P L D 1965 Dacca 68 (PLP)

SATTAR, J.‑Petitioner is the Printer and Publisher of the daily Bengali newspaper `Ittefaq'. The present application is directed against two orders dated the 6th May 1964 passed by the Provincial Government under section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958 prohibiting the petitioner from making, printing or publishing any matter, namely, news, views, comments, statements and letters concerning and relating to students' strikes, students' agitation, students' unrest, students' meetings or any students' grievances. The assertions of the petitioner which are relevant for the disposal of the points raised may be summarised as follows: The impugned orders have imposed unreasonable restrictions by curtailing the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression and of trade guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore they are void and ultra vires. The petitioner ha: further asserted that inasmuch as section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance authorises imposition of unreasonable restrictions and curtailment of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression, it is void and ultra vires as goes counter to Fundamental Rights NOS. 8 and 9 of the Constitution. The petitioner, as the Printer and Publisher of `Ittefaq', it has been said, has the duty to ventilate the genuine grievances of the people or any section of people and to publish the actual day‑to day happenings, both national and international, for the greater interest of the people and for safety and security of the State. It has then been said that the impugned orders have contravened the established principle of natural law and natural justice inasmuch as the orders were passed against the petitioner without giving him prior hearing or without giving him any prior opportunity whatsoever to explain his position. The petitioner has also asserted that the orders in question are mala fide on their very face and have been passed for a collateral purpose and as such amount to abuse of powers under the Statute m question. The impugned orders seek to suppress the actual day‑to‑day news and happenings. As a matter of fact, the restriction amounted to even prohibition of publication of students' grievances of any kind which clearly shows that genuine and lawful grievances of the students could not also be published. The impugned orders are sweeping in nature and arbitrary. Mr. Z. Huq, Section Officer, Home (Political) Department, who. is respondent No. 2 in this case and under whose signature the orders in question were issued, has filed an affidavit‑in- opposition. In this affdavit it has been asserted that the impugned orders do not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution. It has then been said that an order was passed against the petitioner on the 27th March 1964, which had been issued for a period of 30 days and after the lapse of the said period the respondents watched the trend of publications of the petitioner and also other newspapers, more particularly the printing and publishing of the news with respect to students' strike. The respondents thereafter being fully satisfied that except the three papers including the `Ittefaq' an order under section 9 (1) (b) was not necessary. It is on account of this that the impugued orders were passed against the petitioner. The notifications containing the orders which are under challenge in this petition are in the following terms: Government of East Pakistan Home (Political) Department Section II. __ Order____ No. 443‑Poll (II) Dacca, the 6th May, 1964. Whereas by Order No, 423‑Pll (II) dated the 27th March 1964, issued under section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordin ance, 1958 (East Pakistan Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958), you Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Printer of the Ittefaq were prohibited from 4 making, printing or publishing any news, views, comments, statements and letters concerning and relating to students' strikes, students' agitation, students' unrest, students' meetings or any students' grievances of any kinds in any issue of the Ittefaq for a period of 30 days from 27th March 1964; And whereas after the expiry of the said period of 30 days Government did not renew the order in the hope that the Ittefaq would desist from publishing the aforesaid matters in a manner which is likely to endanger public safety or the maintenance of public order; And whereas it appears to Government that their hope has been belied and the Ittefaq has again started publishing and aforeasaid matters in a manner which is intended or likely to endanger public safety or the maintenance of public order; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the East Pakistan Safety Ordinance, 1958 (as amended up to date), the Governor is pleased to prohibit you, Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Printer of the Ittefaq from making, printing or publishing any of the aforeasid matter, namely news, views, comments, statements, or letter concerning and relating to students' strikes, students' agitation, students' unrest or students' meetings or any students' grievances of any kind in any issue of the Ittefaq for a period of 30 days with immediate effect from today. The aforesaid Mr. Tofazzal Hossain Printer of the Ittefaq, will be entitled to make representation to the Government of East Pakistan against this order for cancelling, amending or rescinding this order before the expiry of the aforesaid period of 30 days. The prohibition contained herein shall also apply to this order as well: Provided that nothing in this order shall be deemed to apply to any matter communicated to the press for publication by Government. By order of the Governor. Sd. Z. Huq, 6‑5‑

64. Section Officer, Government of East Pakistan. To Tofazzal Hossain, Printer, Ittefaq, Dacca." "Government of East Pakistan Home (Political) Department. Section II Order____ No. 444‑Poll (II) Dacca, the 6th May 1964. Whereas by Order No. 422‑Poll (II) dated the 27th March 1964, issued under section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958 (East Pakistan Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958), you, Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Publisher, of the Ittefaq were prohibited from making, printing or publishing any news, views, comments, statements and letters concerning and relating to students' strikes, students' agitation, Students' unrest, students' meetings or any students' grievances of any kinds in any issue of the Ittefaq for a period of 30 days from 27th March 1964; And whereas after the expiry of the said period of 30 days Government did not renew the order in the hope that the Ittefaq would desist from publishing the aforesaid matters in a manner which is likely to endanger public safety or the maintenance of‑public order; And whereas it appears to Government that their hope has been belied and the Ittefaq has again started publishing the aforesaid matters in manner which is intended or likely to endanger public safety or the maintenance of public order; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958 (as amended up‑to‑date), the Governor is pleased to prohibit you, Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Publisher of the Ittefaq from making, printing or publishing any of the aforesaid matters, namely news, views, comments, statements or letter concerning and relating to students' strikes, students' agitation, students' unrest or students' meetings or any students' grievances of any kind in any issue of the Ittefaq for a period of 30 days with immediate effect from today. The aforesaid Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Publisher of the Ittefaq will be entitled to make representation to the Government of East Pakistan this order for cancelling, amending or rescinding this order before the expiry of the aforesaid period of 30 days. The prohibition‑contained herein shall also apply to this order as well: Provided that nothing in this order shall be deemed to apply to any matter communicated to the press for publication by Government. By order of the Governor Sd. Z. Huq, 6‑5‑

64. Section Officer, Government of East Pakistan. To Mr. Tofazzal Hossain, Publisher, Ittefaq, Dacca." Mr. Brohi, who has appeared for the . . . . petitioner, has contended that section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) is void in view of the provisions of Article 6 of the Constitution. The argument is that, as section 9 of the Ordinance goes counter to the freedoms guaranteed by Fundamental Rights Nos. 8 and 9 of the Constitution, section. 9 must be struck down in view of Article 6 of the Constitution. The Ordinance in question was promulgated on the 25th November 1958 and sections 9 and 10 of the Ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. V of 1964 which came into force on the 27th March 1964. After amendment, section 9 of the Ordinance (hereinafter called the impugned section) runs as follows: 9. "Power to impose censorship:‑(1) The Provincial Government may, for the purpose of securing the public safety, or the maintenance of public order, by order addressed to a printer, publisher or editor, or to printers, publishers and editor generally‑ (a) require that all matters, or any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects, shall, before being published in any document or class of documents, be submitted for scrutiny to an authority specified in the order. (b) prohibit or regulate the making or publishing of any document or class of documents, or of any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects, or the use of any press, as defined in the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. Provided that the order under clauses (a) and (b) shall be in force for a period not exceeding 30 days but may be extended for a like period for reasons to be stated in writing. Provided further that within the said period a printer, publisher or editor may represent to the Provincial Government that such prohibition or regulation is no longer necessary and after hearing him, the Provincial Government may modify, amend or withdraw the order. (2) If any person contravenes any order made under sub section (1), then, without prejudice to any other proceedings which may be taken against such person, the Provincial Government may declare to be forfeited to it every copy of any document published or made in contravention of such order and any Press, as defined in the Press and Publication Ordinance, 1960 used in the making of such document. (3) If any person contravenes any order made under this section, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation:‑In this Chapter "document" includes any painting, drawing, photograph or other visible representation as also gramophone records, sound tracks and any other articles on which sounds have been recorded with a view to their subsequent reproduction." It has been argued that, as the impugned section empowers the Provincial Government to pass even an order of prohibition and the said Government is the sole judge with regard to the requirements of public safety and the maintenance of public order and there is no initial procedural provision in regard to hearing, the section puts unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and curtails the freedom of trade. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has also argued that the time‑limit fixed in the first proviso is illusory as there is no bar in passing a similar order after some interval. It is then said that the section contemplates total prohibition and has not provided for prior hearing. Lastly, it is said that the provision relating to entertain ment of representation after the passing of the order is also not substantial as the time‑limit being co‑extensive with the life of the order the possibility of taking a decision urgently is precluded. Before we proceed to examine the above arguments in detail, it is necessary to quote Article 6 and Fundamental Right No. 9 of the Constitution. Article 6 runs as follows: "

6. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights to be void:‑(1) Any law, or any custom or usage having the force of law, in so far as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by this Chapter, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights so conferred and any law made in contraven tion of this clause shall, to the extent of such contravention, be void. (3) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to‑ (i) any law relating to members of the Reference Services, or of the forces charged with the maintenance of public order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the maintenance of discipline among them; or (ii) any of the laws specified in the Fourth Schedule as in force immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963; and no such law or any provision thereof shall be void on the ground that such law or provision is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any provision of this Chapter." Fundamental Right No. 9 is in the following language: "

9. Freedom of speech:‑Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the security of Pakistan, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence." It is not disputed that the right to determine the reasonable ness of the restriction vests in the Court. It has to be noted in! this connection that there can be no absolute test of reasonableness which would be applicable to all circumstances. It has rightly/ been pointed out by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of The State of Madras v. V. G. Row ((1952) S C R 597 at p. 607): "It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to, each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent .and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict." Mr. Brohi has referred to the case of Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras ((1950) S C R 234). This case, in our view, has no bearing on the question raised before us. The question which arose before the Supreme Court was whether section 9 (1‑A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 which authorised the Provincial Government "for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order to prohibit or regulate the entry into or the circulation sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof, of any document or class of document," is a "law relating to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State." The Supreme Court, by a majority judgment, with which Fazal Ali, J. did not agree, came to the conclusion that the impugned section did not came within the protection allowed under clause (2) of Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that nothing else than serious and aggravated forms of public disorder, endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression conferred by Article 19 (1) (a). The impugned section which was designed to secure public safety and the maintenance of public order, therefore, did not come within the legislative limit permitted by Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. The position in the case of Brij Bhushan and another v. The State of Delhi ((1950) S C R 245), was the same. These decisions were given before the original Article 19 was amended by the First Amendment Act in 1951. Before amendment clause (2) of Article 19 was worded in the following manner: "Nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow the State." After amendment the clause stands in the following form: "Nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause in the interest of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence." The above quotations clearly indicate that the language of clause (2) of Article 19 of the Indian Constitution after . . . . . the amendment became almost the same as the language of Fundamental Right No. 9 of our Constitution as regards reasonable restrictions. In this view of the matter, the Indian authority, which is directly on the point, is to be found in Virendra v. The State of Punjab and another (AIR 1957 S C 896) on which the learned Advocate‑General has relied. It is true that in the cases of Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan and another, it has been said that if the language of the impugned law is wide enough to cover "restrictions of a fundamental right both within and without limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right" and so long as the possibility of the restrictions being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, the law must be held to be wholly inconsistent and void but in the instant case, we are not concerned with that question. The impugned section indisputably leaves everything to the subjective satisfaction of the Government. It is the sole judge as to the necessity of issuing an order under the impugned section C for the purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance o public order. The question that arises is whether it can be left to any other agency. In answering this question, S. R. Das, C. J. in the case of Verendra v. The State of Punjab and another, observed as follows: "The Court is wholly unsuited to gauge the seriousness of the situation, for it cannot be in possession of materials which are available only to the executive Government. Therefore, the determination of the time when and the extent to which restrictions should be imposed on the Press must of necessity be left to the judgment and discretion of the State Government and that is exactly what the Legislature did by passing the statute." It has been contended that the impugned section with which the Supreme Court of India was concerned was upheld with reference to the prevailing conditions in the State of Punjab in regard to "Save Hindi Agitation". It is true that the learned Judge in more than one place has referred to the same but that is not the only ground for not striking down the section. In determining the reasonableness of the restrictions the prevailing condition at the time of the legislation may be taken into account. From this, however, it does not follow that absence of manifestly disturbed condition by itself will be sufficient to strike down the legislation particularly when the exercise of the power granted is made dependent upon the existence or threatened appearance of such a situation. On giving our anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned Advocate for the petitioner, we have found it difficult to take a view different from the above. The duty of the Government to maintain law and order includes the obligation to keep itself well informed as to the circumstances which are likely to disturb peace at a given time. Who can in such a context be a better judge as to what preventive measures are to be taken to avoid the threatened breach of the peace? These powers must be conceded to the executive. The powers are indeed wide but they are to be exercised only if it were satisfied as to the necessity of using them for securing public safety of the maintenance of public order. There cannot be any presump tion that there will be abuse in the exercise of the powers case of mala fide exercise of power is always subject to judicial interference. In determining the vires of the impugned section, we are called upon to see only whether the restrictions put by it on freedom of speech were reasonably necessary in the interest of public order. In answering that question, we cannot assume that the Provincial Government will exercise the discretion given to it by the impugned section arbitrarily without reference to the interest of the purposes mentioned in the section. The contemplated action being of a preventive nature, it must be take promptly, and therefore the absence of a provision for a prior hearing does not render the restrictions unreasonable. The rule of prior hearing is not an inflexible one. Its usefulness must be judged with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case such as the nature of the right concerned and the abridgement complained. against. A hearing after the order is passed satisfie under certain circumstance the requirement of audi alteram partem particularly when the order has to be passed immediately [See De Verteuil v. Knaggs and another ((1918) A C 557)]. The order under the impugned section in the first instance remains in force for 30 days though it may be extended for a like period but this can only be done for reasons to be stated in writing. The order may be modified, amended or withdrawn on the representation of the Printer, Publisher or Editor concerned. Indeed, the right of reviewing the order is again left to the Government but we do not think the provision could be otherwise as the Government is in possession of all relevant materials and would be the best judge if any change in the situation or the attitude of the party concerned demands modification or possession (sic) of the order. The argument that had there been a shorter period fixed for making representation instead of 30 days, the party could expect a quick decision in the absence of which the Court could have intervened, does not appear convincing. The scope of passing orders at intervals does not necessarily mean that the restrictions.' are unreasonable. If a party succeeds in proving mala fide in passing an order under the section, the order will be struck down but not the law under which it has been passed. We have already pointed out that the exercise of the power is dependent upon the existence of a situation which threatens public safety or the maintenance of public order. It is further conditioned by the premises that it remains effective only for 30 days and can b extended for a like. period for reasons to be stated in writing and that it can be modified, amended or withdrawn on the representation of the aggrieved party. These conditions definitely circumscribe the right of exercising the power and as such the legislation which authorises it cannot be said to have put unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has not been able make out any case of interference with the right of freedom of trade. The discretion conferred on the Executive is neither unguided nor unqualified. This is not a case of denial of the right. It amounts no doubt to abridgement but that within permissible limits of the Constitution. Regard being had to these facts we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that section 9 of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance is inconsistent with the rights of freedom of speech and trade guaranteed by the Constitution. This is the only point that has been urged in this case and as we have found no substance in it the Rule is discharged but we make no order as to costs. Mr. Gholam Hafez prays for a certificate under Article 58 (2) (a) of the Constitution for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. The question raised in this petition has not been considered and decided in any other case by our Courts. The point raised by Mr. Brohi relates to the interpretation of Fundamental Right No. 9 guaranteed by the Constitution. In this view we feel that the certificate prayed for should be granted. We, certify that this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. A. M. SAYEM, J.‑I agree that the Rule should be discharged. The circumstances in which the orders under challenge are claimed to have been passed by the Provincial Government having been fully set out m the judgmen4 just delivered by my learned brother, I do not propose to refer to the same over again. It is not in dispute that the two orders were passed by the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred on them by section 9 (1) (b) of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958, nor does the petitioner claim that they are in excess of the powers so conferred on the Provincial Govern ment. Mr. Brohi, appearing for the petitioner, raised only two points in support ‑of the rule, first, that section 9 (1) (b) of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958, (hereinafter called the Ordinance), under which the two orders were passed was violative of the petitioner's fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also of trade guaranteed to him by the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1963 and, secondly, that the orders were also otherwise liable to be declared as having been made without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect, since they were made without first hearing the petitioner, in disregard of the principle of natural justice that no one should be condemned unheard. In support of his first point, namely, the constitutionality of section 9 (1) (b) of the Ordinance Mr. Brohi referred us to certain Indian decisions, particularly that of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras ((1950) S C R 234) which was decided in May, 1950 and followed by the same Court in the case of Brij Bhusan v. The State of Delhi ((1950) 8 C R 745). In these two cases enactments similar to the one under challenge before us were declared to be unconstitutional. In Ramesh Thapper's case the Government of Madras, in exercise of powers conferred on them by section 9 (1‑A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Orders, 1949, issued an order on the printer, publisher and editor of a weekly journal, printed and published in Bombay, imposing a ban upon its entry and circulation in the State of Madras on the ground that they were satisfied that it was necessary so to do "for the purpose of securing the public safety and maintenance of public order." In Brij Bhusan's case the Chief Commis sioner of Delhi directed the editor and printer of a weekly journal in exercise of powers conferred on them under section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, to submit for scrutiny, before publication, all communal matters and also news and views about Pakistan, other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, on the ground that the Government were satisfied that the journal had been publishing highly objectionable matters constituting a threat to public law and order, and that the action was necessary "for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order". These orders were quashed by the Supreme Court of India on a conclusion that the respective enactments, under which they were passed, were unconstitutional, being restrictive of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression, and not being protected by the terms of Article 19 (2) of the Indian Constitution as it stood in 1950. Article 19 (2) of the Indian Constitution was, however, amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which saved laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. Mr. Brohi could not place before us a single Indian decision of a date later than the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1961 supporting his proposition. There can be no doubt that the petitioner's right of freedom of speech and expression has been curtailed or restricted by the order complained of, nor can there be any dispute that the petitioner's right of trade as a publisher of news has also been so affected. These rights, however, are not absolute rights. The very Articles of the Constitution relied upon by the petitioner permit reasonable restrictions on the exercise of these rights. It will, therefore, be necessary in this context to examine the impugned provisions of the section namely, section 9 (1) (b) of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958, with a view to ascertaining if the restrictions imposable by it on the exercise of the said fundamental rights are reasonable restrictions. The impugned provision of the section, as it stood amended on the date of the orders complained of, is in the following terms: "9 (1). The Provincial Government may, for the purpose of securing the public safety, or the maintenance of public order, by order addressed to a printer, publisher or editor, or printers, publishers and editors, generally‑ (a) * * * * * (b) prohibit or regulate the making or publishing any document or class of documents or of any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects . . . . ." I have omitted here so much of this clause as to whose validity we are not concerned in this rule. "Provided that the order under clauses (a) and (b) shall be in force for a period not exceeding thirty days, but may be extended for a like period for reasons to be stated in writing. "Provided further that within the said period, a printer, publisher or editor may represent to the Provincial Government that such prohibition or regulation is no longer necessary and after hearing him, the Provincial Government may modify, amend or withdraw the order." It is evident from the above quoted text of the impugned provision of the section of the Ordinance, that the power conferred by it on the Government is circumscribed by the following limitations: (i) It can be exercised only for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order. (ii) The prohibition or regulation is to relate to a document or class of documents or a matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects. (iii) The order passed under the impugned provision of the section shall be in force for a period not exceeding thirty days; and there can be only one extension and that also only for a like period. In the event of an extension, the reason for such extension is to be stated in writing. (iv) The printer, publisher or editor concerned is given the right of making representation against the order so that a corresponding duty is cast on the Provincial Government to entertain such a representation and to modify, amend or withdraw the order, in the event of being satisfied that such prohibition or regulation is no longer necessary. Mr. Brohi contended that the aforesaid limitations imposed on the powers of the Government were illusory, and that the impugned provision of the section of the Ordinance actually con ferred on them powers which could be exercised arbitrarily to the prejudice of printers, publishers or editors. According to him the following are the `vices' attached to the section which make the section unconstitutional:‑ (1) The Executive Government has been made the sole judge to decide, by subjective satisfaction, as to the existence of circumstances necessitating the making of orders under the section, and it is the said Authority again that has been empowered to pass the orders. (2) It provides for a total prohibition, as in the instant case where according to Mr. Brohi, there has been a total prohibition against publishing any matter relating to students. (3) The time‑limit of 30 days can be extended at least by another 30 days, and under cover of fresh orders that time can be indefinitely extended. (4) It has made no provision for pre‑audition, enabling the printer, publisher or editor concerned to offer any explanation, with a view to satisfying the Government that no such orders need be passed. (5) The provision relating to entertainment of representations after the passing of the order is deceptive, as the period of time for presenting them has been made co‑extensive with the period of prohibition or regulation which suggests the absence of a sense of urgency in disposing of such representations. The section ought to have put a time‑limit for disposal of such representations, according to Mr. Brohi. The above are the only objections levelled against the impugned provision of the section of the Ordinance as to its reasonableness, both as regards the substantive and the procedural parts thereof. Of necessity, the reasonableness of the restrictive provisions of such an enactment has to be judged in the context of the urgency and the seriousness of the situation intended to be controlled by exercise of powers conferred by the enactment. The Ordinance provides an urgent preventive measure against probable serious disturbances of public order. There can be no question that the Executive Government to which is entrusted the duty of maintaining public order, being in possession of the machinery for swift collection of information is the Authority most competent, in the first instance, for taking a timely decision on the question as to whether in the circumstances existing such an order need be passed. The fact that it is that Authority again which has been empowered to pass the order or to name an authority subordinate to it for exercising such powers on its behalf, is a guarantee of a sort against possible irresponsible orders. It may be added here, with a view to allaying any apprehensions in that regard, that it is true that this Court does not sit on appeal over executive decisions relating to such matters, yet nothing stands in the way of this Court in interfering under Article 98 (2) of the Constitution, in the event of being satisfied that such in order has been passed upon an illegal extension of jurisdiction, either by misinterpreting the section or on conclusions of fact that a person acting reasonably could not have reached, except with reference to considerations extraneous to the section: See Province of East Pakistan v. Abdus Sobhan Sowdagar and others (P L D 1964 S C 1). The section provides for a restriction impossible for a period of 30 days only, and for a single extension thereof for a like period, and no more. Such an extension has to be justified with reasons in writing. The restriction, again, can be made only in respect of a particular document or class of documents or a particular subject or class of subjects. I am unable to find any unreasonableness in such a restriction, having regard to the standard of test set forth above. Publication of the news of the day is not contemplated altogether to be prohibited. What can be prohibited in exercise of powers conferred by the section is the publication of a particular matter or particular matters. Such a prohibition, in my view, is nothing but a partial restriction on the right of publication, leaving that right in that in regard to all other subjects. The objection that the section does not provide a procedure for a hearing before the making of the order is not also a valid objection, since such a procedure cannot but defeat the very purpose of the Ordinance. The urgency of the situation envisaged by the Ordinance cannot brook any delay, which such a procedure/ would necessarily involve. Even in the case of Rao Mahroz Akhtar v. District Magistrate, Dera Ghazi Khan etc. (P L D 1957 Lah. 676), relied upon by Mr. Brohi, a case of restriction of movements of certain persons, S. A. Rahman, C. J. of the West Pakistan High Court (as his Lordship then was) observed that "cases of an emergent nature may require an ex parte order to be passed initially", but that "an opportunity to be heard at some stage ought to be there." The impugned section does provide for a representation. This representation can be made any time between the service of the order and the date of the expiry of the period of restriction. I am at a loss to follow what valid objection there can be on the score of the impugned section having given the affected party the liberty of making representation within a period co‑extensive with the period of the restriction. Instead of imposing a limitation as to the time for representation, the section gives the affected party complete freedom of choice as to the point of time at which he may make the representation. How can this then be unreasonable? In view of the absence of any shorter period fixed by the section for the disposal of such a representation, Mr. Brohi contended that the disposal may be delayed, out of mala fide motives, till the expiry of the period of restriction. One need hardly point out that mala fides always attracts the jurisdiction of this Court, and in case of a complaint of unconscionable delay this Court will certainly inquire as to the bona fides of the inaction and will not hesitate to interfere, in the event of being satisfied that such inaction is due to mala fide motives. Learned Advocate‑General, appearing for the Government of East Pakistan, referred us to a number of Indian decisions of dates subsequent to the enactment of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, by which the laws in reasonable restriction of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and expression and also of trade have been saved. I will content myself by referring only to the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Virendra and another v. The State of Punjab and another ((1958) S C R. 891=A I R 1957 S C 896) that has settled the law on the question, so far as India is concerned. In this case the Supreme Court of India was called upon to examine the validity, inter alia, of section 2 (1) (a) of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 which run as follows:‑ "2 (1) The State Government or any authority so authorised in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the maintenance of communal harmony affecting or likely to affect public order, may by order in writing addressed to a printer publisher or editor,‑ (a) prohibit the printing or publication in any document or any class of documents or any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects for a specified period or in a particular issue or issues of a newspaper or periodical; Provided that no such order shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof; Provided further that the person against whom the order has been made may within ten days of the passing of this order make a representation to the State Government which may on consideration ‑thereof modify, confirm or rescind the order" A Bench comprised of 5 Judges of the Indian Supreme Court held the aforesaid section of the said Act to be valid, as being protected by the amended Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, clause (2) whereof, (leaving aside what is not relevant for our purpose) is in the following terms: "Nothing in sub‑clause (a) of clause (1) (right to freedom of speech and expression) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub‑clause in the interest of . . . . . public order . . . . ." Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Indian Constitution saves laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of trade `in the interest of the General public'. Das, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, referred to an earlier decision of the said Court in the case of The State of Madras v. V. G. Row ((1952) S C A 399) and approved the observations made therein to the effect that no abstract standards of general pattern of reasonableness could be laid down as applicable to all cases, and further that the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the dispropor tion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time should all be considered in judging the reasonableness of the restrictions sought to be imposed. Das, C. J., pointed out that quick decision and swift and effective action must be of the essence of the powers conferred under such enactments and that their exercise must, of necessity, be left to the subjective satisfaction of the Executive Government who are charged with the duty of maintaining law and order. It was held that, having regard to the body of section 2 (1) (a) of the Act impugned before them and the provisos thereto, namely, the conditions as to the satisfaction of the Authority in respect of certain matters specified in the section, the time‑limit as to the efficacy of the notification and the right to make a representation given to the aggrieved party, no valid objection could be taken against the Act. It is worth mentioning here that although the law under challenge before the Indian Supreme Court provided that an order passed thereunder could be made effective for a period of two months, instead of one month as in the case before us, it was held to be valid. It was provided in that enactment that the representation, if any, was to be made within 10 days. The impugned provision of the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958, provides for a larger period of time for making representation. This is undoubtedly an advantage rather than a disadvantage for the affected party, who can make the representation, if he chooses, at the earliest immediately after service of the order, or he may bide his time according to his own convenience. Nor can any valid objection be taken against fresh orders on now materials. Our Constitution having protected laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights claimed by the petitioner and, having regard to the view that I have taken of the limitations on the restrictions imposable by the impugned provisions of the section of the Ordinance which I have noted above, I am unable to agree with Mr. Brohi that the same is unconstitutional. In support of his second objection to the orders under challenge, namely, that they were passed without giving the petitioner a prior hearing, Mr. Brohi referred to two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, viz., the cases of Messrs Farid Sons Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (P L D 1961 S C 537) and Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45), where the principle of `audi alteram partem' was given effect to upon particular facts of those cases. In disposing of this point, however, I would content myself by saying that the petitioner is not entitled to call the said principle in his aid, in view of the impugned provision of the section of the Ordinance, which we have already held to be valid piece of legislation, having by necessary implications and for good and sound reasons, excluded such a procedure, with a view to eliminating risks of delay involved therein. For the above reasons I find no substance in the Rule which I agree should be discharged. K. B. A. Rule discharged.