P L D 1956 (W P (PLP)

INAMULLAH, J.‑

The present writ petition under section 223‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935 was filed on 7th November 1955, praying for the issue of writs in the nature of Certiorari, mandamus or any other appropriate writ by calling for the record of the petitioner's case from the Addi tional Custodian (Judicial) and the Rehabilitation Commis sioner, Karachi, and quashing their orders of 4th November and 6th October 1955, passed by them respectively. The petitioner who is a Director in the Department of Supply and Development, has been ordered to be ejected from the house in his possession under the Rehabilitation Ordinance. The relevant facts are set out by the petitioner in a 19‑page petition which starts with his birth, earlier career, his decision to opt out for Pakistan, the allotment of the house in question on 29th October 1947 by the Rent Controller in his favour, expenses incurred by him on the repairs of the house, his application for "regularization of the allotment order issued by the Rent Controller" to the Rehabilitation Authority conse quent on the passing of the Rehabilitation and the Adminis tration of Evacuee Property Law, notice by the Rehabilitation Commissioner dated 12th February 1955 asking the petitioner to show cause why he should not be ejected and their decision on 6th October 1955 ejecting him and allotting the house in question to respondents 4 and 5, and lastly, the filing of the revision petition to the Additional Custodian (Judicial) and his decision modifying the order of the Rehabilitation Com missioner. The relevant facts leading to the present petition more elaborately are these: The petitioner after partition opted for Pakistan in 1947 and was appointed Officer on Special Duty and "did his best to restore the economic and social life of the country". He was allotted the house in question on the recommendation of the Estate Officer on 29th October 1947. Consequent on the promulgation of the Rehabilitation and the Evacuee Pro perty (Administration) Law, the petitioner started paying rent of the house to the Custodian and the house was recorded in his name by the Deputy Custodian. The petitioner, in view of the assurance given by the Rehabilitation Authorities that those who were in peaceful possession of the evacuee property and produced certificate of full payment of rent would be allotted the houses in their possession, obtained the requisite clearance certificate of pay ment of rent, and applied for allotment on 17th January 1953. The petitioner had approached the Additional Custodian for sanction of Rs. 3,100 towards repair of his house, but this could not be done unless the allotment was regularised by the Rehabilitation Authorities. The petitioner pressed the Rehabi litation Authorities for allotment, but he was told that as the Assistant Commissioner had already forwarded his application to the Custodian with the remark that "no other order of allotment was necessary", he was not to worry. The petitioner on 12th February 1955 received a notice to show cause why he should not be held an unauthorised/unsuit able person under section 8 (2) (b) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, as he had built his own house. The petitioner while showing cause on 16th February 1955, stated that he had no house in any Housing Society, and that though he had a house at Mary Road he had entered into an agreement to sell. The house had been sold on 31st March 1955 (after the date of notice). He also stated that he hadonly an open plot of land in the Co‑operative Housing Society. The Rehabilitation Authorities did not pass any order on this notice and kept on postponing the date of order from time to time, the last date being 2nd June 1955. The Rehabilitation Authorities in the meantime assured the petitioner that every thing was all right. The petitioner was ultimately informed on October 6th, 1955 that he had been ejected and the bungalow in question had been allotted to respondents 4 and

5. The petitioner further urged that the respondent 4 had filed an insufficiently stamped application for allotment, while the application of respondent 5 was filed by an unauthorised person. It is urged by the petitioner that in order to help the respondents 4 and 5, some of the documents of the petitioner had been removed from the file. The petitioner filed a revision before the Custodian against the order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner. The petitioner had disclosed certain facts in his petition which took place during the pendency of the revision petition to throw doubt on the bona fides of the Custodian and the Rehabi litation Authorities. It is, however, not necessary to mention those facts, as they were categorically denied by the Addi tional Custodian (Judicial) and the Rehabilitation Commis sioner, and the petitioner had not been able to substantiate those allegations. The revision petition was disposed of by the Additional Custodian (Judicial), whereby he allotted only the ground‑floor to the two respondents and allowed four months time to the petitioner to vacate the first-floor. The Additional Custodian ordered that the first‑floor, after it was vacated by the petitioner, was to be allotted to some other deserving person, but not to any one of the parties. Of the respondents, the respondent No. 2, the Additional Custodian (Judicial) and the respondent No. 3 the Rehabilita tion Commissioner, have filed counter, affidavits in reply to the allegations of the petitioner. Mr. Riaz‑ud‑Din Ahmad, Additional Custodian (Judicial) has filed his own affidavit. He has stated that the name of the petitioner was recorded in the register for the purposes of recovering dues for the use and occupation of the house which was an evacuee property, and that no relationship of landlord and tenant was thereby created between the Custo dian and the petitioner. The Additional Custodian (Judicial) maintained that the petitioner was not a suitable person to hold the premises which was an evacuee property. The learn ed Additional Custodian (Judicial) categorically asserted that it was wrong to say that his order was mala fide or illegal. On behalf of the respondent No. 3 Mr. A. L. Khan, the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner has filed his affidavit. It has been denied by him that the Rehabilitation Authorities had passed an order to the effect "that no further order of allotment was necessary". It is stated that the petitioner was allotted a plot of land in the Pakistan Employees Co‑opera tive Housing Society as late as 12th September 1951, but he did not construct a house but purchased one for Rs. 63,000 in December 1951.. Half portion of the house purchased by the petitioner was under requisition order by the Government, but the ground floor was vacant. The petitioner, however, did not make any effort to get the same vacated. The peti tioner, it is alleged, has sold his house on Mary Road for Rs.70,000 in March 1955. It is stated that the notice of ejectment was served on the petitioner in February 1955. The petitioner had ample time to start construction of his own house, as he had sufficient funds, having received the sale consideration of Rs. 70,000 in March 1955. It is also urged that the petitioner could have taken loan from the House Building Finance Corporation and started the construction over the vacant plot of land if he was anxious to do so. It is also stated that the petitioner has a three thousand square yard plot of land in Malir, where he could construct a house. The petitioner, it is urged, had been given full opportunity to file such documents that he relied upon. It is stated that in fact the petitioner did not file any documents at any stage before the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner. No facts have been distorted in the statement made by the petitioner as it bears the signature of the petitioner himself. The petitioner had been given all opportunity to represent his case before the respondents 2 and

3. It is denied by the Additional Rehabilitation Commis sioner that the petitioner was given an assurance by the respondent 3 or his office in respect of the result of the matter pending against the petitioner. It was only after taking into consideration the claims of respondents 4 and 5 that the allotment was made in their favour. The allegation regarding the tampering with records or removing documents has been denied. The Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner also stated in his affidavit that the petitioner at no time‑filed before him an application for getting the Rent Controller's order regula rised. In case the petitioner had done so, he would have been required to show in the first place that he was a refugee and in the second place that it would be in the interest of social and economic rehabilitation to make the allotment of the house in question in his favour. The Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner maintains that he was justified in holding that the petitioner was an unsuitable person. The petitioner, it is alleged, was entitled to a Government quarter from the Estate Office pool ever since 1947 and had no right to continue his possession of any evacuee property at the cost of other deserving persons. The petitioner's appli cation of 17th January 1953 had been disposed of by the Addi tional Rehabilitation Commissioner and was not granted by him. The Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner maintains that he did not act mala fide and that he passed the orders in good faith and in accordance with law. The elaborate argument of Mr. Manzar‑i‑Alam, the learn ed Advocate for the petitioner, can be dealt with under five heads:‑ (a) The order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner was a judicial order or, at any rate, quasi‑judicial order, and, therefore, the writ of certiorari could issue. (b) The petitioner held an allotment order of 29th October 1947 issued by the Rent Controller, and as such, during the continuance of the allotment order, he could not be ejected by the Rehabilitation Commissioner. (c) The order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner ejecting the petitioner was a mala fide order. (d) The Rehabilitation Commissioner passed his order without regarding the principles of natural justice. (e) The ejectment of the petitioner was against the provi sions of sections 241 and 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. We propose to consider these contentions separately and the question whether the order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner is a judicial or quasi‑judicial order, in some detail, as this, to our mind, is an important question which might affect many other matters which are pending in this Court. We may at the very outset mention that ix has not been contended by the learned advocates appearing for the various respondents that the order passed in revision by the Addi tional Custodian (Judicial) was not a judicial or quasi‑judicial order. We would therefore not go into this question. But it has been urged strenuously by the learned advocates for the respondents that the order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner under section 8 (2) (b) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance ejecting the petitioner was not a judicial or quasi judicial order but an administrative or executive order, and therefore no writ of certiorari would lie. The important ques tion, therefore, is whether the order of ejectment passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 6th October 1955 was a judicial or, at any rate quasi‑judicial order. It is well estab lished that a writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order which is an administrative or ministerial order ; it lies only to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts which can be held to be judicial. In order to ascertain the exact conno tation of the expression "judicial act" in connection with the issue of a writ of certiorari and to determine whether the order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner was judicial or quasi‑judicial, it would be convenient to set out briefly how the law on the point as developed by the Courts in England, stands to‑day. A writ of certiorari, like a writ of prohibition, is a judicial writ of antiquity, and it is the ordinary process by which the Court of King's Bench Division exercises control over the acts of bodies vested with inferior jurisdiction. The writ is intended to bring before the High Court the records of pro ceedings of inferior tribunals and to quash them if the tribunals are found to have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. It is well settled that the writ is not limited to bringing up the acts of bodies that are ordinarily considered to be Courts. The law relating to the issue of certiorari is thus summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. XI, para 114 at page 55 :‑ "Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, is subject to the controlling jurisdic tion of the High Court of Justice exercised by means of these orders. It is not necessary that it should be a Court : A an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a‑ duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its pro ceedings have none of the formalities of, and are not in accordance with the practice of, a Court of law. It is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition. A body may be under a duty, however, to act judicially (and subject to control by means of these orders) although there is not form of Its inter partes before it ; it is enough that it should have to determine a question solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the evidence before it, apart from questions of policy or any other extraneous considerations. Moreover an administrative body, whose decision is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, if at some stage of the proceedings leading up to the decision there was something in the nature of lis before it then in the course of such consideration and at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judi cially. If, on the other hand an administrative body in arriving at its decision has before it at no stage any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any time to act judicially". There can be no doubt that, originally the writ of certiorari was issued only to inferior Courts using the word "Court" in its ordinary sense. As tribunals and bodies of various types exercising some judicial functions came to be introduced by the Parliament, the writ was extended to these bodies also. There is a long line of decided cases where the writ of cer tiorari has been issued to various bodies and authorities which cannot be held to be "Court" in the ordinary meaning of the word. It has been held that determinations of the Board of Education required to determine a class of questions of censors of the Royal College of Physicians, of canal commis sioners empowered to hold inquiries with regard to the cons truction of bridges, and of sheriffs empowered to hold inquiries, might be removed by certiorari and quashed. A report made by a chief gas examiner, a certificate of disable ment under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925, by a certifying surgeon and a certificate and report that a boy was incapable by reason of mental defect of receiving benefit from instruction in a special school or class, and was an imbecile, have been removed and quashed by certiorari; similarly a resolution of an authority granting permission to build under a town planning (interim development) order, a resolution of the Milk Marketing Board imposing a penalty on a registered retailer, a certificate for legal aid granted by a local aid committee, the grant or refusal of a licence for a cinematograph entertainment and decisions of a dental services committee and of the Ministry of Health investigating com plaints against a dental practitioner, have been held to be judicial acts. (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. XI, para 115. pp. 57‑58). In the words of Bankes L. J., "it has, however always been the boast of our common law that it will, whenever possible, and where necessary, apply existing principles to new sets of circumstances". Rex v. Electricity Commissioners ((1924) 1 K B 171 p. 192). In the same volume at page 113, Bankes L. J. observed :‑ "In the case of Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorganshire, the Court expressed the general opinion that it would examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parlia ment, and if under pretence of such an Act they proceeded to encroach jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warrants the Court could send a certiorari to them to have their proceedings returned to the Court, to the end that the Court might see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction, and if they exceed it to restrain them". The whole law on the subject relating to the issue of writ of certiorari was summed up by Atkin L. J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioner ((1924) 1 K B 171 p. 205) in the following words:‑ "Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs". This statement of law has been affirmed and followed in various English cases since then. It would thus appear from the above that it involves

(a) existence of legal authority in the officer to act ; (b) to act affecting the rights of subjects ; (c) duty to act judicially. It is clear that an executive authority may have legal authority to determine questions which may affect the rights of subjects, but the question is whether it has duty to act judicially or not. So far as the question of acting judicially is concerned the statement of law by Atkin L. J. does not give any indica tion as to the circumstances under which such authority can be said to act judicially. The material points for considera tion therefore are : (a) what is the true creterion of a judicial act; and (b) how it is to be ascertained whether an authority is bound to act judicially in a particular matter or not. A classic definition in this connection distinguishing a 'judicial act' from an 'administrative act' is that of May C. J. in the Irish case of Reg v. Dublin Corporation ((1878) 2 L R Ir. 371), which runs thus:‑ In this connection the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the deter mination of matters of law, but for purposes of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent autho rity upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others. And if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, make estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such conse quences would be judicial acts". In other words, it would appear from the above definition that, where a decision is based, not on private or personal opinion, but conforms to an objective standard or criterion, the sound ness of which is capable of being tested by some other standard, the decision is judicial. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative or executive function. Whether the authority is required to exercise one of the functions or other depends entirely on the provisions of a particular enactment. Where the statute itself is clear on the point, no difficulty is likely to arise; but where the language of the enactment does not indicate with clarity what kind of function is to be exercised by the autho rity, difficulty is bound to arise. Keeping in view the principles mentioned above we would now turn to the provisions of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance, 1948, and the Rules framed thereunder, and try to find out whether the order passed by the Rehabilitation Com missioner ejecting the petitioner was a judicial order or an administrative order. In this connection the relevant section is section 13‑C of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, which reads as under :‑ "(1) When holding an inquiry under this Ordinance, the Rehabilitation Authority or the Officer appointed under subsection (2) of section 13‑A shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely‑ (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation ; (b) compelling the discovery and production of documents, articles and things ; (c) issuing a commission for the examination of witnesses; (d) any prescribed matter. (2) Any proceeding before the Rehabilitation Authority or such officer aforesaid under the Ordinance shall be deem ed to be a, judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the P. P. C;, (Act XLV of 1860), and the Rehabilitation Authority or such officer aforesaid shall be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). "Rehabilitation Authority" is defined in section 2 (8) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance to mean any Rehabi litation Board, Rehabilitation Commissioner or Additional, Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, appointed under this Ordinance, or any other officer appointed under any law for the time being in force relating to the rehabilita tion of refugees or social and economic rehabilitation in Pakistan. From subsection (2) of section 13‑C of the Rehabilitation Ordinance it is clear that a proceeding of the nature contem plated under section 8 (2) of the Ordinance is also a judicial proceeding. It cannot be urged from reading subsection (2) of section 13‑C of the Rehabilitation Ordinance that the pro ceeding before the Rehabilitation Authority was to be judicial proceeding only for the purposes of sections 193 and 228 P. P. C. The relevant portion of section 193 P. P. C. may be reproduced to emphasize that the legislature intended every proceeding before the Rehabilitation Authority to be judicial proceeding ; it runs as under :‑ "Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine ; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine." Another section to be considered is section 18 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance, which runs as under :‑ "Any petition whether in appeal or otherwise and any application under the Ordinance may be presented in person or by counsel or by duly authorised agent, and nothing in this Ordinance shall be deemed to forbid appearance by counsel or such agent." Rules have been framed under the Rehabilitation Ordi nance which are known as the "Pakistan Rehabilitation Rules, 1951". Rule 9 reads as under :‑ "Every application and appeal presented to a Rehabi litation Authority shall be framed, signed and verified as if it were a plaint or, as the case may be, an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and a Rehabilitation Authority shall have the same powers to reject or return it as a Civil Court has to reject or return a plaint or an appeal." Rule 10 provides for the procedure for filing appeal, revision or review. It is clear from the consideration of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Ordinance and the rules framed there under that every proceeding before the Rehabilitation Authority is a judicial proceeding or, at any rate, quasi‑judicial proceeding. The contention of Mr. Sharifuddin, the learned Advocate for respondents 4 and 5 was that though some of the orders passed by the Rehabilitation Authority may be judicial giving rise to the issue of a writ of certiorari, the order passed under sub‑clause (2) (b) of section 8 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance was not a judicial or quasi‑judicial order, but purely an execu tive order. Sub‑clause (2) (b) of section 8 of the Ordinance reads as under :‑ "(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by the preceding subsection but subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, a Rehabilitation Authority may‑ (b) eject summarily 'with the use of such force as may be necessary any person in possession of any abandoned land, building, business or undertaking, whose possession thereof has not been authorised by the Rehabilitation Authority or to whom such land, building, business or under taking has been allotted whether the stock‑in‑trade or machinery involved in the business or undertaking has been sold to him or not but who has failed to observe any of the conditions of the allotment, or who has subsequently been found in the opinion of the Rehabilitation Authority to be an unsuitable person to hold the property so allotted to him as evacuee property has lost the character of being such property either by a declaration or by the operation of any other law for the time being in force ;" The contention of Mr. Sharifuddin for respondents 4 and 5 is that the opinion to be formed under sub‑clause (2) (b) of section 8 was subjective, and not objective, and therefore the order passed was an administrative order. Section 8 (2) (b) has to be read along with rule 6 of the Ordinance, the relevant portion of which reads as under :‑ "The procedure for summary ejectment under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 8 shall be as follows :‑ (a) The Rehabilitation Authority shall in the first instance issue a notice to the unauthorised person to show cause, within a period which shall not be less than 7 days, why he should not be ejected ; (b) After consideration of the representation if any, made by or on behalf of the unauthorised person and after taking such evidence as he may consider necessary, the Rehabili tation Authority may make an order under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 8 which shall ' be served in the manner prescribed in rule 8." It would appear from the above rule that the Rehabili tation Authority has, in the first place, to give a notice to show cause, and in the second place, to consider the representation of the person sought to be ejected, and lastly the Authority may pass an order for ejectment. The important question is whether the order of ejectment under the above conditions can be held to be a judicial order or an adminis trative order. There can be no doubt that it depends entirely upon the particular provision of the enactment or the rule whether an Authority is required to act judicially or administratively. It is also not necessary that the provision may lay down specifically how the authority has to act. A judicial or administrative function of the Authority can be deduced from the language of the enactment or the rule itself. It would appear from an examination of rule 6 of the Ordinance that the Rehabilitation Authority has not to form an opinion about the ejectment subjectively but objectively. The language of the rule does not point that the satisfaction or opinion required is personal or subjective while passing an order of ejectment. If that was so, the order would be an administrative order. The decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson ((1942) A C 206), is the leading illustration of cases where the authorities concerned had to form opinion personally. Lord Atkin, in the course of his dissenting judgment in that case observed : "When the discretion is left to the Minister or any other authority without qualification by use of expressions like the following "A Secretary of State . . . . . if it appears to him necessary may order . . . . . .; If it appears to the Secretary that any person . . . . . .; if the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient . . . . the act cannot but be held to be an executive act". The same view has been taken by some Indian authorities as well that such words are indicative of the intention of the legislature that the opinion of the authority concerned was to be subjective. Mr. Sharifuddin the learned Advocate for respondents 4 and 5 has relied on the cases of. (1) Vishvanath hasudeo and another v. The State of Madhya Bharat (A I R 1954 Madh. Bhar. 161). (2) Alarakha Somijee v. Collector of Nasik (A I R 1951 Bom. 131). (3) Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer and another (A I R 1953 S C 373). These cases have no application in view of rule 6 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance. As we have already observed, rule 6 does not contemplate that the order passed by the Rehabilitation Authority should be a subjective one. Moreover, we may also observe while considering rule 6 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance that it had not been urged by the learned Advocates for the respondents that this rule was ultra vires or that the Rehabilitation Authority while consider ing the representation of the petitioner was not bound to consider, the facts or the proposition of law that may have been raised by the petitioner according to the rules of reason and justice. In the absence of any such contention, which we consider could not possibly be urged on the consideration of the language of rule 6 of the Ordinance, the order of eject ment passed by the Rehabilitation Authority was the result of judicial process. We would, therefore, for the reasons given above, hold that the order passed by the Rehabilitation Authority was a judicial order or at any rate, a quasi‑judicial l order, to which a writ of certiorari could under appropriate circumstances issue. We would now consider the other arguments of the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The next argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner was that the petitioner admittedly was occupying the house in question under an allotment order dated 28th October 1948, issued by the Rent Controller, Karachi and as such, during the continuance of the allotment order, the petitioner could not be ejected by the Rehabilitation Authority. The learned Advocate for the petitioner relies on subsection (2) of section 14 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance. The relevant portion of section 14 may be reproduced here:‑ "(1) A Rehabilitation Authority may, for the purpose of the rehabilitation of refugees, or social or economic rehabilitation in Pakistan, allot any evacuee property to any person. (2) Every allotment of evacuee property made for the purposes aforesaid between the first day of March 1947, and the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been made under subsection (1)." It is urged that the allotment in question was made between the 1st day of March 1947 and the commencement of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, which was passed on 15th October 1948, and therefore, was a valid and subsisting allotment. There is no force in this contention. It was never the case of the petitioner either before the Rehabilitation Commissioner or before the Additional Custodian (Judicial) that the allotment of 29th October 1947, was made in his favour either for his rehabilitation as a refugee or for social or economic rehabilitation. The allotment admittedly was made under the Rent Restriction Act 1947. whose obvious object was not either the rehabilitation of refugees or social and economic rehabilitation in Pakistan, as the Rent Restriction Act under which the allotment was made in favour of the petitioner was passed on 28th March 1947, much before the establishment of Pakistan. Moreover, the rehabilitation of refugees or social and economic rehabilitation would depend upon questions of fact which have to be alleged and proved. As we have already observed no such contention was ever raised by the petitioner before the Rehabilitation Commissioner or the Additional Custodian (Judicial). In fact, the petitioner on 17th January 1953, had made an application for fresh allotment of the premises in question. The view that we have taken about the allotment of 29th October 1947, that it was not an allotment within the meaning of section 14 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, the house in question under section 6 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance would vest in the Custodian. Subsection (1) of section 6 of the Ordinance reads as under : "All evacuee property shall vest and shall be deemed always to have vested in the Custodian with effect from the first day of March 1947." The house in question admittedly is an evacuee property and therefore, it vested in the Custodian. Every person who was in possession of an evacuee property after the 28th day of February 1947, would be holding the same under section 7 the Evacuee Property Ordinance on behalf of the Custodian. The petitioner, therefore, could not hold the property on behalf of himself or the evacuee owner. The property admittedly being evacuee property was open to the allotment under section 14 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance. Under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Evacuee Property Ordinance, every evacuee property is open to allotment by the Rehabilitation Authority. Subsection (1) of section 14 reads as under : "A Rehabilitation Authority may, for the purposes of the rehabilitation of refugees, or social or economic rehabili tation in Pakistan allot any evacuee property to any person." It cannot be urged by the petitioner that the house in question which is admittedly evacuee property, was not open for allotment. The petitioner cannot legally urge that the Rehabilitation Authority .had no power to call upon him to show cause under section 8 (2) ‑(b) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance why he should not be ejected. The relevant portion of section 8 (2) (b) reads as under : "Rehabilitation Authority may . . . . . eject summarily with the use of such force as may be necessary any person in possession of any abandoned land, building, business or undertaking whose possession thereof has not been authorised by the Rehabilitation Authority." "Abandoned" has been defined in section 2 (1) of the Rehabilitation Ordinance as meaning in relation to any property that the property is evacuee property. The property in question being admittedly evacuee property, the Rehabilitation Authority will have jurisdiction to call upon the person who was in unauthorized possession thereof, or if holding an allotment order, was unsuitable to hold the property, why he should not be ejected. The allotment order of 29th October 1947, as already observed, not being an allotment order within the meaning of section 14 (2) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, the Rehabili tation Authority was within its jurisdiction to proceed under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 8 of the Rehabilitation Ordinance. On the supposition that the allotment order of 29th October 1947, held by the petitioner was a valid allotment order, it was urged by Mr. Manzar‑i‑Alam, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, that the same was final order within the meaning of section 22 of the Sind Rent Restriction Act (X of 1947), and as such, the petitioner could not be ejected. The argument proceeds on a fallacy, as the allotment order dated 29th October 1947, in favour of the petitioner being contrary to the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance was not valid order. The property, admittedly, having become evacuee property would be deemed to have vested from the first day of March 1947, in the Custodian, and the petitioner would be holding on behalf of the Custodian. In other words the allotment in favour of the petitioner could be ignored by the Custodian and the Rehabilitation Authority as the property was evacuee property. Moreover, the petitioner before the Rehabilitation Authority had accepted the position that, in view of the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance and the Rehabilitation Ordinance, the allotment of the house in question made by the Rent Controller in favour of the petitioner was not good. He had clearly applied for fresh allotment of the property in question on 17th January 1953, before the Rehabilitation Authority. It was urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the order passed by the Rehabilitation Authority ejecting the petitioner was a mala fide order. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the fact that of the two respondents No. 4 and 5, who had filed applications for the allotment of the property in question, one had applied on an insufficiently stamped paper, while the other had applied through a person who was not duly authorised by him. It is true that one application was insufficiently stamped and the other was made by a person who had not a valid authority from the respondent to make the application for allotment on his behalf. The contention of the. learned Advocate from these facts was that the Rehabilitation Commissioner was interested in the respondents 4 and 5 and that is why he ordered the ejectment of the petitioner. There is no force in the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner acted mala fide. The acceptance of an insufficiently stamped application or of one filed by a not duly authorised person was a mere irregularity. Moreover, it was a mistake of the person responsible to accept such applications. It has not been urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that, in spite of the fact that the omission was pointed by the clerk concerned, the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner acted upon these defective applications. So long as in the opinion of the Rehabilitation Authority the persons in whose favour the allotments had been made were deserving persons, the allotment could not be set aside on the mere ground of such irregularity. It was also urged that the order of allotment in favour of respondents 4 and 5 was passed in a great hurry. These facts MAY raise certain suspicion of partiality on the part of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, but are not sufficient to hold that the Rehabilitation Commissioner has acted mala fide in passing the allotment order in favour of the respondents 4 and 5 or ejecting the petitioner. We may also observe that the question of ejecting the petitioner mala fide does not arise, as on 26th May 1953, the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner on the petitioner's application of 17th January 1953 has already passed the following order :‑ "Since the applicant is a non‑refugee and also owns property in Pakistan, it is doubtful if the house in question can be allotted to him. Keep it pending till the position is clarified." In view of the above order, which was passed in May 1953, it cannot be legitimately urged by the petitioner that if he was called upon to show cause why he should not be ejected, or that the allotment of the premises in question had been made in favour of somebody else, the Faction of the Rehabilitation Authority was mala fide. In fact the Rehabili tation Authority was, in view of the above order, considerate in not taking any step against him. They were constrained, it appears, to take this step when there were applications of suitable persons for allotment of premises in the possession of the petitioner. It was urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the order passed by the Rehabilitation Authority was against natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was not given fresh notice after he was able to show cause that he had not constructed any house in any of the Co‑operative Housing Societies. There is no force in this contention. It is true that in the notice of 12th February 1955, it was mentioned as a ground for asking him to hand over the possession of the property to the Rehabilitation Authority that he had built his own house, but that in no way affects the main notice the relevant portion of which reads as under :‑ "You are also directed under section (sic) of Ordinance XIX of 1948 read with rule 6 (a) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Rules 1951 to show cause within 7 days of the receipt of this notice why you should not be held an unsuitable/unauthorized person to hold the said evacuee property, as you have constructed your own house and also own other immovable property in Karachi." It was open to the Rehabilitation Authority to peruse the representation of the petitioner and to pass such order thereon as could reasonably be passed. We do not think that the petitioner was entitled to fresh notice. No provision either of the Rehabilitation Ordinance or the Rule had been shown to us why the petitioner should have been served with a fresh notice if one of the grounds mentioned in the notice was not correct. In fact it was not necessary under the rules of the Rehabilitation Ordinance to give reasons why the petitioner was sought to be ejected. All that was necessary was to call upon the petitioner to show causes why he should not be held to be an unauthorized and/or unsuitable person. We do not see any ground for holding that the Rehabilitation Authority had acted against the, principles of natural justice. It was lastly urged by Mr. Manzar‑i‑Alam, the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner being a Government servant, under section 241 of the Government of India Act, it was one of the conditions of service that he should be given a house for accommodation. We have not been shown any such provision in section 241 of the Govern ment of India Act 1935 that the petitioner could be allowed to hold an evacuee property without the allotment order. It was also urged by Mr. Manzar‑i‑Alam that the petitioner could not be deprived of this property without being given compensation under section 299 of the Government of India Act 1935. There is no force in this contention. Section 299 of the Government of India Act 1935 has no application to the facts of the present case. The property does not belong to the petitioner, nor can the petitioner be said to have any interest in the property in question. The property being evacuee property, his possession thereof in the absence of an allotment order was that of a trespasser. Having considered the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the question is whether there is any ground on which a writ of certiorari can be issued. When a writ of certiorari can issue was considered in the case of Muhammad Mohsin Siddiqi v. Feroze Nana (P L D 1956 Kar. 203), by Kayani and Munshi JJ. on 6th December 1955. Kayani J. while delivering the judgment observed :‑ "The nest question is whe._her certiorari lies in a case like the present one. In R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952 All‑Eng. L R 122), it was held that certiorari to quash the decision of the tribunal lay, not only where the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, but also where an error of law appeared on the face of the record. This seems to be the latest view in England and it has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal. It was followed by the Supreme Court of India in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (A I R 1955 S C 233 = P L D 1956 S C (ind.)1). What is an error of law apparent on the face of the record is a matter for opinion of the facts of each case. In the English case it was observed that 'a striking instance was where the commissioners of sewers imposed an excessive fine, and it was quashed by the Court of King's Bench on the ground that in law their fines ought to be reasonable. Other instances are the numerous cases where certiorari was used to determine the validity of a sewer's rate imposed by the commissioner of sewers'. Considering the law as enunciated above, we do not find that on the face of the record there is any error entitling us to issue the writ of certiorari against respondents 2 and

3. Respondent 3 had jurisdiction to decide the question whether the petitioner was an unauthorised or/and unsuitable person to hold the premises in dispute or not. We also do not find that the order of respondent 3 ejecting the petitioner was unreasonable so as to amour to an error on the face of the record as enunciated above. We would, for the reasons given above, dismiss the petition and withdraw the interim order of stay. Under the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs. The parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.