2000 PLP 510 (PLC)

(19) ........................................... (20) .......................................... (21) .......................................... (22) The contractor's employees shall be available during the working hours as notified by the PIA from time to time.

6. A mere look of the aforesaid contractor agreement indicates that veneer of an independent contractor as provided under law is not at all visible and visionary agreement in question goes to show a mischievous device of the respondents in collusion with the said so‑called contractor just to protect and shield the respondents from any demands and claims of any sort from workmen who has been entrusted at the mercy of the contractor in question by the Respondents at the cost of the labour, sweat and blood of the workers in the shape of payment same time amounting to Rs.200 and now amounting to Rs.175 per person per month plus 3 % commission on the consolidated salaries of the workers to the contractor in question to whom actually the concerned workers even does not know at all. Prom the perusal of the above referred agreement it is clear beyond shadow of doubt that the agreement in question even does not at all fulfil the very definition of the word" Contractor" and, "Contract" and the so‑called agreement is also void under law. It shall be appropriate there to‑ reproduce the extract of judgment in an identical case of Honourable Mr. Justice Karam Elahi Chohan reported in PLD 1976 Lahore 1169 titled as Taj Din and others v. Punjab Labour Court No.3:‑‑ Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) S.2(xxviii)‑‑ "Contract"‑‑‑‑Meaning.‑‑‑A contractor is a person who in the pursuit of an independent business undertakes to do specific jobs o t; work for other persons without submitting himself to their control in respect to the details of the work.

7. Obviously the aforesaid agreement executed between the so‑called contractor and that of the respondents lacks the very purpose and basic requirement of the definition of an independent contractor, there exist no element of any sort of an independent business of the aforesaid contractor with the establishment of the respondent and the aforesaid agreement is also devoid of any substance to prove even the intention of the contractor in question to do some specific jobs or work in the establishment of the respondents. The entire/sole consideration between the so‑called contractor and the respondents is that the latter shall secure the service of the former for the engagement/provisions of manpower/labourers of various categories and w.e.f. 17‑10‑1997/28‑10‑1997, during the agreed period, the former shall provide his services as labour suppliers. The rate of salaries of the workers shall be determined and approved by the PIA management (respondents) from time to time, the payment of which shall be made to the workers through the aforesaid contractor on monthly basis and the contractor shall be paid 3 % commission on the consolidated salaries of the said workers plus Rs.160 (now 175 per person per month and such employees. shall be available during the working hours notified by the PIAC from time to time for the execution of their duties entrusted to them by the PIAC, but the workers so employed shall be treated as contractor's employees. Working in view the aforesaid consolidations between the respondents and the asserted contractor. I am inclined to believe that the agreement exhibited in the case is void ab initio from the face of it as in the present age the terms and conditions of services of the workers in the country are to be determined and regulated under various enactments of labour laws, particularly under the standing orders (Order 1968) and the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan vide Judgment reported in PLD 1980 SC 323 titled as PIA v. Sindh Lahore Court and others has rightly held that "employer cannot contract out of his obligations under (standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968).

8. Even section 23 of Contract Act, 1872 provides that consideration or object of an agreement if would defeat the provisions of law, or involves or employs injury to the persons or property of others, oppose to public policy shall be unlawful and void and section 27 of the said Act provides that every agreement to restrain anyone from exercising lawful profession trade or business of any kind shall be void protanto. From the face of the agreement in question, it is hit by the above said provisions of the act and is unlawful and void. All I. would say is that the so‑called agreement between the Respondents and their asserted contractor is the worst example of corruption, exploitation, slavery, forced labour and traffic in human beings, in clear violation‑of the provisions of Article 3 and Article 11 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and also violative of the Article 25 of the constitution which provides the safeguard and security of lob to the workers 'without any, discrimination according to their ability and work. Obviously all other employees similarly placed and working in PIAC at par shoulder to shoulder with the asserted contractual workers have been provided with regular pay scales, all allowances and other fringe benefits and all benefits of service promotion etc whereas the respondents has deprived of and worstly discriminated with hundreds of such workers including the petitioner by way of payment of meager salaries to them every month through asserted contractor and the so‑called contractor in collusion with some under‑hand elements of the establishment of .PIAC are building castles upon the grave of the labour, sweat and blood of the said workers by way of misannronriating the public exchequer in lacs and crores since years in the shape of payment of 3 % or more commission on the consoli‑dated salaries of the said workers plus 200 and now 175 per person per month to the so‑called contractor. Here I am inclined to believe that the role of the so called contractor is nothing but a cash clerk through which the monthly salaries of the asserted contractual workers are being paid every month by the respondents of the establishment. Patently the so‑called contractor is nothing but a mere smoke screen to drive the group of workers of their rightful emoluments privileges and benefits which would be available to them under law of the land as are being enjoyed by other workers of the establishment of the respondents. 8‑A. During the course of proceedings, the contractor in question could not substantiate through any document that he ever engaged the petitioner/complainant in his employment or terminated her services as maintained and asserted by the respondents in the written reply of the complaint. The pay roll sheet of the workers for the month of October 1997 to October, 1998 adduced by the said contractor in collusion with the respondents also includes the names, of Mst. Ismat Mehayuddin, Miss Abida Malik, Miss Shazia Mobin, Miss Nasreen Asghar, Mrs. Amina Tahir, Muhammad Zahid, Mrs. Jargees Abbas, Nisar Bhatti and Ghulam Qamber. Reservation and Ticketing Assistant alongwith the name of the complainant and the contractor in question conceded on oath that all were employed and working in the establishment of the respondents prior to the execution of his agreement dated 28‑10‑1997 but asserted that since he is entrusted the job of payment of salaries every month to the said workers, hence they came in his. employment automatically from the previous contractor namely Unique Traders. It is strange and amazing to observe that the petitioner was got employed in the establishment of the respondents in June 1997, the fact of which even conceded by the respondents and also proved through letter dated 24‑6‑1997 and 25‑7‑1997 issued by the authorities of the respondents in favour of the petitioner for provision of Uniform to her whereas the asserted agreement between the respondents and the so‑called contractor, the Al‑Abbas Traders was signed and executed on 28‑10‑1997 effective from 17‑10‑1997 for the supply of labour to the establishment of the respondents and then how the respondents can escape from their liabilities of accepting the petitioner as an employee of their establishment and how the asserted contractor is claiming and blindly insisting upon thrusting his so‑called relation of master and servant with the petitioner/complainant and on what ground the respondents are paying to the so‑called contractor every month lacs of rupees from the public exchequer in the shape of 3 % on the consolidated salaries of hundreds of workers plus Rs.175 per person per month on the name of the workers who have been employed and serving since years much earlier than the execution of the so‑called agreement dated 28‑10‑1997. No doubt, such a malpractice by the respondents employing contractors as suppliers of labour is in fact just a cover to escape from the legal responsibilities of the proprietors imposed by the standing orders and other labour laws in respect of the workers. employed by them. The workers are in such cases left at the mercy of the contractor who are same time fictitious and only played a role of puppet in the whole game. Obviously the petitioner applied for her appointment direct to the respondent No. 1 who as practice without providing her appointment letter engaged in his establishment w.e.f. 10‑6‑1997 and also provide to her official facility of pick and drop through vehicle of the respondents establishment and also issue a letter dated 24‑6‑1997 and 25‑7‑1997 on the name of their official tailor for the provisions of PIAC Uniform to the petitioner. The name of the petitioner included in the daily attendance register at serial No.37 maintained by the respondents in their offices including the names of all permanent staff including reservation and ticketing officers, supervisors and reservation and ticketing assistants who has been serving in the establishment of the respondents since years which fact is admitted and acknowledged by the respondents as well as the asserted contractor.

9. An anxious consideration of the prose and cons of the contentions raised on behalf of the contestants and in the light of the pleadings and the record available on the file lead me to believe that the petitioner/complainant worked continuously at office site of the respondents shoulder to shoulder alongwith other employees of the respondents. Rate of salaries and allowances of the petitioner is determined by the respondents. Timings and duties are regulated by the respondents and her work was assigned, supervised and controlled by the authorities of the respondents in every respect and when the petitioner started participating in the lawful trade union activities and demanded her appointment orders, rightful emoluments and right of regularization of her employment, the respondents started the acts of unfair labour practice against her by way of omitting her name in the duty roaster in November 1998 and by using intimidation, coercion and pressure started restraining her from her trade union activities and from claiming the right of regularization and emoluments at par with other regularized workers and in such a circumstances the petitioner in time invoked the jurisdiction of this bench and obtained the ad. interim order dated 30‑11‑1998 restraining the respondents from the commission of further acts of unfair labour practice then the respondents with the false pretext and device of the so‑called contractor restrained the petitioner from attending her duties and marking her attendance w.e.f. 1‑12‑1998 mala fide just to circumvent the order of this bench of the commission and when the petitioner immediately moved the instant complaint under section 22‑C of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before this bench, the respondents just to escape from their legal obligations have altogether denied their relationship of employer and employee in respect of the petitioner by way of maintaining and asserting her to be the employee of the so‑called contractor, intentionally and deliberately concealing the real facts on record regarding the employment of the petitioner in their establishment since June 1997.

10. Now I may as well advert to the controversy and question whether vinculum juris existed between the petitioner and the respondents and whether a workman employed through a labour contractor is the employee of the establishment in which he/she rendered his services or whether he remains the employee of the contractor/labour supplier, in other words‑‑‑who is employer, whether the management or the intermediate contractor is the employer?. It is clear from the asserted agreement between the contractor in question and the respondents and has, also been conceded on oath by the said contractor that he is registered only as supplier of labour in the establishment of the respondents and nothing has been leased out to him except the receipt of payment of monthly salaries of the asserted contractual workers from the respondents and distribute the same among the concerned workers ever month and in addition he received 39'o commission on consolidated salaries of the workers plus Rs.175 per person per month. In such a circumstances, the law on the subject has been explained under various enactments of labour laws enforced in the country. Let us have a glance over the relevant provisions of law. Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969). Section‑2 (XXVIII)‑‑‑"Worker" & "Workmen" means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment) as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceedings under this ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid‑off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off or removal has led to that dispute. Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders (Ordinance 1968) Section 2(i) "Workman" means any person employed in any Industrial or Commercial Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical (work) for hire or reward. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in a judgment reported in 1987 SCMR 1463 to decide an identical question has very elaborated clarified the very purpose of the above provision of law as under:‑‑‑ "What was intended by the legislature by this provision was to include amongst workmen or employees not only persons who have been directly employed by the owner or employer but also those who were employed by them through such persons who undertake contracts to supply labour." "Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders Ordinance 1968" Standing Order 20‑‑‑‑Liability of Employer: The Employer of the Industrial and commercial establishment shall personally be held reasonable for the proper and faithful observance of the standing orders, whether or not the workmen of such establishment employed through contractor.

11. It is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that prima facie the relationship of Master and Servant did exist not only between the petitioner/complainant and the respondents but also between all the asserted contractual employees and the management of the .establishment of the respondents as it can be observed from the face of the record that only the respondent is and concerned Management of the establishment of the PIA has the right to assign supervise and control the work of the petitioner not only in the matter of directing what the petitioner is to do but also the manner in which the petitioner is to do her work The contractor in question is only just a cover merely to deprive the petitioner of her rightful emoluments privilege, benefit and fruits of her labour. I am of the opinion that even if the workmen/employee is employed through contractor has got the lawful right to claim to be the employee of the concerned establishment with all the due employment and legal rights at par with other regular workers in which the workman executes his services under the control of the authorities of the related establishment. Here I felt it appropriate to reproduce the Yardstick determined by various Courts of justice while deciding the identical question as to whether the workers employed through contractors, are the employees of the establishment or the intermediate contractor/labour supplier etc. The Indian Supreme Court in its decision of D.C. Workers Limited v. State of Saurashtra and others reported in AIR 1957 SC 264, held that prima facie test for the determination of relationship between the master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by servant not only in the matter of directing what servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work. In the case of United States of Amercia v. Silk (1946) 131 U.S. 704 also. It was held that "the common law tests of control etc. were no longer decisive and that one had to look to the economic reality of the relationship to determine its trite nature". In a case titled as British India Engineering Works Karachi v. Mr. Akhtar Hussain Khan and others reported in 1960 LLC.

7. The Honourable High Court (W.P.) Karachi held that the workmen employed through labour contractor are the regular employees of the company and not of the contractor. The Honourable High Court Lahore in PLD 1976 Lahore 1169 titled as Taj Din and 44 others v. 'Punjab Labour Court No.3 Layallpur resolved the identical matter through its land mark judgment and held: A concept of employment involves three ingredients (i) employer; (ii) employee and (iii) the contract of employment the employer is one who employee i.e. one who engaged the services of other persons. The employee one who works for another for hire. The employment is the contract of service between the employer and the employee where under the employee agrees to serve the. employer subject to his control and supervision. Employment brings in the contract of service between the employer and the employee, the control of management which is a necessary element of the relationship between master and servant, is not directed towards providing or dictating the nature of the article to be produced or the work to be done, but refers to the other incidents having a bearing on the process of work the person carries out the execution of the work. The manner of work is to be distinguished from the type of work to be performed. Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) S.2(Xxviii)‑‑ "Contractor"‑‑‑Meaning (Words and phrases). A contractor is a person who in the pursuit of an independent business undertakes to do specific jobs of work for other persons without submitting himself to their control in respect to the details of the work. (e) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXVIII) of 1969)‑‑‑S.2(xxviii)‑‑ Employer and Employee‑‑‑Prima facie test for determination of relationship between. ' The' prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between the employer and the employee is the existence of the right in the employer to supervise and. control the work 'done by the employee not only in the matter of directing what work the employee is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work. ‑‑‑‑S.2(xxviii)‑‑‑Words and phrases‑‑‑Words "either directly or through a contractor" in S.2(xxviii)‑‑‑Indicate employment being by management directly or through sonic kind of employment agency Contract employment there is between management and person employed in either case. In another identical case reported in 1989 PLC 81 titled as Sindh Employees Social Security Institute v. Pakistan National Produce Company Limited, the Honourable Karachi High Court mere elaborately clarified the relationship of Employer and Employee and the role of intermediate contractor and held:‑‑ (c) West Pakistan Employees" Social Security Ordinance (X of 1965)

S.2‑‑Word"Employee"‑‑‑Workers employed by contractor‑‑‑Status of ‑‑‑definition of 'employee' does not provide that contract of employment should be with the employer but provides that any person working for wages normally for at least twenty‑four hours per week, or in connection with the establishment mentioned therein under any contract of service would be an employee‑‑‑Workers employed by contractor to do work in, or in connection with the work in, or in connection with the work of industry or establishment were not excluded from definition of employee. Here I have the opportunity to have a glance on the finding of the Honourable Supreme Court of India reported in 1978 LLI 397 in a case titled as Hussain Bhai Calicut v. Alath Factory Union and others reproduced in a reported judgment in 1992 PLC 1193 wherein it has been held that; "the true test is that where a worker or a group of workers labour to produce goods or services and their goods or services are for the business of another, that other is in fact the employer, he has economic control over the workers' existence, still and continued employment, if he for any reason chockes off, the workers is virtually laid off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have an immediate contractual relationship of no consequence when on lifting the veil the naked truth is discovered, though dropped in a different paper arrangement that the real employer is' the management and not the immediate contractor ....Court should be a statute to avoid the mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be misled by the maya of legal appearances. In 1992 PLC 1193 in an identical case simens Pakistan Engineering Company Limited v. Nisar Gill and others it has been held:‑‑ "Workman"‑‑‑‑Contractor‑‑‑Respondents workman whether employees of appellants or of contractor‑‑‑Respondents et first and the ordinary‑ treatment dispensary maintained by appellant‑ All raw‑material and goods needed for work in different section of appellants' factory came for appellants plant and factory belonged to them‑‑‑Respondent admittedly worked at Factory site, shoulder to shoulder with workers of appellant and their work was supervised by the foreman and site incharge of appellants‑‑Evidence on record showed that arrangement between appellants and contractor was merely to deprive a grout) of workers of their rightful emoluments, privileges and benefits which would be available to them under the law of land as enjoyed by other workers of appellants ‑‑‑Contractor in question was thus just a cover to deprive respondents of fruits of their labour‑‑All that respondents wanted was that they should be treated at par with other workers of appellants‑‑‑respondents were directed to be treated at par with other workers and were to be entitled to same emoluments and benefits as were being enioyed by other workers of appellants. In 1993 PLC 931, the Full Bench of this Commission in the case titled as General Secretary Pak Saudi Fertilizer v. Pak Saudi Fertilizer Limited held that (g) Industrial Relation Ordinance (XXIII) of 1969)‑‑‑ ....S.2(xxiii)‑‑ Factories Act (XXV of 1934). S.2(h)‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S.2(1) & S.O. 20‑‑‑Workman‑‑‑Liability of Employer‑‑ Legislative intend directly or through a contractor but beneficent provisions of labour law, was equally to be applicable to all workers in an establishment whether they were recruited directly or through a contractor in any manufacturing or commercial establishment. In 1994 PLC 90 in a case titled as M/s. Hinopak Motors Limited v. Muhammad Sharif and others it has been held:‑‑‑ Industrial Dispute‑‑‑Relationship of employer and employee‑‑‑Proof of existence‑‑‑Grievance petition filed b employees against termination of their services was resisted by employers contending that petitioners were not their employees but were employees of their contractors‑‑‑Evidence on record had fully proved that lunch and tea were being served to employees on behalf of the employers and jobs were to be assigned to employees by employer having been established between parties employees were rightly ordered to be reinstated by Court. In another recent judgment reported in 1998 PLC 147 titled as Abdullah and 10 others v. M/s. Daud Cotton Mills Limited on the same and identical question it has been held that:‑‑‑ Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII 1969)‑‑‑Even if employees were receiving payment from alleged contractors weaving machines tools raw material were supplied by employer mills and distribution of cloth was also done by the employer mills‑‑ Employer Mills were responsible for quality of cloth and the overall supervision of the production‑‑‑Employer Mills were not leased out to alleged contractors but mills were very much in possession of employer‑‑‑Employer had not produced any evidence with regard to actual payment made by employer to alleged contractors with regard to supply of labour either in Trial Court or even at appellant stage‑‑ Such fact show that alleged contracts were not genuine but had been executed for the purpose of denying the relationship of employer and employees by the employers with their workers‑‑ employers in circumstances were thus liable for application of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 and their observance for the benefit of the employees as provided under S.O.20 of West Pakistan Industrial _and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968‑‑ Services of employees thus could not be terminated nor they could be removed under S.O.12 of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1969, except by an order in writing stating reasons for such termination or removal‑‑‑Employees were directed to be reinstated m services with back benefits". 12. As discussed above I regret to observe that the so‑called contract /agreement between the aforesaid asserted contractors, the Al‑Abbas Traders and that of the respondents is a manipulated contract by the respondents to escape from the liabilities under labour laws. The petitioner/complainant as well as all the other workers of the establishment of the respondents to whom the respondents are emphasising to be the contractual employees are the regular and permanent employees of the establishment. The respondents cannot escape from their legal obligations by putting the said workers in the lap of the so‑called contractor as under. Standing Order 2-A it is the legal obligations of the respondents to provide orders in writing to the workers at the time of their appointments, transfer, promotion etc showing the terms and conditions of their services and Standing Order 20 further clarifies the question in hand, wherein it is laid down that the employer of the Industrial and Commercial Establishment shall personally be held responsible for the proper and faithful observance of the standing orders, whether or not the workmen of such establishment employed through contractor. It is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the so‑called contractor has miserably failed to establish his any sort of relation of master and servant/employer and employee with the complainant/petitioner and the petitioner is admittedly an employee of the establishment of the respondents in the eyes of law. 13. I find no merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that since the respondents never issued to the petitioner any letter of appointment in PIA, therefore, she cannot be the member of the trade unions registered in the establishment of PIAC. Section 2‑A of Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders (Ordinance) made it obligatory for the employers to issue appointment orders to employee at the time of his/her appointment showing terms and conditions of services employment and Standing Order 12(3) also make it obligatory for employer to issue termination order in writing explicitly stating reasons for action taken and communicate to workman effectively in PLD 1985 (D.B.) Lahore 407 as well as in 1992 PLC 255 it is held that if respondents has not issued appointment orders accordingly, they are liable to be prosecuted, but the employees cannot be punished for such lapses on part of employer. There is nothing on record to show that the respondents terminated the services of the petitioner/complainant uptil now and the attendance register for the complete month of November, 1998 including the names of officers and staff of the respondents alongwith the petitioner clearly substantiate the existence of the employment of the petitioner in the establishment of the respondents and at the time and moment when the ad interim order in favour of the petitioner dated 30‑11‑1998 was passed by this bench and the same was accordingly got received to the respondents by the petitioner on the same day. She was admittedly on the role of the respondents but just to circumvent the orders of this bench, the respondents intentionally and deliberately restrained the petitioner from entering in the premises of the office of the respondent for duties and marking her attendance on 1‑12‑1998. As regards the membership of the union by the petitioner it has clearly been held by the Honourable Karachi High Court in 1997 PLC 746 that prerogative to form trade union was not only that of permanent workers but all workers without any distinction could form the union in terms of section 3 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and even temporary workers would be a member and voter of the union he/she employee for more than 90‑days but no restriction can be imposed which was not intended by the legislator. As such the petitioner/complainant being the employee of the establishment of the respondents has got the right to join the trade union of her choice. The contractor in question is nothing but only a lame excuse of the respondents for escaping from their legal obligations and responsibilities. There seems to be no justification on the objection of the learned counsel for the respondent made by him in the written arguments of the complaint asserting that after the insertion of section 2‑A with the Services Tribunal Act, 1973, the petitioner/complainant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this commission and a remedy lies for her is only with the Federal Services Tribunal. Such an objection at the last stage made by the respondents is astonishing and rediculous one. As on one hand, the respondent entirely denied their relationship of employer and employee with the petitioner/complainant by rendering her to be an employee of asserted contractor, whereas on the other hand, rendering the petitioner to be the civil servant, the respondent intended to defeat the instant case of the petitioner on technical grounds. Law does not allow the respondent to approbate. and reprobate and below hot and cold at the same breath as has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in PLD 1997 SC 107, PLD 1990 SC 681 and 1992 SCMR 1290. Even otherwise despite insertion of section 2‑A with the services' Tribunal Act of 1973, the provision of section 4 of the said act does not attract at all in the case of the complainant. As per verdict of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in 1999 SCMR 819, the threatening of alleged acts of unfair labour practice on the part of the employers as provided under section 15 of the I.R.O., 1969 fall outside the scope of section 4 of Services Tribunal Act of 1973 for which no remedy is provided with the Services Tribunal and the exclusive remedy guaranteed to the petitioner is only lies with this bench of the Commission under the statute of the I.R.O, 1969. It is an admitted fact that no written order of any sort have been served upon the petitioner by the respondent and she was on the role of the establishment of the respondents on 30‑11‑1998 and she was under severe threatening of termination by the respondent on account of her lawful trade union activities and was clear victim of the acts of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer for which she rightly invoked the jurisdiction of this commission as has been guaranteed to her under the statute of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and in such a circumstances for invoking the jurisdiction of this commission under the provisions of I.R.O., 1969 against the alleged acts of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer, no bar or restriction has been imposed by the newly amendment of section 2‑A with the Service Tribunal Act, 1973. A perusal of the judgment of the Full Bench referred by the learned counsel for the respondent in the written statement does not at all support the contention of the respondent that the employee of the contractor are not the employee of PIAC as no such decision has been made by the full bench in the appeal referred by the learned counsel and the only question decided by the Full Bench in the said appeal was that the union cannot expose the cause of action of the individual workers in a representative capacity under section 22‑A(8)(g) of the I.R.O., 1969 and the said appeals were only disposed of by the full bench on this technical ground alone. It is a settled law that stay order comes into the effect, the moment it is passed and same was binding on parties and the respondents cannot be allowed to defy the same when the position prevailing as on 30‑11‑1998 clearly goes in favour of the complainant, she is admittedly an employee of the establishment of the respondents and not of the so‑called asserted contractor and at the moment the ad interim order dated 30‑11‑1998 was passed the petitioner/complainant was on the roll/duty of the establishment of the respondents on 30‑11‑1990 but w.e.f. 1‑12‑1998 the petitioner has been disallowed and restrained from entering the office premises deliberately and intentionally by the respondents through verbal orders with the pretext of so -called contractor just to circumvent the ad interim order of this bench dated 30‑11‑1998, the act of which prima facie constitute the act of the contempt of the orders of this bench dated 30‑11‑1998 as provided under section 22‑C of the I.R.O. 1969. In such a circumstances, in a reported judgment placed in 1980 SCMR 90 titled as Bakhtawar etc. v. Amin etc. the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held: (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑‑ --(xxxix, R. 2(3) read with S.151‑‑‑Injunction‑‑‑Party against whom injunction order passed doing something for its own advantage and to disadvantage of other party‑‑‑Court can, under its inherent jurisdiction bring back such party to original petition‑‑‑Plea that since ad interim order was later discharged, violation of such, order was no longer congnizable‑‑ Held, without substance‑‑‑(jurisdiction‑‑‑injunction). When by contravening an injunction order the party against whom the order is passed has done something for its own advantage to disadvantage of the other party, it is open to the Court under its inherent jurisdiction to bring back the party to a position where it originally stood, as if the order had not been contravened. The exercise of this inherent power is based on the principle that no party can be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong in spite of the order contrary passed by the Court. . (c)Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908),-- S. 58 and O.XXI, R. 2(2) read with S.36 & O. XXI, R. 32(1)‑‑‑Secruing compliance and execution of an order of injunction by directing arrest and detention of judgment debtor‑‑‑Held, a matter different from punishing a judgment‑debtor for violation of injunction of status quo‑‑‑Object and application of S.58 and O. XXXIX, R.2(3). (Injunction). Securing compliance and execution of an order of injuction by directing arrest and detention etc. of (as this term is usually used‑‑‑a judgment debtor is an independent subject by itself whereas punishing a judgment‑debtor for violation of the injunction of status quo is quite a different matter altogether though in certain respects apparently they may look to the overlooking but that is only incidental. The object of first to seek compliance by a Court of its orders as otherwise these orders would be ‑a mere force. The aim of the second machine by is the punishment of the defaulter. The former is regulated by section 58, C.P.C. whereas the latter by Order XXXIX, rule 2(3), C.P.C. The former is applicable when stage for execution has not passed out or in other words the order is still capable of execution whereas the latter is attracted at all stage. Furthermore, the record shows that the order of this bench of the Commission dated 30‑11‑1998 was not challenged by the respondents in any forum and it has attained finality and as the complainant was on duty on 30‑11‑1998 the marking of attendance of whom accordingly acknowledged by the respondents with the pretext that she wrongly marked her attendance uptil 30‑11‑1998 and on getting received the orders of this bench of the Commission on the same date in the office of the respondents she remained in the office of the respondents till the close of the office hours on 30‑11‑1998. Thus, the respondents were legally bound to make compliance of the orders of this bench of the Commission and it should have been obeyed with careful exercise. Reliance is also made in PLD 1975 Lahore 126 wherein his Lordship, the then Honourable Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Iqbal elaborately held:‑‑‑ When an injunction order has been issued, it must be obeyed and the only remedy of the aggrieved party is to come up in appeal to superior Court to have the order vacated. So long as the order stand and its operation has not been suspended by another Court or by the Court which passed the order, it will not be tolerated that and person should disobey that order. It is so because the administrating of justice can only be effective if it has the means to enforce Court order and to punish acts ending to impair public confidence in the authority or integrity of the Judges who administer the course of justice. " Neither the respondents moved any application for recalling the order dated 30‑11‑1998 or challenged the same in any higher forum but in disregards the orders of this bench of the Commission restrained the complainant from attending her duties and marking her attendance later on, with the pretext of the so‑called contractor who miserably failed to prove his any sort of relation of employer and employee with the complainant and for tendering a false statement before this bench of the Commission prosecution under section 56 of the I.R.O., 1969 is also pending adjudication against the so‑called contractor whereby he is escaping to face the same by non appearance despite repeated summons and notices. In such a circumstances the law does not allow the respondents to play mockery with the orders of this bench of the Commission which has attained finality and the respondents are legally bound to comply with the same. For the foregoing reasons and peculiar facts of this case, in exercising the powers conferred upon this bench under law laid down by the Honouarble Supreme Court of Pakistan, I direct the respondents to bring the petitioner back to her original position prevailing as on 30‑11‑1998, when ad interim order was passed and the petitioner be immediately taken back to her original post/position with all due emoluments otherwise, the law would take its own course for due compliance and execution of the orders of this bench dated 30‑11‑1998. Let is the first instance, summons be issued to the respondents alongwith a copy of this order to ensure the due compliance of the orders positively, with the direction to the respondents Nos.2 and 3 to appear in person on 2‑8‑1999 and to show cause as to why the prosecution under section 22‑C of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 may not be initiated against them. H.B.T./349/NIRC Order accordingly.