P L D 1969 Lahore 338 (PLP)

SHAMEEM HUSSAIN KADRI, J.‑This is an appeal by MR. Khan Bibi against the judgment of the learned Administrative Civil Judge 1st Class, Multan, dated the 22nd January 1962, whereby he granted a preliminary decree to the plaintiff for possession by partition of 4/13th share in House No. 2396‑B‑IX, situated in Mohallah Sultani outside Loharigate, Multan City, and dismissed her suit regarding House No. 2430‑B‑IX.

2. The facts of the case are that one Abdur Rahim, who was Sunni Muslim, died leaving his another, a widow and two sisters. The pedigree‑table given in the plaint is reproduced as below:‑ Abdul Qadir Khan ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑Mst. Murad | Khatoon | (Deft. No. 3) ______________________________|______________ | | | | | | | | | | | | Mst. Satia Begum | Mst. Hayat Bibi Mst. Khan Bibi | (Deft. No. 2) Plaintiff | Abdur Rahim Khan

3. Mst. Khan Bibi, who is sister of the deceased, brought a suit for possession by way of partition of the three houses, namely, Houses Nos. 1 and 2, their common number being 2480‑B‑IX and another House No. 2396‑B‑IX, situated in Mohalla Sultani outside Lohari gate, Multan city. It was claimed that the first two houses were the ancestral property. while the third house was purchased by Abdur Rahim on 27‑3‑1941, by registered sale‑deed, Exh. P. 3, The plaintiff claimed 4/13th share as sister of the deceased, a similar share (4/13th) was prescribed for Mst. Hayat Bi, defendant No. 2, another sister of the deceased, while 3/13th was provided in the plaint for Mst. Safia Begum, defendant No. 1, and 2/13th share for Mst. Murad Khatoon, defendant No. 3, mother of deceased Abdur Rahim. These shares are, however, not disputed.

4. The suit was resisted by defendant‑respondent No.

1. She raised several objections and claimed that at the time of the death of Abdur Rahim, the houses mentioned at Nos. 1 and 2 of the plaint were not the property of the deceased. These houses were given to her by the deceased during his lifetime.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues :‑ (i) Is the pedigree‑table as embodied in para. 1 of the plaint correct ? If not, what is the correct pedigree‑table ? O. P. (ii) Did Khan Abdur Rahim deceased make a gift of two houses mentioned in paras. 1 and 2 of the relief clause of the plaint in favour of defendant No. 1 and has she become a full ewer of these houses ? O. D. No. 1. (iii) Is defendant No. I in possession of the first two houses in the capacity of a limited owner 7 O. P. (iv) Has defendant No. 1 acquired an adverse title on the property in dispute by prescription ? O. D. No. 1. (v) If Issues Nos. 2 and 3 are proved against defendant No. 1, what is the share of the plaintiff in the house in dispute ? (vi) Is defendant No. I estopped, by her conduct, from raising the plea that the property in dispute is not partiable ? O. P. (vii) Relief.

6. Munshi Allah Bakhsh Draftsman appeared as P. W. 1 and stated that he prepared the plans of the property L. C. 1 and L. C. 2, after visiting the spot. Ghulam Qadir Khan (P. W. 2), a son of the plaintiff, who is also her attorney, also entered the witness‑box in support of her claim. The following documents were produced by the plaintiff. Exh. P. 1, the pedigree‑table and Exh. P. 2, plan of the houses submitted in the suit filed by the plaintiff which was subsequently withdrawn by her. Exh. P. 3, sale‑deed of the house purchased by Abdur Rahim deceased from Ahmad Niwaz Khan on the 27th March 1941, Exh. P. 4, an order dated 21‑1‑1954, passed in suit brought by Mst. Safia Begum, Exh. P. 5 is the last order passed by Court on the plaint of Mst. Hayat Bibl against Mst. Safia Begum widow of Abdur Rahim deceased. This suit was dismissed for non‑prosecution on 11‑5‑1954.

7. The defendants' evidence consists of as many as 11 witnesses. Abdur Rahim (D. W. 1) is the son of the marginal witness Muhammad Akram in the gift‑deed, Exh. D. 1, executed in favour of defendant Mst. Safia Begum. He proved the signatures of his father and stated that the house in dispute was in possession of Mst. Safia Begum for the last 8 or 10 years. Agha Muhammad Yousaf (D. W. 2) is the son of the scribe of document Exh. D.

1. He stated that the register maintained by his father was in his custody and the gift‑deed, Exh. D. 1 was entered in the register at serial No. 4430. Abdur Rashid Deed. writer (D. W. 3) deposed that he wrote Exh. D. 2, a rent‑deed, on behalf of Muhammad Ashraf in favour of Mst. Safia Begum defendant. Muhammad Habib‑ur‑Rahman (D. W. 4) proved that his father was the scribe of rent‑deed Exh. D.

3. He identified the signatures of his father and stated that the rent‑deed dated the 24th October 1942, was entered in the register kept by his father at serial No.

364. Mian Nur Din (D. W. 5) proved the execution of Exh. D. 4 a rent‑note, executed by him in favour of Mst. Safia Begum in respect of shop in his possession. Syed Saeed Ahmad Shah (D. W. 6) stated that he was residing in House No. 2430, outside Loharigate, Multan City as a tenant of Mst. Safia Begum and was paying rent to her. Muhammad Ashraf (D. W. 7) admitted to have executed rent‑deed, Exh. D. 2, in favour of Mst. Safia Begum in respect of House No. 2396. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan (D. W. 8), brother of defendant Mst. Safia Begum, appeared as her special attorney in support of her case. Allah Bakhsh (D. W. 9) witnessed sale‑deed, Exh. P. 3, by which house was purchased by Abdur Rahim (deceased). Noor Muhammad (D. W. 10), a cousin of the deceased, stated that the heirs of deceased Abdur Rahim lived in the house for about 12. years and thereafter Rahim Niwaz Khan Mukhtar of Mst. Safia Begum, took the possession of the house and it was let on rent to Muhammad Ashraf. SahibzaJa Nusrat All Advocate, Multan appeared as D. W.

11. He stated that plaint dated 18‑5‑1953 (Mst. Safia Begum v. Mst. Hayat BIN and others) bears his signatures. A certified copy of replication dated the 14th November 1954, Exh. D. 6. also bears his signatures. He also admitted to have made the statement Exh. D. 7. dated the 25th January 1951 in Civil Suit No. 358 of 1953. He admitted Exh. D. 8. a correct copy of written statement dated 26th August 1953. According to him, he represented Mgt. Safia Begum in the case and the original written statement bears his signatures.

8. The following documents were produced by the defendants. Exh. D. 1, gift‑deed executed by Abdur Rahim on 29‑11‑1939. Exhs. D. 2 to D. 4, different rent‑deeds executed by the tenants in favour of Ms:. Safia Begum. Exit. D. 5, COPY of the plaint in the suit, and Exh. D. 6, replication in Suit No. 358 of 1953. Exh. D. 7, statement of the counsel in the Suit Exh. D. 8, written statement of defendant No. 1 in an earlier Suit No. 358 of 1953. Exh. D. 9, written statement of Mst. Hayat Bibi and Exh. D. 10, written‑statement of Mst. Khan Bibi in Suit No.

358. Exh. D. II is the copy of the written statement of Mst. Murad Khatoon and Exh. D. 12 is a copy of the plaint of Mst. Hayat Begum.

9. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff regarding House No. 2430‑B‑IX, but decreed her suit in respect of House No. 2396‑B‑IX, situated in Mohallah Sultani outside Lohartgate, Multan City. It was held that the property was gifted in favour of Mst Safia Begum by Abdur Rahim and was no more the property of the deceased at the time of his death.

10. A reference to the gift‑deed, Exh. D. 1, will show that Abdur Rahim deceased before marrying the defendant‑respondent, Mst. Safia Begum, made a gift of the house in her favour on 28‑11‑1939. The gift‑deed was written by Ab:iul Aziz Khan deed‑writer and was witnessed by Abdul Qadus Khan son of Abdul Wahid Khan and Muhammad Akram Khan son of Haji Muhammad Rab Nawaz Khan. The document was, however, registered on 29‑11‑1939. Abdur Rahim was identified by Munshi Sher Muhammad Khan, Reader of the Court on criminal side, before the Sub‑Registrar who admitted the execution of the said deed.

11. Sheikh Ghias Muhammad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the gift made by the deceased, Abdur Rahim, was only that right residence in the house for Mst. Ghulam Safia during her lifetime, i.e. the gift was not for the corpus but for its usufruct only and that only a portion and not the entire house was meant for that purpose. In these circumstances, it is contended, the property could not be excluded from distribution among the heirs of Abdur Rahim. The above submission can only be dealt with, while looking into the document which is printed on page 34 of the paper book, and some of the salient features of which are as under : ‑‑ "After giving the description of the residential house, the deceased intended to convey the right of residence for lifetime of Mgt. Ghulam Safia. It was further mentioned that she may keep the house in her possession and use in any manner she likes, and during her lifetime: he or his heirs will have no right to interfere with her possession. It was also mentioned that so long as the wife lives, he will not be entitled to transfer the house or to dispossess her. Similarly, she will have no right to alienate mortgage or gift the property to any one. While concluding the document, it is mentioned, "after the death of the lady, the property in ‑question will be considered to be the property of Abdur Rahim or his heirs." Both the contentions were resisted by the learned counsel for the respondent, who claimed that the gift in question is "Umeri". The gift is valid and the 'conditions attached to it are void, and the property has rightly been excluded‑ by the learned trial Court from distribution amongst the heirs of Abdur Rahim.

12. Mr. M. B. Zaman, learned counsel for the respondent, referred to the following books in support of his contention :‑ (i) Hedaya by Charles Hamilton, page 489, which is reproduced as under :‑ "An Amree, or life‑grant, is lawful to the grantee during his life; and descends to his heirs, because of the tradition before quoted. Besides, the meaning of Amree is a gift of a house (for example) during the life of the donee, on condition of its being returned upon his death.‑The conveyance of the house, therefore, is valid. without any return ; and the condition annexed is null, because the prophet has sanctioned the gift in this instance, and annulled the condition, as before mentioned. An Amree, moreover, is nothing but a gift and a condition ; and the condition is invalid ; but a gift is not rendered null by involving an invalid condition, as has been already demons trated." . (ii) A Digest of Mohammadan Law by B. E: Bailie, page 546, which reads as follows :‑ "All `our' masters are agreed that when one has made a gift and stipulated for a condition that is fasid, or invalid, the gift is valid and the condition void ; as if one should give another a female slave, and stipulate that he shall not sell her, or shall make her an com-i-wulud; shall sell her to such an one to the give after a month,' the gift would be valid, and all the conditions void. Or if one should give a mansion, or bestow it in alms, on condition `that the donee shall restore some part of it,' or give some part of it in lwuz, or or exchange the gift would be lawful and the condition void. It is general rule with regard to all contracts which require seisin, such as gift and pledge, that they are not invalidated by vitiating conditions." (iii) Saeeh Muslim, Vol. 11, page

987. Hadiths Nos. 100, 102 and 105 read in the following words :‑ But Hadith No. 101, which is also reproduced below specifically goes against him :‑ (iv) From Mishkot Sharif, published by Muhammad Saeed & Sons, Hadiths Nos. 2877, 2878, 2879 and 2883, were referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention, which read as follows :‑‑ Hadith No. 2880, which is mentioned below, however, does not support his contention :‑ (v) Section 444 of Muhammadan Law by Tyabji (3rd Edition) is reproduced as under :‑ "(1) Under Hanafi Law when it is clear that a donor has made a hiba (viz. a present gift of the full and absolute ownership of certain property), and yet the donee's right therein are purported to be restricted for his life (or for any other limited period) or he is prohibited from alienating it, the gift operates absolutely ; the purported restrictions are invalid, and the donee takes the property not only for his own life with powers of alienation, (by reason of the fact that the transfer is a hiba) he takes such an interest in the property that after his death it devolves upon his heirs. (2) It is submitted that a Hanafi Muslim may grant without considera tion rights in property owned by him, which rights would constitute what is in English law called a life‑estate. The technical form required under Hanafi law for making such a grant is to grant to the donee the usufruct and or similar rights in the property for life. When the intention is clear to make a grant of such tights and no other, the Court will (it is submitted) as far as possible' carry out the intention of the parties. In any case where it is clear that only a life interest is intended to be granted, it will not be expanded into an absolute interest * * * * * * * * * * * *" (vi) Section 164 of the Principles of Mohammadan Law by D. F. Malla is illustrated as under :‑ " Gift with a condition.‑When a gift is made subject to a condition which derogates from the completeness of the grant, the condition is void, and the gift will take effect as if no con dition were attached to it."

13. In order to examine the complicated question of law involved in this case, the following case‑law has been reviewed, before us by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent. In Mst. Hameeda and others v. Mst. Budlun and the Govern ment (17 Suth. W R 525) their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as under :‑ "The Privy Council reversed so much of the decision of the High Court as ruled that the effect of the arrangement between the plaintiff and her son, by which the son relinquished his share in his late father's property, was not that Vie mother took an absolute interest in the property in satisfaction of her claim for unpaid dower, but that she should have only a life‑interest, the son retaining the legal reversion in himself ; the Privy Council being of opinion that the creation of such a life‑estate did not seen to be consistent with Muhammadan usage, and that there caught to be very clear proof (which had not been shown in this case) of a transaction so unusual and so improbable amongst Mohammedans." In Abdul Ghafur and others v. Nizamudin and others (19 I A 170) there was an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay which involved the following two questions :‑ (i) settlement of the property of a Muslim on his heirs one after the other popularly known as Wakf‑al‑aulad, and (ii) as to whether the will created life estate or full owner ship in the circumstances. The observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council on page 178 are as under :‑ "Their Lordships do not think the appellants would take any benefit from the document of 1838 if it were construed as the will of Karimuddin. It was plainly not his intention to create a series of life‑rents, a kind of estate which does not appear to be known to Mohammedans law (see Humeedan and others v. Budlun and the Government 17 Suth. W. R. 525), but to make the fee devolve from one generation of his descendants to another without its being alienable by them, or liable to be taken in execution for their debts. Even if Tahira Bibi had expressly consented to accept the will, she would not have been the owner of a life estate, but a full owner, with a prohibition against alienation, which, being void in law, could not affect either herself or her creditors." In Prince Suleman Kadr v. Darab Ali Khan (8 I A 117) which was a case of Shia Muslim involving a limited interest created by the late King of Oudh from the Income of the Government Promlsory notes, the judgment was delivered by Sir Robert P. Collier. His Lordship at page 121 observed as under :‑ " . . ; but when their Lordships proceed further, and find that the Queen desires that the expenses of the imambara shall be paid, without specifying out of what fund‑and indeed it is but natural to suppose that for a purpose of that sort she would be disposed to appropriate her general estate and when it is found that the sum of no less than Rs. 214.7a. lp. is part of this Rs. 644 which has been mentioned as being a third of the Rs. 1,933, it appears to their Lordships that, taking these portions of the will together, the bequest of the Rs. 644. 7a. lp. cannot be treated as appropriated entirely, as far as payment is concerned, to that particular sum of Rs. 1,

933. The mention of its being a third of Rs. 1,933 appears to their Lordships on the whole to amount to no more than a statement of her belief that that was the proportion which all the sums mentioned in the schedule bore to her annuity from the Government notes, but did not amount to a specified limitation of the payment from that sum. This being so, and the rest of the estate being admittedly sufficient to pay all these legacies, the case is disposed of in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, their Lordships think it right to guard themselves against it being supposed that they assent to the proposition that, even if this had been a specific legacy payable out of the specific fund mentioned, it would have been invalid. Their Lordships are by no means satisfied that the gift to this lady of these Government promissory notes subject to a condition that she is to have the interest only for life, and that after her death there is to be a trust in perpetuity for all her heirs to all time, is not according to Muhammadan Law, in its legal effect a gift to her absolutely, the condition being void. However, without determining a point which is not necessary for the decision of the case, their Lord ships think it enough to say that; for the reasons which they have given they will humbly advise Her Majesty that this judgment should be affirmed, and this appeal dismissed with costs. In Abdullah v. Mohammad ((1905) 7 Born. L R 306) it was held that the creation of life estate is inconsistent with the Muslim law. This was a case between Khojas and the law applicable in their case should have been Shia law, which admits the creation of life estates. In Muhammad Shah v. Official Trustee of Bengal ((1909) 36 Cal. 431) by the deed in that suit the plaintiff took life interest while the remainder had to go to some other persons, it was held that it was void under the Mohammedans Law. In Arnjad Khan v. Ashrof Khan and others (A I R 1925 Oudh 508) question of conditional gift in favour of a Pardanashin lady was considered by Wazir Hasan and Ashworth, A. J. Cs. Both the learned Commis sioners differed and their observations are reproduced as under :‑ "Per Ashworth, A. J. C. (Wazir Hasan, A. J. C. dissenting).‑ The owner of an estate may retain what is virtually a life estate, but he cannot transfer anything more than a more use. If he purports to transfer something more than the use, namely, a use which is not revocable during the term for which is granted, and which can be lent or leased to another or otherwise alienated, he will be held to have transferred not only the use, but also the corpus. Under Muhammadan Law, a life estate can only be created by reservation after the transfer of the corpus. It cannot be created by transfer to another whether the corpus is retained or not by the donor. The gift of a life estate will be construed as a gift of an absolute estate. For a gift by a husband to a wife who is not a minor some act of delivery of possession other than the mere declaration fn the deed that possession has been given is necessary. Per Wazir Hasan, A. J. C.‑Where the object of the gift is to accelerate the operation of a previous will, the donor stands in the relation of husband to the donee, the donee is a Pardanoshin lady, the subject‑matter of the gift in her favour is an interest in the property and not the corpus of it, the husband and the wife live amicably together so long as the former is alive, and in the deed of gift the donor makes a declaration to the effect that has put the lady donee in possession of the property, the lady should be held to acquire such possession as the nature of the property gifted to her is capable of and the gift should be held to be completed." This case went up to the Privy Council and their Lordships approved the judgment of Sir Wazir Hasan, A. J. C., in Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and others (A I R 1929 P C149) with the following observa tions at pages 151 and 152:- "The material question then is what is the true construction of the deed. The intention of the donor is to be ascertained by reading the terms of the deed as a whole, and giving to them the natural meaning of the language used. Their Lordships, basing their decision on the terms of the deed, are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judicial Commis sioner, Mr. Wazir Hasan, on this part of the case is correct, and that Mst. Waziran acquired merely a life‑interest. In the property under the deed of 17th January 1905, together with a power of alienation over one‑third of the property. The donor by the terms of the deed purported to make a gift without consideration to his wife of the entire property detailed therein : he divided the property into two parts, one- third and two‑thirds, with a view to giving his wife a power to alienate the one‑third of the property or any part thereof by way of mortgage, sale or gift. The words used in connexion with the power of alienation point to the donor contemplating a possible alienation by his wife during her lifetime of the one‑third or part thereof. It was further provided that after the death of the donee "the entire property gifted away by this document" should revert to the donor's collaterals named therein. It is to be noted that the provision as to reversion is not limited to the two‑thirds over which the wife was to have no power of alienation, but it related to the "entire property gifted away by this document." The "entire property" was to revert to the collaterals, but it would, of course, be subject to any mortgage, sale or gift which the wife had power to make during her lifetime in respect of the one‑third part of the property mentioned in the deed. Reading the deed of 17th January 1905, as a whole and giving effect to all the terms thereof, their Lordships are of opinion that it does afford clear proof that the donor intended to make and did make a gift to his wife of a life‑interest only in the entire property comprised in the deed together with the above‑mentioned power of alienation in respect of one‑third of the property." In Nawazish Ali Khan v. Ali Raza Khan (A I R 1948 P C 134) it was held as under :‑ "In General, Muslim law draws no distinction between real and personal property, and it does not recognise the splitting up of ownership of land into estates, distinguished in point of quality like legal and equitable estates, or in point of duration like estates in fee simple, in tail, for life, or in remainder. What Muslim law does recognise and insist upon, is the distinction between the corpus of the property itself (ayn) and the usufruct in the property manafi over the corpus of property the law recognises only absolute dominion heritable, and unrestricted in point of time : and where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion the condition is rejected as repugnant ; but interests limited in point of time can be created in the usufruct of the property and the dominion over the corpus takes effect subject to any such limited interests. This distinction runs all through the Muslim Law of gifts‑gifts of the corpus (hiba), gifts of the usufruct (ariyat) and usufructuary bequests. No. doubt where the use of a house is given to a man for his life he may, not inaptly, be termed a tenant for life, and the owner of the house, waiting to enjoy it until the termination of the limited interest, may be said, not inaccurately, to possess a vested remainder. But though the same terms may be used in English and Muslim law, to describe much the same things, the two systems of law are based on quite different conceptions of ownership. English Law recognises ownership of the land limited in duration. Muslim law admits only ownership unlimited in duration, in the use of property. There is no difference between the several Schools of Muslim law in their fundamental conception of property and ownership. A limited interest takes effect out of the usufruct under any of the Schools In dealing with a gift under Muslim law, the first duty of the Court is to construe the gift. If it is a gift of the corpus, then any condition which derogates from absolute dominion over the subject of the gift will be rejected as repugnant ; but if upon construction, the gift is held to be one of limited interest the gift can take effect out of the usufruct, leaving the ownership of the corpus unaffected except to the extent to which its enjoyment is postponed for the duration of the limited interest." Mr. M. B. Zaman, then cited Annamalay Chetty v. Shaikh Mahomed Ismail and others (A I R 1914 L B 152 (2)) in which it was held :‑ "The creation of a life estate is inconsistent with the Muhammadan Law, and where a life estate is attempted to be created the donee takes an absolute estate. Learned Judges of the Lower Burma High Court considered amongst others the following cases in coming to the above conclusion :‑ (i) Mst. Humeeda v. Mst. Budlun (1872) 17 W R 525 (ii) Suleman Kader v. Dorab Ali Khan 8 I A 117 (P C) (iii) Abdul Ghafur v. Nizamudin 19 I A 170 (P C) (iv) Abdul Wahid Khan v. Mst. Nuran Bibi 12 I A 91 (P C) (v) Umes Chunder Sircar v. Mat. Zahoor Fatima 17 I A 201(P C) Mr. Zaman referred to Bai Saroobai v. Hussein Somji and others (A I R 1936 Born. 330) a Full Bench case, and relied on the judgment of Rangnerkar, J. who dissented with the other two Judges of that Court. The majority verdict was that under Sunni Muhammadan Law a gift of a life interest is valid, but it does not become automatically enlarged into a gift of the corpus of the property absolutely. Rangnekar, J. who also discussed a number of Privy Council cases in support of his view came to the contrary conclusion.

14. In Naziruddfn and others v. Kharat All (A I R 1938 Oudh 51) it was held:- "A bequest for a limited period or the bequest of a life estate or the usufruct of property for a fixed period is valid and such a bequest does not operate as an absolute bequest. The rule of Muhammadan Law stated in the texts (namely that a condition repugnant to a gift is void) is restricted to cases where the subject‑matter of the gift is the entire physical property, and is inapplicable to a case where it is a limited interest in the property and should not be extended to the later class of cases. Areeat under the Muhammadan law for a fixed period being valid, it follows that the gift of the usufruct of property for the lifetime of the donees is valid as areeat though it would not be included in the term Hiba. The same question was also considered by the Judicial Commis sioner's Court of Peshawar in Mst. Inayat Begum v. Mst. Maryam Bibi and another P L D 1953 Pesh. 1, wherein it was held :‑ There is no substantive or positive rule of the Hanafi School of Muslim Law preventing the creation of a life‑interest in property. If a person granted the lease of certain property in favour of his four daughters, and that lease was to subsist till the lifetime of these four girls, it could not be said that the lease was against any law much less the Hanafi Law, even though the consideration was natural love and affection, which is permissible under section 25 of the Contract Act. The creation of life‑interest is nothing more than a lease of a certain property, which is to subsist for the lifetime of the lessee. In such a case the owner does not part with the corpus of the property, but he only grants to another its use and occupation for a specific period, which, cannot on any ground be made subject to any legal objection. If, however, a person gifted away the corpus of certain property in favour of another person but attached a restriction thereto, that the donee would not lie able to alienate it in any way, the restriction would be bad in law and the gift shall operate without the restriction but where life‑interest in a certain property is created in favour of another person, why should effect be not given to the clear intention of the donor." Mr. Asaf A. A. Fyzee in his book `Cases in the Muhammadan Law of India and Pakistan', 1965 Edition, at page 357 refers to a case Anjuman Ara v. Nawab Asif Kader ((1953)2 Cal. 109). According to the author it was held in this case that in the Muhammadan Law of Gifts, corpus must be distinguished from usufruct. Life‑grants are not common in Muhammadan law ; therefore, the deed of gift must be carefully scrutinized as a whole. If there is an absolute gift of the corpus, no questions arise, and the gift will take effect. If there is a limited grant. (a) of the corpus, any restrictive conditions will be deemed to be void, and the deed will take effect as an absolute grant ; (b) but if it is of the usufruct, then the grant is valid. This case dealt with the Ithna Ashri Shiite Law.

15. In Nagoor Ammal v. M. K M. Meeran (A I R 1954 Mad. 770) the learned Judges considered a deed of settlement executed by a Sunni Muhammadan in favour of his second wife. It was mentioned therein :‑ "I have settled upon you for your maintenance the under, mentioned nanja land . . . . . . you should enjoy for your lifetime the income alone from the said nanja land, that you should not m31;c any gift, sale or hypothecation, etc. of the said land, that if you should hereafter have issues by me, the said issue should enjoy the said land hereditarily, and that if you should not have such issue the said property after your lifetime go to me and my heirs." It was held that there was no absolute gift of the corpus in favour of the wife, but it created only a life interest in the income of rite land in tier favour. The ownership of the corpus was left unaffected except to the extent to the extent to which its enjoyment was post poned for the duration of the limited interest in favour of the wife. So on the death of the husband in whom the ownership continued, the succession opened and his heirs succeeded to the Property. In Samir Shaikh v. Aijan Bewa and others (P L D 1956 Dacca 143) a learned Single Judge of that Court considered this question ,.with the following observations: "Under the Muhammadan Law a gift which is subject to a condition and which derogates from the completeness of the grant, the condition becomes void and the gift takes effect as if no condition has been attached to it. But it is equally correct on principle and authority that if the gift is not of an absolute interest with a condition‑ of defeasance, but of a limited interest only, it will be valid: Held on a true construction of the deed of gift in this case a life estate was only created and then a condition was attached to the effect that the gifted property on the death of the donee should revert to the donor or his heirs and legal representatives, and the condition cannot be disregarded and the gift is valid." Held further that under the Muhammadan law a gift of usufruct of the gifted property is valid." Another Division Bench of Madras High Court in Syed Duriesh Mohideen v. Madras State (A I R 1957 Mad. 577) held :‑ "If a donor were to make a condition that the donee should pay an annuity to one of his heirs in perpetuity, and give effect to the donation by transferring the subject thereof to the dominion of the donee, as the condition in no way interferes with the completeness of the gift, both the gift and the condition become operative in law. There is no real basis for the con tention that the only exception to the general rule, that any condition that derogates from the full rights of ownership in property, the corpus, gifted by a Muslim, is a reservation of the usufruct or a portion thereof in favour of the donor. A direction to pay a portion of the usufruct to some one other than the donor and direction to pay it in perpetuity are valid and enforceable obligations." A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of M. A. Ansari and M.A.Ansari and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ. in Shaikh Mastan Bi and others v. Shaikh Kikari Sahab and others (A I R 1958 Andh. Prad. 751) while dealing with the question as to what is Hiba and Ariyat, observed as under :‑ "A Sunni under Hanafi Muhammadan law cannot without consideration convey ownership of the property with limitation for the life of the donee. But where the ownership is vested in somebody and only the enjoyment of the property is conveyed or received, the rule does not apply. Therefore limitation on the enjoyment of property is permissible though it is not allowed on ownership. This separate enjoyment is known as Ariat. A `hiba' has become associated with transfer of owner ship and the several conditions necessary for making valid gifts would not be essential for creating Ariats. Thus in Ariat, it is not necessary for the donor to be of Age, nor that the thing given should not be undivided. It equally follows that the prohibitions concerning what cannot i.e. done by gift would not extend to the rules governing Ariats, for the ownership is not conveyed by the latter transaction. Where only Ariat rights are being conveyed to a person, they can be limited by time." Mr. Justice B. Z. Kaikaus (as he then was) in Wali Muhammad v. Mst. Anwar Sultana (P L D 1958 Lah. 198 at p. 201) observed "A gift of usufruct is known in Muslim Law as Ariyat . . . ." In Mst. Bibi Alam Taj and others v. Mst. Inayat Begum (P L D 1963 Pesh. 199). A Division Beach of this Court held as under at pages 210 and 211 :‑ "From the record, it is abundantly clear that the gift of the property in favour of his wife and four daughters by Qazi Mir Alam was of limited interest, which took effect out of the usufruct and left the ownership of the corpus unaffected except that its enjoyment was postponed for the duration of the limited interest, and so the settlement made by Q. Mir Alam was not against Muhammadan Law and Mst. Maryam Bibi and after her, daughter can claim a share out of the property under the Muhammadan Law."

16. Mr. M. B. Zaman, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that their Lordships of the Privy Council in Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and others (AIR 1929 P C 149) did not decide this question and Nawazish All Khan v. Ali Raza Khan is a case of Shia Muslim and there is divergence of opinion on this question in the different High Courts in Indo‑Pakistan sub‑continent. In Amjad Khan's case, this question although was not directly decided, but their Lordships examined the gift‑deed and held that the donor only intended to make gift of the property in favour of the donee which after his death was to revert to his collaterals, mentioned in the said deed. The inference, therefore, can be drawn that the gift made was that of the usufruct of the property in dispute and not that of its corpus and such a gift is valid under the Hanafi Law. No doubt Nawazish Ali Khan's case was a dispute about the property of Shia Muslim, but the judicial Committee examined the general Muslim Law and came to the conclusion, referred to above, in this judgment. Thus the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has no force. In view of the divergence of opinion on this question in the different High Courts of the Indo‑Pakistan sub‑continent, the learned counsel for the respon dent then argued that the Umeri gift is valid, but the conditions attached to it are void and that the two houses were rightly held by the trial Court at the property of Mst. Ghulam Safia. We are, however inclined to follow the reasoning in the two above mentioned Privy Council cases. Even the two sayings of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) are clearly against the contention of the learned counsel. The consensus of opinion of different authors of Muhammadan Law supports the proposition that where corpus of the property is transferred for lifetime and the conditions are attached thereto, the gift is valid but the conditions are void. However, where the intention of the maker of the gift is to transfer the usufruct of the property then in that case a limited interest is created for a particular to:‑;, and, therefore, conditions can be attached to it such as the reversion of the property to the donor after the expire of toe limited period. Following this principle, we now examine the gift deed in order to answer the question involved in this case. It is abundantly clear that the deceased Abdur Raheem while making the gift had in his mind only the creation of a limited interest in the property, as it has repeatedly been stressed in the deed: "The possession of the donee on the house in question will be up to her lifetime, and so long as she lives the donor will not alienate the house or dispossess her. Similarly, the wife will have no right to mortgage, alienate or gift the property to any one."' At the end of the document, it is mentioned. "After the death of the wife, the whole house will revert to the donor or his heirs in its entirety." In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Mst. Ghulam Safia took the property as an absolute owner. The ownership of the corpus of the house in question was kept by deceased Abdur Raheem and only usufruct was gifted to the wife for her enjoyment during her lifetime. The finding of the learned trial Judge that Mst. Ghulam Safia held the property as an absolute owner cannot, therefore, be sustained in view of the above discussion. We are however told that during the pendency of this appeal, Mst. Ghulam Safia has died and as such the life‑interest created by deceased Abdur Rahim in her favour has, therefore, come to an end and the property reverts to the heirs of Abdur Rahim. As held in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others (AIR 1941 F C 5) and Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmad Din (P L D 1964 S C 106) we take notice of the death of Mst. Ghulam Safia and hold that the life interest created by Abdur Raheem in her favour has come to an and. The property will revert to the donor Abdur Raheem and will be open for distribution amongst his heirs.

17. The second question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that only a certain portion the house in question was gifted by the deceased Abdur Raheem in favour of Mst. Ghulam Safia and not the complete house, has become unnecessary to be decided in this appeal in view of the fact that we have already held that the life interest of Mst. Ghulam Safia in the property gifted has ceased to exist after her death.

18. We are grateful to Mr. M. B. Zaman, learned counsel for the respondent who has ably assisted us in this case.

19. For the reasons given above, he appeal is accepted and the judgment and decree of the trial Court is set aside in regard to the house in question. The property will Case considered to be that of Abdur Raheem and will be distributed amongst his heirs. We, however, make no order as to costs. K. E. CHAUHAN, J.‑‑I respectfully fully agree with the judgment of my learned brother Shamim Husain Kadri, J. How ever, in view of the importance of the point involved in the case I would like to add some words of my own.

2. The mistake committed by the learned Civil Judge in this case was that he did not keep in view as to what was the concept of property under Muhammaden Law and how did it differ from the English Law. Unless the basic features of this difference are maintained and grasped, confusion is likely to arise very often and the decisions in cases are likely to go astray. Before proceeding further, I may, therefore, straight away adver to this difference. Conception of property in English law

3. The English Laws as to rights in property are classified by a Division on the basis of immovable and movable (real and personal) property. Rights in land described as "estate in land" do not always imply only absolute ownership but also rights which fall short of it and are limited to the life of the grantee or otherwise limited in respect of time and duration or use. Property in all these various forms are described as "estate". Ownership of land is thus split up into estates distinguished in point of quality (e. g. into legal and equitable estates) and in point of duration (e.g. estates in fee simple, in tail, for life, or in remainder). Conception of property in Muhammadan Law

4. The Muslim Law does not recognize the splitting up of ownership of land into estates as under the English Law. 1 n general Muslim Law draws no distinction between real and personal property. What the Muslim Law does recognize and insist upon is the distinction between the corpus of the property itself (ayn) and usufruct in the property (manafi). Over the corpus of the property the law recognizes only absolute dominion (heritable and unrestricted in point of time) but interests limited in point of time can be created in the usufruct of the property and the dominion over the corpus takes effect subject to any limited inter ests. This distinction runs allthrough the Muslim Law of gifts

gifts of the corpus (hiba) gifts of the usufruct (ariyat) and usu. fructuary bequests. Limited interests in respect of property are not identical with the incidents of estates under the Egnlish Law. Under the Muhammadan Law they are only usufructuary interests (and not rights of ownership of any kind). Thus, in English law a person having interest in immovable propeity for limited periods of time is said to be the "owner" of the property during these periods. The usufruct is also a part of the corpus. On the other hand in Muslim Law, a person can be said to be an "owner" only if he has full and absolute ownership. Ownership for a limited period is not contemplated at all. If the use or enjoyment of property is granted to a person for life or other limited period such person cannot be said to be an "owner" during that period. The English Law thus recognizes ownership of the land limited in duration while Muslim Law admits only ownership' unlimited in duration but recognise interests of limited duration in the use of the property. The result of the difference between the two concepts

5. The result is that‑ (a) if a gift (or bequest) of the corpus is made it cannot be limited in duration or extent in respect of the corpus. Any such limitation being void) ; (b) but if a gift (or bequest) of the usufruct is made, it may be limited in duration; and (c) the corpus may vest in one person and usufruct in another. (a) Corpus with donee and usufruct for donor:- If the donor transfers the property to the donee and does not retain any dominion over the corpus, a condition that a whole or part of the usufruct would be paid to the donor or would be in his use during his lifetime would be valid. See Nawab Amjad Ally v. Mohumdee Begam (1867) 11 M I A 517 (bequest Shia case) ; for Sunni Case see Zhora Khathun Bibi v. Mahbub Bi v. Abdul Haq Sahib A I R 1943 Mad. 677 ; Mohammad Abdul Ghani Khan and another v. Mst. Fakhr Jahan Begum and others 68 1 C 254 P C Kosim Hussain and another v. Sharif un‑Nissa I L R 5 All. 285 ; Mohamed and another v. Kairum Bivi and others A I R 1954 Mad. 769; Maitheen Beevi Umma v. Ithappiri Varkey A I R 1956 Trav. 268 and K. Veerankutty v. Pathumakutty Umma and others A I R 1956 Mad.

514. This can be demonstrated by further illustrations. If for example A makes a transfer of Government Promissor notes to his son B and endorses them in the name of B and delivers them to him but stipulates that B would pay the recurring income to A during his lifetime the transaction is valid. See Nawab Amjad Ally v. Mohumdee Begam and Suleman Kadr v. Dorab Ali Khan (I L R 8 Cal. 1). Similarly, if A makes a gift to B on the condition that he would reside in the house which is the subject of the gift, this is permissible. See Alla Pichai Tharagana alias Kadir Mira Sahib Tharanagar and others v. Mahomed Moideen Tharaganar and others (23 I C 520 (1)) ands Kandath Veettil Bava alias Avuthala v. Musaliam Veettil Pakrukhatti and others (I L R 30 Mad. 305). Again if A makes a gift to B on the condition that B would maintain A during his lifetime, the transaction is valid. See Jagir Pramanik v. Subid Molla and others (54 I C 378) and Shaikh Ali Jan and others v. Mst. Phaguni (A I R 1950 Pat. 300) where the enforcibility of such a clause was recognized. (b) Corpus with possession to "A" with usufruct for "B" ; The donor may give the corpus with possession to one person and usufruct to another for a limited period. If a donor makes a gift of the corpus and delivers possession to the donee "A", but makes a condition that the income or a part of it shall be given to another person "B", during his lifetime, the gift and conditions are both valid. See Lall Jan v. Muhammad Shaft Khan I L R 34 All. 478 ; Tavakalbhai v. Imatiyaj Begam Javje Nirbanesaheb I L R 41 Bom. 372 and Syed Duriesh Mohideen v. Madras State and others A I R 1957 Mad. 577. (c) Possession to "A" to take usufruct for life and after that corpus to "B". For illustration of such a case reference may be made to Hedaya, page 694 and the case of Mahboobi v. Kampaiah A I R (1955) N U C

705. It may be mentioned that a consider. able confusion existed on this point by mixing up the conception of property in Muhammadan Law with that in English Law. Such grant for life with possession would be considered to be a life‑estate in English Law and A would be the owner of the estate during the limited period. In Muhammadan Law, a limited interest for life for A would take effect only from the usufruct and the corpus would be unaffected as it would vest in B. A would not be an owner even during his lifetime. The confusion in such cases crops up if for instance the interest of A is loosely described as life. estate and that of B as a vested remainder. Definition and various concepts of gift.

6. Gift under Muhammadan Law is a transfer of property or rights by one person to another and it may be of two types from the point of view of its subject‑matter, namely, (a) hiba which is confined only to the transfer of rights of full ownership of the corpus of any property, or (b) ariat, which is the transfer of some limited interest in the benefits, produce, profits, usufruct or in the use of the property (for example of right to reside in a house for a limited period while retaining the ownership of the corpus or a right to fish in a stream, the right to take the produce of a garden, the recurring income of partnership or dividends on shares or interest on Government loan or stock). Some of these related legal concepts have some technical names as well, as for example sukna is a right to reside in a house for life, ruqba is a right to the usufruct for a fixed period and umra is a life grant of the use or usufruct. The distinction between hiba and ariat is very significant and runs throughout the Muslim Law of gifts. If this distinction is kept in view, there will be no difficulty in solving the relevant questions which might arise in that behalf. The salient points of difference between hiba and ariat are mentioned in the form of a table below :‑ S.No. Hiba Ariat 1 The donor must be a person who has attained majority, It is not necessary that he should have attained majority. 2 The subject of the hiba must be the ownership of some property (Mal) (corpus) It is a transfer of use or usufruct (and not ownership). Muslim law recognizes transfer of an interest for life in certain property, but not the transfer the corpus (ownership) for life. 3 A hiba must not be conditional or limited in time. Conditions if attached would be void and the hiba would be valid. It may be subject to condi tions limiting the duration or use.Here conditions are valid and interest of the donee cannot be enlarged into absolute ownership. 4 It must be immediate and not contingent or future. The use or usufruct may relate to a future time. Pro duce (manafi) refers to rights which accrue from day‑to‑day in future. Such produce or use of a thing becomes property particle by particle as it is brought into being. See Hedaya page 478. 5 Rights under a hiba are transferable and heritable. Rights are transferable and heritable (in the absence of an express provision). 6 A hiba is not revocable in some cases It is revocable at the will of the donor. 7 The doctrine of Musha applies. The doctrine of Musha does not apply. 8 Acceptance is necessary to complete a hiba. A hiba may be made to any person (including a juristic person who is in existence and who is capable of holding pro perty or to a child in the womb who is born within six months of the date of hiba. Acceptance is nota condition. An ariat may be to an unborn person provided that he is in existence when the interest is opened out to him. The above discussion will show that in considering the natureof a transaction the English word "gift" is generic and must not be confused with the technical term of Islamic Law hiba and ariat, according to which alone a transaction in a given case should be scrutinised. Life estates and life interests. 7. 'Estate' is a term of art in English law and has a definite meaning in its technical sense. A 'life estate' implies the transfer of a corpus of the property to a certain person with certain limitations as to its use and alienation during his lifetime. In this technical sense of the term, a `life estate' is unknown to' Muhammadan law. As opposed to this, there is a concept of 'life interests' which means the transfer of the usufruct or any other interest in the corpus of a property bestowed on a person for a well‑defined period, namely, the lifetime of the donee. The creation of the life estates is prohibited but not the creation of life interests or interests for life in the usufruct of the property. Life interests may be created (a) by family wakfs (wakfs alal‑Awlad); (b) by wills (wasiyyat bi'l manafi) ; (c) by the rule in Nawab Umjad Ally Khan's case quoted earlier; (d) by the law of Gifts as explained in Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and ((1956) 29 I A 213) Sardar Nawazish Ali Khan's case and (1948 I A 62 ) by Family Settlements (tawrith). It is not my intention to dilate upon the methods hereinbefore mentioned or the incidents of all these transactions and I leave their discussion for some appropriate case which might arise under any of those heads. For facility of refereace. however, I may state that Asaf A. A. Fyzee in his book "Outlines of Muhammadan Law" Third Edition 1964, has dealt with all these concepts in Article 46 at pages 234 to 256 and has opined that limited ownership may be created in Family Settlements which are more of the nature of a contract and are transactions for considerations, rather than a 'Hiba'.

8. After having examined the law on the subject stage is now set for construing the transaction in hand from the gift deed (Exh. D. 1) in this case. This deed reads as follows :‑ A perusal of the above document and especially the portions underlined shows :‑ (a) that the donor did not gift the corpus of the house to the donees (b) the donee was only provided with a right of residence in the house during her lifetime ; (c) the donee eras not given the power to alienate the property : (d) after the death of the donee the house was to revert to the heirs of the donor : (e) the repairs etc., of the house were the responsibility of the donor himself; (f) that the husband of the donee was also to reside with the donee ; and (g) that the interests created for donee were only for her lifetime. The above incidents and the tenor of the deed point out that the transaction through and through was in the nature of arias and not hiba as explained in the earlier paragraphs of my judgment. The learned Civil Judge erred in assuming that the above deed purported to transfer the corpus of the house. Had that been the case, then of course, the conditions would have been void, but as it is, the transaction is merely an ariat and cannot be enlarged and widened in its scope and effect.

9. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent argued that as life estate could not be created in Muhammadan Law, therefore, the a transaction in hand should ire considered to be a hiba of the corpus. The answer is quite simple. The transaction in hand is nest life: estate as understood in English law but only a bestowal of right of residence in the house. The donor did not create a life estate and we therefore, cannot convert a right of residence (sukna) into the transfer of the corpus of the property.

10. Learned counsel cited a number of authorities to show that life estate cannot be created in Muhammadan Law. He referred to Mst. Hameeda and others v. Mst. Badlun and the Government ((1872) 17 W R 525), Abdul Gafur and others v. Nizamudin and others judgment of Rangnekar, J., (as opposed to the other Judge or Judges) in Rasoolbibi v. Yusuf Ajam Piperdi (A I R 1933 Bom. 324) and in Bai Saroobai v. Hussein Somji and others and P. M. P. A. N. Annamalay Chetty v. Shaikh Mahomed Ismail and others and the case cited therein. Leaving aside the view of the Rangnelar J., for the present, if these authorities are read by keeping in view the distinction between hiba (gift of corpus) and ariat (gift of usufruct for life), they do not negative the propositions which I have enunciated earlier. Rather in the later case‑law which has flown on the subject all the aforesaid authorities have been held as to mean what I have said, and as such they can be reconciled by keeping in view the distinction that exists on the two concepts of gifts from the point of view of their subject‑matter. Reference can be unade to larnjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan and others, Nazirud din and another v. Khairat All, Nawazish Ali Khan v. Ali Raza Khan, Amjad Khan v. Ashraf Khan etc., An luraan Ara v. Nawab Arif Kadir Mst. Inayat Begum v. Mst. Maryam Bibi and others, Nagoor Ammal and another v. M. K. M. Meeran and others, Veerunkutty v. Kutti Umma (I L R 1956 Mad. 1004), Syed Duriesh Mohiden v. Madras State, Sheikh Mastan Bi and others v. Shaikh Bikari Sahab and others, Wall Muhammad v. Mst. Anwar Sultana, Mst. Bibi Alam Taj and others v. Mst. Inayat Begum and Samir Shatkh and others v. Aijan Bewa and others. Reference may also be made to the commentaries by various authors on Muhammandan Law, as for example : (1) Muslim Law by Kashi Prasad Saksome (4th) (1963) Edition, Chapter X, Outlines of Muhammadan Law by Asaf A. A. Fyzee (3rd) (1964) Edition, Chapter VIII ;(3) Muhammadan Law by Babu Ram Verma (3rd), (1959) Edition, with Supplement 1962 Chapter XIV , (4) Principles of Muhamma dan Law by Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla Kt., (Fourteenth Edition) 1955 ; (5) Muhammadan Law by Syed Ameer Ali, Chapters I to V, Volume I (Fourth Edition), (1912); (6) Muhammadan Law by Faiz Badruddin Tyabji (3rd Edition), 1940 Chapter IX and especially pages 487 to

530. It is to be mentioned that it were the views of this learned author which ultimately prevailed and were accepted by the Privy Council as well as all the other various High Courts in India and Pakistan. The learned author has dealt with this subject in a very illuminating manner and only a reading of his commentary can do justice to the Sam: and (7) Anglo‑Muhammadan Law by Sir Roland Kayvat Wilson (6th Edition) by A. Yusuf Ali (1930) Chapter X.

11. As regards the views of Rangneker, J., mentioned by me in para. 10 of this judgment suffice it to say that his opinion was not shared by his brother Judge or Judges who adorned the Bench with him in the two Bombay cases mentioned above. Not only that, no Judge either in India or Pakistan has taken that view. Rather in the various autiaorities quoted by me above, all the Courts have taken views contrary to the views of Rangnekar, J. In these circumstances, the pursuation of Mr. M. B, Zaman, learned counsel for the contesting respondent, that I should follow that views of Rangnekar, J., cannot cut any ice.

12. Mr. A. B. Zaman also relied upon a passage occurring at page 489 of Hedaya and a message occurring at page, 546 of Baillie in support of his contention that interests for life cannot be created even in the usufruct of a property. These passages have already been quoted by my learned brother Kadri, J., and were considered in most of the cases mentioned above, wherein it has been held that instead of supporting such a proposition they rather negatived it.

13. Mr. M. B. Zairian lastly referred to precepts Nos. 100, 101, 102 and 105 occurring in Sahi Muslim Volume II at pages 987 to

989. He further referred to precepts Nos. 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880 and 2883 occurring at pages 57 to 59 of Mishkot Sharif Volume II. These precepts have, been quoted in extenso in the judgment of my learned toroulor Kadri, J. Out of these, Precept No. 101 of Sahi Muylirn Volume 11, and Precept No. 2880 of Mishkot Sharif Volume it, support the view that interests for life in a property can be created.

14. Another point sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent was that life‑interests in Shia Law may be permissible; but the same were not permissible in Hanfi Law. Suffice it to say that this contention was negatived by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nawuzish Ali Khan v. Ali Raza Khan where they observed that on this principle there was no difference between the two Schools of thought. Reference on this point can also be made to Mst. Inayat Begum v. Mst. Maryam Bibi and another, Nagoor Ammal and another v. M. K. M. Meeran and others (which are cases of Sunnis). A. E. Appeal accepted,