P L D 1970 Karachi 97 (PLP)

The petition was allowed, amongst others, on the ground that section 178‑A of the Sea Customs Act was void under Article 13 of the Constitution. It was further held that even if section 178‑A was valid, the condition precedent for invoking the rule as to the burden of proof prescribed by the section had not been complied in that the Customs Officer who effected the seizure, which preceded the adjudication, did not entertain a "reasonable belief" that the gold was smuggled with the result that the confiscation was invalid. Their Lordships were also of the view that section 178‑A of the Sea Customs Act could not be invoked in adjudicating a contravention of the notification under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which imposed restrictions on the import of gold. The Collector of Customs, Madras, in order to file an appeal against this judgment in the Supreme Court obtained the leave of High Court under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution. In due course the appeal was presented before the Supreme Court and the same was allowed with costs. Apart from the attack upon the constitutional validity of section 178‑A of the Sea Customs Act, the next contention which found favour with the High Court was that for the contravention of the provisions of section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, no action could competently be taken under the provisions of the former section. In substance the argument was that section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, when enacted in 1952, incorporated into that Act, all the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, as that enactment stood in that year, with the result that section 178‑A of the Sea Customs Act, which was subsequently introduced by the amending Act XXI of 1955, could not form part of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act so as to validate the impugned action. The judgment of the High Court was largely based on the decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co‑operative Insurance Society Limited. The Supreme Court of India, while reversing the finding of the High Court on this point, observed that section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, when enacted in 1952, did not incorporate into that Act the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and further that the Privy Council judgment upon which the High Court had relied was wholly distinguishable. In order to appreciate the underlying principle of the Supreme Court judgment it would be profitable briefly to refer to the relevant provisions of the two enactments which fell for consideration in that case. As already pointed out, the Collector of Sea Customs had taken the impugned action under section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which was introduced into the original Act of 1947 by an amendment in 1952. According to section 23‑A ; . . . . . . . . . . . . the restrictions imposed by subsection (1) . . . . . of section 8 . . . . . . . shall be deemed to have been imposed under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly . . . . . Section 8 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and section 19 of the Sea Customs Act respectively read :‑ "8. (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, order that, subject to such exemptions, if any, as may be contained in the notification, no person shall, except with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the fee, if any, prescribed bring or send into India any gold or silver or any currency notes or bank notes or coin whether Indian or foreign." "

19. The Central Government may from time to time by notification in the official Gazette, prohibit or restrict the bringing or taking by Sea or by land goods of any specified description into or out of India across any customs frontier as defined by the Central Government." The Supreme Court, after construing these provisions, observed that The effect, therefore, of section 23‑A is to treat the text of the notification by the Central Government under section 8(1) as if it had been issued under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act with the title and the recital of the source of power appropriate to it by the creation of a legal fiction. It would be obvious that in the context and on the language here employed, if section 19 of the Sea Customs Act were repealed there would no longer be any legal foundation for invoking the penal provisions of the Sea Customs Act to a contravention of a notification under section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act." In order to see the relevancy of this judgment, let us briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the Import Export Act, 1950 and of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 under which the impugned action was taken by the respondents. Section 3(1) of the Import Export Act, 1950 empowers the Central Government to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control the import or export of goods of any specified description by an order published in the official Gazette subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be specified in that order. Subsection (3) of that section provides that "All goods to which any order under subsection (1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the import or export has been prohibited or restricted under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly . . . . . . . ." It is an admitted position that the required notification under section 3(1) of the said Act was published by the Central Government whereby the import of betelnuts and cigarettes of foreign origin was prohibited without an import licence. It is also an admitted position that the petitioners before us failed to produce the required licences to show that they had not imported their respective goods into the country in contravention of the requirement of the notification. In this view, the provisions of subsection (3) of section 3 of the Import Export Act, 1950 were attracted to the goods, seized from their possession with the result that the petitioners rendered themselves liable to action under section 19 and all the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. It will have been noted that section 23‑A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, which came for consideration before the Indian Supreme Court, is almost identically worded as section 3(3) of the Import Export Act, 1950. The object of both these sections is to attract section 19 and all other provisions of the Sea Customs Act to a case in which goods have been imported into the country in violation of the requisite notification of the Central Government. The Supreme Court of India also distinguished A I R 1931 Privy Council with the observations that A close examination of the decision . . . . . . . would show that the incorporation effected in the statute thereunder consideration the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911 referred to by their Lordships as the "Local Act" was in express terms and in the form illustrated by 54 and 55 Vict. Ch. 19 just now referred to. The "Local Act" in dealing with the acquisition of land for the purposes designated by it made provision for the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were subjected to numerous modifications which were set out in the Schedule so that in effect the "Local Act" was held to be the enactment of a Special Law for the acquisition of land for the special purpose. It was in the context of these and several other provisions which pointed to the absorption of certain of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the "Local Act" with vital modifications . . . . . . . . It would be seen that the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911, which came for construction before the Privy Council, was for all practical purposes held to have incorporated into it the various provisions of the land Acquisition Act and it was on that score that their Lordships came to the conclusion that the subsequent amendment in the Land Acquisition Act could not form part of the Local Act of Calcutta. The judgment is clearly distinguishable. Unlike subsection (3) of section 3 of the Import Export Act, 1950, the Local Act of Calcutta was a clear case of legislation by incorporation. We have compared the language of the said Act with that of the Land Acquisition Act and found that some of the provisions of the latter Act were bodily lifted and incorporated in the former Act. In this view, the underlying principle of the Privy Council judgment is under standable but, and we say so with profound respect, it has no bearing upon the facts of the present case. An objection, like the one which we are presently considering was also raised before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a judgment Noor Hussain v. The State (P L D 1966 S C 88) and the same was repelled with these observations It is admitted in the present case that there was a notifica tion under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act prohibiting the Import and Export of spices save upon a licence issued in that behalf. In terms of subsection (3) of section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act this notification was to be deemed to be also a notification under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and all the provisions of that Act applied except for those of section 183 thereof. The contention, therefore that the offence committed by the appellant could not come within the mischief of the Sea Customs Act is without any substance, for, the notification under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act made the provisions of the Sea Customs Act applicable, as it was also to be deemed to be a notification under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. In this view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, by which we are respectfully bound, the objection of the learned counsel must be repelled. The result would be that in view of the notification under the Import Export Act, 1950, which attracted the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, sections 167(8) and 177‑A of that Act would be properly attracted to the facts of the present case, although these sections were no a part of the original Act when its provisions were made applicable to the contravention of the notification published under Import Export Act. Mr. A. Aziz, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply to the arguments of the learned Attorney‑General, once again reiterated his objection as to the vires of Ordinance XXIX of 1962 and contended that it could not have validly extended the life of Import Export Act, 1950 which had already expired. In support he relied upon a judgment of the Federal Court Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar (A I R 1949 F C 175). The facts in that case were that the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, which was a temporary statute, was to remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement. However, in terms of the provisions appearing after section 1 (3) of that Act, the Provincial Government was empowered to extend the life of the Act for a further period of one year by a notification after passing of the resolution by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council. By the order of the Governor, the Chief Secretary of Bihar issued a notification on 16‑3‑1947 stating that in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor was pleased to direct that the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 shall apply to the Chhota Nagpur Division and to the Santhal Parganas District. The Bihar Legislative Assembly and the Bihar Legislative Council having passed resolutions to extend the Act for a further period of one year, under the order of the Governor of Bihar, a notification was published in Government Gazette on 11‑3‑1949. By this notification the life of the Act of 1947 was further extended by one year with effect from 16‑3‑1948. On 7th March 1949, the Governor of Bihar, in exercise of his power under section 92(1), Government of India Act, issued a further notifica tion directing that the said. Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act shall apply and shall always be deemed to have applied to the Chhota Nagpur Division and to the Santhal Parganas District with effect from 16th March 1948. On 15th March 1949, Bihar Act V of 1949, being an Act to amend the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 was passed. The Act in material part reads. "Whereas it is expedient to amend the Bittar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, in the manner hereinafter appearing, it is hereby enacted as follows :‑ (2) in subsection (3) of section 1, (Bihar) Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947, for the words "for a period of one year from the date of its commencement" the words and figures "till 31st March 1950" shall be substituted." Following that, on 12th March 1949, a public notification was published in the Government Gazette stating that in exercise of the powers conferred by section 92(1), Government of India Act, as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, the Governor of Bihar was pleased to direct that the Bihar Act V of 1949 shall apply to the Chhota Nagpur Division and to the Santhal Parganas District. The two questions which came for conclusion before the Federal Court were (1) Whether the Bihar Amending Act V of 1949 could have validly extended the life of the temporary Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947 by another year when before its promulgation the Act of 1947 had already expired? (2) Whether the Bihar Government could validly extend the life of 1947 Act by one year through notification dated 11‑3‑1949 published under proviso to section 1(3) of the Act of 1947? The Federal Court answered both these questions in the negative. In regard to the first question, their Lordships were of the view that the Bihar Act V of 1949, being simply an amending Act, could not have extended the life of the Act of 1947 as before its promulgation the Act of 1947 had already expired. We respectfully agree with this conclusion but have failed to appreciate as to how does it help the case of the petitioners. Surely Ordinance XXIX of 1962 was not simply an amending Ordinance but had also revived and re‑enacted the provisions of the expired Act of 1950. In this view and for the reasons already given in the earlier part of this judgment, the case is clearly distinguishable. In regard to the other question the objection before the Federal Court was that the power to extend the life of an Act, beyond the prescribed period, was clearly legislative power and the Provincial Legislature had no authority to delegate the same to the two Houses of the Legislature of the Province of Bihar under the proviso to section 1(3) of the Act of 1

947. In substance the objection appeared to be that the provision in question was ultra vires the Provincial Government and subsequently the two houses of Legislature could not extend the life of the Act of 1947 by passing resolutions. This objection prevailed with their Lord ships who, upon the construction of the proviso to section 1(3) of the Act of 1947, and as a matter of general principle, came to the conclusion that the power to extend the operation of the Act beyond the period mentioned in the Act prima facie is a legislative power. It is for the Legislature to state how long a particular legislation will be in operation. That cannot be left to the discretion of some other body. This conclusion has obviously no bearing upon the facts of the present case as admittedly Ordinance XXXIX of 1962 was promulgated by the President himself and not by any of his delegatee. We would now proceed to examine each petition on merits. In Petition No. 229/1968, the impugned orders of the respondents have been assailed on the following grounds (1) That the search and seizure of the goods having been carried out in violation of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, was illegal and therefore all the subsequent proceedings, including the impugned orders were vitiated. (2) That as circumstances existed to justify a reasonable belief that the petitioner's possession of betelnuts was illegal as these goods were freely available and openly sold in the market of Karachi. (3) That the respondents had wrongly placed the onus on the petitioner to prove that the goods were not imported into the country in violation of the provisions of Sea Customs Act. (4) That enquiry under section 171‑A of the Sea Customs Act was conducted secretly and in violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not afforded any opportu nity to participate in these proceedings. The first objection appeared to be grounded on the provisions of sections 172 and 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act although it was not elaborated by Mr. A. Aziz, the learned counsel for the petitioners. The requirement of section 172 is that any Magistrate may, on application by Collector of Customs, stating his belief that dutiable or prohibited goods or any documents relating to such goods are secreted in any place within the local limits of his jurisdiction, issue a warrant to search for such good or documents. Then follows section 172‑A, which provides for exceptional cases in which it would be difficult to take appropriate action under section

172. The exceptional cases, in which the requirements of section 172 may not be followed, are those in which the Customs Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that unless immediate action was taken the suspected goods may be removed before a search could be effected under the provisions of section

172. In such cases the Customs Officer is, however, required to be in possession of a signed copy of a statement men tioning the reasonable grounds for his belief and the goods for which the search is to be made. He is further required to deliver to the occupier of the place where the search is carried out a signed copy of the said statement at his last known address. By examining these two sections, we are of the view that they were designed to provide safeguards to the citizen against any wanton or arbitrary action of the Customs Authorities. Clearly, there fore, compliance with the requirement of these sections will have to be made when these authorities proceed to search any place in which according to their belief dutiable or prohibited goods are secreted. However, if the authorities, without the necessity of a search, come upon goods which are liable to confiscation, they are empowered to seize them under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act. The question, therefore, is whether sections 172 and 172‑A were attracted to the facts of the present case and if so were they disregarded? In this respect reference may be made to para. 5 of the petition in which it is alleged that :‑ "

5. On 6‑5‑1966 on enquiry from the staff of the Directorate of Customs and Investigation, the petitioners informed them that they had in stock large quantities of betelnuts (of foreign origin). In return these officers almost raided the premises of the petitioner firm. In flagrant disregard to the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and in violation of the provisions of section 172‑A of the said Act in particular, the said officers searched the shop and godowns of the petitioners, seized the stocks consisting of 528 bags of betelnuts (of foreign origin) weighing 1,249 maunds 20 seers, and sealed the same in godown of the petitioners at Kharadar." This being the case of the petitioners, we are of the view that it did not attract the provisions of sections 172 and 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act. After all the petitioners themselves volunteered the information and admitted to be in possession of the contraband goods without the necessity of any search by the Customs Authorities. It is true that when the petitioners made this disclosure the authorities seized the contraband goods but their action would not tantamount to a "search" within the meaning of sections 172 and 172‑A. The "search", as envisaged by these sections, must proceed on the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that contraband goods are concealed in a particular place,' but surely this would not mean that the search in question must result in the discovery of such goods. So long as the search is carried out on reasonable grounds to believe that contraband goods are concealed in a particular place the action of the Customs Authorities would be protected although as a result no goods are discovered. In this view, we are clear in our mind that section 178 of the Sea Customs Act, under which the goods were seized by the Customs Authorities, was properly applicable to the facts of this case and the objection of the learned counsel is without force. The next two objections of the petitioners are also mis conceived. The admitted facts are that out of 528 bags of betelnuts, which were initially seized by the Customs Authorities, seven bags were marked "In Transit to Afghanistan". After the usual investigation, the Collector of Customs issued show‑cause notice to the petitioners as to why 314 bags, including 7 bags bearing the marking "IN TRANSIT TO AFGHANISTAN", should not be confiscated as their lawful import had not been proved satisfactorily. In reply to the show‑cause notice the petitioners alleged that they had purchased these goods from various parties at Karachi under regular bills which had been already produced in support of their account books and stock register. They further alleged that 7 bags bearing the marking "IN TRANSIT TO AFGHANISTAN" could not give rise to the presumption that the goods were illegally imported as they had purchased the empty bags in the open market in which the goods were re‑packed. Without discussing the merits of the stand taken by the petitioners at this stage, at least this much is clear that the seizure of 7 bags, bearing the marking "IN TRANSIT TO AFGHANISTAN", could give rise to a legitimate presumption that the goods had been imported into the country unlawfully. Therefore, the Collector of Customs was justified in issuing show cause notice to the petitioners under section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act to prove the contrary. Mr. A. Aziz, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, urged that the seizure of 7 bags, with Afghanistan markings, was not a ground upon which onus could be properly placed upon the petitioners to prove that the goods had been imported into the country lawfully. In support he relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court Pakistan v. Qazi Ziauddin (P L D 1962 S C 440). The contention is without force. The explanation of the petitioners that they had purchased these bags in the market of Karachi appears to be absurd inasmuch as the very markings, which they bore, clearly militated against their contention. It is difficult to believe that these bags, which were meant to be transported to Afghanistan, would find their way back into the market of Karachi to be sold as empties. The judgment of the Supreme Court upon which reliance is placed is wholly distinguishable. While construing section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act, their Lordships held that A presumption with respect to the existence of certain facts can, under section 177‑A, Sea Customs Act, 1878 arise only if circumstances exist justifying a reasonable belief in the existence of these facts so that the practical of the section is only this that if there is prima facie evidence of certain facts then these facts are to be presumed to exist. The seizure of 7 bags in this case, with Afghanistan markings was a circumstance justifying a reasonable belief that the goods had been imported into the country unlawfully. Therefore, under section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act the petitioners were obliged to prove that it was not the case. Furthermore section 167 (81) of the Act, under which action was taken in the case before the Supreme Court, was materially different than when action was taken under it in the present case. The section, as originally worded, envisaged the confiscation of goods and the imposition of penalty on a person if "knowingly and with intent to defraud the Government of any duty" he acquired possession of such goods, but it was amended in 1962, by Ordinance 58 of 1962, with the result that these words were omitted and instead the words "if any person, without lawful excuse, the proof of which shall be on such person, acquires possession . . . . . . . . . of any goods . . . . . . . . of which there is a reasonable suspicion that any prohibition or restriction for the time being in force under or by virtue of this Act has been contravened . . . . . . . ." were substituted. There fore, the judgment of the Supreme Court, based as it was upon the original wording of the section, is no authority, and we say so with respect, for the present case in which action was taken under the amended section. Even otherwise the judgment is distinguishable. In that case the petitioner, who had purchased some foreign cloth in the open market of Landikotal, was proceeded against under section 167 (81) of the Act and his goods confiscated. The action of the authorities was struck down on the ground that as a matter of policy, the Customs Officers took no action against the shop keepers though it was known that, on the goods which they sold, duty had not been paid. It was further held by their Lordships that if goods were allowed to be brought into Pakistan, without the payment of duty, it was hardly possible to allege that the Government had been defrauded of the duty payable on the goods by the‑person who brought them into Pakistan. In fact their Lordships went to the extent of holding that the impugned action of the authorities was wholly arbitrary as they failed to show any criterion upon which action was taken only against a few persons out of those who had purchased goods from Landi kotal. Mr. A. Aziz, the learned counsel next argued that the petitioners had adduced convincing evidence before the respon dents to show that they had purchased the goods bona fide from various merchants of Karachi, and consequently the impugned orders, including the explanation of the petitioners, and observed that before the Collector of Customs confiscated 314 bags, out of 528 bags initially seized, the entire evidence of the petitioners was considered on merit. In regard to these bags the petitioner's case was that they had purchased them from Messrs P. M. Mahfooz, a firm of Karachi against regular vouchers. These vouchers were considered by the respondents at three stages but they found them unsatisfactory, being not supported by the account books of P. M. Mahfooz & Company. This finding, which i9 a finding of fact, is not open to review in these proceedings. It was not the case of the petitioners that the said finding was based on no evidence and consequently this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution, could not review that finding by re‑examining the evidence. Mr. A. Aziz, in support of his last objection, that the principles of natural justice had been violated in this case, referred to para. 7 of the petition and paras. 10 and 21 of the counter‑affidavit of the respondents. In para. 7, it was alleged that the petitioners were not allowed to participate in the enquiry conducted by the Customs Authorities and all the witnesses were examined in their absence. To this the respondents replied in paras. 10 and 21 of their counter‑affidavit that the enquiry in question was simply an investigation in which the presence of the petitioners was not necessary. They further alleged that the petitioners never asked to cross‑examine the witnesses at any stage of the proceedings although they were informed of the nature of all evidence brought on record. We have examined the record and observed that in the show cause notice issued by the Collector of Customs the petitioners were informed not only of the date when the case was to be heard but also of the nature of evidence which had been taken during the investigation. They were further asked to be present on the date of hearing in person or through a representative. The impugned order of the Collector of Customs of 12‑9‑1966 shows that the petitioners participated in the proceedings through their representative and according to para. 3, he had nothing to say. Furthermore, in their appeal and the two revision applications filed against the impugned order of the Collector of Customs the petitioners did not make any grievance of the fact that they had not been heard. Therefore, Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, the learned Deputy Attorney‑General, correctly pointed out that this objection was simply as an afterthought, having not been raised at any stage of the proceedings before the respondents. In any case, we are satisfied that the principles of natural justice were fully observed in this case as the petitioners participated in the proceedings before the Collector of Customs without claiming the right to cross‑examine the witnesses or raising any objection to the manner in which the investigation was conducted. On the contrary they appeared to have relied on the evidence taken during the course of investigation and consequently it is difficult to appreciate as to how they could properly object that it was recorded in their absence. Mr. A. Aziz also faintly argued that in passing the impugned order the Collector of Customs had not applied his own mind to the facts of the case as he simply appeared to have accepted the findings of the investigating agency. We find no force in this contention either. The impugned order of the Collector of Customs clearly shows that while deciding the case he was not only cognizant of the facts and the evidence on record but also of the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act. In fact, according to para. 4 of his order, he had carefully gone through the record of the case which position must be accepted nothing has been shown to the contrary except for the bare allegation of the petitioners. However, we are conscious of the fact that while appreciating the evidence he came to the same conclusion, as that of the investigating agency, but surely it could not mean that his conclusion was not the product of his own mind. For all these reasons we find no force in this petition which is dismissed with costs. We would now proceed to examine the other two petitions filed by the same petitioner Muhammad Yousuf. We have already mentioned the facts of these petitions in the earlier part of this Judgment which may not be re‑produced. The grounds upon which the impugned sections of the respondents have been challenged in both these petitions are (1) That section 3(i) or (iii) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, or section 19 or section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, had no application to the facts of these cases. (2) That the petitioners were never called upon to show cause under section 167 (8)(b) of the Sea Customs Act. (3) That the seizure of the car, in Petition No. 545/1967, was illegal as no prior notice was given to its owner. (4) That the seizure of the goods, the arrest of the petitioners, the adjudication proceedings and the consequent impugned orders were without lawful authority and of no effect. We have already considered the first‑objection in great detail, while disposing of Petition No. 229/1968, and found it without force. For the same reasons we feel that the present objection must be rejected. In regard to the second objection Mr. Mirza, the Law Officer of the Customs House, Karachi stated in para. 20 of his counter affidavit that the goods were confiscated under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and not under subsection (8)(b) which was inadvertently typed in the order. This explanation appears to be plausible as the petitioner was found to be in possession of the contraband goods which could only be seized under section 167(81) of the Act and not under subsection (8)(b) of that section which envisages the seizure of goods imported into or exported from Pakistan contrary to the prohibition or restriction imposed by or under the Sea Customs Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned action had been taken in violation of the principles of natural justice. Admittedly in both the cases he was given a show‑cause notice by the Collector of Customs to which he replied and also participated in the proceedings. Similarly he filed appeal and revision applications against the impugned order of the Collector in which he was heard and therefore the objection appears to be without force. In regard to the third objection the petitioner was pointedly asked in show‑cause notice to explain as to why car No. KAE‑7447, from which the contraband goods were recovered should not be confiscated. In his reply of the 8th July 1966, and in his appeal and revision applications against the impugned order, the petitioner did not raise any objection that the car was not his property. In this view, the car in question was properly seized under the provisions of section 168 of the Sea Customs Act as it was found to contain the contraband goods. Apart from this position, there is no provision in section 168 of the Sea Customs Act, that before the car was to be seized and confiscated, notice was to be issued to its owner. Furthermore, the alleged owner of the car does not appear to have intervened into the proceedings at any stage nor is he a party to this petition. Therefore, the present petitioner, according to whom the car belongs to some one else, cannot be heard on behalf of the alleged owner who is not before us. The last objection, which is raised in both the petitions, is grounded on the allegations that the search carried out by the respondents, the consequent seizure of the goods,, the adjudication proceedings and the impugned orders were illegal, without lawful authority and in disregard of the provisions of law and the principles of natural justice. However, no facts have been mentioned in the petitions to show as to how the impugned orders were illegal or without lawful authority. This lacuna was attempted to be abridged by Mr. Muzzafar Hassan, the learned counsel for the petitioner who, during the course of the arguments contended that the search for the contraband goods was carried out in disregard of the provisions of sections 172 and 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act and consequently the entire proceedings, including the impugned orders, were vitiated. In support he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court Collector of Customs and others v. S. M. Yousuf and others (1968 S C M R 603). As we have already pointed out, in the earlier part of this judgment, that if the Customs Authorities desire to search any premises on the belief that dutiable or prohibited goods are M secreted therein then they will have to comply with the provisions of sections 172 and 172‑A. However, these sections will have no application to cases in which, without the necessity of a search, contraband goods are found by the Customs Authorities either at the pointing out of the person who possesses them or the goods are so displayed which could be conveniently seen by any one. In a situation, such as this, the question of "search" would be not only irrelevant but altogether unnecessary. In ibis view, the contraband goods be liable to seizure under sections 178 and 179 of the Sea Customs Act pending adjudication proceedings and their ultimate confiscation or otherwise. This being our view in regard to the application of sections 172 and 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act, let us now examine the case of the petitioner to see if he could properly assail the impugned orders of the respondents for lack of conformity with the provisions of these sections. The case of the petitioner, as set out in paras. 4, 8 and 9 of the Petitions is as follows

4. Petition No 544/1967.‑That the petitioner purchased these goods from the dealers who purchased it from the city Court auctions in the month of November 1965 and obtained valid receipts from the said sellers. The goods were openly exhibited for sale in the shop of the petitioner and being sold to the public, Government officials and officers of the Customs Department in the normal course of business. "

8. Petition No. 545/1967.‑On or about 18th April 1966, the petitioner bought 400 Cartons, i.e. 8,000 cigarettes which were lawfully imported into Pakistan under the Passengers Baggage (Import) Rules, 1958 and took the same in the car of one Iqbal to his house with the intention to take these to the shop after rest.

9. When the petitioner started for the shop some members of the Customs Intelligence, staff whom he had earlier seen at the port met him in the way, stopped the car and asked for the cigarettes which were in the booth of the car. The petitioner told them that these were still there." It will have been noted that according to his own showing the goods, which were seized from the petitioner, were partly openly displayed in his shop and partly recovered from his car of which, according to him, the raiding staff of the Customs was already aware. Obviously therefore it was not the type of case in which a search was either required or carried out within the meaning of sections 172 and 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act. In fact, the goods being admittedly of prohibited nature came within the mischief of the notification under section 3(3) of the Import Export Act, 1950 and all the provisions of the Sea Customs Act and were liable to seizure under section 178 of the Act pending the adjudication proceedings by the Customs Authorities. In this view, the onus laid on the petitioner, under section 177‑A of the Act, to prove that the goods had not been imported into the country in violation of the prohibition or restriction imposed by the 'notification under the Act of 1950. It is an admitted position that after the goods were seized the petitioner was given show‑cause notices to which he replied. It is also an admitted position that he participated in the proceedings at all stages and also filed appeal and revisions against the original orders confiscating his goods. Therefore it cannot be contended that the principles of natural justice were violated nor can it be said that the impugned orders of the respondents were without lawful authority. I Apart from this position Mr. Mirza, the Law Officer of the Customs Department, alleged in para. 5 of his counter‑affidavit, that before the petitioner's shop was searched statement under section 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act was prepared and its copy offered to him which he refused to accept. He further alleged that the said copy was then left in his shop along with a copy of Mashirnama of the seized goods. The petitioner did not specifically deny these allegations in his affidavit in rejoinder. Furthermore both the petitioners are silent in regard to the grievance on this score and it must, therefore, be presumed that the version of the respondents is correct although under the circumstances it was not necessary to resort to that procedure as the existence of contraband goods came to be known without the necessity of a search as contemplated by section 172‑A of the Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court, upon which reliance was placed is wholly distinguishable. In that case the Customs Authorities had searched the business premises of the respondents without complying with the provisions of section 172‑A of the Sea Customs Act and seized some cloth of foreign origin. Upon a petition filed in the High Court, the action of the Collector of Customs was struck down being without lawful authority, and it was ordered that the goods be returned to the respondents. In purported compliance with this order the goods were loaded in trucks, to be made over to the respondents, but before they were actually delivered the Collector re‑seized them under section 178 of the Sea Customs Act. Upon these facts the Supreme Court of Pakistan came to the conclusion that the re‑seizure of the goods under section 178 of the Act stultified the orders of the High Court and the same was unlawful. In reaching this conclusion their Lordships observed that "If the construction placed by the Department on that section is accepted the safeguards provided by the Legislature in sections 172 and 172‑A would be rendered completely nugatory." While agreeing with this conclusion, by which we are respectfully bound, we do not see how does it help the petitioner. Unlike the present case, the facts in that case were that the Customs Authorities were not aware of the existence of contraband cloth for which they had to search the premises of the respondent. In this view, the provisions of section 172‑A of the Act were clearly attracted and since they were disregarded the action of the Collector of Customs was clearly without lawful authority. It was in this background that the Supreme Court highly disapproved the re‑seizure of the goods under section 178 of the Act. Mr. Muzzafar Hassan, the learned counsel lastly contended that the petitioner had produced cogent evidence before the respondents that he had acquired the goods lawfully and consequ ently the impugned action could not be properly taken. The attempt of the learned counsel appeared to be to persuade us to re‑appraise the evidence to see if the impugned action was justi fied, but surely this course is not open to us in these proceedings for the well‑known principle that the conclusions of the authorities in matters which by law have been entrusted to their jurisdiction, could not be interfered with so long as there was some evidence in support of such conclusions. It is not the case of the petitioner that it was a case of no evidence and consequently this Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned action of the respondents. Even otherwise the petitioner does not appear to have any case on merit. His contention before the respondents was that he had acquired a part of the goods from one Muhammad Arif, who had earlier purchased them in an auction at the City Court, Karachi and a part from bona fide passengers. In support of his contention he produced various receipts before the respondents which on scrutiny were found not to cover a part of the goods. The further conclusion of the respondents was that the petitioner had failed to produce any satisfactory evidence to show that he had purchased a part of the goods from bona fide passengers. They also disbelieved the petitioner that he had purchased some of the goods from one Muhammad Arif as, according to them, the goods seized from the petitioner were altogether fresh while the goods which were auctioned at the City Court about three and a half months earlier were from an old stock. These findings of the respondents, based as they are on proper evidence, were not open to interference by us while exercising jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that on re‑appraisal of the evidence on record we might have come to a different conclusion. Mr. Muzaffar Hassan also faintly argued that the respondents have wrongly placed the onus on the petitioner to prove that the goods had not been imported into the country in, contravention of the notification under section 3(3) of the Import Export Act, 1950. We find no force in this contention either. It is an admitted position that the goods were of foreign origin and their import into the country was prohibited. Therefore, according to section 177‑A of the Sea Customs Act, it was the burden of the petitioner to prove that the goods in question had not been imported into the country unlawfully and further that no act was committed in relation to those goods so as to defraud the Government of any duty payable on them. In view of these conclusions, we find no force in these petitions, which are dismissed with cost. S. Q. Petition dismissed.