P L D 1969 Karachi 566 (PLP)

(a) Letters Patent (Lahore), Cl. 10‑Point neither raised before single Judge nor opposite‑party cross‑examined on such point‑Not allowed in Letters Patent Appeal. (b) Rules of Business (Government of Pakistan)‑ Rules of Business and instructions issued thereunder

‑Not mandatory

‑Mere technical non‑observance thereof‑Does not render actions of Government a nullity‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXVII, r. 8‑B (a). It was argued that the appointment of Advocate was done in pursuance of oral consultations and by means of demi‑official letters with the concerned Ministry and the Law Division of the Government of Pakistan by the concerned officer. The resort to demi‑official letters, was contended to be against the instruc tions and Rules of Business of Government of Pakistan and as such it was pleaded that the appointment was not proper: Held, though it cannot, at all, be said that the Government func tionaries, Departments and Ministries are not supposed to follow those Rules and Instructions, yet it will be too much to say that whenever there is a departure in respect thereof, the action of the Government should be considered as a nullity. The machinery, provided for running the business of the Government is vast and has, by the passage of time, become complicated also. That, by itself, may not be a justification for departure from the correct rules of procedure; but in the day‑to‑day dealings and handling complex and emergent matters, verbal consultations and orders and other similar methods of dealing with situations cannot be altogether ignored. A reasonable appreciation of the whole matter will result in the conclusion that, the non‑observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules and Instructions, if not provided by penal results provided they are faithfully, honestly and substantially followed (even though not technically and strictly), will not annul the actions and proceedings of the Government. The general presumption that, all official acts must be pre sumed to have been done according to procedure, must be raised in this case; and in that view also the appointment of the Advocate cannot be viewed but as legal. Thal Development Authority v. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1965. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXVII, rr. 1, 2 4 8‑B (a)‑Advocate directed to conduct case on behalf of Government‑Becomes recognised agent for purposes of appearances, acts and applications under C. P. C. Rule 2, Order XXVII, C. P. C. provides for not only an ex officio appointment but also an authorisation otherwise to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding. When such an authorisation is made, the person so authorised becomes a recognised agent for the purpose of appearances, acts and applications under the Civil Procedure Code. This view of the meaning of rule 2 is further supported by the words "Government may appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purpose of this Order" used in clause (a) of rule 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. which show that the Government can make a general or special appointment for the purpose of Order XXVII, C. P. C. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. III & O. XXVII

Provisions of O. III-‑Not to be read in O. XXVII‑Order XXVII contains special provisions dealing with suits by or against Government‑Advocate engaged by Government need not file vakalat nama‑Sind Chief Court Rules, para.

51. Thal Development Authority v. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi P L D 1962 Lah. 830 distinguished. All India Reporter Ltd., Bombay and another v. Ramchandra Dhondo Datar A I R 1961 Bom. 292 ref. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI, r. 14 and S. 151 read with S. 107 & Arbitration Act (X of 1940), S. 14‑Defendant failing to sign objections filed under S.14

Arbitration Act but affidavit submitted therewith signed by defendant‑Failure to sign objections, in circumstances, a mere irregularity‑

Defendant allowed to sign same at Letters Patent Appeal stage. There is ample authority in support of the proposition that unintentional failure to sign the pleadings can be rectified by permitting the person concerned to sign subsequently; and this rule of practice and justice is equally applicable to the stage of an appeal. Under section 107, C. P. C., subject to such condi tions and limitations as may be prescribed, an appellate Court has the same powers and shall perform, as nearly as may be, duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on the Courts on the original side in respect of suits instituted therein. Malik Sajawal Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another P L D 1968 Lah. 527; All India Reporter Ltd., Bombay and another v. Ramchandra Dhondo Datar A I R 1961 Bom. 292; Ganpati Nana Powar v. Jiwanabai Kom Subanna A I R 1923 Born. 44 (1); Bundi Portland Cement Ltd. v. Abdul Hussain Essaji A I R 1936 Bom. 418; Nanjibhal Jethabhai v. Popatlal Shriraj an] others A I R 1932 Born. 367; Shib Deo Misra and others v. Ram Prasad and others A I R 1925 All. 79; Secretary of State for India v. Dinshaw Navroji and another A I R 1925 Sind 275 and Rajab Ali v Gujrat Bus Service and another P L D 1961 Kar. 486 rel. Ghulam Yasin in person. JUDGMENT MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑

This letters patent appeal, arises out of Arbitration proceedings which resulted in. an award: by the Umpire Col. (Retired) S. N. Raza, in favour of the present appellant for the recovery of Rs. 6,95,00,000 from the respondent and rejecting the claim of the respondent totalling about Rs. 100 crores.

2. The award was signed on 4th May 1968. On the same day, the notice under section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act was given to the appellant and also to the respondent through. Mr. Habibur Rahman, Assistant Director (Arbitration), Department of Investment, promotion and supplies, Tughlak. House, Karachi. After the payment of the fee to the Umpire, he filed the award in the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, on 8th May 1968; by means of an application which has been registered as Suit No. 118 of 1968 on the original side. Notices to the parties were issued on 11th May 1968, for 9th. August 1968.

3. No objection was filed by the appellant. However, several objections (under sections 15, 30 and 33, of the Arbitration: Act) were filed by the respondent on 5th August 1968, which date, admittedly, was the last date of limitation these objections were signed only by Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, who had appeared for the respondent during the Arbitration proceedings.‑ but the accompanying affidavit sworn on the same day at Karachi was signed and verified by the above‑named Mr. Habibur Rahman.

4. As the dispute relates to the filing of these objections, therefore it is necessary to state the circumstances in which they were filed in the High Court. It appears that Mr. Habibur Rahman had been conducting the proceedings on behalf of the respondent during the Arbitration; that is why the notice of award was sent through him. It is also an admitted position that Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, who is on the panel of the Advocates and Advisers to the Government of Pakistan, appeared as counsel for the respondent during those proceedings. The learned Advocate addressed a letter to Mr. S. A. Nizami, Deputy Solicitor, Law Division, Karachi, making some suggestions in respect of the Arbitration proceedings and the award. Mr. Nizami took action on this letter on 10th May 1968. He wrote to Mr. Habibur Rahman on the same day; and with reference to that, the latter addressed a demi‑official letter to Mr. Muhammad Akram on 11th May 1968, requesting him "to move" an application before the High Court to direct the Umpire to file the award in the Court. A copy of this letter (Annex. A‑1) was endorsed to Mr. Nizami, with reference to his communication of 10th May 1968. A top priority reminder demi- official letter (Annex. A‑2) was sent by Mr. Habibur Rehman to Mr. Muhammad Akram, a copy whereof was endorsed to Mr. Nizami with reference to another communication from him, dated 13th May 1968: In the meanwhile, the notice issued by the High Court in respect of the filing of the award which had been received from Mr. Nizami in the office of Department of Investment, Promotion and supplies (Arbitration Section), was forwarded to Mr. Muhammad Akram under demi‑official letter, dated 8th June 1968 (Annex. A‑3). In this D. O., Mr. Muhammad Akram was requested to do the needful in the matter which, according to the Department, was very important and was already known to Mr. Muhammad Akram. Copies of this D. O. were sent to Mr. Nizami and Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, standing Counsel to the Government of Pakistan at Karachi. On 11th June 1968, Mr. Habibur Rahman addressed another D. O. (Annex. A‑4) to Mr. Muhammad Akram, reminding him about the D. O. of 8th June 1968 (Annex. A‑3) and informing him that "the objections on the award were to be filed by 27th June 1968, positively". It was further requested that the day to day position in the matter should be intimated. Copies of this letter were not only sent to Mr. Nizami and Mr. Shah Jamil Alam but also to "Section Officer, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources (Industries Division), Islamabad". It appears that at this stage, the question of filing the objections was being considered in consultation between the following:‑ (i) Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, who was being treated, by all concerned, as the counsel for the respondent; (ii) Mr. Habibur Rahman, who was Assistant Director (Arbitration) and in that capacity was dealing with the matter on behalf of the Department of Investment, Promotion and Supplies and the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources. His full designation which can be found on an application, dated 26th September 1968, is Assistant Director (Arbitration) and Liaison Officer Litigation Matters DGIP & S, Karachi. (iii) Mr. S. A. Nizami, Deputy Solicitor; (iv) Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, the; Standing Counsel of the respondent at Karachi; and (v) The Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources at Islamabad through a Section Officer. In the meantime, the High Court addressed a letter to the Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources on 8th June 1968, inviting attention to notice issued on 15th May 1968 (the original notice), seeking information about the date on which it was received by the Ministry, and asking for the return of the original to the Court. The Ministry, by an office memorandum, dated 22nd June 1968, signed by Mr. K. Ansari, Section Officer, wrote to Mr. Habibur Rahman, to take necessary action in the matter and to forward the original notice, which had already been sent to the Department, to the High Court. Mr. Habibur Rahman was also asked to apprise the Ministry of the history of the case and furnish copies of the relevant documents. It appears from that memo. that the Ministry was already cognizant of the matter and had issued an office memorandum in that behalf on 29th May 1968. On 4th July 1968, Mr. Habibur Rahman addressed a D. O. (Annex. A‑5) to Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, in the following words:‑ "I shall be grateful if you kindly file objections on the award immediately. This issues with the telephonic confirmation of Law Division, Karachi." A copy of this D. O. was sent to Mr. Nizami. As stated earlier, the objections were, in fact, filed on 5th August 1968, in the High Court. The last letter (Annex. A‑6) in point is dated 12th August 1968 sent by Mr. Nizami to Mr. Muhammad Akram. The latter was reminded about the award and the objections thereto and was requested to send full report of the case along with relevant documents for bringing the matter to the notice of higher authorities, as the case involved heavy amount. He was further reminded that as "also instructed before" be was "to conduct the case" under the supervision of the standing Counsel to the Central Government, i.e., Mr. Shah Jamil Alam.

6. When the matter came up for the regular hearing of the objections on the award, the appellant examined Mr. Habibur Rahman as his witness who stated that Mr. Muhammad Akram was appointed by him in concurrence with the Ministry of Law to act on behalf of the Government and that he had the power to appoint a counsel to act on behalf of the Government. He produced a Gazette Notification, dated 20th January 1964, (Exh. 5). No more questions were put to the witness to any of the parties. The notification (Exh. 5) was issued by the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division), under rule 1 read with clause (al of rule 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. It amended an earlier notifica tion, dated 14th December 1955, so as to add the new entry, i.e. "Assistant Director (Arbitration) Mr. Habibur Rehman." The appellant raised a preliminary objection that Mr. Muhammad Akram was not a properly constituted and appointed agent. for the respondent and, therefore, could not act on its behalf so as to sign arid file the objections; and that, in any case, Mr. Muhammad Akram having failed to file any vakalatnama or any other letter of authority in writing with the objections, the same be held not to have been filed at ail. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Order III, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. with regard to the letters, referred to above, which were said to have constituted the appointment, in writing, of Mr. Muhammad Akram as an agent by the respondent, it was objected that they being demi‑official were not issued according to the official procedure contained in the Instructions issued under the Rules of Business of the Government of Pakistan. Our learned brother Feroze Nana Ghulamally, J., after hearing the appellant and the learned Attorney‑General, overruled the objection and held that Mr. Muhammad Akram was a duly constituted and appointed agent for the respondent and could act as such, on its behalf in the matter before the High Court. It was also held that the objections not having been accompanied by the vakalatnama or other letter of authority was only an irregularity and not an illegality.

7. Mr. Ghulam Yasin claiming to be the Managing Partner of the appellant‑firm and also its General Attorney, argued the case himself before us at length. He has repeated the objections raised before the learned single Judge and urged that. Mr. Muhammad Akram was not duly appointed by the respondent to act on their behalf and that the objections were not validly filed and, therefore, could not be heard on merits. He thought that the learned Judge did not pass any specific order so as to allow the application of the respondent, dated 26th September 1968, to sign the objections; therefore, he (the appellant) was not supposed to address any arguments in that behalf. We, however,. told him that he should argue that matter as well, because the learned Judge appears to have impliedly accepted the position of the respondent that it was due to an oversight that the objec tions could not be signed by the respondent and that it was only an irregularity and not an illegality. We also informed him that if a case is made out for allowing that application specifically, this will only be a formality and we may pass an order accordingly. The learned Attorney‑General also addressed us on the question of the filing of the objections by Mr. Habibur Rahman on behalf of the respondent and the application for signing the same. The appellant availed the opportunity of replying to the arguments of the Attorney‑General.

8. The grounds urged before us in support of the preliminary, objection are the same as were urged before the learned Single, Judge who considered them at length and discussed the Case‑law on the point. After hearing the appellant who, more or less, repeated the same arguments and cited the same Case‑law, we have come to the conclusion that the reasoning and the decision of the learned Single Judge on those points is unexceptionable. However, it is not out of place to deal with the points urged before us by the appellant.

9. The appellant had contended before the learned Judge that Order III, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. were applicable to the case; but changed his position before us and relied on the provisions of Order XXVII, rules 1, 2 and 8‑B, C. P. C., agreeing that the matter being one relating to proceedings by or against the Government, the latter provisions were more aptly attracted. For the interpretation of these provisions however, he thought that the cases decided on the interpretation of provisions contained in Order III, C. P. C. were relevant. According to him, the power given to Mr. Habibur Rahman, by notification (Exh. 5) under rule 1 read with clause (a) of rule 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. was only to sign the plaint or written statement on behalf of the Government and not to act on its behalf so as to appoint an Advocate. According to him, the only persons appointed by the Government to act on its behalf were the attorney‑General, Deputy Attorneys‑General at Dacca and Lahore and the standing counsel at Karachi. He referred to a notification issued by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, vide Gazette No. S. R. O. 573 (K)/63, dated 16th July 1963, issued under rules 1 and 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. It is stated in this notification that the persons mentioned therein were authorised generally to act for the Government in respect of judicial proceedings covered by the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant contended that the mention of rule 1 of Order XXVII, C. P. C. is a clerical mistake and that rule 2 of Order XXVII, should instead be read. In our view, there is no justification for considering the last‑mentioned notification as having been issued under rule 2 and not rule I of Order XXVII, when the notification itself states that it was issued under rule 1 read with rule 8‑B. At present it is not necessary to examine this aspect of the matter any further; because it is not the contention of the appellant that apart from the four persons mentioned in the above notification, there could be no other appointment by general or special order or by ex officio or otherwise authorisation, either under rule 1 or rule 2 of Order XXVII, C. P. C. The question here is whether or not Mr. Habibur Rahman was so authorised as to act on behalf of the respondent in appointing a counsel and whether or not the respondent appointed Mr. Muhammad Akram to act on its behalf.. The reading together of the six letters (Annex. A‑ I to A‑6) and the memo. dated 22nd June 1968, issued by the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources, leaves no doubt that Mr. Muhammad Akram was appointed by the respondent to act for it. It is clear from the contents of these letters, cross reference made therein and the endorsements made thereof to different persons that the appoint ment of Mr. Muhammad Akram to act for the respondent was made by Mr. Habibur Rahman, as a result of the consultations between the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs and the Department of Investment, Promotion and Supplies (Arbitration Section). There fore, this appointment cannot, in fact, be considered to be an appointment by Mr. Habibur Rahman alone but also an appointment by Ministry of Law and the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources. The appellant may have appreciated the effect of these letters; therefore, he strenuously contended that they were not issued according to the legal procedures and further that they were forgeries. The latter part of the contention need not be dealt at length because this was not raised before the learned Single Judge not any question in that regard was put to Mr. Habibur Rahman when he appeared, in the witness‑box. The same is, therefore, repelled. About he procedure for the issuance of the letters, the appellant referred us to the following paras of the Rules of Business of the Government of Pakistan and the Instructions issued under para. 4 sub‑para. (9) thereof:‑ Instruction No. 10 lays down that the business of the Govern ment shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Business and the Instructions. Instruction No. 5. provides for the extent of the delegation by the Secretary, by means of Standing Orders. It was contended that no Standing Order was issued by the Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources, delegating the power to Mr. Habibur Rahman to appoint an Advocate. Para. 4(6) of the Rules of Business lays down that the Secretary shall be the official head of the Division and responsible for its administration and discipline and for the proper conduct of business assigned to it under rule

3. Para. 12 (1) (e) & Rules of business provide for the consultation with the Law Division on the (f) of the questions of institution of criminal or civil proceedings. Instruction No. 40. provides for the consultation by the attached: Departments with the Ministry of Law through the Ministry concerned. The precise point in referring to the above two provisions was that the Ministry of Law could only be consulted by the other Ministries in matters of legal proceedings and that the Ministry of Law had no independent power to act in and deal with the legal proceedings and that, in any case, the D. O. letters were not the proper communications for dealing with the Law Ministry. Instructions Nos. 49 and 51. defining the "letter" and "demi‑official letter" so as to contend that A‑1 to A‑5 which were demi‑official letters could not be issued its view of the subject dealt therein.

10. We devoted a considerable time on this aspect of the matter; because the appellant who was himself arguing the case complained that the same was not properly dealt by the learned Single Judge before whom, it is alleged, the point was raised. We have noticed that the learned Single Judge has mentioned the fact that a reference was made by the appellant to the Rules of Business and the Instructions issued thereunder before him. But it appears that the learned Judge did not consider these references worth the importance, the appellant considers, they have. We have no reason to differ with the approach of the learned Judge on this issue. However, we proceed to give the reasons. They are: that the Rules of Business and the Instructions relied upon by the appellant are not of mandatory character. It is true that some of them are couched in a language which will give them an appearance of being mandatory. But there is no provision for any penal consequences to follow, for their non‑observance. In such a situation though it cannot, at all, be said that the Government functionaries, Departments and Ministries are not supposed to follow those Rules and Instructions, yet it will be too much to say that whenever there is a departure in respect thereof, the action of the Government should be considered as a nullity. The machinery, provided for running the business of the Govern ment, is vast and has by the passage of time, become complicated also. That, by itself, may not be a justification for departure from the correct rules of procedure; but in the day today dealings and handling complex and emergent matters, verbal consultations and orders and other similar methods of dealing with situations cannot be altogether ignored. A reasonable appreciation of the whole matter will result in the conclusion that, the non‑observance of the procedure laid down by the Rules and Instructions, if not provided by penal results provided they are faithfully, honestly and substantially followed, (even though not technically and strictly,) will not annul the actions and proceed ings of the Government. This conclusion is supported by Instruction No. 29 which reads as follows:‑ "Where simultaneous references have to be made to more than one Division, the file may be sent to the Division most concerned, other Divisions being consulted by means of self-contained office memoranda, unofficial notes, or demi‑official correspondence except in cases which can be disposed of by verbal consultation." This will show that the verbal consultation also, where possible and necessary, is accepted as means of communication. In the present case, we have already noted that the letters placed on the file show that there were telephonic communications, discussions, consultations and confirmation of decisions relating to the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram. We particularly refer to Annex. A‑5, wherein it is noted that the authorisation for the filing of the objections by Mr. Muhammad Akram was confirmed by the Ministry of Law on telephone. In this case the question of limitation was involved. The amount being about 7 crores and the objections, as we have noted, being very serious, the action of the Government functionaries in expediting the matter, we cannot hold, was in any way a substantial departure from the Rules of Business or the Instructions issued thereunder. The reading of the Rules and Instructions referred to by the appellant does not, in our view, justify the conclusion that the communications, which took place in this case, could not be done by means of the D. O. letters. Mr. Muhammad Akram conducted the case during the Arbitration proceedings. He knew about the importance of the matter and all concerned were stressing the need for personal attention. The definition of a "demi‑official letter" in Instruction No. 51 lays down only this much that the same will be issued when it is desired that the matter should receive personal attention of the individual addressee. It does not say that a decision as to the appointment, etc. cannot be conveyed by means of a demi‑official letter. However, in this case, it is the combined effect of the verbal communications, official memorandum, demi‑official letters and other letters which constituted the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram as an agent by the respondent. It is also pertinent to note that sub‑para. (6) of para. 4 of the Rules of Business which provides for the Secretary to be the official head of the Department, also provides for the conduct of business as mentioned in para.

3. Under para. 3, the business is allocated to different Ministries. Schedule 11 to the Rules of Business gives the distribution of business among the various Divisions. Para. 17 clause (i) of this Schedule reads as follows:‑ "

17. Law Divisions. ‑ (I) Advice to Divisions on all legal and constitutional questions arising out of any case and on the interpretation of any law; legal proceedings." The provisions referred to by the appellant relating to the consultation between the Ministry of Law no doubt provide for the consultation by various Ministries with the Ministry of Law on the subject of legal matters. But that cannot, in any way, dilute the effect of the distribution of business as provided in Schedule II. The above clause also provides for legal proceedings to be dealt by the Law Division. Mr. Ghulam Yasin, the appellant, contended that the phrase "legal proceedings" is to be connected with "advice" only and that no independent action can be taken by the Law Division in respect of legal proceedings. We do not agree with this limited interpretation. There is a semi‑colon between the phrase starting with the word "advice" and the phrase "legal proceedings". In our view, legal pro ceedings have been assigned to the Law Division, independently of the questions as to advice. This interpretation of the clause is supported by the fact that the present clause (1) of para. 17 of the Schedule II was substituted by an amendment, vide Cabinet Division No. 104/48/62‑Min, dated 26th August 1966, for the following clause:‑ "Advice to Divisions on legal questions arising out of any case and on the interpretation of any law." The substitution and in that the addition of "legal proceedings" appears to have been done with a purpose, namely, that the legal proceedings are also to be handled by the Law Division. In this case, while dealing with the various communications on the subject, we have already found it as a fact that the appoint ment of Mr. Muhammad Akram, was not by Mr. Habibur Rahman alone but was formally made by him with the concurrence of the Ministry of Law as well as the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources. Therefore, looked at from any angle, that appointment does not suffer from any infirmity. It may be noted hero that the observations by us in respect of the Rules and Instructions have been made with reference to the particular provisions thereof, referred to in this case, and are, by no means, available for any general application.

11. The question whether or not the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram by the respondent to act in the matter in the High Court falls under Order XXVII, C. P. C. does not present any difficulty. Rule 1 of Order XXVII provides that the Government can, by general or special order, appoint any person to sign the pleadings. Rule 2 of the said order provides that persons who are ex officio or otherwise authorised to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding, shall be deemed to be recognised agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under the Code may be made or done on behalf of the Government. Clause (a) of rule 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. provides that the Government Pleader means the pleader whom the Government may appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purpose of this Order. The combined reading of these provisions leaves no doubt that the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram, which is constituted and is proved to be complete by the various communications referred to above, was lawful and with competence and falls under Order XXVII of the Civil Procedure Code. It is particularly pointed out that rule 2 provides for not only an ex officio appointment but also an. authorisation otherwise to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding. When such an authorisation is made (as is proved to have been done in this case), the person so authorised becomes a recognised agent for the purpose of appearances, acts and applications under the Civil Procedure Code. This view o c the meaning of rule 2 is further supported by the words "Govern ment may appoint, whether generally or specially, for the purpose of this Order" used in clause (a) of rule 8‑B of Order XXVII, C. P. C. which show that the Government can make a general or special appointment for the purpose of Order XXVII, C. P. C., and the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram in this case would certainly also fall under this provision. In reaching the above conclusions, we have been conscious of the fact that the Government has throughout contended that Mr. Muhammad Akram was properly appointed person to act in this case. The general presumption that, all official acts must to presumed to have been done according to procedure, must be Q raised in this case; and in that view also the appointment or Mr. Muhammad Akram cannot be viewed but as legal. This view is supported by an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court cited before us by the appellant himself in another connection, i.e. Thal Development Authority v. Mr. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi (Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1965), wherein it was observed as follows:‑ "During the hearing of the appeal it was ascertained by us that the Authority had by a letter written on the 11th January 1961 instructed Sh. Shaukat‑Ali to appear in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, and file objections to the award on its behalf. The letter in our view constituted a proper document in writing "signed by an agent of the Authority appointing Sh. Shaukat Ali a pleader to act on its behalf in the matter of filing objections to the award. No other formal document was necessary to comply with the requirements of Order III, rule 4, C. P. C the letter dated the 11th January 1961 which from the office of "the Chairman was signed by the administrative officer and it would be reasonable to presume that the said officer was competent to act and sign on behalf of the Chairman as a delegate under section 19 of the Act."

12. The contention of the appellant that the failure to file a Vakalatnama by Mr. Muhammad Akram at the time of and along with the filing of the objections is fatal, has no force. According to him, even in relation to persons authorised to act on behalf of Government under Order XXVII, C. P. C., the requirement of filing a Vakalatnama under Order III, rule 4, C. P. C. is mandatory. Proceeding on this assumption, he has cited Thal Development Authority v. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi (P L D 1962 Lah. 830) in support of his contention. That judgment proceeded on the assumption that the provisions of Order III, C. P. C. were applicable to the particular case which was being dealt by the learned Judge. The learned Single Judge in the instant case has considered the effect of the above cited case. And we have no reason to differ with him on this question. The cited judgment, however, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Thal Development Authority v. Mr. Nisar Ahmad Qureshi (Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1965), the effect of which has also been noted by the learned Single Judge and we need not repeat it. However, we may add that if the provisions of Order III and Order XXVII, C. P. C. are compared and read together, the contention that the provisions of rule 4 of Order III, C. P. C. are to be read in Order XXVII loses all force. Order XXVII is to be considered as a special E provision dealing with suits by or against the Government or Public Officers in their official capacity, while Order III is a general provision relating to recognised agents and pleaders. In Order XXVII, a departure has been made from the provisions of Order III in various respects. A parallel provision to rule 4 of Order III, C. P. C. is found in only rule 8 of Order XXVII, C. P. C. The latter rule provides that when the Government undertakes the defence of a suit against a public officer the Government pleader, upon being furnished with authority to appear and answer the plaint, shall apply to the Court, and upon such application the Court shall cause a note of his authority to be entered in the register. 1n this rule which applies to suits against public officers only, the need is stressed only of the making of a note by the Court, of the authority of the pleader to act on behalf of the public officer. There is no mention of the placing of the letter of authority on the file of the Court. In respect of the other suits, i.e. those by or against the Government, there is no binding requirement of the Court noting the authority or the pleader's placing the letter of authority on the file. Had it been intended by the framers of the Rules to snake it mandatory that the Government pleaders should also file the Vakalatnama or other letters of authority, such a provision could have been made in Order XXVIL Absence of this provision in this behalf is very significant. There is another aspect of the matter para. 51 of the Sind Chief Court Rules deals with the procedure of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, on the original side, in so far as the filing of the Vakalatnama is concerned. It provides that the Advocate‑General, the Government Pleader or any other Advocate appearing on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Central Government, Crown Representative, or the Provincial Govern ment shall not be required to file a Vakalatnama. The instant case which was registered as suit on the original side of the High Court is covered by that rule, of course read with the provisions of Order XXVII, rule 2, C. P. C., as explained above; therefore, Mr. Muhammad Akram need not have filed his Vakalatnama. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Even if the filing of the Vakalatnama was necessary, the failure to do so in this case is an irregularity and not an illegality. It has not prejudiced any body. This question has been discussed by the learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, at length and Case‑law has been cited in support of the above proposition. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the learned Judge. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram as an authorised agent of the respondent to act on its behalf in these proceedings was valid; and that he having been appointed under Order XXVII, C. P. C., there was no need for him to have filed the authorisation in writing in Court along with the objections. The learned Single Judge has also taken note of the following circumstances which, in our view, are not entirely irrelevant in the matter; but in view of our findings about the appointment and filing of Vakalatnama, those matters do not require to be dealt in detail‑‑ (i) that Mr. Muhammad Akram was on the panel of Govern ment Advocates and advisers to the Government; (ii) that Mr. Muhammad Akram conducted the Arbitration proceedings before the "Umpire on behalf of the respondent which, we note, was not objected to by the appellant either before the Umpire or in the High Court; (iii) that from all the circumstances of the case, a clear intention can be gathered that Mr. Muhammad Akram was ap pointed by the respondent to act on its behalf; and there being no objection on behalf of the principal (respondent) in respect of the authority of the Advocate appearing for it, the proceedings cannot be annulled on the objections of a third party who has not, in any way, been prejudiced and lastly ; (iv) that, in any case, the principle of ratification (by the principal) of acts done by the agent will apply to this case. Some Case‑law was cited before us by both the parties on the question whether or not ratification can take place in a matter like the present one, after the period of limitation. All India Reporters Ltd., Bombay and another v. Ramchandra Dhondo Datar A I R 1961 Bom. 292 and Malik Sajawal Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another P L D 1968 Lah. 527, cited by the learned Attorney‑General do support him. The appellant also cited Utlaram Vithaldas v. Thakur Das Parshottamdas A I R 1922 Bom. 113, Hirabai Gendalal v. Bhagirath Ramchandra and Co. A I R 1946 Born. 174 and P. L. K. Palaneappa Chetty v. R. M. A. R. Arunachellam Chetty A I R 1914 L B

191. Some of the observations in these cases go against the contention raised by the appellant. But in view of our above finding on the basic questions of appointment of Mr. Muhammad Akram and the filing of the Vakalatnama, we do not feel inclined to examine this question in detail.

13. There is another important aspect of this case and that is whether the objections were filed in the Court by Mr. Habibur Rahman; if so whether he was authorised to sign on behalf of the respondent; and whether in the circumstances explained in the application, dated 26th September 1968, under Order VI, rule 14 read with section 161, C. P. C., the. omission to sign the objections can be condoned by now allowing the objections to be signed. The detailed facts about the filing of the objections have been stated earlier in this judgment. The position that emerged is that on the day that the objections were filed, Mr. Habibur Rahman was in Karachi. This is borne out from the affidavit that he swore in support of the objections on the same day at Karachi. If he was present in Karachi and was available for filing the affidavit along with the objections, there is every likelihood that he would be present when the objections were filed. However, no conclusion can be based on this likelihood alone, unless there is some supporting evidence. Mr. Habibur Rahman, in his affidavit filed on 26th September 1968, categori cally stated that he filed the objections. This averment has been controverted by the appellant in his counter‑affidavit, dated 14th October 1968. But he does not base the denial on his personal knowledge. What he stated was that it was not possible, due to two circumstances mentioned in that counter‑affidavit, for Mr. Habibur Rahman to have filed the objections. We in para graph 5 of this judgment, have already repelled the contention based on those two circumstances. Therefore, on the one hand there is affidavit of Mr. Habibur Rahman asserting a fact based on his own knowledge and conduct, and on the other hand the denial by the appellant not based on his own knowledge but on inference which we have not accepted. In this view of the matter, there is nothing to prevent us from accepting the statement of Mr. Habibur Rahman, as correct. In addition to this, there is another circumstance which shows that the assertion made by Mr. Habibur Rahman is correct. The appellant examined Mr. Habibur Rahman as his own witness at the time when Mr. Habibur Rahman had already submitted his affidavit asserting the fact in dispute. The appellant did not put any question to Mr. Habibur Rahman in respect of the fact that he filed the objections in Court. When the appellant had the opportunity to disprove the assertion made by Mr. Habibur Rahman by examining him and, if neces sary, by cross‑examining him. He failed to avail of that opportunity, the presumption goes against him; that if he would have made an attempt in that direction he would have failed. Therefore, we hold that at the time that the objections were filed, Mr. Habibur Rahman was present; and the fact that the objections were signed by Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, does not necessarily mean that they were filed by him alone and that Mr. Habibur Rahman was not with him. We have already indicated that the file does not contain any note or order having been passed on the day (5th August) that the objections were filed, showing as to who in fact filed them (physically). The note of the Additional Registrar (on 9th August) in that behalf, is only inferential, based on the signatures of Mr. Muhammad Akram.

14. In view of the above finding the next question that falls for determination is whether or not Mr. Habibur Rahman could file the objections. The learned Attorney‑General stated at bar that Mr. Habibur Rahman held the rank of a Section Officer and that Mr. Nizami, the Deputy Solicitor, who has been mentioned above in connection with the correspondence, held the rank of a Deputy Secretary, under rule 6 of Rules of business, both ranks are qualified to authenticate Orders etc. of the respon dents. Admittedly, Mr. Habibur Rahman was acting on behalf of the respondent in the matter before the Umpire and the notice, sent to the respondent, of award under section 14 (1) of the Arbitration Act, by the Umpire was addressed to him. Mr. Habibur Rahman was holding the pest of Assistant Director (Arbitration) and Liaison Officer Litigation Matters, D. G. I. P. & S., Karachi. The communication between the Ministry of Law; the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resour ces; Arbitration Wing of the Department of Investment, Promotion and Supplies; and Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, show that in addition to Mr. Muhammad Akram Advocate, Mr. Habibur Rahman also throughout acted on behalf of the respon dent in the capacity of an authorised agent, as envisaged by Order XXVII, rules 2 and 8‑B, C. P. C. The Memorandum dated 22nd June 1968, of the Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources which is addressed to Mr. Habibur Rahman, clearly authorises him to take necessary action in the matter relat ing to the proceedings (Suit No. 118 of 1968) in this Court in respect of the filing of the award. This, in our view, constitutes a specific authority, if at all there was any need for such an authority in presence of the other communications showing the conduct of the respondent throughout in accepting Mr. Habibur Rahman as its authorised agent in the matter. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Habibur Rahman had the authority to act on behalf of the respondent in the proceedings in respect of the award in this Court.

15. The same subject, if viewed from another angle, pro duces the same effect. Admittedly, by notification, dated 20th January 1964 (Exh. 5), Mr. Habibur Rahman was authorised to sign the plaint and written statement and verify the same on behalf of the respondent in terms of rule 1 of Order XXVII, C. P. C. The notification, apart from rule 1, also mentions rule 8‑B or Order XXVII, C. P. C. meaning thereby that the appointment thereunder, of Mr. Habibur Rahman, by the Government was also under rule 8‑B. In other words, Mr. Habibur Rahman was appointed by the Government as its agent for the purpose of Order XXVII, C. P. C. Thus it would appear that the authority to sign the plaint or written statement in this case would also include the authority to act as an agent for the purpose of rule 2 of Order XXVII, C. P. C., so as to put in appearance, do other acts and file applications on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, Mr. Habibur Rahman had this additional source of authority to act on behalf of the respondent.

16. The fact that Mr. Habibur Rahman had the authority to sign plaint and written statement on behalf of the respon dent has been admitted by the appellant; but according to him the objections filed in the High Court were not in the nature of plaint or written statement, therefore this circumstance was not, in any way, relevant to the present case. We do not agree with him. The learned Attorney‑General brought to our notice the provisions contained in sections 33 and 41 of the Arbitration Act. The former section provides for a possible challenge to the award, by means of an application by the affected party. The latter section provides that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all the proceedings before the Court under that Act. In this connection the provisions contained in section 141, C. P. C. can also as referred with advantage. It provides that the procedure contained in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction. In order to give full effort to section 41 of the Arbitration Act read with section 33 thereof and section 141, C. P. C. it will have to be held that the application mentioned in section 33 would, mutatis mutandis; have to be treated either a plaint or a written statement; while applying the Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings relating to arbit ration in the Court. Same effect is deduced by reading rules 282; 284 and 287 of the Rules of Chief Court of Sind (original side). Rule 282 (3) provides for registration of petition qua award as a suit. Rule 284, inter alia, provides that an application of objection to an award shall be made by a verified petition. Rule 287 provides for the detailed procedure for filing the applications under the Arbitration Act. This rule read with rule 278 shows that such applications are to be treated as suits by the Court. We have already noticed that the application is to be made by a verified petition. Rules 40 to 43 provide for the general practice and proce dure, in so far as the form of the proceedings to be filed in the High Court (original side) is concerned. The form and procedure for plaints and written statements and other miscellane ous applications is not materially different from the procedure for filing petitions under rule 284 in respect of awards. It is the effect of all these rules that the objections are numbered and treated as a suit on the original side of the High Court. Therefore, the authority to plaints and written statements given to Mr. Habibur Rahman by notification (Exh. 5) will, in the circumstances of the present case and in the light of the above discussed legal provisions, include the authority to sign the objections in dispute in this case which were filed under sec tions 15, 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. We have already held that in view of the provisions contained in Order XXVII, C. P. C. read with notification (Exh. 5), this authority also included the authority to act on behalf of the respondent and, in any cause, the authority to file the objections in Court.

17. The only question that remains to be resolved in this behalf is whether or not the respondent, of course through Mr. Habibur Rahman, can now be allowed to sign the objections. The answer to this question is not entirely dependent on any provision of law but is dependent upon the effect of the circum stances of this case. Admittedly, Mr. Habibur Rahman signed and swore to the affidavit which was filed in support of and along with the objections on the same day. That affidavit, read with the contents of the objection petitions, by itself, can be treated to be an objection petition. However, it can, at least, be treated as a verification of the contents of the objection petition. This use of the affidavit has been admitted by the appellant in his various affidavits filed against the objections, wherein he des cribed this affidavit as verification. If the objection are treated at par with a plaint or written statement and affidavit as the verification thereof, then the position that emerges is that Mr. Habibur Rahman, though having signed the verification, failed to sign the pleading itself. 1n normal circumstances, such failure to sign the pleading cannot be considered to be intentional. In this case also, there is no reason to suppose that it was intentional. Mr. Habibur Rahman, in his affidavit filed with application, dated 26th September 1968, has categorically asserted that it was due to oversight that he failed to sign the objections. If he could sign and swore to the affidavit attached with the objections, we see no reason as to why he could not sign the objections; except the reason of oversight. At least, no other reason has been suggested by the appellant in this behalf. Moreover, the appellant has not put any question to Mr. Habibur Rahman, when he was in the witness‑box, to challenge the position that it was only through oversight that the latter failed to sign the objections. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Habibur Rahman did sign and swore to the affidavit which, in the circumstances, will have to be treated as verifica tion; but due to oversight failed to sign the memo of objections itself. There is ample authority in support of the proposition that unintentional failure to sign the pleadings can be rectified) by permitting the person concerned to sign subsequently; ands' this rule of practice and justice is equally applicable to the stage of an appeal. There is mass of Case‑law in support of this proposition. However, it will suffice to refer to only one recent ruling of this Court which has already been referred in another connection, and that is Malik Sajawal Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another (P L D 1969 Lah. 527). After con sidering and discussing the Case‑law on the point, their Lordships were pleased to hold at page 532 of the report, as follows:‑ "

4. Even in the case of Order VI, rules 14 and 15, C. P. C. there is ample authority for the view that signing and verifi cation of plaints are mere matters of procedure, and even if a plaint is not properly signed and verified, but it is admitted and entered in the register of suits, it does not cease to be plaint, and the suit cannot be said not to have been instituted, because of the defect or irregularity in the matter of signing and verification of the plaint. In this connection All India Reporter, Bombay v. Ramchandra, Dhonda Dater, Ganpati Nana Poivar and another v. Jiwanabai Kom Subanna, Bandi Portland Cement Ltd. v. Abdul Hussain Eassaji and Nanjibhai Jethabhai v. Popatlal Shriraj and others, may be referred. In Shib Deo Misra and others v. Ram Prasad and others, it was held that a plaint is not void merely because it does not contain the verification clause as required by the Code of Civil Procedure. The omission to verify it is a mere irregularity, which could be cured even at a later stage. Merely on the ground of such a defect the plaint cannot be treated as altogether invalid. In Secretary of State for India v. Dinshaw Navroji and another, it was also stated that the provisions of Order VI, rule 11, C. P. C. relate to a mere matter of procedure and any mistake or omission therein may be amended at any time subsequent to the institution of the suit. In Mohiuddin and others v. Pirthi Chand Lal Chaudhry, it was held that even an appellate Court should not dismiss a suit on the ground that the plaint was not duly signed and verified for such a defect does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. As a general proposition it was stated in it, that though no hard and fast line could be drawn between a nullity and irregularity, a non‑compliance with every requirement of a statute does not universally make the proceedings a nullity, and when the provisions of a statute have been contravened, if a question arises as to how far the proceedings are affected thereby, it must be determined with regard to the nature, scope and object of the particular provision violated. In Rajabali v. Messrs Gujrat Bus Service, Karachi, a Division Bench of this Court held on a consideration of Order VI, rule 14, C. P. C. that the omission of plaintiff No. 1 to sign the plaint was of a minor nature and the objection being of a minor technical nature, which had no bearing on the merits of the case, the Curt could even at the appellate stage get the plaint signed from plaintiff No.

1. The objection was overruled." (1) A I R 1961 Bom. 292, (2) A I R 1923 Bom. 44 (1), (3) A I R 1936 Bom. 418, (4) A I R 1932 Born. 367, (5) A I R 1925 All. 79, (6) A I R 1925 Sind 275, (7) P L D 195 t Kar.

486. We are in respectful agreement with the observations of the Division Bench and adopt the same for application to the present care which we find, is fully awarded by them.

18. Mr. Ghulam Yasin vehemently argued that we, dealing with letters patent appeal, could not allow Mr. Habibur Rahman to sign the objections at this stage when the learned Single Judge did not specifically allow him to do so. In other words, his objection amounted to that the learned single Judge not having specifically allowed the respondent to sign the objections, the appellant has not challenged such an assumed order. As already mentioned we, in the very beginning of the arguments which extended over two days in this case, pointed out to Mr. Ghulam Yasin that if a case was ultimately made out for granting such a permission, the power exercisable by the learned Single Judge could be exercised by the Letters Patent Bench; therefore he may urge any points and grounds against this request on behalf of the respondent. After that he, in fact, addressed arguments in this behalf and also repeated some of them in reply to the argu ments of the learned. Attorney‑General. Therefore, we do not find any technical difficulty in passing a proper order in this behalf. The learned Single Judge was considering the prelimi nary objection of the present appellant on the one hand and the application made under Order VI, rule 14 read with section 151, C. P. C. dated 26th September 1968, for signing the objections by the respondent on the other. The pith and substance of the order is that the learned Single Judge accepted the position of the respondent as correct and overruled the preliminary objection. Though he did not specifically grant the application referred to above, yet for all practical purposes the effect of the order in drat this application was not rejected. Under section 107, C. P. C., subject to such conditions and limitations; as may be prescribed, an appellate Court has the same powers and shall perform, as nearly as may be duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on the Courts on tire original side in respect of suits instituted therein. That provision applies with full force to the present circumstances of the case, and applying the same we allow Mr. Habibur Rahman to sign the objections on behalf of the respondent. This permission has been granted on the assumption that it was due to an oversight that Mr. Habibur Rahman could not sign the objections; and also that it is an irregularity not amounting to illegality. It is further clarified that even without the signatures on the objections, the same in this case cannot be held to be invalid or invalidly filed; firstly, because of our findings that Mr. Muhammad Akram, Advocate, had the authority to sign the objections and act on behalf of the respondent, so as to file the same in Court and there was no need to file the letter of authority in Court with the objections, and, secondly, because of our finding that the signing of the affidavit attached with the objection petition by Mr. Habibur Rahman who, in our view, was also authorised to sign the pleadings and act on behalf of the respondent, was sufficient because the affidavit itself, by reference, could be treated as the petition of objections. It is only to complete a procedural technicality that we thought it necessary to examine the question whether or not Mr. Habibur Rahman could now be permitted to sign the objections. It was for that reason and for the reason of supplying an inadvertent omission in the completion or record (the objections) that we have permitted the respondent to sign the objections at this stage. It is emphasized that even, in absence of the signatures permitted by us, according to our finding, the objections have been competently and validly filed, and require to be disposed of on merits.

19. In view of the above discussion and with the above order as to permission to the respondent to sign the objections, we dismiss this appeal with costs. A. E./K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.