1988 PLP 91 (SCMR)

SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the appellant could in proceedings under section 59 of the Employees' Social Security Ordinance X of 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance challenge the vires of the notification issued under subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance, and if so, whether that notification is in fact ultra vires the Ordinance.

2. The appellant is a small Printing Press employing a fluctuating number of workers, their number remaining the neighborhood of ten at a time. The Government of Sind by a Gazette (Extraordinary) notification dated 24-1-1977 under subsection (3) of section 1 applied certain specified provisions of the Ordinance to the establishment of the appellant. The protests of the employees and the employers proved of no avail. A notice of demand dated 21-5-1977 was served on the appellant and coercive recovery with penalty threatened. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 59 of the Ordinance challenging the application of the Ordinance to it, the demand notice served and the threatened coercive recovery. The only question argued before the Sind Social Security Court was that the impugned notification is discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, as other similar establishment in the locality were left out and the provisions of the Ordinance were applied to the appellant alone. The Social Security Court disposed of this question in the manner appearing hereunder:- "The question raised before the Court is not covered by section 57 of the said Ordinance and this Court, therefore, cannot give a finding as to whether the notification in question violates Article 25 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the Government has not been made a party in this matter. In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed." In the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 64 of the Ordinance the appellant took up the pleas that its workers were already in the enjoyment of greater benefits than were allowed to them under the Ordinance, that their wishes in the matter were not ascertained and finally that the impugned notification was ultra vires .subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. At the stage of admission of appeal the following submission was noted:- "The point of law urged by the learned counsel is that under section 1 subsection (3) of the Social Security Ordinance, 1965 the Government is empowered to apply the aforesaid Ordinance only to a class of industries or establishments and not to individual establishments of their choice leaving aside the other establishments of the identical nature situated in the same areas, as such action would be discriminatory and would violate Article 25 of the Constitution. The contention raised requires consideration. Admit, Notice."

3. At the hearing of the appeal three questions of law were taken up. The first was that the notification was ultra vires of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance as it individualized and particularized the establishment of the appellant. On its own words subsection (3) of section 1 permitted such an action only in respect of class of establishments, or a class of industries and not in respect of individual establishment or individual industry. The second contention was that even if subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance permitted such individualized action, or under its cover the Government by its notification without reasonable classification discriminated against any individual industry or establishment then such action violated Article 25 of the Constitution and was ultra vires. The third ground was that these two grounds could lawfully be raised before the Social Security Court in view of clause (f) of Section 57 of the Ordinance.

4. The learned Judge in the High Court while dismissing the appeal held that clause (f) of Section 57 of the Ordinance must be given a restricted meaning as held in Sind Employees' Social Security Institution v. Mumtaz Ali Taj P L D 1975 S C 450 and cannot be extended "to include the fundamental question whether the Ordinance itself was legally applicable to a particular establishment". The Social Security Court being a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction was held not competent to adjudicate on the vires of the notification. It was further held that by its language subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance permitted application of Ordinance by notification to individual establishment or industry and class requirement was confined to persons and did not extend to industry or establishment. As regards the violation of Article 25 of the Constitution the learned Judge the earlier part of the Judgment observed "I would deal with this question at a later stage of this judgment but for the present I will consider first the other limb of the argument advanced by the learned counsel". After holding that such a question of law could not be raised before the Social Security Court, the learned Judge did not advert to it.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has, apart from the contentions already noted, made a grievance of the fact that having reserved a finding on the legal question concerning Article 25 of the Constitution and not adverting to it again in the judgment, the learned Judge has left the impugned judgment incomplete. It was a serious question of law of constitutional importance, and as noted in the judgment itself "a large number of reported cases" were cited in support of the submission. It, therefore, needed decision. In support of his contention concerning violation of Article 25 he has referred to decision in the following cases. Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali v. State P L D 1975 S C 506, Muhammad Swaleh v. M/s. United Grain and Fodder Agencies P L D 1964 S C 97, Jabindra Kishore Achharya Chaudhry v Province of East Pakistan P L D 1957 S C 9, Waris Meah v. The State P L D 1957 S C 157, East and West Steamship Co. v. Pakistan P L D 1958 S C 41, Nasir Hussain Hashmi v. Capital Development Authority P L D 1977 Lahore 148, The Barbers' Association v. Province of Punjab P L D 1976 Lahore 769, K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone P L D 1976 Lah. 1097, Nagpur Improvement Trust v Vithal Rao AIR 1973 S C Lah. 639; Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and another v. The State of Bihar AIR 1953 S C 215, The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and another AIR 1952 S C 75, Din Diyal v. State A I R 1956 All. 520, Blupendra Kumar Bose v. The State of Orissa A I R 1960 Orissa 46 Deodat Rai and others v. State AIR 1958 All. 718; V.G. Row v. The State of Madras AIR 1951 Madras 147, Southern Railway Company v. Samuel E. Greene 216 US 400; Yick Wo v. Pater Hopking 118 U S

356. The appellant has illustrated to extent and manner of discrimination by listing in para 3 of the Memo of Appeal filed under Section 64 of the Ordinance, similar other Printing Presses in the same locality not covered by the notification. That para reads as hereunder: "That the said notification is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution is so far as the appellant establishment has been signed out by inclusion under the scheme leaving the other establishments of this kind, namely:- (1) Minerve Printers- (2) Delux Printers (3) Hamdam Printers. (4) Akbari Art Printers. (5) Shaheen Packages. (6) Asian Printers. (7) Idrees Printing Press. (8) Printage. in the same area. This notification is, therefore, not only ultra vires of the Social Security Ordinance 1965 but also violated of this Article as it is discriminatory and has not treated the appellant's establishment equally in the eye of law . In addition, according to the learned counsel for the appellant even if the Social Security Court had limitations on its jurisdiction and the Constitution question raised was outside its purview, as appeal under Section 64 lay to the High Court which was a superior Court, a Court of Record, having extensive plenary jurisdiction and it could examine the question oblivious of the jurisdictional limitations of the Social Security Court. In support of this submission the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following decisions:- (i) Mr. Fazlul Qadir Chaudhry v. Mr. Muhammad Abdul Haque P L D 1963 S C 486. (ii) Khan Umar Khan v. Mar et Committee Into, P L D 1972 Lahore 497. (iii) Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan P L D 1981 Karachi 290. (iv) M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan P L D 1980 SC 22. (v) M.H. Shamim v. Pakistan P L D 1980 S C 37. (vi) Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan P L D 1975 S C 331. (vii) Sharif Hussain v. Hav. Pir Bakhsh 1983 S C M R 857. (viii) Iqan Ahmad Khurram v. Government of Pakistan P L D 1979 Karachi 610. (ix) Fazal Elahi Ejaz v. Government of Punjab P L D 1977 Lah. 549. (x) Muhammad Hashim Khan v. Province of Baluchistan P L D 1976 Quetta 59. (xi) Bhagwan and others v. Chabil Das AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 170. (xii) Messrs British India Engineering Works v. Mr. Akhtar Hussain Khan and others P L D 1959 Karachi

403. The specific questions of law noted in the leave granting Order are whether the impugned notification of the Sind Government is not violative of the requirement of subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance under which it professedly issued and whether subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance is itself not ultra vires in view of its conflict with Article 25 of the Constitution. The first contention, in order to be intelligible, requires reproduction of the provisions of the law itself. It is in the following words:- "(1) (1) .. (2) (3) It shall come into force at once but shall apply only to such areas, classes of persons industries or establishments, from such date or dates, and with regard to the provision of such benefits as Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf. " The relevant portion of the impugned notification published in the Sind Government Gazette, Extraordinary on 24th of January, 1977 is as hereunder:- "No. SOG (Lab) 6-21/74 (Pt.II).--In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 1 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 (West Pakistan Ordinance of 1965), the Government of Sind are pleased to apply the said ordinance with immediate effect to the employees and the employers, of the establishments mentioned in the schedule below, and to order that the employees of the said establishment and their dependents will be entitled to the benefits to the extent and in the manner provided in sections 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the Ordinance:- S. No. Name of the Establishment Address 46 M/s. Standard Printing Press Zarie Manzil Demola Road near Pakistan Chowk, Karachi" The contention of the appellant throughout has been that the qualifying word "classes of" appearing before the word persons in subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance should be read as equally controlling and qualifying the subsequent words also like "industries or establishments". If this view is accepted then certainly the impugned notification does not conform to such a requirement. The impugned notification applies the specified provisions of Ordinance to the industries or establishment by particularizing them by name and address and does not adopt the area, the locality the class of persons or any intelligible classification of the industry or establishment itself. This is more clear from the assortment of industries or establishments covered by it there being only two printing presses, others are cafe and restaurants, filling and refuelling and service stations, construction companies, textiles, silk, garments and fancy fabrics, manufactures soap factory and trading corporations, packers and leather grafter, etc. located all over Karachi. The learned Judge in the High Court rejected such an interpretation observing as hereunder:- "Be that as it may, the contention that in subsection (3) of Section 1 the word 'classes' qualifies the words 'industries' or 'establishments', is plainly untenable on a bare reading of the subsection. It was surely the intention of the law that the Ordinance be extended, subject to the discretion of the Government to particular industries or establishments if Section 70 of the Ordinance is perused alongwith subsection (3). In Section 70 the legislature has not used the word 'classes' and has clearly referred to a situation where the Ordinance is 'applied to some areas or establishments, but not to other areas or establishments'. It seems the learned counsel overlooked Section 70 in advancing this argument."

7. The legal argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant has to be examined from all aspects concerning the construction of statutes. The first elementary principle to be noted is, what has come to be known as "golden rule", stated in the following words in Statute Law by Edward Wilberforce (page 112):- "The result of these several statements is that construing any statute the Court should adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to their grammatical construction, unless the words when so read produce some manifest absurdity or injustice, inconsistency, inconvenience or incongruity: or unless the meaning so given be repugnant to the context, or at variance with the intention of the Legislature as it is stated expressly or by implication, or as it may be collected from other parts of the same statute." Applying this principle and keeping intact the structural grammatical integrity of the statutory provision, the relevant portion makes the reading as hereunder:- "Shall apply only to such areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments, as Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf." On its plain language there is no scope for contending that the expression "classes of" should be carried forward to govern not only the persons but also the "industries" and "establishments".

8. The meaning canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant can be obtained only by slightly changing the arrangement (punctuation) as hereunder:- "Shall apply only to such areas, classes of, persons, industries, or establishments as Government may by notification specify in this behalf." Without a change, or such a change, the results canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot follow. As there is nothing manifested in the statute prompting a change in the language to achieve this meaning, it cannot be embarked upon while interpreting this statutory provision. There is another aspect of the matter, punctuation of statute is not traditionally regarded as its essential part and it can be disregarded or supplied. But as noted by Crawford in Construction of Statutes section 199 "Where a statute is ambiguous, its punctuation may and should be considered and given weight especially where the act is carefully punctuated. If the punctuation is in accord with the suggested meaning of the statute it is an important additional reason for the acceptance of that meaning. It should be given weight, unless, from the inspection of the whole statute, it is apparent that the punctuation must be disregarded in order to arrive at the legislative intention". The Ordinance under consideration is not only a modern statute which are generally well-punctuated but is itself copiously and carefully punctuated. Giving the punctuation is its due place and effect the provision poses neither difficulty nor ambiguity in its interpretation.

9. Reverting to the plain, literal, grammatical construction, the word "or" used between "establishments" and "industries" in the statutory provision is a disjunctive particle which is used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two more things. As defined in Black's Dictionary the word "or" has to be used as a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things". Ordinarily, therefore, such a use of the word "or" as has been done in this provision indicates a disjunctive effect, a distributive sense of the words used and the sort of connection sought to be established by the learned counsel or the appellant cannot exist where the word "or" has been so used. It is not the contention, and cannot be in the context, that "or" here has the meaning of the word "and", which sometimes in statutory instruments it has. In order to ascertain the intention and purpose of the legislation, it is necessary to read the various provisions of the statute, so as to construe it as a whole. Subsection (1) of Section 70 of the Ordinance reproduced hereunder not only specifically mentions the provision under examination but also gives an indication of its scope and mechanism:- "70(1). Where, in respect of any group of undertakings producing a particularly type of product or performing a particular type of service, this Ordinance is, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 1, applied to some areas or establishments, but not to other areas or establishments, Government may, after consultations with the Institution by a notification levy on the employers in the areas or establishments to which the Ordinance is not applied, notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance, a special tax to be paid to the Institution at such rate, not exceeding per centum of the total wages paid by the employer at such times and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed." Instead of classes of industries or establishment "any group of undertakings producing a particular type of product" has been used and clearly it is visualized that a notification under subsection (3) of Section 1 may not apply to some of the establishments within the group. The word "some" has the dictionary meaning of "one or other". Where such a selective notification issues a special levy can be imposed on those not covered by notification but included in group merely because they belong to the group or class and yet remain excluded from the notification. Subsection (1) of Section 70 of the Ordinance in unequivocal terms recognizes a state of affairs which on the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot ever be allowed to come into existence. The next argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the law itself (subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance) is ex facie violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. It has to be seen whether it is so. Article 25 of the Constitution provides as under:- "25(1). All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. (2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone. (3) Nothing in its Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the protection of women and children."

10. The law (the Ordinance) complete in all respects was enacted and placed on the statute book Its application was, however, referred, and left to the Government. Its progressive application and extension was envisaged. Such a provision has an established place in the modern legal systems. In Sobho Cyanchandani v. Crown P L D 1952 F C 29 the following observations touching such a legislation were made: - "When a law is made to take effect on the happening of a certain event, the Legislature in effect declares the law but leaves it to an external agency to bring it into force, whenever it considers" it expedient to do so. A law may be regarded as inexpedient in certain events, but expedient if certain events should take place. In passing conditional Legislation, the Legislature completely performs the duties which are imposed by the constitution upon it. That is, it places legislation on the Statute Book, and the only function that it delegates to an external authority is to bring the legislation into force if certain events should happen and the enforcement of the legislation should be considered necessary. Even if the legislation is not brought into force if remains on the Statute Book to be utilized, when and if necessary." A.K. Brohi, in Fundamental Law of Pakistan has commented on the subject in the following words:- "When the law is full and complete when it leaves the legislative chamber but only the operation of it is made dependent on the fulfilment of some specified condition, and what is delegated to an outside body is merely the authority to be determined by the exercise of its own judgment whether or not the condition thus specified has been fulfilled, we have a case of what is called 'conditional legislation' having been enacted by the Legislature, and upon the determination of the existence of the condition by the body named therein, the law becomes effective. The principle on which this is said to be permissible is that the Legislature is thereby not delegating its power to make a law but is only delegating the power to determine some facts or state of things upon which the law-making organ makes or intends to make its own action dependant. In the words of an American Judge (see 1873, (13) American Reports 716 at page 722). "To deny this would be to stop the wheels of Government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend, which cannot be known to the law-making power and must, therefore, be a subject of enquiry and determination outside Halls of Legislature." In an Australian case Baxter v. Ah. Way (1909) 8 CLR 626 (at p.637) the following principle was enunciated:- "The aim of all legislatures is to project their minds as far as possible into the future, and to provide in terms as general as possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the application of the law. But it is not possible to provide specifically for all cases and therefore, legislation from the very earliest times, and particularly in modern times, has taken the form of conditional legislation, leaving it to some specified authority to determine the circumstances in which the law shall be applied, or to what operation shall be extended, or the particular class of persons of goods to which it shall be applied."

11. In a case from Indian Jurisdiction Edward Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 S C 25 the appropriate Government had been authorized to add to the schedule any industry or employment to which provisions of Minimum Wages Act could be applied. Such a reservation of power, for the Government was held to be in conformity with the principles of conditional legislation and the existence for such a provision was justified in the following words:- "Conditions of labour vary under different circumstances and from State to State and the expediency of including a particular trade or industry within the schedule depends upon a variety of facts which are by no means uniform and which can best be ascertained by the person who is placed in charge of the administration of a particular State. It is to carry out effectively the purpose of this enactment that power has been given to the "appropriate Government: to decide, with reference to local conditions, whether it is desirable that minimum wages should be fixed in regard to a particular trade or industry which is not already included in the list. We do not think that in enacting Section 27 the legislature has in any way stripped itself of its essential powers or assigned to the administrative authority anything but an accessory or subordinate power which was deemed necessary to carry out the purpose and the policy of the Act."

12. In another case from Indian Jurisdiction Muhammad Ali and others AIR 1964 S C 980 a similar provision existed in Employees Provident Funds Act applying it to "any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishments which the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette specify in this behalf" which came under attack on the grounds of excessive delegation and as one capable of discriminatory use. It was held after examining various provisions of the Act that the power conferred on the appropriate Government was not 'uncontrolled and unchannelised." In the case of Jibendra Kishore P L D 1957 S C 9 at p.33 the Court while examining a similar provision in East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950 observed as follows:- "The Act challenged in these cases is not discriminatory on the face of it because it does no more than empower the Provincial Government to acquire the interests of such rent-receivers as may be specified in the notification in any district, part of a district or local area, and the Provincial Government could, as it has actually done so far as the present appellants are concerned, acquired the interests of all rent-receivers throughout the Province at one and the same time, and if the law be, as I think it is, that in cases where a statute is not ex facie discriminatory but is capable of being administered in a discriminatory manner, the party challenging the constitutionality of that statute must show that it has actually been administered to the detriment of a particular class and in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner, the appellants' case must fail because the acquisition challenged is not piecemeal but wholesale, and nobody can have any occasion to complain that he or the class to which he belongs has been singled out for a discriminatory treatment. Mr. Das was not able to cite any precedent in support of his assertion that where a statute on the face of it was not discriminatory and could have been applied in an impartial manner, the Court declared it to be invalid on the mere ground that the authorities charged with its administration could have administered it in a partial and unfair manner, and in the absence of any proof that it was in fact administered in such manner." The principle was more clearly stated in following words in East and West Steamship Company's case P L D 1958 S C 41:- "The argument is that section 3 of the Act confers on the Shipping Authority a naked arbitrary, uncontrolled and unqualified power which makes it possible for that Authority to discriminate between one ship owner and another in the matter of granting licences, and that for that reason it offences against Article 5 of the Constitution. After carefully considering the American and Indian precedents and subjecting the argument to a rigorous test we held in that case that where a statute is not ex facie discriminatory but is capable of being administered in a discriminatory manner, the party challenging its constitutionality has to show that it has been administered to the determinant of a particular class or in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner. In the present case, therefore, if the Act be not ex facie discriminatory, the petitioners in order to establish a right to relief are clearly under an obligation to show that the Shipping Authority has administered the Act to their detriment or in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner, but the petition, though it emphasizes the vastness of the powers given by the Act to the Authority, does not at all allege that in the granting of licences it has in fact acted in an objectionable manner. In each of the four complaints there is a distinct allegation that the petitioners never applied for the voyages on which they embarked in an unauthorised manner. This allegation, in the case of two of the ships, namely, Minocher Cowasjee and Firdausa, is denied by the petitioners on affidavit and it is stated that licences for. these ships were applied for and refused. If the petitioners' allegations are true they could have, by taking proper proceedings in the High Court, questioned the improper exercise of discretion by the Shipping Authority, and if it had been made out that Authority made any unreasonable discrimination between the petitioners and others, I have no doubt that the High Court by issuing an appropriate writ would have controlled such improper exercise of that discretion because there can be little dispute about the proposition that where a statutory functionary acts male fide or in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner, the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction has ample power to grant relief to the aggrieved party, and it seems to me to be equally clear that if the allegation be that a statute is being administered by a functionary in a discriminatory manner, his action can be successfully called in question on the ground that it offends against Article 5 of the Constitution. These propositions appear to me to be plain enough and are mere deductions from the special jurisdiction which has been conferred on the High Court by the Constitution. " Finally, in the case of M/s. Jalan Trading Co. AIR 1967 S C 691 the requirements while throwing such a Phallenge were considered in the following words:- "There is a presumption of constitutionality a statute when the challenge is founded on Article 14 of the Constitution, and the onus of proving unconstitutionality of the statute lies upon the person challenging it. Again many classes of employees are excluded by Section 32 and neither those employees, nor their employers, have been impleaded before us. Each class of employees specified in section 32 requires separate treatment having regard to special circumstances and conditions governing their employment. We, therefore, decline to express any opinion on the plea of unconstitutionality raised before us in respect of the inapplicability of the Act to employees described in section 32." In the case under discussion before us the law conferred the power of applying the law by notification on the Provincial Government. The Provincial Government had exercised that power. Such an exercise of the power had aggrieved the appellant. The appellant had, therefore, to array the Provincial Government as a party because it was the Government which was accountable for the exercise of that power. The Institution which alone has been impleaded as a party was required to act on it was not answerable for its validity and effectiveness. Similarly, the establishments or industries in whose favour discrimination had taken place had to be arrayed to establish the identity of the subject-matter. In the absence of it, the nature and the scope of the alleged discrimination could not be fully and satisfactorily adjudicated upon.

13. Finally, there is the question whether the Social Security Court was the appropriate Court and the appellate procedure the appropriate mechanism for getting such a question raised and adjudicated upon. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Social Security Court under Section 61 extends to hear and decide appeals from decisions of the Institution under Section

57. Section 57 enumerates the- subjects on which the H Institution is supposed to give a decision. The vires of a notification issued under subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Ordinance is included neither expressly nor impliedly in it. The residuary clause (f) of Section 57 cannot overreach sweepingly the preceding enumerated clauses as held by this Court in the case of Dr. Mumtaz Ali Taj PLD 1975 SC

450. The right of appeal has been held to be one pertaining to the remedy, and as such not a natural, inherent or vested right. It exists only as a legislative privilege to be granted or withheld as seems best to the law-making body. It is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the cases in which the parties shall be entitled to bring a cause for review, to prescribed the Courts to which causes shall be brought, and to impose such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit. Merely because an additional appeal on a substantial question of law lies to the High Court does not imply that all questions of law, even those which could not be even raised in the lower forums, can for the first time be raised in such final appeal. Even this final appeal to the High Court is under the statute, the Ordinance, and is controlled and governed by the provisions thereof. The term appeal itself indicates "a re-examination by a higher Tribunal of issue determined in the original trial or at least issues which could have been so determined, and it is a misnomer to call it an appeal where the appellate Tribunal may hear and determined issue which the original Court could not have determined and where such determination has the effect of adjudicating such issues which could not be adjudicated by the original officer or Tribunal". Therefore, it is only those questions of law which could legitimately arise in proceedings and could appropriately be subject-matter of adjudication by the Social Security Court which could be brought to the High Court.

14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the right of appeal conferred on the Social Security by section 59 of the Ordinance is by statute limited to matters enunciated in section 57 of the Ordinance. A further appeal on a "substantial question of law" to High Court under section 64 of the Ordinance does not enlarge, rather it limits, the scope of appeals arising on adjudications under section 57 of the Ordinance. Constitutional question of the vires of enacted law and notifications thereunder could not be agitated under section 57 before the Social Security Institution or in appeal under section 59 before the Social Security Court in further appeal under section 64 before the High Court. In any case, the enacted law (Section 1 subsection (3) is not ultra vires for its repugnance with Article 25 of the Constitution. As the challenge to the Government's notification under section 1, subsection (3) of the Ordinance necessarily involves the examination of certain controverted facts and determination thereof it cannot take place in the absence of the Government and the parties in whose favour discrimination was alleged for they could possibly demonstrate that their cases were not similar but distinguishable. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. M.I./S-76/8 Appeal dismissed.