P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

ABDUL AZIZ KHAN, J.‑In Writ Petitions No. 23 and 52 of 1962, a question was raised before the Bench consisting of A. R. Changez and Faizullah Khan, JJ. That an "Additional Judge" is not competent to bear an appeal against the order of a Rent Controller under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), hereinafter to be referred to as the Ordinance. Learned counsel for the petitioner, who raised this question, relied on an unpublished judgment of a Division Bench (of which I was a member) in Writ petition No. 79 of 1962. In the courses of arguments in Writ Petition No. 79 of 1962, no authorities were cited before us by either side. We held on the plain language of section 15 of the Ordinance that the District Judge alone was competent to hear appeals against the orders of Rent Controllers. While arguing the case before Changez and Faizullah Khan, JJ. learned counsel for the respondents relied on Behari Lal Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lal and another (A I R 1922 P C 361), Rup Keshwar Lal v. Jaijai Bibi and others (A I R 1916 Cal. 561) and Mst. Daho Kuer v. Mst. Tural Del (A I R 1924 Pat. 593) in support of the proposition that an Additional Judge is also competent to hear appeals arising out of the orders of Rent Controllers The learned Judges, who heard Writ Petitions Nos. 23 and 52 of 1962, were of the view that the point involved was not free from difficulty, and referred the matter to my Lord the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench to decide the point involved. It is in these circum stances that the matter has come up before this Full Bench.

2. The Ordinance was promulgated on the 23rd of February 1959. In order to appreciate the point involved, a reference to the provisions of the Ordinance is necessary. Section 1 gives the title and the extent of the Ordinance. Subsection (4) of section 1 provides that subsection (5) of section 13 and section 19 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions shall be deemed to have taken effect on, or from the date of the expiry of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957 hereinafter to be refer red to as the Act of 1957. Section 2 defines various terms and expressions used in the Ordinance. The term "Controller" has been defined in clause (b) of section 2 as meaning any judicial officer who is appointed by the Provincial Government to perform the functions of a Controller under the Ordinance. Section 3 declares that the Government may, by a notification to be published in the Official Gazette, direct that all or any provision of the Ordinance shall not apply to any building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented lands. Section 4 enacts that the Controller shall, on application of the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land, fix the fair rent for such building or rented land after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit. The section gives certain points which have to be taken into consideration for determining fair rent and allows curtain increases in rent to be made. Section 5 lays down that when the fair rent of a premises or rented land has been fixed under section 4, no further increase in such fair rent shall be permissible except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration has been carried out at the land lord's expense and if the building or rented land is in the occupation of a tenant at his request. This right of increase is also subject to certain limitations. Subsection (3) of this section provide3 that any dispute between the landlord and the tenant In regard to an increase claimed under the section shall be decided by the Controller. Section 6 debars the landlord from claiming or receiving any premium or other like sum in addition to the fair rent or any rent in excess of such fair rent. But he is permitted to stipulate for and receive in advance an amount not exceeding one month's rent. Any agreement for the payment of any sum in addition to serif or of rent in excess of the fixed fair rent shall be null and void. The rent which became due before the 1st of January 1950 is, however, exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 7 also prevents the landlord from requiring the payment of any fine, premium or any other like sum in addition to the rent in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy of any building or rented land. Section 8 allows a tenant to recover from the landlord all such sums which he may have paid in excess of what is permissible under the Ordinance within the prescribed time with the permis sion of the Court. Section 9 gives the right to a landlord to increase the rent if after the commencement of the Ordinance a fresh rate, cess or tax is levied in respect of the rented premises or if there is increase in the amount of such levy provided that the increase in rent shall not exceed the amount of the newly imposed rate, cess or tax or the amount of increase in such rate, cess or tax as the case may be. Section 10 prohibits the landlord from interfering with the right of the tenant to enjoy the amenities. It also provides a remedy to the tenant if the landlord without just or sufficient cause cuts off or withholds any of the amenities enjoyed by him (the tenant). Section 11 forbids the landlord from converting a residential building into a non‑residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. Under section 12 if a landlord fails to make the necessary repairs other than structural alterations, an order may be passed by the Controller, on application by the tenant, allowing the tenant that such repairs may be made by him and the cost deducted from the rent payable by him to the landlord. Section 13 creates what may be termed as a statutory tenancy inasmuch as the tenant in possession of a building or a rented land, by virtue of this section, cannot be evicted therefrom In execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Ordinance, or otherwise, and whether before or after the commencement of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section. Section 14 embodies the principle of res judicata and provides that the Controller shall summarily reject an application under subsec tion (2) or subsection (3) of section 13 which raises an issue which has been finally decided in a former proceeding under the Ordi nance. Section 15 relates to the appointment and powers of an appellate authority. It empowers the Local Government to confer these powers on such District Judges as it thinks fit by a general or special order by a notification. It also provides that any person who is aggrieved by an order of the Controller, may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority within the prescribed period. According to subsection (4) of this section, any party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority may appeal to the High Court. Sub section (5) ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of orders passed under the Ordinance. Section 16 confers on the appellate authority the same powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested In a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 17 provides that every order made under sec tions 10 and 13 and every order passed on appeal under section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court. Section 18 authorises the Controller to call for such particulars in respect of a building or rented land as may be prescribed from a landlord or a tenant. Section 19 provides that any person contravening any of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 10, section 11 or section 18 shall be punished with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,

000. Section 20 empowers the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying out all or any of the provisions of the Ordinance. Section 21 is the repealing section. Section 22 deals with the revival of certain proceedings taken under the Act of 1957. This exhausts the provisions of the Ordinance. It would be clear from a perusal of the provisions of the Ordinance, given above, that the intention was to provide for a graduated increase of rents of the specified premises situated in urban areas. At the same time, it was intended to protect tenants from demands for premium or excessive rents by landlords and further to provide protection to sitting tenants.

4. In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of the Ordinance, all first and second class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except Quetta and Kalat Divisions, all Senior Subordinate Judges and Subordinate Judges In Quetta Division, and all Civil Judges in Kalat Division were appointed as Controllers vile Notification No. HG‑10‑2/59 dated the 12th of March 1959, appearing in the Extraordinary Gazette of West Pakistan dated the 16th of March 1959. Similarly, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 15 of the Ordinance, the Government, by means of Notification No. HG‑10‑2/59 dated the 12th of March 1959, conferred the powers of appellate authority on all District Judges In West Pakistan and the Majilis‑e‑Shoora in Kalat Division. The latter notification is in the following terms :‑ "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to confer on all District Judges in West Pakistan and the Majilis‑i‑Shoora in Kalat Division the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the said Ordinance in respect of urban areas in their respective jurisdictions with regard to orders made by Controllers under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the said Ordinance."

5. The question to determine is whether the "Rent Con troller" and "appellate authority" appointed under the Ordinance are "Courts" or "persona designata". At this stage, the following sections of the Punjab Courts Act may be referred to: ‑ "

18. Besides the Courts of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 and the Courts established under any other enactment for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of Civil Courts, namely: ‑ (1) The Court of the District Judge ; (2) The Court of the Additional Judge ; and (3) The Court of the Subordinate Judge." "

20. The Local Government shall appoint as many persons as it thinks necessary to be District Judges, and post one such person to each district as District Judge of that district: Provided that the same person may, if the Local Government thinks fit, be appointed to be District Judge of two or more districts." "21. (1) When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of an Additional Judge or Judges for its speedy disposal, the local Government may appoint such Additional Judges as may be necessary. (2) An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge."

24. The Court of the District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court or principal Civil Court of original jurisdic tion in the district." The sections reproduced above would show that the terms "Con troller" and "appellate authority" are foreign to the Punjab Courts Act. The expressions "District Judge" and "District Court" have been defined in sections 2 (20) and 2 (21), respectively, of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, which read as under: ‑ "(20) District Judge. `District Judge' shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but shall not include the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. (21) District Court. `District Court' shall mean the principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction of a district ; but shall not include the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original civil jurisdiction". There are numerous authorities laying down that In the circum stances analogous to those in the present case, the persons functioning are "persona designata " and not "Court". Reference to some of them may be made here.

6. In H. A. Aziz v. Kilyoboy (A I R 1927 Rang. 1) it was held by a Full Beach of four Judges that the First Judge of the Rangoon Small Causes Court, when exercising powers vested in him by section 18 of the Rangoon Rent Act, 1920, exercises those powers not as a Court but as a persona designata and, therefore, his decision is not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The con trary view held in Muhammad Ibrahim Moola v. S. R. Jandass (A I R 1923 Rang. 94) were overruled.

7. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatter ji (A I R 1943 Cal. 247,) held that the District Judge, while exercising powers under paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942, does not act as a Court and conse quently his orders are not revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was further held that a Judge nominated to bear appeals under an order made by the Governor In the exercise of his executive and not legislative powers is only a superior executive officer and not "Court".

8. In Sm. Subashini Doss v. Mahandra Kumar Bose (A I R 1947 Cal. 455) following Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held: "An order passed by the District Judge in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by paragraph 12 of the Bengal House Rent Control Order cannot be revised by the High Court inasmuch as the District Judge, in exercising those powers, does not act as a Court but acts as a persona designata and superior executive authority."

9. The Madras view may be gathered from the following authorities :‑‑ (1) M. Abdul Wahid Sahib v. Dewanjee Abdul Khader Sahib A I R 1947 Mad. 400. (2) Chinniah Thevar v. F. M. Badsha A I R 1948 Mad. 439. (3) S. Rajam Ayyar v. Payanambal A I R 1949 Mad.

787. In all these cases it was held that the District Judges and Subordinate Judges invested with powers of an "appellate authority" under section 12 of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XV of 1946) functioned as persona designata and not as Courts subordinate to the High Court. In the case reported as The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum (P L D 1952 Lah. 258), S. A. Rahman, J. observed that the provisions of the Act (Madras Act) appeared to be in pari materia with those of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (VI of 1947), (Page 269 of the report.)

10. In Keshav Ramahandra v. Municipal Borough Jalgaon and others (A I R 1946 Bom. 64), Chagla J., after reviewing the authorities of that Court, held that a District Judge acting under section 15 of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act is not a Court but a persona designata, and the High Court has no jurisdiction to revise the order under section 115 bf the Code of Civil Procedure or to correct any mistake committed by him whether he exercises jurisdiction not vested in him or falls to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or acts with material Irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.

11. The view held by the Sind Chief Court may be noticed from the authorities that follow. In Muhammadi Steamship Co. Ltd. Karachi v. Underwood Typewriter Co. (P L D 1951 Sind 35), a Division Bench of that Court held that a Rent Controller appointed under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947, is merely an Administrative officer and cannot be regarded as Court subordinate to the High Court.

12. In Mirza Adamkhan v. Tkamdas Wadhumal and another (A I R 1939 Sind 165), a Division Bench of the Sind Chief Court held: ‑ "Where new tribunals are constituted to determine new questions under new Acts, the tribunals so constituted by and for the purposes of those Acts, unless the contrary is expressly enacted or necessarily implied, are special tribunals and the Judges when they are named are named as persona designata and not as Court. Therefore, when the Judge of the Karachi Small Cause Court acts under sections 16 and 17 (of the Karachi City Municipal Act, 1913), he acts as a persona designata and not as a Court."

13. In The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum, a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court considered the position of a "Controller" and an "appellate authority" under the Act of Iv47, section 15 of that Act is as follows :‑ "(1) (a) The Provincial Government may, by a general or special order by notification, confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or In such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Con troller may, within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal In writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, If necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller. (4) The decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision." It was held that a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not competent to the High Court against the order of the "appellate authority" under the Act of 1947, as he was not a Court. The present Ordinance and the Act of 1947 differ in so far as the persons qualified to be appointed as an "appellate authority" are concerned. . According to the Act of 1947, any , officer or authority could be appointed as "appellate authority." The powers of the "appellate authority" were, however, conferred on District Judges only. Under the Ordinance, a District Judge, who functions as "appellate authority" not as a District Judge but by virtue of the notification referred to in section 15 (1) (a) of the Ordinance, reproduced in paragraph 4 above. The words "confer on such District Judges as it thinks fit" are very significant. The Government may not confer the powers of an "appellate authority" on any District Judge. The appellate authority" does not hear appeals against orders of "Controllers" as District Judge but hears appeals as personal designata.

14. The Ordinance under consideration was enacted and enforced on the expiry of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restric tion Ordinance (XIX of 1956). Clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 15 of this Ordinance read as under: ‑ "The Provincial Government may by a general or special order by notification confer on such officers and authorities as it thinks fit the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Ordinance, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order." Under the above provision of law, the Provincial Government issued Notification No. 540‑HG/56 (i) dated the 15th of November 1956, which appeared in the Extraordinary Gazette of West Pakistan of even date, and ran as under: ‑ "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1956, the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to confer on all District and Additional District Judges in the districts of Campbellpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Jhelum, Jhang, Lahore, Lyallpur, Mianwali, Mont gomery, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Rawalpindi, Shahpur, Sheikhupura and Sialkot, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the said Ordinance in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdiction with regard to orders made by Rent Controllers under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the said Ordinance." The necessary notification under the Ordinance has already been reproduced in paragraph 4 above. A comparison of the notifi cation under the Ordinance and. the one given above would clearly show the intention of the Government. In the notification under the 1956 Ordinance, District and Additional District Judges of certain districts were notified to perform the functions of appellate authorities. In the Ordinance under consideration, the Government could not and did not include the "Additional Judges" as section 15 (1) (a) had empowered the Government to confer these powers on such District Judges only whom it considered fit.

15. The following observations by Rahman, J. in The City of Lahore Corporation v. Mst. Fahmida Begum on page 273 of the report, deserve consideration: ‑ "The question really is, whether under the Act, the Controller and the Appellate Authority can be described as Courts, and secondly, if the answer is In the affirmative, whether they are Courts subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. The statute itself does not seek to enlarge the existing jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts. That was undoubtedly the position under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941. Section 4 of that Act expressly enacted that when under the provisions of that Act, any question arose for the determination of a Court or any order was to be made by a Court, such question shall be determined or such order made by the Court having cognizance of the suit or proceedings, if any, in relation to which such question arises or such order is to be made. The jurisdiction under that Act was, therefore, vested in the ordinary Civil Courts. The 1941 Act was, no doubt, couched in almost similar terms as the 1947 Act, but for the first time the latter Act created the two functionaries known as the Controller and the Appellate Authority. The very fact that a departure was made from the old position existing in the 1941 Act makes the intention of the Legislature clear that the ordinary Courts were not henceforth to take cognizance of the dispute envisaged by the Act. Under the 1947 Act, any person could be appointed a Controller and any officer or authority as the appellate authority by a notification to be issued by the Provincial Government. In issuing such notification, the Provincial Government could not be said to be exercising legislative functions and could not, therefore, confer additional jurisdiction on Subordinate Judges or District Judges by these notifications. Even though, therefore, all Subordinate Judges and District Judges have been invested with the relevant powers under the Act, the inference by no means follows that they are to function as Courts. The Controller does not appear to be armed with all the powers of a Civil Court under the Act, and, therefore does not seem to be bound by all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar is the position with regard to the appellate authority. They can make such inquiry `as they deem fit' in each case. It cannot be said, therefore, that they are hidebound by the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The word `Controllers' is used in the Act in contradistinction with the expression `Court' in sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act, and orders of a Controller are to be executed by a Civil Court, having jurisdiction in the area, as if it were a decree of that Court, under section

17. Only a limited principle of res judicata is embodied in section. 15 of the Act. In the first instance, therefore, the Controller and the Appellate Authority do not appear to be intended to act as Courts and even if it be assumed that for certain purposes they may be regarded as Courts, in view of the special provisions of the Act and the absence of any indication of a link with the High Court, the conclusion is irresistible that they are by no means Courts subordinate to the High Court so as to attract its revisional jurisdiction." If the appellate authority is not a Court, then the irresistible conclusion is that the "Controller" and "appellate authority" are persona designata. Rahman, J.'s remarks on page 275 of the above case are noteworthy: ‑ "The cases discussed above reveal a preponderating balance of authority in favour of the proposition that special tribunals created under circumstances analogous to those obtaining under the Act of 1947 would not be Courts and in any case would not be Courts subordinate to the High Court. In arriving at this conclusion, Rahman, J. relied on Mian Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Husain (P L D 1049 Lah. 301).

16. The respondents relied on the following authorities. Behari Lal Bulaki Ram v. Kundan Lal and another (A I R 1922 P C 361) is a case under the Companies Act. On appeal, an objection was raised that the Additional District Judge who had passed the order under section 179 of the Companies Act had no jurisdiction and it was contended that all the orders in the winding up of companies must be made by District Judges. The relevant part of section 3 of the Companies Act reads as under: "(1) The Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate: Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, empower any District Court to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction by this Act conferred upon the Court, and in that case such District Court shall, as regards the jurisdiction so conferred, be the Court in respect of all companies having their registered offices in the district." The "District Court" has been defined in section 2 (6) of the Companies Act to mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, but does not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Section 24 of the Punjab Courts Act provides that the Court of the District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court or principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district. This section and section 21 of the Punjab Courts Act have been reproduced earlier. "Additional Judge" is. a part of the District Court. This would clearly show that the Privy Council case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, has no bearing on the facts of the present case.

17. In Rup Keshwar Lal v. Jaijai Bibi and others (A I R 1916 Cal. 561), a case under section 51 of the Probate and Administration Act was transferred by the District Judge to the Court of the Additional Judge. It was contended that the District Judge alone had jurisdiction to grant Letters of Administration in all cases within his district and that he was not competent to transfer the case to an Additional Judge. The Full Bench held that under section 8 (2) of the Bengal, N. W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act, it was competent to a District Judge to transfer a particular case to an Additional Judge. A similar view was taken in Mst. Daho Keur v. Mst. Tural Dei (A I R 1924 Pat, 593) which is also a case under the Probate and Administration Act. The points involved in the Calcutta and Patna cases have no bearing on the point involved in the case before us.

18. After carefully considering the language of the Ordi nance, the notifications, and the arguments of learned counsel, I am of the opinion that an "Additional District Judge" is not competent to hear appeals against orders of a "Controller" under A the Ordinance. A. R. CHANGEZ, J.‑I agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother Abdul Aziz Khan, J. but in view of the importance of the question, I would like to add a few words of my own.

2. Under section 15 (1) (a) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the Government is empowered to confer the powers of the "appellate authority" on such District Judges as it thinks fit. It is, therefore, clear that the Government has no power to confer the powers of the "appellate authority" on the Additional District Judges. It is also clear that the Government cannot empower the "District Court" or "the Court of the District Judge", as envisaged by section 18 of the Punjab Courts Act, to exercise the powers of the "appellate authority" under this section. The choice has been left to the Government to select particular District Judges to exercise the powers of the "appellate authority". The Government may empower the District Judges of all the districts or may empower some of them only, and leave out the others.

3. The question, therefore, arises whether the law‑maker had the intention of authorising the District Judge on whom the powers of the "appellate authority" have been specifically con ferred to assign such business to the Additional District Judge under section 21 (2) of the Punjab Courts Act. In my opinion, the answer is in the negative. Section 21 (2) of the Pcjnjab Courts Act contemplates the assignment of such business which the District Judge, as the Judge of a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, or, in other words, as the presiding officer of the Court of the District Judge, ordinarily exercises under the l law, and not such business over which he has been given jurisdiction under the provisions of a special statute. If the Government bad been empowered to confer the powers of the "appellate authority" on the Court of the District Judge" or "on the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district or on the district Court" and if such powers had been conferred on such Courts, then of course all the incidents to jurisdiction of such Courts would have remained intact and consequently the provisions of section 21 (2) of the Punjab Courts Act would have been available, but this is not the case. I am clear in my mind that it is not the case of enlargement of jurisdiction but is a case of conferment of special jurisdiction on the particular District Judge in his own personal capacity. I have grave doubts if the successor of such a District Judge on whom the powers of the "appellate authority" have not been conferred for the particular district will be competent to hear such appeals. It does not stand to reason at all that whereas the Government is not empowered to name an Additional District Judge as the "Appellate Authority", the District Judge who is selected for the purpose becomes entitled to delegate his powers to any of the Additional District Judges working in the district. The intention of the law‑maker seems to be that the individual District Judge empowered in this behalf by the Government is to exercise the powers of the "appellate authority" and no one else,

4. I am further strengthened in my view by the fact that a special provision has been made under subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance for filing a second appeal before the High Court from an order of the "appellate authority". This provision of law would be redundant if the District Judge acts in such cases as the Court of a District Judge because in that case the second appeal to the High Court can be filed under the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of the District Judge being subordinate to the High Court.

5. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that it is only that District Judge who has been empowered by the Govern ment to exercise the powers of the "appellate authority" in the district, who can hear and determine appeals against the order of a Rent Controller and that such a District Judge cannot assign such an appeal to the Additional District Judge under the provisions of section 21(2) of the Punjab Courts Act, and that the Additional District Judge is not competent under the law to hear appeals arising out of the orders of the Rent Controllers. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.‑The question which falls for determination in the reference to the Full Bench is whether the District Judge appointed 2s an appellate authority under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 functions as persona designata or as a Court. In the former case his functions and powers are confined to those laid‑ down in the Ordinance of 1959, while in the latter these powers are in addition to all other powers and jurisdiction vested in a District Judge by the Punjab Courts Act. A fortiori he may assign to an Addi tional District Judge the appeals preferred in his Court from the order of a Rent Controller under section 15 of Ordinance VI of 1959. The former view has prevailed with my learned brothers Abdul Aziz Khan and A. R. Changez JJ., but for the reasons to be given hereafter I regret my inability to agree with them.

2. In support of his opinion Abdul Aziz Khan J. has relied on H. A. A ziz v. Kilyoboy (A I R 1927 Rang. 1) ; Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chattarji (A I R 1947 Cal. 247 J) ; Sm. Subashini Dass v. Mahandra Kumar Bose (A I R 1947 Cal. 455) ; M. Abdul Wahid Sahib v. Dewanjee Abdul Khadar (A I R 1947 Mad. 400) ; Chinniah Thevar v. P. M. Badsha (A I R 1943 Mad. 438) ; S. Rajam Ayyar v. Pavanambai (A I R 1949 Mad. 787) ; Mian Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Hussain (P L D 1949 Lah. 301) ; The Cor poration of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Bagum (P L D 1952 Lah. 258) ; Keshav Ramchandra v. Municipal Borough Jalgaon and others (A I R 1946 Bom. 64) ; Mirza Adam Khan v. Tikamdas Wahdumal and another (A I R 1939 Sind 165) ; Muhammad! Steamship Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Underwood Type writer Co. (P L D 1951 Sind 35). 3. 1n order to appreciate the dictum in the aforementioned authorities it has to be borne in mind that under section 15 of Ordinance VI of 1959 the Provincial Government may appoint such District Judges as it may think fit as appellate authorities to hear appeals from the orders of the Rent Controller in such cases as may be prescribed in the order. The choice of the Provincial Government is thus confined to the District Judges unlike under the predecessor enactments of Ordinance VI of 1959 whereunder the Government was to appoint such officers or authorities as they deemed fit to hear appeals from the orders of the Rent Controllers. Further, the procedure for the constitution of the appeals to the District Judge as well as to the High Court and their disposal is the same as under sections 96 and 100, respec tively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Chapter VI of the Code relating to appeals being made applicable in this behalf. It is against this background that we shall examine the true character of a District Judge acting as an appellate authority under Ordi nance VI of 1959, and distinguish this case from those referred to above.

4. In H. A. Aziz v. Kilyoboy there was specific provision in the Rangoon Rent Act, 1920, that the decision of the first Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Rangoon, on a reference to the Controller fixing the rent shall be final. The question before the Full Bench in this case was whether such an order should be revised under section 107 of the Government of India Act then in force. In an earlier case, The Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur (A I R 1926 Rang. 25), that Court had laid down that when by an act of the Legislature a new authority is constituted for the purposes of determining questions concerning rights which are themselves the creations of the Act and a Judge or presiding officer of a Court, as distinct from the Court itself, is directed to perform the functions of the newly created authority then 1t must be presumed, unless the contrary is expressly enacted or nece ssarily implied, that the intention of the Legislature was that the Judge or the presiding officer should perform those functions as a persona designata and not as a Court. In the opinion of their Lordships such a presumption was stronger in the case of Ran goon Rent Act, 1920, under which only one of the plurality of the Rangoon Small Causes Court was invested with the new powers. Without any further discussion of the subject‑matter or taking into consideration the authorities relied upon to the contrary, such as Balkrishana v. A. K. Roy (26 C W N 30); Kalidasi v. Kanai Lal De (26 C W N 52); Chatterjee v. Trihadi (I L R 49 Cal. 528); Indian Engineering and Motor Co. v. Gladstone Wylie (26 C W N 102) and Allan Bros v. Bondo (I L R 49 Cal. 931); in which it was held that the Rent Controller and the President of the Calcutta Improvement Trust when exercising powers vested in them by the Calcutta Rent Act were Court, it was held that the first Judge of the Court of Small Causes hearing a case on a refer ence by the Controller in the matter of fixation of rent was not a Court subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Rangoon High Court under section 107 of the Government of India Act. With utmost respect to the learned Judge, the above statement of law in H. A. Aziz v. Kliyoboy is expressed in too wide terms. They have drawn a distinction between a Judge or a presiding officer of a Court and the Court itself, and laid emphasis on the creation of rights and their determination by the authority named in the statute. The latter distinction is plainly negatived by a number of parallel cases, such as Companies Act, Succession Act, Reli gious Endowments Act and Insolvency Act, etc. We have, there fore, to examine the soundness of the first point of distinction viz., between a Judge and the Court itself. With profound res pect to the learned Judges, there is no real distinction between the two. There can be no Court without a presiding officer or a Judge and vice versa. But a distinction does lie between the two if in a given case the Judge or the presiding officer is not required to adjudicate upon the naturally created rights in a judicial H manner. But this one has to examine in detail the functions and the powers conferred on the Judge or the presiding officer, and the procedure by which they are to be regulated. The learned Judges of the Rangoon High Court did not even advert to the relevant provision in the Rangoon Act, 1920, but chose to fellow the above statement of law other than an earlier decision of their Court in The Municipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur. The decision in this ca se, therefore, need not detain us any further.

5. In Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji, it was held that the District Judge in exercising the powers under para. 12, Bengai House Rent Control Order, and the Defence of India Rules, did not act as a Court and consequently his orders were not revisable by the High Court under section 115, C. P. C. In this case too there was‑ a provision that the decision of the Chief Judge or the District Judge, as the case may be, and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final. The Bengal House Rent Control Order of 1942 under which this case was decided was an order made by the Governor in exercise of his powers under rule 81(2)(bb), Defence of India Rules. The learned Judges noticed that it was not a case of the exercise of the legislative powers by the Governor as are contemplated by sections 88 to 90, Government of India Act, but was an instance of an executive act pure and simple. Further it was found that there was no indication in the House Rent Control Order that the District Judge was to exercise his authority as the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the District. Apart from it their Lordships considered that there were weighty reasons which inclined them to hold that the District Judge was not and could not have been invested with the authority of a Court by the provi sions referred to above as it was only a legislative enactment or a rule having statutory authority that could constitute a Court or invest a Judge with authority to determine matters outside his ordinary jurisdiction. One other distinction which the learned Judges drew and is very significant in the context of this case may be reproduced in extenso : "Difficulties do not arise, however, that the expression used is not `Court' but `Judge' and in such cases one has got to look to the entire provision for the purpose of determining whether the matter is to be heard by the Judicial Officer as a Court or in his own personal capacity. In 21 Bom. 279, the question arose under section 23, Bombay District Municipal Act, and it was held that the District Judge referred to in that section when he decided an election dispute acted not as a Court but as persona designata and his orders were not revisable by the High Court under section 622, C. P. C. The same view was taken in a later decision of the Bombay High Court in 50 Born. X

57. On the other hand this Court in 39 C W N 971 took the view that the District Judge referred to in and contemplated by sections 36 to 44, Bengal Municipal Act, was not persona designata but the Court of the District Judge over which the High Court had powers of superintendence under section 107, Government of India Act. In coming to this decision the learned Judges laid much stress on the fact that under section 37 (1). Bengal Municipal Act, the District Judge was given the power of transferring the election petition for decision by any other Judicial Officer subordinate to him and not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. This shows that the Act recogniscs the ordinary judicial hierarchy of a District with the District Judge at the head and the election petition is to be heard in the Court of the District Judge and not by the District Judge personally for a persona designata the District Judge could not have any judicial officer subordinate to him. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 47 Mad. 369 took the same view. In a Full Bench case of the Rangoon High Court, viz., 3 Rangoon 560, (referred to above) a question arose as to whether the Chief Judge of the Rangoon Small Cause Court exercising powers under the provisions of the Rangeon Municipal Act acted as Court or as persona designata. It was held that he was a mere persona designata and , one of the reasons given was that the Rangoon Small Cause Court consisted of a plurality of Judges and the Rangoon Municipal Act instead of vesting jurisdiction In the Court of Small Causes as a whole singled out of the Chief Judge of that Court as the authority who was to exercise the jurisdiction created by that Act. That decision was followed by the Madras High Court in the Full Bench case in 50 Mad. 121." This discussion was raised to meet the dictum of Lord Parker of Waddington in 1913 A C 546 at that "where by a statute matters ate referred to the determination of a Court of record without any further provision the necessary implication is I think that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged but all the incidents of jurisdiction including the right of appeal from its decision remain the same." The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in A I R 1917 P C

71. In that case the order challenged was one made under section 10 of the Religious Endowments Act which authorised the Civil Court to fill up a vacancy in the temple committee., The words "Civil Court" and "Court" are defined in the Act itself to mean the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the District in which the mosque, temple or religious establishment are situated, and it was pointed out by their Lordships that It is to the Civil Court and not to the individual Judge who may preside in or constitute the Civil Court that jurisdiction is given. The next Calcutta case Sm. Subhashini Dass v. Mahandra Kumar Bose is on the same lines as Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji.

6. The three Madras judgments are distinguishable on the short ground that under section 12 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV of 1946, the Provincial Government was authorised to confer on such officers and authorities as they may deem fit the powers of the appellate authorities for the purposes of that Act in any such areas or any such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. Sub section (3) of section 12 embodied the procedure to be followed in the disposal of such appeals. That these special features of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Control) Act have a significant bearing on the issue in hand shall be seen presently.

7. In The Corporation of the City of Lahore v. Mst. Fahmida Begum, on which much stress has been laid by my learned brother Abdul Aziz Khan, J., the first question which fell for determination of their Lordships was whether a Rent Controller or the appellate authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act functioned as a Court, and the reply to it was in the negative. The word "Controller" was defined In the Act of 1947 as meaning any person who was appointed by the Provincial Government to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act, and under section 15 (1) (a) the Provincial Government was authorised to confer on such officers and authorities as they thought fit the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the Act in any such areas or any such classes of cases as may be specified In the order. The procedure by which those appeals were to be governed and disposed of was also provided for in the Act. Further, subsection (4) of section 15 laid down that the decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question In any Court of law whether in a suit or by way of revision or appeal. Following an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court In Mian Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Husain, it was held that the order of the Controller or the appellate authority under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, was not revisable by this Court under section 115, C. P. C. or its supervisory jurisdiction under the Government of India Act then in force. It is to be noticed that the provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, are in pari materia with those of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV of 1946. If one may say so with respect in lace of these provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1947, the matter was beyond dispute that the Controller and the appellate authority appointed under it by the Provincial Government functioned as persona designata and not as Courts.

8. The Bombay authority Keshav Ramchandra v. Municipal Borough Jalgaon and others is much easier to distinguish, because Mr. Dixit, the learned counsel for the applicant, conceded before Chagla J, who decide this, that the Assistant Judge of Jalgaon acted as persona designata under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, for the purpose of deciding election petitions. On this concession the learned Judge remarked: "I fail to see how if the learned Judge is a persona designata the High Court can exercise any revisional power. Section 155, C. P. C., in terms referred only to Courts subordinate to the High Court in respect of which revisional powers of the High Court can be exercised. Mr. Dixit says that the learned Assistant Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under the Act. Be that as it may, this Court has no jurisdiction to correct any mistake committed by a persona designata whether he exercises jurisdiction not vested in him or fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or acts with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction."

9. In Mirza Adamkhan v. Tikamdas Wadhumal and others, two applications in revision purporting to fall under section 115, C. P. C. were filed against two orders of the Judge of the Karachi Small Cause Court, one made under section 16, City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933, in which he dismissed the application of Mirza Adamkhan petitioner against one Tikamdas Wadhumal on the ground that the latter was disqualified for being a Municipal Councilor. The other application was under section 17 (1) by the same petitioner on the ground that the Chief Officer of the Corporation had wrongly rejected his nomination paper. Without referring to the provisions of sections 16 and 17 of the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933, or the other salient provisions of law, the Judge of the Karachi Small Causes Court may adjudicate upon these matters. The learned Judges relied upon "a long series of decisions to the effect that when by an Act of the Legislature a new authority is constituted for the purpose of determining questions concerning rights which are in themselves the creation of the same Act and the Judge or Presiding Officer of the Court as distinct from the Court itself is directed to perform the functions of the newly created authority then it must be presumed unless the contrary is expressly enacted or necessarily implied the intention of the Legislature was that the Judge or Presiding Officer should perform those functions as persona designata and not as a Court. There is a marked resemblance between the statement of law reproduced above and the one enunciated in the Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in H. A. Aziz v. Kilyoboy. It may, therefore, be rightly presumed that the Chief Court of Sind based its decision on the dictum of the Rangoon High Court which has already been dealt with in the earlier part of this order. This exhausts the authorities relied upon by my learned brothers in support of the view that the District Judge appointed as an appellate authority under section 15 of Ordinance VI of 1859 acts as persona designata and not as a Court.

10. In support of the contention that the District Judge could assign an appeal preferred to him from an order of the Rent Controller under section 15 of Ordinance VI of 1959 under section 21 of the Punjab Courts Act, the learned counsel for the respondents relied, among others, upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Behari Lal Bulaki Bam v. Kundan Lal and another. In that case it was maintained that under section of the Companies Act, an Additional District Judge did not have the power to exercise all or any of the jurisdiction conferred by that Act on a District Court, the term being defined in the Companies Act as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction; which, by virtue of section 24 of the Punjab Court Act, means Court of the District Judge in the district. In repelling the contention raised by the appellants their Lordships observed as follows: ‑ "It is not disputed that under the Act the District Court has jurisdiction, the only question is whether that jurisdiction is confined to the District Judge or can be exercised also by an Additional District Judge. This matter appears to be settled by the Punjab Courts Act, 1888, which by section 6 provides as follows: ‑ When the business pending before any Divisional Court consisting of one Judge, or before the Court of any District Judge, requires the aid of an Additional Judge for its speedy disposal, the Local Government may appoint to the Court an Additional Divisional Judge, or an Additional District Judge, as the case may be. An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a Divisional Judge or District Judge, as the case may be, which the Divisional Judge or District Judge may assign to him, and shall, as regards the discharge of those functions and subject to the provisions of the next following subsection, be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be a Divisional Judge or District Judge. There is no doubt that the District Judge had assigned to the Additional District Judge all the functions of supervising this liquidation. He discharged these functions apparently without any objection for a considerable time and made many orders and no point was taken till this appeal was made at an advanced stage of the liquidation. He had jurisdiction, and the question which remains to be decided is the propriety of the order which he made." The manner in which the objections raised to the jurisdiction of an Additional District Judge was disposed of by their Lordships without entering into any further discussion shows that the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act were so plain that they did not admit of any argument in this behalf. Abdul Aziz, Khan J. has distinguished this authority on the ground that section 3 of the Companies Act speaks of District Court and not of a District Judge and that an Additional Judge is a part of the District Court. I remember that Mr. Fazl‑e‑Mahmood, learned counsel for the petitioner, argued vehemently that the Courts of the District Judge and Additional District Judge were separate entitles and relied upon Nand Singh v. Sher Singh and others (A I R 1933 Lah. 130), in support of this proposition. Further, it has been seen that the terms District Court and District Judge have been used by their Lordships as synonymous in the opening lines of the quotation reproduced above. There is thus no content in the distinction between the District Judge and District Court on which reliance was placed by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in H. A. Aziz v. Kilyoboy.

11. In Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Moghulpura v. K. G. Hashmat (A I R 1946 Lah. 316), the question referred to the Full Bench of this Court was whether the authority appointed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, is a Civil Court, and was subject to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C. P. C., and section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. In answering the reference in the affirmative Sir Abdur Rashid, Acting C. J. (as he then was), observed as follows: ‑ "One of the fundamental tests whether a certain Tribunal Is a Court or is not so is whether it exercises jurisdiction by reason of the sanction of the law or whether juris diction is given to it by the voluntary submission of the parties to a dispute. Another important test whether a certain Tribunal is or is not a Court is whether it can take cognizance of a lis and whether in exercising its functions it proceeds in a judicial manner." On review of the Payment of Wages Act, the learned Chief Justice remarked that its provisions and the Rules framed under it made it perfectly obvious that the Authority appointed under section 15 performed the delegated judicial functions and in exercising its functions it proceeded in a judicial manner. The fact that the amounts awarded by the Authority were described as directions rather than decrees and that the Authority as such could not execute its own decrees should not be regarded as determining factors. On this consideration the Authority was held to be a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court within the purview of section 115, C. P. C. and section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. In coming to this conclusion the learned Chief Justice followed Mst. Dirji v. Sm. Goalin (A I R 1941 Pat. 65 (F B)) and Shrinivas v. Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Nagpur (A I R 1945 Nag. 94) and distinguished decision of this Court in Muhammad Ahmad v. Governor‑General‑in‑Council (A I R 1945 Lah. 313 (F B)) and Turabali v. Sorabji (A I R 1944 Nag. 288), which was relied upon for the contrary proposition, was expressly dissented from. The reasons in support of the above conclusions of Sir Abdur Rashid, C. J. appear at page 318, which may be reproduced with advantage: ‑‑ "The provisions of the Act make it perfectly clear that as soon as an application is presented to the 'Authority.' It has to give notice to the other party. The application has to be heard in the presence of both parties and a decision is to be given after the bearing. The 'Authority' has to enter all the' particulars of the application and the pleas of the different parties in Form F appended to the Rules. The finding of the 'Authority' has then to be recorded and a brief statement of the reasons f or arriving at the conclusion must be appended to the finding. For the purpose of taking evidence and enforcing the attendance of witnesses the 'Authority' has been given the powers of a Civil Court. If any person makes a false statement before the 'Authority' the 'Authority' can take action in exactly the same manner as a Civil Court would under section 196, Criminal P. C. Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure can also be availed of by 'Authority' and it has power to commit a person, refusing to answer or produce documents for contempt of Court. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that the provisions of the Act and Rules make it perfectly obvious that the 'Authority' performs the delegated judicial functions of the State. It must, therefore, be regarded as a Court." It may be noticed that earlier I have brought out the distinction between section 15 of the present Ordinance and its predecessor enactments to show that in the matter of appointment of appellate authorities the choice of the Provincial Government is now confined to District Judges. Before that any public officer or authority could be appointed an appellate authority. When a public officer is appointed an appellate authority to adjudicate upon rights created by a statute and such officer is not required to perform his functions judicially, then certainly he is acting as persona designata and not as a Court, although he may have contained a Judge or Presiding Officer of a Court. But when the law provides that a District Judge shall be appointed an appellate authority, ft means the District Judge appointed under the Punjab Courts Act with all the powers and jurisdiction conferred on him by that Act. In principle, there will be no warrant to deprive him of those powers and jurisdiction, unless it was so provided expressly or implied necessarily, without acting as an appellate authority under Ordinance VI of 1959. It is indeed a case of an additional power conferred on the Court of District Judge under Ordinance VI of 1959 to hear appeals from the order of a Rent Controller. Under the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15, reproduced above, the appeals to the District Judge under the Ordinance are deemed to be appeals under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Similarly further appeals to the High Court are deemed to be appeals under section 100 of the said Code, and the provisions of Chapter VI of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to appeals shall apply to such proceedings. The case of a District Judge as an appellate authority under Ordinance VI of 1959, therefore, stands on a much higher footing than the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, which was held to be a Civil Court in Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Moghalpura v. K. G. Hashmat.

12. The reasons which have appealed to my learned brother A. R. Changez, J. may now be examined. He has first relied on the distinction between a District Judge and a District Court. In his view if appellate powers under section 15 of Ordinance VI of 1959 were conferred upon the District Court or on the principal Court of original jurisdiction, it would have been a case of enlargement of jurisdiction i.e. the powers conferred by the Rent Restriction Ordinance would have been in addition to t hose conferred on such a Court by section 21 (2) of the Punjab Courts Act. A District Judge is defined in the Punjab Courts Act as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It was maintained by Mr. Fazl‑e‑Mahmood that section 24 provides that the Court of the District Judge shall be deemed to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district as distinct from the District Judge. There is, however, no warrant for it because Chapter III of the Punjab Courts Act, which deals with the Subordinate Civil Courts, under section 18 mentions the hierarchy of the Courts as the Court of the District Judge, the Court of the Additional Judge and the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The next section authorised the Provincial Government to divide the territories under its administration into civil districts. Under section 20, the Provincial Government was required to appoint as many persons as it thought necessary to be District Judges and shall post one such person to each district as District Judge of that district. It means that the District Judge appointed under section 20 is to constitute as the Presiding Officer or the Judge of the Court of the District Judge enumerated in section

18. I am, therefore of the view, as indicated above, that there is no valid distinction between a District Judge and a District Court. In face of the given case a District Judge may act as persona designate and not as a Court, I but that will depend upon the provisions of the statute under which he is assigned that distinction and the procedure by which his functions are regulated.

13. The next argument which appealed to my learned brother was that it did not stand to reason that whereas the Government was not empowered to appoint an Additional District Judge as the appellate authority, the District Judge could delegate his powers to an Additional District Judge. The one short answer to this argument is that in making provision under section 15 that the Provincial Government may appoint such District Judges as it may deem fit to be appellate authorities, it was understood under the Punjab Courts Act that he may assign the appeals preferred to him under the Ordinance to an Additional District Judge. It also does not stand to reason that whereas a District Judge may assign an appeal of which the subject‑matter may be r valued, as at present up to Rs. 20,000 and which may involve adjudication of substantial rights between the parties, he cannot assign an appeal to the Additional District Judge in which the issues between the parties are comparatively very simple and not conclusive of their rights in the parties other than the right of occupation as a tenant. '

14. The last argument of my learned brother that if a District Judge was to function as a Court and not as persona designate, under the Rent Restriction Ordinance It would have been unnecessary to provide for a second appeal under section 15(4) also does not held good. Second appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code lie from decrees passed on appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, and not from orders made by District Judges on appeal from the orders of the Controller under section 15 of the said Ordinance. It was, there fore, necessary to provide that such appeals shall be deemed to be appeals under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.

15. On the view expressed above, I hold that the Additional District Judge was competent to dispose of the appeal filed by Ch. Rahmat Ali Nagra, respondent No. 4 from the order of the 1 Rent Controller, Lyallpur. In the result the writ petition filed by Mst. Aziz Begum fails, but in view of the difficult question of law involved in the case there will be no order as to costs. ORDER OF THE FULL BENCH According to the decision of the majority of the Members of the Full Bench, the District Judge could not delegate his powers of hearing appeals against the order of the Rent Controller to the Additional District Judge. In view of the decision of the Full Bench, Writ Petition No. 52 of 1962 (Ch. Rahmat Ali Nagra v. The District Judge, Lyallpur) and the connected Writ Petition No. 23 of 1962 Mst. Aziz Begum v. Sh. Nur Muhammad etc. are hereby accepted and the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge, is hereby set aside for want of jurisdiction. The record will be sent back to the District Judge, who will now himself decide Ch. Rahmat Ali Nagra's appeal, in accordance with law. In view of the difficult question involved in this case, we make no order as to costs. Parties will appear before the District Judge on 11‑6‑1962. A. H. Order accordingly.