P L D 1983 Karachi 76 (PLP)

MUANWAR ALi KHAN, J.-This judgment will dispose of a batch of Constitution Petitions Bearing No. D-407/77, D-1287/79, D-1655/79, D-1680/79. D-1624/80, D-427/81, D-434/81, D-887/81, D-892/81 and D-893/81; respectively filed by Golden Industries Ltd. C/16,. Estate Avenue, SITE, Karachi, Messrs Globe Textile Mills Limited, IInd Floor, Sattar Chambers, 29 West Wharf Road, Karachi, Messrs Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Limited, Sattar Chambers, 29 West Wharf Road, Karachi, Star Textile Mills Ltd. 9th Floor, Adamji House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, Messrs A. B. Beverages Limited, E/18-A, S.

1. T. E., Karachi, Messrs Karim Silk Mills Limited, C/30 Sind Industrial Trading Estate Karachi, Messrs B. R. Herman and Mohatta Limited, B-lII-305-135-A, Talpur Road, Karachi, Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. Landhi, Karachi, Adamji Industries Limited, Adamji House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, and Hussain Industries Limited, Jubilee Insurance House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, as they involve common points of law and fact.

2. The factual background out of which those petitions have arisen may briefly be narrated as follows: The petitioners used to pay property tax in respect of the premises on which their industrial units situate in accordance with the provisions of the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958-Act). However, in 1976 the Taxation Authorities embarked upon an exercise of self-assessment Scheme with a view to prepare new valuation list in respect of the properties used wholly or partly for industrial purposes. By a public notice, which is reproduced below in verbatim, the owners of the properties as per form in pink colour which was made available to them through the National Bank and its Branches. The public notice reads as under: ATTENTION INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY OWNERS A survey is being carried out by the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of Sind to assess all Industrial, and industrial-cum-Commercial Residential Properties situated in the Rating Area of Karachi, under the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. . All property owners, occupants and lessees are required by the law to supply complete information with respect to their properties. This information is to be supplied by filing in Declaration Forms available at all branches of the National Bank of Pakistan from 26th October to 15th November, 1976. Instructions about how to . fill in these forms are also available alongwith the forms. Declaration Forms in duplicate, duly filled in and signed by the owner/ occupier/lessee or his authorized representative must reach the following address by post not later than 15th November, 1976: Director Taxes, Industrial Survey. P. O. Box No. 7984 Saddar, Karachi-3. Any one who is owner, occupier or lessee of an Industrial or Industrial cum-Commercial-cum-Residential property and fails to submit the information on the Declaration Form by due date, or supplies false information will be liable for prosecution under the Sind Tax Evasion (Punishment) Act, 1974, which prescribes two years' imprisonment for supplying false information or for withholding any information asked for in the Form. Please mail the Declaration Forms promptly under registered post. Your co-operation will be highly appreciated. (Ziaul Islam) Director, Excise & Taxation (Taxes), Karachi. In response to the above notice the petitioners furnished the requisite 'date. Based on the material received from the petitioners., a new valuation list was hammered out. It was founded on the formula which is reproduced below:"Dear Property Owner The Draft valuation list of Industrial Properties published today, the I st of December, 1976, has been prepared by using the following rates prescribed by the Government Cost of Land . Rs. 50,000.00 per acre. (The same flat rate has been fixed, whatever the size of the plot of land irrespective of its location of market value). Cost of Construction . Rs. 60.00 per sq. ft. A. C. C. . . . Rs. 45.00 per sq. ft. (ACC stands for all kinds of constructions which are not RCC). (Improved land ...Rs. 4.00 per unit of measurement). (This includes all kinds of platforms, water tanks, roads, boundary walls, chimneys, funnels etc). After calculating the cost of constructions as above the GARV has been worked out as follows:- (1) GARV of Land -4 % of Cost of Land. (2) Rental Value of RCC, AC and improved Land -5 % of cost of construction. (3) GARV of construction area - Rental value as obtained at No. (2) minus 25 % depreciation allowance. Total G. A. R. V. . . . . . . . (1) Plus (3) Please check up for yourself if the G. A. R. V. shown for your property in the Draft Valuation List is in accordance with the information supplied by you. If you have any objection, please fill up the closed objection form and hand over within 30 days to: The Assessing Authority, Excise & Taxation Department, 6th Floor, Shirin Manzil, Bunder Road, Karachi. Sabihuddin Ahmed, Khurshid Anwar Shaikh, Imam Ali Kazi and A. Rauj for Appellant. Abdul Sattar Shaikh, A. A: G. for Respondent. Dates of hearing: llth, 12th, 13tb, 18th and 19th May, 1982. JUDGMENT MUANWAR ALi KHAN, J.-This judgment will dispose of a batch of Constitution Petitions Bearing No. D-407/77, D-1287/79, D-1655/79, D-1680/79. D-1624/80, D-427/81, D-434/81, D-887/81, D-892/81 and D-893/81; respectively filed by Golden Industries Ltd. C/16,. Estate Avenue, SITE, Karachi, Messrs Globe Textile Mills Limited, IInd Floor, Sattar Chambers, 29 West Wharf Road, Karachi, Messrs Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Limited, Sattar Chambers, 29 West Wharf Road, Karachi, Star Textile Mills Ltd. 9th Floor, Adamji House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, Messrs A. B. Beverages Limited, E/18-A, S.

1. T. E., Karachi, Messrs Karim Silk Mills Limited, C/30 Sind Industrial Trading Estate Karachi, Messrs B. R. Herman and Mohatta Limited, B-lII-305-135-A, Talpur Road, Karachi, Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. Landhi, Karachi, Adamji Industries Limited, Adamji House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, and Hussain Industries Limited, Jubilee Insurance House, I. I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi, as they involve common points of law and fact.

2. The factual background out of which those petitions have arisen may briefly be narrated as follows: The petitioners used to pay property tax in respect of the premises on which their industrial units situate in accordance with the provisions of the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the 1958-Act). However, in 1976 the Taxation Authorities embarked upon an exercise of self-assessment Scheme with a view to prepare new valuation list in respect of the properties used wholly or partly for industrial purposes. By a public notice, which is reproduced below in verbatim, the owners of the properties as per form in pink colour which was made available to them through the National Bank and its Branches. The public notice reads as under: ATTENTION INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY OWNERS A survey is being carried out by the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of Sind to assess all Industrial, and industrial-cum-Commercial Residential Properties situated in the Rating Area of Karachi, under the Sind Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. . All property owners, occupants and lessees are required by the law to supply complete information with respect to their properties. This information is to be supplied by filing in Declaration Forms available at all branches of the National Bank of Pakistan from 26th October to 15th November, 1976. Instructions about how to . fill in these forms are also available alongwith the forms. Declaration Forms in duplicate, duly filled in and signed by the owner/ occupier/lessee or his authorized representative must reach the following address by post not later than 15th November, 1976: Director Taxes, Industrial Survey. P. O. Box No. 7984 Saddar, Karachi-3. Any one who is owner, occupier or lessee of an Industrial or Industrial cum-Commercial-cum-Residential property and fails to submit the information on the Declaration Form by due date, or supplies false information will be liable for prosecution under the Sind Tax Evasion (Punishment) Act, 1974, which prescribes two years' imprisonment for supplying false information or for withholding any information asked for in the Form. Please mail the Declaration Forms promptly under registered post. Your co-operation will be highly appreciated. (Ziaul Islam) Director, Excise & Taxation (Taxes), Karachi. In response to the above notice the petitioners furnished the requisite 'date. Based on the material received from the petitioners., a new valuation list was hammered out. It was founded on the formula which is reproduced below: "Dear Property Owner The Draft valuation list of Industrial Properties published today, the I st of December, 1976, has been prepared by using the following rates prescribed by the Government Cost of Land . Rs. 50,000.00 per acre. (The same flat rate has been fixed, whatever the size of the plot of land irrespective of its location of market value). Cost of Construction . Rs. 60.00 per sq. ft. A. C. C. . . . Rs. 45.00 per sq. ft. (ACC stands for all kinds of constructions which are not RCC). (Improved land ...Rs. 4.00 per unit of measurement). (This includes all kinds of platforms, water tanks, roads, boundary walls, chimneys, funnels etc). After calculating the cost of constructions as above the GARV has been worked out as follows:- (1) GARV of Land -4 % of Cost of Land. (2) Rental Value of RCC, AC and improved Land -5 % of cost of construction. (3) GARV of construction area - Rental value as obtained at No. (2) minus 25 % depreciation allowance. Total G. A. R. V. . . . . . . . (1) Plus (3) Please check up for yourself if the G. A. R. V. shown for your property in the Draft Valuation List is in accordance with the information supplied by you. If you have any objection, please fill up the closed objection form and hand over within 30 days to: The Assessing Authority, Excise & Taxation Department, 6th Floor, Shirin Manzil, Bunder Road, Karachi. properties situating within the Karachi Rating Area, the similar properties outside that area would continue to be governed by the old valuation list. (vii) The impugned assessment purported to have been made in accordance with the new valuation list does not, in fact, conform to the said list. Taking up the first point that the valuation list was prepared in violation of the legal requirements, it may be advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions of the 1958 Act (i. e. section 3(1)(2), section 7, section 5, section 8 and section 18) which provide the framework for compiling of valuation list and assessment of the tax on the basis thereof. They are: "3(1) Government may by notification specify urban areas where tax shall be levied under this Act: Provided that one urban area may be divided into two or more rating areas or several urban areas may be grouped as one rating area. (2) Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4), there shall be charged, levied and collected a tax on annual value of buildings and lands at the following scales: "S. 5. (1) The annual value of any land or building shall be the gross annual rent at which such land or building together with any fixtures such as lifts, or electric or other such fittings, may be let out. (2) The gross annual rent shall be the prescribed amount not exceeding ten per cent. of the total value of the land or building. (3) The total value of any land or building shall in the prescribed manner, be determined by the prescribed officer or authority on the basis of the market value thereof and the value of fixtures, if any, therein. (4) For the purpose of determining the market value, a rating area may be divided in such sub-rating areas, and each rating or sub-rating area may comprise one or more such categories of lands or buildings . and there may be such different rates for determination of the market value for .lands or buildings in each rating area, sub-rating area or category, as the case may be, as may be prescribed; Provided that the annual value of a building which is subject to any law for the time being in force relating to restriction of rent shall not be greater than the annual value of such building immediately before the coming into force of this section. "Section 7.-(1) A valuation list shall be made by the prescribed authority in accordance with the rules framed under this Act for every rating area so as to come into force either on the first day of July, or the first day of January, and thereafter a new valuation list shall be made from time to time so that the interval between the dates on which one valuation list and the next succeeding valuation list respectively come into force shall be a period of five years Provided that Government may by order: (a) reduce by a period not exceeding one year or extend by a period not exceeding five years the interval which would otherwise elapse between the coming into force of any two successive valuation list for any rating area or where a valuation list has beers lost or destroyed by operation of circumstances beyond central, cancel the list, direct the preparation of a new list and order recovery of pending tax to be made on the basis either of last preceding valuation list or of the new list prepared under this proviso; and (b) for the purpose of preparation of new valuation list, divide any rating area into parts, each part comprising such areas or types of properties as may be specified in the order and appoint date or dates on which new valuation lists in respect of such part or parts shall come into force. (2) Subject to the provisions of any such order as aforesaid, every valuation list shall come into force on the first day of July, or the. first day of January, as the case may be, next following the date on which it is finally approved by the assessing authority and shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder (including the provisions with respect to the alteration of and the making of . addition to the valuation list) remain in force until it is superseded by a new valuation list. "Section 8.-(1) Where the assessing authority for any area has issued notices requiring returns in connection with the making of a new valuation list, the said authority shall, as soon as may be after the expiration of the period allowed for the delivery of the returns, cause a draft valuation list to be prepared for the area published in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Any person aggrieved by any entry in the theft valuation list, or by the insertation therein or omission therefrom of any matter, or otherwise, with respect to the list, may, in accordance with the rules made under this Act lodge an objection with the assessing authority at any time before the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the draft valuation list is published Provided that in special circumstances the Commissioner may, by notification. extend the period to a maximum of sixty days." "Section 18.-(1) In every case where a new valuation list is intended to be made for any rating area, the assessing authority shall give public notice of such intention in such manner as may be prescribed and may serve a notice on the owner, occupier or lessee of any building or land in the said area, or on any one of them, requiring him, or them, to make a return containing such particulars, as may be prescribed. (2) Every person on whom a notice to make a return is served in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall, within thirty days of the date of the service of notice, make a ,return in such form as is required by the notice, and deliver it in the manner so required to the assessing authority. (3) If any person on whom such notice has been served fails within the required period to submit such return, the assessing authority may . proceed to value such property in such manner as it deems fit. As provided in subsection (1) of section 3, tax is collected in urban areas which are declared, by notification, as rating areas. Subsection (2) of section 3 provides that the tax is leviable on annual value of building and lands. According to subsection (1) of section 5, annual value is nothing but the gross annual rent at which the land or building in question is let out. .Subsection (2) of the same section shows that gross annual rent is the prescribed amount not exceeding 10 % of the total value of the land or building. Again subsection (3) of this second provides the mechanism for determining the total value of the land or building, which again is linked with market value and subsection (4) lays down the procedure for computing the market value. Keeping in view the guidelines contained in section 5, preparation of valuation list is undertaken under section 7 by the prescribed authority in accordance with the rules. According to the section there has to be a separate list for every rating area, and the list so prepared is to be brought in force either from 1st day of July, or lst day of January, and is to remain valid for a period of 5 years. However, the Government has power to reduce this period by a maximum period of one year or extend it by a period not exceeding 5 years. As provided in section 8, where the assessing authority has called for returns for making of new valuation list, he shall, at the expiry of the period for submitting the returns publish draft valuation list. Any person aggrieved by the draft list can file objections with the assessing authority within 30 days of its publication. Thereafter the list is finalized by disposing the objections. It may also be mentioned that returns for preparation of new valuation list are called for and are submitted in accordance with section

18. In the instant case the owners of the properties used wholly or partly for industrial purposes were no doubt called upon by a public notice (reproduced above) to furnish the requisite date in respect of their properties on the prescribed form. The petitioners in response to the notice submitted the details of their properties in the said form. But , still the complaint in that section 18 was not strictly followed in calling for and submitting of the returns. However, a, required by section 8, the draft valuation list based on the formula (reproduced above) was published, vide the public notice dated fat December. 1976, given by the Director, Excise & Taxation through Press. Under the same section the petitioners filed their objections against the list. Despite this, their grievance is that they were not given hearing in support of the objections and the list was finalized in their absence without according them any opportunity of being heard. They were simply informed by the cyclostyled communication that the objections filed by the Chamber of Commerce J3c Industry were treated as their objections. The petitioners also took exception to the formula which was made the basis for determining the valuations specified in the list. According to them the formula was not in accordance with the principles of section

5. Finally as provided in section 7 the list was enforced with effect from 1st January, 1977. But the enforcement of the list from this date is also under fire. From the above appraisal, it would appear that although attempt was made to comply with the necessary legal requirements in preparation of the list, yet there can be not manner of doubt that the list was prepared and finalized not strictly in accordance with the provisions of the 1958, Act, and the rules thereunder. Neither the list was prepared by prescribed authority as required by section 7 nor the valuations reflected therein were computed in the light of guidelines contained in section

5. The formula adopted in the preparation of the list had no legal basis and was totally alien to the said Act. Precisely for these reasons the concerned authorities seemed to have felt the necessity to cure the list of legal infirmities by providing it a legal cover. Accordingly the list was validated by an amendment brought the Sind Finance Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 1977-Act). This brings us to consideration of the second objection by which vireo of the validating legislation have been assailed. Third and fourth objections which too call in question the validity of the aforesaid amendment may be considered together with this objection. The amendment was made in the 1958-Act by inserting section 8-A which reads as under: "Section 8-A.-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the valuation list which has been prepared in respect of the properties used wholly or partly for industrial purposes and situating within the limits of Karachi Rating Area and has been enforced from the 1st day of January, 1977, shall be deemed to have been validly prepared and enforced." This amendment is the creature of the Provincial Legislature which derives its power and authority from the Constitution. The relevant part of Article 142 of the Constitution, 1973, which deals with the legislative power of Provincial Assembly reads as under: . "

142. Subject to the Constitution (b) . (c) a Provincial Assembly shall, and Parliament shall not, have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List; and (d) .............. It would appear that the Provincial .Legislature has unfettered legislative jurisdiction in respect of the matters not mentioned either in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List. Any law made in exercise of such jurisdiction would however be subject to the Constitution (I. e. not being in contravention of any provision of the Constitution). There is no dispute that the subject-matter of the controversial amendment falls within the Provincial Legislative sphere. The only question that remains to be examined is whether the amendment under consideration contravenes any provision of the Constitution. The amendment has been attacked on several grounds. The first ground of attack is that, although it is not a monetary measure, it has been passed as a part of the Finance Act, 1917. As the mode of passage of the law relating to financial matters through assembly is different from the one followed in case of other laws, the amendment, it is argued, has been passed in contravention of the procedure laid down by the Constitution and the rules framed thereunder. Consequently the amendment is thought to be invalid and inoperative. With regret w cannot subscribe to the view that the legislation which validated the valuation list, thereby paving the way for assessment of Property Tax cannot be treated as law relating to monetary affairs. We are of the considered A opinion that the amendment which has bearing on finances of the Province is essentially a financial legislation and was therefore rightly got through the Assembly as a part and parcel of "Money Bill". We are strengthened in our view by clause (2) of Article 115 .of the Constitution. It defines the scope of `Money Bill' m the following terms: "115.-(2) For the purposes of this Article, a Bill or amendment shall be deemed to be a Money Bill if it contains provisions dealing with all or any of the following matters namely (a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax; (b) . (c) . (d) . . (e) . (f) Any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in the -preceding paragraphs." The amendment which relates to the validation and enforcement of -the valuation list undoubtly provides a basis for assessment of the property tax and as such it falls within para. (a) or in any case para. (f) of the above clause. Accordingly it was correctly enacted as a part of the Sind Finance Act, 1977. It may further be stated that in the event of controversy if a particular Bill is or is not Money Bill, the ruling of the Speaker of the Assembly will have the effect of clinching the matter vide clause (4) of Article

115. Since the Speaker allowed the amendment in question to be passed as a matter of the Finance Act, his decision was presumably in favour of the amendment being a money bill. The clause (5) of Article 115 further provides that the Speaker's certificate appended with the Money Bill when it is presented to the Governor for his assent shall be taken as a conclusive proof of the Bill being a Money Bill. Even if it be held that the amendment was not in the nature of the money bill, yet we see no difficulty in getting it passed as a part of such bill. According to Article 115, all that distinguishes money bill from other legislation is that for introduction of money bill in the Assembly, prior consent of the Governor is required and further after passing of the bill by the Assembly, when it is presented to the Governor for his assent, the Speaker has to certify the legislation to be a money bill. But for these two requirements, the money bill is passed in the same manner as is followed in case of other laws. We are unable to appreciate how the fulfillment of aforesaid two requisites would render the law, which is not a money bill, as invalid if the Assembly chooses to pass that law as a part of money bill. Our attention was also drawn to the rules of procedure regulating the transaction of business by the Assembly. It was submitted that these rules provide different procedures to be followed for passing money bills and other laws. As the procedure prescribed for the laws other than money bills was not followed in the instant case, the argument went further, the amendment was defective. It seems the argument betrays the ignorance of the scheme of the rules wherein, although Chapter XIV has been reserved for passing of budget yet Chapter XI deals with legislation in general. The latter chapter obviously applies to all kinds of laws-money bills as well as other laws. Even otherwise the Assembly itself being the author of the rules which have been made by it for its own convenience, any departure from the rules, which the Assembly is quite, competent to make, would not render any action or proceeding of the Assembly as invalid. Thus the, objection that the amendment is invalid because it has been passed as a part of the Finance Act has no substance. The next objection that has been taken as to the validity of the amendment is that the authorities responsible for compiling the valuation list have managed the validating legislation in order to cover up their illegal acts of omission and commission. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the validating law was, therefore, made with mala fide intention. This argument has raised a very crucial issue as to whether allegations of mala fides can be attributed to the Provincial Assembly which is the author of the amendment. In this connection reference has been made to the cases reported as State v. Ziaur Rehman (1), Federation of Pakistan v. Saeea Ahmed (2), Pir Shah Mardan Shah v. Chief Land Commissioner, Sind (3) and Azad Government of the State Jammu and Kashmir v. Brig. Muhammad Aslam Khan (4). In the first case it was held : "It will thus be seen that, so far as this Court is concerned it has consistently held the view that a mala fide act stands in the same position as an act done without jurisdiction, because no Legislature when granting a power to do an act can possibly contemplate the perpetration of injustice by permissing the doing of that act mala fide. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the words "purported to be done or done in the purported exercise of powers" cannot cover acts which were not done by person empowered under the Statute or the legislative measure to so act or were clearly beyond the scope of the power given by the statute or were done mala fide or by practising a fraud upon the Statute for a colourable purpose. I, therefore, agree with the majority view which prevailed in the High Court that clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution does not validate acts which are coram non judice or without jurisdiction or done mala fide." In the above case reference has been made to acts done in the purported exercise of powers derived from a legislation. If such acts were done mala fide, they were held not to have been validated by Article 281 of Interim Constitution. It would be noticed that Article 281 had given blanket legal coverage to all `acts' done or purported to have been done in exercise of powers derived from the laws specified in the Article. While interpreting the scope of the coverage of validation provided in the Article, the Supreme Court expressed the view that the acts done mala fide, or without jurisdication could not be held to have been validated. In other words the Supreme Court attempted to explain the intention of the Legislature as envisaged by the Article

281. That is to say what acts the Legislature .intended to validate by enactment of the said Article. It was not ruled by the Supreme Court that legislature had no power or was in any manner prohibited from legalising such acts. Furthermore, in the above case the allegations of mala fide against the Legislature were not involved. In the instant case, however, the act of preparation of the valuation list which has rot been prepared strictly in accordance with the existing law and rules has been legalised by the Provincial Assembly. The reported case in which neither the power of Legislature to validate such act has been questioned nor allegations of mala fide are attributed to the Legislature is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. For the same reasons the cases of Saeed Ahmed and Shah Mardan Shah referred to above would not be helpful to the. petitioners. In these cases too mala fide acts of legislature were not involved. However the relevant authority pertinent to the point of attributing mala fide to the Legislature in the case of Brig. Muhammad Aslam Khan. In that case the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir made the following observations : "Courts have the power to go into the vires of a statute on the ground whether such a statute is violative of any constitutional provision. (1)PLD 1973 S C49 (2)PLD 1974SC 151 (3) P L D 1974 Kar, 375 (4) P L D 1981 Azad J & K 71 But there is no provision in the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force, empowering a Civil Court or a Supreme Court to declare a statute as void on the ground that this was the result of mala fides on the part of the Legislature. Various authorities have been cited by the Learned counsel for the respondent where in the enactments were declared as void but in none of those cases declaration was made on the ground that enactment was prompted by mala fide on the part of law giver. Legislature and Judiciary, the two organs of the State, have different spheres of action which has been defined in the Constitution of all the civilised countries. It is not within the province of the Courts to Judge the `bona fides' or `mala fides' of the Legislature. The Legislative Assembly in Azad Kashmir is empowered to legislate, subject to the restrictions imposed on it by the interim Constitution Act of 1974. The Courts can declare a law to be void on the ground that it is violation of a constitutional provision but Courts -have not been invested with the powers to declare a law as void attributing rnala fides to the Legislative body. We are fortified in our view by a case reported as A I R 1932 Cal. 753, where .in it was held that High Court had the power to consider and determine whether an Act passed by Legislative Assembly was within power but it was not in the province of the Court to consider the propriety of such a legislation. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid authority and we held that the amendment in Article 151 of Limitation Act cannot be held as void on the ground that it was mala fide." We fully endorse the views expressed in the above authority. We wish to reiterate that the Legislature is Supreme within its legislative field as defined by the Constitution. It is absolutely free to enact any law within the four corners of such field. The only restriction on exercise of its legislative power is that the law made by it does not offend against any provision of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioners have not been able to point out any provision of the Constitution under which any law. of Legislature can be struck down ,on the ground of mala fide on the part of the legislature. The Judiciary's role is limited to testing the vires of any legislation in the light of the Constitutional provisions. The Courts which are themselves creation of the Constitution cannot travel beyond the extreme borders of that basic document and Saddle the Legislature with mala fide intention, declaring the amendment made by it as invalid and ultra vires on that account. The amendment has also come under attack on the ground that it is discriminatory, being inconflict with the Article 25 of the Constitution 1973 which guarantees equality of citizens before law. It would app.-ar that the valuation list which has been validated by the amendment in question provides a basis for assessment of the property tax only in respect of industrial properties situate within Karachi Rating Areas. In other words the list is not applicable to other categories of properties within the same rating area or all kinds of property in other rating areas. The question is whether limited applicability of the list to particular class of the properties only in one rating area had the effect or offending against the aforesaid Article of equality of citizens. The same point of discrimination in violation of the Constitutional Provision came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case reported as Jibeitdra Kishore etc. v. Province. of East Pakistan (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.)). It was held : "One of these propositions is that equal protection of the laws means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances, in their lives, liberty and property and in pursuit of happiness. Another generalization more frequently stated is that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires that all person shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. In the application of these principles, however, it has always been recognised that classification of persons or things is in no way repugnant to the "equality doctrine provides and classification is not arbitrary or capricious, is natural and reasonable and bears a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. It is not for the courts in such cases, is said, to demand from the legislature a scientific accuracy in the classification adopted. If the classification is relevant to the object of the Act it must be upheld, unless the relevancy is too remote or fanciful. A classification that proceeds on irrelevant consideration, such as differences in race, colour, or religion will certainly be rejected by the Court." Applying these tests to the present case we are inclined to hold that the legislation under attack is not discriminator. Obviously all industrial units as a class within Karachi Rating Area are covered by the amendment. It is not a case of discrimination against any individual unit as distinct from remaining similar units in the same rating area nor the amendment seeks to discriminate a group of such units from rest of similar units in the same rating area. Merely because the amendment has not been extended to the other categories of property in the same rating area or the industrial units of the other rating areas it cannot be subbed as discriminatory. By virtue of power conferred by subsection (4) of section 5 of the 1958 Act the property in any rating area can be divided categorywise for the purpose of determining market value which ultimately served as foundation for assessment of the tax. The application of the valuation list only to industrial property of that Karachi rating area is therefore in accordance with the principles of the above provision of law. As for the industrial units situating within other rating areas, they cannot necessarily be placed at par with the similar property units within Karachi rating area. May be they exist in the circumstances and under the conditions different from those of Industrial Units of Karachi rating area. The privileges enjoyed and the liabilities suffered by both sets of individual units may also not be the same. Probably economic considerations or geographical position or such other facts are the reasons for segregation of the industrial units of Karachi rating area from those of other rating areas for the purpose of applying the new valuation list. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case it is not for the Courts to demand from the legislature a scientific accuracy of classification adopted. What is to be seen is that the classification is natural and reasonable. W e have no doubt in our mind that by extending the new valuation list only to the industrial units of the Karachi rating are the classification that has resulted is both natural and reasonable. Therefore we see no force in the argument that the amendment in question is discriminatory or in any way offends against Article 25 of the Constitution on, 1973. The next objection is directed against the retrospective operation of the amendment. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that they had vested right to be assessed in accordance with the law that held ground at the relevant time of assessment. Since the retrospective application of the amendment has the effect of taking away that right, it is ultra vires of the legislative jurisdiction of the Assembly. This argument is obviously based on the thinking which overlooks the sovereign power of the Legislature to legislate in respect of all matters which fall within its legislative field. As pointed out earlier the only bar to which the power of the legislature is subjected is that a law produced by the exercise of the legislative power is not violative of any provision of the constitution. Article 12 of the Constitution prohibits retrospective application of the law which authorizes punishment excepting this provision, there is no other restriction on the. power of legislature from applying any legislation retrospectively. To elaborate the retrospectivity of .the enactments further, references has been made to several authorities. The recent case on this point is reported as Commissioner of Income-tax (East), Karachi v. Ebrahim D. Ahmed P L D 1982 Kar.

470. The relevant observations of the Division Bench are as under : "From the principles deduced .from the case law discussed hereinabove, it is evident that the legislature has power to enact curative legislation and validate orders/actions, which were not valid or were without jurisdiction when .passed or taken in cases when some proceeding arising .from such order or action remains pending. In the instant case the Financs Ordinance XXI of 1972 was enacted during the pendency of the above references/cases containing inter alia enactment of subsection (4-AA) to section 15-BB of the Income-tax Act disentitling the recipients of the dividends from the Companies covered under, section 15-BB of the Income-tax Act from the Income-tax exemption. The above provision was enacted with restrospective effect i.e. reverting back to the date when section 15-BB was enacted by Ordinance XV of 1959 (with effect i.e. reverting back to the date) when section 15-BB was enacted by Ordinance XV of 1959 (with effect from 1-4-1959). The above enactment including subsection (4-AA) as a valid piece of legislation; Another case in the series is of I. T. O. v. Suleman Bhai Jiwa (P L D 1970 S C 89). It was held : "No rule is more. firmly established than the rule with regard to restros pective operatin of a statue law. It is fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have restrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implication .. . .. It follows from this rule that retrospective effect to a statute may be given either by express order or that the same may be inferred from the language employed." The next case referred in this connection is Messrs Mamukonjan Cotton Factory v. Punjab Province (P L D 1975 S C 50). In this case the argument addressed at the bar was; .that the validating ordinance purports to enable the provincial Government to retain and claim, what according to the Judgments of the High Court, the Government could not have act the material time, levied and collected. These Judgments are rendered by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution itself. The validating Ordinance on the other hand, is subconstitutional legislation, which according to the counsel cannot under or destroy, what he described as the end product of the constitutional jurisdiction". It was held : "The argument, in my opinion, is without substance and which if accepted would indeed lead to startling results. It would strike at the very root of the power of Legislature, otherwise competent to legislate on a particular subject, to undertake any remedial or curative legislation after discovery of defect in an existing law as a result of the judgment of a superior Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The argument overlooks the fact, that remedial or curative legislation is also "the end product" of constitutional jurisdiction in the cognate' field. The argument if accepted, would also seek to throw into serious disarray the pivotal arrangement in the Constitution regarding the division of soveriegn power of the State among its principal organs, namely, the executive, the Legislature and the judiciary, each being the master in its own assigned field under the Constitution." We may also refer to Sh. Aminullah v. Pannu Ram PLD 1967SC

289. In this case the contention was that the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which was promulgated on 7-10-1959, could not be given retrospective effect. Repelling the contention the Supreme Court held : " . . . the established rule is that subject to any constitutional bar there is no legal limit to the making and unmaking of laws by a Legislature. Similarly it is within the domain of the Legislature to appoint a date for the commencement of laws made by it including a date preceding the making of the laws. In short the authority to legislate includes the authority to legislate with retrospective effect. The doctrine stems from the sovereignty of a Legislature . . . . ." In view of above, we see nothing wrong with the amendment i.e . section 8-A of the 1958 Act which is accordingly .:held as intra vires of the' Provincial Assembly and the Constitution. The next point of controversy is about the simultaneous operation of both the new valuation list and old valuation list. `-Since both the lists existed and were operative at the relevant time of the impugned assessment, the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the petitioners were entitled to be assessed in accordance with the list already existing, particularly when it was neither scrapped nor modified by the new list. It is true that the valuation list which was originally enforced under section 7 of the 1958 Act was extended from time to time vide Notifications mentioned below : "(i) Notification No. 3 (89)/72-Tax/5082, dated I1-10-1972 extending the period from 1-7-1973 to 30-6-1975. . (ii) Notification No. 3 (43)/73-Tax/3327, dated 29-6-1975 extending the period from 1-7-1975 to 31-12-1975. (iii) Notification No: 3 (43)/73-Tax/8140, dated 17-10-1975 extending the period from 1-1-.1976 to 30-6-1976. (iv) Notification No. 3 (43)/73.Tax/4053, dated 30-6-1976 extending the period from 1-7-1976 to 30-6-1977. (v) Notification No. 3 (43)/73-Tax/2334, dated 27-6-1977 extending the period from 1-7-1977 to 31-12-1977. It is clear that the original valuation list was in existence on 1-1-1977 vide notification at S. No. (iv) above, when the new valuation list was put into force. The amendment by which the new valuation list was validated and enforced does not provide for replacement or modification of the existing old list. However the latter list was to expire on 30-6-1977. But instead of allowing it to lapse on that date, it was once again renewed and given fresh lease of life up to 31-12-1977 vide notification at S. No. (v) above. Thus both the old list and the new list existed side by side during the period when the impugned assessment was made. This situation by itself does not entitle the petitioners to be assessed in accordance with the old list. The new list was brought into force by a legislation which has been held perfectly valid and intra vires the Provincial Assembly which passed it. Accordingly the list enforced by the law will have precedence over the list which was being kept alive by executive actions (i.e. by issuing notifications). Of course the notifications were also issued in pursuance of the statutory power conferred on the Provincial Government. But immediately on promulgation of the law by which new valuation list came into force, the power of Government ceased to the extent of renewing the old list in respect of the properties covered by the new list. If dispite the implementation of the new list, the government authorities through oversight or otherwise kept the old list alive simultaneously, their such action would not in any manner jeopardise the new list. In case of conflict between the two, the list made operative by express legislation would prevail. It would appear that the old list is not confined to any particular class of properties. It covers all categories of the properties. After enforcement of the new list which relates to only industrial property, the old list had to be kept alive to enable the authorities to assess other categories of properties which do not find mention in the new list. Therefore, to say that the old list was wrongly extended in presence of the new list; is not a correct view. All that was required was that at the time of renewing the old list for further period, the properties specified in the new list should have been dropped. Perhaps this omission has been due to oversight. In any case we are convinced that the co-existence of the two lists at the relevant time, does not entitle the petitioners to be assessed in accordance with the old list. Accordingly the argument on this point fails. ' The next contention is that the amendment in question being applicable only with the. Karachi rating area, it does not cover the properties involved in some of the Petitions, as they lie outside that area. Accordingly the impugned assessment made in accordance with the new valuation list in these cases is illegal and liable to be set aside. As provided in subsection (1) of section 3 of the 1958 Act (reproduced above) the Peovincial Government has power to notify the urban area where the property tax is to be levied and for this purpose one urban area may be divided into two or more rating areas or several urban areas be grouped together as one rating area. Reference is invited to the four notifications mentioned at S. Nos. (fi), (iii), (iv) and (v) on page 91-92 above. These notifications, by which Karachi rating area has been shown separately from Sind Industrial Trading Estate Rating Area, Landhi Colony Town Committee Rating'Area, Federal 'B' Area Rating Area and Model Town Rating Area, are issued under section 7 of the 1958 Act, extending the life of the valuation list. We have however not been shown the notification issued under subsection (1) of section 3 of the said Act indicating which of the urban areas of Karachi Division are included in the Karachi rating area. In absence of such notification it cannot be held authoritatively if the areas where the industrial units of the petitioners situate are not part of Karachi rating area. Even otherwise it is a question of fact whether the properties involved in these petitions fall within the Karachi rating area or outside it. Such question cannot be answered by this Court by exercising its constitutional jurisdiction. But we would like to make it clear that section 8-A by which the new valuation list has been enforced and validated applies only to the industrial properties within Karachi rating area. Bearing this in mind, we would wish the authorities concerned to have a fresh look at the petitioners' cases and if any of their properties is found to be situating outside the limits of the Karachi rating area, they are bound to be re-assessed in accordance with the old valuation list if they are already assessed according to the new valuation list. The last point that was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in course of their arguments was that the impugned assessment in respect of their properties has not been made in accordance with the new list. This is however denied. Even otherwise if the petitioners are aggrieved by the assessment made by the relevant authority, the remedy open to them is to go in appeal or revision as the case may be vide section 10 of 1958 Act. This Court cannot assume the role of appellate or revisional authority no can it take on itself the responsibility of deciding the controversial issues of fact. We have been informed that some of the petitioners have already challenged the assessment in appeal and their appeals are still pending. In some cases, it is said, the matter has been taken in revisions which are also pending decision. In such cases it would be in the petitioners' own interest to pursue their case in appeal or as the case may be revision. In the cases in which the remedy of appeal . or revision has not been resorted to the aggrieved parties may do so even at this stage and if necessary move the concerned authorities for condonation of delay in filing appeal or revision.. Subject to above we dismiss this petition, leaving the parties, in the circumstances of this case, to bear their own costs. NAIMUDDIN, J.-I agree. s. Q. Petition dismissed.