produced copies of representations made by the deceased plaintiff. In his cross-examination he has proved the signatures of his father, the deceased plaintiff, on Bonus sheet for the year 1965-66 (Exh. 1-1), on the salary Register (Exh. 1-J) and on letter dated 26-8-67 (Exh.-1-K) addressed by the plaintiff to the General Manager for payment of bonus.

15. D. W. Allahdad Muhammad Khan stated that deceased plaintiff after the termination of his service received Rs. 11,093.05 as provident fund dues. He further stated that at his request the deceased plaintiff was paid salary for 3 months in lieu of notice, as well as bonus.

16. Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has half-heartedly pressed his case on the ground of mala fides. As stated above in the pleading of the plaintiff the only mala fides alleged was that the then Maaging Director Mr. Raza Ali wanted to get rid of plaintiff and his counterpart in the then East Pakistan in order to facilitate his making illegal gains through corrupt means. But the only evidence on the point consists of an oral assertion by P. W. Muhammad Amin to the effect that the post was abolished in order to do away with the services of the counter part engineer of the plaintiff in East Pakistan. Not only that but he went on to assert that the post was not abolished at all, although he was not able to say who was appointed in the post subsequently. It is well established that mala fides is to be specifically pleaded and proved by the A party relying on it. There is thus no evidence of mala fides and I find no force in the contention.

17. Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman nest assailed the impugned order by raising various objections to the legality of the resolution passed by the Board of Governors abolishing the post of engineer. His contention was that the resolution was illegally passed and therefore the consequential order of termination of service was also rendered illegal. He urged that there was no quorum for the meeting as required by law and the subject of abolition of the posts of Engineers in the Corporation was not on the agenda of the meeting He further submitted that the Board of Directors were not compe tent under. the law to abolish the post in question as they had no power to abolish the Class I posts.

18. Replying to the contentions of Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman Mr. A. A. Zari learned counsel for the defendant, submitted that in view of the fact that the plaintiff accepted the termination of his services and received 3 months' salary in lieu of notice and by his own request received bonus and provident fund dues he was estopped from challenging the validity of termination order. He next contended that the alleged absence of quorum or the fact that the question of abolition of post was not on the agenda of the meeting, are matters pertaining to the internal management of the Corporation and are protected from scrutiny by the doctrine of indoor management. In this connection he referred to Farld Sons v. Karachi Cotton Association Limited (P L D 1956 Kar. 315 ); United Bank Limited v. Pakistan Wheat Products Limited (P L D 1970 Lah. 232) and P. K. Basak & Co. Ltd. v. Gosen & Company Ltd. (P L D 1957 Dacca 230).

19. Finally it was urged by Mr. Zari that Regulation 11 of the House Building Finance Corporation Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the Service Regulations) vested in the Corporation the power to dismiss the services of a permanent employee by giving 3 months' previous notice or payment equal to the pay for 3 months without assigning any reason. Accordingly-the order of termination which was expressly passed in pursuance of this power cannot be challenged by this suit. 20. 1n order to appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the House Building Finance Corporation Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the various regulations framed thereunder.

21. Section 3 of the Act provides for establishment of Corporation to be called as House Building Finance Corporation which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 6 vests the general direction and the administration of the Corporation and its affairs in a Board of Directors which may "exercise all powers and do all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Corporation". Section 9 provides that the Board of Directors shall consist of 7 directors some to be appointed by the Central Government and some drawn from officials of the Central Government representing the two wings of the country at that time including the Managing Director. Section 13 empowers the Corporation to appoint or employ officers and advisers as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.

22. Section 16 which prescribes the procedure for holding of the meetings of board in its Clause (2) prescribes for the quorum necessary for such meet ings in the following terms "The quorum of the meetings shall be as follows : (a) Of the board, four directors including the Managing Director ; (b) ..

23. The contention of the plaintiff was that the requisite quorum was not present at the meeting held on 3-12-1966. Obviously the onus was on the defendant to prove otherwise. In this connection the only evidence produced by the defendant is the copy of the minutes of the meeting (Exh. 2-D). This document shows that at the meeting in question the Chair man Mollah Abdul Majid, Managing Director Raza Ali and two Directors A. R. Khan and A. M. Shamsul Alam were present. But Mr. Saeed-uz Zaman contended that this document being a copy was not admissible. To this Mr. Zari contended that the defendant has proved the circumstances which entitled the defendant to lead secondary evidence. In this behalf the defen dant's witness has stated that after the Fall of Dacca in 1971, all the original records of the Corporation remained there at the Head Office and therefore were not available with the defendants at the time of evidence. In the cross-examination however, it has been brought out that the summons of this suit was served on the defendants on 25-8-1969 and the affidavit of documents on behalf of the defendants was filed on 19,11-1969 wherein this document viz. the 'Minutes of the Board's Meeting' dated 3-12-1966 was shown as a document in the possession of the defendants.

24. Now section 64 of the Evidence Act directs that the documents must be proved by primary evidence, or secondary evidence where permissible under section

65. Clause (c) of section 65 has been invoked no behalf of the defendants which enables the patty to give secondary evidence in case the original has been lost or destroyed. The case of the defendant is that the original documents pertaining to this case went out of possession and power of the defendants on the fall of Dacca in 1971. However, it will appear that issues in this case were settled by the Court on 8-12-1969 and the documents were required to be produced within 3 months. The defendants in fact produced six documents including the purported true copy of the Minutesl (Exh. 2-D) alongwith the list on 23-1-1970. Thus it will be seen that the defendants did not choose to rely on the original at the relevant time and did not therefore produce it when admittedly the original must have been available with them. Even if the original document was not available at the time of the evidence, to my mind the defendants did not have the absolute right to produce it in evidence in view of Order XIII, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Accordingly, this leads to the conclusion that the original document was not produced by reason of wilful default or neglect on the part of the defendants, Additionally D. W. Allahdad Muhammad has frankly admitted that he cannot say who has signed the certificate appended to the. document in question. No attempt has been made to produce in evidence the person who is purported to have certified the correctness of the copy.! Therefore, it is not established that this copy was made from the original or compared with it. Surprisingly the copy does not even, bear the seal of the Corporation. In my opinion, therefore, the document is not even admissible as secondary evidence as defind in section 63 of the Evidence Act. I therefore, hold that Exh. 2-D is not an admissible piece of evidence according to Law.

25. If this evidence is excluded out of consideration, there is no other evidence to show that the meeting was held with the requisite quorum.

26. The second alleged illegality that the matter was not on the agenda of the meeting has no substance as no provision of the Act has been pointed out mandatorily requiring that the matters brought under deliberation and decision of the Board must necessarily be included in an agenda to be previously circulated. In this connection learned counsel referred to Regulation 34 of the General Regulations of the Corporation. Clause (v) whereof prescribes as under "(v) no business other that! that for which the meeting was convened shall be discussed at a meeting of the Board, except with the consent of the Chairman and the vote by the majority of the directors present unless one clear week's notice has been given of the same in writing to the Chairman" A bare reading of this Sub-Regulation clearly shows that the Chairman was empowered with the vote of majority of the directors to allow considera tion of any matter not originally included in the agenda. Consequently nothing turns on the mere absence of a matter from the previously prepared agenda for the meeting. Thus this contention cannot also be considered for the simple reason that it is neither raised in the pleadings of the plaintiff nor any issue has been raised to that effect. The pleading of the plaintiff is also silent with regard to the contention that the post held by the plaintiff could not be abolished without the sanction of the government. Even otherwise I find no force in this contention for the simple reason that the Corporation has full power to appoint or employ persons for the efficient performance of its functions. Consequently the abolition of any post on the, schedule of establishment, if considered unnecessary, would certainly be within the power of the Corporation to abolish.

27. However, as stated above Mr. Zari contended that the matters relating to the holding of meetings or the manner in which the business of the Corporation is conducted are questions relating to internal management and are therefore not questionable at the instance of third parties. I find nothing in the cases relied upon by the learned counsel to support the contention in the facts of the present case. If any mandatory provision of the law governing the manner in which the powers are to be exercised by the statutory corporation, are violated as a result of which the service rights of an employee are infringed, the Corporation cannot defend itself by setting up the doctrine of indoor management. In Farid Sons Ltd. v. Karachi Cotton Association the facts were distinguishable but even otherwise the learned Judge observed that "the Court will not interfere with the internal management of a Company unless there was a reason that action of the Company was fraudulent or against natural justice." In that case the finding was that the impugned action of the Company was within its power under the Articles of Association. In the Lahore case applying the doctrine of "Indoor management" against the Company it was observed that a person dealing with the Company is not concerned with its indoor management and may assume that all has been done regularly and therefore that case does not help the learned counsel. In the Dacca case it was observed that the persons "dealing with the Directors or Managing Director of a Company are not called upon to enquire whether the directors have been validly appointed or whether there is a specific resolution authoris ing them to do a particular- act if it is clear from the Articles of Association of the Company that they could have been authorised to do the said act." Accordingly the proposition made by the learned counsel is not available to him in the present case by way of defence against challenge to the action impugned in this suit.

28. The purported termination order in regard to the service of the plaintiff (Exh. 1-G), which has been reproduced above would appear- to have been under the signature of the Managing Director of the Corporation. Mr. Zari's contention therefore was that irrespective of the Board's decision to abolish the post held by the plaintiff and terminate his services the Managing Director had sufficient power under the Act to himself terminate the services of the plaintiff. In reply Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman vehemently contended that the post held by the plaintiff being a Class I post the Managing Director had no power to terminate the services of the holder thereof. In this connection learned counsel referred to Regulation 56 of the General Regulations of the Corporation dealing with the powers of the Managing Director, the relevant part whereof is in the following terms : "without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Managing Director by the Act, or Rules or any other Regulation the Managing Director may- (a) create within the budget grant all classes of post except Class I post ; (b) create in excess of the budget provision for a maximum period of 6 months all classes of post except Class I post." On the language of this Regulation, the learned counsel contended that since the Managing Director had no power to create a Class I post, it follows that he had no power to abolish a Class I post or terminate the service of a Class I employee. I find no substance in the contention, for .the matter of creation of posts, involves financial burdens on the exchequer of the Corporation and would obviously be confined to the budget grants except for limited period. But I am quite unable to conclude from this that the abolition of a post should be confined to the same restriction. Be that as it may, the very opening words namely "without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Managing Director by the Act", very clearly make the provisions of this Regulation subject to section 8 of the Act, the relevant part of which reads as under : (1) .. (2) The Managing Director shall be the Chief Executive Officer and shall, on behalf of the Board direct and control the affairs of the Corporation. (3) Any matters not specifically required by this Act or by Regulation made thereunder to be done by the Board the Managing Director shall have authority to conduct the business, control the function and manage the affairs of the Corporation"

29. It would therefore appear that the Managing Director except where contrary provision has been made in the Act itself or the Regulations would have all the powers of the Board in regard to the management or the affairs of the Corporation. Nothing has been pointed out expressly to exclude from the powers of the Managing Director in the Act or theta Regulations to abolish a Class I post or to terminate the services o If Class I employee. I have therefore, come to the conclusion that the Managing Director was competent under the law to terminate the services of the plaintiff:

30. Mr. Saeed-uz.Zaman next argued that the prior permission of the Central Government was necessary for abolition of the post and in this connection invoked the provisions of section 6 (ii) of the Act, which lay down that the Board in discharging its functions shall act on commercial considerations and shall be guided on questions of policy by such directions as the Central Government may give it. . The contention was that the abolition of both the posts of Engineers was a question of policy and therefore it was incumbent upon the Corporation to seek prior approval for its action. However, I am unable to construe the provision relied upon in the manner canvass-.d by the learned counsel. All that the above provision. prescribes is that whenever the Central Government in its judgment issued any directions for the guidance of the Corporation on question of policies, the Corporation shall be bound to follow them. But it certainly does not provide that in all matters of policy the Corporation was required to seek approval and was denuded of all powers of decision on questions of policy without seeking such approval. It is nobody's case that the Central Government had issued a directive for the creation of these posts or had prohibited their abolition. This contention therefore fails. The last contention of Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman was that the Corporation was bound to follow the procedure laid down in the Service Regulation No. 26 which contemplated a departmental enquiry on the lines provided for civil servants and he therefore impeached the order as arbitrary. He feebly contended that the termination order purporting to be in pursuance of Regulation 11, was in fact a cloak to do away with an undesirable employee. In this connection he relied on Nasim Jehan v. General Manager, P. W. R., Lahore and others (PLD 1968 SC 112) which was a case of a civil servant governed by constitutional guarantees -under the 1962 Constitution. The contention of the learned counsel was that after the termination of his services when the petitioner made a represen tation to the Corporation the remarks were called for by the General Manager. The letter containing the remarks has been produced in evidence as Exh. 2-C which shows that the plaintiff was involved in irregularities concerning the funds of the Corporation and that he was involved in establish ing his own construction firm at Karachi. On the basis of the contents of this document it is being contended that the dictum laid down in the Supreme Court case is fully attracted fn the facts of this case and therefore the termination was wrongful.

31. On the other hand Mr. Zari argued that the Service Regulations which prescribe the conditions of the employment governing the service of the plaintiff expressly vested the Corporation with the power to terminate the service of any permanent employee without cause and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any fixed tenure of service. He further contended that it was within the discretion of the Corporation to adopt either course vie. to terminate the service under Regulation 11 or to proceed under Regulation 26 for the purpose of punishing departmentally which included removal or dismissal from service. Supporting his contention Mr. Zari referred to the facts on record which clearly established that the plaintiff himself regarded this case as falling under Regulation 11 by accepting 3 months' salary, in lieu of notice, provident fund dues, differences and bonuses. It was submitted that under Regulation 17 of the House Building Finance Corporation Employees' Provident Fund Regulations the sum standing to the credit of subscribing officer becomes payable on termination of services or death and not on dismissal under Regulation

26. Counsel also relied on Abdul Karim v. West Pakistan Province (P L D 1956 S C (Pak.) 298) and urged that when the services of a public servant are liable to be terminated by one month notice and no action was taken after enquiry on charges but the services were terminated by notice the termination was upheld as in accordance with the conditions of employment.

32. Rule 11 of the Service Regulations is in the following terms : "(i) The Corporation may dispense with services of a permanent employee by giving 3 months previous notice in writing without assigning any reason or in lieu thereof, a sum equivalent to his substantive pay for 3 months. (ii) Regulation 26 which is captioned as 'Punishment and Appeal', on the other hand opens with the words "Subject to tire provisions of Regulation 11 an employee who commits a breach of the Rules sad Regulations of the Corporation or who displays negligence, inefficiency, or indolence, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Corpora tion or in conflict with its directions or commits breach of discipline or commits an act of misconduct or in subordination, etc. shall be liable to the following penalties. The Rule then provides in detail the nature of penalties which may be imposed, the authorities which may impose the penalties, and to whom the appeals may be preferred and also the procedure for holding of the enquiry before inflicting punishment, on the pattern of civil service Rules on the subject.

33. The question for consideration therefore, is two-fold. Firstly whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the impugned termination order fell within the ambit of Regulation 11 or whether it was incumbent upon the Corporation to comply with the procedure laid down in Regulation 26 ; and secondly even if it is held that the impugned action amounted to wrongful dismissal whether the Corporation is liable to pay compensation for wrongful dismissal. A bare reading of Regulation 26 clearly shows that the power of termination without reason is expressly saved. The plaintiff had accepted service with the Corporation obviously on conditions prescribed in the Service Regulations which was not for fixed duration- or tenure but made the employment terminable at the pleasure of the Corporation without reason by notice. The rights available to civil servants under the previous Constitution cannot be invoked by employees of Statutory Corporation as was the plaintiff. The employees of Public Corporations are not treated as civil servants and the power to dismiss them must tie found in the statutory powers of the Corporation or the Board or in the contract of employment in question. It is now, in Pakistan well settled that the employment of the employees of Statutory Corporations is governed by the Master and Servant Law. Thus the latest fronouhcement of Supreme Court of Pakistan was in R. T. S Janjuwa v. N. S. Corporation (P L D 1974 S C 146) where it was held that the constitutional safeguards available to the generality of the civil servants against the arbitrary dismissal or removal from service are not available to the servants of a registered Company or a Statutory Corporation. The general law of Master and Servant is applicable and the only remedy available to the aggrieved servant in such cases is to sue for damages fop wrongful dismissal. Accordingly, I am of the confirmed view that the considerations or principles governing the dismissal of civil servants are entirely different and cannot be urged for decision so far as the employees of Statutory Corporations are concerned, whose case in terms of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, falls entirely within the province of law relating to Master, and Servant. The only exception to the Rule is the case of incumbent holding a public office, as postulated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above referred case. It is the case of no one that the plaintiff was holding any statutory office or public office.

34. In any case the evidence does not make out that it was intended to dispense with the services of the plaintiff under a cloak and f am not convinced that merely because certain illegalities were attributed to the plaintiff subsequently in correspondence, inter se, between two officers of the Corporation, after termination of service, it could be said that the motive for the impugned order was to avoid the holding of departmental enquiry. In the view that I have taken. I therefore, hold that the order of termination as is expressly mentioned therein, fell squarely within the purview of Rule 11 and was validly passed.

35. Even if it is assumed that the impugned order was illegally passed the position would not very materially change. It may be seen that the suit as it was filed prayed for a relief of declaration that the order of termination was void and that the plaintiff therefore continued to be in service and consequential relief for payments of arrears of salary. Mr. Saeed-u-Zaman conceded before me that on the death of the plaintiff the prayer relating to declaration no longer survived and the suit is in substance only a suit for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal. It is now well settled that the Court will not grant specific performance of a contract of employment. Such a contract is one for personal services and comes within the category o g contracts whose execution the Court cannot supervise and will not therefore enforce by an order for specific performance. This is the import of Rule laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to the effect that such a case would be governed by the law of Master and Servant. The remedy of an employee who has been wrongfully dismissed is an action for damages and if the defendant has the right to terminate the contract before the expiry of the term, damages for wrongful dismissal to be awarded can be assessed only up to the earliest time at which the defendant could have validly terminated the contract. Thus if the contract expressly provide that it is terminable upon 3 months' notice the damages will ordinarily be 3 months' wages or loss of salary. Thus in this case the most that the plaintiff could claim was 3 months' salary which has already been received by him admittedly.

36. In the light of the above reasons I therefore find issue No. 1 in the affirmative and hold that the services of the plaintiff were terminated in accordance with the Service Regulations of the Corporation. On Issue No. 5 my finding is in the negative and on Issue No. 6 as stated above I have come to the finding that the defendant has failed to prove that the meeting of the Board of Directors was validly convened.

37. As regards the additional issue the contention of Mr. Zari is that the rights claimed in the suit were of personal nature, pertaining as they did to the service rights of the deceased plaintiff and as such on his death the suit abated. He referred to several cases from the Indian Jurisdiction as well as some Pakistani cases. I do not wish to burden this judgment with the discussion of the cases cited. Suffice it to say that none of the cases is directly on the point. In all these cases the right claimed was strictly a personal right and therefore could not survive in favour of or against the Legal Representatives of the deceased. In the present case as stated above one of the relief claimed in the suit was for recovery of arrear3 of salary accruing by way of consequential relief and accordingly an ascertained sum M was being claimed, which had fallen due to the deceased in his life time if the case had succeeded. I therefore hold that the right to sue did survive to the Legal Representatives of the deceased plaintiff.

38. For the foregoing reasons this suit fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. S. A. H. Suit dismissed.