P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑In Writ Petitions Nos. 150 and 222 of 1961 the petitioners seek a writ of quo warranto against the respondents cited therein, with regard to the latter's membership of a Town Council and a Union committee, respectively, in the Sheikhupura District. It is alleged that the respondents in question were disqualified for being members or candidates for the membership of a Local Council under the Provisions of clause (f) of paragraph 2 of Part 11 of the second Schedule to the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, read with section 5 of the Elective Bodies (Disqualifications) Order, 1959, (President's Order No. 13 of 1959), for the reason that they had been detained under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act during the Anti‑Ahmadia Agitation in 1953. As the questions which arose for determination in both these petitions were the same, they were heard together and will be disposed of by this judgment.

2. All the respondents admit that they were detained as alleged, although on behalf of Muhammad Siddiq, respondent No. 1 in writ petition No. 222 of 1961, Mr. Fazle Ghani made a feeble attempt to dispute this fact partially by arguing that the respon dent did not know the law under which he was detained, and that the information supplied by the Superintendent of the Jail, where he was detained, was also silent on this point. This contention cannot, in any way, benefit respondent Muhammad Siddiq for the reasons that, in the first place, there is an affidavit by the petitioner Sardar Muhammad that Muhammad Siddiq was detained under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act; in the second place, there is a report by the District Magistrate, Sheikhupura, enclosing a copy of the order of detention, and finally the respondent himself has not asserted in his affidavit that he was not detained under the Punjab Public Safety Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that all the respondents including Muhammad Siddiq were detained under the Punjab Public Safety Act in March 1953 and they are, therefore, clearly hit by the provisions of section 5 of the Elective Bodies (Disqualifications) Order, 1959, read with the relevant provision of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, to which reference has already been made. That such detention, as was ordered in the case of these respondents and actually undergone by them for varying periods, is a disqualifica tion for membership of an elective body is no longer open to question in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Noor Muhammad v. The Collector, Jhelum etc. reported as (P L 13 1960 Lah. 481) of which my learned brother Shabir Ahmad, J. was a member and wrote the leading judgment. The respondents could escape the disqualification only if the order was vacated by a competent Court or authority on the ground that it was not justified, as in that case it shall be deemed not to have been passed at all, but that is not the case here.

3. It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that even though the disqualification stands proved against them, no writ of quo warranto should issue in these cases for the following reasons: ‑ (i) Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented within thirty days after the declaration of the result of the election, with the result that all other remedies, including a writ of quo warranto, (ii) Even if Rule 55, referred to above, be not treated as a statutory bar in the way of the issue of a writ of quo warranto, such a writ should not issue as an alternative remedy was available to the petitioners under the relevant statute of which they did not avail. (iii) Besides the remedy by way of an election petition provided by Rule 55 of the Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, there is still another procedure available for removal of the respondents under Article 25 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, to which resort could be had by the petitioners and the existence of which also bars the issuance of a writ of quo warranto. (iv) There has been inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, and for that reason alone the petitions should be thrown out.

4. Besides the above contentions which are common to both the petitions, Mr. Fazle Ghani raised the following additional points in Writ Petition No. 222 of 1961: ‑ (i) That the petitioner Sardar Muhammad had no locus standi to file the petition, and (ii) That the petitioner was a person of bad character and antecedents which disentitled him from seeking a writ of quo warranto.

5. Sub‑rule (1) of Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, is to the following effect: ‑‑ "No election shall be called in question except by an election petition present in accordance with these rules". It is contended that the rule clearly operates as a statutory bar in the way of the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of elections to Basic Democracies. The jurisdiction of this Court is now regulated by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. Paragraph 2 (1) of this Order contemplates that notwithstanding the abrogation of the Constitution of the 23rd March 1956, Pakistan shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution, subject to any Order of the President or Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Sub‑para. (2) of the same paragraph preserves the jurisdiction of all Courts in existence immediately before Proclamation and sub‑para. (4) confers on the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power to issue the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It will be seen that the jurisdiction thus conferred on the Courts can only be taken away by an Order of the President or a Regulation made by the Chief Administrator of Martial Law. There is no doubt that the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, was issued by the President of Pakistan, but the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, on which reliance is being placed on behalf of the respondents, were made by the Provincial Governor in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (1) of Article 72 and clause (2) of Article 89 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1359, read with Entry 1 in the 6th Schedule thereto. We cannot accept the contention that the rules have become a part of the Basic Democracies Order and should, therefore be deemed to have been issued by the President of Pakistan. It is hardly open to question that a Governor cannot take away the jurisdiction conferred by the President. We have therefore, no hesitation in repelling the contention that Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules 1959, has taken away the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the matter of elections to the Basic Democracies.

6. It was next contended that even if there be no statutory bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction fn matters of the present kind, at least two alternative remedies existed in this case, namely, an election petition under Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, and the procedure for removal of elected members under Article 25 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, and, therefore, the Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioners who have not resorted to any of these alternative remedies. We may observe in passing that Article 25 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, does not appear to be applicable in the present case as it deals with a member's liability to removal from membership, inter alia, on the ground that "he incurs any of the disqualifications specified in Part II of the 2nd Schedule." It appears to us that the situation contemplated is where a member incurs the disqualification after having been elected or appointed as a member. In other words, Article 25 is not intended to deal with cases where the disqualification was already present when the member in question secured the membership either through election or appointment. It is, however, arguable whether the Article could be Invoked In the case of a continuing disquali fication, as the one which attaches to the respondents before" us. But it is not necessary to decide this point finally in this case, as we shall proceed on the assumption that an alternative remedy was available because an election petition, in any case, lay under Rule 55, cited above. It is admitted that the petitioners have not availed themselves of this remedy.

7. In support of this contention, the two learned counsel appearing for the respondents in these petitions, have relied on several authorities which may be briefly noticed. In the first place, reference is made to the case Reg. v. Morton (LXV L T R 611) where it was held that a writ of quo warranto should not issue in a case where any statute provides for an election petition. But this view was not followed in the later case of Rex v. Beer ((1903) 2 K F3 693). The rule propounded in paragraph 279 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Lord Simonds' Third Ed., Vol. 1I, p. 148, is based on the dictum in Rex v. Beer and may be usefully reproduced here: ‑ "Even in a case where an election petition Is the only remedy when an election is objected to on the ground that the person whole election is questioned was disqualified at the time of the election, yet the remedy by injunction in lieu of quo warranto is available where a person becomes disqualified after election, or where there is a continuing disqualification‑in other words, where the objection is a continuous holding of the office by the person disqualified."

8. Mr. S. M. Zafar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents In Writ Petition No. 150, pointed out that the rule laid down in paragraph 1377 of Lord Hailsham's Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, Second Edition was some‑what different. This paragraph is as follows: ‑ "Where it is provided by statute that election to a municipal office is to be questioned by an election petition, an infor mation in the nature of a quo warranto will not lie, and proceedings by way of quo warranto have accordingly been abolished in respect of such office. Although the statutory provisions displace quo warranto as a remedy in cases within their scope, nevertheless procedure by way of quo warranto remains applicable to all cases outside that category. So, although an election petition is the proper remedy when an election is objected to on the ground that the person whose election is questioned was disqualified at the time of the election, yet the remedy by quo warranto is left untouched where a person becomes disqualified after election, or where there is a continuing disqualification‑in other words, where the objection is a continuous holding 6 the office by the person disqualified."

9. It seems to me that basically the rule propounded in Halsbury's Laws of England is the same in both the Editions, and it is clear that a writ of quo warranto would lie, according to Halsbury, where the disqualification is a continuing one, as in the present case, as a person who has ever been detained under the Punjab Public Safety Act stands disqualified until the 31st day of December 1966, from being a member of an elective body, which term, includes a Local Council and a Union Committee. It is clear, therefore, that this particular contention does not find any support from Halsbury.

10. Reliance was then placed on certain observations in 'Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by Ferris, particularly on para graph 110 commencing on page 132 of the 1.926 Edition. This paragraph reads as follows: ‑ "Generally speaking, the proceeding will not lie where there is another adequate remedy available. But the general rule is, however, to be understood as applicable only to cases where the main object is the redress of relator's private injury, and not where the proceeding is by the State. The State may, by quo Warranto, oust a corporation notwithstanding the corpora tion's franchise provides another remedy. The ‑ sovereign power of the State to proceed for forfeiture of franchise, even at the relation of a city, cannot be contracted away or in any way abridged by the city. At most such a provision in the ordinance only provides the city another remedy. It should be further noted that quo warranto, being a civil remedy, Is applicable in the civil proceeding to oust a corporation, even through the acts complained of may also constitute violations of criminal statutes. Where not constitutionally prohibited, the legislature may of course by statute supersede the remedy by quo warranto, and such an intention, clearly manifested, will be held as exclusive; but unless the contrary intention clearly appears, the statutory remedy will be considered cumulative."

11. It will be noticed that, according to Ferris, the exclusion of proceedings by way of quo warranto by statute is subject to the overriding condition that it is not constitutionally prohibited ; and generally the statutory remedy will be considered cumulative. Now, I have already observed that in the present D case the exclusion of this Court's jurisdiction sought to be spelt out of Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, runs counter to the constitutional provisions contained in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, and cannot, therefore, be given effect to. That being the case, we can only regard the procedure for election petition as being cumulative, i.e., in addition to proceedings by way of quo warranto.

12. We were next referred to Mr. A. K. Brohi's treatment of the question of the impact of Article 146 of the late Constitution of Pakistan on the power of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto, in his book entitled `Fundamental Law of Pakistan'. The subject is dealt with on pages 513 to 515 of this book. The following observations, appearing in the middle of page 513, are relevant: ‑ "Under our Constitution we have in Art. 146 a prohibition which enjoins that no election to the National Assembly or Provincial Assembly shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided by an Act of Parliament. The scope of jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings under our Constitution will have to reckon with what is contained in Art. 146, which Article, as its wording shows, expressly excludes elections to the National Assembly, or a Provincial Assembly from being called in question by any other means except by election petition. Any illegality committed during the course of election can only be tested by means of an election petition, and all other forms of procedure, including the one relating to questioning the validity of elections by means of quo warranto, are necessarily excluded by the express prohibition contained in Art.

146. It is submitted that considering that quo warranto proceedings are discretionary in character, the jurisdiction to avail of this writ will be ordinarily resisted on the ground that there is another equally efficacious remedy available to question the validity of an election to the National or Provincial Assembly under the Law."

13. Again, in the middle of page 51 5, Mr. Brohi sums up his conclusions in the following words: ‑ "We are here concerned with a constitutional prohibition, and as Article 146 is specific as to what it prohibits, no construc tion on Article 170 could be imposed which would undo the effect of that prohibition. Besides, a writ jurisdiction being discretionary, that jurisdiction cannot be made a substitute for processes like appeals, revisions and review which are ordinarily provided for in matters affecting the determinations by election tribunals."

14. Mr. Brohi has, however, taken pains to point out (in the last paragraph on page 513) that the orders of the election tribunal are not immune from attack on the ground of jurisdic tion. The point may be stated in his own words: ‑ "Care must be taken to remember that what Article 146 expressly provides for is the procedure by resort to which election to the National or Provincial Assembly could be called inn question. It does not prohibit the determination of the issue whether an election tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted in the absence of a jurisdiction validly conferred upon it by law. There is no ground for thinking, however, that the proceedings of election tribunal cannot be attacked on the ground of jurisdiction . . . . ." If I have understood Mr. Brohi's observations correctly, all that they amount to saying is that Article 146 contains a constitutional prohibitions which has to be respected and accordingly proceedings by way of quo warranto would not lie in matters touching elections to the National or Provincial Assembly. Even here the prohibition is not absolute, as proceedings before an election tribunal could be challenged before the High Court by means of a petition for a writ of certiorari, on the ground of excess or want of jurisdiction etc. We cannot interpret these observations as laying down a rule that a writ of quo warranto would not lie in every case where an alternative remedy by way of an election petition is provided under the relevant statute. The existence of an alternative remedy is obviously not to be confused with a constitutional prohibition. In the present case, there is no such constitutional prohibition, with the result that the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of quo warranto cannot be denied simply because there exists an alternative remedy under the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959. Even with regard to the constitutional prohibition contained in Article 146 of the late Constitutional, the view expressed by Mr. Brohi do not seem to be in accord with those expressed by a Division Bench of this Court comprising Constantine and Lari, JJ. in Muhammad Akbar v. Dr. Khan Sahib, Chief Minister of Rest Pakistan (P L D 1957 Kar, 387). Their lordships took the view that Article 146 was to be read subject to the provisions of Article

170. However, that point does not call for determination in the present case.

16. In Theberge v. Laydry, (L T .R Vol. XXXV p. 640), which was a case from the Province of Quebec in Canada, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refused to interfere in appeal from a judgment of the superior Court of that Province under the Quebec Controverted Elections Act. The Act bad enacted that "such judgment shall not be susceptible of appeal". Their Lordships observed that: "Although the prerogative of the Crown cannot be taken away except by express words, yet that, having regard to the peculiar nature of the Act, as affecting the rights and privileges of the legislative Assembly independent of the Crown, it could not be taken to have created a tribunal with the ordinary incident of an appeal to the Crown under its prerogative attaching to it." It will be seen that this authority is hardly of any assistance to the respondents in this case, for the reason that their Lordships of the Privy Council were, in the first place, dealing with an Act which, according to them, was peculiar in nature ; and in the second place, they did not lay down that the prerogative of the Crown had been taken away by the Act by question although they considered that the Act did not create tribunal with the ordinary incident of an appeal to the Crown. It would thus be far‑fetched interpretation and application of this dictum of the lordships of the Privy Council to hold that no writ of quo warranto, lies where an election petition has been provided.

17. The one case which appears to be helpful to the responder: is Narayan Chandra Mukherjee and another v. District Magistrate, Hooghly and others (A I R 1954 Cal. 32). In that case, an election under the Bengal Municipal Act had been challenged. Their Lordships observed that: "The Act contains a complete remedy for the particular breach complained of. There is no satisfactory expla nation as to why remedy by way of au election petition was not followed * * * *. There is, therefore no excuse for the petitioners allowing time to pass by until it became too late to file an election petition. Absence of diligence in pursuing a legal remedy can never be a justification for issuing a high prerogative writ." In an earlier paragraph, the learned Judges observed as follows :‑ " Sawday v. Singha Roy (A I R 1946 Cal. 206 (J).), Das J. flirted out that the provincial legislature by enacting the Calcutta "Municipal Act, 1923, had not taken away the power of the High Court under the Carter to issue High prerogative writs. Such n alternative remedy does not absolutely debar the High Court from exercising. Its jurisdiction under Article

226. It is how ever a rule of expediency that where the right itself created by a statute, and where there is a specific remedy provided for in that Statute for a particular violation of it, that remedy and not the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should be allowed." On this view of the matter, the learned Judges refused to interfere. It wall be seen, however, that even this case cannot be treated as laying down any bard arid fast rule that a writ of quo warranto must be refused where sufficient cause is not shown by the petitioner for not invoking the alternative remedy of an election petition.

18. On a consideration of the authorities, the position which emerges is this. Quo warranto is the remedy or proceeding whereby the State inquires into the legality of the claims which a party asserts to an office or franchise, and to oust from its enjoyment if the claim be not well founded, or to have the same declared for feited, and to recover it, if, having once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed, it has become forfeited for mis‑user or non‑user. (Ferris) Generally speaking, the proceedings will not lie where there is another adequate remedy available, but the existence of an alternative remedy by way of an election petition does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo Warranto in suitable cases, particularly in cases of a continuing disqualification or a disqualification Incurred after the election. The decision whether this Court will interfere, or not, fn quo warranto proceedings shall depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the discretion of the Court cannot be fettered by laying down any hard and fast rules in this behalf.

19. We now take up the question of delay that has occurred on the part of the petitioners in coming to this Court. The result of the elections was declared in December 1959, while the present writ petitions were not filed until March 1961. The delay has been explained by saying that In the first place, there was some doubt as to whether detention under the Punjab Public Safety Act would be a disqualification or not, and this doubt was only resolved in July 1960, when the Full Bench of this Court decided that the detention in question was a disqualification within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959. After that, the petitioners expected that the Controlling authorities concerned would themselves take the necessary action in the matter and remove the respondents from the Local Councils, but as that was not done, the petitioners filed the present petitions. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the respondents that, In the first place, petitioners could have objected to the nomination of the respondents even before the elections were held, and in the second place, they allowed several months to elapse even after the legal position was placed beyond doubt by the Full Bench decision of this Court. I am Inclined to agree with the respondents that there has been delay in this case and normally this Court would refuse to exercise its writ jurisdic tion in favour of a petitioner who is guilty of laches, but In view of the continuing nature of the disqualification which attaches to the respondents, we are of the view that this is a case where delay on the part of the petitioners cannot be allowed to defeat the petitions.

20. We may now dispose of the two additional contentions raised by Mr. Fazle Ghani in Writ Petition No. 222 of 1961. The first one relates to the locus standi of petitioner Sardar Muhammad. The precise objection is that Sardar Muhammad's name is not borne on the electoral roll of the ward concerned and, therefore, he is not entitled to file the present petition. The objection clearly proceeds on the assumption that it is necessary for a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings relating to a member of an elective body to be an elector in the ward of constituency, the election to which is being challenged by him. This assumption seems to be based on sub‑rule (8) of Rule 55 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Rules, 1959, which prescribes that an election petition may be presented by any elector or candidate. It seems to me that Mr. Fazle Ghani is extending this rule to quo warranto proceedings by analogy. The proposition advocated by him is, however, not supported by any authority.

21. In this connection we may usefully refer to certain passages in `Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by Ferris. In para graph 123 at page 146, it is laid down that: ‑ "The real test of the right of a private party on relation to bring a proceeding in quo warranto is whether the relator has the necessary interest to maintain the action, A certain degree of interest on the part of the relator is generally deemed requisite ; the efficacious intermeddling by parties having absolutely no interest, either as tax‑payers or voters, is not favoured."

22. Again, in paragraph 148 at page 170, the learned author observes that: " . . . . the relator must have a special interest fn the matter of inquiry. While neither at common law nor under the statute of Anne is the relator necessarily a claimant to the office challenged, still it is not good public policy to place every person who is performing the duties of an office to the satisfaction of all directly concerned, at the mercy of an interloper who might choose, from motives of amusement or malice, to subject him to the trouble and expense of exhibiting all the minutiae of his title."

23. The point came up for consideration in Muhammad Akbar v. Dr. Khan Sahib, Chief Minister of West Pakistan to which a reference has already been made in an earlier part of this judgment. Their lordships observed that: "the rule that no person may invoke the Court's aid in respect of a wrongful act of a public nature not affecting prejudicially the real and special interest or a specific legal right of the relator is true only so far as the Issue of writs of mandamus and certiorari is concerned. In respect of writ of quo warranto there is no such restriction and a member of the public may challenge a public act of the State provided he does not do so mala fide as an instrument of others."

24. It will be seen that the authorities do not insist that a relator in quo warranto proceedings should be either an elector or a candidate for the election to which the proceedings relate. It is enough if he has a visible interest in the public office concerned. For this purpose, it is not necessary that he should be a voter or a candidate. Any resident of a local area, to which the public, office relates, would appear to have the requisite interest, and for that reason the locus standi to present a petition for quo warranto. The petitioner Sardar Muhammad is admittedly a resident of the area from which the respondent was elected as a member of the Local Council. He is, therefore, competent to present the petition.

25. Apart from this, we find that Sardar Muhammad is entered as a voter in Ward No. 15 of the electoral rolls of the Legislative Assembly, which rolls were adopted for elections to Basic Democracies. By a notification bearing No. P. E. A. 59/963 (Urban) issued on the 19th of November 1959, by the Commissioner of Lahore Division this ward was designated as Ward No. 19 for the purpose of election to the Union Council No. 4 of the Sheikhupura District. The name of the petitioner Sardar Muhammad is shown at Serial No. 167 of the electoral roll. Even if, therefore, the requirement had been that only a voter could present a petition for quo warranto, Sardar Muhammad would be qualified to do so. Mr. Fazle Ghani contended that the facts whether Sardar Muhammad was a voter, or not, for the ward In question was a disputed matter, and therefore, a matter Into which this Court will not go in accordance with its established practice. In this connection we need only reiterate observations made by one of us in Haji Feroze Din and others v. Government of West Pakistan and others (P L D 1961 Lah. 304) which are to the following effect: ‑ "We consider that the practice of this Court not to go into disputed questions of fact does not mean that we would refuse h to exercise writ jurisdiction simply for the reason that the respondents contest the facts stated by the petitioners ; the correct rule being that this Court will not embark on an inquiry into facts or admit extraneous evidence for determining disputed facts, but instead confine itself to the material already on the record for ascertaining the true facts. This rule was approved by their lordships of the Supreme Court in The Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Karim and others (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 246)." In the present case there is on the record the official electoral roll supplemented by the notification of the 19th November 1959 and I see no reason for not placing reliance on it. However, as already observed, the petition of Sardar Muhammad was competent even if he was not registered as a voter for the ward in question.

26. The Second contention put forward by Mr. Fazle Ghani was that Sardar Muhammad was a man of bad character and a history‑sheeter, and that according to police record he was always out to make false cases against innocent persons. In order to support this contention reliance was placed on Miss Avi J. Cama v. Banwari lal Agarwal and others (A 1 R 1953 Nag. 81). In that case, it was observed: "Before granting a writ of quo warranto it is necessary to see that the relator is a fit person to be entrusted with this writ. The Court will not listen to a candidate who has acquiesced or perhaps concurred in the very act which he afterwards comes to complain of when it suits his purpose. It will not issue a writ of quo warranto at the instance of the candidate for an election who did not object to the nomination of another candi date for the same constituency at the proper time." In that case, the relator was a person who was a practising lawyer, had offered herself as a candidate for the election which she had later challenged in the writ petition, and the learned Judge con sidered that she must have known the disability from which her opponent was suffering at the time when nomination papers were to be scrutinised, but did not raise the objection at that time.

27. I am in respectful agreement with the view that before granting a writ the Court must see that the relator is a fit person, but in the present case one finds that although the relator may be described as a history‑sheeter and a man of bad character, it cannot be said that he has brought a false charge against the respondent as the disqualification alleged by the relator has been proved to exist, and is of a continuing nature. In other words, this is a case where the antecedents of the relator do not seem to affect the merits of the petition presented by him.

28. As I have found that the respondents are suffering from a continuing disqualification under the Elective Bodies (Disquali fication) Order, 1959, read with clause (f) of paragraph 2 of Part II of Schedule 11 to the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, they are not legally entitled to continue as members of the Local Council to which they have been elected. It has also been found that the exist ence of a remedy by way of an election petition or a procedure for removal of members is not a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings. The delay that has occurred in presenting these petitions is not material in view of the nature of the disqualification. I would accordingly accept both these petitions with costs and issue writ of quo warranto directing respondent Muhammad Siddique (in Writ Petition No. 222 of 1961) to vacate his seat on Union Committee No. 4 of the Sheikhupura District and respondents Muhammad Bashir, Abdul Karim and Suleman (in Writ Petition No. 150 of 1961) to vacate their seats on the Town Council of Mandi Chuhar Kana in the same District. SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑I have nothing to add to the elaborate judgment of my learned brother with whom I agree on all points dealt with by him. K. B. A. Petitions accepted. s