P L D 1968 Lahore 269 (PLP)

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.‑‑

This is an appeal under sub section (5) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, against the award of the Industrial Court dated the 22nd of May 1964 whereby it rejected demand No. 2 in which it was asked that Jalal Din appellant had been dismissed illegally, in violation of the principles of natural justice and as measures of victimization and that by setting aside his dismissal he should be re‑instated. The facts as stated by the appellant are that on the 11th of July 1961, the Labour Trade Union, Orient Match Factory, Shahdara, served a strike notice under section 18 of the Ordinance upon the respondent and also sent a copy of that to the Conciliation Officer; that the appellant was a Treasurer of the said Union and his services were terminated on the 13th of July 1961. The Conciliation Officer held the conciliation proceedings under section 5 and since no settlement was arrived at he issued on the 17th of July 1961 the Failure Certificate under subsection (4) of section

5. The Union, on the basis of the Failure Certificate, submitted on the 19th of July 1961 an application under subsection (5) of section 5 to‑the Industrial Court for adjudication and determination of the industrial dispute. The Industrial Court decided the dispute and the award was published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Gazette of West Pakistan dated the 10th of April 1962.

2. The Labour Trade Union again issued a notice of strike on the 4th of November 1961 and one of the demands raised in the strike notice was that the services of the appellant had been terminated on the 13th of July 1961 illegally, in violation of the principles of natural justice and with a view to victimising him and that he should be re‑instated. The conciliation proceedings failed and consequently on the issuance of Failure Certificate, the Union invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under subsection (4) of section 5 of the Ordinance. The demand was rejected. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the services of the appellant were terminated with the offer of one month's wages in lieu of notice and that he had received the wages for the period of notice. The Court also took into consideration the plea raised before it that his services were terminated on the 13th of July 1961 after the first strike notice was given to the Management on the 11th of July 1961 without the permission of the Conciliation Officer. The learned Court is the light of the evidence led by the parties, with particular reference to the evidence of Mr. Masood Afzal who was the Conciliation Officer, held that the requisite permission was granted by him to the respondent by terminating the services of the appellant and that the Conciliation Officer had satisfied himself that there were good grounds for terminating his services. The learned Court otherwise held that the services of Jalal Din 'had rightly been terminated by the Management in the exercise of the employer's power under the general law of master and servant, as recognised by Standing Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, on payment of one month's wages in lieu of notice on the ground that his services were no longer required. It was also held that the Union had failed to substantiate the plea of victimization. This is the appeal preferred by Jalal Din and not by the Labour Trade Union, Orient Match Factory, Shahdara.

3. The appeal has been preferred through one Mr. Abdul Majid Qureshi. It was contended on behalf of Mr. Abdul Majid Qureshi that Mr. Cyril G. Bhan, who held the power‑of‑attorney of the Management was not competent to appear on behalf of the respondent. . Feroze Nana Ghulamally, J., by his order dated the 15th of March 1965 repelled this contention and held that the provisions of the Ordinance are neither exhaustive nor restrictive and that the provisions of rule 1 of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure were applicable and in that view of the matter held that Mr. Cyril G. Bhan, being the duly authorised agent of the respondent, was competent to make appearance on its behalf.

4. On behalf of the respondent an objection has been taken as to the competence of Mr. Abdul Majid Qureshi to appear before this Court and present the appeal. It was contended that he was not an officer of a registered Trade Union. Mr. Qureshi admitted that he was not a workman in any industry, but ho claimed to be an officer of more than one trade union, namely, the Labour Union of WAPDA Electrical and Mechanical Workshop which was a registered Trade Union and of the Government of Pakistan, Press Workers Union, and that his appointment was within the prescribed limit of twenty‑five per cent. as is laid down in section 22 of the Trade Unions Act (XVI of 1926). This question needed an investigation into the fact and we do not feel inclined to go into this question for the simple reason that Mr. A Qureshi has been appearing in this case before the Industrial Court and no objection was taken. It would clearly imply that he was competent to make appearance under section 34 of the Ordinance.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent also contended that the earlier proceedings in industrial dispute (No. 122 of 1961) in which the impugned award was given was void and the reason put forth in support of the contention was that Jalal Din who signed the notice of strike dated the 4th of November 1961 as General Secretary of the Labour Trade Union Orient Match Factory, Shahdara, was not competent to do so because he, after his discharge from service on 13th of July 1961, was an outsider and, therefore, he could not hold office in contravention of the provi sions of the Ordinance and the Rules, because under section 22 of the Trade Unions Act only 25 per cent. of the office holders could be the outsiders, but MF. Bhan contends that it was established by evidence on the record that out of the four office holders, there were three outsiders. We do not feel inclined to go into this question for the reason that if the respondent had any objection to the legality or otherwise of the strike notice or to the sub sequent proceedings, it should have taken this objection before the g Industrial Court, but it appears from the award that no such objection was taken, as there is no reference to such an objection in the order of the Court. Moreover, the award in respect of demand No. 1 is against the respondent, but it has not challenged the decision of the Industrial Court by way of an appeal under subsection (5) of section 12 of the Ordinance. For the same reasons another contention raised by Mr. Bhan that the Labour Trade Union was not validly constituted Trade Union on the 24th of November 1961. and that the proceedings initiated by it were invalid, is untenable.

6. It was next contended by Mr. Bhan that under sub section (5) of section 12 only a party to a dispute could file an appeal and since the party to the industrial dispute was the Union and not Jalal Din, the appeal was not competent. Before we deal with this question, we would like to be clear on our part. On the allegations of the appellant that he was an officer of the Trade Union and his services had been terminated on the 13th of July 1961 without the permission of the Court after the first notice of strike was given on the 11th of July 1961, he could assert that the provisions of subsection (2) of section 30 of the Ordinance had been contravened and on that basis he could make a complaint to the industrial Court under section

31. On receipt of such a complaint the Court would have adjudicated upon the complaint as if it were a dispute, regarding which an application had been made in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance. Section 30 itself provides:‑

"(1) No employer shall, during the pendency of conciliation proceeding or proceedings before a Court in respect of an industrial dispute or during the period between the conclusion of the conciliation proceedings and commencement of the proceedings before the Court, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of conciliation proceedings, nor shall he:‑ (a) save with the permission of the conciliation officer, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings and the period thereafter preceding the commencement of the proceedings before the Court, and (b) save with the permission of the Court, during the pendency of proceedings before the Court, discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish any such workmen except for misconduct not connected with such dispute. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), an officer of a Trade Union shall not, during the pendency of any proceedings or period specified in that subsection, be discharged or dismissed for misconduct not connected with the industrial dispute referred to therein except with previous permission of the Court, but may, pending the disposal of an application to the Court for such permission, be placed under suspension. (3) The Court shall deal with an application under sub section (2) in such summary way as it may think fit. Explanation.‑In this section "an officer of a Trade Union" has the same meaning as in the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (XVI of 1926)." In the case of contravention of section 30, a special provision for adjudication is contained in section 31, which reads as:‑-- "Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 30 during the pendency of proceedings before a Court, any employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to such Court and on receipt of such complaint, that Court shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were an industrial dispute in respect of which application has been made under subsection (5) of section 5." The Legislature in its wisdom has provided a speedy and expeditious remedy by giving to an officer of the Union and a workman whose services are terminated during the pendency of the proceedings, a right to make a complaint to the Industrial Court. The Court is under a statutory obligation to decide the dispute under section 31 as any other industrial dispute. The Court has to decide the case on merits and to see if the employer was within its right in terminating the services or dismissing an employee. In such a case the parties to the dispute would have been Jalal Din and the Management; and in case of an award in that dispute any one of them could legitimately prefer an appeal to the High Court under subsection (5) of section 12.

7. The position here is different. Jalal Din did not make any application under section

31. The Union in its subsequent strike notice raised the question of his discharge from service as a dispute and the same became the subject‑matter of conciliation before the Conciliation Officer under section

5. The parties before the Conciliation Officer were the Union and the Manage ment. When the parties could not arrive at a settlement, the Failure Certificate was also issued in favour of the Union and again it is the Union which applied to the Industrial Court under subsection (5) of section

12. The learned Court rejected the demand relating to Jalal Din and the award which it gave was again between the Union and the Management. In these circumstances, the question arises whether it was competent for Jalal Din to have filed the appeal. He could do so if he was a party to the industrial dispute. It is provided in subsection (5) of section 12 as "any award published under subsection (2) or subsection (2‑B) may be appealed against to the High Court by any party to the dispute within thirty days of the publication of the award; and the decision of the High Court in such appeal shall be final." This question depends upon the definition as to what an "industrial dispute" means. "Industrial Dispute" has been defined in section 2 (h) of the Ordinance to mean "any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between g employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of work, of any person." It is argued that in the above definition, the reference to both the parties has been made in the plural form; that the plural will include singular and that any dispute or difference between an employer and a single workman will also be an industrial dispute. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on section 13 of the General Clauses Act, which reads: "In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context . . . words in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa." It was, therefore, argued that the words "employers and workmen" must be construed as including also the "employer and workmen" when the dispute is between an employer and a workman. Section 13 of the General Clauses Act extends the meaning of the plural word so as to include the singular. According to the tenor of the definition, it is manifest that it applies only if there is nothing "repugnant in the subject or context." Thus, this clause is not to apply in all circumstances, but it only declares what may be included in the term when the circumstances and the facts of a particular case warrant that it should be so interpreted. In Meux v. Jacobes ((1875) L R 7 HL 481) Lord Selborne said at page 493 "that the interpretation clause does not more than say that, where you find these words in the Act, they shall, unless there be something repugnant in the context, or in the sense, include fixtures." The provisions contained in section 13 of the General Clauses Act are in accordance with the view so expressed. Caries in his book on "Statute Law" (sixth Edition) observed at page 215 : "If, therefore, an interpretation clause gives an extended meaning to a word, it does not follow as a matter of course that, if that word is used more than once in the Act, it is on each occasion used in the extended meaning, and it may be always a matter for argument whether or not the interpretation clause is to apply to the word as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration." The context of the statute has, therefore, to be kept in view) when dealing with the interpretation clause. The context in the L words of Crawford (Statutory Construction, pages 352‑353) implies that one should not while interpreting a statute "isolate words or give them their abstract meaning or consider the different parts of a statute separately and independently. Every part of the statute must be considered together and considered as an integral part of the whole and subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Each part of section of the statute subject to construction should be construed in connection with every other part or section, even sections which are invalid or in conflict. Indeed all the parts must be given effect according to the intent expressed or clearly revealed." It was argued on behalf of the Management that the word "workmen" used in the definition of the "Industrial Dispute" must be interpreted as referring always to "workmen" unless there was a contrary intention expressed unmistakeably in some of the provisions of the Act and he pointed out that it was. only in a case contemplated in section 31 that a dispute between a single workman and an employer could be the basis of the industrial dispute. He explained that since it was an exception to the rule, the same being that the "workmen" and not a single workman are to be a party to the dispute, the Lagislature had to specifi cally provide that in a case contemplated in section 31, the dispute, although it is between a single workman and the employer, shall be an industrial dispute. In Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Employees' Union (P L D 1961 S C 403) Cornelius, C. J., in dealing with the purpose and the scope of such legislation observed that its main principle "is to supply means by which overall harmonious relation may be maintained in the field of industry, not only between employers and their workmen, but between workmen and workmen in the same establishment, and even between employers and employers in the same industry, or perhaps even in other industries. These categories relate to differences at three different levels, but all of them are addressed to the same overriding necessity, that disputes which had arisen among these two categories, viz., of employers on one side and workmen on the other, should be harmoniously composed through the intervention of an independent Board or Tribunal, and sometimes by reference to a Court. "In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal ((1953) 8 F J R 326) cited in Ahmad Ali Ansari v. Chaudhary Sia Saran Sinha (1962 P L C 165) it was pointed out that the expression "industrial dispute" cannot be construed in a grammatical sense so as to mean any dispute relating to an Industrial establishment, and that the conception of industrial dispute is a conception in the realm of economics. It connotes a dispute between capital and labour organised in a collective sense, and the object of an industrial dispute in this sense is to obtain new industrial conditions for the body of employees and not merely to ventilate the grievance of any specific individual employee at a particular moment in an industrial establishment. The purpose of the Act was not to constitute the special tribunals in place of the Civil Courts for the enforcement of contractual obligations between an employer and an individual workman. The individual workman cannot on the basis of a personal grievance initiate proceedings under the Ordinance.

8. The Ordinance contemplates only two parties, the Manage ment and the workmen. It aims at peaceful conditions in an industry and, therefore, provides for all the measures which may promote a harmony and good relationship between the two. The prosperity of the country depends on its industrialization and its happiness depends on the economic conditions of its people. It is, therefore, necessary that whereas the capital should thrive, it is equally necessary that the persons who contribute towards it should also have the satisfaction that they have received the share out of it commensurate with their contributions. The relationship between the capital and the labour, therefore, is an important factor towards the prosperity and the happiness of a country. It is impossible to conceive that as between two parties there can always be such an amity as may obviate the possibility of a dispute. r The disputes if not resolved properly, at times end in destructive consequences which are detriment to both the parties. The workmen may paralyse the industry by refusing to work which is called a strike and the employer may like‑wise render the workmen jobless by closing the industry. By such acts, neither the labour nor the employer gain. This conduct on the part of the capital or the labour is not isolated in its effect on the parties alone, but it is likely to impair the economy of the country and also to disturb the public peace and tranquility. It was to achieve this object that a specific law in the form of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance was made to resolve the disputes which may arise between the employers and the workmen in the collective sense: If the Management dismisses a workman or terminate his services, it can at best furnish him with a cause of action for damages if he is able to establish that his dismissal has not been in accordance with the terms of his employment. The action taken against the workman does not ordinarily affect the industrial peace. 1n case, however, the .Union which represents the workman takes up the dismissal of an individual workman and proceeds against such an action on the part of the Management it may become the subject‑matter of an industrial dispute. The cause in that case will not be of the individual workman concerned, but will become that of the body of the workmen. In General Secretary, Transport Labour Union v. Muhammad Hashim Mangi (1964 P L C 330) A. R. Changez (a retired Judge of the High Court), in his capacity as the Chairman of the Industrial Court, observed as:‑ " The objection does not appear to provide a new machinery for the enforcement of rights contractual or otherwise of an individual workman. The expression `Industrial Dispute' connotes a dispute between capital and labour organised in a collective sense, and the object of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance is to provide new industrial conditions to the employees and not to give relief to any specific individual employee. There is ample authority for the view that an individual dispute is not converted into an industrial dispute for the purposes of the Ordinance, unless it is taken up by a Trade Union of the workmen of the employers or by an appreciable number of workmen of the employer." In Conway v. Wale (1909 A C 506 at p. 520) it is stated by Lord Shaw: "But I cannot see my way to hold that "trade dispute" necessarily includes accordingly every case of personal difference between any one workman and one and more of his fellows. It is true that after a certain stage even such dispute, although originally grounded it may be, upon personal animosity, may come to be a subject in which sides are taken, and may develop into a situation of a general aspect containing the characteristics of a trade dispute ; but until it reaches that stage I cannot hold that a trade dispute necessarily exists." In National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation (1943 A C 166) it was observed: "A mere adoption by the Union of an individual dispute will not do. The workmen must back up the Union. There could be an industrial dispute over the retrenchment of a single individual worker, if that dispute had been converted into a collective dispute by the Union acting on behalf of the workmen in general, and by the workmen backing up the Union by obeying the call to come out or strike. I have referred to these observations just to show that an individual dispute as such is outside the ambit of an industrial dispute which alone can be decided by the industrial tribunal only when such a dispute has been espoused by the Union, and the workmen have actively joined in such support by the Union, the dispute sheds its 'individual' character and becomes a collective dispute. Then it is adjudicated by the industrial tribunal because it then becomes an industrial dispute." In Ex parte Keable Press Ltd. (1943‑2 All. E R 633) the case of a dismissed workman was taken up by the Union and it was held that an industrial dispute in the circum stances had become a trade dispute. A dispute which is prima facie an individual dispute can become an industrial dispute for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance only when it has been established that it has been taken up by a Trade Union of the workmen of the employer or by at least 5 chosen represen tatives of the workmen. This question was considered in Muhammad Ataullah v. P. I. D. C. (1963 P L C 951) and it was held by a Division Bench of Dacca High Court: "Having examined the relevant provisions of the Ordinance we fail to see how an individual worker can initiate a proceeding thereunder or how the cause of an individual worker can be said to amount to an `industrial dispute' unless that is made an issue, i.e., a common cause, by the entire body of workers or a group of them and thus threatens to affect the working of the establishment concerned." in Abdul Hamid v. Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. (1961 P L C 631) it was observed by Muhammad Shafi, Chairman of the Industrial Court as:‑ "On behalf of the Bata Shoe Company a preliminary objection has been raised that the dispute of one single individual which has not been taken up by the Union is not an industrial dispute and consequently this Court has no jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate upon it. The definition of the 'Industrial Dispute' given in the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 is `any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of work, of any person'. Under section 13 of the General Clauses Act words in the singular shall include the plural, and the vice versa. If point involved was to be settled on the definition of industrial dispute alone then I have no doubt in my mind that the Conciliation Officer will have the jurisdiction to start the conciliation proceedings whether it concerns one worker or more. But the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance does not contemplate the initiation of the conciliation proceedings if the machinery set up by the Ordinance is set in motion by one individual workman. The intention of the law seems to be that the Industrial Court set up by the Ordinance should be called upon to adjudicate those disputes only which involve the rights of workmen as a class or of a single individual workmen when it has been taken up by a Union or a number of workmen. If every workman is allowed to set in motion the machinery provided in the Ordin ance to settle his individual dispute then there will be no end of such disputes. An industry will in that case be continually plagued by the workers and will not be allowed to work freely and without coercion. If one worker has finished his dispute with the factory, the other will start and when a factory has workmen hundreds and thousands of workers, this process will continue till the Doomsday. Bata Shoe Company is a public utility service. No doubt a Conciliation Officer under section 5 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance is authorised to hold the conciliation proceedings where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended but under section 16 of the Ordinance read with rule 57 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Rules of 1960 in case of the public utility service a conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have commenced in case of an industrial dispute relating to public utility service only on the date when a notice of strike is given. According to the definition of 'strike' given in the Ordinance the notice of strike cannot be given by one single individual but should be given by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination. This makes it perfectly clear that the law does not envisage a dispute of one single individual to be determined and adjudicated by this Court but it should be by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination. I, therefore, agree with the Management that Abdul Hamid's dispute which admittedly was not taken up by the Union is not an Industrial Dispute." On the same question, the Supreme Court of Indian Jurisdiction in Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. Industrial Tribunal (1961 P L C 588) observed "The sole question that arises for our determination therefore is whether the appellant was entitled to separate representation in spite of the fact that the Union which had espoused his cause was being represented by its Secretary, Fateh Singh. The appellant's contention is that he was a party to the dispute in his own right and so was entitled to representation according to his own liking. The question whether when a dispute concerning an individual workman is taken up by the Union, of which the workman is a member, as a member affecting workmen in general and on that basis a reference is made under the Industrial Disputes Act the individual workman can claim to be heard independently of the Union is undoubtedly of some importance", and it was held: "In deciding this question, we have on the one hand to remember the importance of collective bargaining in the settle ment of industrial disputes, and, on the other hand, the principle that the party to a dispute should have a fair hearing. In assessing the requirements of this principle, it is necessary and proper to take note also of the fact that when an individual workman becomes a party to a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not independently of the Union which has espoused his case. It is now well‑settled that a dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute as defined in section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by a Union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen." In their view "the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the Union. The Union or those workmen who have by their sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal." The same view was taken in Murtaza Ali Khan v. Pakistan Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd. (1964 P L C 843) where it was observed by the Chairman of the Industrial Court of East Pakistan, after referring to the definition of the Industrial Dispute: "From the above definition itself it is clear that an industrial dispute connotes a general dispute and not an individual dispute it is now well established from a series of decisions of the superior Courts that an individual dispute does not come under the purview of the Industrial Dispute Ordinance and that an individual dispute can be converted into an industrial dispute only if the case of the individual workman or workmen is taken up by the other employees as their own cause."

9. Thus the dispute regarding the discharge or dismissal of an individual workman is an individual dispute. Such a dispute can become the subject‑matter of an industrial dispute only if the body of the workmen in general represented through Union or by a considerable number of them take up his case, who should in virtue of rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960 authorise in this behalf five of its representatives at a meeting held for the purpose. The workmen of the respondent‑company did raise a dispute in regard to the non‑employment of Mal Din appellant and thereby it gave it a character of a collective dispute. It is not the matter in controversy that the dispute in the present case was between the employers and the workmen, and that it related to the termination of the services of the appellant. But what is contended is that after such a dispute was raised, Jalal Din became a party to the dispute in his own right. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The individual workman in no way is a party to the industrial dispute except in a case covered by section 31 of the Ordinance independent of the union the Union by espousing his cause converted the dispute of the appellant into an industrial dispute and, therefore, became party independently of the appellant.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, relied on section 34 of the Ordinance to contend that in the context of this Ordinance a single workman is also a party to the industrial dispute. Section 34 reads as:‑-- "(1) A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a registered Trade Union, and any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceeding by an officer of an association of employers, if such officer of a registered Trade Union or of an association of employers is not a legal practitioner. (2) No party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceed ings, or, except with the consent of all the parties to the dispute, in any proceedings before a Court adjudicating such dispute." This section provides for the representation of the parties to an industrial dispute. In the context, the term "workman" used in singular here will have to be interpreted both in the singular and plural in accordance with section 13 of the General Clauses Act. If a workman is discharged from service in contravention of section 30 he in his individual capacity can raise the dispute which will be dealt with by the Court as an industrial dispute under subsection (5) of section

5. He has under section 34 a right to be represented as provided therein. In all other cases, the dispute can be raised only by a Union or by an appreciable number of workmen. In that case the workman will have to be understood in the plural sense. However, by the provision contained in section 34, it cannot be held that any workman in respect of whom a dispute is raised by the Union or by the G considerable number of the workmen, becomes a party to the industrial dispute. To explain this we find it necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Ordinance and the rules. The proceedings under the Ordinance commence with the con ciliation proceedings; which commence under section 16 in respect of public utility service on a notice under section 18 of a strike or a lock‑out and in other cases on the date on which the Conciliation Court starts conciliation under subsection (2) of section

5. The notice of strike under section 18 is to be given in accordance with the provisions contained in rule 57 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1960, in the case of public utility service in Form G and in the case of an industry other than a public utility service in Form H. The notice has to be signed by the Secretary of the registered Trade Union of which such workmen are members, or where such workmen are not the members of any registered Trade Union by five representa tives of the workmen duly authorised in this behalf at a meeting held for the purpose. It is clear that the notice cannot be given by any individual member. The notice possesses in itself a representative character. It is clear from Forms G and H that the parties are shown as the registered Trade Union or the elected representatives of the workmen on the one hand and the employers on the other. Subsections (1) to (4) of section 5 relate to concilia tion proceedings before the Conciliation Officer, the main purpose of which is to induce "the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute." The settlement according to sub clause (1) of section 2 of the Ordinance means "a settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding and includes an agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of any conciliation proceeding, where such agreement is in writing, has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed, and a copy has been sent to the appropriate Government and to the conciliation officer concerned." According to rule 6 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1960, the memorandum of settlement is to be in form `A' which again refers to the employees in the plural. The settlement also includes an agreement between the parties. Form 'B' which prescribes the form of an agreement has to be by the employees and not by a single workman. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that after the notice is served, it is an individual workman who can continue with the dispute had been correct, then in forms 'A' and 'B' the reference should have been to the workman and not to the employees in the plural. The certificate of failure under section 5(4) is also issued to the parties which according to rule 7 read with form `C' are deemed to be either the registered Union or the representatives of the workmen, as the case may be. Under subsection (5) of section 5, only a party to whom a certificate is issued under sub section (4) can apply to the Industrial Court for adjudication of the dispute. Rule 10 provides for such an application and it has to be in form 'B' which has to be signed either by the Secretary of the Trade Union or by the representatives of the workman. It is, therefore, manifest that an individual workman cannot, even if the dispute is in respect of his terms and conditions of the service or relates to his re‑instatement, invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under section S(5). Section 13 is very significant. It is provided in subsection (1) that "a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings or an award published under subsection (2) or subsection (2‑B) of section 12 shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute ; . . . . . (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (d) is composed of work men, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates . . . . . . ." Clauses (a) and (d) make it clear that a party to an industrial dispute may be composed of workmen which means that the workmen themselves are not directly a party to the industrial dispute otherwise the term used in clause (d) would have been "consisting of" and not "composed of". Under section 13 a settlement or award binds all employees of an establishment. The dispute in the context must concern the workmen generally. A reference to subsection (2) of section 13 shows that a settlement arrived at outside a conciliation proceeding, that is by means of a private agreement, has to be between the employer and the workmen. Section 14 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards. It also provides as to how it can be determined. It is inconceivable that the award or settlement affecting all employees can be terminated by a single individual or only by some of the workmen. Any such interpretation is bound to give rise to many complications, and would reduce the purpose of an award or settlement to an absurdity. It is thus clear that an individual workman is at no times a party to an industrial dispute. Thus the proceedings under the Ordinance start by a strike notice. The notice cannot be given by an individual workman. It has to be by a Union or the representatives of the workmen. After the receipt of the notice, the Conciliation Officer proceeds with the conciliation proceedings and he also tries to bring about a settlement between the Union or the representatives of the workmen on the one hand and the employees on the other. If he succeeds in bringing about a settlement, it has to be signed by someone on behalf of the Union or by the representatives of the workmen, as the case may be. A settlement so arrived at is to be binding upon the parties and an individual workman in respect of whom a dispute might have been raised by the Union etc., cannot object to the settlement on the ground that he had not agreed to the same. The Failure Certificate is also issued to the Union or the representatives and they alone can approach to the Court under subsection (5) of section

5. If they fail to do so, an individual workman cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. In this view of the matter, the parties to the industrial dispute are the Union or the workmen except in case of section 31, and the appeal to the High Court under subsection (5) of section 12 can be filed by anyone of the parties to the dispute. The party is always the Union or the five representatives.

11. In this case the Union was a party to the industrial dispute and the Union alone could file an appeal. Jalal Din in his individual capacity as a workman has no locus standi to file an appeal although demand No. 2 inner alia related to him and has been rejected by the Industrial Court.

12. Against the decision of the Industrial Court dated the 30th of April 1964, Jalal Din filed an appeal on the 19th of June 1964. The period of limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days of the date of the publication of the award the award was published on the 22nd of May 1964. The appeal was, therefore, within time. On the date the appeal was filed, i.e., the 19th of June 1964, office raised an objection as to why the Labour Trade Union had not been made a party. Jalal Din impleaded the Union as a respondent and refiled the appeal on the 22nd of June 1964. The fact remains that the Union had not filed the appeal and by impleading it as respondent, the objection as to the competence of the appeal under subsection (5) of section 12 is not satisfied. The appeal remains by Jalal Din as an individual workman and the same being by not a party to the industrial dispute merits to be dismissed. We may as well state that the Union was not impleaded as a respondent within the period of limitation which expired on the 21st of June 1964. There is no application by the appellant for the condonation of the delay of one day.

13. In our opinion, the appeal is not competent, but as it has been seriously contended on behalf of the appellant that he was an officer of the Union and since his services were terminated on the 13th of July 1961 without the permission of the Court after the strike notice had been given on the 11th of July 1961, the respondent‑management has acted in contravention of sub section (2) of section 30 of the Ordinance, we would like to deal with this case on merits as well. The demand made by the Union was:‑-- 14. "As Orient Match Factory Limited has dismissed, discharged or terminated the services of the following workmen illegally, in violation of the principle of natural justice and as measures of victimization it is demanded that these workmen be reinstated with retrospective effect:‑ (1) Jalal Din The Industrial Court in its impugned order has held that the Union had failed to establish the plea of victimization in the case of Jalal Din. The case of the appellant before the Industrial Court was that his services had been terminated without the permission of the Conciliation Officer. The Court, after referring to the evidence, held that the allegation of the appellant was unfounded. The respondent‑management has brought the evidence on record that they terminated the services of Jalal Din on the 11th of July 1961 at 11 O' clock and it was to take effect from 4‑30 p.m., on that date, but at about 1‑00 p.m. they learnt that a strike notice had been issued to them and without the service of the notice they immediately referred the case to the Conciliation Officer for his permission. The permission was granted by the Conciliation Officer on the 13th of July 1961. These facts have not been assailed before us. It was, however, on an earlier hearing contended before Feroze Nana Ghulamally, J., that since he was an officer of the Trade Union, the provision applicable to him was one contained in subsection (2) of section 30 and, therefore, the permission requisite for terminating his services was to be that of the Court and not of the Conciliation Officer. The question whether or not the appellant was an officer of the Trade Union on the day when his services were terminated was referred back to the Industrial Court for its opinion after recording the evidence and it has reported that he was an officer of the Trade Union on the said date. The finding of the Industrial Court has been challenged by Mr. Bhan before us. He contends that even if it be assumed that he was an officer of the Union yet it was not necessary for the respondent to take permission of the Court. In order to attract subsection (2) of section 30, it was necessary that the appellant should have proved that he was discharged from service during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or the proceedings before the Industrial Court in respect of an industrial dispute. The industry of the respondent is not a public utility service within the meaning of clause (k) of section

2. In the Failure Certificate issued under section 5 by the Conciliation Officer on the 19th of December 1961, it is certified as "non‑public utility". The conciliation proceedings under section 16 in the case of an industrial dispute relating to a public utility service commence on the date when such a notice is received by the Conciliation Officer and according to clause (b) of subsection (1) in other cases on the date on which the Conciliation Officer starts investigation, under subsection (2) of section

5. Section 5(2) lays down: "The Conciliation Officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute." Reading subsections (1) and (2) of section 5 together, it is obvious that the conciliation proceedings do not start on receipt of the notice by the Concilia tion Officer, but they start only on the date when the Conciliation Officer starts investigation. After the receipt of the notice of the h Union, the Conciliation Officer issued a letter to the parties on the 13th of July 1961 to appear before him on 17th of July 1961. The investigation before him obviously started as on that date. The question arises as to when did the proceedings start before the Conciliation Officer, whether they commenced on the 13th of July when he issued the notice or on the 17th of July when the parties appeared before him. The notice, in my opinion, cannot be a part of the investigation. It is a procedural matter. The notice is issued only for the purpose of investigation and is not a part of the investigation. The investigation would be deemed to have started only on the date the parties appeared before him and he started bringing about Settlement. In this view of the matter, the services of the appellant were terminated before the commence ment of the conciliation proceedings and that being so the permission of the Industrial Court under section 30(2) was not necessary.

15. It is clear from the record and this fact is not challenged by the appellant that the Management actually passed the order of his discharge on the 11th of July 1961. The order was passed at 11‑00 a m. The Management, however, as a measure of abundant caution referred the matter to the Conciliation Officer for his permission under section 30(1). According to the appellant, subsection (1) of section 30 is not applicable to his case. On his own admission, therefore, it was not necessary to refer the case to the Conciliation Officer. On that basis, the respondent passed the order of terminating his services on the 11th of July and not on the 13th of July 1961. On that date, the conciliation proceedings had not at all started because the Conciliation Officer was not cognizant of the matter at all. In this view of the matter also, the provisions of section 31(2) are not attracted.

16. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.