2013 PLP 66 (SCMR)

DIPAK MISRA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on Glory of Life, pronounced with conviction and humility, "the reverence of life offers me my fundamental principle on morality". The aforesaid expression may appear to be an individualistic expression of a great personality, but, when it is understood in the complete sense, it really denotes, in its conceptual essentiality, and connotes, in its macrocosm, the fundamental perception of a thinker about the respect that life commands. The reverence of life is insegragably associated with the dignity of a human being who is basically divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained. The sustenance of such dignity has to be the superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of dig nity can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that matter, 'a brief candle', or 'a hollow bubble'. The spark of life gets more resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an honourable life which is a splendid gift of "creative intelligence". When a dent is cre ated in the reputation, humanism is paraly sed. There are some megalomaniac offic ers who conceive the perverse notion that they are the 'Law' forgetting that law is the science of what is good and just and, in very nature of things, protective of a civi lized society. Reverence for the nobility of a human being has to be the corner stone of a body polity that believes in orderly progress. But, some, the incurable ones, become totally oblivious of the fact that living with dignity has been enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy and it has its ubiquitous presence, and the majesty and sacrosanctity of dignity cannot be allowed to be crucified in the name of some kind of police action.

3. The aforesaid prologue gains signifi cation since in the case at hand, a doctor, humiliated in custody, sought public law remedy for grant of compensation and the High Court, despite no factual dispute, has required him to submit a representation to the State Government for adequate relief pertaining to grant of compensation after expiry of 19 years with a further stipula tion that if he is aggrieved by it, he can take recourse to requisite proceedings available to him under law. We are pained to say that this is not only asking a man to prefer an appeal from Caesar to Caesar's wife but it also compels him like a cursed Sisyphus to carry the stone to the top of the mountain wherefrom the stone rolls down and he is obliged to repeatedly per form that futile exercise.

4. The factual matrix as uncurtained is that the appellant, an Ayurvedic Doctor with B.A.M.S. degree, while practising in West Chirmiri Colliery, Pondi area in the State of Chhattisgarh, used to raise agita tions and spread awareness against exploi tation of people belonging to weaker and marginalized sections of the society. As a social activist, he ushered in immense awareness among the down-trodden people which caused discomfort to the people who had vested interest in the coal mine area. The powerful coal malaria, trade union lead ers, police officers and other persons who had fiscal interest felt disturbed and threat ened him with dire consequences and pres surized him to refrain from such activities. Embedded to his committed stance, the petitioner declined to succumb to such pres sure and continued the activities. When the endeavor failed to silence and stifle the agi tation that was gaining strength and mo mentum, a consorted maladroit effort was made to rope him in certain criminal of fences.

5. As the factual narration further un folds, in the initial stage, cases under sec tions 110/116 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated and thereafter Crime No.15 of 1992 under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the I.P.C.') and Crime No.41 of 1992 under sections 427 and 379 of the I.P.C. were registered. As the activities gathered further drive and became more pronounced, Crime No.62 of 1990 was regis tered for an offence punishable under sec tion 379 of the I.P.C. for alleged theft of elec tricity. In the said case, the appellant was taken into custody.

6. Though he was produced before the Magistrate on 22-9-1992 for, judicial re mand and was required to be taken to Baikunthpur Jail, yet by the time the order was passed, as it was evening, he was kept in the lockup at Manendragarh Police Sta tion. On 24-9-1992, he was required to be taken to jail but instead of being taken to the jail, he was taken to Pondi Police Station at 9-00 a.m. At the police station, he was abused and assaulted. As asseverated, the physical assault was the beginning of ill-treatment. Thereafter, the SHO and ASI, the respondents Nos.4 and 5, took his pho tograph compelling him to hold a placard on which it was written:-- "Main Dr. M.N. Azam Chhal Kapti Evam Chor Badmash Hoon". (I. Dr. M. N. Azam, am a cheat, fraud, thief and rascal).

7. Subsequently, the said photograph was circulated in general public and even in the revenue proceeding, the respondent No.7 produced the same. The said atroci ties and the torture of the police caused tre mendous mental agony and humiliation and, hence, the petitioner submitted a com plaint to the National Human Rights Commission who, in turn, asked the Superintendant of Police, District Koria to submit a report. As there was no response from the 2nd respondent the Commission again required him to look into the grievances and take proper action. When no ac tion was taken by the respondent or the police, the petitioner was compelled to in voke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh with a prayer for punishing the respondents Nos.4, 5 and 7 on the foun dation that their action was a complete transgression of human rights which af fected his fundamental right especially his right to live with dignity as enshrined un der Article 21 of the Constitution. In the Writ Petition, prayer was made for award ing compensation to the tune of Rs.10 lakhs.

8. After the return was filed, the learned single Judge passed a detailed order on 3-1-2003 that the Chief Secretary and the Director-General of Police should take ap propriate steps for issue of direction to the concerned authorities to take appropriate action in respect of the erring officers. Thereafter, some developments took place and on 24-3-2005, the Court recorded that the writ petitioner was arrested on 22-9-1992 and his photograph was taken at the police station. The learned single Judge referred to Rule 1 of Regulation 92 of Chhattisgarh Police Regulations which lays down that no Magistrate shall order photo graph of a convict or other person to be taken by the police for the purpose of Iden tification under Prisoners Act, 1920, un less he is satisfied that such photograph is required for circulation to different places or for showing it for the purpose of identi fication to a witness who cannot easily be brought to a test identification at the place where the investigation is conducted or that photograph is required to be preserved as a permanent record. Thereafter, the learned single Judge proceeded to record that not only the photograph of the writ petitioner had been taken with the placard but had also been circulated which had caused great mental agony and trauma to his school go ing children. Thereafter, he referred to Regulation 737 of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations which relates to action to be taken by the superior officer in respect of an erring officer who ill-treats an accused.

9. After referring to various provisions, the learned single Judge called for a report from the Chief Secretary. On 18-11-2005, the Court was apprised that despite several communications, the Chief Secretary had not yet sent the report. Eventually, the re port was filed stating that the appellant was involved in certain cases including grant of bogus medical certificate and regard being had to the directions issued in 1992 that the photograph of the offender should be kept on record, the same was taken and affixed against his name and after 7-9-1992, it was removed from the records. It was also stated that the Sub-Inspector had been imposed punishment of "censure" by the Superintendent of Police on 19-11-2001. It was also set forth that on 3-5-2003, a charge-sheet was served on all the erring officers and a departmental enquiry was held and in the ultimate eventuate, they had been imposed major penalty of withhold ing of one annual increment with cumula tive effect for one year commencing 27-5-2004. That apart, on 19-7-2005, a case had been registered under section 29 of the Police Act against the erring officers.

10. It is apt to note here that when the matter was listed for final hearing for grant of compensation, the learned single Judge referred the matter to be heard by a Divi sion Bench.

11. The Division Bench referred to the prayer clause and various orders passed by the learned single Judge and eventually directed the appellant to submit a represen tation to the Chief Secretary for grant of compensation. We think it appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the order passed by the Division Bench:-- "(4) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the pendency of the writ petition, Relief Clause No.7.3 was fulfilled under the directions of this court and now only the compensation part, as claimed in Relief Clause No.7.5A, remained there. (5) In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the respondent State authori ties have taken cognizance of the harass ment meted out to the petitioner by the err ing personnel of the police department and initiated departmental enquiry against them in which they were found guilty and pun ishment has also been awarded to them."

12. After issuing notice, this Court, on 17-2-2012, thought it apposite that the ap pellant should submit a representation within a week which shall be considered by the respondents within four weeks therefrom.

13. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the appellant submitted a representation which has been rejected on 19-3-2012 by the OSD/Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh, Home (Police) Department. In the rejection order, it has been stated as follows:-- "In the aforesaid cases, the arrest and the action regarding submission of charge- sheet in the Hon'ble Court was in accordance with law. (2) On 24-9-92 the police officers taking your photograph and writing objection able words thereon was against the legal procedure. Considering this, action was taken against the concerned guilty police officers in accordance with law and two police officers were punished. (3) In your representation, compensation has been demanded on the following two grounds: A. Defamation was caused due to the police officers taking photograph. B. Your wife became unwell mentally. She is still unwell. C. Difficulty in marriage of daughter. Regarding the aforesaid grounds, the actual position is as follows:-- A. Defamation is such a subject, the de cision on which is within jurisdiction of the competent court. No decision pertain ing to defamation has been received from the court of competent jurisdiction. There fore, it would not be proper for the State Government to take a decision in this re gard. B. Regarding mental ailment of your wife, no such basis has been submitted by you, on the basis of which any conclusion may be drawn. C. On the point of there being no mar riage of children also no such document or evidence has been produced by you before the Government along with the represen tation, on the basis of which any decision may be taken. Therefore, in the light of the above, the State Government hereby rejects your rep resentation and accordingly decides your representation."

14. Mr. Niraj Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that when the conclusion has been arrived at that the appellant was harassed at the hands of the police officers and in the departmen tal enquiry they have been found guilty and punished, just compensation should have been awarded by the High Court. It is fur ther urged by him that this Court had directed to submit a representation to grant an opportunity to the functionaries of the State to have a proper perceptual shift and determine the amount of compensation and grant the same, but the attitude of indiffer ence reigned supreme and no fruitful re sult ensued. It is canvassed by him that it would not only reflect the non-concern for a citizen who has been humiliated at the police station, but, the manner in which the representation has been rejected clearly exhibits the imprudent perception and heart of stone of the State. It is argued that the reasons ascribed by the State authority that defamation is such a subject that the issue of compensation has to be decided by the competent court and in the absence of such a decision, the Government cannot take a decision as regards the compensation clearly reflects the deliberate insensitive approach to the entire fact situation inas much as the High Court, in categorical terms, had found that the allegations were true and the appellant was harassed and thereby it did tantamount to custodial tor ture and there was no justification to adopt a hypertechnical mode to treat it as a case of defamation in the ordinary sense of the term and requiring the appellant to take recourse to further adjudicatory process and obtain a decree from the civil court.

15. Mr. Atul Jha, learned counsel appear ing for the State, has supported the order of the High Court as well as the order passed by the competent authority of the State who has rejected the representation on the foundation that when the appellant puts forth a claim for compensation on the ground of defamation, he has to take re course to the civil court and, therefore, no fault can be found with the decision taken either by the High Court or the subsequent rejection of the representation by the au thority of the State.

16. The learned counsel appearing for the private respondents has submitted that they have already been punished in a dis ciplinary proceeding and, therefore, the question of grant of compensation does not arise and even if it emerges, the same has to be determined by the civil court on the base of evidence adduced to establish defa mation.

17. At the very outset, we are obliged to state that five aspects are clear as day and do not remotely admit of any doubt. First, the appellant was arrested in respect of the alleged offence under Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Electricity Act, 2003; second, there was a direction by the Magistrate for judicial remand and thereafter instead of taking him to jail the next day he was brought to the police station; third, self- humiliating words were written on the plac ard and he was asked to hold it and photo graphs were taken; and fourth, the photo graphs were circulated in general public and were also filed by one of the respon dents in a revenue proceeding; and five, the High Court, in categorical terms, has found that the appellant was harassed.

18. In the aforesaid backdrop, the sin gular question required to be posed is that whether the appellant should be asked to initiate a civil action for grant of damages on the foundation that he has been defamed or this Court should grant compensation on the bedrock that he has been harassed in police custody.

19. At this juncture, it is condign to re fer to certain authorities in the field. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (AIR 1997 SC 610 : (1997) 1 SCC 416) it has been held thus:-- "(10) "Torture" has not been defined in the Constitution or in other penal laws. "Torture" of a human being by another human being is essentially an instrument to impose the will of the "strong" over the "weak" by suffering. The word torture to day has become synonymous with the darker side of human civilization. "Torture is a wound in the soul so pain ful that sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so intangible that there is no way to heal it. Torture is anguish squeez ing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a stone, paralyzing as sleep and dark as the abyss. Torture is despair and fear and rage and hate. It is a desire to kill and destroy including yourself." Adriana P. Bartow (11) No violation of any one of the hu man rights has been the subject of so many Conventions and Declarations as "torture" - all aiming at total banning of it in all forms, but in spite of the commitments made to eliminate torture, the fact remains that torture is more widespread now than ever before. "Custodial torture" is a naked violation of human dignity and degrada tion which destroys, to a very large extent, the individual personality. It is a calculated assault on human dignity and whenever human dignity is wounded, civilization takes a step backward - flag of humanity must on each such occasion fly halfmast. (20) In all custodial crimes what is of real concern is not only infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person undergoes within the four walls of police sta tion or lock-up. Whether it is physical as sault or rape in police custody, the extent of trauma, a person experiences is beyond the purview of law."

20. We have referred to the aforesaid paragraphs to highlight that this Court has emphasized on the concept of mental agony when a person is confined within the four walls of police station or lock-up. Mental agony stands in contradistinction to inflic tion of physical pain. In the said case, the two-Judge Bench referred to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which provides that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". Thereafter, the Bench adverted to Article 21 and proceeded to state that the expres sion "life or personal liberty" has been held to include the right to live with human dig nity and thus, it would also include within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its functionaries. Reference was made to Article 20(3) of the Constitution which postulates that a person accused of an offence shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself.

21. It is worthy to note that in the case of D.K. Basu, (AIR 1997 SC 610) (supra), the concern shown by this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) 4 SCC 260 : (AIR 1994 SC 1349) was taken note of. In Joginder Kumar's case, this Court voiced its concern regarding complaints of viola tion of human rights during and after ar rest. It is apt to quote a passage from the same:-- "The horizon of human rights is expand ing. At the same time, the crime rate is also increasing. Of late, this Court has been receiving complaints about violations of hu man rights because of indiscriminate ar rests. How are we to strike a balance be tween the two? A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collec tively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the em phasis; of deciding which comes first - the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider..."

22. After referring to the case of Joginder Kumar, (AIR 1994 SC 1349) (supra), A.S. Anand, J. (as his Lordship then was), deal ing with the various facets of Article 21, stated that any form of torture or cruel, in human or degrading treatment would fall within the ambit of Article 21 of the Con stitution, whether it occurs during investi gation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to happen, for a citizen does not shed off his fundamental right to life, the mo ment a policeman arrests him. The right to life of a citizen cannot be put in abeyance on his arrest. The precious right guaran teed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law by placing such reason able restrictions as are permitted by law.

23. At this juncture, it becomes abso lutely necessary to appreciate what is meant by the term "harassment". In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Second Edition, the term "harass" has been defined, thus:-- "Harass. "injure" and "injury" are words having numerous and comprehensive popu lar meanings, as well as having a legal import. A line may be drawn between these words and the word "harass" excluding the latter from being comprehended within the word "injure" or "injury". The synonyms of "harass" are: To weary, tire, perplex, distress, tease, vex, molest, trouble, disturb. They all have relation to mental annoyance, and a troubling of the spirit." The term "harassment" in its connota tive expanse includes torment and vexation. The term "torture" also engulfs the concept of torment. The word "torture" in its denotative concept includes mental and psychological harassment. The accused in custody can be put under tremendous psy chological pressure by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

24. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to a two-Judge Bench decision in Sunil Gupta and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (1990) 3 SCC

119. The said case per tained to handcuffing where the accused while in judicial custody were being es corted to court from jail and bound in fet ters. In that context, the Court stated that the escort party should record reasons for doing so in writing and intimate the court so that the court, considering the circumstances may either approve or disapprove the action of the escort party and issue nec essary directions. The Court further ob served that when the petitioners who had staged 'Dharna' for public cause and vol untarily submitted themselves for arrest and who had no tendency to escape, had been subjected to humiliation by being hand cuffed, such act of the escort party is against all norms of decency and is in utter viola tion of the principle underlying Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The said act was condemned by this Court to be arbi trary and unreasonably humiliating towards the citizens of this country with the obvi ous motive of pleasing 'someone'.

25. In Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J & K (1985) 4 SCC 677 : (AIR 1986 SC 494), this Court expressed the view that the police officers should have greatest regard for personal liberty of citizens as they are the custodians of law and order and, hence, they should not flout the law by stooping to bizarre acts of lawlessness. It was ob served that custodians of law and order should not become depredators of civil liberties, for their duty is to protect and not to abduct.

26. It needs no special emphasis to state that when an accused is in custody, his Fun damental Rights are not abrogated in toto. His dignity cannot be allowed to be comatosed. The right to life is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and a fortiori, it includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. It has been so stated in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others (1981) 1 SCC 608 : (AIR 1981 SC 746) and D.K. Basu (AIR 1997 SC 610) (supra).

27. In Kharak Singh v. State of U. P., (1964) 1 SCR 332 : (AIR 1963 SC 1295) this court approved the observations of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 US 113:-- "By the term "life" as here [Article 21] used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed."

28. It is apposite to note that inhuman treatment has many a facet. It fundamen tally can cover such acts which have been inflicted with an intention to cause physi cal suffering or severe mental pain. It would also include a treatment that is inflicted that causes humiliation and compels a person to act against his will or conscience.

29. In Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. and others AIR 1995 SC 117, it has been opined that torture is not merely physical but may even consist of mental and psychological torture calculated to create fright to submit to the demands of the police.

30. At this stage, it is seemly to refer to the decisions of some of the authorities re lating to a man's reputation which forms a facet of right to life as engrafted under Article 21 of the Constitution.

31. In Smt. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another (1989) 1 SCC 494 : (AIR 1989 SC 714), this Court reproduced an observation from the decision in D. F. Marion v. Davis 55 ALR 171:-- "The right to enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slan der is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an el ement of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and prop erty."

32. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others (1983) 1 SCC 124 : (AIR 1983 SC 109), it has been ruled that right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Consti tution.

33. In Smt. Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka AIR 2010 SC 1974, while dealing with the invol untary administration of certain scientific techniques, namely, narcoanalysis, poly graph examination and the Brain Electri cal Activation Profile test for the purpose of improving investigation efforts in crimi nal cases, a three-Judge Bench opined that the compulsory administration of the im pugned techniques constitute 'cruel, inhu man or degrading treatment' in the context of Article

21. Thereafter, the Bench ad verted to what is the popular perception of torture and proceeded to state as follows:-- "The popular perceptions of terms such as 'torture' and 'cruel, inhuman or degrad ing treatment' are associated with gory images of blood-letting and broken bones. However, we must recognize that a forc ible intrusion into a person's mental processes is also an affront to human dignity and liberty, often with grave and long-last ing consequences. [A similar conclusion has been made in the following paper: Marcy Strauss, 'Criminal Defence in the Age of Terrorism - Torture', 48 New York Law School Law Review 201-274 (2003/2004)]." After so stating, the Bench in its con clusion recorded as follows:-- "We have also elaborated how the com pulsory administration of any of these tech niques is an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would also amount to 'cruel, inhuman or degrad ing treatment' with regard to the language of evolving international human rights norms."

34. Recently in Vishwanath son of Sitaram Agrawal v. Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal 2012 (6) SCALE 190, although in a different context, while dealing with the aspect of reputation, this Court has observed as follows:-- "......reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity."

35. We have referred to these paragraphs to understand how with the efflux of time, the concept of mental torture has been un derstood throughout the world, regard be ing had to the essential conception of human dignity.

36. From the aforesaid discussion, there is no shadow of doubt that any treatment meted to an accused while he is in custody which causes humiliation and mental trauma corrodes the concept of human dig nity. The majesty of law protects the dig nity of a citizen in a society governed by law. It cannot be forgotten that the Welfare State is governed by rule of law which has paramountcy. It has been said by Edward Biggon "the laws of a nation form the most instructive portion of its history." The Con stitution as the organic law of the land has unfolded itself in manifold manner like a living organism in the various decisions of the court about the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. When citizenry rights are sometimes dashed against and pushed back by the members of City Halls, there has to be a rebound and when the rebound takes place, Article 21 of the Constitution springs up to action as a protector. That is why, an in vestigator to a crime is required to possess the qualities of patience and perseverance as has been stated in Nandini Sathpaty v. P. L. Dani AIR 1978 SC 1025.

37. In Delhi Judicial Services Associa tion v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 406 : (AIR 1991 SC 2176), while dealing with the role of police, this Court condemned the excessive use of force by the police and observed as follows:-- "The main objectives of police is to ap prehend offenders, to investigate crimes and to prosecute them before the courts and also to prevent commission of crime and above all to ensure law and order to protect citizens' life and property. The law enjoins the police to be scrupulously fair to the offender and the Magistracy is to ensure fair investigation and fair trial to an offender. The purpose and object of Mag istracy and police are complementary to each other. It is unfortunate that these objectives have remained unfulfilled even after 40 years of our Constitution. Aberra tions of police officers and police excesses in dealing with the law and order situation have been subject of adverse comments from this Court as well as from other courts but it has failed to have any corrective ef fect on it. The police has power to arrest a person even without obtaining a warrant of arrest from a court. The amplitude of this power casts an obligation on the po lice and it must bear in mind, as held by this Court that if a person is arrested for a crime, his constitutional and fundamental rights must not be violated."

38. It is imperative to state that it is the sacrosanct duty of the police authorities to remember that a citizen while in custody is not denuded of his fundamental right un der Article 21 of the Constitution. The restrictions imposed have the sanction of law by which his enjoyment of fundamental right is curtailed but his basic human rights are not crippled so that the police officers can treat him in an inhuman manner. On the contrary, they are under obligation to protect his human rights and prevent all forms of atrocities. We may hasten to add that a balance has to be struck and, in this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from D. K. Basu (AIR 1997 SC 610) (su pra):-- "There can be no gainsaying that free dom of an individual must yield to the se curity of the State. The right of preventive detention of individuals in the interest of security of the State in various situations prescribed under different statutes has been upheld by the Courts. The right to interro gate the detenus, culprits or arrestees in the interest of the nation, must take precedence over an individual's right to personal liberty. ...... The action of the State, however, must be "right, just and fair". Using any form of torture for extracting any kind of information would neither be 'right nor just nor fair' and, therefore, would be im permissible, being offensive to Article

21. Such a crime-suspect must be interrogated indeed subjected to sustain and scientific interrogation determined in accordance with the provisions of law. He cannot, how ever, be tortured or subjected to third de gree methods or eliminated with a view to elicit information, extract confession or derive knowledge about his accomplishes, weapons etc. His constitutional right can not be abridged except in the manner per mitted by law, though in the very nature of things there would be qualitative difference in the method of interrogation of such a person as compared to an ordinary crimi nal."

39. In the case at hand, the appellant, while in custody, was compelled to hold a placard in which condemning language was written. He was photographed with the said placard and the photograph was made pub lic. It was also filed in a revenue proceed ing by the 7th respondent. The High Court has recorded that the competent authority of the State has conducted an enquiry and found the erring officers to be guilty. The High Court has recorded the findings in favour of the appellant but left him to sub mit a representation to the concerned au thorities. This Court, as has been indicated earlier, granted an opportunity to the State to deal with the matter in an appropriate manner but it rejected the representation and stated that it is not a case of defama tion. We may at once clarify that we are not at all concerned with defamation as postulated under section 499 of the I.P.C. We are really concerned how in a country governed by rule of law and where Article 21 of the Constitution is treated to be sa cred, the dignity and social reputation of a citizen has been affected.

40. As we perceive, from the admitted facts borne out on record, the appellant has been humiliated. Such treatment is basi cally inhuman and causes mental trauma. In "Kaplan & Sadock's Synopsis of Psy chiatry", while dealing with torture, the learned authors have stated that intentional physical and psychological torture of one human by another can have emotionally damaging effects comparable to, and possibly worse than, those seen with combat and other types of trauma. Any psychologi cal torture inflicts immense mental pain. A mental suffering at any age in life can carry the brunt and may have nightmarish effect on the victim. The hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and his self-respect gets gradually atrophied. We have referred to such aspects only to highlight that in the case at hand, the police authorities possi bly have some kind of sadistic pleasure or to "please someone" meted the appellant with this kind of treatment. It is not to be forgotten that when dignity is lost, the breath of life gets into oblivion. In a soci ety governed by rule of law where human ity has to be a laser beam, as our compassionate constitution has so emphasized, the police authorities cannot show the power or prowess to vivisect and dismember the same. When they pave such path, law can not become a silent spectator. As Pithily stated in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All ER 997, 1006:-- "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy if go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope."

41. Presently, we shall advert to the as pect of grant of compensation. The learned counsel for the State, as has been indicated earlier, has submitted with immense vehe mence that the appellant should sue for defamation. Our analysis would clearly show that the appellant was tortured while he was in custody. When there is contra vention of human rights, the inherent con cern as envisaged in Article 21 springs to life and enables the citizen to seek relief by taking recourse to public law remedy.

42. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 : (AIR 1993 SC 1960) wherein it has been held thus:-- "A claim in public law for compensa tion for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by re sorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the rem edy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitu tional remedy. It is this principle which jus tifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guar anteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fun damental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitu tion by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution."

43. Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as his Lordship then was), in his concurring opinion, ex pressed that the relief of monetary com pensation, as exemplary damages, in pro ceedings under Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contra vention of the guaranteed basic and inde feasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 seek ing enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citi zen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is gen erally understood in a civil action for dam ages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an or der of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The com pensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.

44. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 2006 SC 1117, a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, has opined as follows:-- "It is thus now well settled that award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional com pensation in a civil court, in enforcement of the private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering compensation under section 357 of Code of Civil Procedure."

45. At this stage, we may fruitfully re fer to the decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 1 SCC 748 : (AIR 2012 SC 1751). The appellant therein was engaged in running a coaching centre where students were given tuition to pre pare for entrance test for different profes sional courses. On certain allegation, he was arrested and taken to police station where he was handcuffed by the police without there being any valid reason. A number of daily newspapers published the appellant's photographs and on seeing his photograph in handcuffs, the appellant's elder sister was so shocked that she expired. After a long and delayed trial, the appel lant, Hardeep Singh, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur that the prosecution purpose fully caused delay in conclusion of the trial causing harm to his dignity and reputation. The learned single Judge, who dealt with the matter, did not find any ground to grant compensation. On an appeal being pre ferred, the Division Bench observed that an expeditious trial ending in acquittal could have restored the appellant's personal dignity but the State instead of taking prompt steps to examine the prosecution witnesses delayed the trial for five long years. The Division Bench further held there was no warrant for putting the hand cuffs on the appellant which adversely af fected his dignity. Be it noted, the Divi sion Bench granted compensation of Rs.70,

000. This Court, while dealing with the facet of compensation, held thus:-- "Coming, however, to the issue of com pensation, we find that in light of the find ings arrived at by the Division Bench, the compensation of Rs. 70,000 was too small and did not do justice to the sufferings and humiliation undergone by the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be an adequate compensation for the appellant and would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly, direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay to the appellant the sum of Rs.2,00,000 (Ru pees Two Lakhs) as compensation. In case the sum of Rs.70,000 as awarded by the High Court, has already been paid to the appellant, the State would naturally pay only the balance amount of Rs.1,30,000 (Rupees One Lakh thirty thousand)". Thus, suffering and humiliation were highlighted and amount of compensation was enhanced.

46. On a reflection of the facts of the case, it is luculent that the appellant had undergone mental torture at the hands of insensible police officials. He might have agitated to ameliorate the cause of the poor and the downtrodden, but, the social hu miliation that has been meted to him is quite capable of destroying the heart of his phi losophy. It has been said that philosophy has the power to sustain a man's courage. But courage is based on self-respect and when self-respect is dented, it is difficult even for a very strong minded person to maintain that courage. The initial invincible mind paves the path of corrosion. As is per ceptible, the mindset of the protectors of law appears to cause torment and insult and tyrannize the man who is helpless in cus tody. There can be no trace of doubt that he is bound to develop stress disorder and anxiety which destroy the brightness and strength of the will power. It has been said that anxiety and stress are slow poisons. When torment is added, it creates commo tion in the mind and the slow poisons get activated. The inhuman treatment can be well visualized when the appellant came out from custody and witnessed his photo graph being circulated with the self-con demning words written on it. This withers away the very essence of life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Re gard being had to the various aspects which we have analysed and taking note of the totality of facts and circumstances, we are disposed to think that a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be granted towards compensation to the appellant and, accordingly, we so direct. The said amount shall be paid by the respondent State within a period of six weeks and be realized from the erring officers in equal proportions from their salary as thought appropriate by the competent authority of the State.

47. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. MWA/28/SC-Ind. Appeal allowed.