2017 PLP 1697 (CLC)

MUHAMMAD JUNAID GHAFFAR, J.

Through instant appeal the appellant has impugned Judgment dated 21.9.2015, passed in Suit No.871 of 2014, whereby, while hearing applications filed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 and under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., a learned Single Judge of this Court has dismissed the Suit as being not maintainable.

2. Brief facts as stated are that the appellant was appointed as a distributor of respondent No.1 which is a foreign based company initially through agreement dated 1.6.1996 which was superseded through agreement dated 21.10.2002, which for the present controversy is relevant. It has been further stated that for certain reasons which are not relevant, the said agreement was terminated by respondent No.1 vide letter dated 20.3.2013 against which the appellant instituted a Suit before the Original side of this Court and vide order dated 30.5.2014 the termination letter was suspended, and thereafter, on an objection with regard to jurisdiction of this Court, the Suit filed by the appellant has been dismissed as aforesaid.

3. Counsel for the appellant has contended that the learned Single Judge has erred in law and facts and has not appreciated clause 33 of the agreement in question, as according to the Counsel, the said jurisdiction clause did not oust the jurisdiction of this Court completely. Counsel has further contended that the learned Single Judge while relying upon the case reported in the case of State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Rana Muhammad Saleem (1987 SCMR 393) has failed to appreciate that the dispute in hand was earlier put to rest by a three member bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Chowdhry v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd and 3 others (PLD 1970 SC 373), wherein, it has been held that even if there is any clause in the agreement of such nature, the same has to be construed as an arbitration clause and therefore, this Court had the jurisdiction in the instant matter. Without prejudice to the above, Counsel further contended that at the most, the proceedings in the Suit could have been stayed instead of dismissing the entire Suit. In view of such position, Counsel prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the parties be directed to lead evidence in the matter which shall be decided on merits.

4. Conversely, Counsel for respondent No. 1 has contended that since the parties had agreed vide clause 33 of the agreement to refer the dispute, if any, in the Court at Italy therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the Suit of the appellant by relying upon the case of M/s. Raziq International (Pvt.) Limited v. Panalpina Management Limited (PLD 2014 Sindh 175).

5. We have heard both the Counsel and perused the record. By consent instant appeal is being finally decided at Katcha Peshi stage. Insofar as the facts are concerned, the same do not appear to be in dispute and therefore, need not be repeated. However, very briefly, it may be reiterated that the appellant was appointed as s Sole Distributor for Pakistan to sell and market various poultry vaccines being manufactured by Respondent No.1 through agreement dated 21.10.2002. On termination of such agreement unilaterally as alleged, the suit filed by the appellant has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge for want of jurisdiction. The controversy before us is in respect of clause 33 of the agreement dated 21.10.2002 which relates to the disputes and the jurisdiction in the matter. The same reads as under:- "DISPUTES"

33. If in the event of any dispute or difference arising between the parties with respect to any matter arising from or in connection with the agreement which cannot be settled by negotiation between the parties, such dispute or difference shall be forthwith referred for determination by the Court of Brescia, Italy."

6. Perusal of the aforesaid clause reflects that the parties have agreed that in the event of any dispute or difference between them with respect to any matter arising from or in connection with the agreement in question, which cannot be settled by negotiations, then such dispute or difference shall be forthwith referred for determination by the Court of Brescia Italy. What needs to be decided is that whether in view of the aforesaid clause in the agreement, a Civil Court in question has any jurisdiction in the matter, and, further, the clause as above completely ousts such jurisdiction or merely binds the parties to refer the dispute for determination by the Court at Italy. Bare perusal of the agreement and the above clause though reflects that the parties to the agreement had agreed that in case of a dispute the matter would be referred for determination by the Court at Italy. However, it is to be seen and examined that as to whether the aforesaid provision is hit by the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act or not, and whether, by incorporating the said clause in the agreement, the jurisdiction which otherwise vests in this Court, could be ousted. Though the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Suit has relied upon the case of State Life supra, however, with respect, we may observe that the issue in the said case was with regard to a situation when two or more Courts had jurisdiction to try a Suit, and the parties mutually agreed to refer their dispute to one of them, and it was held that such agreement between the parties is permissible and would not be regarded as being in any violation to Section 28 of the Contract Act. However, the courts referred to in the said case were within the country i.e. Pakistan and the parties had agreed to confer jurisdiction to a specific Court, excluding the other, and it was held that such exclusive jurisdiction agreement between the parties is not void and rather permissible. Therefore, in our view the ratio of the said judgment is not squarely applicable to the instant case, as the facts are distinguishable wherein the question of ousting jurisdiction of a Court in a country, where admittedly, a part of cause of action had accrued, is being ousted and simultaneously being conferred on a foreign Court.

7. Insofar as the dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Chowdhry Supra, on which the entire case of the appellant rests, is concerned, in that case it was alleged on behalf of the defendant that since the contract provided that "any dispute arising under this bill of lading shall be governed by Japanese Law, except as may be otherwise provided herein, and any such dispute shall be decided by Tokyo District Court in Japan" and therefore, the Courts at Chittagong had no jurisdiction to try the Suit in question. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case after examining various judgment of the East and West Pakistan High Courts as well as English and other foreign jurisdiction and the provision of Section 28 of the Contract Act, came to the following conclusion(s) which are relevant and reads as under:- (pg:389) "It would thus appear that so far as England is concerned the Courts there had never proceeded on the basis that such a clause absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the English Courts. At most, they have treated such a clause as being in the nature of a submission to arbitration, which does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court but gives the Court a discretion to decide whether it will allow the suit to proceed or enforce the agreement between the parties and compel them to go to arbitration as agreed upon whether before another tribunal it the same country or in a foreign country or before a lay arbitrator. It seems difficult to appreciate how the question of ouster of jurisdiction can at all arise in a case of such a clause providing for adjudication of the dispute by a tribunal in a foreign country, if the principle is accepted, as was done in the Dacca case, that no one can by consent either vest a Court with jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess or take away its jurisdiction which it does possess. The principle that where two Courts are equally competent to try a cause or matter then it is open to the plaintiff to choose his forum or for the parties to the dispute to agree to a particular forum in advance, must in my opinion, be read subject to the laws of the country in which the contract was made and in which it was intended to be performed. Such a choice or election but the parties cannot be in defiance of the law or opposed to public policy or to statutory provisions expressly prohibiting the making of such agreements or rendering the same, if made, invalid. The practice adopted by the East Pakistan Subordinate Courts and approved by the Dacca High Court is, to my mind based neither upon principle nor upon precedent. Even upon the principle adopted by the East Pakistan High Court in each case there should of necessity have been an enquiry to find out whether under the proper law of the contract the foreign Court to which exclusive jurisdiction was sought to be given, had, in fact jurisdiction to try the cause of matter according to the laws of that country. If it had no such jurisdiction, then obviously the principle that a party may choose one of two competent Courts which had jurisdiction to try a cause or matter would not be applicable. If it so happens that the foreign Court has no jurisdiction in the matter, or is unable to grant the relief sought for, then the plaintiff would be left with no redress at all. Again the question of returning the plaint can only arise where the same plaint can be presented in a foreign Court. This may well not be possible, for, the rules of procedure of the foreign Court may require the plaint to be in the form prescribed by that Court in the language of the country in which that Court is situated and affixed with court-fee, if any prescribed, in the manner laid down by the laws of that country. Obviously this procedure of returning the plaint can only apply where both the competing Courts are situated in the same country and follow the same laws. (pg:394) Some countries have actually declared by law that such clauses shall be null and void, others have struck them down as being opposed to their own public policy, while a few have given them the status of an arbitration clause providing for an arbitration by a foreign arbitrator in a foreign place, and in order to preserve the sanctity of private contracts by binding the parties to their bargain merely stayed proceedings in their own Courts, if the clause is otherwise found to be reasonable and does not decrease the rights which would be available to a party to the contract in the ordinary tribunals of the country of [sic] does not relieve the other party altogether or lessen his liability in any way. In some cases, the Courts have even held that such a foreign jurisdiction clauses does not bind the party who is not a signatory to the contract. But there is no case in which such a clause has been held to be valid in the face of an express law prohibiting the making of such a contract or invalidating the same. Indeed, the very fact that most Courts treat such clauses to be void as being against public policy seems to indicate that where there is an express provision in a local law forbidding the making of such a contract too then it would be void on the same principle, for, whatever a law prohibits is also opposed to public policy. In this view of the matter, in spite of the consistent decisions of the High Court of East Pakistan, I have, with utmost respect, to hold that these decisions have diverted the law of the country into a wrong channel and must, therefore, be overruled. Having said this, however, I am of the opinion that in order to preserve the sanctity of contracts I ought also to hold, as was done in the earlier cases in Great Britain that such foreign jurisdiction clauses, even when they purport to give jurisdiction to a Court in a foreign country, are really in the nature of arbitration clauses which come within the exceptions to section 28 of the Contract Act and, therefore, should be dealt with in the same manner as other arbitration clauses. In the case of an arbitration it has to be remembered that the jurisdiction of the Courts is not altogether ousted, for, the Courts merely stay their hands to allow the parties to resort to the form of adjudication to which they have previously agreed. By only staying the actions before them the Courts still retain to themselves the jurisdiction to resume the case if the arbitration, for any reason, fails or the parties find it impossible to comply with the form of adjudication to which they had agreed. This was also the view taken in the case of Malik Ali Akbar, which I approve. (pg:396) For the reasons given above, I would allow these appeal set aside the orders of the High Court and of the trial Court and remand the cases back to the trial Court to consider, in accordance with law, as to whether the Suits filed before them should or should not be stayed. (Emphasis supplied)

8. From a bare reading of what has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not categorically held, as contended by the Counsel for the appellant, that in each and every case, where such exclusive jurisdiction clause is in consideration, the same is to be ignored out rightly by holding that such clause, being in conflict with the express provision of law (S.28) is to be held to be void. Similarly, it has also not been held that by agreeing to such a clause, the jurisdiction which vests in Court can be ousted. Rather, the Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that the Court should preserve the sanctity of the jurisdiction clause in the same manner as an arbitration clause, at the most, by staying the Suit pending before it and allow the parties to approach the forum they had chosen by their own volition. This under no circumstances lays down any such guidelines to hold that the exclusive jurisdiction clause would always be void as being against the express provision of Section 28 of the Contract Act. It in fact depends on the facts and circumstances of each case on its own, and after examining such facts, the Court has to arrive at any such conclusion. Moreover, it is only to the extent of ousting the jurisdiction of this Court, that the aforesaid finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be understood. In no manner the same can be construed otherwise. The appellant cannot take shelter under the said dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to plead that notwithstanding that he had agreed to submit to such jurisdiction clause on his own knowingly, the said clause be held to be void and his Suit should be proceeded before this Court by completely ignoring the jurisdiction clause. In our considered view, such clause, can at the most, be read as an arbitration clause which could, at the maximum benefit the appellant that the Suit shall not be rejected or dismissed at the outset for want of jurisdiction, but be stayed, pending adjudication of the matter in terms of the agreement between the parties and that the jurisdiction of this Court is not, rather cannot be ousted by such clause. However, at the same time it cannot be so construed to confer exclusive jurisdiction to this Court, neither can the appellant stress upon this Court to try his Suit, notwithstanding that he has failed to act any further in the matter, according to the agreement itself.

9. The question of exclusive jurisdiction clause in an agreement also came for discussion before a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Light Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs ZSK Stickmaschinen GmbH and another (2007 CLD 1324), wherein clause 10 of the agreement between the parties provided for the exclusive jurisdiction as under:- "Clause 10 (1) Projects which have been negotiated by ZSK before signing this Contract and which can be concluded only after coming into force of this contract are not subject to the regulations of this contract. (2) The contractual relation is subject to German law. The direct or respective application of the obligatory determinations of the German Code for "Commercial Representative" is excluded. (3) Place of fulfillment for all obligations of this contract and exclusive jurisdiction is Krefeld ZSK is also entitled to accuse the Agent at his competent Court." The learned Single Judge after considering the case law of this country as well as of foreign jurisdiction came to the following conclusion:- "Before I would discuss various case-laws relied upon by the respective parties, I would like to say that exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract in my humble opinion is part of consideration of the agreement between the parties on the basis of which parties enter into a contract and said consideration should not be ignored lightly particularly merely at the whims of one of the parties to the contract. Learned Advocate for the plaintiff opposed the application on the ground that (i) it is more convenient and appropriate for the parties to pursue remedy before this Court than District Court of Krefeld Germany, (ii) all evidence is available at Karachi, within the jurisdiction of this Court, (iii) there is no valid exclusive clause in the Contract and (iv) clause 10(3) of the Contract is not void under section 28 of the Contract Act. As regards first two objections of learned Advocate for the plaintiff, due to the advancement of science and travelling facilities within last couple of years the matter of convenience and inconvenience is almost, in my humble view, has become insignificant. It is now-a-days very easy to approach from one continent to another within a couple of hours which few years back used to take much more time, the documents can be dispatched to any part of the world within couple of minutes by fax or by email which used to take various days in the past. For the purpose of recording evidence now it is not necessary that witness should travel from one -to another as recording of evidence by way of video conference has become common feature in developed countries and such facilities in appropriate cases can be availed whereas in the instant case most of the evidences in my tentative view is based upon documents. Coming to objection that there is no valid exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Contract and Article 10(3) of the agreement is void under section 28 of the Contract Act. To discover the intention of parties to a contract document/agreement as a whole has to be read. By Agency Contract defendant No.1 appointed plaintiff as his agent exclusively representing for the territory of Pakistan for the products manufactured by him viz Automobile Multi-Head Embroidery Machines. Card Studio, equipment for said machines and their spare parts. In terms of the agreement defendant was required to put at the disposal of the plaintiff a sufficient quantity of leaflets, advertising material, details which are important for sale business etc and plaintiff was obliged to observe the interests of defendant and was not authorized to conclude deals procured by him without the written confirmation of defendants, and the plaintiff was entitled for fixed commission on sale service and accessories. Clause 10(2) specifying provided that the contractual relation was subject to German law and by clause 10(3) parties agreed that for the fulfillment of all obligations of the contract Krefeld has exclusive jurisdiction. In the counter affidavit to application plaintiff himself stated that this Court is more convenient and appropriate than District Court of Krefeld Germany made it clear that so far as exclusive jurisdiction agreed to be same was given District Court of Krefeld Germany and there was no ambiguity in the mind of contracting parties in this regard, nor it was the case set up by the plaintiff." The aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge was impugned by the plaintiff in the Suit before a learned Division Bench of this Court through Appeal, which was also dismissed and the case is reported as Light Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs ZSK Stickmaschinen GmbH through Attorney and another (2009 CLD 1340).

10. In another case of somewhat similar nature a learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of CGM (Compagnie General Maritime) v. Hussain Akbar (2002 CLD 1528) after a threadbare examination of various decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court including the case of M.A. Choudhry (Supra) on the subject controversy has been pleased to hold as under:- "How the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of Lading referred to above requires that "all actions under this contract of carriage shall be brought before the Tribunal de Commerce in Paris to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of a Court of any other country, unless the carrier appeals to another jurisdiction or voluntarily submits himself hereto". In the instant case the ship-owner / appellant No. 1 objected to the assumption of jurisdiction by this Court by pointing out that the action by the respondent is not maintainable at Karachi and that the respondent should file his claim before the Tribunal de Commerce in Paris. In light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Mitsui's case, this Court should preserve the sanctity of the contract between the parties and treat the jurisdiction clause in the same manner as an arbitration clause, stay the action pending before it and allow the parties to resort to the forum of adjudication to which they have agreed. By staying the action before it, the Court would still retain to itself the jurisdiction to resume the case if the adjudication agreed to between the parties for any reason fails or the parties find it impossible to comply with the form of adjudication in the forum to which they had agreed. The observations of the learned Single Judge that the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Mitsui's case that the jurisdiction clause 25 of the Bill of Lading cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Pakistani Court is correct; however, the conclusion that the application for return of the plaint under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. is misconceived and is liable to rejection is not borne out by the said judgment. While deciding the Mitsui's case the Supreme Court also discussed the various factors that the Court should consider for exercising the discretion to stay the proceedings and direct the plaintiff to refer the claim to the agreed forum mentioned in the contract of carriage. The factors highlighted by the Supreme Court include, inter alia, as to in which country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated or more readily available; relative convenience and expense of trial between the Pakistan and the foreign Court; whether the law of foreign Court applies and, if so, whether it differs from Pakistan law in any material respect; with that country either party is connected and how closely; and whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign Court because he would be deprived of security for the claim, be faced with a time bar not applicable locally; unable to enforce any judgment obtained etc. He also held that the burden to satisfy the Court as to the justification for staying its proceedings should be on the person who seeks the stay of proceedings and reference of the dispute to the foreign forum. Consequently, in light of these observations the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan remanded the cases to the trial Court to consider, in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court, as to whether the suits filed before it should or should not be stayed. In the instant case, appellant No.1 (ship-owner) has only referred to the exclusive jurisdiction clause and has not mentioned or elaborated the various factors highlighted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for stay of the proceedings in this Court. Similarly respondent (Cargo-owner) has also not given any reason for not staying the proceedings and asking him to approach the forum mentioned in the Bill of Lading except that the goods were loaded on the vessel in Karachi and appellant No.2 (Ship-owner's agent) had executed and delivered a bond under section 55 of the Pakistan Customs Act, 1969. In view of this state of affairs the Court has to make its own assessment to exercise its discretion to stay the proceedings looking at the circumstances of the case. As the goods were loaded at Karachi Port, a part of the cause of action arose here and accordingly the suit has been filed properly in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. However, the Bill of Lading contains a jurisdiction clause which requires the cargo-owner to file his claim before Tribunal de Commerce in Paris. A copy of the written statement filed by the appellant No.1 has not been filed with this appeal, however, the learned Single Judge on the basis of the appellant's written statement has made the following observations: "As to the fate of the consignment, it was stated that it duly arrived at the port of destination (Monrovia) on or about 17th June, 1990 and was delivered to the Port Authorities of Monrovia for subsequent delivery to the consignee, in accordance with the normal practice, but was destroyed or looted in the civil war that engulfed the town shortly after the arrival of consignment and therefore, the responsibility of the shippers (sic) had come to an end and they were not responsible for the loss of the consignment." Assuming this to be correct, the proper place to decide the dispute would be Monrovia, the port of destination where the consignment was delivered to the Port Authorities and thereafter destroyed or looted in the civil war that erupted there but under the exclusive jurisdiction clause the dispute cannot be referred to Monrovia. The choice is between Tribunal de Commerce in Paris or Karachi where the present suit has been filed. Both parties will have to bring their witnesses either to Karachi or Paris and incur expenditure in doing so. It is difficult to say which place would be less inconvenient and more expensive. It is, however, that the dispute shall be governed by the law of France on the basis of the jurisdiction clause. The law of France on the subject will have to be proved by production of expert witness in Karachi which would entail additional expense and inconvenience. A French Tribunal would be less inconvenient and better placed to decide the dispute under French Law. The sanctity of the contract has also to be maintained and enforced as laid down by the two Supreme Court judgments referred above. In these circumstances, we are of the view that it would be proper to ask the respondent to refer this dispute for decision by Tribunal de Commerce in Paris as contemplated by the Bill of Lading."

11. Similarly the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Messrs Kadir Motors (Regd.), Rawalpindi v. Messrs National Motors Ltd., Karachi and 3 others (1992 SCMR 1174) has been pleased to discuss the implication of Section 28 of the Act, which provides that every agreement in restraint of legal proceedings, is void and has been pleased to hold as under:- "To wriggle out of this agreement, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on section 28 of the Contract Act which provides that every agreement in restraint of legal proceedings is void. We have minutely read the said provision of law and could not find anything therein to restrain the parties from entering into an agreement to get their disputes decided by a particular Court of competent jurisdiction for their convenience and avoidance of unnecessary objections to the territorial jurisdiction of Courts. The intention behind the said provision of law is that all those agreements which restrain a person to enforce his rights under a contract by usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals are void. It obviously implies that a party cannot be restrained to enforce his right in ordinary Court of law but if by mutual agreement between the parties a particular Court having territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction is selected for the determination of their dispute, there appears to be nothing wrong or illegal in it or opposed to public policy."

12. The conclusion which could be drawn from the aforesaid discussion by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the learned Division Bench of this Court, is that insofar as exclusive jurisdiction clause in an agreement is concerned, the same is permissible and could not be termed as void or contrary to the provisions of section 28 of the Contract Act, however, with the exception that firstly, the jurisdiction of this Court or for that matter any other Court, cannot be ousted by agreeing to such a clause in the agreement; secondly, the said clause if agreed upon by the parties, is to be treated as an arbitration clause with a necessary corollary that the Suit filed before that Court, jurisdiction of which is being intended to be ousted, must be stayed and not dismissed.

13. However, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order while dismissing the Suit of the appellant has partly agreed by a decision of another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Raaziq (Supra), to the extent that Forum selection clause cannot be held against public policy or arbitrary in nature as the presumption of law is that the parties were oblivious to their relative convenience or inconvenience at the time of entering into a contract .... however, has differed with regard to the final conclusion drawn in the case of Raaziq (Supra), that the proper course is to stay the proceedings in the Suit, and has been pleased to dismiss the Suit as not maintainable, as according to the learned Single Judge under C.P.C., the Suit is either to be proceeded with or the plaint is to be rejected or returned, but cannot be kept pending as stayed. The learned Single Judge has further went on to hold that ... Once a lis is brought to a file of the Court, the law provides mechanism for disposal thereof which in no way could include an order of staying proceedings for an indefinite period, and has been pleased to hold that the Suit is not maintainable before this Court. However, with respect and humility at our command, we do not subscribe to such reasoning as already discussed hereinabove, (See Paras 8 and 11), and additionally for the reason that the same besides being in direct conflict with the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Choudhry (Supra), (which either was not brought to the knowledge of the learned Single Judge, or otherwise escaped attention), also confirms the view that parties to an agreement cannot oust jurisdiction of a specific Court, which otherwise vests in it, and likewise cannot confer jurisdiction in a Court which is lacking. The same is not permissible in law, hence cannot be approved by this Court, as we are of the considered view, that by staying the proceedings, the Court retains its jurisdiction as well as respects the agreement between the parties as being permissible to chose a forum of their convenience to settle the dispute. Whereas, by dismissing the Suit as not maintainable, the Court will be ousting itself from the lawful jurisdiction, it has, as undoubtedly, in the instant matter as well as in dealership agreements of like nature, notwithstanding that they have been signed outside Pakistan, there is always a likelihood, that a part of the cause of action accrues within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, (like, supply of sub-standard goods, breach of any part of letter of credit opened in Pakistan, claims and returns of inventories by local purchasers and so on and so forth).

14. In the circumstances, we partly allow this appeal, by modifying the impugned order by holding that the Suit cannot be dismissed as not being maintainable in the facts and circumstances of the case, and it would be more appropriate to keep it pending by staying the proceedings till such time the issue is resolved by the parties from the forum chosen by them for settlement of dispute in the agreement or otherwise. 13.(sic) Appeal partly allowed. MH/M-61/Sindh Order accordingly.