P L D 1972 Lahore 434 (PLP)

34. Allah Rakha denied in his‑ statement dated 17th of March 1972 that he ever participated in the procession and he supported it by an affidavit. When, however, he presented another affidavit on the 21st of March 1972 through Mr. R. S. Sidhwa Advocate, he admitted that he was a member of bath the processions on the 7th and 8th of March 1972. Mr. Yousuf Ali Khan also has now suggested that Allah Rakha was, in fact, not present. There is no difficulty in identifying Allah Rakha who has appeared in Court with the person marked as Allah Rakha in the photograph Exh. A. We, therefore, hold that he did take part in the processions.

35. So far as the others are concerned, they have, at no stage, denied participation in the procession. The result is that we hold that, except Khushi Muhammad and Kbair Din, all the respondents in Cr. O. 9 of 1972 did take part in the processions on the 7th and 8th of March 1972 which paraded the Mall.

36. Shouting of slogans has been admitted by all these participants; so have they admitted that the procession went up to the Governor's House. We, therefore, find accordingly. Question No. 2.

37. In their statements made on the 17th of March 1972, Taj Muhammad and Qadir Bakhsh admitted having shouted the following slogans:‑ (1) Long live the President. (2) Long live the Government of the People. (3) Long live the Governor of the Punjab. (4) Down with Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal.

38. Ghulam Rasul stated that though he did shout some slogans, he did not remember what they were. He, however, admitted that the procession was taken out against Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal as they were persecuted by him, were turned out of their fields; their standing crops were taken away by him; and they were sent to jail at his instance. There should, therefore, be no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the slogans shouted by Ghulam Rasul referred to Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal and to the subjects mentioned above Abdul Majid did not make any statement on this point.

39. In their affidavits filed through Mr. R. S. Sidhwa also, there is no reference to the shouting of slogans by any one of them. Question No. 3.

40. Taj Muhammad, Ghulam Rasul, Qadir Bakhsh and Abdul Majid have admitted that they were carrying placards in their hands. They have denied knowledge of the nature of the inscriptions upon them and have ascribed it to illiteracy. Allah Rakha initially denied participation in the processions but, however, admitted it in the affidavit that he filed through Mr. R. S. Sidhwa. In photographs Exhs. A and B, however, he has placard in his hands but the inscription upon it is .not decipher able even with the help of a powerful magnifying glass. While, therefore, it is clear that all the contemnors who participated in the processions carried placards in their hands, the inscriptions on the placards cannot be found from the statements of the respondents or from their affidavits.

41. Mr. Yousuf Ali Khan has, however, made a statement at the Bar on behalf of his clients that they did carry the following inscription on the placards that they had: He further admitted that this did not refer to the Judiciary at large, but had specific reference to Mr. Justice Sarder Muhammad Iqbal. We found ourselves duty‑bound to point out to the learned counsel that by making this statement he was tightening the noose round the neck of his clients and whether he had any authority to say so. He categorically and vehemently asserted before us that he was making this statement on instructions from his clients. This much is, therefore, proved that the placards carried by the respondents other than Khair Din and Khushi Muhammad, who have already been held not to have participated in the procession, did contain: at least, this inscription. Question No. 4.

42. Now we come to the question about the effect of these slogans and these placards. In the face of the categorical statement made by Mr. Yousuf Ali Khan that the placards did display the inscription referred to above and that they had and along intended to refer to Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal and l further the statement of the contemnors themselves that they had taken out the procession to protest against Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal, there is no doubt left that by doing the A aforementioned acts they scandalised the Judge as such as well as the Court and brought them into hatred and contempt. Having come to this conclusion, we are constrained to hold that the alleged contemnors, other than Khushi Muhammad and Khair Din, have acted in a way as makes them liable for punishment under Article 123(2)(b) of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 and Article 206(2)(b) of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan promulgated in April 1972. Criminal Original No. 10 of 1972 Question No. 5. 43. 'The facts of this case have already been given above. The photograph Exh. B which was published in the dally Nawa‑i‑Waqt of the 9th of March 1972 had the following caption under it:‑ The publication of this photograph and the caption is not denied by Mr. Majid Nizami.

44. It has been seen above that he Initially submitted a statement in which he justified the publication and argued that it did not constitute contempt. He also stated therein that he had the highest respect for this Court and could not even think of committing contempt and that in any case he regretted incon venience caused. This did not constitute. an unconditional apology and he, therefore, gave an unconditional apology. It has also been reproduced above.

45. On the 5th of May 1972 he made a lengthy statement referred to above in which he narrated the circumstances which, according to him, led to his having made that statement and tendered the unqualified apology referred to above. His unqua lified apology was withdrawn in this statement.

46. Let us now consider the effect of the publication.

47. Mr. Aftab Farrukh, Advocate who appeared for Mr. Majid Nizami; submitted that a statement, allegation or asser tion published by any body which is not relatable to the judicial capacity of a Judge of superior Court or the discharge by him of his public functions and is confined only to activities restricted to his personal matters cannot fall within the mischief of the law of Contempt. He submitted that sometimes the line of demarca tion between the private and the public activities of a Judge might be extremely thin, but it has to be found out and if it exists, the mere fact that it is very thin should not stand in the way of exonerating a parson of the charge of Contempt for, after all, the right to freedom of expression is one of the most cherished rights of the citizens of a free State and their circumscription by the law of Contempt is confined only to granting protection to Judges in the discharge of their duties and public functions so that the stream of justice flows clear and unsullied by aspersions cast upon him or the Court to which he belongs. He has cited from the classic work on Contempt by the celebrated writer Odgers. He referred to the following observations contained in this book:‑ "Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrepute or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants or their witnesses during the litiga tion" (page 6). "An attack upon a Judge while not engaged in or exercising judicial functions is properly punishable, not as a contempt, but, as in an ordinary case by summons or by indictment" (page 43). "General criticism on the conduct of a Judge not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice of the due ad ministration of the law in any particular case, even though libellous, does not constitute a contempt of Court" (page 48). "A libel upon a Judge in his judicial capacity is a contempt, whether it concerns what he did in Court, or what he' did judicially out of it; but a libel is not a Contempt if not written of the Judge in his judicial capacity" (page 50).

48. We were, then, referred to Lord Justice Wilmot'; opinion in the King v. Almon (97 E R 94). The case started with an application made by the Attorney‑General against Mr. Almon for publishing a pamphlet containing libellous passages upon the King's Bench and upon the Chief Justice for his conduct both it Court and out of it. It referred to an amendment made in the rules of the Court by Lord Mansfield "Officiously arbitrarily and illegally"". Several objections were taken by tire: respondent in that case Mr. Justice Wilmot while dealing with the case found that‑ "It seems to be material to fix the ideas of the words, 'authority' anti `contempt of the Court' to speak with precision upon the question." "By the word `Court' 1 mean the judges who constitute it, and who are entrusted by the Constitution with a portion 3' jurisdiction defined and marked out by the Common law or cad Acts of Parliament . . . ." "Contempt of the Court' involves two ideas; contempt of their power and contempt of their authority. The word `authority' is frequently used to express both the right of declaring the law, which is properly called jurisdiction and of enforcing obedience to it, in which sense it is equivalent to the word `power'; but by word 'authority', I do sot mean that coercive power of the Judges but the deference and the respect which is paid to them and their acts from an opinion of their justice and integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . .................................. It is not the coercive power of the Court, but it is homage and obedience rendered to the Court, from the opinion of the qualities of the Judges who compose it. Lt is a confidence is their wisdom and integrity that the power they have is applied to the purpose for which it was deposited in their hands, that authority acts as the great auxiliary of their power, and for that reason the Constitution gives them this compendious node of proceeding against all who shall endeavour to impair and abate, it; and, therefore, every instance of an attachment for contumelious words spoken of a rule of the Court (of which there are great many) is a case in point to warren; attachment in the present case, where a rule of the Court is the object of the defamation; and it would be a very strange thing that judges actions in the King's Supreme Court of Justice in Westminster Hall, should not be under the same protection as a Bailiff's follower, executing the process which those Judges issue; It is not their own cause, but the cause of the public: which they are vindicating at the instance of the public, for I do not think that Courts of justice are to take their complaints up of themselves ............................................................ "And therefore, the question resolves itself at last into the single point, whether a Judge, making an order at his house or Chambers, is not acting in his judicial capacity as a Judge of this Court and both his person and character under the same protection, as if he was speaking by himself in Court? It is conceded that an act of violence upon his person when he was making such an order would be a Contempt punishable by attachment; upon what principle? for striking a Judge in walk ing along the streets would not be a Contempt of the Court. The reason, therefore, must be that he has in the exercise of his office and discharging the function of a Judge of this Court; and if his person is under this protection why should not his character be under the same protection; it is not for the sake of the individual, but for the sage of the public, that his person is under such protection I and in respect of the public, the imputing corruption and the perversion of justice to him, in an order made by him at his Chambers, is attended with much more mischievous consequences than a blow .But the principle upon which attachment issue for liables upon Courts, is of a more enlarged and important nature, it is to keep a blaze of Glory around them and to deter people from attempt ing to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public .........But a libel upon a Court is a reflection upon the King, and tells the people that the administration of justice is in weak or corrupt hands; that the fountain of justice is itself tainted, and, consequently that Judgments struck out of that fountain must be impure and contaminated" We were then referred to a special reference from the Bahama Islands (1893 Appeal Cases Page 139, (Privy Council)). The conduct of the Chief Justice of Bahamas was criticised in the columns of a newspaper. "The Nassau Guardian" in a letter dated the 14th of May signed by "colonist". The Chief Justice's attention had been drawn to this letter whereupon he requested the Editor to appear and of his refusal to hand‑over the manuscript and give up the name of the reference, Mr. Mozley was served with notices for having committed contempt of Court. As a result, Mr. Mozley was committed for Contempt. For this he sentenced to fine and imprison ment the Editor, for alleged Contempt of Court.

49. This committal order was made ineffective by the Governor who after having sought permission from the Secretary of State released Mr. Mozley as according to the Governor the Chief Justice has written letters outside his province in the papers, and a satirical criticism followed them. The Chief Justice protested against this. The Secretary of State referred the following questions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy council:‑ (1) Was Mr. Mozley guilty of Contempt of Court in respect-- (a) of the publication of the letter signed "colonist" in the. Nassau Guardian; (b) of his refusal to give up the name of the writer, or to hand over the manuscript of the letter. (2) If so, were the sentences passed in these offences, respectively or for either or both of them in accordance with law. (3) Had the Governor power in the circumstances to order the release of Mr. Mozely?

50. No judgment was given in the case but a report was submitted which was confirmed by an Order‑in‑Council. The report was to the effect that‑ (1) (a) that the letter signed " colonist " in the Nassau Guardian though it might have been made the subject of proceeding for libel was not in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of the law, and, therefore, did not constitute a Contempt of Court; (b) that Mr. Mozley was not guilty of Contempt of Court in respect of his refusal to give up the name of the reference or to hand‑over the manuscript of the letter, there being no authority in point of law to require him to do either."

51. The report submitted by their Lordships of the Privy Council, therefore, shows that a libel against a Judge need not necessarily always be culpable under the law of Contempt unless It could be "calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or to the due administration of law."

52. This brings us to the case of Devi Prasad Sharma (AIR1943 PC 202). Notice was issued by the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court and a brother Judge to Devi Prasad Sharma and others of the Hindustan Times for having published some offensive material in the newspaper against the Chief Justice with regard to the War effort: "The comment contains a clear insinuation that the Chief Justice had issued a circular to all judicial officers to raise contributions from litigants and others to the war fund, that pressure was thereby being exerted by an authority which it would not be safe to displease and that the prestige of the Courts would thus be impaired. The implication is that the Chief Justice had done something which was unworthy of a person holding that high office and that as the head and representative of this High Court he had committed the gross impropriety of forcing judicial officers subordinate to this Court to ask for war contributions from litigants, who notwithstanding that the giving of donations was ostensibly' voluntary, were not in a position to refuse." On these facts, it was held by their Lordships: "When the comment in question in the present case is examined it is found that there is no criticism of any judicial act of the Chief Justice, or any imputation on him for any thing done or omitted to be done by him in the administration of justice." The instance, therefore, even in this case is upon the capacity in which a Judge has been criticised. If it pertains to his judicial work, it is contempt otherwise it is not.

53. In the matter of Sir Edward Snelson (PLD 1961 SG 237) where the appellant, a Secretary in the Central Government of Pakistan Ministry of Law, had been convicted for Contempt by the High Court and subjected to a fine of Rs. 2,

000. He had published a pamphlet in which he had suggested that the High Courts in Pakistan were manned by incompetent people etc. The present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who was then a Judge of that Court observed:‑ "From what I have said above, it will be observed that I am inclined to accede to the proposition that criticism of conducts of Judges, which cannot possibly have the tendency to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice ate not Contempt of Courts, even though they may be libellous attacks on Judges: Thus an attack on a Judge for conduct not connected with his judicial functions will not come within the mischief of Contempt of Courts (vide in the matter of Special Reference from the Bahama Islands). But I cannot stretch this to attacks on Judges in their public capacity for, to my mind, such an attack would inevitably also be calculated to lower the authority of the Courts over which the Judges so maligned happened to be presiding and thus tend to interfere with the due course of justice and proper administration thereof."

54. In Syed Mohsln Trimzi v. The State etc. (P L D 1965 S C 28) the appellant who was a District Judge and had been placed under disciplinary inquiry by order of the Provincial Government at the instance of the High Court levelled allegations of malice etc., against the Court in a letter of explanation sent to the Chief Secretary to the West Pakistan Government, it was held:‑ "Mr. Brohi arguing the brief for the appellant carried the point as far as it could be taken, but there is no question now, in view of the definition given to this particular class of Contempt by the Constitution itself, that provided the reference is to the Court or to a Judge of the Court, as such Court or as such Judge, and it has the effect of scandalizing the Court, that is to say, lowering it in general esteem or attracting to the Court or any Judge, feelings of hatred, ridicule or Contempt, the Contempt is established and immediately invites punish ment." Here also their Lordships stressed that the reference should be to the Court or to a Judge of the Court as such Court or as such Judge which clearly implies that if the reference be to a Judge In a personal capacity, it would not constitute Contempt, so argued Mr. Aftab Farrukh.

55. Mr. Aftab Farrukh, therefore, stressed that unless it could be said that the caption underneath the photograph was relatable to the public capacity or functions of the learned Judge, it could not constitute Contempt.

56. He then passed on to the case of Mir Abdul Qayyum (P L D 1971 S C 230). Mir Abdul Qayyum had sent a telegram to the Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court and then to the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, Lahore protesting "against arbitrary selection of Civil Judge candidates by the West Pakistan High Court." He was convicted for Contempt by the High Court and, on appeal, it was held by the Supreme Court in a judgment Written by the present Chief Justice of that Court who after referring to the case of Mohsin Tirmizi stressed that the attack had to be on the High Court as such Court if it was to constitute Contempt. The ratio of Mohsin Tirmizi's judgment was reiterated in this case.

57. Reference was also made to Israr Hussain's case (PLD 1954 FC 313). Syed Israr Hussain, Advocate of the Sind Chief Court moved an applica tion for transfer of a case which was pending before Mr. Justice Vellani. It was accompanied by an affidavit. The prayer was that‑ "The Honourable Court be pleased to make a report to the Provincial Government to transfer the suit herein to any other High Court of Pakistan . . . . . . . . . ." A notice of contempt was issued to Syed Israr Hussain and a Bench of the Sind Chief Court consisting of five Judges including the Chief Judge held that the affidavit amounted to contempt. In an appeal filed before the Federal Court, the citation of which has been referred to above, Chief Justice Muhammad Munir observed that‑ "If the affidavit is analysed it will be found that it contains the following allegations against Mr. Justice Vellani:‑ (1) That the Judge had been the Legal Adviser of the father of defendants 2‑8 and that defendant No. 1 in the course of negotiations for compromise had asserted in the presence of Mr. Hafiz, Advocate of the appellant, that defendants 2‑8 had undertaken to arrange matters with the Judge. (2) That the Judge had not permitted the appellant to explain his case or to examine certain documents. (3) That the Judge had prepared a false and incomplete note of inspection which he had, on request, refused to correct so that the note may be misinterpreted by the defendants or the Appellate Court. (4) That in the matter of permitting affidavits to be filed the Judge had been partial because he had permitted the defendants to file fresh affidavits when they were not entitled to do so, but had disallowed the appellant from doing so though he was entitled to it. , (5) That in Court, on more than one previous occasion, the Judge had blustered like a bully. He not only lost temper and grew hot, but also made faces, howled in anger and indulged in brow‑beating the appellant and his Advocate for reasons better known to him. He spoke loud, refused either to under stand the appellants' case or to examine an important document and ordered the plaintiff to sit down. On 19th September, on seeing the affidavit of the appellant, he again burst into anger, spoke at the top of his voice, and humiliated the appellant's Advocate and lowered him in the eye; of his clients and some members of the public present in Court. (6) That justice was not only not being done by the Judge but it did not appear to be done by him." It was observed by the learned Chief Justice that:‑ "No one can be allowed to defame, ridicule or abuse a Judge in his public capacity even with the best of motive because if that sort of thing was once held to be permis sible, the whole judicial system would readily be brought Into utter contempt." The Supreme Court referred to a Judgment of the Lahore High In re: Dr. K. S. Chaudhary (P L D 1953 Lab. 244) and quoted with approval the following extract from it‑; "Any allegation which undermines the confidence of the public in a Court of Justice is a contempt of that Court. And public confidence in a Court is undermined as mach by attribut ing dishonesty and corruption as partiality or incompetence to it. 'The arraignment of the justice of the Judges,' said Mr, Justice Wilmot, 'is arraigning the King's justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his Judges and excites in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and in dis pense: their minds to obey them; and whenever men's allegiance to the law is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice. It does not make the slightest difference whether the contempt of a Court is committed in that Court, or in a subordinate Court, or in a superior Court, or on the roadside, or In a club room in Pakistan or outside Pakistan., and it has never been doubted that a contempt of Court by a member of the legal profession is a 'reasonable cause' for taking disciplinary proceeding against him the reason being that any such conduct on the part of an Advocate reveals a mental defect which, so long as it lasts, renders him unfit to remain a part of the system which he sees to damage by bringing it into contempt. I adhere to that opinion still and with greater conviction, and nothing has come to my notice since to make me entertain any doubt as to the correctness of that principle."

58. Although the facts of this case disclose that the con tempt was committed in connection with the proceedings of the Court and, therefore, the Judge had been scandalises or brought into contempt in his public capacity, still it has been very clearly brought out in this case that it is the scandalising or bringing into hatred or contempt of a Judge in his public capacity which constitutes contempt.

59. The learned Advocate‑General referred us to Arly Nizami's case (P L D 1971 S C 72) and more particularly to the following obser vations:‑ "So far as the Editor, Printer' and Publisher are concerned, the law is well settled that they are responsible for everything that is printed and published in the newspaper under their control. This Court has already laid down in the case of Saadat Khialy v. The State and anther P L D 1962 S C 457, that in the case of newspaper the Editor, the Manager, the Printer, the Publisher as also the Staff Reporter, who is the actual author, are legally responsible in the fullest measure for the publications made therein. It is clearly the duty of the Editors and the Publishers to see that whatever is published in their newspapers . . . is not likely to either scandalise the officer presiding over the Court or prejudice parties to litigations pending before it." "It is futile, therefore, for the Editor, Printer and Publisher to come forward and say that they had nothing to do with the news item or that they had advised against its publication. Once the publication has been made, they are in law liable for whatever is published and printed, but it is a circumstance which may well be taken into account in assessing the quantum of punishment to be imposed upon them. If the Court is satisfied that the publication was made without their knowledge and they had not been negligent the punishment, for their technical liability may indeed be slight, and even negligible." "But before I come to this question of punishment I have first to consider whether the offending publication did at all constitute a contempt of Court. Scandalizing the Court or one of its Judges is a species of contempt which has, by no means become obsolete as was pointed out by Lord Russel, C. J. in the case of Regina v. Grey (1900) 2 Q B 36, for it not only has the tendency of lowering the authority of the Court but also of interfering with the administration of justice by shaking the confidence of the public in the Court or Judge scandalized. This kind of contempt may be committed by attacking the character of the Judge or the quality of his work or by imputing improper motives to him or by suggesting that action is being contemplated to remove him from his office. A Judge of a superior Court holds office quam due se bene gesserit, i. e., while he conducts himself well. In other words he is removable only for misconduct. To suggest, therefore, that a Judge has been served with a notice either to resign or to face an enquiry for his removal necessarily carries with it the suggestion that he has been guilty of such misconduct as makes him liable to removal. This is a serious aspersion on his conduct in his capacity as a Judge and if such expression is totally baseless and false, as it admittedly was in the present case, then I have no manner of doubt that it amounts to gross contempt of Court. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that the offending news‑item in the present cage did constitute a Contempt of Court."

60. Even in this case cited by the learned Advocate‑General, the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has particularly referred to the aspersion being "one, on his conduct in his capacity as a Judge," and it would not be in correct therefore to infer that criticism of the conduct of a, Judge in his personal capacity would ordinarily constitute Contempt only if it happens to cast aspersions upon such a facet of his per sonality as cannot be segregated from hi: public capacity. For example if a Judge were dubbed as dishonest in his private life or in his personal dealings can anybody say that such an asper sion would not shake the confidence of a public in his official and public capacity also for who would like to have justice dispensed to him by a Judge who is known to be dishonest in his private or personal dealings. The honesty of a person can hardly be bifurcated into public and private capacities. If a person is dishonest in his private dealings it would be difficult to convince a litigant or the public at large that he has another water‑tight compartment in his character which concerns only with his public dealings and that he continues to be honest in that particular facet. Such examples could be multiplied and, therefore, it would not be a good defence for an alleged contemner in every case to say that lie was referring only to the private capacity of the Judge if it can be shown that the reference in that capacity was to such an aspect of his personality in his private capacity as could not be differentiated from his personality in the public capacity.

61. We should, however, not be understood as saying that every attack on a Judge in his private capacity could be the subject‑matter of an action under the law of Contempt. While the person and reputation of a Judge has to be protected, but the protection is to be afforded only to the extent to which it is relatable to the maintenance of confidence of the public in his dealing with the cases brought before him in Court as well as confidence in a Court of which he is a member.

62. The learned Advocate‑General also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Muhammad Pinial v. The State (1969 S C M R 740). The learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court observed at page 746 as follows:‑ "Scandalising the Court is a well‑known form of contempt and anything which is done to bring into disrepute an officer entrusted with the duty of administering justice, such as imputing immoral or disreputable conduct to him or making wanton attacks upon his integrity and moral character are the worst possible forms of contempt that can be committed. There is no doubt that the appellant could have been made liable in damages for defamation in a civil action or even criminally prosecuted for it under section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code bit that, by itself, is not enough to absolve him of the charge of contempt of Court. Under the Contempt of Courts Act it is now well established that unless the offence itself is punishable as a contempt, the offender cannot escape liability for being committed summarily for contempt also." These observations do support the conclusion that we have arrived at in the preceding paragraph we may, however, point out that in this case also when the S. H. O. entertained a com plaint of rape against the learned Civil Judge and had it publicised inside and outside the thane to so many persons, tile complaint of the Civil Judge was that the police officer concerned who was the alleged contemner had adopted these tactics because the learned Civil Judge had on several occasions in the past made references to the District Judge complaining about the interference of the local police in the administration of justice. He had also, on more than one occasion, made observations in his judgments against the police officer concerned and it was for these reasons that O is campaign of vilification had been started. In this case also, therefore, it was the public capacity of the Judge which was to be affected for an allegation pertaining to his private conduct was being used for the purpose of blackmailing him and under mining his conduct as a Judicial Officer.

63. The learned Advocate‑General also adverted our attention to the decision of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court in State v. Bachal and 8 others (1971 P Cr. L J 1129). False allegations had been made against a Civil Judge contained in an application sub mitting to the Governor imputing immorality to a Civil Judge by indulging in illicit intimacy with his maid‑servant and on intimacy being discovered, adopting coercive measures against relations of the woman trying to prevent her from visiting the Civil Judge's house and getting such persons criminally prosecuted and by being personally present in Court of the Magis trate who convicted them on a false charge. It was held by Ghulam Rasool K. Shaikh, J.:‑ "Thus they assailed the conduct of two officers engaged in the administration of justice. They made disparaging and scand alizing imputations against the Sub‑Judge and reckless allegations against the Mukhtiarkar and First Class Magistrate for lending judicial support to spite them and thereby convictions were secured on false charges. The allegations were adhered to at the various stages and the justification was founded on the plea that the allegations were true and were made to further the cause of justice without any malice or bad faith. The allegations of these kinds are of serious nature and in the eye of the public lower the dignity and the prestige of the judicial officers who are expected to administer justice, without fear, favour or frown. A judicial officer who is said to indulge in the institution of false cases in order to spite his opponents or enters into an alliance with another to record conviction of innocent persons on false charges is unfit to hold any judicial office. So the allegations are wilful and tenacious. No one can be allowed to defame or ridicule an officer engaged in the administration of justice otherwise the officer will be thrown at the mercy of the disgruntled litigants who will scandalize him with impunity and his position as a judicial officer will be jeopardised. Cause of justice cannot be served by false and contemptuous imputations. This on the contrary, impairs that cause and undermines the dignity and the authority of the Courts. In the end I may refer to the plea taken by the above persons in the written statement which they had filed in this Court. It was pleaded by them that the allegations which had been made in the application amounted to defamation and were made against him in his private capacity and no criticism was levelled against him in respect of his judicial functions or anything done or attempted to have been done by him in the administration of justice and, therefore, the case should be tried by the ordinary Court." Even in this case Mr. Muhammad Saleh the Civil Judge was alleged to have been using his official influence as a Civil Judge for doing the acts complained of. The imputations, therefore, concerned his public capacity even in this case.

64. We were also invited to peruse the following observa tion at page 50 of the Corpas Juris Secundum, Volume 17, page 64 where it has been observed that‑ "Picketing or demonstrating at the home of the Judge is Contempt."

65. A case from one of the States has been referred to but the facts thereof have not been given and it is, therefore, not possible to say whether this picketing or demonstration was not in connection with some case decided or being heard by the Judge concerned. It will, therefore, be difficult to infer from this observation in the corpus juris that picketing at the house of a Judge even if it be in connection with his personal and private affairs having no effect whatsoever upon his public capacity, or the proper discharge of his duties as a Judicial Officer would be Contempt.

66. The caption over which the photograph Exh. B. was published in the daily Nawa‑i‑Waqt is to the effect that certain tenants of Mr. Justice Muhammad Iqbal agitated against him Neither the photograph nor the caption gives any impression that it has even a remote relation with the public capacity of the learned Judge or that it could, by any stretch of imagination, C shake the confidence of the people in him or bring him or the Court to which he belongs into hatred or contempt.

67. In the light of the decisions of superior Courts quoted:above and the conclusions arrived at by us, we cannot convict a person for publishing just a photograph in respect of an event which has taken place and which casts no reflection, whatsoever, on the public capacity of a Judge of a superior Court. Question No. 6.

68. In view of our finding on question No. 5, this question does not arise.

69. We, therefore, hold that Mr. Majid Nizami has not committed contempt of this Court by publishing the photograph and the caption referred to above and would, therefore, discharge the rule so far as he is concerned.

70. As for the respondents in Criminal Original No. 9 of 1972, we have already discharged the rule in respect of Khushi Muhammad and we now do the same in respect of Khair Din. As for the others, we find that they have committed gross contempt of a Judge of this Court.

71. The conduct of these persons in this Court does call for attention. Initially Allah Rakha denied even his presence in the procession. He then admitted it and gave an affidavit in support of it and begged for mercy. Thereafter, he went back upon it through a statement made by his counsel and again tried to justify his actions.

72. So far as the others are concerned, they, at one stage, justified their actions, they later filed affidavits and begged for mercy and finally they again withdrawn to the positions tatter, up by them initially by withdrawing their unconditional apology and making a plea of justification they have not even cared to stand by their sworn statements before this Court and have had no compunction in perjuring themselves. In these circumstances, they do not deserve any leniency.

73. We have, however, decided not to inflict the maximum penalty upon them in spite of this contumacious conduct and, therefore, direct that they be committed to the prison to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

74. We further direct that this order shall remain in abey ance for a period of thirty days from today to enable them to file appeals before the Supreme Court if they are so advised. K. B. A. Order accordingly.