1968 P Cr (PLP)

MURSHED. C. T.-These two cases arise out of one and he same proceeding and. the unfortunate incidents which have been stated in these applications that have been filed before us, could have been avoided, and we say this without allocating blame between the parties, with some amount of patience and tact, which, we think, one acquires by acquisition of maturer judgment. The applications are mainly directed against certain orders passed by respondent, Azizul Huq, Additional Deputy Commis sioner (Development),, Dacca, described as respondent No. 3 in Petition No. 156 of 1967 and respondent No. 1 in Cr. Misc. Case No. 73 of 1967. The said Azizul Huq, in his capacity as Addi tional Deputy Commissioner, Dacca, is entrusted with a number of duties which are imposed upon him and is also entrusted with the administration of some matters relating to the Town Improve ment Act (Act XIII of 1953). Under the said Act it is, probably, one of his duties to assess compensation allowed to parties from whom properties are requisitioned or acquired. We are not concerned with the question of assessing compensation because an assessment had, in fact, already been made with regard to the acquisition, which is the subject-matter over which the husband of the petitioner in Petition No. 156 of 1967, namely, Serajuddin Bhuiyan, was engaged. The husband of the said petitioner, by the name of Serajuddin Bhuiyan, is an Advocate, practising in the Dacca District Court, and, among others, he engages himself in matters concerning re quisition and acquisition cases. On Friday, the 14th of April 1967, he was briefed on behalf of a person who is also called, Azizul Huq. The said client of Serajuddin Bhuiyan was, awarded compensation in respect of an acquisition, as stated above, and the application that was made was merely directed towards one and one purpose, namely, a prayer that the applicant (also called, Azizul Huq) might be allowed to receive compensation, immedi ately, in cash, at Dacca, and not at the spot where the said property is situated: This was the sole object of the application, which was made for no other purpose. It is important to remem ber this because this will indicate the nature and character of the work in which respondent, Azizul Huq, was engaged as a public servant. It would be seen, at the very outset, that respondent, Azizul Huq was merely called upon to exercise a ministerial and execu tive authority, namely, to decide whether the applicant, Azizul Huq, would be allowed to receive compensation at the former' s office or at the aforesaid spot, the question of the quantum of compensation being a transaction which was decided and closed in the past. It is sufficient to state that when the said Serajuddin Bhuiyan presented the said application, the respondent, Azizul Huq, was plainly and solely concerned with either allowing or rejecting it. He was called upon to exercise an executive authority vested in him. He rejected the application. It would be noticed that it is at that point of time when a tension had generated in the office of respondent, Azizul Huq. What actually transpired then, and thereafter, is a matter on which divergent affidavits have been, sworn and filed. It is stated on behalf of respondent, Azizul Huq, that the said Serajuddin Bhuiyan was obstructive in the course of the hearing of the aforesaid application and had insulted the former in an unseemly manner. However, in the statement of particulars which have been recorded, obviously, under section 481 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by respondent, Azizul Huq, the following has been stated "14-4-67. As I was giving hearing to a petition submitted by the accused Md. Sherajuddin Bhuiyan s/o Late Abdul Bari Bhuiyan, of Village Haliura, P. S. Nandail, Dt. Mymonsingh, I found inconsistencies in his argument and pointed out be was making confusing and inconsistent argument. At this he became furious and uttered most indecorous language and assumed an aggressive and unmannerly attitude towards the Court. To reproduce in Bengali he uttered the following words: "How am I making inconsistent statement? What do you think of yourself? Address me decorously and properly." (Translation is by us). I asked him to withdraw from my presence, he hesitatingly did this shouting abuses on the Court. He used the following language drawing a crowd: "You seem to have become a great `Saheb' etc. etc." (Translation is by us). "In my opinion his behaviour was most unruly and dero gatory to the prestige of the Court. I draw this contempt proceeding under section 228, of P. P, C. and find him guilty of contempt of Court. Since he would not apologize for his conduct i convict him to pay a fine of Rs. 500 in default to S. I. for 7 days. Sd. M. Azizul Huq, A.D. C. & Magistrate, 1st Class, Dacca." The above is the narration of the material fact of the incident as recorded by the respondent, Azizul Huq, himself. It has been further stated in the affidavit filed by respondent, Azizul Huq, that he was not aware of the fact that the said Serajuddin Bhuiyan was either engaged in some judicial or court-work elsewhere on that very date or that he was about. to be engaged in a Court. In the context of a tense situation, in which tempers were roused, respondent, Azizul Huq, assumed or purported to assume jurisdiction under section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code and convicted the said Serajuddin Bhuiyan under the above-mentioned section 228, sentencing the latter to pay a fine of five hundred rupees, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of seven days. Thereafter, the said respondent Azizul Huq, allowed Serajuddin Bhuiyan time till the 28th of April 1967, for payment of the fine imposed upon him, and, subsequently, passed an order of discharge in respect of the warrant for commitment to jail custody. What happened in the crucial period is a matter of acute controversy and the circumstances as alleged in the petition have been fully controverted, on all material points, in the affidavit-in opposition, filed on behalf of respondent, Azizul Huq, in respect of Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 73 of 1967. We have a feeling that, on material points, there has not been a full disclosure of facts by the parties. It is, therefore, difficult to place any reliance, with some degree of confidence, upon, what seems to us to be, incomplete statements. We leave these questions undecided because, in view of the order we propose to make, it is unnecessary to adjudicate upon controversial issues of fact in these cases. It is sufficient to state that in the circumstances indicated above, respondent, Azizul Huq, proceeded to exercise powers which, according to him, he could appropriate to himself in proceeding against Serajuddin Bhuiyan, under the provisions of section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code. As Serajuddin Bhuiyan was in custody of the police in the course of office hours, and, thereafter, during the day, on the said date, namely, the 14th of April 1967, he was not released by the jail authorities, to whom he was subsequently entrusted, on a warrant of commitment, on a mere discharge of the warrant of commitment, without being granted an interim bail. The result was that Serajuddin Bhuiyan remained in jail till the next morning, that is, till the morning of Saturday, the 15th of April 1967, when a petition was moved before this Court by one Aziza Khatun, wife of the former, under sections 491 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, read along with Article 98 of the Constitution, and this Court issued a Rule nisi on the following terms "On hearing the learned Advocates appearing for the peti tioner and on perusal of the application, we feel that an immediate Rule nisi should issue from this Court. Serious allegations have been made in the petition which call for investigation and consideration. Let a Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why it should not be directed that Mr. Serajuddin Bhuiyan be immediately released from jail custody, or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. We are entertaining this application under Article 98 of the Constitution and under sections 491 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Let a further Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause why the impugned order passed by Mr. Azizul Huq, Additional Deputy Commissioner (Development), Dacca, on the 14th of April 1967, convicting the said Mr: Serajuddin Bhuiyan under section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code should not be set aside and/or quashed under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, furthermore, why the same should not be quashed under Article 98 of the Constitution. It is further ordered that the said Mr. Serajuddin Bhuiyan be forthwith released on bail on a bond of personal recognizance furnished by him, as accepted by Mr. Abur Rahman Sarder, Assistant Registrar (Writs), of this Court, pending the hearing of these Rules. The Rules are made returnable by Monday, the 24th April 1967, Let a copy thereof be served on the Advocate-General, East Pakistan. On Monday, the 17th of April 1967, another petition was addressed to this Court by Serajuddin Bhuiyan himself, asking for a Rule nisi for the committal of the respondents for contempt. This Court issued a Rule nisi in the following terms . "Let a Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause why they should not be committed for contempt of Court on the allegations made in the petition filed today or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. Let a further Rule nisi issue calling upon the respondents to show cause why this Court should not give appropriate directions for suitable steps to be taken against the respondents under the law, if the facts as alleged in the said petition are duly established and/or_ such other or further order or orders may trot be passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper. The Rules are made returnable on or before the ,24th of April 1967. The respondents, in the aforesaid applications have separately filed answers to the aforesaid Rules nisi issued on the 15th of April 1967. The Rules nisi which were issued on Saturday, the 15th of April 1967, at the instance of Aziza Khatun, wife of Serajuddin Bhuiyan, were marked for hearing as Petition No. 156 of 1967 and the next set of Rules which were issued on Monday, the 17th of April 1967, on a petition moved by Serajuddin Bhuiyan himself, were marked for similar hearing as Miscellaneous Case No. 73 of 1967. All the aforesaid cases were set down for hearing on Monday, the 24th of April 1967, and adjourned, at the instance of rarties, till the 26th of April 1967. We have heard all these cases together as they arise out of the same facts, which are not very complicated. In reply to the Rules issued in respect of Petition No. 156 of 1967, the respon dents have controverted all material allegations made against them. With regard to Criminal Miscellanous Case No. 73 of 1967, which concerns the Rule nisi for committal for contempt, respon dent, Azizul Huq, has simply tendered his unqualified apologies to the Court and the other respondents have explained that they were discharging their official duties without any knowledge of the aforesaid facts constituting contempt. We note with gratification that the respondents have taken a decorous attitude towards the Rule for contempt of Court. An unqualified apology has been offered, and sufficient explanation has been given by the rest of the respondents. We would like to observe that such conduct does not, in any manner, discredit the respondents, but, on the other hand, it enhances their sense of decorum in having acted in aid of the processes of Court. Their attitude is correct because they have not allowed the processes of law to be ruled. The affidavits that have been filed on their behalf, in this connection, are consistent with a long established practice of expressing regrets when a Court of law considers it fit to issue a Rule nisi for committal for contempt, on facts, which, when established, may constitute an obstruction to the processes of Court. We would like to add that we have heard both these applica tions together in order to get a full picture as to what had led to the alleged incidents. This judgment will dispose of all these applications, that is, both the cases. We would first take Petition No. 156 of 1.967 and examine whether the action taken under section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code was warranted by law. Section 228 reads thus: "Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public, servant, while such public servant is sitting, in any stage of a judicial proceeding; shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, pr with both." It would be seen that the language of the said section 128 is wide enough for the purpose of bringing, into the mischief of the section, any person guilty of insulting or causing interruption to a public servant engaged in a judicial proceeding. But, there are other weighty considerations which are attracted to the interpretation of the section. In the first place, the "public servant'", mentioned in the section, must be engaged in "a judicial proceeding". Can it be said that respondent, Azizul Huq, was, in considering a simple question as to whether payment, as refer red to above, would be made immediately in case, in a judicial pro ceeding? Secondly, whether the section, in its actual application, only applies in respect of a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, when read along with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code, notwithstanding, the wide phraseology of the said section 228? Thirdly, whether, in view of the sentence that was passed, the aggrieved "Court" could try the offence itself, in violation of section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? Fourthly whether it was mandatory to fulfil all the requirements of section 481 of Criminal Procedure Code? Section 228 of the Penal Code, however, has to be 'read along with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal. Procedure to decipher its scope and purpose. Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which an exhaustive Schedule has been appended, runs thus: "Subject to the other provisions of this Code any offence under the Pakistan Penal Code may be tried- (a) by the High Court, (b) by the Court of Session, or (c) by any other Court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the Second Schedule to be triable. " The said section 28 together with the Schedule provides for the forum and the manner of trial of all offences under the Penal Code. The Criminal Procedure Code does not permit trial of any offence under the Pakistan Penal Code except by a Court It is of paramount importance to bear this in mind. In the Schedule appended to the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of section 28 thereof, it is specifically stated that an offence under section 228 of the Penal Code for which Serajuddin Bhuiyan has been tried is exclusively triable by "the Court in which the offence is committed, subject to the provisions of Chapter XXXV". It' is, therefore, patent that an offence under section 228 of the Penal Code cannot be tried, except by a Court and under section 28 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court itself must be the Court which has been interrupted or insulted. Section 190, read along with the Schedule and section 476, read along with section 193, would be inapplicable to this case. Sections 480 and 482 are, therefore, the only sections which can be attracted on the facts of the present case. No other procedure is available. One is, therefore, driven to the position that it is a Court and only a Court which can conduct a trial under section 228 of the Penal Code. This is the inevitable result of the juxtaposition of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, and, the two must be read together to give a meaning to the provisions of the former. Respondent, Huq, is certainly not a "Court". It is true that in the course of numerous duties with which he has been charged, he can, under appropriate circumstances, function as a Court, and has jurisdiction to work as such; but, the crucial question is What is the manner of the work which he was doing when the alleged offence under section 228 of the Penal Code is said to have been committed? As seen above, the entire series of incidents, which have given rise to the impugned conviction and sentence, stem from a simple application with a view to obtaining an order for payment immediately, in cash. That, to our mind, constitutes 'a purely ministerial work, and what has been construed as an insult would, at best, amount to an insult offered to a public servant engaged in considering such an application. The public servant was merely called upon to reject or allow the prayer in respect of payment of compensation which had already been awarded in a past proceeding. The mode or method of payment of money is a matter which calls for the exercise of a purely ministerial discretion and is de hors the Town Improvement Act. We need not go into the question as to whether an adjudica tion in respect of the amount of compensation, upon a finding as to the market value of a piece of requisitioned or acquired land, would amount to a judicial proceeding. Lands are requisi tioned or acquired for the Dacca Improvement Trust under the Town Improvement Act (Act XIII of 1953). The powers exercised by an Additional Deputy Commissioner under that Act would come under section 93-A thereof. This is a power which is exercise able by a Deputy Commissioner or an Additional .Deputy Commissioner The acquisition and/or requisition of any property under the aforesaid section is made by the Provincial Government under subsection (4)(a) of section 93-A. The Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commissioner is only required, under the said sub section, to hear objections; if any, and to make an enquiry in order to submit a report to the Provincial Government as to whether the property should be requisitioned and/or acquired. In the course of such enquiry evidence may be received. But, merely to receive evidence or to summon witnesses would not attract the provisions of section 4 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; there must be authority and power to administer oath to witnesses and to record evidence given on oath. No such power, has, however, been conferred on the Deputy Commissioner or Additional Deputy Commissioner either under the Town Improvement Act or under any other law of the country, when such a public servant is considering a matter under the Town Improvement Act. It would thus appear that the Deputy Commis sioner or an Additional Deputy Commissioner, even when strictly acting under section 93-A of the Town Improvement Act, cannot be taken to be engaged in any "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which must be the meaning of the said expression as used in section 228 of the Penal Code. Even if the respondent, Azizul Huq, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, was engaged in a judicial proceeding, he could not, by any manner or means, be described as acting, in such capacity as a "Court", although under appropriate circumstances, which do not arise in the present case, he could constitute himself as a Court. The concept of a "Court" in this connection, is well understood and, in this behalf, the meaning of the term "Court", as distinguished front a form merely engaged in a judicial proceed ing, is well-settled in a long series of cases, which need not be discussed here. It is patent, and one need not dilate upon this proposition, that he was not acting either as a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, within the meaning of either section 476 or section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Further more, it is also patent that section 190, a-long with the Schedule under section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was not, and could not be, invoked. We may, further, notice that section 480 of the Code of. Criminal Procedure runs thus "When any such offence as is described in section 1-75, section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and, in default of payment, to simple imprisonment for a term which Sty extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid." . (The under linings are by us) If the above provision is analysed, it would be seen that section 228 of the Penal Code can only be invoked by a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, in whose view or presence the alleged offence is committed, and, further more, that the said Court is allowed a jurisdiction to impose a fine of two hundred rupees only, and no more, with an appropriate default order. If, however, such a "Court" is of opinion that w heavier punishment is called for, then it is required to take recourse to section 482 of the said Code, which runs thus "(1) If the Court in any case considers that a person accused of any of the offences referred to in section 480 and commit ted in its view or presence should be imprisoned otherwise than in default of payment of fine, or that a fine exceeding two hundred rupees should be imposed upon him, or such Court is for any other reason of opinion that the case should not be disposed of under section 480, such Court, after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the- accused as hereinbefore provided, may forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same, and may require security to be given for the appearance of such accused person before such Magistrate, or if sufficient security is' not given, shall forward such person in custody to such Magistrate. "(2) The Magistrate, to whom any case is forwarded under this section, shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused person in manner hereinbefore provided." It would thus appear that, for all practical purposes, only a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court can pray in aid section 228 o the Penal Code and that this is the necessary limitation impose by the Criminal Procedure Code upon the expression, "judicial proceeding" as embodied in section 228 of the Penal Code, because, if the provisions of section 28, with the Schedule under it, along with sections 190, 195, 476, 480 and 482 are analysed, there is no escape from the conclusion that when an offence is committed under section 228 of the Penal Code in respect of a public servant. who does not constitute a Court, but is merely engaged in a judicial proceeding, no machinery for trial of such offence available. The view that we have taken, as indicated above; will find support from the decision in the case of Probhat Chandra v. State (A I R 1930 Cal. 366). However, we are not concerned with the question whether it was possible for respondent, Azizui Huq, to lodge a complaint under section 228 or any other section of the Penal Code because the point before us is whether the respondent himself could try the offence. If the alleged offence is committed, ex facie, the said "Court" can itself try it only when a fine of two hundred rupees or less is imposed. This postulates that the offence is committed in respect of a "Court". Besides, even when an aggrieved "Court" is trying an offence under section 228 of the Penal Code, which committed, ex facie, the said "Court" is required to follow the procedure laid down in section 481 of the Code of Criminal; Procedure under which it is mandatory to record the statement of the accused. In this case, no statement of the alleged offender that is, Serajuddin Bhuiyan, was recorded under section 481 o. the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whenever a sentence of a fine of more than two hundred rupees is considered to be appropriate, under the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has to make a complaint about the alleged incident, setting out the necessary particulars, and, thereupon, an appropriate Court would proceed to try the alleged offence udder the provisions of section

482. Thus, without going into the fact, constituting the alleged offence under section 228 of the Penal Code, it appears that the conviction of Serajuddin Bhuiyan (husband of petitioner in Petition No. 156 of 1967) is wholly without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the Additional Deputy Commissioner, namely, respondent, Azizul Huq, who had himself tried and convicted Serajuddin Bhuiyan, had assumed an unauthorised, illegal and. unwarranted jurisdiction because, in the first instance (we do not finally decide this question), he was not engaged in a "judicial proceeding" at the time when the offence was alleged to be committed. Secondly, because, even if he was acting in a judicial proceeding, he was not acting as a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court. In any event, there can be no doubt that he did not constitute a "Court" and .was, therefore, incompetent to try the alleged offence. Thirdly, even if he could be said to constitute a Court (and we hold, he did not constitute a "Court"), he was not authorised to try and convict the said Serajuddin Bhuiyan because the provisions of section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted to this case. In view of the sentence that has been passed, Serajuddin Bhuiyan could only be tried by another Court. The gravamen of all the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, that it is only a Court, and a Court alone, which can try an offence under section 228 of the Penal Code and the requirement, further, is, that if it is tried by the very Court in whose presence or view the insult or interrup tion is caused, it (the Court) cannot impose a fine of more than two hundred rupees. If it is considered that a heavier sentence is called for, the matter should be left to the adjudication of another Court under section

482. When we examine the sentence that has been imposed upon Serajuddin Bhuiyan, the fact which stares us in the face is, that a fine of five hundred rupees was imposed upon him. This is a course which is not permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, whatever view one may take of the convic tion of Serajuddin Bhuiyan, and the sentence imposed upon him, it must be held that they are illegal and void and that respondent, Azizul Huq, acted without any jurisdiction whatsoever. The next question is: What would be the order which we should pass in this case, that is, in respect of Petition No. 156 of 1967? The conviction of Serajuddin Bhuiyan and the sentence imposed upon him, having been found to be illegal and. void, they must be so declared and, they must be set aside. In exercise of the jurisdiction vested in us, we could direct, if we had considered it desirable, that Serajuddin Bhuiyan be tried under an appropriate provision of law by a competent Court. Apart from the fact that such an action would amount to raising a tempest over a tea-pot, we do not think that such a course is desirable in the light of the facts of this case. A public servant must not be unduly sensitive in a matter like this. It has been argued on behalf of respondent, Azizul Huq, that the application -is not maintainable inasmuch as the husband of the petitioner, namely, Serajuddin Bhuiyan, has an alternative remedy by way of appeal under section 486 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This section (section 486) is not at all applicable to this case since we have already held that the said respondent, Azizul Huq, has acted wholly without jurisdiction in convicting the -said Serajuddin Bhuiyan under section 228 of the Penal Code. In a suitable case, in furtherance of the ends of justice, we could treat this application as one under section 486, even though, it is not expressly made under that section. It is not necessary to do so because we have held that the conviction and sentence are void, ab initio, and, as such, they amount to a nullity in the eye of law. Section 486 of the Code of Criminal procedure has no manner of application to this case. We are not unconscious of the provisions of sections 435, 438 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to remind ourselves that it is only from an order passed by a Court, in the heirarchy of Courts, defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the provisions of section 439 are attracted. This is apparently so, but the question cannot be so lightly disposed of. Implicit in the word "Court" itself is a pretended Court which has illegally assumed the jurisdiction of a Court, defined, as such, in the Criminal Procedure Code. Any usurpation of such jurisdiction may be amenable to correction by this Court under section 439 of the Code, more particularly, when such provision is read along with section 561-A of the said Code. We, however, leave this question as open to further investigation on an appropriate occasion. In this case, we have advisedly acted under Article 98 of the Constitution and/or section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Having held that the impugned order of conviction and sentence is without jurisdiction, we declare them to be illegal, void and without lawful authority. We, therefore, set aside the same and quash the proceedings against Serajuddin Bhuiyan, purported to be taken under section 228 of the Penal Code. We make the Rules absolute in respect of Petition No. 156 of 1967. If any bail bond has been furnished by Serajuddin Bhuiyan, it stands cancelled. We now come to the Rules nisi, issued by us, in respect of Criminal Misc. Case No. 73 of 1967 directed towards the committal of the respondents for contempt. We would simply observation that, in view of the apologies that have been tendered and also in view of the explanations that have been offered, no further action is called for. We had issued these rules because the averments in the petition, if fully established, would amount to a deliberate and unauthorised obstruction to a lawyer in the discharge of his duties in another Court. It is alleged that respondent, Azizul Huq, had knowingly and intentionally prevented Sarajuddin Bhuiyan from discharging his duty in another Court by an illegal order of detention in Jail. The alleged case was a strong one at least, in so far as respondent, Azizul Haq (Additional Deputy Commissioner), was concerned. In this connection, we may, however, remind ourselves that, in the affidavit filed, in respect of the former application, by respondent, Azizul Huq, he has denied knowledge of Serajuddin Bhuiyan' s engagement in any other Court on the material date, namely, Friday, the 14th of April 1967. We need not, at all, go into this question. In any event, we may repeat that justice and punishment are not interchangeable terminologies. Having regard to the order we propose to make in respect of the Rules in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 73 of 1967, we are not called upon to enter into 'the pterits of the case. It is unnecessary to decide whether; in fact, such a contempt has been proved. In any event, in respect of respondents, other than respondent, Azizul Huq, there is not even a semblance of evidence that they were aware of any engage ment of Sarajuddin Bhuiyan in any other Court work. Both the Rules in respect of the contempt petition are, therefore, disposed of by an order which we hereby make, namely, that no further action is called for in as much as we have unhesitatingly accepted the apologies that have been tendered in an unqualified manner. We have no manner of doubt that all the respondents sincerely regret the unfortunate course that the occurrence had taken. The said Rules stand discharged. Before we take leave of these cases, which we have heard and disposed of, we would like to say that it has been persistently argued, on behalf of respondent, Azizul Huq, that, the circum stances of this case would establish that there has been no malice on the part of the said respondent (Azizul Huq), even if he had, mistakenly, assumed a jurisdiction, which, on subsequent exami nation, is found to be illegal and void. It has been urged that respondent, Azizul Huq, acted in good faith and had genuinely believed that he could exercise jurisdiction under section 228 of the Penal Code. Since we have merely held that such assumption of jurisdiction was not warranted by law, we have refrained from' giving any decision upon the controversial facts of this case. It has been asserted and admitted before us, by learned lawyers of both parties, that there has been no previous acquaintance ship between Serajuddin Bhuiyan and respondent, Azizul Huq, and that the latter could not have been actuated by any previous ill-feeling against the former. There is not even a suggestion in this behalf in any of the affidavits that have been filed before us. It is not probable, in the aforesaid circumstance, that res pondent, Azizul Huq, would have lost his temper without the slightest provocation given by Serajuddin Bhuiyan. Such conduct is highly improbable. Something must have transpired which had led to the unfortunate situation and, we believe, that this Court has not been fully appraised of the situation by any of the parties before us. The facts stated by Serajuddin Bhuiyan are not supported by any affidavits from lawyers, who are said to have played a major role in this unfortunate incident. Admittedly, respondent, Azizul Huq, allowed sufficient time for payment of the fine that was inflicted on the former. Admittedly,, again, an order of discharge was also passed. These orders became infructuous because Serajuddin Bhuiyan failed to obtain an ad interim bail from the said respondent. It is said that respondent, Azizul Huq; thought that his previous orders would be sufficient. In fact, there is no bail application on the records of these cases. Therefore, it is difficult to hold, in the aforesaid premises, that respondent, Azizul Huq, was actuated by malice towards Serajuddin Bhuiyan in passing the impugned order. We do not, however, express any final opinion, in this connection, because we are not called upon to do so. We . have made the aforesaid observations merely because the point was vigorously mooted before us, on behalf of respondent, Azizul Huq. So far as the other respondents are concerned it would be policed that they appear to have performed What they considered to be their respective duties. We would further observe that the administration of law and justice is a matter of vital importance to any civilized society. The machinery by which law is enforced has been crystillised by centuries of wisdom and experience. The Bench and the Bar, in this behalf, constitute one unit and each is complement of the other. The relationship between .the Bench and the Bar calls for a balanced exercise of patience and reasonable indulgence. It is a relationship which must be tempered by tolerance and restraint which the wisdom of experience teaches us. Law yers are expected to show due respect to a Court and the Court, on its part, is required to be reasonably indulgent to a lawyer and to exercise such caution and patience as are calculated to promote the calm and unruffled climate of a Court of law. Such a posture of sobriety and poise is best expressed, in the words of Shakespeare "O, it is excellent To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous To use it like a giant." This exhortation is a wholesome reminder to us of the far reaching impact of the obligation we are called upon to discharge. We are happy to see that everybody concerned in this case has acted in a creditable manner in a course of the proceedings before us, despite some prior exhibition of a roused temper. We have considered these applications when passions had faded out. In this context, we acknowledge, with gratification, the assistance we have received from all the lawyers who have appeared before us. We noticed a happy harmony, while hearing these applications and have allowed the curtain, when the head had subsided, to drop there. The law of contempt is a device to restore the' balance in the scales of justice, when upset, by unauthorised, interference with processes of law and punishment, which may lead to a cul de sac, has never been, by itself, the end of law. ABDULLA, J.-I agree. Rule made, absolute.