P L D 1962 Dacca 310 (PLP)

S. M. MURSHBD, J.‑The petitioner, Messrs Momin Motor Company, of which one Moulvi Abdul Aziz of 25 Haranath Ghose Road, P. S. Lalbagh, District Dacca, is the sole proprietor, has asked for the issue of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ of the like nature directing the respondents to cancel, withdraw, rescind or quash resolution No. 4 passed by respondent No. 1 in its meeting held on the 31st of December 1960, and to forbear them from acting in pursuance of the said resolution as also to remove all impediments in the way of the petitioner so that the petitioner can ply twenty one buses, including those bearing numbers EBD 1931, EBD 1932 and EBD 1933 in the Tarabo‑Narsingdi Route, for which no permits were given by the respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the said Resolution No. 4.r The petitioner claims that they run a considerable number of buses in the district of Dacca, and have been running buses on a route known as Tarabo‑Narsingdi Route for the last ten years under permits which were renewed from time to time under section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to the petitioner firm, it held twenty- one valid permits to run as many number of buses in the said route and the said permits were last renewed by the respondent No. 1 on the 2nd of February 1960, under section 58 (1) of the Act. These permits were in respect of twenty‑one stage carriages (buses) belonging to the petitioner, namely, EBD 1747, EBD 1748, EBD 2914, EBD 2915, EBD 1683, EBD 1647, EBD 1648, EBD 4140, EBD 1929, EBD 4139, EBD 1649, EBD 5358, EBD 2375, EBD 1884, EBD 5688, EBD 1746, EBD 6702, EBD 4138, EBD 1931, EBD 1932 and EBD 1933. It is claimed by the petitioner that the aforesaid twenty‑one permits are valid till the 2nd of February 1963. It is averred that the respondent No. 1 cannot cancel the said permits of the petitioner, except upon the terms as laid down in sections 48 and 59 of the Act, nor can the said respondent create any obstacle in the way of the petitioner in plying buses in the said Tarabo‑Narsingdi Route until the 2nd of February 1963. The petitioner has also stated in the petition that res pondent No. 1, namely, the Regional Transport Authority, Dacca, (hereinafter referred to as the R. T. A.) at its meeting held on the 31st of December 1960, passed a resolution, which is marked as Resolution No. 4, in which it was decided to grant twenty‑one route permits in respect of the said route. It was further decided that out of these twenty‑one route permits eighteen were to be given to the petitioner with regard to its buses the numbers of which have been specified above, except for those which bear numbers EBD 1931, EBD 1932 and EBD 1933. Three other buses bearing numbers EBD 4211, EBD 6917 and EBD 3806, were given permits to run in the aforesaid route as a result of the aforesaid Resolution No. 4, dated the 31st of December 1960, and the petitioner's buses bearing numbers EBD 1931, EBD 1932 and EBD 1933, which were given valid permits on the 2nd of February 1960, became idle because no permits were given in respect of them after the 31st of December 1960. The aforesaid Resolution No. 4 reads as follows: ‑ "Heard both the representatives of the Motor Vehicles Association and Messrs Momin Motor Co. The R. T. A. considered the resolution of the Sub‑Committee and decided to accept their recommendation for the grant of 3 route permits to EBD 4211, EBD 6917 and EBD 3806. In view of the fact that the Momin Motor Co. has produced documents to show that they have changed the engines of the vehicles and keeping regard to the Home Transport Department letter No. HTA/IM 29/60/581 dated the 14th September 1960, their 18 Vehicles EBD 1747, EBD 1748, EBD 2914, EBD 1883, EBD 1647, EBD 1648, EBD 4138, EBD 4140, EBD 1929, EBD 4139, EBD 1649, EBD 5398, EBD 2375, EBD 1884, EBD 5688, EBD 1746, EBD 6702 be given route permit for three years. The question of increasing the number of vehicles on this route should be examined after receiving a report from the S. D. O. concerned. The S. D. O, Narayanganj be requested to send a report whether It Is necessary to increase the number of vehicles any further. " It is alleged that the R. T. A. Invited applications under the provisions of section 57 of the Act and to that effect advertise ment was published in the Morning News on the 26th of November 1960. It is contended that the R. T. A. passed the aforesaid resolution without giving the petitioner any facility to inspect the applications made in response to the aforesaid adver tisement and without giving public notice to that effect. It is the petitioner's case that whereas the petitioner was awarded valid permits to run the aforesaid twenty‑one buses, till the 2nd of February 1963, the R. T. A. illegally purported to grant fresh permits in respect of the said twenty‑one buses on the 31st of December 1960, before the expiry of the period during which the petitioner held valid permits for the said twenty‑one buses, till the 2nd of February 1963. . With regard to the granting of permits to three other buses, the petitioner's case is that the buses belonging to the petitioner, for which no permits were given, were better buses than those to which permits were given. It has also been stated that the petitioner was given no opportunity to make representations against them under section 57 (3) of the Act and furthermore, that the R. T. A. never took into consideration the f act that the petitioner was running buses in routes other than the Tarabo- Narsingdi Route at a financial loss. In substance, the petitioner's grievance is that Resolution No. 4 was passed without complying with various formalities and considerations as required by the Act. In these circumstances, the petitioner has claimed that it holds valid permits for twenty‑one buses, which permits were renewed on the 2nd of February 1960, and were valid till the 2nd of February 1963. It is therefore, claimed by the petitioner that the said Resolution No. 4, in so far as it purported to curtail the permits with regard to the petitioner's buses to eighteen, indirectly revoked the permits for the remaining three buses for which no permits were given in accordance with the impugned resolution. Secondly, it was submitted that the permits granted to twenty‑one vehicles including eighteen belonging to the petitioner and three belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were not validly given under section 58 of the Act inasmuch as the requirements of law for the granting of such permits as laid a down by the various sections of the Act were not complied with. According to the petitioner, the granting of such permits in pursuance of the impugned resolution was totally bad in law. The respondents before us have filed separate affidavits in opposition by which they have traversed the averments made in the petition. Inasmuch as neither the petitioner nor the res pondents had stated in their respective affidavits some material particulars of this case, we allowed them to file‑further affidavits. The petitioner has stated further facts in support of its petition and on behalf of the respondents all such averments of the petitioner have been completely traversed and denied. The substance of the affidavit‑in‑opposition appears to be that the petitioner was initially granted temporary permits for a year only which the respondent No. 1 claims were given under section 62 of the Act, in the year 1949. Thereafter the petitioner was granted temporary permits annually, which were limited for a duration of a year only. It was submitted that the petitioner has suppressed this very important and vital fact in its petition as well as in the further affidavit that has been filed before us. It has only made a vague assertion to the effect that the permits were validly renewed under section 58 (1) of the Act from time to time, without specifying as to when such permits were first issued. To our mind, this is a deliberate suppression of fact on the part of the petitioner because, even if the original permits given to it may not be given under section 62, such permits purported to be temporary permits only. However, respondent No. 1 in the affidavit‑in‑opposition sworn by its Secretary has stated that the temporary permits were granted to the petitioner for the first time in 1949 in respect of the aforesaid route and has in support set out Resolution No. 1 of the R. T. A. meeting held on the 17th of December 1949, which has been marked as Annexure A to the affidavit‑in‑opposition, and it reads as follows: ‑ " Considered the petition of the proprietor, Momin Motor Co., Dacca and resolved that he be allowed temporary permits to ply his buses on the Taraba‑Narsingdi Road via Bahurhat on condition that he will make the road busworthy to the satisfaction of the District Engineer and that he will stop the bus service the moment he is desired to do so by the Super intending Engineer, Eastern Circle, Dacca. No other party will be granted any permit on this route during this period." On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, it is the case of the respondents that purely temporary permits were given to the petitioner in respect of its twenty‑one buses mentioned above for the purpose of plying them on the aforesaid route under section 62 of the Act. The respondents have denied that the aforesaid permits, which were first issued in 1949 were given under section 58 of the Act. It is their case that the R. T. A. did not purport to grant permits to the petitioner in 1949 under section 58 of the Act. It is claimed by them that no steps were taken under section 57 of the Act and various other sections in order to grant valid permits under section 58 of the Act. It is claimed by them that the records of the R. T. A. do not show that there was any step taken either under section 57 or under any other section of the Act to give the permits under section 58. In the affidavit- in‑opposition filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 it has been specifically stated that it was for the first time towards the end of 1960, that it was decided that permits would be given under section 58 and necessary steps were taken to that effect. It is, therefore, the definite case of respondent No. 1 that neither the original permits given to the petitioner in 1949 nor the subsequent renewals of those permits were under section 58. It is clamed by them that they were merely temporary permit first issued in 1949 and the subsequent renewals were nothing more than renewals of the said temporary permits. The respondents have submitted in their affidavits‑In‑opposition that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches as also of suppression of material facts and are not, therefore, entitled to the relief as prayed for. Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, appearing for the petitioner, submitted two points before us on behalf of the petitioner. In the first place, he has argued that the renewal of the permits in respect of twenty‑one buses belonging to the petitioner on the 2nd of February 1960, in fact, amounted to a renewal of the said permits under section 58 of the Act, for a period of three years although they, in fact, purported to be for one year. In the aforesaid premises he has argued that the granting of the permits to twenty‑one buses under section 58 of the Act in pursuance of resolution No. 4 of the 31st of December 1960, to the petitioner as well as to three other bus‑owners is totally illegal inasmuch as it tantamounts to an indirect revocation and cancellation of permits fn respect of the three buses belonging to the petitioner. He has argued that he is entitled to ask this Court to cancel the permits purported to be given to twenty‑one buses in pur suance of the impugned resolution inasmuch as it was an illegal interference with a right which has been validly conferred on the petitioner for a period of three years from the 2nd of February 1950, and ending with the 2nd of February 1963. Secondly, Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury has argued that the issue of the said twenty‑one permits to buses belonging to the petitioner as well as to respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4, is invalid in law because in purporting to grant the said permits under section 58 of the Act the respondent No. 1, namely, the R. T. A. did not comply with the following provisions of the Act: ‑ (1) That respondent No. 1 did not take into consideration the fact that the petitioner, which had held permits to run buses on the aforesaid route continuously for a long period, was running buses in other routes at a financial loss. (2) That disregarded the requirement of law to that effect that, if other things are equal, preference should be given to persons who already hold permits in respect of buses plying in the said route. In this connection it was submitted that the buses belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were of inferior quality compared to those belonging to the petitioner. (3) That, inasmuch as there was no notice given with regard to the applications made for the issue of the said permits, the petitioner was deprived of the right to make representations against the issue of permits to respondents Nos. 2 to 4. It is thus evident that the first branch of the argument of Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury bolls down to this that the renewal of the permits granted to the petitioner on the 2nd of February 1960, for a period of one year would automatically become permits for a duration of three years. In order to appreciate this point, we would like to set out the provisions of the Act. Section 62 of the Act runs thus: ‑ "A Regional Transport Authority may at its discretion and without following the procedure laid down in section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily: ‑ "(a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit." Section 57 of the Act is as follows "(1) An application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier's permit may be made at any time. (2) An application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates. (3) On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the sub stance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection there with may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered. (4) No representation in connection with an application referred to in subsection (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation. (5) When any representation such as Is referred to in sub section (3) Is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall dispose of the application at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being either in person or by a duly authorised representative. (6) When any representation has been made by the persons or authorities referred to in section 50 to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted In any region or any area within a region is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or of such area, whether such area, whether such representation is made in connection with a particular application for the grant of a contract carriage permit or otherwise, the Regional Transport Authority may take any such steps as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the representation in the presence of any persons likely to be affected thereby. (7) When a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for a permit or any kind, it shall give to the applicant In writing its reasons for the refusal." And section 58 of the Act is in the following language "(1) A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit "Provided that in the case of a permit issued or renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall be effective without renewal for such period of less than three years as the Provincial Government may prescribe. " (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit "Provided that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits." In support of his contention learned Advocate for the peti tioner relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of United Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sreelakshmi Motor Transport Co. Ltd. (A I R 1945 Cal. 260). The facts in that case were as follows : The plaintiffs were private limited com panies and had business in carriage of goods and passengers by motor vehicles. In 1937, when the Motor Vehicles Act of 1914 was in force, they obtained permits to ply twenty‑two motor vehicles of different types on the Sylhet‑Shillong Road from the 1st of April 1937, to the 31st of December 1939. Those permits were issued by the Assam Government under the rules framed by virtue of section 11 of the Act of 1914. In 1939 the Motor Vehicles Act of 1914 was repealed and the Motor Vehicles Act IV of 1939 (the present Act) came into force on the 1st of July 1939. By section 134 of the last mentioned Act the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1914 were kept in force subject to some limitation and conditions for a period of nine months from the date when the Act of 1939 came into force, that is to say, those rules remained in force upto the 31st of March 1940. The Assam Government, exercising powers under those rules, which thus remained in force till the 31st of March 1940, renewed those permits 9n the 5th of December 1939, issued to the plaintiffs companies permits for a period of three months from the 1st of January to the 31st of March 1940. On the 20th of March 1940, those permits were again renewed by the Assam Government for a further period of three months from the 1st of April to the 30th of June 1940. As the old rules ceased to have force on the 31st of March 1940, the Assam Government ceased to have powers from and after that date to issue permits and did not issue further permits to the plaintiffs companies after that date. The Provincial Transport Authority of Assam was constituted by the Assam Government. No Regional Transport Authority was constituted in respect of the area over which the Sylhet -Shillong Road ran and so all the functions, powers and duties requir ed to be performed, exercised or discharged by the Regional Transport Authority were vested in the Provincial Transport Authority. Accordingly that authority on the 29th of June 1940, extended the period of the permits, that had been issued by the Provincial Government under the rules framed by virtue of the Act of 1914 to the plaintiffs companies from the 1st of July to the 30th of September 1940, and then again on the 25th of September 1940, extended them for a further period of three months from the 1st of October to the 31st of December 1940. On the 16th of July 1940, the Provincial Transport Authority of Assam issued a notice inviting applications for plying motor vehicles of different types on the Sylhet‑Shillong Road (presumably under section 57 of the Act). After considering the applications so made, the said Provincial Transport Authority granted permits on the same road to others but did not grant any permit to the plaintiffs. Thereupon the plaintiffs filed a suit praying for a declaration that they had a right to ply their vehicles on the Sylhet‑Shillong Road for a period of three years commencing from either the 1st of July or the 1st of October 1940, contending that the extension and renewal of permits given to them from the 1st of July to the 30th of September 1940, and then again from the 1st of October to the 31st of December 1940, really amounted to regular permits which were granted for three years, namely, the period for which such permit could be legally granted under section 58 of the Act. The suit was decreed and the relief s prayed for by the plaintiffs were granted. Thereupon principal defendant No. 1 preferred an appeal, which was heard and disposed of by the aforesaid Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. After noticing the various provisions of the Act, the Division Bench observed as follows (at page 263). "If a permit which is not Issued under section 62 of the Act, is issued by a competent Transport Authority after following the procedure laid down in section 57 of the Act, but the permit on the face of it is for a period of less than three years, that permit in our judgment would be valid for a period of three years. That is the view we take of section 58 of the Act for that section says that "without renewal" the permit shall be effective for a period of not less than three years. The phrase "without renewal" shows that the Legislature had in contemplation cases where the competent Transport Authority had in fact issued permits for a fixed period and that period was less than three years. The case before us, however, is of a slightly different type. It is of the type where a competent Transport Authority issues a permit for a period of less than three years without an application from the owner of the vehicle and without following the procedure laid down in section 57 of the Act, the permit being at the same time not a temporary permit issued under section 62 of the Act. The contention of the appellant is that such a permit is of no effect, that is to say, the owner of a motor vehicle to whom such a permit has been issued must be taken to have no permit at all. The contention of the plaintiffs‑respondents is that such a permit would attract to it the provisions of para. 1 of section 58 and notwithstanding the shorter term mentioned in the permit, the holder will as a matter of law, be entitled to use his vehicle for a period of three years. This contention of the plaintiffs has found favour with the learned Additional District Judge. In support of their contentions the appellants say that the formalities prescribed in section 57 are not directory but mandatory formalities, and so a permit issued by a competent Transport Authority by disregarding the procedure laid down therein would be of no effect. It would not, they say, be regarded as a permit issued under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. "It is quite clear that the procedure laid down in section 57 must be followed by the transport authority when dealing with applications for permits. If that authority either grants a permit or refuses a permit without following the procedure laid down in section 57, it would be a case of material irregu larity and the order for granting or refusing permit, as the case may be, will be liable to be set aside by appellate authority on an appeal being preferred under section 64 of the Act by a person aggrieved by the refusal, when the permit had been refused, or on an appeal preferred by a local authority, or by the police or by a person providing transport facilities who had opposed the grant of the permit, where the permit has been granted. In our judgment such a permit would not be void document. It will have to be revoked at the instance of persons mentioned in cl. (f) of section 64, by the Appellate Tribunal, and if not revoked or till revoked will be a valid permit, a permit issued under the Act, and would attract to it the provisions of para. 1 of section 58. We accordingly uphold this part of the judgment of the Additional District Judge." With respect to the learned Judges who decided the afore said case, we cannot agree with the observations made therein. We fail to see how a permit which fulfils neither the requirements of section 62 of the Act in granting temporary permits nor those of section 58 of the Act can be automatically converted into a regular permit under the provisions of section 58. Fur thermore, it is still more difficult to see how, if such a permit, even if it is a valid one, would automatically become one for a period of three years if It is expressly given for one year only. It will be evident from the terms of section 58, as quoted above, that the R. T. A. has been given a wide discretion to give permit for a period, which may vary from three years to five years. The minimum period is three years and the maximum period is five years, and the R. T. A. after considering the exigencies of the situation may grant permit for a period, which may vary from three years to five years. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how, by a sort of automatic press‑button device, a permit specifically given for one year only would be automatically converted into one for three years. In our opinion, a permit, which is not validly granted either under section 62 or under section 58 of the Act cannot be described as a valid permit given under the Act. I t is an illegal permit, or as has been described in various other cases, an irregular permit; but it cannot cer tainly be described as a permit under section 58 when there was not even a pretence to grant a permit under that section and when the mandatory requirements of law with regard to the issue of such permits were not even followed. The logic of the afore said proposition, which found favour with the learned Judges who decided the aforesaid case, seems to be that a permit must be either under section 62 or under section 58, and, if it is not one under section 62, it must automatically be one under section 58. This argument loses sight of the fact that there can be a permit, which is neither one under section 62 nor that under section 58, in such a case, the permit granted would not at all be a permit under the Act itself. In this connection, we may point out that in the case of Shib Prosad Mondal v. The State of West Bengal (A I R 1959 Cal. 543) a Single Bench of the said High Court, namely, the Calcutta High Court, expressly dissented from the view taken in United Motor Transport Co. Ltd's case by the Division Bench. In the aforesaid case it was observed as follows: "The learned Advocate‑General has argued that under section 58 (1) (a) of the Act, a stage carriage permit could not be granted for less than three years. Hence, if the R. T. A. grants a permit for a lesser period, it must be taken to be a permit for three years. This appears to me to be a somewhat strange but supported by a Division Bench of this High Court which is binding upon me. This is the case of United Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. Sreelakshmi Motor Transport Co. Ltd. A I R 1945 Cal. 260. In that case a bench presided over by H. C. Mitter, J., said as follows; `The only other class of permits, which these authorities can issue and which we have for convenience called non temporary permits are to be issued by those authorities after following the procedure laid down in section 57 of the Act. Section 58 (1) defines the duration of such permits. The duration must be for three years at least, but the Transport Authority has been given the power and discretion to give them life for a longer period not exceeding five years . . . . . If a permit which is not issued under section 62 of the Act, is issued by a competent Transport Authority after following the procedure laid down 1n section 57 of the Act, but the permit on the face of it is for a period of less than three years that permit in our judgment would be valid for a period of three years. That is a view we take of section 58 of the Act for that section says that `without renewal' the permit shall be effective for a period of not less than three years. The phrase `without renewal' shows that the Legislature had in contemplation cases where the competent Transport Authority had in fact issued permits for a fixed period and that period was less than three years.' " This case was dissented from the Allahabad High Court in Motilal v. Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh A I R 1951 All. 257. But the particular conclusion reached there was that a temporary permit wrongly granted could not be considered to be a permit validly granted under section 58. In Baghat Transport Service Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A I R 1951 Him. Pra. 36, it was held that a renewal for less than the prescribed period was illegal. "With respect I do not see how a permit issued for a period of less than three years can be taken to be a permit for three years. Under section 58 (1) (a) a permit can be issued for a period of not less than three years. An issue of a permit for a lesser period is illegal and the R. T. A. has no jurisdic tion to issue the same. But I fail to see how the permit can be held to be valid for three years although the R. T. A. has not specified that period in the permit as is essential under section 58 (1) (a) of the Act." In the case of Moti Lai v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh (A I R 1951 All. 257) a Full Bench of five Judges of the Allahabad High Court has dissented from the view taken by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in United Motor Transport Co. Ltd's case. The Full Bench had to consider a similar point and Malik, C. J. in pronouncing the judgment of the Full Bench, observed as follows: ‑ " To my mind section 58 only prescribes the period for which a Regional Transport Authority can grant a permanent permit as against a temporary permit, which is only for a period of four months. In granting a temporary permit the Regional Transport Authority need not follow the procedure laid down in section 57 and need not consider some of the matters which it is directed to consider under sections 47 and 48 when issuing a permanent permit. In these cases from the files placed before us, it was demonstrated that the Regional Transport Authority had acted in complete disregard of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, and even after the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder had come to an end they continued to exercise the powers given to them as a temporary measure and issued temporary permits without any reference to the provisions of section 62 or any other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 58 cannot be interpreted to mean that if a Regional Transport Authority has wrongly issued a temporary permit when it had no power to issue a temporary permit under section 62 then such a permit must be deemed to be a permanent permit validly issued in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, even though those provisions may have been completely disregarded. I prefer to follow the decision of the Madras High Court in Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. Road Traffic Board, Madras A I R 1948 Mad. 400; (1948 1 M L J 85) cited above, where a temporary permit was not deemed to be a permanent permit and the application for a permanent permit was sent back for reconsideration on the ground that It had not been disposed of according to law." Mootham and Wanchoo, JJ. agreeing with the order proposed to be made in that case, observed as follows: ‑ " It is convenient to refer at this stage to an argument ad vanced on behalf of the applicants that as the temporary permits issued to them had not been granted under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, such permit must be deemed in law to be regular permits. This argument was based on the terms of section 58 (1) of the Act . . . . . and reliance was placed on the decision to that effect in United Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. Shree Lakshmi Motor Transport Co. Ltd. I L R 1944 1 Cal. 631 A I R 1945 Cal. 260. Subsection (1) of section 5F deals, however, only with the duration of permits and cannot we think, with all respect to the learned Judges who decided the Calcutta case, be so construed as to convert a permit issued without authority into a regular permit. The same point arose in a Madras case Sri Ranta Vilas Service Ltd. v. Road Traffic Board, Madras A. I. R 1948 Mad. 400; (1948 1 M L J 85), where it was held that a Transport Authority which, on an application for a regular permit, issues a `temporary' permit otherwise then under section 62, must be deemed not to have disposed of tile application in accordance with law. With that view we respectfully agree." In the case of Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd, v. The Road Traffic Board Madras (A I R 1948 Mad. 400) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider the same point. Gentle, C. J. in delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, has observed as follows (paragraph 21): "Although a finding upon the grant of the temporary permits to the appellant is not necessary for the purpose of the present appeal nevertheless, a few words upon that matter are not out of place. The sole authority for grant of such permits is section 62 and only when a circumstance therein specified, exists and for no longer than four months. No attempt was made to justify the grant by virtue of clauses (a) and (b) of the section but it was argued that clause (c) has application. That clause enables a temporary permit to be granted `to meet a particular temporary need'. It was suggested that the `particular temporary need' was the non‑availability of the Government buses at the date when the appellant's three years' permits expired on 1‑5‑1947 and that need was met by granting a temporary permit for the appellant's buses to ply for lire during the period preceding the date when the Government hoped to obtain its vehicles and put them into use. Incidentally it was stated, during the course of argument, that the Government's buses had not materialised within four months of the grant of the temporary permits, which have been renewed once and may be they will again be renewed. If some private enterprise, instead of the Government, had been making preparation to place buses on the road but the necessary vehicles were not expected to be ready when the appellant's three years' permits expired, it is beyond doubt that the same course would not have been taken by the Board nor been taken by the Board nor, indeed, by the Government as occurred in the present instance. There was not a particular temporary need within the meaning of the Act, which empowered the grant of temporary permits. 'Tae grant of temporary permits was misusing the pro visions of the Act st4ely for the benefit of the Government and to prevent criticism and objection by the travelling public. The whole circumstance of the grant was improper in the extreme." In the case of Shah Transport Co. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (A I R 1952 Nag. 353) the Nagpur High Court had also to consider the same point Sinha, C. J. In delivering the judgment observed as follows: "(8) The question then remains as to whether any other legal right of the petitioners has been infringed. The permits held by them are clearly marked "Temporary Permits". No doubt, one of the petitioners had actually applied for a regular permit, but even then only a temporary permit was issued to him. It is, however, arms.‑d that though the permits are marked as temporary, they cannot be regarded as temporary within the meaning of the term as used in the Motor Vehicles Act. In this connection we were referred to section 62(1) of the Act. The heading of the section is "Temporary Permits." "(9) The permits in question do not quite obviously fall under clauses (a) and (b) and the question is whether they fall under clause (c). The learned counsel for the petitioners refers us to two decisions of this Court and says that those present here cannot be regarded as temporary permits. The first of these decisions is The Rajnandgaon Transport Co. v. The Appellate Authority of State Transport Authority, Misc. Petition No. 38 of 1951 (Nag.). That is a decision of a Single Judge where it was said that if it is not alleged that the permit was sought for any of the purposes specified in section 62(l) it can not be regarded as a temporary permit merely because the duration is four months only. The second decision is of a Division Bench of this Court reported as `New Motor Transport Co. v. R. T. Authority' A I R 1452 Nag. 111. In that case a permit was granted for a period of four months after full enquiry prescribed by section 57 and the learned Judges held that such a permit cannot be regarded as temporary. In our opinion, the later decision is distinguishable because in the present cases no enquiry as prescribed by section 57 was made before granting permits to the petitioners. The first mentioned case is, however, relevant because no enquiry under section 57 was made. In that case also, as here, there was nothing to indicate whether the permit was issued for any of the purposes set out in section 62(1). It is not suggested that the permits were granted for any of the purposes set out in clauses (a) and (b) of the section, but it is said that there was a temporary need for providing a motor transport along those routes and therefore those permits were issued. A temporary need to fall within clause (c) must be a `particular need' and it has not been shown what particular need existed for meeting which the permits were issued. We are, therefore, clear that the permits in question cannot be classified as temporary permits. "(10) The question then remains is whether these permits can be regarded as permanent permits. Now it is clear from the provisions of the Act itself that a particular procedure has to be followed in dealing with applications for the grant of permanent permits. It is common ground that such procedure was not adopted in these cases. So the permits in question cannot be regarded as regular permits either. On the other hand, what we find is that the Regional Transport Authority granted what can best be described as irregular permits to the petitioners, that is, permits for the grant of which there is no express provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act. Indeed, the Regional Transport Authority has committed an error in granting such permits but that error does riot entitle the holder of the permits to claim renewal of the permits under section 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no legal right of the petitioners has been infringed." In the case of Y. Mahbood Sheriff & Sons v. Mysore State Transport Authority (A I R 1960 S C 321) the Supreme Court of India had to con sider the same point. In that case one of the material points that may be stated here was that the permits granted to the petitioners were renewed by an appropriate authority for a period of one year from April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959. The petitioners claimed that the aforesaid renewal being one under section 58 of the Act, they were entitled to have a grant of permits for a period which should not be less than three years in accordance with the terms of section 58(1)(a) of the Act. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court was expressed In the following terms: "This brings us to the question of relief to be granted to the petitioners. It is contended on behalf of the Department that all that this Court can do Is to quash the order of 15‑12‑1958, and send the case back to the Authority for consideration of the question of the renewal afresh. On the other hand, the petitioners contended that this Court should quash the illegal condition limiting the duration of the renewal to one year and direct the Authority to specify a period of not less than three years and not more than five years in conformity with section 58(1)(a) in the order of renewal. This raises the question of severality of a part of the order passed by the Authority. The principle on which any unconstitutional provision can be served and struck down leaving other parts of a statute untouched were laid down by this Court in R. M. D. Chambaraugwalla v. Union of India 1957 S C R 930 (A I R 1957 S C 628) and the first principle Is whether the Legislature would have enacted the valid part if It had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. This principle relating to statutes was extended by this Court to orders in Sewpujenrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs 1959 S C R 821 (A I R 1958 S C 845), where a part of the order of the Collector of Customs was quashed. The question therefore resolves into this would the Authority have ordered renewal if It knew that it could not reduce the period of a permit to below three years 7 Looking at the facts of these cases which we have set out earlier,, it is to our mind obvious that the Authority would have granted renewal in the circumstances of these cases when it did so in December 1958. The previous permits in these cases had expired on 31‑3‑1958, and the peti tioners had been plying their stage carriages right upto the time when the order was passed on 15‑12‑1958 ; they could not do so without a permit in view of section 42 of the Act. Therefore, renewal in these cases was certain when the order was passed on 15‑12‑1958. In these circumstances it is open to us to severe the illegal part of the order from the part which is legal. namely, the grant of the renewal. (11) The next question is what order should be passed in the circumstances. This depends on the exigencies of each case, for this Court is not confined by the technical rules relating to issue of writs by the English Courts . . . . (12) We therefore allow the petitions and quash that part of the order complained against which specified the renewal of the permits upto 31‑3‑1959, and direct that the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore to comply with the requirements of the law as laid down in section 58 (1) (a) read with section 58 (2) in the order of renewal made by it in favour of the petitioners on 15‑12‑1958." We may also mention in passing that the Supreme Court of India in the above‑mentioned case has held that a renewal of a permit is nothing but a continuation of the original permit. We think that this is a self‑evident proposition, because the word `renewal' connotes a continuation of something. The Supreme Court of India has further laid down that the procedure in respect of renewal of permit under section 58 of the Act would be the same as in the case of fresh application for such permit at page 325 of the report it has been observed as follows: "It is not disputed that the effect of section 58(2) is that the considerations for renewal would be the same as for the grant of the permit and the procedure would also be the same. But it is said that the Legislature did not intend to go further and prescribe the same duration for a renewal as for a permit. We are of opinion that there is no reason why we should stop short at section 57 and should take into account. Section 58(1) as applying to a renewal along with all other considerations that apply to the grant of a permit. Section 58(2) lays down that a renewal application shall be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit and we think that all that applies to the grant of a permit would also apply to the grant of a renewal." We will take leave of this case by mentioning that Kapur, J., in expressing dissent from the majority decision of the Supreme Court of India in the aforesaid case, held that in the aforesaid circumstances the entire order passed by the Regional Transport Authority was illegal and he, therefore, held that the order should be quashed in toto leaving the Regional Transport Authority to consider the whole matter afresh. Therefore, the only distinction between the majority decision and the view expressed by Kapur, J., is that according to the majority decision the grant of permits to the petitioners was valid but the period to which it was limited, i.e., one year, was invalid ; the cases were sent back to the Regional Transport Authority to pass a valid order in accordance with the terms of section ; whereas according to Kapur, J., the entire order should be quashed and the matter should be sent back to the Regional Transport Authority. The point, which we would like to emphasise is that the Supreme Court of India did not hold that the permits granted for one year became automatically converted Into permits for three years. On this point there was no difference of opinion in that case. We will now notice a decision of Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of West Punjab Government v. Pindi‑Jhelum Valley Transport Ltd. (P L D 1953 Lah. 339). Khurshid Zaman, J., in delivering the judgment (Kayani, J. agreeing with him) has obser ved as follows: "The learned Advocate‑General alternatively argued that the Regional Transport Authority was empowered to issue a permit to be effective for any specified period not exceeding five years, by the new sub‑clause (b) which was substituted by Ordinance No. XXVI of 1944 for sub‑clause (h) of Ordinance No. XXIII of 1942. This Ordinance came into force on the 24th June 1944 . . . . "This contention of the learned Advocate‑General leads us to the question whether the permits which were renewed on the 20th October 1942, were still in force when the Ordinance came into operation, because if they were existing at the time the Ordinance was not applicable to them as it obviously applied only to new permits and renewals. On their expiry on the 27th October, 1942, the permits could be renewed only under section 58(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is true that a permit may be renewed, but it requires that the application for renewal `should be made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit.' This means that the Legisla ture has made no distinction between issuing and renewing a permit and that the provisions of section 58(I) as to the period for which a permit may be issued equally apply to renewals. That the Legislature did not intend to leave the muter of duration of renewed permit entirely to the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority is further made clear by a reference to the proviso to section 58(1) which provides the same period for a permit which is issued for the first time and a permit which is renewed. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the permits though renewed for one year were valid for three years under section 58(2) read with section 58(1) and were in force at the time when Ordinance XXVI of 1944 came into operation. They were, therefore, not affected by the Ordinance." It was pointed out to us that the judgment pronounced by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the aforesaid case was overruled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of West Punjab Government v. Pindi‑Jhelum Valley Transport Ltd. (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 88). It will be noticed that the Supreme Court of Pakistan overrule) the aforesaid decision of the Lahore High Court on a totally different point, and the Supreme Court was not called upon to consider the question as to whether a permit granted for one year under section 58 of the Act would automatically become one for three years. With regard to this we would like to observe that hardly any reason has been given by the learned Judges of the West Pakistan High Court in coming to the conclusion that a permit granted under section 58 of the Act for a period of one year would become a valid permit for three years. The only reason, which appears to have been stated by Khurshid Zaman, J., was that the Legislature did not intend to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the R. T. A. With all respects to the learned Judge, we do not think that even this reason will bear the test of scrutiny, it is obvious from the terms of section 58 that the Legislature has left a good deal of discretion to the R. T. A. with regard to the duration of the period for which the permit would be valid. It has imposed two limitations, namely, in the first place, that it should not be less than three years and, secondly, that it should not exceed five years, but within such limitations the discretion of the R. T. A. is unfettered and it would certainly not be correct to say that the Legislature did not leave any discretion to the said authority in the matter of fixing the duration of the permit. However, for reasons, which we have already stated above, we respectfully dissent from the views expressed in the afore said case to the effect that a permit given under section 58 for b 1c period of one year would automatically become one for a period of three years. It will thus be seen that the aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner has no substance. This point can be considered from another aspect of the question, namely, has the petitioner succeeded in showing that the renewal of permits granted to it on the 2nd of February 1960, was in fact, a renewal under section 58 of the Act ? On this point the statement of the petitioner in the application is misleading. The petitioner has contended itself by saying that the permits granted to it were renewed from time to time, without mentioning as to when the permits were first granted and also without stating that the original permits purported to be "temporary permits." The peti tioner has kept the Court in complete darkness as to whether it had applied for a permit under section 58 of the Act at any point of time. In the affidavit‑in‑opposition filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 by Its Secretary, we find the following averments (Paragraph): "That with regard to the statements made in paragraphs 4 and 5 it is stated that the petitioner was at the first instance given a temporary route permit in the Tarabo‑Madhabdi -Narasingdi route hereinafter referred to as the said route, vide resolution of the Regional Transport Authority hereinafter called R. T. A. dated 7‑12‑1949. The said resolution is annexed herein and marked "A". The said route permit thereafter was renewed from time to time and was finally terminated on 31‑1‑1960." We have already quoted above the said resolution of the 7th of December 1949. It has been further stated in the said affidavit‑in-opposition as follows (part of paragraph 6): "Accordingly for the first time under section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act the R. T. A. on 31‑12‑1960 granted new route permits to the stage carriage which fulfilled the necessary conditions and to petitioner got 18 of the said 21 route permits and 18 route permits of the petitioner and 3 other route permits belonging to others have been made valid upto 31‑12‑1963. All the permits granted on 31‑12‑1460 are new and the petitioner has not objected to these new permits." In reply to the further affidavit filed in this Court by the petitioner the said Secretary of the R. T. A. has filed a further affidavit‑in‑opposition In which the following statement has been made (paragraph 11) : "That with regard to the statements made in paragraph 4 of the petition it is denied that the route permits given to the petitioner in 1949 were under section 58 of the said Act ; and it is stated that the records do not show that the provisions of sections 57 and 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act were complied with before issuing route permit in 1949 or before granting any renewal upto February 1960. The permits issued in 1949 were however renewed from year to year and expired on 31‑12‑1960. This deponent craves leave to produce the resolution books and permits registers at the time of hearing in support of this contention." Thus the aforesaid statement made on behalf of respondent No. 1 which we have no hesitation in accepting, gives the correct genesis of the permits that were granted to the petitioner. We find it difficult to place any reliance on the averments of the petitioner either in the petition or in the affidavits filed by it. In view of the fact that the petitioner had failed to make a full disclosure of the material facts to this Court, the affidavit on behalf of the R. T. A. was sworn and filed by its Secretary and the said Secretary was present in Court at the time of the hearing of this petition and, though the learned Advocate‑General, placed the entire records of the R. T. A. for this Court to see. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances the learned Advocate‑General, who appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1, has argued that the original permits that were given to the petitioner were temporary permits, and it was expressly stated to be so. He submitted that the original permits must be taken to be given under section 62 of the Act. He has drawn oar attention to the terms of the resolution that was passed on the 7th of December 1949, which has been quoted above. The aforesaid resolution does specify any time for which the permits were to be granted. It does not also specify, under what clause of section 62 of the Act the temporary permits were purported to be given. Furthermore, it transpires that, in fact, temporary permits for a period of one year were given to the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is difficult for us to hold affirmatively that the permits were given under section 62 of the Act. The R. T. A. appears to have given the permits under section 62, but the period for which the permits were granted was not legally permissible under the said Act, nor is it clear, under which of the clauses of the above section the R. T. A. seems to have acted. Learned Advocate‑General argued, alternatively, that, even if the original permits given to the petitioner might not be held to those granted under section 62 of the Act, it could not, by any manner or means, be described as permits given under section 58 of the Act. The R. T. A. did not purport to give the permit under section 58. The mandatory requirements to be followed la granting permits under section 58 were not complied with in giving the petitioner the temporary permits in 1949. There was no pretence to give the petitioner such permits under section 58. The procedure laid down in section 57 of the Act was not followed and, in fact, the records of the R. T. A. would show that no such procedure was observed. In these circumstances it was strenuously contended by the learned Advocate‑General that the original permits given to the petitioner could not be construed to be permits under section 513, and we think that this contention mist be upheld. It appears from the records which have been shown to us in presence of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that there is no manner of doubt that the original permits given to the petitioner in 1949 were for a period of one year only and renewed annually for the same period, namely, for one year. All the renewals are in respect of the original "temporary permits" given for a period of one year in 1949. In these circumstances, the contention of the petitioner that on the 2nd of February, 1960, permits were renewed under section 58 of the Act is a mere ipse dixit, not supported by the facts of the case, and we are not prepared to uphold the same. Its contention that if the grant of permits in 1949 and subsequent renewals could not be held to be permits given under section 62, they must automatically be considered to be permits granted under section 58 is clearly untenable. From the facts and circumstances of the case it is patent that the permits given to the petitioner were irregular and illegal permits and not granted under section 58 of the Act. We would like to observe that the petitioner is not only guilty of suppression of material facts, but its conduct also has been such as would disentitle it to seek any relief in this petition. From what we have stated above, it is clear that the petitioner became the beneficiary of as irregular order passed by the R. T. A. in its favour in 1949, and it continued to be the recipient of such illegal benefit annually for a period of ten years and has now for the first time come to this Court with a grievance that the renewals of the permits given to it for one year were illegal and not in accord ance with the provisions of section 58(l)(a) of the Act. The petitioner has never teen diligent to correct what according to it was obviously an illegal act and has slept over the matter for over ten years. The petitioner has acquiesced in similar orders in identical terms for such along period and is, therefore, disentitled to any relief from this Court. Even now the petitioner has come at a belated stage after the expiry of the yearly renewal of permits given to it on the 2nd February 1960. We are not basing this view on the doctrine of estoppel, brat on a well established principle in respect of grant ing discretionary writs, namely, that Courts would be reluctant to exercise their discretionary powers of issuing such writs, if the petitioner's conduct is found to be such as would disentitle him so obtain the relief prayed for (See Reg v. Committee Men for South Holland Drainage ((1838) 112 E R 901 at p. 904)]. We, therefore, hold that on this ground also we would discharge the present Rule. , It has been contended by the learned Advocate‑General that section 64 of the Act provides for appeal at the instance of any person aggrieved by the orders passed by the R. T. A. and, in fact, the petitioner had filed such as appeal which is still pending before the appellate authority. The petitioner, has stated in the petition that such an appeal was filed before the appellate authority on a wrong advice given to it and that It has been further advised that in an appeal under section 64 of the Act it cannot obtain the reliefs it has asked for in this case. It has been further stated that inasmuch as the appellate authority refused to give it an interim stay of the operation of the impugned order as prayed for, there was an urgent necessity of coming to this Court to obtain such relief. We may, at the outset, point out that this Court did not give the petitioner the interim order as prayed for by it. Mr. Hamidul Haq Chowdhry has tried to argue that the grievances of the petitioner as stated in this petition could not be redressed in an appeal as provided by section 64 of the Act. Section 64, which reads as follows: "Any person‑ "(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the Provincial or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or "(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or "(c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit, or "(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the Provincial or a Regional Transport Authority to a countersign a permit, or by any condi tion attached to such countersignature, or "(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or "(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by a condition attached thereto, or "(g) being the holder of a licence, who is aggrieved by the refusal of a Regional Transport Authority to grant an authorisation to drive a public service vehicle, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." Learned Advocate‑General has pointed out that the grievances of the petitioner would be covered by the provisions of clauses (b) and (e) of section 64 of the Act, as quoted above. The point sought to be made on behalf of the petitioner before us is that the grant of permits by the R. T. A. in pursuance of the impugned resolution dated the 31st of December 1960, to eighteen buses of the petitioner and to three other buses belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 4, tantamounts to revocation and cancellation of the previous permits validly given to the petitioner in respect of its buses. This will undoubtedly come under section 64 (b) of the Act. The other contention of the petitioner, namely, the refusal to renew permits with regard to three of its buses, would certainly come under section 64(e) of the Act. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that the petitioner could have got complete redress of its grievances by way of an appeal which, in fact, it has preferred before the appellate authority and which is still pending before that authority. For the first time the petitioner in its affidavit in reply has sought to make out a case that for‑some time the Chairman of the appellate body was not appointed. In the first place, this is entirely a new averment and it is not permis sible to state this in the affidavit‑in‑reply. In the second place it has not been specified as to when there was a vacancy in the post of the Chairman of the appellate body and when' such office was filled up. In any event, learned Advocate for the petitioner has stated to us that at the present moment there is no such vacancy. Therefore, the appeal, which is now pending can be disposed of by a validly constituted body. It is well‑settled that as a matter of normal practice Courts would refuse to grant an extraordinary relief by way of the issue of a discretionary writ of mandamus when there is an adequate and effective remedy provided by a statute. It is only in exceptional cases when an appeal cannot grant full relief to the petitioner that Courts would entertain applications for issue of writs without the petitioner's taking recourse to the right of appeal which the statute gives it. For this proposition learned Advocate‑General relies on the decision to the case of District Magistrate, Lahore v. Raza Kazim (P L D 1961 S C 178). We think that this contention of the learned Advocate‑General must also be upheld. The petitioner is, therefore, disentitled to any relief as prayed for by it on this ground also. The petitioner has not asked us to hold on the materials given by it (in fact no such materials was given in the petition that was filed before us) that the duration of permits given to it on the 2nd of February 1960, were invalid under section 58 of the Act and to cancel the order granting those permits in so far as it purported to give them for a period of one year, and to direct the R. T. A. to fix the duration of the said permits in accordance with section 58 (1) (b). The petitioner presented to us mere assertions to the effect that the said renewals of the 2nd of February 1960 were given under section 58 and that the duration of the permits, which were expressly fixed for one year, has become automatically converted into a period of three years. We have already stated that it has not been shown to us as to how the said renewals were granted under section 58. The respondents have denied that they were so granted under the said section 58 and have categorically stated that for the first time in December 1960 the R. T. A. acted under section 58 upon com pliance with all the statutory requirements for so acting under the said section. It is the definite case of the R. T. A. that at no time prior to the issue of the permits by virtue of the impugned resolution of the 31st of December 1960, it has acted under section 58. Even if it could be held that the renewals granted to the petitioner on the 2nd of February 1960 were given under section 58, we cannot overlook the fact that they were expressly granted for one year. At best the petitioner could have asked us, in an appropriate circumstance, to direct the R. T. A. to fix the duration of the said permits in accordance with the provisions of section 58 (1) (a). We cannot hold that the said period of one year has automatically become one for three years. Without deciding whether we would have given such direction, if asked for, It is enough to state that the petitioner has asked for no such direction. We will now consider the last arid the only other point that was pressed before us on behalf of the petitioner, namely, that resolution No. 4 passed at tire meeting of the 31st of December 1960, should be cancelled inasmuch as it purports to revoke and cancel Indirectly the valid permits which the petitioner holds for a duration of three years without complying with the requirements of section 60 of the Act. The short answer to this paint is that which we have already held that we cannot treat the renewal of permits granted to the petitioner on the 2nd of February, 1960 as permits granted for a duration of three years. In these circumstances, no question of n implied revocation or cancellation arises. Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhury has alternatively argued that the said resolution of the 31st of December 1960 is liable to be cancelled inasmuch as the permits granted by virtue of the said resolution to eighteen of the petitioner's buses and three buses belonging to respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were not made in compliance with the provisions of sections 43, 47, subsections (3) and (7) of section 57 and section 58 (2) and various other provisions of the Act. The averments of the petitioner in this behalf have been traversed in the affidavits fried on behalf of the respondents. We have no hesitation in accepting the statements made on behalf of the respondents. In substance, the grievance of the petitioner seems to be that no notice was given with regard to the applica tions that were made for obtaining permits with a view to enable the petitioner to make representations against such applicants. In the affidavit‑in‑opposition filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 a notice has, in fact, been appended to show that it was hung up in the Notice Board of the office of the R. T. A. We accept this statement made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and hold that, in fact such notice was given. It also appears that a grievance has been made that the R. 'f. A. did not consider the question that the petitioner bad suffered loss with regard to the other route permits which it holds. On behalf of respondent No. 1 it was denied that the petitioner had suffered any loss either in respect of the present route or in regard to any other rouse nor which the petitioner holds permits. It has been asserted that the petitioner has made quite large profits out of these other route permits. It has further been stated that the petitioner never made representations to the R. T. A. In the further affidavit on behalf of the petitioner it has been stated that the sawyer who represented the petitioner orally submitted these matters for consideration of the R. 'T'. A. We find it difficult to accept this statement of the petitioner. But it is obvious that if such submissions were orally wade, the R. T. A. must have considered the same because it purported to pass the impugned order after hearing the representations of the petitioner as well as those of other applicant. It has not, therefore, been proved that the R. T. A. did not consider these matters if they were at all placed before It. It has also been argued that the requirement of the law is that the petitioner, being a previous permit‑holder, should have been given permits in respect of its vehicles in preference to other owners, if other things were equal. The petitioner has stated that the vehicles of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to whom permits have been given are inferior in quality to those of the petitioner's three vehicles for which such permits were refused. These allegations have been refuted by the respondents and we hold that the petitioner has not been able to substantiate this point. With regard to the buses in respect of which the petitioner was not granted permits it was pointed out to us that the renewed permits granted to these buses on previous occasions, will show that the first renewal was given to the petitioner in the year 1951, which necessarily postulates that the model of these buses could not be later than 1950. The counter argument to this was that inas much as the engines of the said buses were replaced by new diesel engines they became entitled to be described as buses of later model, learned Advocate for the petitioner drew our attention to some correspondence by the Government of East Pakistan without being able to show to us that, in fact, these buses were ever described as (uses of a model bearing a later date. In con trast to these buses the buses belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 bear, respectively, tire dates of 1953, 1955 and 1959. It is thus evident that there is no substance whatsoever in the point that the buses of the petitioner, which were refused renewal of permits, were of better types thus chase belonging to respondents Nos. 2 to 4. On the affidavits before us we cannot hold that the R. T. A. in griming permits to twenty‑one vehicles in pursuance of resolution No. 4 of the 31st of December 1960, acted in violation of the provisions of the Act. It has been definitely asserted by respondent No. 1 that all the statutory provisions under the Act have been complied with, and we have no reason to doubt this assertion. It is unnecessary to reiterate here a mass of details that have been given by the respective parties. We hold that there is no substance in this point urged on behalf of the petitioner. Learned Advocate‑General has drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of The Tariq Transport Company v. The Sargodha- Bhera Bus Service (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) in support of his contention that the order of refusal of a permit under section 58 of the Act is not a judicial or quasi‑judicial act amenable to correction by way of a writ of certiorari with a view to quash an order made there under. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has laid down that an order passed under the aforesaid section 58 is not a judicial order and that it cannot, therefore, be quashed by a writ of certiorari or interfered with unless it can be shown that the order that has been passed could not have been made under the provisions of the said section. In the petition before us it has not been contended that the R. T. A. bad no authority or jurisdiction to grant permits which it purported to have done by virtue of the impugned resolution No. 4 of the 31st of December 1960. The grievance of the petitioner is that in making the said order the R. T. A. did not comply with the various provisions of the Act. Our answer is, in the first place, that the petitioner has not been able to substantiate its case as to the alleged violation of the requirements of the Act, and, in the second place, that if the order itself was a legal order passed under section 58, the order being a ministerial or administrative order, cannot be quashed by way of a writ of certiorari merely on the ground that some procedural provisions of the law were not followed unless the breach of such provisions affected the jurisdiction of the R. T. A. to issue the impugned order. The decision of the Supreme Court in Tariq Transport Company's case referred to above, supports the aforesaid proposition. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that this Is one of the many cases in which we have noticed that administrative officers, who are entrusted with a discretion to exercise various statutory powers, do so most perfunctorily without caring to look into the provisions of law which give them such power. In this cage, from what we have stated above, the R. T. A. had been continuously passing irregular and illegal orders since 1949 uptil February 1960. In cases dealing with requisition and acquisition of land and also in various other cases where powers are exercised under different statutes, we have frequently noticed similar careless application of the law, which leads them into illegal actions, which we have been constrained to set aside. Public officers called upon to exercise such powers should carefully read the provisions of law under which they purport to act and should, if necessary, consult State Lawyers in this behalf before they take various steps under the relevant statutes. They should act in conformity with the law and not in breach thereof. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government of East Pakistan. Thus for reasons stated above, we discharge the Rule without any order as to costs. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.‑I agree. K. B. A' Rule discharged.