P L D 1962 Dacca 368 (PLP)

MURSHED, J.‑The petitioner, Dr. Azizul Islam, claims to be the owner and occupier of a piece of land consisting of C. S. Plots 1343 and 1424 of Mouza Shahar Khilgaon, J. L. No. 287, in the District of Dacca. It is stated that he has built a building on the said plots where he resides with members of his family. On the 30th of December, 1959, he received a piece of printed paper which purported to be a notice under section 3 read with section 9 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (Act XIII of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector, Dacca. The document which was made over to him bore a seal of that office and a rubber stamp replica of a signature appended under the printed pace provided for the signature of the Additional District Magistrate, Dacca. This paper, which was served on him, accord ing to its printed directions, required him to deliver the said piece of land which was purported to be requisitioned for a rehabilita tion scheme for displaced persons. On receipt of the so‑called notice as described above, the petitioner made several representa tions to the Land Acquisition Collector for a reconsideration of the pretended order of requisition on the ground that he lived on the said plots of land along with his family in a house which he had built thereon. When he found that his representations were of no avail, he obtained the present Rule from this Court for a Writ of mandamus directing the respondents to cancel, rescind or with draw the said notice. It is not necessary to set out here in detail all the various averments in the petition. On behalf of the respondents an affidavit‑in‑opposition has been filed wherein the statements of the petitioner has either been denied or not admitted, but the averment that the petitioner received a piece of paper, which is called a notice bearing a rubber stamp at the place which should have contained the signature of the District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrate, Dacca, has not been traversed and indeed, it cannot be traversed on the face of the pretended order itself. At the hearing of this petition one of the points, which was canvassed before us by Mr. Moinul Huq, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, was that the service of the printed paper on the petitioner, which Is miscalled a notice, cannot amount to the service of a legally valid order upon the petitioner. In order to deal with this point, it is necessary to set out the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Act. On the date, on which the so‑called notice was served upon the petitioner, the said section 3 ran as follows: "

3. If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is expedient or necessary so to do for the administration and development of the new Province of East Bengal or for any other public interest connected therewith such as improvement of towns or ports, construction or betterment of roads, water ways or other communications, development of commerce or industries, maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and other similar purpose, the Provincial Government may, by order in writing, requisition any property and may make such further orders as appear to that Govern ment to be necessary or expedient in connection with such requisition: Provided that no property used by the public for the purpose of religious worship shall be requisitioned. Provided further that the Provincial Government may exempt any particular property or class of properties or exclude any particular area from the operation of this Act." This section, namely, section 3, has been subsequently amended, but we are not concerned with the amendment at the present moment. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows: "4. (1) When an order of requisition has been made under section 3, it shall be served on the owner of the property personally by delivering or tendering it to him or where the owner cannot be found it shall be served by leaving an authentic copy of the order with some adult male member on` the family of such owner, or and, if no such adult male member can be found, the notice may be served by axing such copy to some conspicuous part of the premises in which he is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain and also by affixing another such copy to some conspicuous part of the requisitioned property. (2) Where the order of the requisition has been served under subsection (1) in respect of a property, the Provincial Govern ment may take possession of the property forthwith and may use or deal with the property in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in section 15 the Provincial Government shall not delegate its powers of taking possession to an officer other than one having a gazetted rank". For an appropriate construction of the provisions of these two sections they must, of necessity, be read together. On a considera tion of the aforesaid sections, we have reached the following) conclusions. (a) Section 3 is an enabling section which empowers the Provincial Government to requisition properties for the purpose mentioned in the said section, when the Provincial Government is satisfied that it is expedient or necessary to do so. (b) The power to requisition properties as enacted in the said section must take the form of an order in writing. (c) Section 4 provides that the very order itself must be served upon the owner of the requisitioned property. (d) Section 4 further provides for two other alternative modes of service in case of failure to effect personal service. These are not relevant for the purpose of the present case. (e) The said order will have a legally binding effect only upon the service of the order on the person mentioned above, namely, the petitioner here. It, therefore, clearly follows that service of the order itself, which must, in the first place, be a personal service, is the condition precedent for enforcement of the order, that is to say, that the said service of the order provides the legal sanction behind the order. With these observations we would like to examine the printed paper, which was served upon the petitioner and which is claimed to be a notice under section 4 of the Act. This paper, as has been rightly contended before us, is a printed paper bearing a robber -stamp replica of a totally illegible signature which appears above the words "District Magistrate" with the word "Add)." added to them. What strikes one in the face is that this document, which was served on the petitioner is not an order at all. Section 3 of the Act, as quoted above, requires an order to be passed. The order to be treated as an order must be made by somebody. The document does not disclose that anybody had personally made the order. A rubber‑stamp is no substitute for the conscious signature of the person who is required to make the order. In this printed paper with a rubber stamp appended to it there is absolutely nothing to indicate that it is, in fact, and order passed by the person authorised to make such an order. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that this document cannot constitute an "order" in the eye of law. The petitioner's contention is that he has not been served with a legally valid and binding order. It is interesting to note that under section 18 of the Act the Provincial Government has been empowered to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act and subsection (2) of the said section enumerates, amongst others, the matter in respect of which the rules may make provisions. Section 18 (2) (a) authorises the framing of the procedure to be followed in making an order for requisition under section 3 of the Act. In fact rules thereunder have been framed and published in the Dacca Gazette by a notification, being Notification No. 7824 Reqn., dated the 27th of October 1948. They are called the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Rules, 1,

948. Rule 3 of the said Rules reads thus: "An order of requisition referred to in subsection (1) of section 4 shall be in Form A." And Form A has been printed in very large numbers. In fact, such a form has been served upon the petitioner with only the petitioner's name and plots numbers mentioned in the Schedule. The form itself provides for the signature of the person making the order. There has to be a signature of the person who is making the order because otherwise it cannot operate as an order, which is consciously passed by the individual authorised to make the order. A mere printed form with a rubber stamp does not convey an order. Rule 3, as quoted above, provides that the order itself must be in Form A and below the Schedule there are dotted lines for the signature of the District Magistrate and a there rubber stamp cannot perform the duty for that signature. The significant point to remember is that the value of the signa ture lies in the fact that the person signing the order takes the responsibility for it, whereas a rubber‑stamp can be appended by anybody without the cognizance of the person, the replica of whose signature the said rubber stamp purports to be. The document, which is served under section 4 of the Act, must, under the requirement of law, be the order itself and the aforesaid rule specifically mentions that the order itself must be in Form A. The learned Advocate‑General, who appeared for the respondents, has submitted the following points in answer to the arguments advanced by Mr. Moinul Haq. In the first place, he has said that the law does not require the appending of any signature to Form A. Next he has argued that the service of notice upon the petitioner is a mere technical matter which cannot vitiate the order itself and it would be enough to show that the petitioner had otherwise derived knowledge of the order of requisition. The short answer to this argument would be, first, that Form A provides for a dotted line where the signature is expected to be appended. But the most important point to remember is that an order must be made by some one and a mere printed document bearing a rubber stamp cannot be described as an order for which the rubber‑stamp cannot take the responsibility. We asked the learned Advocate‑General to produce the original order passed by the Additional District Magistrate, if there is any original order at all. The result has been a revelation of a most eye‑opening character. The learned Advocate‑General handed over to us a file dealing with the requisitioning of properties of hundreds of persons. The order passed by the gentleman, whom the learned Advocate‑General has described to be the Additional District Magistrate, on the 27th of November, 1959, reads as follows: "Seen G. O. No. 17866 Reqn. dated 24‑11‑59 forwarding a copy of the memo. No. 4510 T. P. dated 21‑10‑59 from W. H. S. (C & B) Department with request to requisition and acquisition lands as per schedule attached for rehabilitation of persons displaced by the Dacca Rly. Dvn. Line. Mr. A. M. A. Qader A/L.A.C. will please take up the case with right earnest (illegible). Sd. Illegible. 27‑11‑59" Some portion of the note‑sheet has become illegible and the following portion, which is legible, is quoted below. " . . . Requisition notices, demarcation and title verification must go on with the utmost speed. Reqn. notices must be ready for despatch by Monday the 30th instant. Both myself and Mr. A. H. Chowdhury will be available for any assistance that may be needed by Mr. trader. Sd. Illegible. "Later Illegible." On the next sheet there is an endorsement which purports to be an order and it reads as follows: "28‑12‑

59. Requisition notice signed. To A. D. M. Sd. Illegible." Presumably the A. D. M. simply wrote one word, "Signed", after which an equally illegible initial has been put in bearing the date "29/12". When we asked the learned Advocate‑General to point out the order passed and signed by the Additional District Magistrate with respect to the properties of the petitioner, he failed to do so and enlightened us by saying that out of a large number of printed papers, in a bundle, the Additional District Magistrate had signed one such in the beginning and another towards the end. Nowhere, is there any noting or endorsement to the effect that the Additional District Magistrate has, in fact, passed an order of requisition in respect of the properties of the petitioner. This is one of the many instances of the slipshod and perfunctory manner in which officers have exercised their drastic power of compulsory requisitioning of properties. The learned Advocate‑General has failed to show us from the records that were produced before us that there was any order of requisition passed with regard to the property of the petitioner. We shall now deal with the next contention of the learned Advocate‑General that knowledge of the requisition, howsoever derived by the petitioner, is sufficient to serve the purpose of the notice under section 4 of the Act. This contention is wholly untenable. To hold so would be to wipe out the provision of section 4 of the Act. The service of notice under section 4 is the very foundation of the legality of the order. It will be interesting, on this point, to refer here to two decisions of the High Court of Calcutta, which have been cited before us by Mr. Moinul Huq. The first of them is a decision of a Special Bench in the case of Kassim Ibrahim v. Johurmull Khemka (I L R 43 Cal, 447) with regard to service of summons under the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of the Court, which has been faith fully summed up in the head‑notes, reads as follows: "For substituted service of summons to be effective, it is essential that the requirements of the rules of the Code should be strictly observed. "Knowledge of the institution of the suit, derived by the defendant aliunde is not sufficient in the absence of proper service of the summons. "Where the serving officer on three separate occasions went to the place of business of the defendant's firm under the erroneous belief that it was his ordinary place of residence, and asked for the defendant and, on not finding him, posted a copy of the writ of summons on the outer door of the premises: ‑ "Held, that this was not sufficient service . . . . . . " Woodroffe, J., has very precisely stated the law as follows: "That the defendant had otherwise knowledge of the institu tion of the suit is highly probable. But that is not sufficient, if service is not formally proved. "I would like to add that the decision referred to by the Chief Justice, Cohen v. Nursing Dass Auddy 1892 I L R 19 Cal. 201 was followed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J. and myself in an unreported decision in appeal from Order No. 75 of 1912, dated the 28th November 1913." The next case, which was cited before us is that of Jhabarmull Dudh walla v. Bhagatram Serowgir (51 C W N 189), In which a Division Bench of the same High Court re‑affirmed the view taken in the former case. Gentle, J., observed as follows: "Even in the absence of service, If the defendant otherwise becomes aware of the proceedings, nevertheless he is entitled to avail himself of the provisions of O. IX, r. 13 of the Code and to have an ex parte decree set aside in the absence of service." It is thus clear that it is no answer to an argument based on absence of service or Insufficiency of service to say that the petitioner had otherwise notice of the fact that an order was made. In the case before us the question is of a still more far‑reach ing consequence. It has to be remembered that the Act Itself is a drastic piece of legislation, which enables Government to compul sorily requisition properties of the citizens. To say the very least, an enactment like this must be very strictly construed. This principle of Interpretation has been reiterated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Kumudini Welfare Trust of Bengal Ltd. v. Pakistan and others (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 121) wherein it has been observed as follows; "Since sequestration of property is involved it is essential that the proceedings under the law authorising such sequestration should be held in strict conformity with that law." In the case of Kumudini Welfare Trust of Bengal v. The Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1959 Dacca 417), a Division Bench of this Court has held that according to section 3 read with section 18 (2) (c) of the Act and rule 3 of the rules framed thereunder, an order of requisition shall be in writing and shall be made in the prescribed Form A and that the order itself shall be served on the owner of the requisi tioned property. In the judgment that was delivered in the afore said case a similar point was dealt with as follows: "When a statute invades a private right, the relevant provision thereof should be construed rigidly. It has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in another case of Kumu dini Welfare Trust that "since sequestration of property is involved it is essential that the proceedings under the law autho rising such sequestration should be held in strict conformity with the law". The principle underlying this observation of their Lordships equally applies to this case, because the Act pro vides for compulsory requisition and acquisition of private pro perty. Therefore, when the Act expressly requires that the requisition order shall be made in the prescribed Form A and that order itself shall be served on the owner, the requirement of the Act will not be satisfied if the requisitioning authority merely records an order of requisition on the file. Even if the order of requisition be not made strictly in accord ance with the prescribed form, the making of the order by a person duly empowered to do so, and the service of that order on the owner is indispensible for its validity and effective ness. If the person aggrieved by an order of requisition intends to challenge it as illegal,, void and without jurisdiction or on any other ground, he can do so only on the basis of the order served on him, if the requisition of a property, as contended by Mr. Khondkar, becomes complete and effective as soon as an order in that regard is recorded on the file by the requisitioning authority, then, the service of a notice of such requisition on the owner shall not be necessary so as to render the owner legally binding and effective. In order to maintain his point of view Mr. Khondkar has gone so far as to say that the service of a notice of requisition though desirable, is not obligatory. It is difficult to accept these contentions as correct in face of the mandatory provision of the Act with regard to the making of an order of requisition and its service on the owner. If requisi tion becomes complete and effective with the making of an order in that regard on the file the requisitioning authority may not serve a notice thereof on the owner, and, by claiming privilege against the production of the relevant file in Court or as has been done, in this case, by objecting to the file being seen by the owner, keep the owner completely ignorant of the particulars and purpose of the requisition and thereby may make it difficult for him to formulate his grounds of objection against the requi sition. This must not have been intended by the Legislature." The learned Advocate‑General has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Muhammad Nur Hussain v. The Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 470). He has relied upon the following observations made by Shahabuddin, J. "The question of service of the order of requisition and the contention that a fresh delegation of powers to the Additional District Magistrate was necessary may conveniently be dealt with at first. The order of requisition issued In respect of plot No. 692 mentioned not only the appellant but also his brothers Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Yusuf as well as two other persons as occupiers of the land in question, and it has been found by the High Court that the endorsement of the peon who served the order showed that it was accepted by a brother of the petitioner. It was contended on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that that brother had separated from him long ago and in support of this position a deed was filed indicating that the brothers had partitioned their property, but the learned Judges of the High Court found that it was not shown that the appellant was not aware of the order of requisition. It was pointed out in this connection that it was significant that in respect of the order with regard to plot No. 694 which adjoins 692 and which was issued to the appellant on the same date as the order In question, it was not even alleged that the appellant did not receive that order. There, only the appellant was mentioned as the occupier and that order was served on him and as observed by the learned Judges the fact that no application In respect of plot No. 694 was filed was significant indeed. In the circumstances stated above it is clear that the appellant was as much aware of the order of acquisition in question when it was served on his brother as of the other order relating to plot No. 694 and the objection to the mode of service, if at all it has any force, is only technical." The learned Advocate‑General has invoked the aforesaid passage to support his proposition that if the knowledge of an intention to requisition is by some manner obtained by the petitioner, it would be enough compliance with the requirement of law. We do not think that this decision of the Supreme Court cited before us by the learned Advocate General is any authority in support of the proposition, which he tried to canvass before us. This is a case against the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party. As has been noticed, in the judgment of Shababuddin, J. as quoted above, the statement of the petitioner with regard to the service of notice upon him was a seriously contested issue What happened in that case was that the impugned order was served upon a brother of the petitioner. This was obviously a service according to the second alternative mode, which is provided in section 4 of the Act. The petitioner's statement in this behalf was very seriously opposed by the respondents in the affidavit‑in opposition that was filed. The Division Bench refused to adjudicate upon this point holding that the issue was a highly controversial and contested issue of fact. On the facts of that case the point was disallowed. The decision was affirmed In the Supreme Court. As we read the aforesaid obser vation, it merely says that the point as canvassed before them as well as in High Court, was a technical objection, as to the mode of service. Whether the mode of service was a proper one or not was neither decided by the High Court nor by the Supreme Court. The entire decision turned round the question that the petitioner failed to derive home the point successfully. In this connection, it is interesting to note that section 4 of the Act does not speak of service of any notice but service of the order Itself. The service of the order will be attended with the consequences mentioned in the section itself and would enable the Provincial Government to take the property forthwith. Without such service of the order the Provincial Government cannot act under the order in taking away the property in question. Section 5 of the Act speaks of notice with regard to a proposed acquisition of a property and it reads as follows :‑ "5(1). The Provincial Government may, if it thinks fit, acquire any requisitioned property and if it proposes to so acquire, the Provincial Government shall direct an officer authorised under this Act to cause a public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the project to be acquired stating that the Government Intends to acquire the property. (2) Such notice shall state particulars of the property to be acquired, and shall require all persons interested In the property to appear personally or by agent before the officer mentioned in subsection (1) at a time and place therein mentioned (such time not being earlier than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice) and to state the nature of their respective interests in the property, their objection (if any) to the acquisi tion of the property and particulars of their claims to compen sation for their respective interests. (3) Notice shall also be served to the above effect on the owner of such property and or all such persons known or believ ed to be Interested therein or to be entitled to act for persons so Interested as reside or have agents authorised to receive service on their behalf within the revenue district in which the property Is situated. * * * * * * * * * * *" We may further note the provisions of section 12‑C of the Act, which was Inserted into the body of the Act by section 9 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property (Amendment) Act, 1954 (East Bengal Act III of 1954). The said section 12‑C reads thus: "12‑C (1) Service of any notice under this Act shall be made by delivering or tendering a copy thereof signed, in the case of a notice under section 5, by the Officer therein mentioned, and, in the case of any other notice, by or by order of the District Magistrate. "(2) Whenever it may be practicable, the service of the notice shall be made on the person therein named. "(3) When such person cannot be found, the service may be made on any adult male member of his family residing with him, and If no such adult male member can be found, the notice may be served by affixing the copy on the outer door of the house in Pakistan In which the person therein named ordinarily dwells or carries on business or is known to have last resided or carried on business and by affixing a copy thereof In some conspicuous place. In the office of the officer authorised under section 5 or of the District Magistrate or In the Court House and also in some conspicuous part of the property to be requisitioned or acquired "Provided that, if the District Magistrate or the officer authorised under section 5 shall so direct a notice may be sent by registered post In a letter addressed to the person named therein at his last known residence address or place of business In Pakistan" It would be further noticed that even with regard to notice, which is required to be served under section 5 of the Act, section 12 enjoins that such notice must be signed by the officer mentioned therein. It further provides that in case of any other notice it should be signed by or by order of the District Magis trate. Even with regard to cases mentioned in section 5 of the Act, signature of the person mentioned therein is mandatory by the requirement of section 12‑C of the Act. We are, however, not concerned at the present moment with notices served under section 5 or any other provisions of the Act. We may only state that it would be a misnomer to describe service of the order as required under section 4 of the Act to be a mere notice, because it is more than that; it gives notice of the order of requisition upon the person served, but in effect and substance, it is upon the service of the order itself on such person that the order becomes effective In law. In this case no order was passed and none was served on the petitioner (except the printed order noticed above.) We may now refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Das v, Province of East Pakistan (P L D 1958 Dacca 290). It seems that In the aforesaid case a rubber stamp was used on the requisition order and it was argued that the fact of the user of such a rubber stamp was a good piece of evidence which proved the contention advanced in the case, namely, the requir ing authority did not apply its mind as in the expediency or other wise of the requisition. In this connection we would like to quote the observations of Akbar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench and we quote as follows: "The learned counsel has lastly contended that the use of a rubber stamp on the requisition order shows that the Additional District Magistrate did not apply his mind as to the expediency and necessity of this requisition. In paragraph 6 of the petition, it is stated that `Your petitioner further states that at a glance of the notice itself it will be found that the respondents have not applied their mind while requisitioning the said brick‑field inasmuch as the notice served on your petitioner does not contain any signa ture but a rubber stamp has been affixed Instead on it as also the notice requires your petitioner to remove movables under instruc tions of District Magistrate at Chittagong as also to claim com pensation and notify change of address to the said District Magistrate at Chittagong which makes the notice itself not only misleading but bad In law and inoperative. Your petitioner states that the above facts reflect that there is an unusual burry and haste in the matter without any justifiable reason and this leads your petitioner all the more to think that the whole action is a mala fide one and fraud upon power. Besides, Plot No. 725 is purported to be requisitioned by this notice, which does not belong to the petitioner at all and this would also show that the respondents did not apply their mind before requisitioning the said brick field. `The land acquisition Collector answers the above allegations in paragraph 8 of his affidavit‑in‑opposition as follows: "That the allegations made in paragraph 6 are denied and it is stated that the notice was issued after due application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is further stated that due to inadvertence the word 'Chittagong' was not scored through in the notice. It is stated that the movables were to be removed under the Instructions of District Magis trate, Dacca. It is further stated that from local information it was learnt that Plot No. 725 belonged to the petitioner. It is asserted that the notice is bona fide, good, valid and operative. It is further asserted that mind was duly applied before the requisition was made. "From the Government File, it appears that on receipt of the direction from the Government the Additional District Magistrate ordered the requisitioning of the plots In question. Thereafter, the office issued notice of requisition with a rubber stamp signature of the Additional District Magistrate. The learned counsel has contended that this rubber stamp shows that the Additional District Magistrate did not apply his mind. In support of his contention, he has relied on an unreported decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 144 of 1958 in the case of Messrs Landale and Clark, Ltd. and another v. The Pro vince of East Pakistan and others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "In any event, he passed an order in the file for acquisition of these plots. Hence he must have applied his mind as to the necessity of this requisition before passing the said order. "Simply because the notice was issued under a rubber stamp signature, it cannot be said that he passed the order without applying his mind." It would thus be patent that the point, which was urged before the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case, was that there was no application of the mind of the requisitioning authority as to the expediency of the requisition. The contention was sought to be supported by the fact that the order of requisi tion, which was served on the petitioner, bore a rubber‑stamp and also by another intrinsic evidence In the order itself, e.g., that, Instead of describing the District Magistrate to be that of Dacca, the word used was Chittagong. The learned Judges satisfied themselves on this point by referring to the actual order of requisition passed by the District Magistrate and they further held that the use of the word "Chittagong" was through inad vertance. On the facts and circumstances of the case, it was held that the relevant authority did apply its mind as to the necessity of requisition before the said order was passed and the decision is summed up in these lines "Hence he must have applied his mind as to the necessity of this requisition before passing the said order." We may add that a decision is an authority only for the point mooted and decided; It cannot be used in support of points which were neither canvassed before the Court nor decided by it. Here the contention before us is of a totally different nature. We have already discussed the gist of the contention, namely, that what was served was merely a printed form of an order, which bore a rubber‑stamp facsimile of a signature, and which, in the eye of law, cannot, by any manner or means, be described as "an order." Now what has happened in this case? From the original file that has been produced before us it appears that the Addi tional District Magistrate received an official memorandum requesting him to requisition certain lands with a view to their acquisition in future in accordance with an attached schedule for the rehabilitation of persons displaced by the Dacca Railway Division Line. An order was passed by the Additional District Magistrate on the 27th of November, 1959, directing the Additional Land Acquisition Collector to take up the matter "in right earnest." On the 28th of December, 1959, as it appears from the record, more than 1500 notices were prepared in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector and an endorsement to that effect has been made by some official in the Land Acquisition Department, which reads as follows: "Requisition notice signed. To A. D. M." The endorsement itself indicates that somebody else signed the notices, whereas a rubber stamp was appended to each of the notices. The aforesaid endorsement is initialled by the Additional District Magistrate (as we hre told by the learned Advocate- General) who appended the word "signed." This is not borne out by the records which have been placed before us. He has not signed any of the 1500 or 1600 notices (except two of them with which we are not concerned). All the so‑called notices are all printed papers with rubber stamp facsimile of signatures pur ported to be those of the Additional District Magistrate. Nowhere in the file produced before us there is anything to show that the requiring authority passed any order that in its opinion it is expedient to requisition the plots of land in question. The records disclosed an attempt to requisition lands by a mere mechanical process without anybody purporting even to satisfy himself that it was necessary and expedient to requisition such lands and without any body passing an order of requisition. We hold that no legally valid and binding order of requisition was served upon the petitioner. The service of the order upon the petitioner is not a mere technical matter but one of vital importance and consequence, as we have noticed above. On this ground alone the petitioner is entitled to succeed before us. Learned Advocate‑General has argued that, inasmuch as there was considerable delay by the petitioner in approaching this Court for the relief sought for in this petition, the petitioner has disentitled himself to get such relief. It is well settled that this Court would not issue a discretionary writ of mandamus in favour of a petitioner who does not come to Court with due diligence. But C it seems to us that the petitioner has given sufficient explanation for the delay in approaching this Court and we accept the same. In the circumstances stated in the petition, the delay was unavoid able and we do not think that we would be justified in refusing to give relief to the petitioner on this ground. As the petitioner has succeeded in his main contention before us, we do not think it necessary to deal with the other points raised before us by the parties. For reasons stated above, we make this Rule absolute and direct the respondents to cancel Requisition Order No. 5644, dated the 30th of December, 1959, in L. A. Case No. 27 of 1959‑60, issued to the petitioner from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector, Dacca. The petitioner is allowed costs of this writ petition, which we assess at ten Gold Mohurs. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Rule made absolute.