1994 PLP 161 (SCMR)

"Thus, one of the inevitable consequences of putting Wright material into the public domain, which he both appreciated and accepted,, would be to damage or destroy that confidentiality and thereby interfere in the administration of justice in the proceedings between the Attorney‑General and `The Guardian' and the `Observer"'. Before your Lordships this finding was accepted. Thus, the Judge had "no doubt that it was the intention of Mr. Neil to interfere in the administration of justice by publishing extracts from Spycatcher." Such a conclusion was in the circumstances irresistible. The law: On this brief statement of the essential facts it would seem to me to be a remarkable lacuna in the law of contempt of Court, its very function being to prevent interference with the course of justice, if it provided no remedy to deal with the situation which I have described. Whatever would be the point of a Court making an order designed to preserve the confidentiality of material, the subject‑matter of a dispute between A and B, pending the trial of the action, if at the whim of C, the protection afforded by the Court by its order could be totally dissipated? How then do the appellants seek to justify the existence of what would be a most anomalous situation? Mr. Anthony Lester, at the very forefront of his submissions, contends that it is a well‑established principle of English law that orders are made as between parties to an action and that such orders bind only those parties. Third parties are not, as a matter of principle, bound by decisions or orders in legal actions between other persons. But this has never been in contest between the parties. From the very outset of this litigation, Mr. Laws, for the Attorney- General, has accepted that the publication which he contends was "contemptuous" did not constitute a breach of the 1986 orders made against "The Guardian" and the "Observer"; since the publication was not made by the only persons restrained by the 1986 order, but independently by other newspapers. Mr. Laws has consistently contended that there are two types of contempt. The first is civil contempt, which consists of a breach by a party to proceedings of an order made against him: that is not the present case. The second type is a criminal contempt which consists of conduit which frustrates or impedes the due administration of justice and that, said Mr. Laws, is the present case. His argument was thus recorded by the Vice‑Chancellor in his judgment on the preliminary issue see: Attorney‑General v. Newspaper Publishing Plc. (1988) Ch. 333, 340: Mr. Lester's main contention was that the authorities decide that a third party is not liable for contempt by performing an act prohibited by the Court except where he has aided and abetted (or incited or otherwise assisted) the performance of the act by the party enjoined. I do not accept that this is the correct interpretation of the authorities upon which he relies. The first case relied upon is that of Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Mornington (1848) 11 Beav. 180 and

181. The facts are sparsely reported. An injunction had been granted restraining the Earl of Mornington from cutting timber etc. The terms of the injunction did not extend to his "servants and agents". An application to commit Mr. Batley, the Earl's agent and manager, for breach of the injunction, in cutting down trees and underwood, failed. However, in the following month application was made to commit him for contempt "in being party and privy to, and in aiding and assisting the breach of the injunction" (p. 181). It seems most unlikely that the Earl of Mornington was himself involved in the physical activity of cutting down trees or was being physically assisted therein by his manager, or that the Earl had requested or required his manager so to act. Significantly there were no proceedings against the Earl. In support of the application it was argued: ' "that it was necessary to make amenable' third parties who were instrumental in committing acts in breach of the order and injunction of the Court, or in obstructing its process; otherwise the judicial power of the Court would be crippled and its orders evaded:" p.

182. In the course of the hearing it was made clear that it was not sought to press for committal. The judgment of Lord Langdale M.R. was accordingly brief. He said, at p. 183: "If the matter had been pressed, I should have found it my duty to commit Mr. Batley for his contempt in intermeddling with these matters; sonic of his acts in contravention of the injunction are distinctly proved, though with respect to others there may be some shadow of doubt. Batley in the position in which he was, and knowing the duty of the Earl of Mornington, ought to have taken care not to do any acts, in violation of the order of the Court." I do not treat this as an authority for the limited proposition that it is only where a third party aids and abets the performance of the act by the party enjoined, that he can be liable for contempt. However, it is the next case, Seaward v. Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545 which is particularly relied upon by Mr. Lester. In that case the plaintiff had let to the defendant premises in Fetter Lane with the usual covenant against committing a nuisance or interfering with the quiet enjoyment by the lessor or his under‑tenants of the adjoining or neighbouring premises. An injunction was obtained against the defendant restraining him from committing a breach of this covenant. Thereafter, the plaintiff established that there had been a breach of the injunction by the defendant in holding boxing matches on the premises and accordingly a contempt of Court had been committed by reason of that breach. The plaintiff also sought to commit for contempt a Mr. Sheppard who had been the "Master of the Ceremonies" when the entertainments in question took place. In addition to Mr. Sheppard, it was alleged that a M. Murray, who had been present during the boxing matches, was more than a mere spectator. He was the prime‑mover. Whether or not Mr. Sheppard was his or the defendant's servant or agent was held not to matter. North, J. held that since Mr. Sheppard was actively assisting in what took place and on his own showing was clearly guilty of taking part in the defendant's disobedience to the injunction, he was in contempt of Court. Although he considered that Mr. Murray stood in a somewhat different position, he too had assisted in‑committing a breach of the injunction. He should therefore be punished for his contempt of Court in so doing, equally with the person enjoined. Mr. Murray appealed. In the course of his judgment Lindley, L.J. said at pp. 554‑556. "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the Court has to make an order against Murray. There is no injunction against him‑‑he is no more bound by the injunction granted against Paterson than any other member of the public. He is bound, like other members of the public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice; ...It has always been familiar doctrine to my brother Rigby and myself that the orders of the Court ought to be obeyed, and could not be set at naught and violated by any member of the public, either by interfering with the officers of the. Court, or by assisting those who were bound by its orders.. A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction is one thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of Court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice, is another and a totally different. The difference is very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the other case the Court will not allow its process to be set at naught and treated with contempt. In the one case the person who is interested in enforcing the order enforces it for his own benefit; in the other case, if the order of the Court has been contumaciously set at naught the offender cannot square it with the person who has obtained the order and save himself from the consequences of his act. The distinction between the two kinds of contempt is perfectly well‑known, although in some cases there‑ may be a little difficulty in saying one which side of the line a‑ case falls." In regard to the position of Mr. Murray, Lindley, L.J. said, at p. 556: "[he] was not there present as a mere spectator, but as one of the persons interested. There is not the slightest doubt that he was at the bottom of the whole thing." Rigby, L.J. in his judgment said, at p. 558, that contempt of Court: "is a punitive jurisdiction founded upon this, that it is for the good, not of the plaintiff or of any party to the action, but of the public, that the orders of Court should not be disregarded, and that people should not be permitted to assist in the breach of those orders in what is properly called contempt of Court." Mr. Murray's appeal was dismissed. I agree with the observations of Eveleigh L.J. in Z Ltd. v. A‑Z and AA‑LL (1982) Q.B. 558, 580‑F‑G that the conduct of Mr. Murray was regarded in the Court of Appeal from the standpoint of interference with the course of justice, rather than simply that of aiding and abetting another to do an act which was wrongful in that other, as being a disobedience by him of a Court order. But the importance of the Z Ltd. case is of greater significance. In that case the Court of Appeal considered the impact of a Mareva injunction on a bank holding assets of a defendant against whom the order was made. Particular consideration was given to the position where the bank, but not the defendant who was enjoined, had been served with the order. It was argued that in such a case the bank could 'not be guilty of contempt of Court by disposing of the defendant's assets within its control, since the defendant could not himself be in contempt and the bank could not be aiding and abetting someone who was not himself in contempt. Eveleigh, L.J. said, at p. 578: "I think that the following proposition may be stated as to the consequence which ensue when there are acts or omissions which are contrary to the terms of an injunction (1.) The person against whom the order is made will be liable for contempt of Court if he acts in breach of the order after having notice of it. (2) A third party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the breach, that is to say if knowing the terms of the injunction he wilfully assists the person to whom it was directed to disobey it. This will be so whether or not the person enjoined has had notice of the injunction I will give my reasons for the second proposition and take first the question of prior notice to the defendant. It was argued that the liability of a third party arose because he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. he was an accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which the third party could be an accessory. In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of Court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often been seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of Court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt of another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of Court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the order of the Court to be thwarted." I respectfully agree that the Z Ltd. case (1982) Q.B. 558 shows quite clearly that an act by C can be a criminal contempt even if C is not aiding and abetting B to commit the breach. Indeed this was accepted by the Vice Chancellor in his judgment on the preliminary issue (1988) Ch. 333, 344D. Let it be assumed that a defendant in the Mareva injunction proceedings, anticipating that such proceedings might be instituted, has given instructions to his bank to transfer the balance of his account overseas. Before the bank has the opportunity to carry out those instructions, a Mareva injunction is obtained and immediately brought to the notice of the bank but meanwhile the defendant has disappeared. If Mr. Lester's submission are correct, the bank can cheerfully disregard the terms of the Mareva injunction contending that it, a third party could not be liable for contempt by performing an act prohibited by the Court, since it .cannot, in the circumstances which I have predicated, have aided and abetted the performance of the act by the party enjoined. I cannot accept that such a proposition is either good law or good sense. Mr. Lester has not sought to support Lord Denning's M.R. decision that a Mareva order operated in rem in the same was as an Admiralty order arresting a ship. This was per incuriam See: Cretanor Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Irish Marine Management Ltd. (1978) 1 W.L.R.

960. So much for the main contention of the appellants. I add but a brief comment on three subsidiary contentions. (a) 1t is for Parliament and not the Courts to extend the concept of criminal contempt. I do not accept that your Lordships are being asked by the Attorney‑General to widen the law of criminal contempt. The submission of the Attorney‑General is based upon established principles, to which I have made detailed reference. The issue in this case is whether, in applying those established principles to novel facts, the offence has been established. I agree with the view expressed by Sir John Donaldson M.R. in his judgment on the preliminary issue (1988) Ch. 333, 368D that the application of the established principle to novel circumstances, for example, to the punishment of a witness after he has given evidence (Attorney‑General v. Butterworth (1963) 1 Q.B. 696) is not a case of widening the principle. It is merely a new example of its application. (b) Contempt of Court Act. 1981. It was suggested that section 6(c) of the Act, which provides "Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act ...(c) restricts liability for contempt of Court in respect of conduct intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice," prevents the further development of the law of contempt of Court. Of course it has no such effect. It is but a savings clause. (c) The appellants did not clearly and irrevocably destroy the subject matter of the actions between the Attorney‑General and "The Guardian" and the "Observer." What is principally relied upon was the publication., in the United States. However, the release of the confidential information by "The Sunday Times" was prior in time to the United States'. publication. When "The Sunday Times" published, the object of the Millett injunctions had not effectively been destroyed. Such prior publication as had taken place, principally by "The Independent", was not extensive. On 12th July "The Sunday Times" published extracts from Spycatcher which had not previously been published in the United Kingdom. Accordingly on that date, and to that extent, confidentiality in those extracts was damaged or destroyed. The contempt must be judged as at the date of commission of the acts complained of. It cannot lie in the appellants' mouth to say that somebody else was also going to commit contempt of Court or otherwise render the Court's order useless, therefore, the interference with the course of justice, flagrant as it was on the day when it was p committed, was subsequently hallowed. For the above reasons I too would dismiss this appeal. LORD OLIVER OF AYLMERTON: ‑My Lords, the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of record to ensure the effective administration of justice by punishing contempt of Court has been developed by the common law over centuries. It is as essential as it is ancient, for unless litigants can be accused that the rights which it is the duty of the Courts to protect can be fairly determined and effectively protected and enforced the system of justice necessarily ceases to command confidence and an essential foundation of the structure of civilised society is undermined. The term "contempt of Court" is, perhaps, a less than happy description of the concept, for it can only too easily be, and frequently is, represented as a judge‑made device for the preservation of. the judicial amour propre. As Salmon, L.J. observed in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 2 Q.B. 52, 61: "The inherent power of the Judges of the High Court to commit for contempt of Court has existed from time immemorial. `Contempt of Court' is as unfortunate and misleading phrase. It suggests that i~ exists to protect the dignity of the Judges. Nothing could be further from the truth. The power exists to ensure that justice shall be done. And solely to this end, it prohibits acts and words tending to obstruct the administration of justice. The public‑at‑large no less than the individual litigant have an interest and a very real interest in justice being effectively administered. Unless it is so administered the rights, and indeed the liberty, of the individual will perish." In the Court of Appeal in the instant case, Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. adverted to the protean nature of the offence, for the due administration of the law has many facets and interference with it may take many forms. Physical interference with the conduct of a trial is, perhaps, the most obvious; but words spoken or published or acts done outside the precincts of the Court may as surely interfere with the fair and effective administration of justice. This may seem trite but I mention it at the outset because it has been submitted by the appellants that the decision by the Court of Appeal that "The Sunday Times" publication, on 12th July, 1987, of extracts from Mr. Peter" Wright's book constituted the actus reus of a contempt of Court amounted to a judicial extension of the concept of contempt. At common law the publisher of a statement which in fact had the effect of impeding the course of justice‑‑for instance, by prejudicing the trial of a person accused of a criminal offence‑‑might find himself guilty of contempt of Court quite regardless of his intention and even though he may not even have known of the contents of the publication. That position‑‑referred to as "the strict liability rule"‑‑was modified and controlled by the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, section 2 of which narrowed and regulated the circumstances in which the rule applied. By section 6(c), however, it was provided that "nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act... restricts liability for contempt of Court in respect of conduct intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice." It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Court bf Appeal, in some way which I confess I have not been able to follow, misconstrued this provision not as a mere saving provision but as extending the circumstances in which intentional acts fall to be treated as contempts. I am quite unable to see that the Court of Appeal did any such thing and the one thing that has emerged with perfect clarity from the argument before the House is that the strict liability rule has nothing whatever to do with this case, for it is conceded for the purposes of this appeal that if and so far as the publication in question constituted the actus reus of a contempt it was effected with the intention of producing the consequences of) which the respondent complains. It is important to stress this aspect of the appeal. Before the Court Of Appeal there was a hotly contested issue between the parties as to whether a specific intent to interfere with or impede the administration of justice could properly be inferred from the foreseeability of the inevitable consequences of what was done. Morritt, J. had found such specific intent and that finding was upheld.. That decision has not been challenged before this House and, accordingly, the removal from the area of contest of any question as to the existence in the appellants of the requisite intention reduces the appeal before your Lordships' House to one issue only, namely, whether, given the intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice (which has, for present purposes, to be conceded) the publication by "The Sunday Times" on 12th July, 1987 of extracts from Spycatcher at a time when other newspapers were restrained by interlocutory injunction from publishing such material constituted the actus reus of contempt. The appellants' primary submission is that it not only was not, but was not capable of being, a contempt of Court because, although they were fully aware of the orders which had been made against "The Guardian" and the "Observer," they were not themselves bound by those orders nor were they assisting in or procuring or inciting a breach of those orders by the two newspapers which were bound. This submission involves some analysis of the particular type of contempt with which the appeal is concerned. A distinction (which has been variously described as "unhelpful" or "largely meaningless") is sometimes drawn by what is described as "civil contempt", that is to say, contempt by a party to proceedings in matters of procedure, and "criminal contempt". One particular form of contempt by a party to proceedings is that constituted by an intentional act which is in breach of the order of a competent Court. Where this occurs as a result of the act of a party who is bound by the order or of others acting at his direction or on his instigation, it constitutes a civil contempt by him which is punishable by the Court at the instance of the party for whose benefit the order was made and can be waived by him. The intention with which the act was done will, of course, be of the highest relevance in the determination of the penalty (if any) to be imposed by the Court, but the liability here is a strict one in the sense that all that requires to be proved is service of the order and the `subsequent doing by the party bound of that which is prohibited. When, `however, the prohibited act is done not by the party bound himself but by a gird party, a stranger to the litigation, that person may also be liable for contempt. There is, however, this essential distinction that his liability is for criminal contempt and arises not because the contemner is himself affected by the prohibition contained in the order but because his act constitutes a willful interference with the administration of justice by the Court in the proceedings m which the order was made. Here the liability is not strict in the sense referred to, for there has to be shown not only knowledge of the order but an ',intention to interfere with or impede the administration of justice‑‑an intention which can of course be inferred from the circumstances. The distinction is very well brought out in the judgment of Eveleigh L.J. in Z Ltd v. A‑Z and AA‑LL (1982) Q.B. 558, where the question arose whether a third party could be liable for contempt in doing, at a time before the party enjoined had himself received notice of the order, that which was prohibited by the order. Eveleigh, LJ. observed, at p. 578: "It was argued that the liability of a third party arose because he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. he was an accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which the third party could be accessory. In my opinion this argument misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party. He is liable for contempt of Court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a 'dual character of contempt of Court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of Court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the `order of the Court to be thwarted." Mr. Lester, on behalf of the appellants, accepts this as an accurate., statement of the principle but nevertheless contends that it is restricted to cases in which it can be demonstrated that the third party was privy in some way to a breach by the party enjoined and that therefore the decision of the Court of Appeal in the instant case constituted an unwarranted extension of the law of contempt in a way which is both contrary to principle and unwarranted by authority. That submission is encapsulated in paragraph 19 of the appellants' printed case where it is asserted: "The authorities decide that a third party is not liable for contempt by performing an act prohibited by the Court except where he has aided and abetted (or incited or otherwise assisted) the performance of the act by the party joined." I will consider in a moment the authorities upon which Mr. Lester relies for this proposition, but a moment's reflection will, I think, demonstrate that it cannot possibly be valid as a general proposition. Of course, aiding and abetting or inciting a breach is an obvious example of the sort of situation in which a third party will subject himself to liability, but if the underlying basis of his liability is, as Mr. Lester accepts that it is, that stated by Eveleigh, U., there can be no logical reason for restricting the liability in the way that he suggests. Take a simple example A has a right of way over a roadway on C's land which constitutes the only access to his premises A, having built a wall on his premises which obstructs the light of his next‑door neighbour B. B commences proceedings for an injunction. On motion in that action proffers and the Court accepts an undertaking by A to use his best endeavours to remove the wall by a given date. A accordingly instructs contractors to carry out the work of demolition. C, who knows of the undertaking but wishes to pursue a private spite against B, in order to prevent the demolition of the wall obstructs the access to the premises by blocking the right of way and employs security guards to prevent A's contractors from removing the obstruction. C is not bound by the terms of the undertaking nor can he conceivably be under any obligation to assist A in fulfilling it. Nor obviously, does he aid and abet a breach by A of his undertaking, which the latter has in fact fulfilled by instructing contractors. But equally obviously C has impeded the administration of justice by deliberately thwarting an undertaking given to the Court and designed to secure the removal of the wall. In circumstances such as these, it would seem to me unarguable that C is not in contempt of Court in exactly the same way as if he had obstructed an officer of the Court and I cannot imagine any Court accepting as a defence to a motion for committal the proposition that no contempt is committed because C was not a party to the action or the undertaking. Nor, in my judgment, do the authorities cited by Mr. Lester support the broad proposition for which he contends. Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Mornington (1848) 11 Bcav 180 and 181 was a case in which the Earl's agent had cut wood with notice of an injunction against the Earl. It was certainly said that the agent was liable to be committed for contempt as a third party who had aided and abetted a breach by the Earl but there is in fact nothing in the report of the proceedings to suggest that the Earl was even aware of the agent's acts much less that he had authorised them. Seaward v, Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545, was, a case where the contemners had actively aided and abetted the defendant in the action in a breach of the injunction and it is not surprising therefore that the judgments treat of contempt in that context. But the principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal, and which is expressed in the judgments of both Lindley, L.J. and Rigby, L.J., was the quite general one that any member of the public is under a duty not to obstruct the course of justice. This emerges perhaps with most clarity from the judgment of Lindley,'L.J., at p. 554: "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the Court has to make an order against Murray. There is no injunction against him‑‑‑he is no more bound by the injunction granted against Paterson than any other member of the public. He is bound, like other members of the public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice; and the case, if any, made against him must be this‑‑‑not that he has technically infringed the injunction, which was not granted against him in any sense of the word, but that he has been aiding and abetting others in setting the Court at defiance, and deliberately treating the order of the Court as unworthy of notice. If he has so conducted himself, it is perfectly idle to say that there is no jurisdiction to attach him for contempt as distinguished from a breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning..." Brydges v. Brydges (1909) p. 187 was not a case of an injunction, the question there being whether a personal order against a co‑respondent to lodge money in Court was enforceable against his executor. In the Court of Appeal Farwell, L.J. referred, at p. 191, to a person not a party to a negative injunction being amenable to the jurisdiction "on the ground of contempt in obstructing the course of justice by acting or aiding and abetting in breach of an injunction of the Court" (emphasis mine). Thorne Rural District Council v. Bunting (No. 2) (1972) 3 All E.R. 1084 does nothing to assist the appellants' case. It merely decides, which I conceive is tolerably obvious anyway, that a person not party to an order or undertaking is under no obligation to prejudice his own legal position in' order to assist the person who has given the undertaking in making it effective. Z. Ltd. v. A‑Z and AA‑LL (1982) Q.B. 558, clearly sets out the general principle and provides no support at all for the proposition that a third party who has notice of the order can be guilty of contempt only if he aids and abets 'or actively assists in the breach by the person who is the subject of the order. . Finally, reference should be made to the decision of this House in Attorney‑General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979) A.C.

440. The facts of that case are a long way from the present but the speeches of all the members of the committee who heard the case contain important pronouncements as to the general principle underlying contempt of Court. Lord Diplock observed, at p. 449, that although criminal contempts may take a variety of forms they all share the common characteristic that: "they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of Court, not the individual Court or Judge who is attempting to administer it." The case itself concerned a supposed ruling by Magistrates that the identity of a particular witness should not be disclosed and as to this Lord biplock said, at pp. 451‑452: "It may be that a `ruling' by the Court as to‑the conduct of proceedings can have binding effect as such within the courtroom only, so that breach of it is not ipso facto a contempt of Court unless it is committed there. Nevertheless where (1) the reason for a ruling which involves departing in some measure from the general principle of open justice within the courtroom is that the departure is necessary in the interests of the due 'administration of justice and, (2) it would be apparent to anyone who is aware of the ruling that the result which the ruling is designed to achieve would be frustrated by a particular kind of act done outside the courtroom, the doing of such an act with the knowledge of the ruling and of its purpose may constitute a contempt of Court, not because it is a breach of the ruling but because it interferes with the due administration of justice." The reference here to the frustration of the purpose designed by the Court finds an echo in the speech of Viscount Dilhorne, at p.

456. This is qualified to some extent in the speech of Lord Edmund‑Davies by the requirement that the intention of the Court must be made entirely clear and must not be left to conjecture‑‑a point stressed by Mr. Lester in the course of his address to your Lordships. Lord Edmund‑Davies went on, at p. 465, to supplement this by the suggestion that the reason for procedural rulings should be explained and accompanied by an intimation that acting in a manner calculated to prejudice that aim would run the risk of being considered contemptuous‑‑‑a matter which assumes some importance in the circumstance of the instant case. As regards the general principle underlying contempt there are in addition two important passages in the speeches of Lord Russell of Killowen and Lords Scarman: "I do not, my Lords, regard as of any relevance the question whether the Magistrates had any power or authority directly to forbid all publication of `Colonel B's' identity. The field in which contempt of Court, or, as I prefer to describe it, improper interference with the due administration of justice, may be committed is not circumscribed by the terms of an order enforceable against the accused. I find no problem in the concept that a decision or direction may have no immediate aim and no direct enforceability beyond the deciding and directing Court, but yet may have such effect in connection with contempt of Court. Merely to state, as is the law, that in general contempt of Court is the improper interference with the due administration of justice is to state that it need not involve disobedience to an order binding upon the alleged contemner" (per Lord Russell of Killowen, at pp. 467‑468). "Can a Court make an order, or give a ruling, which is binding on persons who are neither witnesses nor parties in the proceedings before the Court? It is a misconception of the nature of the criminal offence, of contempt to regard it as being an offence because it is the breach of a binding order. The offence is interference, with knowledge of the Court's proceedings, with the course of administration of justice:... It was for this reason, no doubt, that Lord Widgery, C.J. in this case stressed the element of `flouting' the authority of the Court. Though I would not have chosen the word, I think it does reflect the essence of the offence, namely that the conduct complained of, in this ` case the publication, must be a deliberate frustration of the effort of the Court to protect justice from interference" (per Lord Scarman, at pp. 471‑472). My Lords, there can be no logical distinction between a case where the Court seeks to protect or preserve the interests of justice by a procedural ruling in the course of a hearing and one where it seeks to achieve the same end by a formal prohibition directed to one of the parties. Once one gets away, as these authorities compel, from the notion that the binding effect of an order is an essential ingredient in the offence of contempt, Mr. Lester's proposition that the actus reus of contempt is narrowly confined solely to those who aid, abet or incite breaches by the party bound is seen to be untenable. 1t could not have made the slightest difference to the liability of Murray and Shepherd in Seaward v. Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545, if they had arranged and conducted the offending boxing match without Paterson's knowledge or authority. Both had been served with copies of the order made for the protection of the plaintiffs from disturbance and restraining Paterson from using or suffering the premises to be used otherwise than as a private club and their use of the premises for the holding of a boxing match was an intentional act having the inevitable consequence of frustrating the very purpose for which the Court had made its order. Once the conclusion is reached that the fact that the alleged contemner is not party to or personally bound by the Court's order then, given the intention on his part to interfere with or obstruct the course of justice, the sole remaining question is whether what had done has that effect in the particular circumstances of the case. In the Court of Appeal it was said that the administration of justice was interfered with because the publication, as it was variously put, "rendered nugatory the trial of the action" [(1988) Ch. 333, 358, 373 per Sir John Donaldson M.R.), "destroyed in whole or in part the subject‑matter of the action" (Lloyd L.J., at pp.378‑380) or "rendered the trial.. '..pointless" (Balcombe L.J., at p. 387). 1 respectfully question, however, whether the mere fact that an act of a third party foreseeably has the result that the issue in the action becomes academic or that it is no longer worth pursuing, so that the Court's order ceases to fulfil any useful purpose; necessarily involves the conclusion that it constitutes the actus reus of contempt. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a stranger to litigation acting in the pursuit of his own interests can quite permissibly take steps which he knows perfectly well will render pending litigation pointless or destroy, for practical purposes, the subject‑matter of a pending action. For 1 example, in the course of the argument, I instanced the case of an action in . which a company obtains an ex parte injunction until the next motion day to prevent a creditor whose debt is disputed from presenting and advertising a winding‑up petition. A petition presented the next day with knowledge of the injunction by an unpaid creditor whose debt is not capable of being disputed would clearly have the effect of rendering any further proceeding in the action entirely pointless. But it would be absurd to suggest that a perfectly proper use of the Court's own machinery, even if for the express purpose of affecting the course of other pending litigation, could constitute the actus reus of contempt. Other examples are not difficult to come by and they illustrate the difficulty and, sometimes, the danger of attempting to formulate a universal test of what constitutes interfering with or impeding the administration of justice. For my part. I doubt the value of cataloging a series of hypothetical circumstances which can do no more than serve as illustrations of conduct which can or may fall on one side of the line or the other. I think that a more dependable guide is to be found in the way in which the gravamen of the offence is expressed in the respondents' case and which, I think, must be based upon the speeches in this House in the Leveller Magazine case (1979) A.C. 440: "The publication ....frustrates, thwarts, or subverts‑ the purpose of the Court's order and thereby interferes with the due administration of justice in the particular action." "Purpose;" in this context, refers, of course, not to the litigant's purpose in obtaining the order or in fighting the action but to the purpose which, in seeking to administer justice between the parties in the particular litigation of which it had become seized, the Court was intending to fulfil. The appellants raise two principal objections to addressing the purpose of the order in this context. In the first place, it is said that the purpose of an order is something which can be gathered only from its terms and thus becomes synonymous with the text of the order. By that test, of course, the act of a third party, not an aider or abettor, has no effect upon the order at all. If the order forbids the doing of an act by AA has done nothing and remains bound by the order which thus cannot be said to be frustrated. It was, on its face, designed to inhibit A. It achieves that purpose. Any other approach, it is said, leads to uncertainty, but how otherwise is the Courts' purpose to be ascertained? And can it be right in the context of a criminal offence that members of the public should be obliged to enquire beyond the terms of the order itself? I can see the force of this in a case where the Court's purpose is not manifest from the mere making of the order and this was, indeed, one of the matters which troubled Lord Edmund‑Davies in the Leveller Magazine case (1979) A.C.

440. But the difficulty is more imaginary than real. None of their Lordships who decided the Leveller Magazine case experienced any difficulty where the purpose of the order or ruling is obvious and manifest. Where there is room for genuine doubt about what the Court's purposes is, then the party charged with contempt is likely to escape liability, not because of failure to prove the actus reus but for want of the necessary mens rea for an intention to frustrate the purpose of the Court would be difficult to establish if the purpose itself was not either known or obvious. In the instant case, there could never have been any doubt in anybody's mind what the Court's purpose was in making the order. It was to preserve, until the trial of the action, the plaintiff's right to keep confidential and unpublished the information obtained by Mr. Wright in the course of his employment‑‑‑a right which the plaintiff enjoyed against all the world but which had been specifically threatened by the defendants in the action. Not only was that purpose made manifest in the judgment delivered by Millett, J. on the making of the order and in subsequent judgments in the Court of Appeal, if indeed it was not manifest already, but at the hearing in the Court of Appeal both the Master of the Rolls and Nourse. L.J. had made it plain that it was not open to others to publish what the defendants had been forbidden to publish. Thus, the instant case is not one in which there could be any room for uncertainty or misunderstanding about what was the Court's purpose in making the order‑‑‑it was to enable issues between the plaintiff and the defendants to be tried without the plaintiff's rights in the meantime being prejudiced by the doing of the very act which it was the purpose of the action to prevent. The second objection is one which has troubled me and it is this. Equity, in general, acts in personam and there are respectable authorities, for the proposition that injunctions, whether mandatory or prohibitory, operate inter partes and should be so expressed (see Iveson v. Harris (1802) 7 Ves. 251: Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1948) 1 All E.R. 406) although, as Baleombe, L.J. pointed out in the Court of Appeal in the instant case, there may be an exception in the case of the Court's jurisdiction in wardship. The appellants argue that to invoke the jurisdiction in contempt against a person who is neither a party to the order nor an aider or abettor but who has done what the defendant in the action was forbidden by the order to do, is, in effect, to make the order operate in rem, or contra mundum, if that expression is preferred. If, then, it is argued, that is assumed to be the purpose of the Court in making the order, the purpose is one which the Court cannot legitimately achieve because, as the authorities referred to demonstrate, the order is only properly made inter partes. There is an appealing logic in this but the answer is, I think, that it confuses two quite different things, that is to say, the scope of an order made in private litigation inter partes and the public law question of the proper administration of justice. If the Court has taken into its hands the conduct of the matter to the extent of ordering the interim preservation of the interest of the plaintiff so that the issue between him and the defendant can be properly and fairly tried, it has to be accepted that that is what the Court had determined that the interests of justice require. The gratuitous intervention of a third party intended to result in that purpose being frustrated anti the outcome of the trial prejudiced, must manifestly interfere with and obstruct what the Court has determined to be the interests of justice. Those interests are not dependent upon the scope of the order. The appellants fairly take the point that the third party who learns of the order and is thus put in the position of considering whether he is at liberty to do that which the party to the order is forbidden to do, has not been heard by the Court and has, thus, not had the opportunity of putting before the Court any arguments which he may have for contending that he is free to do what he desires in his own interest to do. That is perfectly true, but the answer is surely that that is by his own choice. "The Sunday Times" in the instant case was perfectly at liberty, before publishing, either to inform the respondent and so give him the opportunity to object or to approach the Court and to argue that it should be free to publish where the defendants were not, just as a person affected by notice of, for example, a Mareva injunction is able to, and frequently does, apply to the Court for directions as to the disposition of assets in his hands which mayor may not be subject to the terms of the order. In the end, therefore, I find myself un-persuaded by this argument. Once it is accepted, as it seems to me the authorities compel, that contempt (to use Lord Russell of Killowen's words) "need not involve disobedience to an order binding upon the alleged contemner" the potential effect of the order contra mundum is an inevitable consequence. Indeed, were it not so, the administration of justice which is the purpose of the law of contempt to uphold would be largely deprived of any effective protection. Three further arguments on behalf of the appellant fall to be noted. It is said, first, that to categorise the publication as contemptuous is to criminalise an act retroactively. As I have endeavoured to demonstrate already, however, the decision of the Court of Appeal involved no alteration of the law of contempt and if that argument fails, it necessarily carries with it any argument based on retroactivity. There .is nothing "retroactive" about the application of perfectly well‑known principles to a novel set of circumstances‑‑‑novel only in the sense that no precise analogue can be found in any previously reported proceedings. Secondly, it is said that the decision conflicts in some way with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969), to which the United Kingdom is party. That Article, however, specifically subjects the right to impart information to "such ...restrictions or penalties ...as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ....for the protection of‑‑rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority ....of the judiciary." In Attorney‑General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (1987) 1 W.L.R. 1248, this House, by a majority, held that the administration of justice required that the injunctions granted by Millett, J., against "The Guardian" and "Observer" newspapers should be kept in place until the trial of the action and Lord Templeman, in the course of his speech, specifically rejected the argument that their maintenance involved any breach of the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention. This, as it seems to me, must dispose of any argument that the application of the law of contempt, which is a necessary consequence of maintaining the injunctions in force, is itself in breach of such obligations. Given the need for the Court to maintain the injunctions, their enforcement, if necessary, by contempt proceedings seems to me to be clearly necessary for maintaining the authority of the judiciary, if for nothing else. Finally, it is said that, because of the impending publication of Mr. Wright's book in the United States. "The Sunday Times" publication did not in fact interfere with the administration of justice since such confidentiality as remained was about to be destroyed in any event. The short answer to this is that the act has to be looked at the date when it was performed. It cannot be open to one who has frustrated the Court's order to excuse himself by saying that someone else was about to do the same thing. It seems, at first sight, a startling proposition that the doing by a person not a party to an action of an act which he is at liberty, in his own interests, to do and which he is not prohibited by order from doing, should subject him to proceedings for contempt merely because he is affected by knowledge that an order has been made against somebody else. But the circumstances are unusual and I cannot readily envisage circumstances likely in practice to occur, apart from claims for breach of confidence, where such an act would have the effect of impeding the administration of justice. As Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. observed in the instant case, breach of confidence is a uniquely fragile cause of action and the publication, once made, can have the effect of destroying for good and all the right, which the law seeks to protect. Whilst newspapers have a legitimate interest and an important and necessary function in disseminating information, their rights are no higher than the right of a private individual to preserve the inviolability of that which he has imparted to another under an obligation of confidence and ought not to be permitted to override that right save where the public interest compulsively demands. A fortiori is that the case where a competent Court has intervened to protect such right. The respondent to this appeal is the Attorney‑General, but it has to be stressed as was emphasised in both the Courts below, that in this case he was in no different position from any other private citizen entitled to preserve the sanctity of confidential information. In the end, I have found the logic of the respondent's arguments inescapable and I accordingly agree that the Court of Appeal reached the right conclusion and that the appeal must be dismissed I confess, however, that I do so with a measure of disquiet, not because I doubt the validity of the conclusion, but because of the possibilities that open up. As I have said, I think that this sort of question is unlikely to arise except in cases of threatened publication of confidential material. But in those cases the important stage of the proceedings is almost always and l inevitably the interlocutory one and it is, I think, important that a vigilant eye should be kept on the possibility that the law of contempt may be invoked in support of claims which are in truth insupportable. The guidelines laid down by this House in. American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) A.C. 396, have come to be treated as carved on tablets of stone, so that a plaintiff seeking interlocutory relief has never to do more than show that he has a fairly arguable case. Thus, the effect in a contest between a would‑be publisher and I one seeking to restrain the publication of allegedly confidential information is that the latter, by presenting an arguable case, can effectively through the invocation of the law of contempt, restrain until the trial of the action, which may be two or more years ahead, publication not only by the defendant but by anyone else within the jurisdiction and thus stifle what may, in the end, turn out to be perfectly legitimate comment until it no longer has any importance or commands any public interest. In cases where there is a contest as to whether the information is confidential at all or whether the public interest in any event requires its publication despite its confidentiality, this could be very important and experience shows that orders for speedy trial do not always achieve the hope for result. I speak only for myself, but I cannot help feeling that in cases where it is clearly of importance that publication, if it takes place at all, should take place expeditiously, it may be necessary for Courts to balance the rights of the parties and to decide the issue, as they sometimes did before the Cyanamid case, at the interlocutory stage on the prima facie merits and on the evidence then available. LORD IAUNCEY OF TULLICHETTLE: =My Lords, the issue raised in this appeal is one of considerable importance and it is perhaps unfortunate that it has arisen in the emotive context of Spycatcher‑‑‑"the most litigated‑about book in recent history" as Mr. Lester described it. It is therefore appropriate at the outset to state precisely what the case is about. It is about contempt' of Court in the context of "the right of private citizens and public authorities to seek and obtain the protection of the Courts for confidential information which they claim to be their property," to borrow the words of Sir John Donaldson M.R. in Attorney‑General v. Newspaper Publishing Plc (1988) Ch. 333,

361. It is purely fortuitous that the issue has arisen between the Crown and a national newspaper. It could equally well have arisen between private individuals when it would have been of no less importance. Questions of national security and official secrets, while factors to be considered by Millett, J. in granting the injunction of 11th July, 1986 are no longer relevant in the context of contempt in relations to that order. The offence of contempt of Court involves two elements, mens rea and act us reus. Both matters were live issues in the Court of Appeal but before this House the appellants did not seek to argue that there was no mens rea. This appeal is accordingly only concerned with the second element. What then is the actus reus of contempt of Court? I cannot do better than to refer to the following observations of Lord President Clyde in Johnson v. Grant, 1923 S.C. 789, 790: "The phrase `contempt of Court' does not in the least describe the true nature of the class of offence with which we are here concerned....The offence consists in interfering with the administration of the law; in impeding and perverting the course of justice ...It is not the dignity of the Court which is offended‑‑‑a petty and misleading view of the issue involved‑‑‑it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged." Contempt may take many forms but the essential ingredient of the offence is interference with the administration of justice. That is to say, that the ability of the Court to regulate its affairs so as to achieve justice between party and party in any particular case has been impaired. Inconvenience to judges and Court staff per se has nothing to do with contempt. As Lord Diplock said in Attorney‑General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979) A.C. 440, 449: "My Lords, although criminal contempts of Court may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of Court, not the individual Court or Judge who is attempting to administer it." In relation to injunctions there is ample authority, to the effect that contempt can take two forms, namely. (1) disobedience to the order by the person named therein, and (2) aiding and abetting by a third person of the person named in the order to disobey it. In the first case the person named is in contempt because he is in direct breach of the order. In the second case the third party is in contempt not because he has disobeyed the order, which is not binding upon him, but because he has assisted the named person to disobey the order and has thereby himself interfered with the administration of justice which requires that the order. be obeyed. There is, however, apparently no reported decision, other than the earlier stages of this case, in which a third party has been held to be in contempt of Court where he has frustrated the object of an order without aiding and abetting the person named therein to breach it. This was, Mr. Lester submitted, because the authorities established that a third party could not be in contempt of Court in relation to such an order if he did not aid and abet the person named therein. It is necessary to examine the authorities to see whether this‑proposition is well‑founded. The starting point is Lord Wellesley v. Earl of Mornington (1848) 11 Beav. 180 and 181, in which the Earl had been restrained from cutting timber by an injunction whose terms did not extend to "his servants and agent". An attempt to commit for breach of that injunction one Batley, his agent, who had cut trees and appropriated the proceeds therefore to the Earl failed because he, Batley, had not been enjoined by the order. Lord Langdale M.R. said, at p.180: "You do not ask to commit him for the contempt, but for the breach of an injunction by which he is not enjoined, I think the objection fatal to this form of notice of motion; but I by no means think, that because Batley is not enjoined in his character of servant and agent, he cannot be punished for knowingly aiding and assisting Lord Mornington in doing that which this Court has expressly prohibited. I must refuse this motion, but without costs." However, a further attempt to commit Batley for his contempt in intermeddling with the matters to which the injunction related would have succeeded had the plaintiff pressed for committed. The Master of the Ross said, at p. 183. "By the forbearance of the plaintiff, I am spared the painful necessity of making an order. If the matter had been pressed, I should have found it my duty to commit Mr. Batley for his contempt in intermeddling with these matters;" This case is clear authority for the proposition that an aider and abettor may be guilty of contempt of Court but it also suggests that aiding and abetting or assisting was construed fairly widely to include acts done for the benefit of the person enjoined but in which that person did not personally participate. The report does not state that Batley was instructed by the Earl to cut the timber and given the social conditions prevailing at the time it is almost inconceivable that the Earl would have been personally involved in the cutting of the timber. In Seaward v. Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545 Lindley, LJ. said, at p.554: "Now, let us consider what jurisdiction the Court has to make an order against Murray. There is no injunction against him‑‑‑he is no more bound by the injunction granted against Paterson than any other member of the public. He is bound, like other members of the public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice; and the case, if any, made against him must be this‑‑‑not that he has technically infringed the injunction, which was not granted against him in any sense of the word, but that he has been aiding and abetting others in setting the Court at defiance, and deliberately treating the order of the Court as unworthy of notice. If he has so conducted himself, it is perfectly idle to say that there is no jurisdiction to attach him for contempt as distinguished from a breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning." A.L. Smith, L.J. said, at p. 557: "As regards the law, I have myself no doubt that if a person who knows that an injunction has been granted aids and abets in committing a breach of it the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to commit him for contempt, although he is not a defendant in the action, and is not a person against whom the injunction has been granted." In Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1948) 1 All E.R. 406, Lord Uthwatt, commenting on the form of a injunction granted against "the defendants, their staff, servants and agents" said, at p. 407: "The reference to servants, workmen, and agents in the common form is nothing other than a warning against wrongdoing to those persons who may by reason of their situation be thought easily to fall into the error of implicating themselves in a breach of the injunction by the defendant. There its operation, in my opinion, ends. If they knowingly assist the defendant in a breach by him of the injunction, they may be committed for contempt of Court, not because they have broken the injunction‑‑‑they have not done so‑‑‑but because they have so conducted themselves as to obstruct the course of justice in assisting a breach and tried to set process of the Court at naught. In that respect they stand in no different position from a complete stranger who knowingly sets out to assist the defendant in committing a breach. The position of a stranger who assists a defendant in committing a breach of an injunction was dealt with by North, J., and the Court of Appeal in Seaward v. Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545 and need not be elaborated." In Z Ltd. v. A‑Z and AA‑LL (1982) Q.B. 558, Eveleigh, L.J., in the context of a third party aider and abettor, said, at p.578: "He is liable for contempt of Court committed by himself. It is true that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual character of contempt of Court by himself and aiding and abetting the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to contempt of Court by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes with the administration of justice by causing the order of the Court to be thwarted." My Lords in none of these cases, nor in any other case cited by the appellants, is it stated that in relation to a Court order a third party can only be liable for contempt of Court if he aids and abets a person named therein to breach it. In all these cases, however, it is made clear that a third party's liability depends upon the fact that he has interfered with the course of justice; indeed nowhere more clearly than by Lindley, L.J. in Seaward v. Paterson (1987) 1 Ch.

545. Given that interference with the course of justice is the basis of a third party's liability for contempt in the foregoing circumstances I can see no reason in principle for distinguishing the position of a third party who aids and abets a breach of the order and one who intends to and does achieve a similar interference with or frustration of the order by means which do not involve. assisting the person named therein to breach it. If a third party by such independent act renders nugatory a Court order of whose existence he is aware, why should he not be liable for contempt as he would be if he had actively assisted the named person to defeat the operation of the order? In both cases the third party has, with knowledge, interfered with the course of justice, and in both cases he should in my view by subject to the same liability. Support for this view is to be found in Attorney‑General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd., (1979) A.C. 440 which related to a ruling of Magistrates that the identity of a particular witness should not be disclosed. Lord Diplock said, at p. 452: "Nevertheless where (1) the reason for a ruling which involves departing in some measure from the general principle of open justice within the courtroom is that the departure is necessary in the interests of the due administration of justice and (2) it would be apparent to anyone who was aware of the ruling that the result which the ruling is designed to achieve would be frustrated by a particular kind of act done outside the courtroom, the doing of such an act with knowledge of the ruling and of its purpose may constitute a contempt of Court, not because it is a breach of the ruling but because it interferes with the due administration of justice." Lord Scarman referred, at p. 472, to the essence of the offence as being: "that the conduct complained of, in this case the publication, must be a deliberate frustration of the effort of the Court to protect justice from interference." He later summarised his conclusions as follows, at p. 473: "If a Court is satisfied that for the protection of the administration of justice from interference it is necessary to order that evidence either be heard in private or be written down and not given in open Court, it may so order. Such an order, or ruling, may be the foundation of contempt proceedings against any person who, with knowledge of the order, frustrates its purpose by publishing the evidence kept private or information leading to its exposure." These passages make clear that a person who is not named in an order may be guilty of contempt when no question of aiding and abetting arises. I find them particularly apposite in the present case where the editor of "The Sunday Times" was well‑aware of the injunction of 11th July, 1986 and of the fact that publication of the article would have the necessary effect of destroying w,. the confidentiality of the information contained therein and thus frustrating to that extent the effect of the order. I am quite satisfied that it is in accordance with the principles enunciated in the foregoing authorities that a person who knowingly acts in a way which will frustrate the operation of an injunction may be guilty of contempt even although he is neither named in the order nor has he assisted the person who is named to breach it. Indeed it would be extraordinary if orders of the Court could be set at naught with impunity by third parties seeking to achieve that end. It would not be profitable to speculate upon the various ways in which the order might be frustrated, but I use the words "may be guilty" advisedly since not every frustrating act will necessarily constitute the actus reus of contempt. There may be cases where the perfectly legitimate pursuit of a purpose by a stranger has the incidental result of frustrating an order. It does not inevitably follow that such pursuit will constitute contempt quite apart from questions of mens rea. I turn to consider whether there is any reason why established principle should not be applied to the situation in this case. I do not accept the proposition that to apply established principles in the foregoing circumstances would effectively be to convert every injunction from an order in personam to an ordgr contra mundum. That proposition ignores the distinction between the breach of an order by the person named therein and interference with the course of justice resulting from a frustration of the order by the third party. Every injunction is capable of breach by the person named therein but every injunction is not capable of being frustrated by a third party stranger. For example, A obtains ‑ an injunction against B trespassing on his land. C's subsequent trespass on A's land, in knowledge of that order, in no way impairs the effect of the order against B. It can only be in a limited type of case that independent action by a third party will have the effect of interfering with the operation of an order to which he is not a party. Cases involving confidential information are obvious examples. If B is restrained pending the trial of an action by A from publishing or otherwise communicating information which is claimed by A to be confidential and his property, it is obvious that publication of the information by C before the trial is likely to render the restraining order nugatory and proceedings abhortive. While in some cases B or C might be members of the media, they might equally well be private individuals as, for example, in a case involving the disclosure of trade secrets by an employee, past or present, to his employer's trade rivals. There may also be situations where a third party could interfere with the operation of an order without also subjecting himself to some other liability, civil or criminal, but these must be very rare. Destruction of a valuable object or demolition of a listed building, which is the subject of a restraining order, are possible examples but it could only be in exceptional circumstances that a third party would be free to achieve this result without also incurring liabilities other than for contempt of Court. All in all I see no danger of the floodgates being opened if established L principles are applied to the facts in this appeal. It only remains to consider whether the public interest in the freedom of the Press should in this case override the interests of the administration of justice. The importance in a democracy of a free Press cannot be overstated. Nevertheless, there are occasions where that importance must give way to other considerations. National security is one such consideration. The importance of affording to an accused a fair trial is another. In my view the public interest in enabling justice to be done unimpeded between party and party is another. As I have already remarked, it is only in a limited type of case that freedom of the Press is likely to be affected by possible interference with the course of justice and I consider that in these cases the public interest in having justice done unimpeded between parties must prevail over that interest in the freedom of the Press. For all the foregoing reasons I have no doubt that the appeal should be dismissed. M.BA./491/F.C. Appeal dismissed.