P L D 1959 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 612, 648, 649, 574, 575, 393 and 81 of 1958, points arising in which are partly common.

2. In Writ Petitions Nos. 612, 648 and 649 of 1958 the facts are that applications for permits to ply "baby" taxis under section 49 of the Motor Vehicles Act were submitted to the Provincial Transport Authority in April and May 1958. This was in response to a public notice by the Provincial Transport Authority that henceforth permits in respect of baby taxis would be given to companies as well as individuals if the cars were of a model not earlier than 1952 and some other conditions as to colour etc. were satisfied. The petitioners allege that on account of this notice they were encouraged and invested their money for the purpose of baby taxis. Each of the three petitioners received in reply to his application the following letter from the Provincial Transport Authority :‑ "You are requested to produce your vehicle for inspection within a fortnight from the date of receipt of this letter. Regular permit will be issued after inspection of the vehicle". The petitioners did produce their vehicles in accordance with the direction contained in this letter. The Vehicle inspector found the vehicles to be otherwise fit but they did not comply with the requirements of the Provincial Transport Authority with respect to colour and fare meter. This was pointed out and the. petitioners then got their vehicles properly coloured and fitted with meters and produced them before the Vehicle Inspector but permits were refused on the ground that in view of a resolution of the Provincial Transport Authority in the meantime, that is on the 14th of June 1958, only a fleet of ten or more cars owned by an individual or a company could be registered and applications for registration of less than ten cars as taxis were not to be entertained at all. In this resolution it had also been decided that only new and unregistered cars could be granted permits as taxis. Public notice of this decision had been given through the press.

3. The Motor Vehicle Inspector before whom the vehicles were produced informed the petitioners of this resolution orally. The petitioners then made representations to the Secretary, Provincial Transport Authority, saying that they had invested money in response to the first notice of the Provincial Transport Authority and had fulfilled all the requirements of that notice. However, neither any permit was issued to the petitioners nor was any reply in writing communicated at which the petitioners, after serving notice through counsel, filed the present writ petitions.

4. In these three writ petitions, the points urged are :‑ (1) That the letter of the Secretary, Provincial Transport Authority reproduced above amounted to the sanctioning of the application for the grant of permit and the Provincial Transport Authority were bound to issue a permit when the vehicle was produced for inspection in accordance with the direction given in the letter, and (2) that the decision of the Provincial Transport Authority that they would register baby taxis only if they, are new and unregistered and in fleets of ten is illegal.

5. As regards the first contention, it is conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that after the issue of the letter repro duced above if the vehicle was found by the Motor Vehicle Inspector to be fit, a regular permit was to be issued as a matter of course. In spite of this concession, however, we would not hold that the application for a permit had already been sanctioned. In the first place, it will be observed that this letter is not even signed by the Secretary, Provincial Transport Authority, and is only in cyclostyle. It appears that such letters were issued in ordinary routine to all persons who had applied for permits for baby taxis in view of the decision of the Provincial Transport Authority that they would register baby taxis in future. It will be observed, secondly, that ultimately there was a refusal to issue a permit even after the vehicle was inspected. On inspection, it had been found that it was not of the required colour and was not fitted with a meter. There was no bar to the Provincial Transport Authority saying that they would inspect the vehicle before they sanctioned the application for a permit. But in any case the point to be decided is whether the application for a permit had already been sanctioned. Even if there was contained in the letter a promise that on production of the vehicle permit will be issued, it still would not amount to a sanction of the application. Learned counsel for the petitioners has in this connection relied upon Rule 52 of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act in order to show that the sanction of the application is not exactly the same thing as the actual issue of the permit. Rule 52 runs :‑ "(a) Save in the case of a temporary permit, where the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit and the applicant is not at the date of application in possession of the vehicle duly registered, then the applicant shall within one month of the sanction of the application by the Regional Transport Authority, or such longer period as the Authority may specify, produce the certificate of registration of the vehicle before that authority in order that particulars of the registra tion mark may be entered in the permit. (b) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has, if the form of permit so requires, been entered therein and in the event of applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the prescribed period the Regional Transport Authority may revoke its sanction of the application".

6. We will concede that even after an application had been sanctioned an actual permit may not be issued till some for malities have been complied with but we do not agree that the letter relied upon is an order passed under Rule

52. Under this rule it is only for the purpose of noting the registration mark of the vehicle in the permit that the issue of a permit is postponed and it is only the certificate of registration and not the vehicle itself that is to be produced. Here it was the vehicle that was to be produced and it was not to be produced for noting the registration mark but for inspection. We would reject, therefore, the first contention. We have not found it necessary to go into the question whether the Secretary had authority delegated to him by the Provincial Transport Authority for issue of permits for contract carriages. The letter in question had been issued not by the Provincial Transport Authority itself but by the Secretary. The contention was that the authority could be delegated under the rules to the Secretary for the issue of contract carriage permits and that it had been delegated. Learned counsel for the respon dents accepted that such authority could be delegated but did not accept that it had been delegated.

7. Before proceeding to discuss the second contention raised, it will be convenient to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act: "2 (3) `Contract carriage' means a motor vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum and from one point to another without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract ; and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares. "Explanation.‑`Contract carriage' does not include a motor vehicle, possession of which has been temporarily transferred in accordance with an express agreement of hire for use as a private vehicle and which is used in accordance with the terms of such agreement". "22. (1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with this Chapter and the certificate of registration of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle carries a registration mark displayed in the prescribed manner. (2) Nothing in this section shall apply to a motor vehicle while being driven within the limits of jurisdiction of one registering authority to or from the appropriate place of registration for the purpose of being registered under sections 23, 25 or 3) or to a motor vehicle exempted from the provisions of this Chapter while in the possession of a dealer in motor vehicles". "

23. Subject to the provisions of section 25 and section 39, every owner of a motor vehicle shall cause the vehicle to be registered by a registering authority in the Province in which he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept." "25. (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 23, the owner of a motor vehicle may apply to any registering authority to have the vehicle temporarily registered in the prescribed manner and for the issue in the prescribed manner of a temporary certificate of registration and a temporary registration mark. (2) A registration made under this section shall be valid only for a period not exceeding one month, and shall not be renewable." "29. (1) When a motor vehicle registered in one Province has been kept in another Province for a period exceeding twelve months, the owner of the vehicle shall apply to the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle then is, for the assignment of a new registration mark and shall present the certificate of registration to that registering authority. (2) The registering authority, to which application is made under subsection (1), shall assign the vehicle a registration mark in accordance with the Sixth Schedule to be carried thenceforth on the vehicle and shall enter the mark upon the certificate of registration before returning it to the applicant and shall in communication with the registering authority by whom the vehicle was previously registered arrange for the transfer of the registration of the vehicle from the records of that registering authority to its own records. (3) A Provincial Government may make rules under section 41 requiring the owner of a motor vehicle not registered within the Province, which is brought into or is for the time being in the Province, to furnish to a prescribed authority in the Province such information with respect to the motor vehicle and its registration as may be prescribed." "33. (1) A registering authority or other prescribed authority which has reason to believe that any motor vehicle within its jurisdiction is in such a condition that its use in a public place would constitute a danger to the public, or that it fails to comply with the requirements of Chapter V or of the rules made there-under, may, after giving the owner an opportunity of making any representation he may wish to make, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the certificate of registration of the vehicle until the defects are remedied to its satisfaction. (2) An authority other than a registering authority shall, when making a suspension order under subsection (1), intimate in writing the fact of suspension and the reasons therefore to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the vehicle is at the time of the suspension. (3) Where the registration of a motor vehicle has been suspended under subsection (1) for a continuous period of not less than one month, the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle was when the registration was suspended, shall, if it is not the original registering authority, inform that authority of the suspension ; and when the suspension has continued without interruption for a period of not less than six months, the registering authority, within whose jurisdiction the vehicle was when the registration was suspended, may, if it is the original registering authority, cancel the registration, and if it is not the original registering authority, shall forward the certificate of registration to that authority which may cancel it forthwith. (4) The owner of a motor vehicle shall, on the demand of a registering authority or other prescribed authority which has suspended the certificate of registration of the vehicle under this section, surrender the certificate of registration and any token or card issued to authorise the use of the vehicle in a public place. (5) A certificate of registration and any token or card surrendered under subsection (4) shall be returned to the owner when the order suspending registration has been rescinded and not before. "42. (1) No owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or Provincial transport authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used. Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage: Provided further that a stage carriage permit' may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a good vehicle either when carrying passengers or not: Provided further that a public carrier's permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the holder to use the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him " "

46. An application for a permit to use a motor vehicle as a stage carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a stage carriage permit) shall contain the following particulars, namely :‑ (a) the type and seating capacity of the vehicle in respect of which the application is made; (b) the route or routes on which or the area within which it is intended to use the vehicle ; (c) the time table, if any, of the service to be provided ; and (d) such other matters as may be prescribed". "47. (l) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely :‑ (a) the interest of the public generally ; (b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; (c) the adequacy of existing road passenger transport services between the places to be served, the fares charged by those services and the effect upon those services of the service proposed ; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service ; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services and in particular of unremunerative services in conjunction with remunerative services ; and (f ) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or routes, and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lies or by any association interested in the provision of road transport facilities. (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time table furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: Provided that before such refusal an opportunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the tithe table so as to conform to the said provisions. "

48. A Regional Transport Authority may, after considera tion of the matters set forth in subsection (1) of section 47‑ (a) limit the number of stage carriages or stage carriages of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region ; (b) issue a stage carriage permit in respect of a particular stage carriage or a particular service of stage carriages ; (c) regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single or more owners ; or (d) attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the following conditions, namely :‑ (i) that the service specified in the permit shall be com menced not later than a specified date and be continued for a specified period ; (ii) that the service may be varied only in accordance with specified conditions ; (iia) that the stage carriage or stage carriages shall be used only on specified routes or in a specified area ; (iii) that copies of the fare table and time table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the fare table and time table so exhibited shall be observed ; (iv) that not more than a specified number of passengers and not more than a specified amount of luggage shall be carried on any specified vehicle at any one time ; (v) that within municipal limits and in such other areas and places as may be prescribed passengers shall not be taken up or set down at or except at specified points ; or (vi) that tickets shall be issued to passengers for the fares paid." "

49. An application for a permit to use a motor vehicle as a contract carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a contract carriage permit) shall contain the following particulars, namely :‑ (a) the type and seating capacity of the vehicle ; (b) the area for which the permit is required ; (c) in the case of a motor vehicle other than a motor cab, the manner in which it is claimed that the public convenience will be served by the vehicle ; and (d) any other particulars which may be prescribed". "

50. A Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a contract carriage permit, have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest, and shall also take into consideration any representations which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region." "

51. A Regional Transport Authority may, after considera tion of the matters set forth in section 50,‑ (a) limit the number of contract carriages generally or contract carriages of any specified type for which contract carriage permits may be granted in the region or any specified area within the region ; (b) fix in the case of motor cabs the fares which may be charged ; (c) require that every motor cab shall carry a copy of the fare table for inspection by passengers ; (d) require that any motor "cab shall be fitted with a taxi meter ; or (e) impose on the use of a contract carriage any other condition which may be prescribed. "

52. An application for a permit to use a transport vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by the applicant (in this Chapter referred to as a private carrier's permit) shall contain the following particulars, namely :‑ (a) the type and carrying capacity of the vehicle ; (b) the nature of the goods which the applicant expects normally to carry in connection with his trade or business ; (c) the area for which the permit is required ; and (d) any other particular which may be prescribed". "53. (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse a private carrier's permit, have regard to the condition of the roads to be used by the vehicle or vehicles in respect of which the application is made, and shall satisfy itself that the vehicle or vehicles for which the permit is required will not be used except in connection with the business of the applicant. (2) The Regional Transport Authority may in granting a private carrier's permit impose conditions to be specified in the permit relating to the description of goods which may be carried, or the area in which the permit shall be valid, or the maximum laden weight and axle weights of any vehicle used. (3) If the applicant is the holder of a private carrier's permit which has been suspended or has been the holder of a private carrier's permit which has been revoked, the Regional Transport Authority may at its discretion notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) refuse the application". "60. (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit‑ (a) on the breach of any condition specified in subsection (3) of section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or (b) if the holder of the permit, uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit or does riot, without reasonable cause, ply the vehicles to the manner authorised by the permit, or (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, or (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation: Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an oppor tunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation. (2) Where a transport authority cancels or suspends a permit, it shall give to the holder in writing its reasons for the revocation or suspension." Sections 54, 55 and 56 contain provisions pertaining to applications for public carrier permits corresponding to those in sections 46, 47 and 48 and we have not considered it necessary to reproduce them. The question to be considered is whether there is any provision under which the Provincial Transport Authority could have passed an order to the effect that they would not entertain applications unless they relate to fleets of 10 baby taxis and whether they could impose the condition that the vehicles must be new and unregistered. Learned counsel for the respon dents contends that such an order is within the power granted to the Provincial Transport Authority by section 51 (a). It is to be observed that these baby taxis are contract carriages. On that point there is no dispute. We cannot see by what method of interpretation learned counsel for the respondents can bring this order within section 51 (a) which only enables Provincial Transport Authority to limit the number of contract carriages either generally or with reference to any specified type. Learned counsel says type refers even to the years of manufacture, and thus tries to justify the order of the Provincial Transport Authority in so far as it insisted upon a car being new and unregistered. We would not agree that the word `type' can refer' to the car being new or old or having been produced in a' particular year. `Type' relates obviously to the construction of the car (including even its colour) but if two cars be identical' in their construction they cannot be said to be of different types just because they were made in different years.

9. In reality it is not that part of the order which relates to the cars being new and unregistered but the one which requires applications for fleets of ten taxis, that is the more important. This order learned counsel for the respondent cannot, by any stretch of language, bring within section 51 (a). As an order, therefore, it cannot be held to be legal. The only point that remains to be considered is whether one can regard this order not as an order but merely as ‑a notice to the public of the policy adopted by the Provincial Transport Authority. Actually this is not how the Provincial Transport Authority itself regards this decision. The Provincial Transport Authority regards this as a sort of rule laid down by them in violation of which no application can be entertained at all. If it was merely an expression of the policy which they intended to follow still they would be bound by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act to entertain in the applications arid to. decide it only after hearing the applicant. The applicant would have the right to say anything which he may have to say against the intended policy of the Provincial Transport Authority. Even if the Provincial Transport Authority had power to reject an application on the ground that it relates only to one vehicle whereas they regard it proper in the public interest to , grant permits only to fleets of ten, still the application will have to be entertained and decided in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. There could be no refusal to entertain it. The Motor Vehicles Act grants rights to persons to apply for permits to ply different kind of carriages and those rights cannot be taken away by a decision of the Provincial Transport Authority which decision it is not entitled to take under any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act or any rule framed there-under. The Provincial Transport Authority can only decide applications for permits. It has no power to frame any rules.

10. But this is not the only objection to the decision taken by the Provincial Transport Authority. An even more serious objection is that they have no power whatsoever to insist that an applicant should apply at least for ten taxis at a time. The ground of the refusal of an application for one taxi would be that it is not accompanied by applications for nine other taxis. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that this is not a matter which can, in view of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, be made a ground of refusal. It is urged that the matters stated in section 50 are the only ones that could be taken into consideration and made the basis of decision by the Provincial Transport Authority when it considers an application for a permit filed under section 49.

11. On a consideration of the provisions of the Act relating to the grant of permits for various kinds of carriages, we have reached the conclusion that the matters stated in section 50 are the only ones (subject to a question of a fitness to which we will revert) which can be considered by the Provincial Transport Authority in determining whether or not to grant or refuse a contract carriage permit. We state below seriatim our reasons for this inference :‑ (1) There is no provision in the Act which empowers the Provincial Transport Authority to take into consideration any matters other than those specified in section 50 expressly or by necessary implication. (2) Section 50 does not contain any words like `inter alia', `among others', etc. (3) It appears to be the general scheme of the Act that the matters to be considered by the Transport Authority in deciding the question of grant of permit are limited. Section 47 relates to stage carriages, section 50 to contract carriages, section 53 to private carriers and section 55 to public carriers. In all these sections, it is stated that the Provincial Transport Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse permits, have regard to the matters mentioned in that particular section. Words like "inter alia", "among others" are conspicuous by their absence. Sections 47 and 51 contain a number of grounds and some of them are of a very general nature. In spite of this there if no residuary clause in either section. The Motor Vehicles Act is a carefully prepared document. Considering that it is usual to use some general or residuary words in provisions of the nature with which we are dealing, it is a legitimate inference that the absence of such words is inten tional. Sections 48, 51 and 56 say "after consideration of the matters set forth in * * * * * ". In these sections too there are no general residuary words and it appears that such words are being scrupulously avoided. (4) In the case of contract carriages, i.e. in section 50, grounds mentioned in sections 47 and 55 do not appear and this omission can obviously be nothing but deliberate. One of the matters omitted is the interest of the public generally. Instead of interest of the public generally, we find in section 50 the words "the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest" which is obviously a comparatively limited expression. (5) Section 53 specifically provides that in case the permit of a person (as private carrier) has been suspended or revoked, that may be the reason for the refusal of his application for a private carrier's permit. This would suggest that in the absence of such a provision the revocation or suspension of a previous permit would not be a ground for refusal of an application for permit. There is no similar provision in the case of stage carriage, contract carriage and public carrier's permits. If the omission is deliberate (as it ought to be unless we were to hold that the Legislature is behaving in a negligent way), then the fact that a person's permit for a contract carriage, a stage carriage or a public carrier has been revoked or suspended is no ground for refusal of a fresh application for a permit. What is very important in this connection and which should really clinch the matter is the reference in subsection (3) to subsection (1). It says "notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1)" which means that were it not for sub section (3), subsection (1) would have debarred the taking into consideration of the revocation or suspension of a previous license. Now subsection (I) only lays down like section 50 that in granting or refusing a permit the Provincial Transport Authority shall have regard to the matters specified therein. A reference to this subsection in subsection (3), therefore, means that the considerations for the grant or refusal of a permit specified in this subsection would be exhaustive. If they were not, the reference to this subsection in subsection (3) would be without any meaning. (6) If the intention was to consider any matter apart from those specifically referred to in sections 47, 50, 53 and 55, there would be provision for its being included in the appli cations for permits because the Transport Authority considers only the applications and the representations mentioned in sections 47, 50 and

55. The representations should relate only to the matters which are specified in these sections. In respect of contract carriage permits, the matter has been clarified in section 50 for the section says that representation is only to be with respect to the sufficiency of the permits already issued though in the other sections on account of a number of matters to be considered, this has not been made clear. Section 57 provides the procedure for hearing of applications for permits and according to subsection (3) of that section in case of stage carriage and public carriers permits date of hearing is to be fixed only for consideration of "the application and any representations received". In the case of a contract carriage permit, the Transport Authority "may take such steps as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the representations". In the case of private carriers' permits there is no provision for any representation or for the fixing of a time or place for the hearing of the application and considering subsection (3) of section 53 to which reference has already been made, it seems clear that only matters in subsection (1) are to be con sidered. (7) The rules framed under the Act too do not refer to any other matter which may be considered by the Transport Authority. On the other hand, they fully confirm the inference derived from the provisions of the Act that the only matters to be considered are those specifically mentioned in sections 47, 50, 53 and

55. As rules 45 and 46 will show, applications for permits for contract carriages, when there is no representation, or for private carriers' permits, may be decided not in a meeting but by circulation among members of the Transport Authority. If the matter is to be decided by circulation, the only information given to the members is of the particulars stated in the application. Rule 49 (c) only provides that a person who has made a representation under section 50 may be heard which obviously means in support of that representation. Even in the case of a stage carriage permit, if there is no representation even after the publication of the application the matter can be decided by circulation without a meeting. Rule 45 (i) empowers the Transport Authority to delegate to its Secretary the power to grant permits for contract carriages. It appears to us clear that while deciding applications for various permits under the Motor Vehicles Act a Transport Authority can (in addition to fitness of the vehicles, take into consideration only the matters enumerated in sections 47, 50, 53 and 55 and no others.

12. We have taken into consideration the effect of our interpretation. The effect is that the suspension of a previous permit will not stand in the way of the Provincial Transport Authority granting a fresh permit even for the same vehicle to an applicant. At first sight, it appeared to us that this should be a matter for consideration in connection with the grant of a permit and that it will not be reasonable that in spite of a suspension or revocation the applicant should be entitled to the issue of afresh permit for the same vehicle if the number of vehicles needed for meeting the public demand was not exceeded. On a full consideration, however, we have reached the conclusion, that the Motor Vehicles Act does not, except in cases falling, under section 53, make the revocation of the previous licence an obstacle in the way of issuing a fresh permit. This appears to have been done deliberately for revocation of a permit may, in a large number of cases, not have any effect on the issue of a fresh permit. A permit may have been cancelled because the driver charged more fare than was allowed under the rules or because the fare meter was not properly working or there was some other requirement in respect of the vehicle which was not I complied with. In the conclusion which we have reached we are supported by a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court Mod Lal v. Uttar Pradesh Government (A I R 1951 All. 527). In that case permits had been refused by the Provincial Transport Authority on the ground that the Government intended to run its own vehicles and it was held by the learned Judges that this did not constitute a legal ground on which the refusal could have been based.

13. We have accepted the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Provincial Transport Authority only fixed in the case of contract carriages, the number of vehicles that is required for being run as taxis, the type of taxi that has to be used and the conditions which should be complied with for plying of taxis. In fact we cannot think of any other matters which the Provincial Transport Authority could reasonably have taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue a permit. The Provincial Transport Authority cannot be expected to go into the question as to which of the two applicants is financially in a better position or is better behaved. So far as the fitness of a vehicle is concerned, we may explain that we do not exclude the possibility of the Provincial Transport Authority refusing a permit on that ground in spite of the fact that it is not one of the matters mentioned in section 47 etc. and is really the concern of the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The moment a vehicle becomes unfit, its registration becomes void under section 38 of the Act. Normally the Transport Authority will not concern itself with the fitness of a particular vehicle but if the registration of a vehicle becomes void when it becomes unfit, the Transport Authority is not bound to issue permit to a vehicle whose registration is void. In fact, it may not issue a permit unless a valid registration exists. In this way the unfitness of a vehicle will become a ground for refusal of a permit.

14. We accept, therefore, the second contention of the petitioners in these three Writ Petitions and hold that the Provincial Transport Authority had no power to promulgate a general order that applications must relate to new cars or to fleets of ten. They had no power to pass this order, firstly, because they cannot frame any general rules and must determine each application presented to them on its merits and, secondly, because the only matters which they are entitled to consider when deciding the applications are those mentioned in section 50 and the orders which they pass should be within section

51. We want to add at the same time that apart from the question of the exhaustiveness of the matters referred to in section 50 the refusal to entertain an application on the ground that it is not accom panied by applications for nine other permits by the same owner is not in accord with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Transport Authority is bound under the Motor Vehicles Act to consider an application for one permit. It is necessarily implied in the provision which entitles any person to apply for a permit that the filing of applications for more permits cannot be a condition precedent for entertaining an application for one permit.

15. The next question to be considered is as to what is the order to be passed. The Provincial Transport Authority has not as yet passed any orders on the application for permits filed in these three cases. The petitioners have only been told that because of the decision taken by the Provincial Transport Authority their applications will not be considered. The Provincial Transport Authority are bound under the law to decide the applications. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no legal right in the petitioners which is being infringed, and, therefore, a mandamus cannot issue. We will assume for a moment that there is no right inherent in every citizen to carry on whatever business he wants to. The right to have an application for a permit decided does exist. As held in Kings v. London Counly Council (1951 A E R 257) it is the right of every person in a case where there is public duty cast on a public servant to decide a matter which will affect the interest of a citizen, to have the application decided. This is a legal right which can be subject of enforcement by means of a writ of mandamus. Writs of mandamus are not issued only for protection of rights of property or status. They are also issued to enforce the right to have a matter decided. The right to have a matter decided means a right to have a matter decided in accordance with law. If there be a consideration on which a public officer is going to act in deciding a matter and by law he cannot take that matter into consideration, a mandamus can be issued to him to exclude such matters for consideration. That is involved in the right of the person concerned to have an application determined in accordance with law. He has a right that the public officer should take into consideration only the matters which the law requires him to consider and give a decision on their basis. A mandamus will, therefore, be issued in these three cases to the Provincial Transport Authority to decide the applications of the petitioners in spite of the fact that they are not for fleets of ten, and to exclude it from consideration that they are not for brand new vehicles.

16. The next petition to be considered is Writ Petition No. 393 of 1958. In this case an application for a permit as taxi had been submitted in respect of an autorikshaw which had been registered in Dacca. To this application the Provincial Transport Authority gave the following reply :‑ "With reference to your application dated 3‑6‑1958 re garding registration of Motor Cycle Rickshaw. You are hereby informed that new registration of Motor Cycle Rickshaw is allowed only in respect of those rickshaws which are purchased on permits issued by the Chief Commissioner; Karachi". This order is attacked by the petitioner on the ground that the reason for refusal of registration is one which cannot in law constitute a reason. The Provincial Transport Authority, it is contended, are not concerned with whether the purchase was on permit issued by any authority. In any case, they cannot make it a condition precedent to registration as taxi that the rickshaw should have been purchased on a permit issued by the Chief Commissioner. On behalf of the Provincial Transport Authority it is conceded that this reply had been given to the petitioner on account of directions given by the District Magistrate of Karachi and the Chief Commissioner, Karachi. On the 5th of June 1957, the District Magistrate, Karachi, wrote a letter to the Provincial Transport Authority which said :‑ "With a view to preventing blackmarketing, it is hereby ordered that no motor‑cycle rickshaw will be registered unless the papers supporting the purchase of the vehicle have been endorsed by the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat."

17. On the 20th of February 1958, the District Magistrate conveyed to the Provincial Transport Authority the following order of the Chief Commissioner :‑ "That with a view to preventing blackmarketing in motor cycle rickshaw, only those motor‑cycle rickshaws should be registered as taxis for which permits have been issued by the Chief Commissioner". It will be observed that so far as registration as taxi is concerned, it is, according to the second order reproduced above, only motor‑cycle rickshaws purchased on a permit issued by the Chief Commissioner that such a registration can take place. So far as the ordinary registration of motor rickshaws is concerned, it is only when purchase of such rickshaws is endorsed by the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat that such registration takes place. The Chief Commissioner's office endorses only those purchases of rickshaws which are made on permits or from authorised dealers. The result is that if a motor cycle is converted into a rickshaw in Pakistan, it is to be denied even ordinary registration.

18. It is accepted by the Provincial Transport Authority that they regard these orders as orders of the Provincial Government which they were bound to obey and they have been obeying them. It is in obedience to these orders that they are refusing registration to motor rickshaws.

19. So far as ordinary registration is concerned, as these directions were in conflict with section 27 of the Motor Vehicles Act which gives a right of registration without regard to whether the rickshaw was constructed in Pakistan or outside, an offer has now been made on behalf of the Provincial Transport Authority that they shall register the motor rickshaws. So far as the permit as a taxi is concerned, they put forward two objections. The first is that they are bound by the orders of the Provincial Government which means the Chief Commissioner in this case, and secondly, that they have already fixed the maximum number of motor rickshaw taxis at 2,000 and they cannot exceed that number. They admit that they have exceeded that number in some other cases but this they say had been done under the orders of the Chief Commissioner.

20. We have already discussed the question as to whether the Provincial Transport Authority can consider any matter outside section 50 when granting permit for a contract carriage and we have held that it cannot consider any other matter. Even if we bad not held that, we would be quite prepared to hold that the consideration whether a taxi was purchased on a permit issued by the Chief Commissioner is wholly foreign to the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor Vehicles Act cannot possibly intend that a person should be refused a permit for a rickshaw because he had purchased it on a permit which he had obtained from the Controller of Imports or some other competent authority and not from the Chief Commissioner, Karachi. In fact it is not even necessary to go into the question as to whether this is a good ground for the Provincial Transport Authority for they have not themselves made it a ground. They are just obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner and they have not decided the matter themselves. They have abdicated their functions in favour of the Chief Commissioner. This they are not entitled under the law to do. They must apply their own mind in respect of matters which are within their cognizance and take a decision themselves. Even the fact that the Chief Commissioner is an appellate authority does not entitle them to reject an appli cation on the ground of a general order passed by the Chi e f Commissioner. An appellate authority cannot merely because it happens to be an appellate authority, give general directions to the original authority as to how matters are to be decided.

21. As regards the limitation of 2,000 vehicles, which is said to have been imposed by the Provincial Transport Authority, it cannot be denied that such an order can be made by them in exercise of their powers under section 51 (a). True they have transgressed this limit themselves, but they say that was done under the orders of the Chief Commissioner and the fact that they have acted illegally in some cases does not mean that they cannot henceforth act in accordance with law and refuse permits on the ground that the maximum limit has been reached. But they have not as yet passed any orders rejecting the application on the ground that the maximum limit has been reached. The order that they passed in this case was based on the sole ground that this rickshaw had not been purchased on a permit issued by the Chief Commissioner. The application of the petitioner had in this case been submitted on the 3rd of June 1958 and even the order rejecting it was passed on the 25th of June 1958, whereas the decision as to fixing of a number had been taken on the 30th June 1958. The only order passed on the application, is, therefore, not in accordance with law and the Provincial Transport Authority has to pass another order. This will give the petitioner a right of appeal and it may be that the Chief Commissioner on appeal does issue a permit. This petition also succeeds and we direct the Provincial Transport Authority to decide the application of the petitioner without regard to whether the motor rickshaw was purchased on a permit issued by the Chief Commissioner or not.

22. In Writ Petitions Nos. 574 and 575 of 1958, applications had been submitted for registration as taxis of six motor‑cycle rickshaws, three applications being the subject‑matter of each writ petition. To these six applications, the petitioners received replies which are in the following form : "There is no objection to the registration of this motor‑cycle rickshaw Ch. No. * * * * Engine No. * * * * as a taxi, if it is according to the specification submitted to the Government. The vehicle should be put on road within one month". This letter is called a no‑objection certificate. Learned counsel who appears for the respondents accepts that after the certificate was issued, all that was to be done was that the vehicle was to be produced and a permit would issue as a matter of course. However, when the vehicles were produced, the petitioners were told that they could not be registered as taxis because in the meantime the directions issued by the District Magistrate and the Chief Commissioner referred to above had been received and the petitioners were directed to get no‑objection certificates from the Chief Commissioner. They applied to the Chief Commissioner for no‑objection certificates but they were told that as the rickshaws for which applications had been made were only motor cycles converted into motor rickshaws no‑objection certificates could not be granted as permission for conversion of motor cycles into rickshaw had not been obtained beforehand from the Chief Commissioner.

23. The reply of the Provincial Transport Authority to these petitions is the same as that in respect of Writ Petition No. 393 of 1.958 and our decision too is to be the same. The fact that the motor cycles had been converted into rickshaws cannot legally constitute a ground for the Provincial Transport Authority refusing permits The Provincial Transport Authority has not as yet passed any final orders in these cases and they are bound to pass orders. Whether the maximum number should be allowed to exceed is not a matter with which we are at present concerned for no orders have on this ground been passed. When they pass orders, the petitioners shall have a right of appeal to the Chief Commissioner. A mandamus will, therefore, be issued to the Provincial Transport Authority to pass orders on these applications.

24. There remains Writ Petition No. 81 of 1958. The peti tioner in this case is a widow who purchased an auto‑rickshaw on the 12th June 1957, under a permit issued by the Controller General of Prices. When she approached the Secretary, Transport Authority, for a permit, she was told that she should first approach the Chief Commissioner for a no‑objection certificate. She applied to the Chief Commissioner for a no‑objection certificate, the first time on the 17th June 1957 and second time on the 28th June 1958. She has as yet received no reply from the Chief Commissioner. The Provincial Transport Authority refused to consider the application till a no‑objection certificate was obtained. The result is that the Provincial Transport Authority is not prepared to consider the application till a no‑objection certificate from the Chief Commissioner is received and the Chief Commis sioner has not given at all a reply to the application for a certificate.

25. On behalf of the Chief Commissioner it is urged that he is not bound at all to grant any certificate under any law. That is quite correct. But if he is not bound to grant a certificate under any law, then surely the Provincial Transport Authority also cannot impose it as a condition that the application for a permit will not be considered till a. no‑objection certificate is produced. They have to decide the application without reference to any such consideration.

26. In this petition too the objection as to the number of vehicles being exceeded has been taken, but the Provincial Transport Authority has to decide the application in any case. It is only when they decide the application that the applicant will have a right of appeal. We may point out to the Provincial Transport Authority that in this case as well as in the cases mentioned above applications had been submitted before the decision to limit the number of motor rickshaws, and they have been registering taxis in excess of the number even on applications filed after the decision.

27. In Writ Petition No. 81 of 1958 also we issue a mandamus to the Provincial Transport Authority to decide the application of the petitioner.

28. All these writ petitions succeed. The petitioners shall have their costs in all cases. A. H. Petitions accepted.