1989 PLP 3808 (MLD)

3. This proclamation unless revoked earlier, shall remain in force for a period of thirty days. ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO, H. PK., PRESIDENT. 4 The second proclamation also expired thus on the 15th April, 1973, and on the 27th April, 1973 the Governor of Baluchistan appointed respondent No. 1 as the Chief Minister and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and later, respondent No. 4 as members of his Council of Ministers and they took oath accordingly under the interim Constitution. Upon the enforcement of the Constitution, although ordinarily the Governor and the Chief Ministers are functionaries who enter upon their office only after taking the oath that is prescribed in the Third Schedule thereto, by reason of Article 275 they continued to hold office even without taking an oath but were of course, under Clause (4) of that Article, required to take the prescribed oath as soon as practicable after the commencing day of the Constitution, that is to say, the 14th of August, 1973. Accordingly the Governor of Baluchistan took the oath on the 16th August, and in turn administered the oath of office to the Chief Minister on that day or perhaps one or two days later, it will be noticed, however, that Article 275 makes no reference to Ministers and accordingly respondents 2, 3 and 4 who were Ministers, at least defacto if not de jure, before the commencement of the Constitution ceased to be Ministers upon the 14th but the same persons have been appointed Ministers and have taken the oath, we are informed, with the Chief Minister, in the case of respondents 2, 3 and 4, therefore, there is a point of distinction inasmuch as they do not owe their office just now to their initial appointment thereto in April, 1973, but have entered upon their offices, if indeed their holding of office is legal, upon the date upon which they have taken oath. Whether or not this will make a real difference is a matter which I shall presently consider. Before I deal with the various contentions put forward by the learned counsel who appeared for the petitioner, it would be proper, I think to consider an argument advanced by the learned Attorney-General against the maintainability of of" their petition, at any rate, part of it. This is in the nature of a preliminary objection but it was not taken and was urged only after learned counsel for the petitioner had concluded his main address: This was, of course, entirely the proper course for the Attorney-General to adopt since the petition had not yet been admitted to regular hearing and he was not. appearing, in any sense, for the respondents but merely in response to our own request. The argument is based upon the prayer which has been made in the petition and which is thus worded: "It is, therefore, prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of Quo Warranto requiring the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to show under what authority of law they claim to hold their respective public offices, and after satisfying itself that the said Respondents do not hold offices under any lawful authority may be pleased to: (i) restrain Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 from exercising the powers of Ministers ,.,in the Province of Baluchistan; (ii) declare that Sardar Attaullah Mengal the Chief Minister of Baluchistan and his Council of Ministers are the only lawful, legitimate and valid Ministers of the Province of Baluchistan; (iii) declare the orders passed/decisions taken, etc. by the Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 in the purported exercise of their powers as illegal, ultra vires and of no lawful consequence; (iv) declare all actions/orders of the Governor as on the advice of Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 as illegal, inoperative and of no lawful consequence; (v) grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may consider it and proper in the interest of justice; (vi) award costs of the petitioners." It will be noticed that the prayers which are given distinctive numbers are all of them, with the exception of (v) and (vi), such as fall within sub-clause (c) of Clause (2) of Article 201 of the Interim Constitution or sub-clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution and are, under each of these provisions maintainable only upon the application of an aggrieved person. The prayers numbered (v) and (vi) are merely to the effect that any other relief which may be considered fit and proper be granted and a prayer for costs. The petitioner does not claim any personal interest or that he has been affected by any order of the Ministers nor can he really claim that he is interested, in any legal sense of the word in the appointment or continuation in office of Sardar Attaullah Mengal and his Council of Ministers. The learned Attorney-General is, therefore, clearly right in saying that so far as these prayers are concerned a petition at the instance of the petitioner is not maintainable. But the earlier part of the paragraph which is not separately numbered is clearly one which falls within clause (b) sub-clause (ii) of the Article 201 of the Interim Constitution, the Constitution which I have referred to. They are in fact, as is expressly stated, prayers for the grant of a writ in the nature of Quo Warranto; such a writ, it is well-known, could be granted at the instance of any person and not necessarily at the prayer of one who was an aggrieved party and that position is expressly maintained m the two Constitutions for clause (b) starts with the expression. "On the application of any person." Right, therefore, thought the learned Attorney-General is in his contention that contention does not suffice to dispose of the entire petition; it is true that he also goes on to say that this petition has not been bona fide made and that we have a discretion in the matter which, in the circumstances of the case, we should refuse to exercise in favour of the petitioners. That is a different argument which I shall consider hereinafter.

5. Now the first contention of learned Council for the petitioner is that Article 136 of the Interim Constitution did not authorise the President to remove the Governor's Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister of that Province which under clause (b) of the first proclamation, the President has in fact ordered and described as incidental and' consequential provisions. Now it is not argued that the direction which he has given and is contained in clause (a) of the proclamation, namely, that the Governor of the Province should assume, on his behalf, all the functions and powers of the Government of that Province .and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any body or authority in that Province other than the Provincial Legislature it is conceded that Article 136 does give this power. It is contended, however, that under Article 104 it was mandatory for the Governor to appoint as Chief Minister a person as to whom he was satisfied that he commanded the confidence of the majority of the total members of the Assembly. It is, therefore, argued that, despite the proclamation under Article 136, Article 104 continued to operate and since there already was a Chief Minister duly appointed by Governor who had taken the oath of office that Chief Minister must be deemed to have continued. This argument I find myself entirely unable to accept. The Interim Constitution, as indeed any legislative instrument, must I think be so constructed as to give effect to all parts of it and to reconcile the provisions with one another and there can be no question of choosing between the provisions unless indeed there is such absolute conflict between two provisions that upon no reasonable interpretation can they both be given effect to. It is unnecessary just now to quote the entire Article 136 but clause (1) thereof may usefully be reproduced; "136.--(1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a Province, or information from any other source, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of a Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by proclamation- (a) assume to himself, or direct the Governor of the Province to assume on behalf of the President, all or any of the functions of the Government of the Province, and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any body or authority in the Province other than the Provincial Legislature; (b) declare that the powers of the Provincial Legislature to make laws shall be exercisable by or under the authority of the Federal Legislature; (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the Province: Provided that nothing in this Article shall authorise the President to assume to himself or direct the Governor of the Province to assume on his behalf, any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend either in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to High Courts:" It will be seen that the Article authorises the President to direct the Governor to assume to himself or to assume on behalf of the President all or any of the functions of the Government and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any body or authority in the Province other than the Provincial Legislature. Clearly, therefore, the manifest purpose of Article 136 is to authorise the President to vest in the Governor or in the Governor on behalf of himself, the entire executive authority of the Province. That authority is otherwise exerciseable by the Governor under Article 104 of the Interim Constitution but clause (4) of Article 104 reads; "104. (4) In the exercise of his functions, the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers or, as the case may be, the appropriate Minister, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution." In the absence, therefore, of a proclamation issued under Article 136, the Governor was required to act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers, but it is to be noted that the clause expressly says "except as otherwise provided in this Constitution". Now it seems to me to be an impossible situation to require the Governor, on the one hand to assume the executive authority of the Province on behalf of the President and all the functions of the Government of that Province and yet to require that in the exercise of his functions he shall act in accordance with the advice of his Council of Ministers. Even if that phrase "except as otherwise provided in this Constitution" did not occur in Article 104 (4) 1 should have been inclined to hold that the only way of construing these two Articles together is to hold that while a proclamation under Article 136 is in force and necessary directions have been given under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of that Article there can be no question of the Governor seeking or acting upon the advice of the Ministers. The position, I think, is made even plainer by sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of that Article which authorises the President to make" such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the proclamation". Now the stated object of the proclamation was that the Government of Baluchistan having failed to take effective measures in certain matters, a situation has arisen in which the Government of that Province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Constitution and that consequently the national interests require the making of a proclamation. If that be so, and I think we cannot go behind the stated object. I am wholly unable to see how the Ministers could well continue in office while the proclamation was in force. Indeed sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Article 136 even includes the power to make provision for suspending the whole or in part the operation of any provisions of the Interim Constitution relating to any body or authority in the Province; a clear indication that if the provision of the Interim Constitution which authorised or required the existence of any other body or authority could be said to come into conflict with the effective enforcement of a proclamation made by the President under Article 136, the President could under Article 136 suspend that provision. I am, therefore, of the opinion that not only did Article 136 authorise the President to remove the Council of Ministers but that having given the directions which he did under clause (a) of the proclamation there really was no alternative to him but so to direct.

6. It was next argued that upon the expiry of the proclamation and by that is meant the expiry of the second proclamation which did not as it need not have, removed the Council of Ministers because upon that date there was no Council of Ministers in fact Sardar Attaullah Mengal automatically and without any appointment as such became once more, in the eye of the law, Chief Minister of Baluchistan with his Council of Ministers. The argument is that the proclamation being in its nature, a temporary measure did not have any permanent effect either upon the provisions of the Constitution which might be regarded as having been suspended in the meantime or upon the Council of Ministers, and when the proclamations ceased to have effect, the position obtaining immediately before them came automatically into being again. The argument is not pressed so far as to say that Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti also ceased to be Governor and that Mir Ghaus Bukhsh Khan Bizenjo again became Governor because the dismissal or appointment of the Governor is not a matter upon which the proclamation has any bearing. It seems to me that this argument entirely misconceived both the legal position of a Chief Minister and the effect of Article

136. The office of the Chief Minister is not the holding of a post in the service of the country the right to continue in which was Constitutionally guaranteed by the Interim Constitution nor is it an office from which removal is prohibited except in accordance with certain special procedure provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Judges of the superior Courts. In essence the office is of a political character and, in a political sense, is always dependent upon the confidence which the Chief Minister enjoys among the members of the Assembly. Previous Constitutions indeed provided that the Ministers shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor and the fact that they could not, again in a political sense, be removed if they enjoyed the confidence of the Assembly was not a matter of Constitutional or legal guarantee nor was it a matter which was possibly justiciable in a Court of law. Even now I am persuaded that the question is essentially political and the remedy must again essentially be political. The Courts did not regard such matters as justifiable issues and I venture to think that even now we will not do so except where the provisions of the Constitution or a relevant law can be shown to have been violated and not upon the basis of political conventions. There have no doubt been cases in the past where the Courts have held that a person was not legally the Chief Minister of a Province but there have been cases where there has been a question of the personal eligibility of that person or his F disqualification; see for example the case Illahi Bux v. Muhammad Ayub Khuro PLD 1956 Sind

101. Such is not the instant case. Accordingly when the proclamation, ceased to have any effect it did. not follow by any means that the person who was the Chief Minister before the proclamations automatically became the Chief Minister once again or rather resumed his office. The person who was then to be appointed the Chief Minister had again to be chosen afresh and the proper person to be chosen was the person as to whom in accordance with Article 104 of the Interim Constitution, the Governor was satisfied that he commanded the majority of the total members of the Assembly. The petitioner is of course entitled to argue that respondent No. 1 was not such a person but I am dealing just now only with the contention that automatically and without anything further Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal assumed, in law, the office of Chief Minister upon the expiry of the proclamations and this argument I totally reject.

7. It is then contended that respondent No. 1 did not enjoy the confidence of such a majority and that when Article 104 speaks of the Governor being satisfied, the satisfaction, it is said, should be objective and not subjective. It is argued upon the basis of the case of Malik Ghulam Jilani PLD 1967 SC 373 and subsequent well known cases of the Supreme Court that the word `satisfied' means satisfied upon such material as would cause a reasonable person to be satisfied. It is true -that their Lordships of the Supreme Court so held in that case and a number of cases which have followed since then but it is to be remembered that these decisions of their Lordships are in the context of the expression used in Statutes which authorised preventive detention. Each case must necessarily be authority for the proposition which it actually decides and must be understood in the light of the facts and contentions which arise in that case. I am wholly unable to agree that their Lordships were laying down in this or in any of the subsequent cases a general rule that the word "satisfied" invariably must bear this meaning. On the contrary the learned Attorney-General placed before us a subsequent decision of their Lordships in Abdul Baqi Baloch v. The Government of Pakistan PLD 1968 SC 313 in which case at page 329 his Lordship the present Chief Justice observed: "The next contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that since clause (8) of Article 30 of the Constitution requires that the President shall, when he is satisfied that the grounds on which he has issued a proclamation of Emergency have ceased to exist, revoke the proclamation, the President was bound to do so as soon as hostilities ceased and the Tashkant Declaration was announced. If he has not done so, the Appellant contends, that the High Court should declare the proclamation as revoked. This argument is wholly misconceived, for, it is the President who has to be satisfied that the grounds on which he issued the proclamation have ceased to exist. It is not for the Courts to substitute their satisfaction for the satisfaction of the President. In any event it cannot be said that merely because hostilities have ceased the emergency is also at an end. This is a purely political question which is outside the competence of the Courts to decide, for the declarations of war and peace are within the exclusive competence of the Executive Government of the Country. In such matters the Courts speak in the same voice as the Chief Executive of the State, for, these are not questions which are amenable to judicial determination. No Court can give a declaration that a State of War has ceased to exist when the Chief Executive does not say so." Their Lordships were here dealing with Article 30 of the 1962 Constitution which starts with the expression "if the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists". That provision deals with the powers of the President to take an extraordinary step upon the pre-condition that he is satisfied of a certain state of affairs while Article 104 of the Interim Constitution empowers the Governor to choose a Chief Minister who has a majority in the legislative Assembly, which is to my mind essentially a political question and upon which in the absence of clearer constitutional language I would hesitate to embark. It seems to me, therefore, that these observations of their Lordships are far more relevant in the present case than their decision as to the meaning of this expression in the context of the laws relating to preventive detention.

8. In this view I am fortified by the fact that this very case was one of preventive detention and the decision in Ghulam Jilani's case was followed and developed and their Lordships laid down the meaning of the word "satisfied" while dealing with preventive detention laws in the manner which was canvassed before us on behalf of the petitioner for the same purpose in Article

104. Clearly the Supreme Court itself refused to give it the same meaning in Article 30 of the 1962 Constitution which, as I have said, is nearer to Article 104 of the Interim Constitution for the purposes of interpretation.

9. Reliance is, however, placed upon clause (8) of Article 104 of the Interim Constitution which reads as follows: "104. (8) For the purpose of being satisfied as required by clause (1) or (5), the Governor shall summon a special session of the Assembly, or if the Assembly is in session, shall direct that a special meeting shall be held at which no business shall be transacted otherwise than discussion and determination- . (a) Where the matter relates to clause (1), of a vote of confidence moved by, or on behalf of any member that he commands the confidence of a majority of the total number of members of the Assembly; or (b) Where the matter relates to paragraph (a), of clause (5) of a vote of confidence moved by, or on behalf of the Chief Minister, or of a vote of no-confidence move as provided in paragraph (b) of clause (5); and the special session or special meeting shall not be adjourned until such business has been concluded by the taking of a vote or votes" It is, therefore, said that, there being doubt in the matter, the Governor should have restored to the procedure laid down in this clause and summoned a special session of the Assembly. The argument overlooks the fact, I think that clause (8) is itself controlled by clause (1) which reads: "104. (1) The Governor shall appoint as Chief Minister a person as to whom he is satisfied that he commands the confidence of the majority of the total number of members of the Assembly. In case of doubt, the Governor shall proceed as provided in clause (8) for the purpose of being so satisfied. If then I am right in thinking that the satisfaction which is intended by Article 104 is the satisfaction of the Governor himself then the doubt also must arise in the mind of the Governor and there is no evidence before us or any circumstances from which such a doubt may properly be inferred. It is true of course, as pointed out by learned counsel for petitioner, that the petition avers that the new Government that is to say, the Government headed by respondent No. 1 did not enjoy the support of more than nine members and that only nine attended the oath taking ceremony of the new Council of Ministers. It is also averred that the other 12 members of the Assembly made a signed request to the Governor asking him to call a session of the said Assembly. In support of these facts, however, we have nothing except the word of the petitioner though of course on affidavit. Now it is one thing to say that a petition of this kind, that is to say, one for a writ in the nature of quo-warranto, may be maintained by any person even though he is not an aggrieved person and has not himself a personal interest, and quite another to say that he may, therefore, depose to facts which are not in his personal knowledge and of which the petition does not even claim that he has personal knowledge. Not only is it a fact that the Ministers who were removed from office are not parties in this case but there is no affidavit from any of them or any other Member of the Legislative Assembly and I cannot, therefore, regard these facts as sufficiently established merely because the petitioner says so on affidavit. In saying so I do not think I am taking too technical a view of the matter, for, the Advocate-General of Baluchistan states that should this case go to a regular hearing, that is to say, that if we admit it and issue notice, these facts will be denied and the contrary asserted on affidavit by those who have personal knowledge. Even, therefore, if I were to hold that the Court may properly come to the conclusion that there was a doubt in the matter and that the mere satisfaction of the Governor is not enough if shown to be fanciful or arbitrary I cannot regard it as established in this case that there are circumstances which would show that it was fanciful or arbitrary. On the factual claim also I do not think that the petitioner has made out any case. The petition was instituted while the Interim Constitution was still in force but the hearing did not take place, as the dates will show, until the Constitution had come into force and we therefore invited learned counsel for the petitioner to argue, if he could, that whatever might have been their position before the 14th of August, 1973, the respondents were in any case, not Ministers in the eye of the law. The relevant provisions of the Constitution are, in several material particulars, different from those contained in the Interim Constitution. While under Article 102 of the Interim Constitution the executive authority of the Province was to be exercised by the Governor although in the exercise of his functions he was required under Article 104 to act in accordance with the advice of the Ministers, under Article 129 of the Constitution the executive authority of the Province is to be exercised in the name of the Governor by the Provincial Government which is to consist of the Chief Minister and the provincial Ministers. Again while under the Interim Constitution the Chief Minister was to be appointed by the Governor though of couese he was to be such person as to whom the Governor was satisfied that he commanded the support of majority of the total number of the members of the Assembly under Article 131 of the Constitution the Chief Minister is to be elected by the votes of the total membership of the Provincial Assembly and under Article 132 the Provincial Ministers are to be appointed by the Chief Minister from among the Members of the Provincial Assembly. It is true of course that although ordinarily the Chief Minister under the Constitution takes office after taking the oath prescribed for that purpose in the Constitution persons who were in the service of Pakistan before the 14th August, 1973 were to continue in such service and this provision was to apply in relation to a person holding office in certain capacities which include the Chief of a Province. Consequently a person who was the Chief Minister of a Province immediately before the 14th of August, 1973 continues under the Constitution to remain such even before he has taken an oath but he is required under clause (4) of the same Article to take the oath as soon as is practicable after that date. It appeared to me, however, that the words "Chief Minister" occurring in Article 275 of the Constitution should mean a person lawfully holding office as such and not a mere usurper; the learned Attorney- General quite frankly conceded that this was so and that if we were to come to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 was not lawfully the Chief Minister of Baluchistan before the 14th of August, 1973, then despite Article 275 he would not continue as such. The mere fact that he has already taken an oath under the Interim Constitution or could continue in office under the Constitution without having taken an oath for some time did not, he agreed, make any material difference.

11. The position of the Ministers, that is to say, respondents 2, 3 and 4 did appear at first sight to be somewhat different inasmuch as they are not among persons who are named in Article 275 as continuing in office regard being had, however, to the fact that under Article 132 of the Constitution it is the Chief Minister who has to appoint the Ministers, this distinction is really without a difference for in order to be Ministers they must be appointed by a person who is in law the Chief Minister and not merely one who is holding the office in fact but not in law. This too was conceded by the learned Attorney-General.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner made no attempt to use the provisions of the Constitution for advancing any argument that the position of the respondents has changed after the enforcement of the Constitution. On the contrary the learned Advocate-General of Baluchistan pointed out certain facts which in my opinion are of importance. In the first place he stated that the Governor of Baluchistan had already summoned a session of the Legislative Assembly of the Province for the 28th September, 1973 and I think, apart from the statement of the Advocate-General we can take judicial notice of this fact as well. In about one month's time therefore, he argued the question whether the respondents enjoy the confidence of the Provincial Legislative Assembly would have been tested and he, therefore, argued that since the granting of a petition of the present kind is a discretionary matter and since the respondents have in fact held their office since the 27th April, 1973 and a petition challenging the validity of their appointment was not filed in this Court until the 8th August, 1973, we should in any view of the matter, refrain from interfering until the Assembly meets. He went on further to point out that under clause (3) of Article 54 upon a requisition signed by not less than 1/4th of the total membership of the National Assembly the Speaker is bound to summon the Assembly and when it meets upon such summon only he may prorogue it. That is to say, it cannot be prorogued as it otherwise could by the President. The Article in terms no doubt applies to the National Assembly but Article 127 makes it applicable also, mutatis mutandis, to the Provincial Assembly. He, therefore, argued that if the petitioner wait not willing to wait until the 28th September, 1973 for testing the question whether the Chef Minister has the confidence of the Provincial Assembly and indeed there were a sufficient number of the members of that Assembly to dislodge him in the ordinary parliamentary fashion steps could be taken to summon the Assembly substantially before the 28th September, 1973 also. I have been impressed by this argument of the learned Advocate-General of Baluchistan and in support of the proposition that the remedy is discretionary the learned Attorney-General has drawn our attention to the case of Kamal Hussain v. Muhammad Siraj Islam PLD 1969 SC 42 in which the elections of some members of the bar to the Bar Council were challenged and in which Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, delivering the judgment of the Court, observed at page 51: "Under Article 98(2)(b) any person and not necessarily an aggrieved person can seek redress from the High Court against the usurpation of a public office by a person who is allegedly holding it without lawful authority. On that account it cannot be doubted that Mr. Siraj-ul-Islam did have the locus standi to file the petition. But the grant of relief in writ jurisdiction is a matter of discretion wherein it is quite legitimate on the part of the High Court to test the bona fides of the relator to see if he has come with clean hands. A writ of quo-warranto in particular is not to issue as a matter of course on sheer technicalities on a doctrinaire approach. In the present case considering all the circumstances I cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Siraj-ul-Islam is not entirely playing his own game, for high altruistic motives, and that he instituted the writ petition not so much for the vindication of any public right or the redress of a public wrong as to redeem the discomfiture of the defeated candidates, and to fight their battle on another front which some of them had already waged by the process of the election petitions within its limitations. The delay that has occurred in the filing of the petition which has not been satisfactorily explained is not without effect on . the grant of this discretionary relief. The election of the appellants and the other members of the Council was duly notified on the 20th of December, 1966. They have been in office discharging their duties since the 1st of January, 1967. The writ petition in the High Court was filed 9 months later on the 12th of September,. 1967. The alleged disqualification of the appellants and the two respondents which formed main basis of the writ, was of an artificial and euphemeral character which vanished on the date when those members took charge of their functions. They did not suffer from an inherent disqualification of any sort. In the circumstances I feel very strongly that it was not at all fit case for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto by the High Court." The learned Attorney-General indeed argued that the petitioner has not come with clean hands and that before the action of the President whereby he removed the Provincial Government was taken, he himself had made statement to the effect that such action was called for. He desired to place reliance upon certain newspaper cuttings for the purpose of proving this but we declined to take any notice of the newspaper and, as I have said earlier, agreed only to take note of the fact that should this petition go to full hearing the Government of Baluchistan would have evidence to produce to controvert many allegations of fact made in this petition. Since I have come to the conclusion on merits that there is no substance in this petition I think it unnecessary to say anything more about the various allegations of fact made in this petition which, even if true, were not really necessary for this petition as I am not going into the counter allegations made as to the bona fides of this petition. A.A./A-688/K Petition dismissed.