P L D 1967 Lahore 1231 (PLP)

This case against Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh respondent of having committed Contempt of this Court has arisen in the following circumstances:‑‑On 4‑8‑1967 I heard the habeas corpus Petition, Mst. Begum Bibi v. Muhammad Din etc. (Criminal Miscellaneous No, 3355/67) but after recording the statements of Muhammad Din, the husband of A9st. Mukhtaran Bibi the alleged detenu and that of Mst. Begum Bibi, the petitioner who is the mother of Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, at about 12‑35 p. m., I adjourned the proceedings to 10‑8‑1967 and ordered Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, the alleged detenu to accompany Muhammad Din, her husband till the next date. After this order was announced Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi showed her disin clination to accompany her husband but the order had already been announced and I seeing no harm in her accompanying her husband till the final decision of the petition, directed Muhammad Din respondent to take charge of her. At this stage the respondent who was wearing a black coat and a black tie and whom I then took for an Advocate of this Court stood up and moving forward addressed me in insolent tones saying that I had no other power except that of setting at liberty the alleged detenu and that my order was wrong. I enquired of him as to who he was but without making any direct reply to this query as to what his name was and what right he had to address me respecting the case, he went on reminding me that there were limitations to my power and that my order was not proper. I thereupon said to him "please withdraw" (from the Court room) but he appeared to be in no mood to comply with my direction and went on repeating his criticism of my order. I thereupon told him to leave the Court room. This order also had no effect on him. I thereupon repeated my order that he should get out of the Court room and when I found that this order also had no effect on him and he was still criticising my order at the top of his voice, I said in a raised voice "push him out of the Court room" but I directed nobody in particular to push him out. Eventually, the respondent left the Court room but saying "I am going but I shall not withdraw my remarks". As it was a Friday, when the Court hours are normally up to 12 noon and it was already past 12‑35 p.m., when some of the counsel who were waiting for the turn of their respective cases addressed me as to whether I would be hearing their cases also, I told them that I could not take up their cases for want of time and passed orders and adjourned their cases, some of them to Monday next. Thereafter I rose from the Court room and came into my Chamber. A short time after I had come to my Chamber different persons including Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema, a retired District and Sessions Judge, Mardan Ali, a peon of this Court and Mr. Akbar Sultan, an official of this Court came into my Chamber at short intervals and informed me that the respondent was yet loudly and vehemently criticising my order outside the Court room near the banyan tree. I was further told that the respondent had even incited some of the persons belonging to the side of Mst. Begum Bibi, the petitioner in the habeas corpus Petition to carry off the girl by force in the teeth of my order that she should accompany her husband. It was reported to me by the above‑mentioned persons that the respondent had exhorted the forcible carrying off of the alleged detenu by saying that he would be responsible for the consequences and that it was not till the A. S. 1. of the Police Guard attached to the High Court had appeared on the scene that he had left the compound. When the respondent had interrupted me in the midst of the Court work as mentioned above Mr. Akbar Sultan who was by that time present in the Court room had told me that the respondent who was interrupting me was not competent to address me. He later told me in the Chamber that the name of the respondent was Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh and that this person had been proceeded against previously for appearing in the High Court without being an Advocate of this Court and that he had given an undertaking before a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was one of the members, that he would in future not appear in this Court as a special attorney. As it was quite late already and it was a Friday and the juma prayers time was nearing and also because I did not want to make any order in haste I postponed the matter of issuing notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for committing Contempt of this Court, to the next day. Accordingly, I directed the office on 5‑8‑1967 to issue notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be proceeded against and punished for committing Contempt of this Court. After the notice was drafted in the office, it was issued to the respondent and was served both through the District Magistrate and directly by some official of this Court. On both the notices that were served on the respondent, he acknowledged receipt of notice with the words "received with thanks", apparently in a trifling sarcastic mood. The respondent was informed to appear before this Court on 18‑8‑1967 but the case could not be taken up on that day and was adjourned to 21‑8‑1967. On 21‑8‑1967 after raising a preliminary objection that I should not deal with the case, Mr. Rashid Murtaza Qureshi, learned counsel for the respondent prayed for proceedings being adjourned for a quarter of an hour so that the written statement of the respondent be filed in Court. I adjourned the case for more than half an hour but the learned counsel represented that the written statement had not yet been typed out and that it would require sometime more for its completion. Therefore, the proceedings were adjourned to the following day; viz., 22‑8‑1967. On this day the respondent filed his written statement which is as follows:‑ "The respondent replies to the notice dated 8‑8‑1967 as follows: (1) That the respondent is a respectable member of the Legal Profession and has been appearing in the High Court with special permission. (2) That on 4‑8‑1967, the respondent filed an application under section 498, Cr. P. C. (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 3406 of 1967) fixed at Serial No. 38 before My Lord Mr. Justice Nazeer Ahmad Mahmood. The case was however, transferred to the Bench of Mr. Justice Ata Ullah Sajjad later on. (3) That while the respondent was awaiting his turn a habeas corpus petition (Criminal Miscellaneous 3355 of 1967) was taken up for hearing. (4) That Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi the alleged detenu in the case was ordered by My Lord Mr. Justice Nazeer Ahmad Mabmood to accompany her husband till the next date. The said detenu showed her disinclination to accompany her husband, on which an unseemly scene was created in Court. (5) That his Lordship told the husband of the detenu to take her away notwithstanding her vociferous and forceful remonstrances that she would be murdered by her husband. Thereupon the husband pounced upon the alleged detenu and grappled with her in open Court, so much so that her shirt was torn in the process. (6) That the respondent felt called upon to intercede on behalf of the helpless girl and pointed out to his Lordship in polite tones that the Court had no other power but to set the alleged detenu at liberty. (7) That Mr. Justice Nazir Ahmad Mahmood took exception to the respondent's legitimate and honest criticism of the said order and ordered the respondent to be forcibly thrown out of Court. (8) That the respondent came out of the Court room and on being questioned by the respondent in the habeas corpus the respondent told her that in his opinion she was not bound to obey an order without jurisdiction. (9) That as will be apparent from the afore going resume of facts the respondent was only trying to do his duty as an Officer of the Court and was in fact trying to uphold the dignity of the Court. (10) That it will be apparent that under the Constitution of 1962 the respondent enjoys the rights conferred upon him by the Holy Quran and Sunnat to level just criticism against Public Authority and thereby to uphold the banner of truth and justice as envisaged by Islam. In the last analysis the respondent feels secure in his belief that this Court will graciously withdraw the notice in question because of the unsullied and pure motives which activated the respondent. In the end it may be added that the respondent had no desire to commit contempt of Court. At the same time the respondent readily assure his Lordship of the un abating respect he has for this August Court and hastens to tender personal apologies to his Lordship if he has unwittingly hurt his Lordships feelings."

2. On 22‑8‑1967 the evidence of two of the witnesses for the State namely P. W. 1 Mr. Mahmood Ghaznavi, Notice Writer, Criminal Branch, High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, and P. W. 2 Mr. Akbar Sultan, Assistant, General Branch, High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore was recorded. The statements of the remaining two witnesses namely P. W. 3 Sh. Nasim Hasan, Advocate and P. W. 4 Ch. Muhammad Abdullah Cheema, were recorded on 23‑8‑1967 and statements of P. W. 5 Mr. Anwar Shariq, Additional District Magistrate, Lahore and P. W. 6 Mardan Ali, orderly attached to my Court were recorded on 25‑8‑1967. Thereafter, the respondent made his oral statement in which after saying that his written statement dated 21st of August 1967 was correct and had been signed by him he introduced additional matters.

3. In the written statement filed by the respondent, he has admitted that he interrupted the proceedings of the Court and criticised my order by saying that the Court had no other power, but to set the alleged detenu at liberty but has introduced three main falsehoods. He has contended that he addressed the Court in polite tones. Secondly, that the husband pounced upon the alleged detenu and grappled with her in open Court so much so when he came out of the Court room he on being questioned by the respondent (petitioner, in the habeas corpus Petition?) told her that she was not bound to obey an order without jurisdiction. The respondent far from addressing the Judge in polite tones addressed the Court, without the ceremony of employing the normal forms of address "My Lord" or "Sir", in the loudest of voices and in insolent tone as deposed by Sheikh Nasim Hassan (P. W. 5), a Senior Advocate of this Court and the Supreme Court. In the course of cross‑examination of Akbar Sultan P. W. it was suggested to him that the shirt of the girl was torn but Akbar Sultan denied it. During the cross- examination of Sheikh Nasim Hassan P. W., it was not at all put to him by the counsel for the respondent that the shirt of the girl had been torn. I must nail this falsehood to the counter. The shirt of the girl was not at all torn. I am contradicting this part of the statement of the respondent not because it has any essential bearing on the merits of the case against the respondent but because what is mentioned by the respondent is factually wrong. This feature, apparently, was deliberately introduced by the respondent in his version in order to capture the sympathy of the press and the public at large had I have noticed that some of the newspapers have thoroughly obliged him in giving publicity to this part of his version. From the statements of Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema, Mardan Ali and Akbar Sultan P. Ws. it is quite clear that the respondent's version that it was only when he. was questioned by the respondent in the habeas corpus Petition (I think instead of respondents, `petitioner' was meant by the respondent in his written statement) Le had told her that she was not bound to obey an order without jurisdiction, is altogether incorrect and that actually he was loudly and vehemently criticising my order even outside the Court room and was instigating persons belonging to the side of the petitioner in the habeas corpus Petition to disobey my order and forcibly carry off the girl Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema, a retired District and Sessions Judge P. W., happened to come to the Court premises on 4‑8‑1967 to meet the Registrar. He witnessed the conduct and behavior and the utterance of the respondent outside my Court room near the banyan tree. Soon after having witnessed the above‑mentioned rowdy and scandalising behaviors of the respondent, Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema P. W., came into my Chamber and informed me of what he had witnessed there. Nor is there any reason to disbelieve the testimony of Akbar Sultan and Mardan Ali, my orderly. Both these persons came to me and informed me of respondent's loud and vehement denunciation of my order and his advising some persons to carry off the girl, the alleged detenu, by main force. All the above‑mentioned three P. Ws. Have given a substantially identical version of the incident. This is, however, correct that when I announced the order that the alleged detenu shall accompany her husband till 10th of August 1967, the date to which the case had been adjourned, Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, the alleged detenu protested loudly that she did not want to accompany her husband as he was likely to kill her. I think she used the expression. Sheikh Nasim Hasan P. W., in his statement has stated that his impression was that she said that her husband would beat her. I suppose Sheikh Nasim Hassan P. W., thought that she had said", but I have a recollection that she did: say; that .... The very loudness of her category gave me an impression that she was acting a part but in any case since I had originally not ordered the Baillif to recover her and had only directed him to serve a notice on the husband of Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi to produce the girl before me I ordered that till the next date she should accompany her husband. As there appeared to me a ring of truth in the statement of the husband, the respondent in the habeas corpus Petition, to the effect that the petitioner, the mother of the alleged detenu had married the uncle of the detenu during the lifetime of her husband Bulanda, the father Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi and that she was actually living with the uncle of the alleged detenu as a wife without having been lawfully wedded to him and that the petitioner who was herself leading an immoral life wanted to ruin his domestic life, I felt it necessary to examine the credentials of Mst. Begum Bibi, to determine whether she was a woman whose allegations could be accepted at their face value. To me it has always appeared that in petitions under section 491, Cr. P. C., the Court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction and that an alleged detenu should be: set at liberty only after the High Court is satisfied that he or she is illegally or improperly detained. A Muslim husband's custody of his wife normally is not illegal or improper detention. But, such it might become. So a heavy duty is cast on the Court in cases where the husband is described as illegally or improperly, detaining his wife, to come to a definite conclusion that the husband is detaining his wife illegally or improperly before the Court can pass an order setting the wife at liberty. I know from experience that the remedy provided under section 491, Cr. P. C., is very often abused. I remember having recently come across a case where a wife and a mother of several children at that, on whose liberty of movement actually no restrictions whatever were placed by the husband, had engineered an application under section 491, Cr. P. C., for the purpose of eloping with her paramour himself a married man, with the blessing of the High Court. I do not think that the discretionary relief that the High Court is supposed to provide under section 491, Cr. P. C., is meant for promoting the cause of vice.

4. In the habeas corpus case in question, after recording the statement of the husband, I started doubting the bona fides of the mother and therefore, recorded her statement also. Her statement did not impress me as truthful and, therefore, I directed her to produce the nikah nama respecting her marriage with the uncle of the alleged detenu with whom she was living as a wife, but according to Muhammad Din, the respondent, without the ceremony of nikah. I did not consider it proper at that stage to deprive the husband of Mst. Mukhtaran, the alleged detenu, of his custody of her, I not being yet satisfied that he was illegally or improperly detaining Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, who after all was his wife. I may mention here that my feeling that Mst. Mukhtaran was acting a part and that Mst. Begum Bibi, the mother of Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, was possibly leading an immoral life and was seeking to ruin the domestic happiness of her daughter, turned out to be true. For, on 10‑8‑1967 the date to which the habeas corpus Petition had been adjourned, which incidentally was the date on which show‑cause notice was served on the respondent in the present case, while Muhammad Din, the husband and Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, the alleged detenu, his wife, appeared before me, Mst. Begum Bibi, the petitioner did not turn up presumably because she could not produce any evidence regarding her nikah with the uncle of the alleged detenu. What is more, Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, the alleged detenu, made a statement to the effect that the protest that she had made at the earlier hearing of the case was out of the fear of her parents and that actually her husband Muhammad Din had never beaten her and bad been treating her well and that she wanted to live with him and accompany him.

5. I have referred to the signification of section 491, Cr. P. C., at some length in order to show that my interim order at that stage had every legal justification, because argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that my order was not legal or proper; but actually the rightness or wrongness of my order is beside the point for the purpose of determining the guilt of the respondent. My order, whether it was right or wrong, after it had been announced, could not be subjected to any open oral criticism to my face, to say nothing of it being criticised in insolent tones in the loudest of voices in a hectoring haranguing manner, not by a counsel who was conducting the case but by a lawyer who was not competent to appear in this Court and was not at all connected with the habeas corpus Petition in question, as a counsel or as an attorney. At this stage I am inclined to refer to an additional factor that the respondent introduced in his oral statement after the prosecution evidence was concluded. In the course of the cross-examination of Sheikh Nasim Hassan P. W., learned counsel for the respondent had elicited a concession that after my order directing the detenu to accompany her husband had been announced, there was some murmuring in the Court room that the procedure adopted by the Judge was not legal. Sheikh Nasim Hassan did not say that this murmur had proceeded from lawyers, whether junior or senior. But this new circumstance was avidly taken up and exploited by the respondent in his oral statement. Now for the first time he started explaining that his interruption of the Court proceedings and criticism of the order of the Judge was because some senior counsel had murmured that my order was wrong. He had neither referred to this motivating circumstance in his written statement, nor in the complaint that he had filed against me on 5‑8‑1967. When for the first time, the respondent came out with this explanation of his misbehavior in Court I asked him as to why when those seniors whom he described as having murmured their criticism of my order had not considered it advisable to stand up in order to criticise my order, he had thought it necessary to stand up and interrupt the proceedings and criticise my order. In reply to this question the respondent brusquely and curtly stated that those seniors were `moral cowards' and actually they should have stood up and criticised the order. The above remark of the respondent shows how irresponsible in his outlook regarding Court proceedings be is I have already observed it is not certain that any lawyer murmured his criticism of my order. The name of any of the lawyers who the respondent describes as having murmured that my order was illegal has not been vouch‑safe to us. Nor has any such lawyer been produced by him to say that he or any other lawyer in the Court room had murmured any criticism of my order. But assuming that any of the lawyers present did murmur his opinion that my order was wrong, the fact that he did not think it necessary to stand up and criticise my order, would show that the lawyer despite having a different view of the legal position did not consider decorous and proper to criticise my order after it had been announced. To describe the discretion, the sense of decorum, and of proportion of such lawyers as moral cowardice shows how reckless, wanton and irresponsible in his thought the respondent is. That without having anything to do with the case, without having the necessary qualification to address the Court and without feeling the necessity of seeking my permission and without recourse to the courteous forms in which the High Court has to be addressed, he started criticising my order in impudent lecturing manner, shows how little regard he had for the Court and how lightly he took his out‑rageous effrontery. Another additional falsehood that he introduced in his oral statement was that I had used the following expression before he departed from the Court room. I never used this expression in Urdu. This expression was not attributed to me in the written statement that the respondent filed in the beginning of the proceedings. This apparently, was invented to justify the complaint that tie filed on 5‑8‑1967, against me, for, it finds mention therein. Again, needless to point out the essential difference between my having directed generally that the respondent should be pushed out, and the Urdu expression attributed by the respondent to me is not much, for, so rowdy and insolent had the behaviour of the respondent become that I might well have directed the policeman, if he were present in the Court room to push the respondent out but as a matter of fact no such Urdu expression was employed by me. The purpose of the respondent possibly was to show that even persons other than always could understand that the respondent was being insulted by the Judge.

6. It is not necessary to refer to any other circumstance appearing in the oral statement of the respondent for the purpose of the case against him, but mention of another circumstance appears to me to be necessary to show his wantonness and his contempt for necessary care and caution before addressing the Court on a point of law. I asked him if he had read section 491, Cr. P. C. and he claimed that he had. I enquired of him as to when a person is to be set at liberty under section 491, Cr. P. C. His answer was that according to his knowledge of this section a person had to be set at liberty whenever he is brought before the Court irrespective of the fact whether he is a minor or major. When it was pointed out to him that the provision said that a person is to be set at liberty when he is illegally or improperly detained, he asserted that it was correct but only the detenu was the final Judge of illegal or improper detention and that his proposition on the subject was that if the alleged detenu said that he did not want to live with anybody or remain in custody be was to be set at liberty. After he had taken up such an unqualified position, I asked him what would be tire position, according to him, if when the alleged detenu is summoned before the Court, a police officer produces evidence to the effect that a cognizable case has been registered against the alleged detenu and that whether in that case only because the detenu stated that he did not want to stay with the police, the detenu had to be set at liberty. In reply the respondent admitted that the alleged detenu in such a case would not be set at liberty because his detention would be legal and proper. It is surprising that with such a scanty and superficial knowledge on the subject, the respondent who was a mere interloper so far as the habeas corpus petition was concerned, should have in a most impudent manner thought of addressing a lecture to me on the illegality of my order and despite being told to withdraw from the Court room should have proceeded with his criticism of my order and when eventually threatened with being pushed out, should have departed from the Court room saying that he was leaving but he would not withdraw his remarks. That I had to direct his being pushed out is a measure of his persistency in his rude and rowdy behaviour. He has admitted in his oral statement that when he withdrew from the Court, room he had stated that he was going but he would not withdraw his remarks. And, as has already been pointed out this is not all. After going out of the Court room he kept up his rude and vehement denunciation of my order outside the Court room with an audience of 30 to 50 persons and also exhorted the sympathisers of the petitioner to disobey my order by forcibly carrying off of the alleged detenu. The respondent has no scrupulous regard for truth as is evident from the circumstance that he has patently introduced three main falsehoods in his version of the incident as it occurred inside the Court, room. As against the statement of a retired District and Sessions Judge, I am not prepared to believe the word of the respondent as regards what happened outside the Court room. This retired District and Sessions Judge came to my Chamber soon after he had heard the loud and vehe ment criticism of my order by the respondent. His version is supported by my own orderly Marean Ali P. W. and Akbar Sultan. They also came to me when I was yet in my Chamber and told me what Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema P. W., had told me and had stated during his evidence. Mardan Ali P.W'S meeting with the respondent outside the Court, room has been admitted by him in his oral statement.

7. It is significant that the respondent was unable to produce any person in contradiction of the statements of Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema, Mardan Ali and Akbar Sultan P. Ws. Before the commencement of the arguments I enquired of the learned counsel for the respondent whether the respondent wanted to produce any evidence in defence and the learned counsel stated that the respondent did not want to produce any evidence in defence. Surely, when a version was given by as many as three persons, among whom was a responsible and independent person like Mr. M. Abdullah Cheema, a retired District and Sessions Judge, if there was any substance in the version of the respondent as regards what happened outside the Court room, he would have produced some witness in support of his version.

8. The misbehaviour of the respondent in my Court and outside it was apparently not the impulsive act of an inexperienced layman. As is evident from the statement of Mr. Anwar Shariq, Additional District Magistrate, Lahore and the resolution of the Lahore Magistrates dated 7‑6‑1967 which was addressed to the Chairman, Bar Council and was also addressed to the Registrar, High Court, vide copy Exh. P. F., the misconduct of the respondent in my Court was quite of a piece with his conduct on earlier occasions before the Magistrate. Mr. Anwar Shariq, Additional District Magistrate stated that in his own Court the respondent had twice interrupted the Court proceedings by demanding that his bail‑bonds must be instantly accepted and that when it was pointed out to him that his interruption was improper, he would go away protesting against the refusal to accept the bail‑bonds instantly. The respondent appears to be a contemner of Courts on purpose. Mr. Anwar Shariq has told us, and this circumstance also finds mention in the copy of the resolution addressed to the Chairman, Bar Council wherein the disbarment of the respondent has been asked for, that when any order is not passed according to his wishes he feels annoyed over it and makes complaints against the Magistrates. The Additional District Magistrate has stated that the respondent had already filed complaints against four Magistrates, with whose orders he felt dissatisfied. The respondent had apparently, developed this technique for intimidating the Magistrates. The respondent followed the same pattern in this case also. After his mis behaviour in my Court and outside it on 4‑8‑67 the respondent presumably because of a consciousness that he might be proceeded against for Contempt of Court and with the purpose of intimidating me filed a complaint against me under section 500, P. P. C., on the 5th of August 1967 wherein he gave a garbled and tendentious and in some respects altogether false version of the incident inside the Court room thinking perhaps that what had happened outside the Court room might not have been brought to my notice. Mr. Anwar Shariq has told us that this complaint was dismissed by him as incompetent in view of section 197, Cr. P. C. It appears to me that the respondent takes pride in his attitude of disrespectfulness towards judicial officers. He has himself, in the course of his statement brought on the record some printed self‑glorifying and self‑advertising hand‑bills issued by him for the most part in the context of District Bar Association Elections setting out therein his plans "to set the Magistracy right". I am borrowing the above expression from the question in cross‑examination put by the counsel for the respondent to Mr. Anwar Shariq, A. D. M. The following answer of Mr. Anwar Shariq to a question put to him by the learned counsel for the respondent indicates the question: "I am not aware of this that quite a few Advocates were prepared to side with Ashfaq Ahmad Sheikh in his efforts to set the Magistracy right". The question to which the above quoted statement of the A. D. M., is an answer gives quite a certain indication of the state of mind of the respondent with regard to judicial officers. One .of the hand‑bills that the petitioner got brought on the record is a printed open letter to Malik Amir Muhammad Khan, Ex‑Governor of this province wherein he has indulged in unmeasured criticism of his ex‑: regime. It is significant that the hand‑bills that have been brought on the record at the instance of the respondent are in different colors, which between them seem to me almost to exhaust the rainbow of the light spectrum. It appears to me that the respondent is a publicity hunter and likes to see his name printed in bold letters in different colours. The following question that was put by his counsel to the Additional District Mamstrate shows the extent of his ambitions to capture applause of a section of our society. "Is it not correct that Ashfaq Ahmad once put up hand‑bills and posters wherein he proclaimed himself as the mukhalif of President Ayub?" In the first instance however the question that was put by the learned counsel for the respondent to the A. D. M., was to the effect "whether the respondent had not put up placards and posters declaring himself to be the dushman of President Ayub". Learned counsel, however, later at the whispering into his ear by the respondent clarified that when he used the word dushman in the first instance, it was his mistake.

9. From the evidence of Akbar Sultan P. W., it appears that the respondent while enrolled as a Pleader has been appearing unauthorisedly in this Court as a special attorney. Notice was taken of this piece of misconduct on the part of the respondent by the High Court and before a Division Bench, of which I happened to be a Member, he gave an undertaking that he would not represent any suitor in this Court or any Court subordinate to it as a special attorney and that in view of this undertaking, the Division Bench refrained from taking any action against him. The fact requires notice that although when he gave his undertaking mentioned above, he had given a list of 6 Writ Petitions only in which he had appeared as a special attorney, in his . written statement, Exh. RG, in reply to a subsequent notice issued to him by Division Bench comprising Mr. Justice S. A. Mahmood and Mr. Justice Muhammad Akram, when he started appearing in the High Court pursuant to a new technique mentioned elsewhere he set out 10 Writ Petitions in which he bad appeared in the High Court in the year 1963. It has to be remembered that his undertaking was given in February 1964. Therefore, it is surprising that while giving the list of cases then, in which he had appeared as a special attorney, he had omitted 4 Writ Petitions of year 1963.

10. I have already mentioned that the learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to my dealing with the case. He was unable to produce any judgment in support of his contention. On the other hand there are numerous judgments which have taken the view that the Judge in whose presence the Contempt of Court has been committed is the properly tribunal to decide the matter. In the matter of Sham L a l A. X. C. Lahore (A I R1 9 3 2 Lah.502), it was held that when a Contempt is committed in the face of a Court, it is that Court which is the proper tribunal to decide the matter. In re: K. L. Gauba, Barrister‑at‑Law, Lahore (A I R 1942 Lah, 105), the Chief Justice who had been personally attacked himself sat in judgment in Contempt Proceedings against K. L. Gauba. It was observed in that judgment: "The gravamen is an endeavour to shake the confidence of the public in the Court. While it is unpleasant for any Judge to have to sit in judgment in a case in which he has been personally attacked, it is his duty to do so where he has been the subject of a malicious and impudent publication containing imputations which are obviously false and of the falsity of which he himself has the best knowledge."

11. In the present case where there was no personal attack, on the Judge in the sense in which the expression was employed in the above‑mentioned judgment and where only the dignity and prestige of the Court has to be vindicated there is absolutely no reason why I should have refrained from doing my duty in deciding the case. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the evidence produced against the respondent is irrelevant and inadmissible and offends against sections, 53, 54 and 55 of the Evidence Act. This was presumably contended by the learned counsel with reference to the evidence to the effect that the respondent had given an undertaking to this Court that he would not appear as a special attorney and that he had been thereafter appearing in this Court despite that undertaking and that he had been attaching an application for permission to appear in the High Court, and in some cases without obtaining specific orders permitting him to appear in this Court, had argued cases in this Court. In the first place it has to be pointed out that Contempt of Court proceedings are not criminal proceedings in the ordinary sense of the expression and it has been held in different judgments that contempt proceedings being summary in nature are not governed by the technicalities of procedure applicable to ordinary criminal cases. Besides, the evidence that has been produced in this case was not with regard to the character of the respondent because none of the witnesses produced in the case has said that he has a good character or bad character. The above‑ mentioned evidence is introductory in nature and has been led to determine the identity of the respondent. The evidence is an answer to the question "who and what is this respondent"? He is the same person who had given an undertaking before this very High Court and who despite that undertaking was again by circuitous methods trying to appear in the High Court. Section 9 of the Evidence Act would cover some of the evidence. Some of the evidence would also be relevant under section 7 of the Evidence Act. As regards the evidence of Mr. Anwar Shariq, Additional District Magistrate, and the letter containing the unanimous resolution of the Magistracy of Lahore sent to the Chairman, Bar, Council, that is relevant for the purpose of showing the state of F mind of the respondent and that what he did in my Court morn and outside it on 4‑8‑1967 was not an accidental affair but intentional one and that it formed one of a series of similar occurrences in which the respondent was concerned. This part of the evidence, therefore, would be covered by sections 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act. But even if the evidence regarding the respondent's previous unauthorized appearances and his attempts at appearing before this Court through the device of an application for permission to appear in this Court and the evidence of Mr. Anwar Shariq, as regards the respondent's behaviour the Courts of Magistrates and his mis‑behaviour in the Court of Mr, Anwar Shariq, Additional District Magistrate be ruled out of considera tion, overwhelming, incontrovertibly relevant and admissible evidence still is there to fix the respondent with the liability for having committed gross contempt of this Court. Without having anything to do with the Habeas Corpus Petition in which I passed the interim order directing the wife to accompany her husband, the respondent in a most impudent manner, in haranguing insolent tones started criticising my order a spite being told to desist from doing so by withdrawing himself from the Court room kept up his criticism and it was only when I had said "push him out", he left the Court room saying he was going but he would not withdraw his remarks. This was a must imperti nent defiant mis‑behaviour on the part of the respondent and yet he was not content with this. Even after he had gone outside, he kept up his criticism of my order and exhorted the persons belonging to the petitioner's side to disobey my order and carry off the girl by main force.

12. The other arguments raised by the learned counsel for the respondent really deserve no serious notice. I am noticing them, however, in deference to the earnestness which the learned counsel displayed in putting them forward. Learned counsel contended that if a person believes that what he is saying is true and does something under a mistaken notion of facts, then he does F not commit any Contempt of Court. Learned counsel, It ) waver, was unable to show that in this contention he is supported by any authoritative pronouncement. Learned counsel also contended that in view of the fact that our Constitution had laid: that the laws of this country will be according to Quran and Sunnah, the law of Contempt of Court has to be treated as unislamic. The learned counsel said "our notions of Court decorum were relice of our servile past." Learned counsel quoted from a book I fail to understand what relevance the above quoted speech of Hazrat Umar has to the case in point. If Hazrat Umar had said that when a Qazi has announced an order, a litigant and even a person not connected with the litigation, can stand up and criticise the order and exhort its disobedience. I should have understood the relevance of this quotation. On the other hand it appears to me that with very strict ideas of discipline that Hazrat Umar had, it is possible that if he had come to know (of course such was the sense of discipline and decorum in his days that none could have dared to criticise or disobey the order of a Qazi) that after the Qazi had announced his order and an interim order at that, somebody had stood up to criticise it and exhort its disobedience, who can tell that the great Caliph might not have ordered a severe punishment for such a person, may be, of unsparing whipping to be administered at the spot.

13. Some other interesting arguments were advanced by the learned counsel. I want to say nothing about his having described the members of the High Court Bar as spineless persons or atout his encomiastic references to his client whom he described as a sort of a Robinhood, who had set out to perform his deeds of bravery regardless of recognition or incentives like Hilal‑i‑Jurat and who, as the learned counsel put it, `had stood up to' President Ayub (by publishing a poster describing himself as mukhalif of the President) and who had stood up to the Ex‑Governor (when he had retired). But I must notice the extra‑ordinary doctrine that the learned counsel propounded in his client's defence. He said that even if the respondent has committed Contempt of Court it should be excused and that the respondent certainly deserves leniency because in doing what he has done, he had shown `guts'. `Guts' is a slang synonym for courage. Surely, courage shown in a good cause and for promotion and achievement of lawful objects and of happiness and welfare of society and individuals is a laudable quality. But if the courage with which a crime or an offence is committed, were to constitute an excusing or extenuating circumstance, then every culprit, every criminal would urge the enormity of his crime as a ground for condonation or leniency. For, all offences and crimes and even mis‑behaviours, generally reflect some sort of courage on the part of the offender or criminal. Every assassin, every cheat and every bounder, gatecrasher and bully would plead for his misdeed or mis‑conduct being passed over because his mis‑behaviour must indicate some sort of `guts'. The dectrine propounded by the learned counsel, I dare say might well be popular in a den of robbers and among a band of gangsters but I do not think any civilized human institution can excuse acts of crime and misbehaviour on the ground that the offender had 1 exhibited 'guts' in the commission thereof. That some really mitigating circumstance might be urged for the purpose of invoking leniency, one can understand, but that what adds to the enormity of offence, the very circumstance which makes the offences all the more flagitious, that in the name of 'guts' or courage, the excess of insolence and impertinence of the respondent should be urged as an excusing and extenuating circumstance, I was surprised to find Mr. Rashid Murtaza Qureshi urging. If the uninhibited 'guts' exhibited by an offender in the Committing of an offence or crime were to be urged as a grouted for dealing leniently with the offender, then one can well imagine that a thief who merely wanted to deprive a person of his purse might consider it necessary to give a beating in his victim into the bargain because that act on his part would indubitably show snore of the 'guts' with which the thieving had been done; and a thief who had committed housebreaking and had robbed the premises might consider it necessary to murder the inmates of the house in addition, because the theft with murder would indicate more 'guts' than burglary simpliciter.

14. Learned counsel also urged that his client should be dealt with leniently because he had a heart of diamond. I do not know whether the learned counsel really meant a left handed compliment to his client it by describing his heart as being of diamond. One sometimes hears a person's heart being described as of gold. This is perhaps said of a good heart on account of the qualities of malleability, ductility and plasticity of that precious metal which can be heated, beaten, disciplined and trained into different shapes, generally beautiful. The description implies a metaphorical reference to the heart being open to nobler, edifying and refining influences. But diamond is the stoniest and hardest allotropic form of carbon. It can be cut and that also with extreme difficulty. Therefore, to describe a heart as being of diamond would apparently be a mataphorical way of saying that the heart is impervious to all noble impluses and ennobling influences. But whether the respondent's heart is of diamond or otherwise is irrelevant for the decision of this case. For, the argument of the learned counsel amounts to giving a chit of good character to the respondent without the respondent having produced any evidence of good character.

15. Nor was there any point in the contention of the learned counsel that the law of Contempt of Court was relic from our servile past ; that it was a legacy left by the English people who ruled our country. It would seem that what the learned counsel wanted to say was that the law of Contempt of Court as understood therefore, should be discarded and thrown by the board because during the days of English domination of this L country such a law was in operation. I do not quite understand why the other laws like the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code, the Evidence Act etc., which are also relics of our `servile past' should not be similarly dealt with and ignored. 1, however, commended to the notice of Mr. Rashid Murtaza, the circumstance that the Constitution by which every Judge has to swear has made the law of Contempt of Court a~ part of our legal system in Article 123 thereof. One other argument advanced by Mr. Rashid Murtaza is left to be noticed. He read some passages from a book written by Mr. Winston S. Churchill wherein some anecdotes from the forensic career of Lord Birkenhead were mentioned. The author has mentioned some passages‑at‑arms between Lord Birkenhead as the counsel and some Judge of a County Court before whom he appeared in a case. It appears to me that the reference by the learned counsel M to the instances of retort and repartee between Lord Birkenhead and the Judge is altogether pointless. Firstly, every counsel is not of the standing and of intellectual stature of Lord Birkenhead so that a Judge may indulge in intellectual gladiator ship with him. Secondly, Lord Birkenhead had such passages‑at‑arms while authorized appearing on behalf of his client. Thirdly, those verbal exchanges took place before the orders in the case were announced. Fourthly, what Lord Birkenhead said by way of retort was presumably said with due observance of the courteous forms of address. The client of the learned counsel, a very junior lawyer who is not even competent to appear in the High Court. He was altogether unconnected with the case and he started criticising an interim order of the Court after it had been announced without having recourse to usual forms of address and without seeking the permission of the Court, in an insolent manner and made sort of mission of criticising the order of the Court even after he had left the Court room and instigated the disobedience of that order. Fifthly, the author of the book is not a jurist and had in the short biographical sketch of Lord Birkenhead aimed at a reference to latter's presence of mind and capacity for sparkling repartee than to any legal aspect of his conduct and he does not say that the Judge could not have, if he were so minded, proceeded for contempt against that eminent lawyer.

16. The result is that I am fully satisfied that not only was the conduct of the respondent inside the Court room out rageously impertinent but it was scandalously impudent outside the Court room also. It appears to me that emboldened by the latitudinarian attitude of the Lahore Magistrates who, according to Mr. Anwar Shariq, A.. D. M., had refrained from proceeding for contempt against the respondent in the interest of harmony between the Bench and the Bar of the District Courts, the respondent had started thinking that although there may be limitations on the powers of the judicial officers and other authorities, there were no limitations on his behaviour and on the wagging of his tongue and that he could possibly with impunity out‑rage and undermine the dignity and prestige of the Courts including the High Court. What the respondent did inside the Court room and the way he behaved outside the Court room, in my opinion, constitutes the grossest contempt of Court. In C Had! Hussain and others v. Naslruddin Haider and others (A I R 1926 All. 623) it was held that "Contempt committed out of Court is just as much punishable as one committed in the presence of a Court". It was further observed in the above‑mentioned judgment that "any conduct that tends to bring the authority of a Court into disrespect or which amounts to an insult of the Judge or dignity of the Court even though it may be after the termination of a pending case is undoubtedly a contempt of Court". The conduct of the respondent inside the Court certainly tended to bring the authority and prestige of the Court into disrespect. Indeed his persistence in criticism of the order of the Judge after he had been told by the Judge to withdraw from the Court room, was in the nature of an insult offered to the Judge and the dignity of the Court. The mis‑conduct of the respondent was all the more reprehensible as he was not a counsel in the case and as already pointed out was not even competent to address the High Court, he being an Advocate of the lower Courts only. What is more, he criticised an interim order after its announcement without having recourse to the usual courteous p forms of address and without seeking the permission of the Court to address it. His denunciations of the order outside the Court room and his inciting the disobedience of the order of the Court by exhorting the sympathisers of the petitioner in the Habeas Corpus Petition forcibly to carry off the alleged detenu shows that the disrespect and contempt of the respondent for the orders and prestige of the Court knew no bounds. In the circumstances, therefore, the respondent has to be held guilty of the grossest contempt of this Court. His conduct inside the Court room and outside it perhaps could be excused if the respondent were an insane person but neither any plea of insanity was raised on behalf of the respondent nor apparently was there any basis for such a plea. The respondent far from expressing any regret or contrition for his mis‑behaviour has tried to justify it in his statements before this Court. Although at the end of his written statement the respondent has stated that he had no desire to commit contempt of Court and "at the same time the respondent readily assures his Lordship of the un a bating respect he has for this August Court and hastens to tender personal apologies to his Lordships if he has unwillingly hurt his Lordships feelings", these words actually do not constitute any apology and appear to be Q in the nature of a condescending obliging gesture on the part of the respondent. It is only unreserved and unconditional apology, which can be considered for the purpose of condonation of offence of contempt or for leniency in the punishment. But mere conditional words of apology, accompanied by an assertion, as in the present case, that the conduct which had been called into question in the proceedings was justified, is worse than no apology.

17. In view of the above I hold that the respondent has committed gross contempt of this Court. I, therefore, sentence him to six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,500 or three months simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine. S.A.G. Contemner convicted.