P L D 1965 Dacca 576 (PLP)

SALAHUDDIN AHMAD, J.‑‑This rule is directed against an order of Mr. S. Z. Khan, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, directing that certain permit of the petitioner be cancelled at once and that he should be asked to stop all work and clear out from Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers. The petitioner's case may briefly be stated as follows:‑

In January 1960, the petitioner purchased several timber lots of the de‑reserved Baghaicheri Forest within Kassalong Rehabilitation Area in the Chittagong Hill Tracts at an auction sale and commenced work in the aforesaid lots and in that process cleared up jungles, laid roads, purchased machinery and equipments to facilitate him in the work of cutting We timber and removing the same outside the area. He felled some trees and cut the timber but before he could remove any timber he was stopped from working by respondent No. 4 by his letter dated the 16th of May, 1960. Several representations having been made by the Petitioner, respondent No. 4 allowed the petitioner time for about a month to extract the already felled timber. The petitioner has com plained that the Sub‑Divisional Forest Officer, Publakhali interfered with his work and be therefore could not carry on his work smoothly. On the 21st of December 1962, however, Respondent No. 4 illegally refused the petitioner permission to work his lots. After several unsuccessful representations to various authorities, the petitioner finally succeeded in obtaining from Respondent No. 1, the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Rangamati extension of time till the 30th of April 1964 (vide Annexure C to the petition). The petitioner proceeds to allege that his work was again interfered with by the authorities on one pretext or another until his work of extraction of timber was suddenly stopped in the middle of February 1964. The petitioner asserts that the interference with his work was the result of collusion between persons interested in cutting and removing the timber from the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area and some Forest Officers. These interested persons, who themselves were holders of permits for cutting and removing timber and some of whom were keen to obtain such permits, managed to influence Respondents 1, 3 and 5 against the petitioner by making all sorts of baseless and fabricated reports against him behind his back. They thus succeeded in creating new troubles for the petitioner. The result was that suddenly on the 10th April 1964, the petitioner was served with a copy of the Deputy Commis sioner's order dated the 9th of April 1964, passed in Miscellaneous case No. 54 (D) of 1962‑63 in Memo No. 1039 (5) M dated the 9th April 1964, (i.e., the impugned order Annexure `D' to the petition) stopping the petitioner from working and asking him to leave Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers at once. The petitioner has, therefore, complained that this order has vitally affected his rights as a citizen and has interfered with his right of freedom of movement as well as of pursuing his vocation and to deal with his own property. He has alleged that the impugned order was passed on the basis of false and mala fide reports behind the back of the petitioner at the instance of respondents 3 and 5 in total disregard of all principles of natural justice. The petitioner, therefore, telegraphically addressed a Notice of Demand of Justice to respondent No. 1 who failed to withdraw the impugned order with the result that the petitioner approached this Court and obtained the present Rule Nisi against the respondent. On behalf of the respondents, an affidavit in opposition has been sworn by respondent No. 5 Mr. Ali Haidar Khan, a Deputy Magistrate of Rangamati within Chittagong Hill Tracts. It should be stated here that the petitioner as well as the respondents have filed further affidavits in the case supplementing facts stated in their earlier affidavits. The sum and substance of the statements made in the affidavits in opposition are that the petitioner's contract with the Governor of the Province of East Pakistan in regard to the purchase of the aforesaid lots of timber terminated with the efflux of time and due to breach of condition en the part of the petitioner, and the petitioner, therefore, has no existing right to cut and remove timber from the said lots as claimed by him. It is asserted that due to non‑payments of the purchase money by the petitioner as stipulated in the said contract a Certificate Proceeding had to be started against the petitioner for realisation of the Government dues and the petitioner was asked to stop his work. It is further stated that the life of the agreement between the petitioner and the Government was for nine months only, viz., from 1st January 1960 to 30th September 1960. Between the 16th of May 1960, (i.e. the date when the petitioner was asked to stop his work as mentioned earlier) and the 30th of September 1960, the petitioner neither paid the bid money as stipulated nor prayed for any extension of time. It is claimed that irrespective of the fact whether the petitioner extracted timber or not the money that was due from the petitioner was recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. Although the petitioner paid part of the dues claimed from him as a result of the Certificate Case sometime an April 1961, it was only on the 18th of April 1961, i.e., long after the contract had ceased to exist that the petitioner for the first time asked for an extension of time for extraction of timber, whereupon respondent No. 4 by his memorandum dated the 28th of April 1961, granted the petitioner an extension of time' up to the 31st of May 1961, inter alia on the condition that no further application for extension of time would be entertained unless the instalments amounting to Rs. 8,730 were paid in full. The petitioner, however, even after the expiry of the said period, failed to pay the said instalments. In spite of this failure, however, the petitioner obtained further extension of time up to June 1962, on grounds of personal sufferings and hardships. The petitioner ultimately paid the aforesaid amount of Rs. 8,730 on the 20th of November 1962, and again applied for extension of time which was rejected. Ultimately, however, on the persistent appeals of the petitioner Mr. S. Z. Khan, the then Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts (respondent No. 1), purely on compassionate grounds, granted the former time up to the 18th of October 1963, on certain terms. On the prayer of the petitioner this period was further extended till the 30th April 1964. It is stated that from an account of the Karnafuli Hydro‑electric project at Kaptai a large number of persons has been displaced and it was imperatively and urgently necessary that they should be rehabilitated as soon as possible. The Government, therefore, de‑reserved certain reserved forest areas specially for the purpose of such rehabilitation. It was necessary that this rehabilitation area should be cleared of trees so that plots for the settlement of the displaced people might be carved out and it might be made suitable for their residence. With this object in view the Government put on auction trees in certain lots for the purpose of cutting down and removing them within a given time. It was in pursuance of this scheme that the petitioner had purchased at the said auction right to cut away trees and remove them. It is stated that the lands containing the said lots now form part and parcel of the home steads of the rehabilitated people: Respondent No. 1 received persistent and serious complaints about the high handedness of the petitioner and his gang of labourers which caused serious apprehensions in the minds of those rehabilitated people resulting in exodus of some of them to India from January 1964, to March 1964. Respondent No. 1 was also informed of several unhappy incidents including an incident in which the petitioner took away certain dug‑out boats belonging to the people of the rehabilitated area as a result of which it was alleged two specific criminal cases were pending against the petitioner in the Court of the Magistrate, Kassalong. It is further said that according to the terms of the agreement (clause 9 of the Agreement whatever timber has been left in the said area has now vested in the Government and the petitioner has forfeited all his rights to cut and remove any trees that may have remained uncut. It is submitted that the relations between the petitioner and the Government being contractual in nature, the petitioner was not entitled to seek remedy in a summary procedure of the nature contemplated under Article 98 of the Constitution. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent it has been claimed that the impugned order was passed in accordance with the provisions of rule 51 framed under the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation, 1900. Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury has appeared on behalf of the petitioner and his main contentions are: that rule 51 framed under section 18 of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation is ultra wires the Regulation and in any event the rule does not apply to the facts of the present case 'that the said rule 51 is ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan because it Contravenes the Fundamental Rights particularly Right No. 5, namely, Freedom of Movement, and Right No. 8, Freedom of trade, business or profession. He has further contended that at any rate the impugned order being violative of the Fundamental Rights is illegal. We may state at the outset that in their affidavits both the parties have placed before the Court a mass of contentious matters which cannot be decided in a summary procedure of the present nature. The petitioner acquired right to cut and remove the timber from the lots allotted to him in the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area on the basis of a contract. The sum and substance of the petitioners case is that whatever be his omission and commission the right which he once acquired under the aforessaid contract continues up to the present time and it shall continue until he has finally succeeded in cutting and removing the entire timber from the lots allotted to him, no matter how long it took and no matter how urgently and imperatively the aforesaid Rehabilitation Area was required for the purpose of rehabilitation. On the other hand the respondents have seriously disputed the petitioner's claim to cut and remove the trees from the lots allotted to him. They have challenged the existence of the contract whereon the petitioner has based his claims. Extension of time was granted to the petitioner long after the contract had ceased to be in force and the petitioner was allowed to carry on his work at the sufferance of respondent No. 1 and only with his permission. The time was extended purely on compassionate grounds and the petitioner instead of being grateful tried to bite the hand that fed him. The position taken by the petitioner, on the facts of the present case, appears to be wholly untenable. In the view which we take, we think it inadvisable to go into the merits of the respective cases of the parties. We feel that the right claimed by the petitioner and its denial by the respondents are both based on contract and such contractual right cannot be determined and enforced by an application under Article 98 of the Constitution. We; therefore, confine ourselves to the two main contentions that have been raised by Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury. Before we proceed to consider these contentions it is necessary to state that the said rule 51 was framed at a time when conditions were different and the Chittagong Hill Tracts was regarded as a tribal area. The Chittagong Hill Tracts has now ceased to be a tribal area under the present Constitution with the result that certain restrictions in regard to the application of Central and Provincial Laws to that area and the restrictions in regard to exercise of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the High Court over this area have now ceased to exist. Rule 51 along with other rules were framed under the provisions of the section 18 of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulations (I of 1900). Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdury has drawn our attention to section 18 of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation to show that they do not empower the Government to make a rule of the nature of rule

51. Section 18 runs as follows:‑‑ "

18. Power to Make Rules.‑(1) The Local Government may make rules for carrying into effect the objects and purposes of this Regulation. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may‑ (a) provide for the administration of civil justice in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; (b) prohibit, restrict or regulate, the appearance of legal practitioners in cases arising in the said Tracts; (c) provide for the registration of documents in the said Tracts; (d) regulate or restrict the transfer of land in the said Tracts; (e) provide for the sub‑division of the said Tracts into circles, and those circles into mouzas; (f) provide for the collection of the rents and the administra tion of the revenue generally in the said circles and mouzas through the chiefs and headmen; (g) Define the powers and jurisdiction of the chiefs and headmen, and regulate the exercise by them of such powers and jurisdiction; (h) regulate the appointment and dismissal of headmen; (i) provide for the remuneration of chiefs, headmen and village officers generally by the assignment of lands for the purpose or otherwise as may be thought desirable; (j) prohibit, restrict or regulate the migration of cultivating ratyats from one circle to another; (k) regulate the acquisition by Government of land required for public purposes; (l) provide for the levy of taxes in the said Tracts; (m). regulate the procedure to be observed by officers acting under this Regulation or the rules for the time being in force thereunder; (3) All rules made by the Local Government under this section shall be published in the Calcutta Gazette and, on such publication, shall have effect as if enacted by this Regulation; (4) The powers conferred by this section on the Provincial Government shall be powers of the Central Government as respects rules for the regulation of the following matters, namely:‑ (a) the possession of firearms and ammunition and the manufacture of gunpowder; (b) the cultivation, manufacture and sale for export of opium; and (c) the import or export across customs, frontiers, as defined by the Central Government, of any intoxicating drug or foreign spirit or fermented liquor". Note.‑The functions of the Central Government under sub section (4) of section 18, have been entrusted to the Provincial Government of Bengal (Vide Government of India, Home Department, Notification No. 21/16/39‑Police, dated the 30th March 1939, and Finance Department (Central Revenues) Notification No. 4, dated the 8th April 1939)". Rule 51 runs as follows:‑‑

"

51. Expulsion of Undesirables.‑If the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the presence in the district of any person who is not a native of the district, is or may be injurious to the peace or good administration of the district, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, order such person if he is within the district to leave the district within a given time or if he is outside the district forbid him to enter it. Whoever disobeys or neglects to comply with any order passed under the rule shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." This rule concerns the administration of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulations 1900, have been made to provide for the administration of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and section 3 thereof provides that subject to the provisions of this Regulation, the administration of the Chittagong Hill Tracts shall be carried on in accordance with the rules for the time being in force under section

18. Section 18, which has been quoted above, empowers the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying into effect the objects and purposes of the Regulation. Rules 51 framed under section 18 is therefore perfectly in accordance with the powers which have been given to the Provincial Government to make rules. In regard to rule 51, Mr. Hamidul Huq has further contended that the terms of the rules themselves do not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the petitioner has not been directed to leave the entire district. Under the impugned order the petitioner has been directed to leave the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area only. We do not think there is much substance in this contention for the whole includes the part and if the Deputy Commissioner can expel a person from the entire District he can certainly do so from a part of the District. Mr. Hamidul Huq has concentrated on the contention that provisions of rule 51 come into clash with the Fundamental Rights of Freedom of movement and Freedom of trade, business or profession provided for in Right Nos. 5 and 8 of the Constitution. At this stage, it is necessary to quote the impugned order which runs as follows:‑

"9‑4‑

64. Recently complaints are pouring in against the high‑handedness of Mustafa Ansari and his labourers on local people. S. D. O. (R) and A. R. O. (K) have made serious complaints against them and alleged that the local tribal people have become extremely panicky. In these circumstances his permit need be cancelled at once. He should be asked to stop all work anti clear out from Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers. Copy to S.. P., S. D. O. (R), D. F. O. (N) and A. R. O. (K). (Sd.) S. Z. Khan Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts. Memo. No. 1039 (5)/M, dated Rangamati, the 9‑4‑

64. Copy forwarded to:‑

(1) Mr. M. Ansari, Marishya, Kassalong Rehabilitation Area for information and necessary action. He is directed to stop bis all work and clear out from the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area with his labourers at once. (2) The S. P. Chittagong Hill Tracts. (3) The S. D. O. Rangarah C. H. T. (4) The D. F. O. (North), C. H. T. (5) The A. R. O. Kassalong. for information with a request to look into the matter and take immediate action with an intimation to this office. Sd. (Illegible), 9‑4‑64 Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts." It may be noticed that the order is not a single order but it contains several orders, namely, (1) that the petitioner's permit be cancelled at once; (2) that he be asked to stop all work; and (3) that rte must "clear out from Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers." We are, therefore, required to see whether all the three orders mentioned above, have been passed without lawful authority. So far as the first two orders are concerned, namely, that the petitioner's permit be cancelled at once and that he should be asked to stop all work, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case mentioned above, we have no hesitation in holding that the Deputy Commissioner, who had granted extension after extension to the petitioner and had given him permission to extract timber up to a certain point of time, was perfectly entitled to withdraw the permission and to direct the petitioner to stop all work which the petitioner carried on solely with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. If the petitioner thinks that he is still entitled to carry on the work of extraction of timber from the lots allotted to him and to remain at the site in pursuance of The contract, he may enforce his right in ‑P suitable proceeding before a proper forum. These two orders can by no stretch of imagination be construed as putting any restriction on the petitioner's freedom to pursue his trade, business or profession. In fact Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury had to concede that the petitioner could not enforce his rights based on the contract in the present proceeding. His ultimate and real grievance is that the petitioner could not be asked by the Deputy Commissioner to "clear out from Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers" in contravention of Fundamental Right No. 5 of the Constitution. Reading the entire impugned order as a whole, one may get the impression that all that the order connotes is that the petitioner's permit to carry on the work of extraction has been cancelled and he has been asked to stop all work of such extraction and get out of the site where he has been working along with his Qana of labourers. It however appears from the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order was passed under rule 51 of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation. Learned Advocate‑General who has appeared on behalf of the respondents has also reiterated this position and has said that the order meant that the petitioner and his labourers were expelled frog the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area and that they could not remain in any part of such area. That being so, we have to consider whether rule 51 and the impugned order that admittedly was passed under rule 51 contravene Fundamental Right No. '3 of the Constitution. It seems clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1964 S C 673) that the High Court has not only a right but a duty under the Constitution to pronounce upon the constitutionality of a legislation affect ing a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and not only the right of examining the constitutionality of the executive action. It has been rightly observed that the Constitution itself has declared that all laws inconsistent with the Fundamental rights shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency. It is, therefore, our duty not only to examine the constitutionality of the impugned order but also of the said rule 51 itself. In order to test the validity of the law with reference to Article 6 read with Right No. 5 of the Constitution it is necessary to consider as to what may happen if the law is allowed to have free play. Rule 51 enables the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to put an unlimited restriction on the freedom of a person if the former is satisfied that the latter's presence in the district is or may be injurious to the peace or good administration of the district. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether these are "reasonable restrictions imposed by law in public interest". There is consensus of opinion among the Courts in Pakistan as well as outside, that a restriction is unreasonable if it is for an indefinite or an unlimited period or disproportionate to the mischief sought to be prevented or if the law imposing the restriction has not provided any safeguard at all against arbitrary exercise of power. In the case of Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan Chief Justice Cornelius has observed this at page 713: "Therefore, there need be no hesitation in holding it to be within the concept of the Constitution as well as of the relevant laws of Pakistan that where grave danger to the public safety or public order is involved, reasonable restrictions upon the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution are ensured in respect of per‑emptory executive actions to avert the danger, if opportunity is provided as soon thereafter as may be convenient for exercise by the person affected of the right to represent that the restraint was not justified in relation to the factual requirements of the law applied, or that in other ways the restriction lacked the elements of reasonableness." The following are the observations made in the same case by two other learned Judges:‑ According to S. A. Rahman, J. the nature of the right affected and character of the restrictions in question, the mischief sought to be suppressed and the circumstances in which the restrictions are sought to be imposed, would be the determining factors. Hamoodur Rehman, J. has observed `If the circumstances do not demand such action or the action is disproportionate to the mischief to be prevented and can be exercised without any check, then the restriction will entirely l e unreasonable.' In the light of those observations of the Supreme Court let us test the provisions of rule 51 and see whether they contravene Fundamental Right No. 5 which runs thus:‑-- "

5. Freedom of Movement.‑Subject to any reasonable restric tions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof." We have stated already that rule 51 was passed at a time when the conditions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts were different and the Fundamental Rights provided for in the present Constitution did not exist. The power given to the Deputy Commissioner under the rule is indeed of a sweeping and drastic nature and the mere satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner that the presence in the district of any person who is not a native of the district, is or may be injurious to the peace or good administration of the district is enough to order such persons to leave the district within a given time or if he is outside the district to forbid him to enter it. There is no provision for giving to the aggrieved person any opportunity to show cause why he should not be ordered to leave the district nor is there any provision for the person to be present before the Deputy Commissioner and challenge the source or the veracity of any adverse report ' against the person, on the basis of which the Deputy Commissioner may pass such an order. The rule does not put any limitation on the period during which an order passed thereunder will remain in force. The result is that the Deputy Commissioner can, on the ipse dixit of any person, turn a person out of the district for ever. It is therefore evident that such unlimited power with such far‑reaching consequences and without any check and without remedy of a judicial character provided to the aggrieved person to obtain redress of his grievances do not satisfy‑the test of "any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest". The restriction under the rule is for an indefinite or an unlimited period. It is disproportionate to the mischief sought to be prevented, viz., "is or may be injurious to the peace or good administration of the district". If the person is found so injurious he may still be given art opportunity to show cause why such drastic action as expelling him from the district should not be taken against him. It is difficult to believe that the very salutary powers‑that the authorities possess under the Criminal Procedure Code and the reasonable safeguards provided thereunder are not enough to deal with such a person even if immediate action was felt necessary. Whatever might have been the justification for such an arbitrary and drastic law at a time when Chittagong Hill Tracts was regarded as Tribal Area there is, no justification for a continuance of such measure after the district has ceased to be a Tribal Area and it is brought on par with other districts and since the reintroduction of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution. The rule provides no check or safeguard against an arbitrary exercise of the power. The aggrieved person has no remedy as of right to protest against an arbitrary exercise of such power against him either before the Deputy Commissioner or before anybody else. It is true that under section 17 of Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900, the Commissioner and the Local Government (now the Provincial Government) may revise any order made under the Regulation. But as has rightly been observed by Kaikaus, J. in the aforesaid case that discretionary remedies are no substitute for remedies to which a person has a right even though the discretion be a judicial one. As has been observed by S. A. Rahman, J. representation that may be made in this regard will not be based on a right and can be rejected summarily by the Deputy Commissioner on that basis. Even if due to any urgency of the public need or for practical reasons of administrative efficiency a prior notice or hearing is not feasible at least a like opportunity soon after the order is made could have been provided for ‑ in the rule in question. The discretionary jurisdiction of the Provincial Government to reverse the order of the Deputy Commissioner cannot be regarded as a safeguard or check against an arbitrary exercise of the power by the Deputy Commissioner. The nature of the restriction contemplated by the rule is pre‑emptory expulsion from the district or total embargo on entry into the district. Any disobedience or neglect to obey the order entails imprisonment extending up to two years or with fine or with both. This is clearly an infringement of Fundamental Right No. 5 of freedom of movement. Such drastic infringement or curtailment of the right of a citizen to move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof can only be tolerated under exceptional circumstances and solely and strictly in the public interest. The rule does not satisfy the test of reasonable restrictions. We therefore, find that the said rule 51 is inconsistent with Right No. 5 of the Constitution and to the extent of such inconsistency the rule is void by operation of Article 6 of the Constitution. We may add that we have arrived at this finding having been fully conscious of the principle that in determining the validity of a statute the Court should lean in favour of its validity unless there are compelling reasons to hold otherwise. However undesirable a person may be, he is entitled to rights that are guaranteed to him under the Constitution in the shape of Fundamental Rights. If rule 51 is allowed to have free play, it can set at nought Fundamental Rights that have been guaranteed to a citizen of Pakistan. It follows from what we have said in regard to the inconsistency of rule 51 with Right No. 5 that the Deputy Commissioner has no authority to order the petitioner to clear out from the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area for an indefinite period. The circumstances disclosed in the respondent's affidavit do not disclose the existence of any emergency of such a character as to call for drastic and immediate action without prior notice to the petitioner. No opportunity was ever given to the petitioner even after the impugned order had been passed to controvert or explain at any adverse facts appearing against him. The allegations against the petitioner on which action was taken were of vague and indefinite nature. There was no time limit put to the petitioner's externment. The restriction put on the petitioner is disproportionate to the mischief sought to be prevented. For all these reasons we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order has subjected the petitioner to restrictions that are not reasonable. Mention must be made of the fact that this particular portion of the order is vague and indefinite so far as the labourers of the petitioner are concerned. Rule 51, even if it did not clash with the Constitution, did not contemplate such a vague and indefinite order as the present one. The order can only be passed in respect of a specific person. One might be tempted to ask how this order can be enforced against the unnamed and un-described labourers of the petitioner. For the reasons stated above, we make the rule absolute and declare that the impugned order dated the 9th April 1964, so far as it directs the petitioner "to clear out from the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area along with his labourers" has been passed without any lawful authority and is, therefore, of no legal effect. This, however, does not mean that the petitioner would be at liberty to proceed to extract timber from the lots allotted to him under the contract unless he succeeds in establishing his right in a suitable proceeding. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Certificate prayed for by Respondents under Article 58 of the Constitution is hereby granted as this order involves a substantial question of Law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. SAYEM, J.‑I agree, that the rule should be made absolute in terms proposed by my learned brother, who has pointed out that in this rule actually three orders of the Deputy Commissioner are under challenge. They are: (1) an order cancelling the contract, (2) an order directing the petitioner to stop work, and (3) an order of externment from a particular area within the district, namely, Kassalong Rehabilitation Area. The order, which was specifically addressed to the petitioner by inserting it in the memo, against his name, directed him to "clear out from the Kassalong Rehabilitation Area with his labourers at once". The first two orders, namely, of cancellation of the contract and the direction on the petitioner to stop work involve rights and. obligations arising out of the contract and, as such they can be better agitated and adjudicated upon in a properly framed suit. I am not inclined, therefore, to go into the question of competency of the Deputy Commissioner to pass such orders. It may also be mentioned that Mr. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury conceded at the hearing that it would be proper to leave the petitioner to seek his relief in respect of these two orders by way of a suit. It is, therefore, necessary only to examine if the order of externment is authorised by law. It `was claimed by the learned Advocate‑General that the externment order was passed in exercise of powers conferred on the Deputy Commissioner by rule 51 of the rules framed under the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 (1 of 1900). I am in full agreement with my learned brother that the said rule is ultra vires the Constitution for reasons enumerated by him. Even if it w‑re not so, I would not hesitate to declare the externment order as having been passed without lawful authority, for the simple reason that it was obviously passed without any least regard for the terms of the said rule. The rule provides first, that the person going to be affected can only be one who is not a native of the district, as in the present case, and against whom it is alleged that his presence in the district is or may be injurious to the peace and good administration of the district; secondly, that the Deputy Commissioner must be satisfied as to the truth of the said allegation; and, thirdly, that such a person shall be given some time and he will be required to leave the district within the said given time. The petitioner was given no time. He was asked to leave at once. He was to leave a particular area within the district, so that his presence could not be said to have been considered at the relevant time to be injurious to the peace and good administration of the district. Nothing appears from the order, and nothing was pointed out from elsewhere, to indicate that before passing the order of externment the Deputy Commissioner satisfied himself or even made any attempt for being satisfied as to the truth of the allegations made in the complaints referred to in the order. Above all, the order of externment caste a duty on the petitioner to take others (persons who might be thought to be his labourers) along with him from the area in question. It would be doing violence on the language of the rule, viz. rule 51 to construe it as empowering the Deputy Commissioner to pass such an order. The ord6r must, therefore, be held to be arbitrary. K. B. A. Petition partly accepted.