P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

5. Yet another issue (No. 7‑A) was added to those already framed on the 17th of December 1957, which was to the following effect :‑ Has not the defence been properly represented. If so, should the defence be struck off and ex parte proceedings be taken against the respondent ?

6. The learned trial Judge then proceeded to record the evidence. He discussed issue 2 first, and held that in spite of the fact that the applicant had omitted to mention Rs. 30 in the schedule, it was not fatal to the case of the applicant, and there fore, the schedule was properly verified and was not false. Other items, which will be mentioned later on in this judgment were completely omitted from the order.

7. The learned trial Court then discussed issue 5 and held that there was no evidence to prove that the petitioner had within two months next before the presentation of the application disposed of any property fraudulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as a pauper.

8. The learned trial Judge then took up issue 3, and after entering into a very elaborate discussion, arrived at the conclusion that the application was properly presented in a proper manner.

9. Issues 4, 6 and 7 were discussed by the learned trial Court together. He observed that the real contention of the respondent was that the agreement was not with the applicant alone, but with five partners of the firm mentioned above, and, as such, the cause of action could arise to all the five persons, and not to the applicant alone. He decided that whether there were five members or one alone with whom the agreement in dispute had been entered into would have to be decided at the time of finding on the merits of the case. For the purposes of the frame of the suit and the question of jurisdiction, the allegations in the application alone shall have to be taken, and not the counter‑allegations put forward by the defendant. The learned trial Judge found that the appli cant had given a prima facie proof that he had framed this application in good faith in all respects. He repelled the con tention of the Company that no cause of action could arise to the applicant, because whether the firm consisted of five partners or only one, the result would be that the present applicant would invariably be having a cause of action. The learned trial Judge, therefore, decided issues 4, 6 and 7 in favour of the applicant.

10. On issue No. 1, the learned trial Court discussed certain items of the property and found it in the affirmative. Lastly, he discussed issue No. 7‑A and decided it against the applicant.

11. As a result of the above findings, the learned trial Court declared the applicant as a pauper and allowed him to sue in forma pauperis.

12. The Standard Vacuum Oil Company has now come up on revision to this Court against the above order.

13. The learned counsel for the applicant has raised a preliminary objection that no revision is competent against the order of the acceptance of an application to sue in forma pauperis.

14. Under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is open to the High Court to call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate thereto, and in which no appeal lies to it, and pass any order as it thinks fit if it is of the opinion that the subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

15. The learned counsel for the respondent has not denied that it is a "case decided", because the word "case" which is not defined anywhere in the Code, should be understood in its broadest and most ordinary sense unless in any particular case there are specific reasons for narrowing its meaning. The word "case" as was held in Bibi Gurdevi's case (A I R 1943 Lah. 65) is wide enough to include the decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights even though such an order was passed in the course of the trial of the suit. The question whether the respondent was a pauper or not was by itself a substantial question upon which a final decision has been given by A the learned trial Court, and therefore, it is a "case decided" amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent is, however, absolutely different. He submits that even if the decision of the learned trial Court be erroneous, it will not amount to material irregularity so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court vested in it by the aforesaid section of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of this view, he has quoted Tajuddin v. Nadir (P L D 1959 Lah. 261), in which Ortcheson, J. held that every decision based on an erroneous view of law was not open to revision. In the course of his judgment, however, the learned Judge quoted the view expressed by Vivian Bose, J. In Devidas Maroti Boke v. Nilkanth rao Deshmukh (A I R 1936 Nag. 157) that the illegality or material irregularity must be something independent of the decision itself ; an irregularity or illegality in the manner of arriving at it, not in the conclusion 6 reached. According to Vivian Bose, J. a good working test would appear to be this : if the decision had been the other way, would be illegality still be there. If not, the flaw must lie in the decision, and not in the manner in which it has been reached. With this L proposition of law I am in respectful agreement and I realise that it has to be seen in every case whether there was an irregularity or illegality in the manner arrived at by the learned trial Court, and not in the conclusion reached. In this case, as the discussion proceeds it will be quite obvious that the learned trial Court's, approach to the case was defective. This is illegality in the manner adopted by him which led him to the conclusion which is abso lutely erroneous.

16. The other preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel against the revision petition is that no revision petition could be entertained on any ground whatsoever if an application to sue in forma pauperis has been accepted by the learned trial Court. In this connection, the learned counsel wishes to draw a distinction between the acceptance of such application and the rejection thereof. In support of his contention, he has cited Mst. Chanda Begum v. Magsud Hussain Khan (A I R 1942 All. 319), in which a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court entertained a revision petition against the rejection of the application of Mst. Chanda Begum to sue in forma pauperis drawing the above distinction. Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court made a reference to Malik Muhammad Ayub v. Malik Muhammad Mahmood (32 All, 623) which was approved by Sulaiman, C. J. in Sumatra Devi v. Hazari Lal (A I R 1930 All. 758). Sumatra Devi's case, however, is no authority for laying down such a broad principle of law that no revision would be competent if an appli cation to sue in forma pauperis was granted, although it is a positive authority for the converse view. Actually, it was a case in which the application of Mst. Sumatra Devi to sue in forma pauperis had been rejected by the learned trial Court and the revision was allowed by the High Court by holding that the manner by which the learned trial Court arrived at the conclusion was substantially defective. The earlier case of the Allahabad High Court Malik Muhammad Ayub v. Malik Muhammad Mahmood, however, supports the respondent's preliminary objection. The Division Bench in this case observed that when an application to sue in forma pauperis is rejected, the case of the applicant comes to an end and is a "case decided", but when the application is granted, the case of the pauper "is not decided" within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I am, however, with all respect to the learned Judges who decided the above case unable to agree with their view that when an application to sue in forma pauperis is accepted, it is not a "case decided", and the High Court, has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in revision, no matter how illegal or without jurisdiction the order may be. Under Order XXXIII, rule 3, Civil P. C., when an application to sue in forma pauperis is made, it is either accepted or rejected. In both the cases it would be a "case decided". The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Malik Muhammad Ayub v. Malik Muhammad Mahmood seem to have confused the word "case" with the word "suit". It is true that if an application to sue in forma pauperis is rejected, then the plaintiff's suit, if the Court‑fee is not paid within the time fixed, must be dismissed, and in the converse case it must proceed, but then the words used in section 115, Civil P. C. are not the "suit decided", but the "case decided", and there is a substantial difference between the two terms. I am, therefore, of the opinion that whether an application to sue in forma pauperis is accepted or rejected, it is a "case decided" and a revision under section 115 or the Civil Procedure Code is competent.

17. The other preliminary objection which the learned counsel for the respondent has raised is that the only party which is really affected by the order accepting the application to sue in forma pauperis is the State, and not the opposite party, and there fore, a revision petition by the former alone is competent. The only authority cited at the bar to support this proposition in fact goes counter to it. It is Maratab Ali Shah v. Madan Lal (A I R 1934 Lah, 295), in which Dalip Singh, J., though he held that the only person really affected was the Crown, yet he was not prepared to hold that the High Court would not interfere in a proper case instituted by party other than the State. All that his Lordship held in this case was that in such a case the Court would be slow to move at the instance of the opposite party. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that only the State is interested in such an application is repelled by Order XXXIII, rule 6, C. P. Code, which lays down that where the Court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the grounds stated in Rule 5, it shall fix a date (of which at least ten days' clear notice shall be given to the opposite party and to the Government Pleader) for receiving such evidence as the applicant may adduce in proof of his pauperism, and for hearing any evidence which may be adduced in disproof thereof. If the opposite party had no interest whatsoever in the decision of the application, then it was absolutely unnecessary for the legislature to provide a notice to the opposite party. A notice to the Government Pleader alone would have been quite enough. By providing a notice to the opposite party, the legislature has clearly conceded a right to such party to contest the application which includes the right to go up on revision if the decision in the first Court goes against him. It is, therefore, perfectly clear to me that the opposite party has as much right to move the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction as the State has.

18. The preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondent are, therefore; overruled.

19. Under Order XXXIII, rule 2, C. P. Code, every appli cation for permission to sue as a pauper must contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits and a schedule of any movable and immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof shall be appended thereto. The learned counsel for the Company has argued that in this case, although the applicant had attached a schedule as required by the above provision of law, yet it did not show the entire movable and immovable property belonging to him at the time of the institution of the application. It is in the evidence of Rao Abdur Rahman (A. W. 2) that a flour mill at Wan Bachran has been allotted to the applicant. According to him, the expenses and the income of the said mill are at par with each other, and therefore, no profit accrues from this mill to the applicant. Rao Abdur Rahman has further admitted that two shops in Mianwali have also been allotted to the applicant, but both of them are lying vacant. The applicant, when he appeared in the witness‑box, admitted that at the time when his agency had come to an end, which was in September 1953, the outstanding debt recoverable by him from different persons was Rs. 54,

000. He added that he had to pay a debt of Rs. 50,000 to different persons. Apart from that, he was to pay income‑tax amounting to Rs. 5,

000. He admitted that a flour mill at Wan Bachran had been allotted to him, but added that the engine was about 35 years' old, and when his agency was terminated, he spent about Rs. 2,100 and overhauled the engine. He admitted that he was getting about Rs. 80 per mensem from the above flour mill. He further admitted that an amount of about Rs. 30 or Rs. 35 lying in the Bank was left by his father. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that all these items have not been entered in the schedule. He, however, contends that so far as the shops and the flour mill are concerned, they are evacuee property and were temporarily allotted to the applicant, because he happened to be a refugee. The applicant, therefore, has no permanent interest in the said property, and, consequently, it cannot be said that this property belongs to him so that it should have been included in the schedule. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent appears to be quite unrealistic and fallacious. A person may not have a perma nent right in a certain property and yet a valuable right in respect of that property may be vested in him which might yield to him a considerable income. In such a case, it is difficult to understand as to how can the applicant, who wants to sue in forma payperis, be allowed not to mention in the schedule such rights which undoubtedly belong to him and to none else. For example, a person may be a lease‑holder of a certain property paying a certain amount of premium to the landlord and earning a considerable amount as income of that property every month or every year. Can it be said that the income of that property after deducting the premium does not belong to that person. The negative answer of this question will obviously lead to most ridiculous and absurd results. Similarly, when an evacuee property is allotted to a refugee and he is entitled to realise the income thereof, then the income or the usufruct of that property belongs to such person and it has to be included in the schedule filed under Order XXXIII, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The excuse that since the property does not permanently belong to the applicant, therefore, it need not be included in the schedule is, under no law, or principles of equity, available to him.

20. The applicant, however, had no reason whatsoever not to mention in the schedule the debt of Rs. 54,000 which he was entitled to recover from other persons. It will be totally wrong for the applicant to say that he is not bound to mention in the schedule the debt which he has to recover from other people, because he himself has to pay the debts far exceeding that amount to different people. Under the law, a person who makes an appli cation for permission to sue in forma pauperis must mention in the schedule all movable and immovable property belonging to him. irrespective of the debt which he has to pay to other persons. The law does not allow the applicant not to mention any property on any ground whatsoever. I am, therefore, constrained to hold that the schedule which the applicant appended to his plaint was highly defective and omitted to mention certain properties belonging to the applicant. It is, however, argued that the omission to mention some movable or immovable property in the schedule, particularly when some of it is mentioned in the plaint, should not prove fatal to the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis. It is stated that the item of Rs. 54,000 which was to be recovered from different persons by the applicant was specifically mentioned in the plaint. The proper course, according to the applicant, is to return the application for amendment and on such amendment the presentation should be deemed to be a proper presentation from the date of the original presentation. It appears that the objection with regard to the defective nature of the schedule was taken at the earliest possible time in the trial Court and it was open to the applicant to request for the amendment of the schedule which the trial Court might have granted to him if he considered proper.. No application for the amendment of the schedule has been made even in this Court. But, even if it is made, it will not be proper to allow him to amend the schedule at this late stage of the case.

21. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, has urged that once an application to sue in forma pauperis is enter tained and notice thereof is issued to the opposite party and the Government Pleader under Order XXXIII, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, it is not open to the Court to reject the application on any of the grounds mentioned in Order XXXIII, rule 5 of the same Code. This rule runs as under:‑ "The Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper‑ (a) where it is not framed and presented in the manner pres cribed by rules 2 and 3, or (b) where the applicant is not a pauper, or (c) where he has, within two months next before the presenta tion of the application, disposed of any property fraudulently or in order to be able to apply for permission to sue as a pauper, or (d) where his allegations do not show a cause of action, or (e) where he has entered into any agreement with reference to the subject‑matter of the proposed suit under which any other person has obtained an interest in such subject matter."

22. It will be noticed that after the application is presented the Court has first to satisfy itself if it is in the proper form and is duly presented. Thereafter, if it thinks fit it may examine the applicant or his agent when the applicant is allowed to appear through an agent. On going through the application, the schedule and the examination of the applicant, if any, the Court may reject the application on any of the grounds under rule 5 or issue notice under rule

6. After the notice is issued, then the Court is to examine the witnesses to be produced by either party and may examine the applicant or agent and has to make a memorandum of the substance of their evidence. Under subrule (2) of rule 7 of Order XXXIII, C. P. C. the Court must hear any arguments which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application or on the evidence (if taken) by the Court, the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in rule

5. This makes it perfectly clear that even though the Court has not rejected the application under Order XXXIII, rule 5, C. P. C. and has issued a notice under Order XXXIIt rule 6, C. P. C. to the opposite party, it can still reject the appli cation for any reasons mentioned in Order XXXIII, rule 5, C. P. C. and if he does not reject the application on those grounds, then pass an order either allowing or disallowing the person to sue as a pauper. It is, therefore, a misconceived argument that if once a notice is issued to the opposite party, the Court is precluded from rejecting the application under Order XXXIII, rule 5, C. P. C.

23. But, even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that action under Order XXXIII, rule 5, C. P. C. cannot be taken after the notice to the opposite party or the Government Pleader is issued, still if the applicant does not disclose all his assets with utmost good faith, then regardless of the motive for his not doing so, his application is liable to be rejected. It is an essential duty of the applicant to give a full and correct statement of his pro perties and assets. In this respect, the utmost bona fides are required of the applicant in the matter of the disclosure of his assets, and any intentional departure from good faith,, whatever the motive might be, must attract the consequences of a dismissal of the petition. The fact that even if the suppressed assets had been disclosed, it would not have affected the question of the alleged pauperism is absolutely irrelevant in this context. This view receives support from the following authorities :‑ Durga Prasad and another v. Sriniwassureka and another reported in 123 I C 398. "It is most important that all applications for leave to sue or prefer appeals in forma pauperis should set forth with the utmost good faith as in the disclosure of assets in insolvency proceedings, the whole of the assets of the applicant, and if it be revealed in the course of the hearing of the application that the applicant has not stated with the utmost good faith the whole of his assets the application must be rejected at the very earliest stage."

24. It was further held in this case that once it is shown that the applicant has not set forth his assets with the utmost good faith it is open to the Court to reject the application ab initio without ordering any enquiry into his pauperism.

25. The other cases in support of this view are Chellammal v. Muthulakshmi Ammal (A I R 1945 Mad. 296), Kuppuswami Naidu v. Varradappa Naidu (205 I C 81), The Saillcupa Co‑operative Multipurpose Society Ltd. v. Jehangir and others (P L D 1957 Dacca 448) and Mst. Kariman and others v. Bahoran singh and others (178 I C 512). It was held in Gyan Chand Chhotelal Jain v. Babu Lai Jaini Lal and others (A I R 1954 Vin. Pra. 46), that the true, criterion appears to be whether or not the applicant has capacity to raise money to pay Court‑fees. He has to prove his actual inability to raise the money not only on property in possession but even on transferable interest in any property though not in his possession. Where the applicant is a partner in a partnership it is for the applicant to explain what happened to his assets and whether or not they were realisable. It is for the applicant to prove that they were out of his reach.

26. The next question which has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the applicant has been guilty of practising fraud on Court and his application to sue in forma pauperis is liable to be rejected on that ground as well. It is clear that if the application of the plaintiff, who wants to sue in forma pauperis, is to be dismissed on account of his bad faith in disclos ing his assets, then as a necessary corollary thereof his application is liable to be rejected if he acts in a mala fide way in respect of other matters materially affecting his application for permission to sue in forma pauperis. The grounds for rejecting the application given in Order XXXIII, rule 5, C. P. C. are not exhaustive. The application can be rejected on other grounds as well not given in the above rule. It is clear from the agreement as has also been admitted by the applicant in his plaint, that the contract was entered into between the Standard Vacuum Oil Company on one part and firm Ha ji Muhammad Bakhsh and Company on the other. The names of the members of this firm are also given in the agreement in question as Muhammad Bakhsh, Israrul Haq, Ihsanul Haq, Anwarul Haq, and Ch. Muhammad Siddique. This firm, as has been made perfectly clear in the agreement itself, con sisted of five members mentioned above and of any other persons who may be accepted as the members of the firm later on. Subse quently, by an agreement dated the 17th of January 1953, to which the Standard Vacuum Oil Company was not a party, Iftikharul Haq was accepted as a partner of the firm Haji Muhammad Bakhsh and Company and Ihsanul Haq excluded therefrom. The shares of the newly constituted firm were specified and this firm was duly registered under the Pakistan Partnership Act. It is quite clear that so far as the Standard Vacuum Oil Company was concerned, it will be considered to have entered into agreement of agency with Muhammad Bakhsh, Anwarul Haq, Israrul Haq, Ihsanul Haq, Ch. Muhammad Siddique, and Iftikharul Haq. It cannot be said that Ihsanul Haq will not have any connection with the agency for the simple reason that his name was removed by a subsequent agreement to which the said Oil Company was not a party. Muhammad Bakhsh then died and was being represented by his sons, including Ihsanul Haq. 1n this capacity too, Ihsanul Haq cannot be absolved from liability under the contract. It is alleged by the plaintiff in the plaint itself that the cause of action to the plaintiff arose on the 8th of September 1953, when Muhammad Bakhsh and Company was in existence and of which there were for the time being six partners, including the five mentioned in the agreement of the year 1950, and Iftikharul Haq added later on. The plaintiff, however, alleges that he alone had a right to file the suit because of the dissolution deed dated the 26th July 1955. This deed purports to have been written by Israrul Haq, Ihsanul Haq, and Anwarul Haq, but later on the names of Ihsanul Haq and Anwarul Haq were scored off from the body of the deed and the only person left behind was Israrul Haq. Anwarul Haq, Israrul Haq, Muhammad Siddique and Iftikharul Haq, however, signed the deed as executants. It is not clear why in the body of the deed their names were scored off, and yet they signed the deed as executants. It is stated in this deed that none except Anwarul Haq was working on behalf of the firm Haji Muhammad and Company after the death of Haji Muhammad Bakhsh and he alone was, therefore, the sole proprietor of this firm. Anwarul Haq has instituted this suit without impleading the other partners as plaintiffs or defendants in the case. The question which arises and which has not been considered by the learned trial Judge is this as to what was the motive for the partners of Haji Muhammad Bakhsh and Company to cut off their relations with the firm whose business had terminated, according to the plaintiff, in September 1953, on account of the withdrawal of the agency by the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. Under section 45 of the Contract Act, when a person has made a promise to two or more persons jointly, then, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract, the right to claim performance rests, as between him and them, with them during their joint lives, and, after the death of any of them, with the representative of such deceased person jointly with the survivor, and, after the death of the last survivor, with the repre sentatives of all jointly.

27. The Standard Vacuum Oil Company had made a contract jointly with five persons to whom a sixth one was added later on. The cause of action, as is clear from the plaint itself, arose, if at all, in favour of all the six persons in September 1953. The relevant paragraphs of the plaint are Nos. 9 and

10. Paragraph No. 9 runs as follows:‑ "That on 8‑9‑1953, without any previous notice and without any fault on the part of the plaintiff's firm, Mr. R. M. Rocke, Sales Manager, and Mr. S. O. Siddique, Salesman, both of the defendant‑company, while the plaintiff was away to Lahore and Karachi, entered into the premises of the said Petrol Pump at Mianwali, threatened the employees of the plaintiff's firm and forcibly took possession of the said petrol Pump at Mianwali and misappropriated the plaintiff's stock and property resulting in loss to the plaintiff, and thus ruined the reputation, prestige, and good‑will of the plaintiff resulting in huge losses." Paragraph No. 10 is as under :‑ "That the defendant‑company, without any fault on the plaintiff's part arbitrarily cancelled the appointment of the plaintiff's firm as defendant's agents for the sale of kerosene oil, purporting to act under clauses 24, 25 and 26 of the Agency Agreement, although the Agency Agreement dated 1‑4‑1950 does not contain such clauses. This action on the part of the defendant is mala fide and illegal, and is due to the illegal and unwarranted action on the defendant's part by its employees dated 8‑9‑1953 mentioned in para. No. 9 of the plaint."

28. If the cause of action based on a contract arises in favour of two or more persons whether constituting a firm or not, the right to sue accrues to all of them jointly, and not to one single individual. All of them, therefore, must bring a suit for the enforcement of the right which arises out of that contract. There may be exception to this general rule, for example where some of the persons in whom the right to sue accrues refuse to join with the others to institute a suit in order to enforce such right, but in this case the persons refusing to join as the plaintiffs must be impleaded as defendants in the case. It shall then have to be examined whether the refusal of the other persons to join as the plaintiffs in the case was bona fide or only a design to allow one or some of them to sue in forma pauperis who is or are known not to possess sufficient means to enable him or them to pay the pres cribed fee. If it is established that the refusal was mala fide or the other persons had abandoned their right for an ulterior motive, then all persons in whom the right to sue has accrued shall be considered as one person in order to judge whether they possess sufficient means to enable them to pay the prescribed fee for the plaint in such a suit. To hold otherwise will open a door to fraud because the persons who are able to pay Court‑fee would evade payment of such fee by putting up such persons to proceed with the suit who are completely paupers. This cannot possibly be the intention of the law.

29. No case on all fours has been quoted at the bar, but a very strong analogy can be afforded by the following two authorities :‑ (1) Charu Sila Dasi v. Haran Chandra Mukherjee (A I R 1919 Pat, 58), it was held therein that the provisions of Order XXXIII have been designed in aid of bona fide litigants and must be strictly confined to such litigants. It cannot have been the intention of the legislature that a litigant fully able to comply with the terms of the fiscal law should by setting up a pauper as his nominee be entitled to evade the claims of the State. The effect of permitting a benamidar to sue as a pauper would be to give a person who is not a pauper the right to evade the fiscal law, and to infringe the provisions of rule

5. The same view was taken in Muhammad Nazif Abdul Karim v. Firm Mushtaq Mal Khem Singh (A I R 1940 Pesh. 13).

30. Now, if we examine the so‑called dissolution deed or relinquishment deed or the deed of abandonment whatever name M may be given to the highly tainted document no doubt is left that this deed reeks with deceit and fraud. This deed is a naked and to defeat the object of this provision of law. Order XXXIII, C. P. C. is intended to grant relief to such persons only who on account of their poverty are incapable of seeking relief from the Courts but it certainly can render no assistance to the persons who bring into existence circumstances which superficially garb them with poverty. No explanation has been offered as to why was this deed written when the business of the partnership had com pletely terminated on account of the withdrawal of the agency by the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. Thereafter as has been alleged by the applicant nothing but liabilities were left behind and it would be either knavish or lunatic for a person to take they burden of these liabilities upon his shoulders only to the complete exclusion of the other partners of the firm. The applicant is not in any way shown to be a lunatic and so the conclusion is irresisti ble that he is the former. I am confident that if the petitioner is allowed to sue in forma pauperis it would tantamount to permitting him to use the provisions of Order XXXIII, C. P. Code as an instrument of fraud.

31. It is the basic principle of law in all civilised countries that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud or to take advantage of his own wrong or to found any claim upon his own iniquity or to acquire property by his own crime. The operation of these maxims is not destroyed by the mere fact that a statute makes no reference to them and certain results from the mandatory language that it uses shall flow from specified acts. In the present case, the applicant has acted fraudulently throughout and without remorse. He did not disclose all his means of liveli hood in the plaint or in the schedule. He was dishonest enough to say that he did not remember whether he had obtained a succession certificate in respect of his father's assets or not, and this, in my opinion, he did in order to conceal the money which he had inherited from his father. A reference to the deed dated the 17th of January 1953, will show that Muhammad Bakhsh and Company was not only carrying on an agency of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company but was carrying on some other business inside and outside Mianwali as well. When he appeared into the witness‑box he failed to give account of that other business. In short, the conclusion is irresistible that the applicant has failed to prove that he is not possessed of means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by the law for the plaint in suit which he intended to institute in forma pauperis. By executing the so‑called relinquishment or the dissolution deed, the partners of firm Haji Muhammad Bakhsh, including the applicant, were playing fraud on the Court and on the statute, which under no circumstances, can be allowed.

32. The result then is that I accept this revision petition and set aside the order of the learned trial Court and dismiss the application of the plaintiff to sue in forma pauperis. He is allowed two months' time to pay the Court‑fee, failing which his plaint shall be considered as rejected. The Standard Vacuum Oil Com pany will have its costs of this application both in this as well as in the trial Court. A. H. Petition accepted.