P L D 1963 Supreme Court 296 (PLP)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑This appeal by the Province of East Pakistan, is against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan directing the cancella tion of an order of requisition issued from the office of the Land Acquisition Collector, Dacca, on the 30th of December 1959, for the requisition of certain lands situated in Mauza Sahar Khilgaon in the district of Dacca. According to the terms of the order itself the requisition was sought to be made in the public interest for the establishment of a rehabilitation zone for persons to be displaced as a result of the diversion of the railway line from the centre of the City of Dacca, and purported to have been made in the exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 read with section 9 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948. The respondent herein, who claimed to be the owner and occupier of two of these plots, namely, C. S. Plots Nos. 1343 and 1424, challenged the validity of the said order by a writ petition filed on the 27th of February 1961, upon, inter alia, the following grounds:‑‑ (a) that the order of requisition was ex facie bad and no order at all in the eye of the law, as it was authenticated by means of a rubber‑stamp engraved with a facsimile signature in the space provided for the signature of the Additional District Magistrate, Dacca, (b) that in view of the above manner of authentication of the order of requisition the order could not be said to have been made after the proper application of the mind of any officer authorised to requisition, and (c) that the service of such an order was no service at all and that the Provincial Government had no authority to take over possession of the respondent's properties in pursuance of such a bad and invalid order. It is unnecessary to refer to the other grounds raised by the respondent in his writ petition, for, neither has the High Court dealt with any one of them in its judgment nor has the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent pressed them before t us. The only additional ground that he has urged is that in the circumstances of this case the impugned order had been made in such a slip‑shod and careless manner that it could well be characterised as having been made in the colourable exercise of the powers of the requisitioning authority. The High Court, after an examination of the relevant provisions of the statute under which the order of requisition purported to have been made and a large number of authorities, of which some dealt with the method of service of a summons under the Code of Civil Procedure and a few, of the same High Court, which dealt with cases where orders of requisition had been similarly authenticated by facsimile rubber‑stamp signatures, came to the following conclusions: ‑ (1) that under the provisions of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act and the Rules framed there under "there has to be a signature of the person making the order, because otherwise it cannot operate as an order which is consciously passed by the individual authorised to make the order," (2) that "a rubber‑stamp is no substitute for the conscious signature of the person who is required to make the order", (3) that "the most important point to remember is that an order must be made by some one and a mere printed document bearing a rubber‑stamp cannot be described as an order", and (4) that as such the "document which was served on the petitioner is not an order at all." The High Court after an examination of the relevant file produced before it was also of the view that there was nothing therein "to show that the requiring (sic) authority passed any order that in its opinion it is expedient to requisition the plots of land in question" and that "the records disclose an attempt to requisition lands by a mere mechanical process without anybody purporting even to satisfy himself that it was necessary and expedient to requisition such lands and without anybody passing an order of requisition." The contention of the Province that the respondent was not entitled to any relief by way of a writ on account of the inordinate delay of over 13 months in making the application was also repelled by the High Court on the ground that the respon dent had satisfactorily explained the reason for the delay in approaching the Court. Those reasons, in the view of the High Court, indicated that the delay had been unavoidable, and, therefore, did not amount to any laces on the part of the respondent. The learned Advocate‑General of East Pakistan appearing in support of this appeal has assailed the correctness of each and every one of the above‑mentioned conclusions of the High Court and has contended that, notwithstanding the authentication made by means of the impression of a rubber‑stamp facsimile of a signature of the Additional District Magistrate, the order impugned by the respondent was a valid and legal order passed in the lawful exercise of the jurisdiction of the requisitioning authority after due application of his mind. It was not disputed before the High Court, and it is not disputed before us, that the purpose for which the requisition was sought to be made, namely, the establishment of a rehabili tation zone for the settlement of a large number of persons who were going to be displaced by reason of the diversion of the railway line at Dacca, was a valid public purpose. But what is disputed is that the authority empowered to requisition had applied its mind to either the expediency or the necessity of requisitioning the lands of the respondent. It is argued that the law not only empowers the appropriate authority to requisition the properties of private citizens but it also imposes a duty upon the authority so empowered to first satisfy itself that it is expedient or necessary so to requisition. The formation of the opinion of the authority, it is said, is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to requisition. So far as the order impugned in the present case is concerned, on its face it does recite that "it is expedient and necessary in the public interest to requisition." In the face of such a recital, normally there would be a presumption that the official act had been regularly and properly performed and the onus would then be upon the person seeking to challenge the correctness of the recital to show the contrary. The respondent made no attempt to rebut this presumption but the High Court presumably took the view that this presumption had been rebutted by the apparent defect in the order itself as to its authentication. The so‑called defect in the authentication of the order, therefore, appears to us to have been the vital question which influenced the High Court in coming to the view that the order impugned was neither an order in the eye of the law nor had it been made in accordance with law. It is necessary, therefore, to first examine as to how far the authentication of the order by means of the impression of a rubber‑stamp facsimile of a signature of the requisitioning authority can be said to have vitiated the order itself. In order to appreciate as to what were the requirements of the statute in question enabling the authorities concerned to requisition it is desirable to consider first its relevant provisions. Section 3, which gives the power to requisition, is in these terms: ‑‑ "

3. If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is expedient or necessary so to do for the administration and development of the new Province of East Bengal or for any other public interest connected therewith such as improvement of towns or ports, construction or betterment of roads, water‑ways or other communications, development of commerce or industries, maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and other similar purpose, the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any property and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be necessary or expedient in connection with such requisition: Provided that no property used by the public for the purpose of religious worship shall be requisitioned. Provided further that the Provincial Government may exempt any particular property or class of properties or exclude any particular area from the operation of this Act." It will be noticed that by this section the power is given to the Provincial Government to requisition. But by section 15 the Provincial Government has also been empowered to delegate wits power to any officer serving under it. This section reads thus: - "

15. The Provincial Government may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on it by this Act shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged by such officer as may be so specified." Section 3 has been subsequently amended by the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960 (East Pakistan Ordinance III of 1960), but since the requisition in this case was made before the amendment came into force, it is not necessary to refer to the said amendment. The procedure to be followed after the order of requisition has been made is prescribed in section 4, which provides: ‑ "4. (1) When an order of requisition has been made under section 3, it shall be served on the owner of the property personally by delivering or tendering it to him or where the owner cannot be found it shall be served by leaving authentic copy of the order with some adult male member of the family of such owner, or and, if no such adult male member can be found, the notice may be served by affixing such copy to some conspicuous part of the premises in which he is known to have last resided or carried on business or personally worked for gain and also by axing another such copy to some conspicuous part of the requisitioned property. (2) Where the order of the requisition has been served under subsection (1) in respect of a property, the Provincial Govern ment may take possession of the property forthwith and may use or deal with the property in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient: Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in section 15 the Provincial Government shall not delegate its powers of taking possession to an officer other than one having a gazetted rank." This section requires by subsection (1) that the order of requisition after it has been made "shall be served on the owner of the property" in the manner specified therein. Subsection (2) lays down that only when the order has been served in the manner prescribed the Provincial Government may take possession of the property requisitioned. This procedure has been further supplemented by Rules, which have been framed in exercise of the rule‑making powers given to the Provincial Government by section 18 (2) (a) of the Act. For our present purposes only Rules 2 and 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Rules, 1948, are relevant. They are as follows: ‑ "2. (1) A separate proceeding shall be started with each proposal for the requisition of any property under the Act. (2) Before making an order for the requisition of a property under section 3, the officer competent to make such order shall satisfy himself that the proposed requisition falls within the scope of the provisions of section 3. (3) An order of requisition referred to in subsection (1) of section 4 shall be in Form A." It will thus be noticed that neither under the main provisions of the statute nor under the rules of procedure framed thereunder is there anything, which prescribes any specific method of authentication of an order. All that is said is that "the Provincial Government may by order in writing requisition any property." The question, therefore, arises as to how is an order to be made. Is it necessary that every portion of the order must be in the handwriting of the person empowered to make the order or is it all that is required that the order must be the conscious act of that person and that it should be authenticated in some recognised manner? The word "make" in its generic sense means "to cause to exist" or "to bring into being", but of course this word is capable of different connotations having regard to the nature of the thing to be made. Thus in the case of a formal document it may mean "to execute with the requisite formalities" but even in this restricted sense we are unable to agree with the High Court that the document cannot be said to have been made unless it is written out in the handwriting of the maker thereof and authenticated by his usual signature appended in his own hand. Take, for instance, the case of a will or a deed, which is required by law to be in writing and to be duly signed by the maker thereof and attested by witnesses. Can it be said that a will or a deed which is typed out or printed and bears only a facsimile rubber stamp of the signature of the testator or of the executant, as the case may be, is not a document which has been made by the testator or the executant? Even in the case of such formal documents we venture to think that their validity will not be affected if the writing in its body is in print or in the handwriting of some person other than the maker. It is common knowledge that such formal documents are usually written out by scribes or deed writers and rarely, if ever, by the executant himself. There can be no reason, therefore, as to why an executive order should be clothed with any higher degree of formality if the maker concerned adopts it as his own act and thus brings it into being. Coming next to the question of the signature on such a document we find that the words "signed" and "signature" are defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, Volume IV, as follows: ‑ "Speaking generally, a signature is the writing, or otherwise affixing, a person's name, or a mark to represent his name, by himself or by his authority with the intention of authenticating a document as being that of, or as binding on, the person whose name or mark is so written or affixed." This description appears to us to be in accord both with reason and with principle, for, we find it difficult to see as to why the genuineness of an authentication should differ merely by reason of the fact that it is made by means of an impression of a rubber stamp affixed either by the party's own hand or by a person duly authorised by him in that behalf from an authentication made by means of a signature executed with the agency of a pen, a pencil or a quill. This view we find to be also supported by a large number of authorities on this subject. Thus even in the case of a will which is required under the Wills Act in England to be signed at the end by the person executing it, it was observed by Sir C. Cross-well in the case of Jenkins v. Gaisford and Thring (1863) 3 Sw. & T 93 that "whether the mark is made by a pen or by some other instrument cannot make any difference, neither can it in reason make a difference that a facsimile of the whole name was impressed on the will instead of a mere mark or cross. The mark made by the instrument or stamp used was intended to stand for and represent the signature of the testator." Judicial opinion in England is predominantly of the view that the impression of the stamped similitude of the maker's signature makes it a perfectly validly signed document, so far so that it was held in the case of Blades v. Lawrence L R 9 Q B 374 that even "a Judge's order is well signed by the impression of such a stamped similitude of the Judge's signature." In the case of Bennett v. Burmfitt (1867) L R 3 Common Pleas, p. 28 an objection filed to the retention of a name on the voter's list had been authenticated by a rubber‑stamp on which was engraved the ordinary signature of the objector, although the relevant provision of the statute dealing with such objections required that "the notice of objection shall be signed by the person objecting." Nonetheless, it was held that the objection had been validly filed. Sir William Bovill, Chief Justice, observed that "the ordinary mode of affixing a signature to a document is not by the hand alone, but by the hand coupled with some instrument, such as a pen or pencil. I see no distinction between using a pen or a pencil and using a stamp, where the impression is put upon the paper by the proper hand of the party signing. In each case it is the personal act of the party and to all intents and purposes a signing of the document by him." In the same case Willes, J., said that "the using a stamp is only a compendious way of writing the party's name." It is unnecessary to multiply authorities on this point, for, they are legion and go even to the extent that the affixation of a facsimile rubber‑stamp signature is a sufficient signing within the meaning of the law for the purposes of saving limitation under the English Statute of Frauds. If, therefore, a manual signature is not necessary either for a will or to satisfy the Statute of Frauds or even for a Judge's order (which are at least as solemn documents as an executive order of a Government Official) we see no reason why it should not be sufficient for the validity of an order made under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, which incidentally does not expressly require the order to be signed by the authority making it. With respect, therefore, to the learned Judges of the High Court we are unable to agree that in law a signature cannot be validly made by the impression of a rubber‑stamp facsimile of the signature of person. The affixation of such a rubber‑stamp would, in our view, constitute in law a valid execution and a proper making of the document if it was consciously made or caused to be made by the person making it with the intention of authenticating it as being his act or as binding upon him. It has, therefore, now to be considered whether the rubber stamp was impressed upon the order impugned in the present case with the intention of so authenticating it. The facts of the present case, so far as they can be gathered from the judgment of the High Court itself, are that after receiving the request of the Government to requisition the lands, of which a Schedule was attached, the Additional District Magistrate asked the Land Acquisition Collector's Department to "take up the case with right earnest", which presumably meant that the case should be examined by the Department under him mainly concerned with the acquisition of land. The proposal that was received was for the requisition of quite a large area of land for purposes of rehabilitation of a large number of persons. In fact, after the case had been examined it was found that it involved the requisition of holdings in the possession of some 1500 or 1600 persons. An equal number of requisition orders had, therefore, to be prepared and after this was done they were placed before the officer concerned for his authentication. He personally signed the first order and the last order in the bundle and caused the rest to be authenticated by the impression of a rubber‑stamp facsimile of his signature. After this had been done he endorsed on the file that he had "signed" the orders. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Department it is also categorically asserted that the orders of requisition were passed by the Additional District Magistrate after due application of his mind. As against this there is no suggestion even by the respondent that the rubber stamp was actually impressed upon these documents by a person who was not duly authorised by the Additional District Magistrate to do so or that they had been placed thereon by someone else without his knowledge, consent or approval. There was also no denial of the assertion of the department. In this state of affairs we are unable to appreciate how any conclusion other than that the authentication of the order of requisition had been consciously made by the officer concerned can possibly be arrived at. Having regard to the large number to say that the procedure adopted in the present case by the Additional District Magistrate, who was admittedly an officer duly empowered to make the order of requisition, was either unreasonable or unwarranted. The illegibility of the signature or its facsimile could also not constitute a valid ground for holding that it was no signature at alt. If any doubt was felt on that account it could have been easily resolved by comparing it with his attested signature or by examining someone acquainted with his signature. Under sub section (7) of section 57 of the Evidence Act the Court can take judicial notice of the signature of a Gazetted Officer, which the Additional District Magistrate undoubtedly is, and as such there would have been no difficulty in having his attested signature produced in Court. The order impugned is in the form prescribed by the Rule framed under the Act itself. The only fault, however, that the High Court has found is that these were printed forms. But we have to point out that in the printed forms prescribed there are some blanks for making relevant entries which have to be filled in by hand and other inappropriate recitals and descriptions which have to be scored out, presumably, by the officer who makes the order or under whose direction it is prepared after necessary enquiry and verification of title has been made or caused to be made. There is no complaint that the particulars filled in on these" printed forms were incorrect or that the recitals or descriptions were inaccurate. 1n the circumstances, we find it difficult to appreciate why the order should be treated as bad merely because a printed form as prescribed under the Act has been used. In upholding the legal validity of the authentication made, in the circumstances of the present case, however, we should not be taken to have also expressed our approval of this practice of impressing such formal orders with a rubber‑stamp in every case. Normally, it would not be too much to expect that orders seeking to sequestrate the properties of private citizens should be authenticated by the affixation of the personal signature of the officer, empowered to make the order, in his own hand. Public officials entrusted with so great a power should not begrudge such little drudgeries if only for the purpose of giving to the citizen sought to be affected by the exercise of their power the satisfaction of knowing that some responsible officer had personally taken the trouble of authenticating his order. The next question that now arises for consideration is whether the High Court was right in taking the view that the impression of the rubber‑stamp was by itself sufficient to lead to the inference that the order had been made in a slip‑shod manner without the necessary application of the mind of the officer concerned. The High Court, we regret to notice, has been rather severe in its criticism of the conduct of the public official concerned and somewhat dismayed with what has been described as a revelation of a most eye opening character" even after the examination of the relevant file produced by the authorities. We, however, find ourselves unable to share the views expressed by the High Court. Having seen the original file ourselves we find nothing therein which could have provoked such strong condemnation. The quotations from the nothings to the file given in the judgment of the High Court itself would indicate that the matter was not dealt with as perfunctorily as the learned Judges of the High Court imagined. It will perhaps be pertinent to mention in this connection that when dealing with such cases the High Court is merely concerned with seeing as to whether the officer empowered to requisition had acted bona fide in the discharge of his duties and as to whether there was any material upon which the subjective satisfaction of that officer with regard to the necessity and the expediency of the requisition could have been founded. It is not concerned with the adequacy or the sufficiency of those reasons, nor had it any power to sit in appeal over his action. Looking at the notings in the file for this limited purpose, therefore, we find that there was therein more than sufficient upon which such satisfaction could have been grounded. The scheme, it must be remembered, was for the rehabilitation of a large section of the public who were to be affected by the diversion of the railway line from the center of the City of Dacca. As to the public purpose of the scheme, therefore, there could be no manner of doubt. Furthermore, since the scheme was to affect a considerable section of the public and had been examined at some length by the Government itself, can it not be legitimately said that the Additional District Magistrate could well have based his satisfaction upon these facts themselves, and if he had done so, what more could he possibly be expected to do? There is no dispute that the diversion of the railway line was part of a scheme of town development for the City of Dacca. There was also no manner of doubt that by the diversion of the line a large number of persons would be displaced. Was there not then sufficient justification for providing for the rehabilitation of such displaced persons? Sub‑rule (2) of Rule 2 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Rules, 1948, only required him to be satisfied that the proposed requisition fell within the scope of section 3 of the Act. It clearly did so. Again, as to the necessity or the expediency of the scheme there can be no room for doubt that the officer concerned had applied his mind. It is apparent from the first noting in the file that the officer concerned bad made himself acquainted with the fact that the requisition was sought to be made "for rehabilitation of persons displaced by the Dacca Railway diversion line" and, as such, the case had to be taken up "with right earnest." The next noting shows that there was a further direction for the preparation of the requisition orders (described therein as notices); the demarcation of the plots to be requisitioned and the verifi cation of the title of the persons owning or occupying such plots and that the same should be done with "utmost speed." Does this not indicate that the officer concerned having applied his mind to the necessity of the requisition had come to the conclusion that the necessity was so great that the utmost speed" must be exercised? This noting also discloses that the said officer was conscious that the Additional Land Acquisition Collector, to whom the previous directions had been given, may come up against difficulties and may need assistance and for this purpose he mentioned in the order that he himself and another officer named therein would also be available for such assistance. These nothings, if anything, lead to a contrary inference and do not suggest that the person making them was merely acting in a "mechanical" manner. It was only after these directions had been complied with and the requisition orders drafted that they were first checked by the Additional Land Acquisition Collector, who first appended his signatures thereto and then put them up before the empowered officer for his authentication. The latter after authenticating them in the manner indicated earlier noted on the file that he had "signed" them and affixed his signature to the note. This does not, in our opinion, indicate that the whole thing was either done in a mechanical fashion or in a slip‑shod or perfunctory manner, although it may be said that it was done with "utmost speed." This by itself cannot be held to be a fault nor are' we in a position to say that the nothings in the file rebut the presumption of the regularity of the official act or belie the statement on the face of the impugned order itself that the authority empowered to requisition was satisfied that in his opinion it was expedient and necessary in the public interest to make the requisition. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question as to whether, after such an order had been made, it was necessary to serve the same upon the persons affected in the manner prescribed in the Act itself, for, in the present case there is no dispute that the order was in fact served on the respondent personally and he acknowledged such service by signing on a duplicate copy of the order. We do not also consider it necessary to go into the question as to whether the order itself is to be served or only a notice of the requisition is to be served, for, section 4 of the statute itself only requires "an authentic copy of the order" to be served and subsequently in the same section describes this authentic copy as a "notice." We may, however, state that service of the authentic copy or notice is necessary and it will not be sufficient if the person affected has aliunde derived knowledge of the order of requisition, for, under subsection (2) of section 4 the service has to precede the taking over of possession. Again, no useful purpose can, in our opinion, be served by entering upon an examination of what constitutes service either under the Civil Procedure Code or other statutes, for the Act under consideration has itself prescribed a method of service which has to be followed. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court "the records disclose an attempt to requisition lands by a mere mechanical process without anybody purporting even to satisfy himself that it was necessary and expedient to requisition such lands and without anybody passing an order of requisition." In our opinion, the High Court was, in coming to this view, mainly influenced by the fact that a rubber‑stamp authentication did not bring into being a valid order of requisition. This view is not supported even by previous decisions of the same High Court. Another Division Bench thereof has held that simply because a requisition notice "was issued under a rubber‑stamp signature it cannot be said that the Additional District Magistrate passed the order without applying his mind." (Vide Ajit Kumar Das v. The Province of East Pakistan) PLD1959 Dacca

586. The only reason given for not accepting this view is that the question that was argued in that case was that the rubber‑stamp signature indicated that the officer concerned had not applied his mind to the requisition. With respect we must point out that the decision was a direct authority also on this question, as in spite of the rubber‑stamp signature the validity of the order of requisition was upheld and if the learned Judges of the High Court deciding the present case were inclined to take a different view, they should have, in accordance with the rules of their own Court, referred the matter to a larger Bench. Alternatively, they could have expressed their doubts regarding the view taken in the precedent case1 in a Court of co‑equal jurisdiction, while yet following that view, and left the matter to be raised in appeal before this Court. The only question that now remains to be considered is as to whether, as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent, the impugned order was made in the colour-able exercise of powers, as it was incumbent upon the officer to whom the power of requisition had been delegated to apply his own independent mind afresh to the facts of the case, to re‑examine the necessity or expediency of the requisition, and not merely to act upon the satisfaction, if any, of the Government. In support of this, contention reliance is placed on two decisions. The first is of this Court in the case of the Province of East Pakistan and others v. Jogesh Chandra Lodh and others 11 DLR SC 411, wherein it was observed that "when powers of the Provincial Government have been delegated to an officer, that officer is substituted for the Provincial Government for the purposes of section 3, with the result that it is he who has to form an opinion that it is expedient or necessary to requisition any property for the administration and development of the Province and for any other public interest connected therewith." The facts of that case were totally different, for, there it was found that not only was there nothing on the record "to show that the requisite opinion was formed by the Provincial Govern ment itself" but also that the facts established were such that the finding was irresistible that the only object of the requisition was to give to favoured person a valuable property belonging to others "for a song" purely for the purposes of commercial exploitation There is no parallel, therefore, between the facts of that case and the present case. The next decision relied upon is of another Division Bench of the Dacca High Court itself in the case of Kumudini Welfare Trust of Bengal v. The Province of East Pakistan P L D 1963 Dacca 136=13 D L R

693. In that case the validity of an "omnibus order" of requisition signed by someone "for District Magistrate, Comilla," was challenged on, inter alia, the ground that it was not made by a person authorized to requisition and alternatively on the ground that the requisition ing authority had not properly applied its mind before making the order. The High Court upheld both these contentions and directed the revocation of the impugned order. The finding as to the non‑application of the mind of the competent authority was really based on the absence of any order by that authority on the relevant file and several omissions, mistakes and mis- descriptions in the order itself but the view was also expressed that in so far as the order of requisition had not been issued "in the prescribed form by the District Magistrate over his own signature" it was a void order. If by this it was intended to lay it down any general proposition of law that unless an order of requisition is issued over the personal signature of the competent requisitioning authority it cannot be treated as a valid order then we must record our disapproval of the view, for, such a wide proposition is not tenable for the reasons we have already given. The facts, moreover, of the said case were again different from the facts of the case before us, for, there the draft order was never put up before the District Magistrate but the Land Acquisition Officer himself signed it "for the District Magistrate" and issued it "completely ignoring" the latter. No question was also raised in that case of the Government itself having applied its mind to the necessity of the requisition, hence it is not of any help for the decision of the question now before us. In any event, no useful purpose will be served by entering upon an examination of decisions, which have no direct bearing on the question in issue before us, for, as we have already held even if it be assumed that the delegate is so substituted, the officer empowered, in the present case, could have legitimately based his subjective satisfaction upon the decision of the Govern ment itself when the scheme was undoubtedly for a public purpose, affecting a large section of the public and had been examined fully by the Government itself. In this connection it cannot be overlooked that under the statute it is the Provincial Government, which has to be satisfied as to the expediency or necessity of the requisition, but it is entitled under section 15 of the Act to delegate any power orb duty conferred upon it to an officer subordinate to it and that such delegation may be subject to conditions. The delegation has no doubt been made in the present case to the Additional District Magistrate. But the question may still arise as to whether by such delegation the authority empowered under the statute can completely divest itself of its powers. It is not impossible to visualise a situation in which the exercise of powers by the dele gator himself, notwithstanding the delegation, may be construed as a pro tanto withdrawal of the power of the delegate, particularly when the delegate is, as in the instant case, an officer subordinate, to the delegator. We do not, however, consider it desirable to express any final opinion on this matter, as the point has not been fully argued before us and as we have based our decision on the ground that in a scheme of the kind proposed in this case the considered opinion of the Government furnished an adequate basis for the subjective satisfaction of the delegate officer. Lastly, there is another argument advanced on behalf of the respondent, which has to be noticed. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that if the avowed purpose of the requisition was the rehabilitation of persons to be displaced by the railway diversion line, there could be no point in displacing other persons settled on the land sought to be requisitioned. The respondent, it appears, has built a dwelling house on this land and he has, in fact, throughout been attempting before the departmental authorities to procure an exemption for the residential portion of his holding. At one stage, it is said, he was even assured by the requisitioning authority that his residential portion would not be taken unless under the scheme of rehabilitation it is required for the purpose of construction of a road, a market, place or some other public building. The learned Advocate‑General appearing before us has also assured us that it is not the intention of Government to cause unnecessary inconvenience and harm to persons already in the area sought to be acquired and that the Government would not demolish a building already standing on the land unless it was absolutely necessary to do so. In our opinion, the request of the respondent appears to be reasonable. It is only just and fair I that, if the respondent has actually constructed a residential building on this plot and is residing there with his family, he should not be thrown out and his building demolished if it is not required for the purposes of building a road or some public building, and we hope that the assurance given by the Depart ment will be honoured. But having regard to the view we have taken as to the validity of the order itself we are not in a position to give any specific direction in that behalf. For the reasons given above we would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court, and recall the writ issued by it. In the circumstances of this case, however, we would not make any order as to costs. A.H. Appeal accepted.