P L D 1962 Dacca 381 (PLP)

MURSHED, J.‑This reference arises out of an appeal in respect of a suit instituted by the respondent‑plaintiff for specific per formance of a contract to sell certain plots of land. The suit was tried by a Munsif of Noakhali, who decreed the same. Thereafter the appellant‑defendants preferred an appeal, which was beard and disposed of by a Subordinate Judge of Noakhali, who dis missed the appeal on its merits and also on a preliminary point that the appeal was barred by the law of limitation on the basis of the following facts: The judgment and the decree were pronounced by the learned Munsif on the 30th of April 1956. The appellants applied for a copy of the judgment on the 18th of May 1956, and the same was made ready for delivery on the 26th of May 1956. In the meantime, on the 21st of May 1956, the appellants applied for a copy of the decree. The decree was signed on the 11th of June 1956, and a copy thereof was made ready for delivery on the 13th of June 1956. The appeal was filed on the 13th July 1956. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the appeal was barred by the law of limitation, and, in doing so, he disallowed the appellants the benefit of an exclusion of the period of time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree, as claimed by the appellants under the provisions of sub section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act. Article 152 of the first Schedule to the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of thirty days from the "date of the decree or order appealed from", is applicable to the case before us. In computing the period of limitation, the learned Subordinate Judge made no allowance to the appellants with regard to the period that elapsed between the date of the pronouncement of the judgment and decree and the date of the signing of the decree, relying on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Wahed v. Abdul Khalique (P L D 1 952 Dacca 399). In the said case one of the points, amongst others, which was decided was that no period which is antecedent to the presentation of the application for a copy of the decree would be considered as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree. Against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, the defendants preferred a second appeal to this Court. The w Division Bench of this Court, before which the hearing of the second appeal commenced, dissented from the views expressed by the previous Division Bench in Abdul Wahed's case and made a reference under Chapter VII of the Rules of this Court. Upon such reference this Full Bench was constituted. In the order of reference to a Full Bench, the learned Judges of the Division Bench did not formulate the point or points upon which they differed from the decision of the former Division Bench which decided Abdul Wahed's case, nor have they expressly referred the whole appeal for its final decision by the Full Bench. Under Chapter VII of the Rules of this Court the relevant rules are as follows: "(1) Whenever a Division Court shall differ from any other Division Court upon a point of law or usage having the force of law, the case shall be referred for decision by a Full Bench. (2) If the question arise in an Appeal from an Appellate Decree or Order, the Court referring the case shall state the point or points upon which they differ from the decision of a former Division Court and shall refer the Appeal for final decision by a Full Bench." Inasmuch as the order of reference did not specify the point or points of difference on which the reference was made, we have ourselves formulated the following questions which have to be A answered by this Full Bench (1) What is the date of the decree, from which the period of limitation starts running ? Is the date of the decree the date when the judgment was delivered ? (2) Is the appellant entitled to the benefit of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, if he has applied for a copy of the decree or the judgment after the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which in this case is thirty days from the date of the decree ? (3) Is the appellant entitled, in computing the period of limitation under section 12, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act, to the exclusion of the period which has elapsed between the date of the delivery of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree, irrespective of the question whether he has applied for a copy thereof prior to the signing of the decree or after the same was signed ? (4) Have the cases of Abdul Wahed v. Abdul Khalique and Falan Chandra Saba v. Manmohan Saba (8 D L R 597) been rightly decided ? We have already noted that Article 152 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation of thirty days from the date of the decree. The question is, what is the date of the decree ? In this connection, we would refer to the provisions of Order XX, rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. Rule 7 reads as follows "The decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree." Section 2, subsection (2), of the Code defines 'decree' as follows: " decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties in controversy in the suit and may be either, preliminary or final . . . . . . " 'Judgment' has been defined in subsection (9) of section 2 of the Code as follows: " `Judgment' means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order." Order XX, rule 6, of the Code provides as follows "(1) The decree shall agree with the judgment.‑It shall contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, and particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. (2) * * * * * * * * * * And section 33 of the Code provides as follows: "The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow." It is thus evident that the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides that the judgment must be followed by a decree, and Order XX, rule 7, of the Code enjoins that the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced. It, therefore, follows that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment, according to the provisions of the Code. In fact, according to the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code, the judgment that is pronounced is accompanied by a precise expression of an adjudication, which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or the specific matters in controversy in the suit. The decree is formally pronounced with the judgment which is accompanied by "an adjudication" con clusively determining the rights and liabilities of the parties in the suit and thereafter, according to the provisions of Order XX, rule 6, of the Code, a decree, consonant to the judgment, is drawn up with the particulars specified In the said rule and is signed by the Court in accordance with Order XX, rule 7, bearing the date on which the judgment was pronounced. From the above it is patent that the date of the decree is the date of the pronouncement of the judgment and the decree so pronounced and awarded is subsequently drawn up and signed. The said rule 6 also specifically provides that the decree should be drawn up according to the judgment which gives a conclusive adjudication of the rights of the parties In respect of all the issues raised in the suit. Thus the date of the decree, as men tioned in Art. 152 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, is the date when the judgment was pronounced. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of The Brenhilda v. British India Steam Navigation Company (8 I A 159). In that case the Board had to consider the 35th Rule ordained by the King‑in‑Council, which provided that all appeals from the Vice‑Admiralty Court were to be "asserted" within fifteen days after the date of the decree. It was held that the words after the date of the decree‑‑ meant after the date when the decree was pronounced, not the date when the decree was reduced to writing and signed, Although in that case the Board was not called upon to construe the provisions of the Limitation Act, but upon principles involved therein, it Is relevant to the questions before us and the following observations made in the judgment delivered by the Board may usefully be quoted here: "It has been urged that the decree was not drawn up In writing and signed by the Court until some considerable time afterwards, and that the parties could not appeal without annexing a copy of the decree to their petition of appeal. But the rule of annexing a copy of the decree to the petition of appeal refers to appeals which are preferred under the Code of Civil Procedure, Act VIII of 1859; It does not apply to appeals preferred or asserted under the 35th section of the rules of William IV. The words "after the date of the decree", according to their Lordships' view of the rule, do not mean after the date when the decree is drawn up in writing, but after the date on which the decree or sentence is pronounced by the Vice Admiralty or Admiralty Court as the case may be. The words, which are constantly used In Acts, which refer to decrees in the Admiralty Court are "the pronouncing of the sentence or decree". Their Lordships, therefore, think that the date of the decree did not mean the date on which the decree was reduced to writing and signed by the Court, but the date on which the High Court delivered their judgment and expressed what the decree was." From what we have stated above, the conclusion 1s Irresistible that the date of the decree is the date on which it is pronounced, namely, the date on which the judgment is passed. It cannot, therefore, mean the date on which the decree is drawn up and signed. The provision of Order XX, rule 7, of the Code to the effect that the decree as signed by the Court shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, Is not intended to be a mere decoration on the document upon which the decree is drawn up and signed. The requirement of that rule that it should bear the date of the judgment, In the afore‑said context, necessarily means that the decree as drawn up In a formal document and signed by the Court must bear the date of its birth, I.e., the date on which the judgment was pronounced. The view that we have taken finds support from a decision of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Abdul salam v. Abdul Khaliq (A I R 1945 Lah. 233) which overruled a previous decision of the same Court in the case of Kahn Chand v. Gurdit Singh (A I R 1936 Lah. 976). We may quote here the following observations of the Division Bench in the aforesaid. Abdul Salam's case: "Now Article 156 lays down that the terminus a quo for an appeal is the date of the decree or the order appealed from and Order XX, rule 7 provides that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment is pronounced. Taking both these provisions together and In view of the fact that everybody is presumed to know the law, I am inclined to think that time for appeal starts from the date of the judgment." The decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Madhub Mitter v. Kali Shunkar Dass (I L R 13 Cal. 104), in fact, expressly decided that the date of the decree is the date on which the judgment was pronounced. Petheram, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, observed as follows: "The first question is, what is the date of the decree, and for the purpose of ascertaining that it is necessary to look at section 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By that section it is provided that a "decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree", so that whatever may be the day on which the actual signature is made, the date of the decree, for all purposes, is to be the date on which the judgment was pronounced." It is apparent that In Bani Madhub Mitter's case the Full Bench decided that the date of the decree was the date of the judgment and It further held that, in computing the period of limitation under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the appellant would be entitled to have the period, which intervened between the date of the judgment and the date of signing the decree, excluded. The Full Bench in that case did not hold that the period of limitation would run from the date of signing the decree. It has specifically, stated that the date of the decree is the date of delivery of the judgment. If the date of the decree is taken to mean the date which it Is signed, then the question of exclusion of the period4 between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree, in computing the period of limitation under section 12 of the Limitation Act, would not arise. In fact, all the cases,' which are discussed below In respect of the third question as formulated by us proceed on the footing that the date of the decree, is the date of the judgment. If the date of the decree, namely, the date from which the period of limitation begins to run is taken to be the date on which the decree is formally drawn up and signed, it would be futile and utterly useless to discuss whether the period which intervenes between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree would be treated as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree in order to claim exclusion under subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act. A Single Bench of the Lahore High Court In the case of Kahn Chand v. Gurdit Singh has held that the date of the decree is the date of the signing of the same; but this has been overruled by a Division Bench of the said High Court in Abdul Salam's case referred to above. A Full Bench of the West Pakistan High Court In the case of East and West Steamship Company v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd. (P L D 1960 Kar. 840), has held that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment and this settles the law for West Pakistan Courts. Similarly, a Single Bench decision of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in the case of Pandu v. Rajeswar (A I R 1924 Nag. 271) was overruled in the Full Bench decision of that Court in the case of Umda v. Rupchand (A I R 1927 Nag. 1), where it was observed as follows; "The Limitation Act gives various periods within which appeals from decrees must be filed, and those all commence from the date of the decree, which is the date of the judgment . . . . ." Later in the judgment it has again been observed: "It is clear that the limitation for an appeal runs from the date of the decree, which is the date of the judgment." In the case of Ramey v. Broughton (I L R 10 Cal. 652), Garth, C. J., at pages 659‑50 has observed as follows; "By the 151st Article of the schedule to the Limitation Act the twenty days are to be reckoned from the date of the decree; and by the 20th section of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree Is to bear date the day on which the judgment Is pronounced, so that the appeal must clearly be filed within twenty days from the day on which the judgment is pronounced." After quoting the aforesaid observations of Garth, C. J., in Ramey's case, Mahmood, J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench in the case of Bechi v. Ahsan Ullah Khan (I L R 12 All. 461), has observed at page 474 of the report as follows: "In the present case the decree bad already been signed on the 31st May 1887, and the defendant applied for a copy on that very day. It cannot be said that the fact of the decree having remained unsigned up to that date in any way delayed their obtaining a copy, and therefore no allowance should be made to them for the period antecedent to their application. Any other view would, I think, require that in the third column of Art. 152 of the Limitation Act, we should read the words "the date of the decree" as if they were "the date on which the decree is signed" an interpretation which in my opinion is not just reliable by any rule." In the case of Rakhal Das Mazumdar v. Jogendra Narain Mazumdar (10 C L J 467), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that for the purposes of Art. 179 of the Limitation Act, the date of the decree is the date of the judgment and that time runs not from the date when the decree was actually signed, but from the date of the judgment. In the case of Golam Gafar Mandal v. Goljan Bibi (I L R 25 Cal. 109) a Division Bench consisting of Sir Francis William Maclean, C. J., and Banerjee, J., held that the words "date of the decree" in Art. 179 of the Limitation Act mean the date the decree is directed to bear under the Civil Procedure Code, and that is the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It was further held that an application to execute a decree, if not made within three years from the date when the judgment was pronounced, was barred by limitation. In our view, when the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides that the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced, we must, of necessity, hold that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment, in the absence of any other provisions to the contrary. We may add that, except for a few decisions, such as those, which have been noticed above, the Courts of this sub‑continent have consistently held that the date of the decree is the date when the judgment was pronounced. In fact, almost all the cases (except a few) have held that the date of the decree is the same as that of the judgment. In the order of reference the Division Bench seems to have taken the view that the date of the decree is the date of signing the same. With regard to certain observations in the order of reference, we like to say that a judgment, which is pronounced under the Civil Procedure Code by a Court, not only contains "the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasoning for such decision", as stated by Hasan, J., but it also conclusively determines and declares the rights and liabilities of the parties arid is capable of execution in the manner provided In Order XXI of the Code. It is true that an application for execution of the decree must normally be accompanied by a copy of the decree as drawn up and signed by the Court and In this sense it would also be correct to say that the decree cannot be executed unless it is drawn up and signed, nevertheless, it would not be strictly accurate to say that the decree did not come into existence with the pronouncement of the judgment, when, in fact, the decree is incorporated in the judgment and the Code specifically provides that the decree as drawn under Order XX, rule 6, must be In conformity with the judgment which pronounced it upon a conclusive adjudication of the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the suit. In considering the question of the period of exclusion which an appellant is entitled to under section 12 of the Limitation Act, it has often been, in a general fashion, observed in various decisions that the decree does not come into existence for the purpose of preparing a copy thereof until the decree that is drawn up is signed by the Court. This, however, does not mean that the decree did not emerge from the judgment. It is one thing to say that it has not come into existence for the purpose of preparing a copy thereof, and another thing to say that it did not at all exist in the judgment which is the basis of the decree as drawn up. If it is correct to say that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment, it must necessarily follow that the decree was born with the pronouncement of the judgment. Factually it is so. In the Full Bench decision of the West Pakistan High Court in East and West Steamship Company's case, Sajjad Ahmad Jan, J., has observed: "In my humble view a decree in a case in the legal sense, and perhaps also in the physical sense apart from the decree‑sheet, comes immediately into existence the moment a judgment is pronounced in a case. Formal expression of an adjudication by the Court concerned determining the rights of the parties as described in section 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code is made by the judgment Itself, putting the parties on notice of their success or defeat." The requirement of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the decree as pronounced in the judgment must take a documentary shape in the manner as provided by Order XX, rule 6, and the very same rule also provides that the drawing up of the decree must conform to the judgment which gave birth to it. It has been argued that it is only notionally that the decree comes into existence with the pronouncement of the judgment. This is only another way of saying that the decree pre‑exists in the judgment and awaits its translation in terms of Order XX, rule

6. For the purpose of execution it may not take shape until it is actually drawn up and signed, but even with regard to matters of execution Order XXI, rule 11 (1) provides, under certain circum stances, for its immediate execution on pronouncement of the judgment without the decree being drawn up. It would serve no useful purpose to enter into the debate whether the decree exists in the judgment or whether it comes into existence, for practical purposes, with the signing of it. The learned Judges who hold that the decree exists in embryo in the judgment and those who say that it comes into existence, for all practical purposes when it takes form and shape in accordance with the provisions of Order XX, rules 6 and 7, do not obviously speak the same language. It is sufficient to say that the judgment being the basis of the decree, the requirement of Order XX, rule 7, is that it should bear the date of the judgment and that when the Limitation Act speaks of "the date of the decree", it means the date which is assigned to the decree by the Code, namely, the date of the judgment. We, therefore, hold that "the date of the decree" is the date of the judgment which pronounced it. We may, however, mention that the Calcutta High Court has held, In the case of Kamini Debt v. Promotho Nath (20 C L J 476), as also in the case of Naimuddin v. Imani Mondal (A I R 1923 Cal. 308), that if a judgment conclusively determines the rights of the parties fully and finally, it is in the eye of law a decree and as such appeal-able even though the Court which gave the decision did not embody the same in the form of a decree. In the case of Vamanacharya v. Govind (A I R 1924 Bom. 33), it was held however, that because no decree was drawn up by the lower Court as a result of its finding, the applicant was precluded from preferring an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this context it will be noticed that under Order LXI, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure a copy of the decree must accompany the memorandum of appeal. Again in the case of Punjaji v. Jairam (A I R 1930 Nag. 122) it was held that if a decision really adjudicated fully and finally the rights of the parties, it was a decree and as such appeal-able even though the Court giving the decision had not formally embodied the result in the form of a decree. In the order of reference Hasan, J., seems to have taken the view that the date from which the period of limitation begins to run is the date of the signing of the decree because, if it is held otherwise, a great hardship would be caused to litigants. We do not think that it is permissible to take this view. The law of limitation, which is a statute of repose designed to quieten title and to bar stale and water‑logged disputes, must be strictly complied with and Courts cannot refrain from applying the la a whenever it is applicable on the ground that hardship would thereby be caused. See the cases of Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap (A I R 1935 P C 85, 88) and Nagendra Nath Defy v. Suresh Chandra Dey (59 I A 283, 288=A I R 1932 P C 165). With regard to the second question, it would be convenient to quote the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, which are as follows: "(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an appli cation for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. "(3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded." The express terms of this section entitles an appellant to the periods of exclusion allowed under the aforesaid subsections. They do not impose any such condition that the appellant must, apply for a copy of the judgment or decree, as the case may be, prior to the prescribed period under the appropriate article of the Limitation Act in order to be entitled to claim the benefit of section 12 of the said Act. We cannot import into the language of section 12 a limitation upon the rights conferred by that section and add to it a rider that the periods of exclusion mentioned in the said section would be available only if an application for a copy is made within, as in this case, thirty days prescribed by the said article. To say that an application for obtaining a copy of the judgment or decree must be made within thirty dais from the pronouncement of the judgment before the exclusion of time allowed by subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 can be claimed by the appellant, would be to read into section 12 a proviso which is not there. In our view, a Court cannot impose upon the statutory provisions restrictions not warranted by the statute itself. Section 12 of the Limitation Act controls and governs the articles of the said Act. The periods prescribed by the articles of the schedules of the Limitation Act are subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 25 of the said Act. We may quote the provisions of section 3 of the Limitation Act, which runs thus: "Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and appli cation made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefore by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence." It will thus be seen that the Limitation Act specifically provides that the various periods of limitations prescribed by the articles in the Schedules of the Act are subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 25 thereof, or, in other words, sections 4 to 25 control and govern the periods prescribed by the articles of the Limitation Act. It would not be correct to treat the period prescribed in the articles as an inflexible period of limitation. In the present case the period of limitation has to be computed by taking the period prescribed by Art. 152 along with the provisions for exclusion of time allowed by section 12 of the Act. The period of limitation, therefore, is the period prescribed by relevant article in the schedule plus such period or periods as section 12 allows. The question before us was directly in issue in a Full Bench case of the Bombay High Court, that is, the case of Murlidhar Shrinivas. v. Motilal Ramcoomar (A I R 1937 Bom. 162). The question before the Full Bench was, whether, in computing the time for appealing from a decree, it was legitimate (in a proper case) to exclude the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree when no application was made for such copy till after the expiration of the time limited for appeal? Sir John Beaumont, C. J., in delivering opinion of the Full Bench, in which the rest of the learned Judges concurred, observed as follows: "Apart from authority, the effect of Art. 15: and section 12, Limitation Act, read together, seems to me to be this: the starting point of time is the date of the decree, and finising point is the date when the appeal is filed. If the period between those two dates exceeds 20 days, or the time limited by the appropriate article of the Limitation Act, the Court has to see whether the excess of time was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and a copy of the judgment. If it was so requisite, the appeal is in time, if not, it is out of time. The meaning of this section has recently been considered in two decisions of the Privy Council, 49 I A 307 (Pramatha Nath Roy v. W. A. Lee) and 55 I A 161(Jijibhoy N. Surety v. T. S. Chettyar Firm) and the effect of those decisions is to show that the time requisite does not mean the time actually required, but the time properly required for obtaining copies of the decree and the judgment. If the time actually taken in obtaining the copies is due to any dilatoriness on the part of the appellant, then that time is not allowed to him. But he is allowed any time occasioned by his opponent, or by anything done in the offices of the Court. The latter case also points out that section 12 confers a substantive right upon the appellant to claim the time as excluded. The decisions of this Court, 23 Born. 442 (Yamaji v. Antaji) and 15 Bom. L R 681 (New Piece Goods Bazaar Co. v. Jivabhai), mentioned in the reference, have laid it down that if the appellant allows the 20 days limited by Art. 151 to expire without making any application for a copy of the decree, then no time can be claimed for obtaining a copy of the decree. In my c pinion there is no justification in the language of the section for imposing such a limitation upon the rights, which the section confers upon tile appellant. The decisions of this Court really amount to adding to section 12 a proviso that application for copy of the decree has been made before the time limited for appeal by Art. 151 has expired, and the section contains no such proviso. Under the practice existing on the Original Side of this Court it is the application to have the decree drawn up, and not the application for a copy, which starts the procedure, which leads to copy being supplied. The practice is for the respondent's attorneys to draft the decree and send the draft to the appellant's attorneys, and if the attorneys agree on the draft, as happened in this case, It is then sent to the Prothonotary, who 'gas the decree drawn up and sealed. In complicated cases it may take some months to settle the terms of the decree, since the draft may pass backwards and forwards many times between the attorneys and there may, be applications to the Court for speaking to the minutes. It is difficult to see in such a case what advantage is to be gained by the appellant applying within 20 days from the date of the decree for a copy of the decree, when he well knows that the decree Itself is not in existence, and cannot be copied. In cases in the mofussil where the decree is actually, though not always, signed within the time limited for appeal, it may be difficult to prove that the time taken for obtaining a copy was requisite if no application for such copy was made within the time limited. But in my opinion the question whether the time was requisite is always one of fact to be decided in the circumstances of each case. I demur to the theory that the Court can impose upon the statutory right of an appellant a restriction not warranted by the Act. I entertained no doubt that a rule providing that no time shall be allowed for obtaining a copy of the decree unless such copy be applied for within 20 days from the date of the decree would be ultra vires." In the case of Badshah Miayan v. Pandurang (A I R 1930 Nag. 113), a Full Bench decided that it was Immaterial whether the period of limitation prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act had expired when a copy of the decree was applied for. In the case of Ramzan Baksh v. Muhammad Ishaq (I L R 47 All. 509) a Division Bench held that there was no clear provision of law to be found in section 12 of the Limitation Act to the effect that it was Incumbent on the appellant to apply for copies at one and same time and within the period provided for in the First Schedule. In the case of Sudhangsu Bhusan Pandey v. Majho Bibi (42 C W N 72), it was held that an appellant was entitled to get the benefit of the period of exclusion under subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 even though he made no application for a copy of the judgment or decree within thirty days of the signing thereof. Similarly, in the case of Sarat Chandra v. Rati Kanta (43 C W N 1139), it was held that in computing the time for filing an appeal, the period between the passing of the judgment and the signing of the decree must be excluded even though the decree was signed and the application for a copy of the judgment was made after the expiry of the period of limitation specified in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. In Abdul Wahed's case a Division Bench of this Court has observed at page 514 of the report as follows :‑ "It is now well settled that the application for copy must be made before the period of appeal expires. That is, exclusion under section 12 can be claimed only if the application for copy is made at a time when the right of appeal subsists." We do not think that the view taken In Abdul Wahed's case on this point is correct. To say that an application for copy of the judgment or decree must be made at a time when the right to appeal subsists tantamounts to begging the question; how long does the right of appeal subsists. The view taken in Abdul Wahed's case ignores the provision of section 3 of the Limitation Act and assumes that the period prescribed by the various sections of the Limitation Act is a fixed and inflexible period of limitation. Section 12 begins with the phrase, "In computing the period of limitation". This means that the period of limitation has to be computed with reference to the said section. Speaking of the operation of Art. 134 of the Limitation Act, the Judicial Committee of the privy Council has, in the case of Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi ((1) 36 I A 148), observed at page 166 of the report that "The operation of this article is controlled by section 10 of the Act." In these circumstances it would not be correct to say that the right to appeal subsists only during a period beginning from the date of the decree and ending with 30 days from that date. This period has to be calculated in accordance with the allowances made under section

12. It is only by adding the periods of exclusion to the period prescribed by Art. 152, as in the present case, that one can compute the period of limitation during which the right to appeal subsists. It is, therefore, clear that the right to appeal is not limited to the period prescribed In the Schedule to the Limitation Act. In Abdul Wahed's case it has been observed that the appellant must act with reasonable promptitude. One may ask, what is the measure of "reasonable promptitude?" Is there any yardstick to measure the same? Does section 12 provide that an appli cation for a copy of the judgment or decree must be made within thirty days from the date of the judgment? If an appellant delays too long in applying for a copy of the judgment or decree, he may find that, in spite of allowances made under sub sections (2) and (3) of section 12, his appeal may be barred. Such a possibility will, of itself, impose some amount of promptitude in applying for a copy of the judgment or decree; but, to impose an obligation to apply for such copy within the relevant periods mentioned In the Schedule, is not authorised by the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section

12. The said subsections merely provide that the appellant will be entitled to the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment and that of the decree, which, of necessity, would be added to the prescribed period of thirty days. If he delays too long in making an application, the allowances under the said subsections will not help him and the appeal will tie barred. Where an appellant has applied for a copy of the decree after the expiry of thirty days, he may find his appeal barred unless there has been a considerable amount of delay in drawing up of the decree and in signing the same. The articles in the Schedules to the Limitation Act fix a primary period of limitation and this will necessarily ensure some alertness and diligence. But under the terms of section 12 the appellant's right thereunder is not restricted by the condition that he must apply for a copy of p the judgment or decree within thirty days from the date of the decree in order to avail himself of the benefit of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Act. In Bechi's case (I L R 12 All. 461) Mahmood, J., has observed, at page 469 of the report, as follows: "Now, in the first place I entertain no doubt that it is necessary and indispensable for a litigant who intends try appeal from a decree which is the result of a judgment against him, and which decree must under the law, bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, to apply for a copy of the decree and, if necessary, of the judgment also, before the lapse of the period of limitation for the appeal which he intends to file, whatever that period may be. This view is amply supported by the ruling of Garth, C. J. (Cunningham, J. concurring) in Rameh v. Broughton I L R 10 Cal. 652 which was an appeal from a decree passed on the original side of the High Court and was therefore governed by the 20 days' limitation under Art. 151 of the Limitation Act. In that case, the decree had remained unsigned for more than the period of limitation, and the appellant subsequently applied for and obtained a copy of the decree. It was there contended on behalf of the appellant "that where the decree was not drawn up and signed until after 20 days had expired from the delivery of the judgment, the 20 days ought to count from the time when the decree was made". In dealing with this contention, Garth, C. J., said (at p. 659‑60): But this is directly contrary to the express language of the law. By Art. 151 of the schedule to the Limitation Act the 20 days are to be reckoned from the date of the decree; and by section 205 of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree is to bear date the day on which the judgment is pronounced, so that the appeal must clearly be filed within 20 days from the day on which the judgment it pronounced'. This rule must be read with the observation of Garth, C. J., in the course of the argument, when he said 'if the appellant had applied for a copy while the 20 days were running he would not be barred', and this is the effect of the judgment in the case. "It appears to me upon general principles that it would be defeating the object of limitation to allow the would‑be appellant to sleep over his right of appeal for more than the limitation period, and then by the accidental or unavoidable delay in the decree being prepared, to claim extension of the period of limitation for appealing from a decree for obtaining a copy of which he had not taken even the first step, by filing an application therefore." With due respect to a Judge of such eminence Mahmood, J. we would like to point out that his observation to the effect that the would be appellant should not be allowed to "sleep over his right of appeal for more than the limitation period", really begs the question: what is the period of limitation? The period of thirty days prescribed by arts 152 of the Limitation Act is the primary period but the total period of limitation itself has to be computed with reference to section 12 and other sections of i a similar nature. If the primary period of thirty days prescribed by Art. 152 plus the periods, which are allowed under section 12 of the Act show that the period of limitation has not expired, an appellant is certainly entitled to the benefit of section 12 even though he has not applied for a copy of the judgment or decree within thirty days from the date of the decree. We now turn to the third point formulated above. We have given a considerable amount of thought to this question, which we have set before us, in view of the controversies that had prevailed over this question in quite a large number of judicial decisions for almost three‑quarters of a century. I must confess, at the outset, that I had experienced some amount of doubt and difficulty in resolving this question, which has been posed before the Full Bench, although my learned colleagues in this Bench did not feel the same amount of difficulty as I had felt initially. In coming to a definite conclusion on this point, we must acknowledge the assistance that we have received from the Bar, particularly the able assistance given to us by the learned Advocate‑General Mr. A. S. Choudhury, Messrs S. R. Pal and Debesh Chandra Bhattacharjee, each of whom addressed us amicus curiae. Before the conflicting decisions were placed before us we devoted a fair amount of time in construing the plain meaning of the words of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act. The phrase, which calls for our construction, is "time required for obtaining a copy" (of the judgment or decree as the case may be). I started with the opinion that the phrase "time requisite for obtaining a copy" must, of necessity, mean such time as is required in obtaining the copy of the judgment or decree by one s own efforts. We had looked up the large edition of the Oxford English Dictionary to re‑assure ourselves of the meaning of the word "obtain". The primary meaning of the word, as given in this dictionary, is, "to court, into possession or enjoyment of (something) by one's own efforts" "to procure or gain as the result of purpose and efforts". In this view of the matter, the impression, which I had formed, at first blush, was that no time was requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree until the appellant had made an effort to procure such copy by his own efforts, namely, by making an application for a copy thereof. Therefore, such time or part thereof, which passes between the passing of the judgment and the signing of the decree would not be time requisite" within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, if the said time or part of it is antecedent to the application for a copy of the decree. In this view that I had initially taken I was further strengthened by the opinion of Mahmood,1., expressed In the Full Bench decision in Bechi's case, in which the learned Judge held that no time antecedent to the application for a copy of the judgment or decree was requisite for obtaining a copy thereof. It was held that the interval between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree would be "time requisite" within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 12 only if such interval or part thereof covered a period subsequent to the application for a copy of the decree. The learned Judge consulted Webster's International Dictionary with regard to the meaning of the word "obtain" in arriving at this conclusion. According to Mahmood, J., In computing the period of time to be excluded under section 12, the "time requisite for obtaining a copy" does not begin until an application for such copy has been made and the period which elapses between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree Is not to be excluded from the period of limitation, unless an application for obtaining a copy of the decree has been made prior to its being signed. At page 470 of the report the learned Judge observed; "This construction is in my opinion supported by the words of the second paragraph of section 12 of the Limitation Act itself. The words referring to exclusion are `the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree'. The words `requisite' and `obtaining' as they occur in the context seem to me to assume that some definite step ancillary to the obtaining, that is, acquisition, is not only intended to be taken, but has already been taken. The first step for 'obtaining' must be to take some step towards the obtainment, and the act of `obtaining' cannot be said to have even commenced before such step. Taking it to be a sound rule of interpretation to interpret the words of a statute in their ordinary and usual sense, unless the contrary Is shown, I have consulted Webster's English Dictionary, and it explains the word `obtain' to mean `to get hold of by effort ; to gain possession of ; to acquire', as the ordinary sense of the word. In this sense I interpret the word 'obtaining' as it occurs in paragraph 2 of section 12 of the Limitation Act, and hold that 'the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree' cannot refer to any period antecedent to the appellant's asking for a copy by the usual mode of applying therefore, or to any period subsequent to its being ready for delivery. If at the time when the application for a copy is made, the decree is not ready, he will of course be entitled to the allowance of such portion of time during which the decree remains unsigned, along with the time which may be occupied in preparing the copy for delivery ; the reason being obvious that the act of obtaining has already commenced and the delay in such a case could not be referred to any omission or neglect on his part. But when he has made no application to obtain a copy and the decree remains unsigned for a portion of, or the whole period of, limitation, he cannot claim the benefit of a matter which in no sense and to no extent frustrated or retarded any endeavour on his part to obtain a copy of the decree, the endeavour itself not having yet commenced." On a further consideration of this matter I was beset with twofold doubts. In the first place, I felt that I had not properly emphasised the word "requisite" which qualifies the noun "time" in the phrase "time requisite for obtaining a copy", and began to doubt whether the view which I had initially taken with regard to the construction of the phrase, which had found favour with such an eminent Judge as Mahmood, J., was correct. Secondly, I began to doubt whether it would be correct to say that the appellant's efforts to obtain a copy of the decree began with his filing an application for a copy thereof. Where, as in the Original Side of various High Courts, it is for the parties to take steps for the preparation of the decree, why should not such steps taken by the appellant be considered as a part of his efforts to obtain a copy of the decree when an application for the same is made after the decree has been prepared and, signed? Then again, when, as is generally the case in mofussil, the preparation and signing of the decree is entirely a matter for the Court and its Officers, why should not the appellant's attempt or attempts to inform himself whether the decree has been so prepared and signed or his waiting for such a stage to be reached be considered as a part of his efforts to obtain a copy of the decree 7 It is thus that we have unanimously come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by Mahmood, J. As a result of a very careful thought, which my learned brothers and I had devoted to the construction of the relevant words, it occurred to us that the adjective "requisite;" qualifying the noun "time" in the phrase quoted above has also a considerable significance and we were fortified in this view by two decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which were cited before us from the Bar. The first of these is the case of J. N. Surly v. T. S. Chettyar (55 I A 161). In that case, while considering the provisions of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, Lord Phillimore, in pronouncing the opinion of the Board, has observed, at page 170, as follows: "The word `requisite' is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word `required'. It means `properly required', and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default. "But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in drawing up the decree, or by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible." The second case is the case of Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee (49 I A 307) where the Board had to construe the provisions of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act. In delivering the opinion of the Board, Lord Buckmaster, after narrating shortly the facts of the case, has observed as follows (pp. 301‑10) "That the notice of appeal was out of time, in fact is beyond dispute, for t be period of appeal is twenty days from the date of the decree or order which it is sought to impeach, and that period expire d on August 15, 1918. But there is a provision contained in section 12, subsection (2) of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, which provides that in computing the time for appeal there shall be excluded the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree: The appellant's contention is that the time 'requisite' within the meaning of that subsection is the time which, in the circumstances of the case, is actually occupied in obtaining the decree, and that, so regarded, the time that ought to be deducted here is more than sufficient to rectify the delay. "The facts with regard to that matter are these : After the order had been made on July 26 no steps were immediately taken by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up, but after the lapse of four days it was competent to the defendant to apply for that purpose. The four days elapsed and nothing was done. On August 6 application was made by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up,, and on August 7, the draft of the order was sent to the appellant. The order was simplicity itself, but the appellant only returned the draft on August

16. On August 28, it was signed, and on September 3, it was filed by the plaintiff. Now the learned Judges in the Appeal Court have held that in determining what is the requisite time referred to in section 12, subsection (2) of the Limitation Act the conduct of the appellant must be considered, and their Lordships think that in so determining they have rightly regarded the statutory provision. In their Lordships' opinion, no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. In the present case he took none, and the periods between July 30 and August 6, and again between August 7 and August 16, which were within the appellant's control, are sufficiently great to prevent the appellant saying that the time that did elapse must have elapsed even if he had acted with reasonable promptitude." The meaning of the word "requisite" as given in the Oxford English Dictionary is, "required by circumstances or the nature of things ; necessary ;indispensable." It is thus clear that the word "requisite" has also to be given a proper significance in construing the said phrase, and, in doing so, this word as well as the word "obtaining" must be given equal emphasis. If one bears in mind the proper import of the words used in the phrase, it would be patently clear that "time requisite for obtaining a copy" must mean not merely such time as is properly taken in delivering a copy of the decree to the appellant upon his application for the same, but also the time which must, of necessity, elapse before the decree can be made ready for copying, that is, the time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree. It is axiomatic that a copy of the decree cannot be obtained until it has been drawn up and signed in accordance with rules 6 and 7 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the time which must necessarily pass between the delivery of the judgment and the preparation and signing of the decree must be considered as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy thereof, irrespective of the question, whether or not an application for a copy of the decree has been made prior to the signing of the decree. It would not be correct to disallow the appellant part of such time or the whole of it, if the same is antecedent to his application for the copy. In computing the time, in these circumstances, one has to ask oneself the question: is the time taken between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree indispensable for obtaining a copy thereof ? Is this period of time necessary for the purpose of obtaining such copy? The answer to this question has to be in the affirmative because the phrase "time requisite for obtaining a copy" of the decree means "such time as is indispensable for the purpose of obtaining a copy of the decree". It is patent that the relevant phrase must mean time requisite for the purpose of obtaining". The phrase is "for obtaining" and not "in obtaining". The emphasis is on the penultimate and final act of obtaining the copy. Therefore, all the time, which has to be consumed for the purpose of obtaining the copy must be "time requisite" for so obtaining it. Of course, one has to bear in mind that the word "requisite" connotes "properly required". Two different situations may arise in the matter of prepara tion of the decree. In the first place, the appellant may have no hand in such preparation and this is the normal situation with regard to decrees in mofussil Courts under the Civil Pro cedure Code. It is the function of the officials of the Court to prepare the decree and for the Court itself to sign it. No duty is cast upon the parties to the suit or appeal to prepare the decree. In these circumstances, the parties have no control over the preparation and signing of the decree. Therefore, the interval in such preparation and signing is necessarily indispensable for the purpose of obtaining a copy thereof. We have thus no doubt in our mind that, in these circumstances, the time taken in the preparation and signing of the decree is also time "requisite" in obtaining a copy thereof. This also finds support from the observations of Lord Phillimore in J. N. Surty's case. "But for that time which is taken up by his opponent in draw ing up the decree, or by the officials of the Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is not responsible." In the second place, the initial steps in the preparation of a decree have to be taken by the parties themselves as in the Original Sides of the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and some other Courts. In the Original Sides of these High Courts the party in whose favour the decree is passed is required to get the decree drawn up. The opposite‑party is precluded from taking such steps until four days have elapsed from the passing of the judgment without the decree‑holder applying for a copy thereof. Both the parties have to take various steps thereafter before the decree can be drawn up and signed. Even in such a case the time taken between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree must necessarily be consumed before a copy thereof can be obtained. Such time will also be "time requisite for obtaining a copy", within the meaning of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act, except the period or periods within this time which the appellant had himself wasted because of his negligence and inactivity. In Pramatha Nath Roy's case (991 A 307) Lord Buckmaster has held that the time which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps in obtaining a copy of the decree or order would not be regarded as time "requisite" within the meaning of subsection (2) while considering the time which elapsed between the date of the judgment and the preparation and signing of the decree. We have already noticed above that in Pramatha Nath Roy's case the fact was that the order was made on the 26th July 1918, and that no steps were immediately taken by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up and even after the lapse of four days the defendant did not take prompt steps for that purpose. On the 6th of August an application was made by the plaintiff to have the order drawn up, the draft of which was sent to the appellant on the 7th of August. In spite of the fact that it was a simple order, the appellant wasted a considerable time and returned the draft on the 16th of August. After noticing the aforesaid fact, Lord Buckmaster made the following observations which we have already quoted above "In their Lordships' opinion, no period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. In the present case he took none, and the periods between July 30 and August 6, and again between August 7 and August 16, which were within the appellant's control, are sufficiently great to prevent the appellant saying that the time that did elapse must have elapsed even if he had acted with reasonable promptitude." While bearing in mind that the word "requisite" is a strong word, as has been observed by Lord Phillimore in J. N. Surly's case, its proper significance would be that the appellant must get the benefit of that time which was not within his control in the preparation and signing of the decree which time must be regarded as time "requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree. It, therefore, follows from what we have stated above that an appellant would be entitled to claim exclusion, under section 12 (2), the time which passes between the passing of the judgment and the signing of the decree even if he has applied for a copy thereof after the decree has been signed, provided that if he had any control over such time he cannot claim so much of the said time as he had himself wasted. The practical result would be that in appeals from a decree passed by a mofussil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure he would, almost invariably (with very few exceptions), be entitled to the exclusion of the whole of the time stated above because in such cases he has no control over the preparation of the decree and the signing of it. In this connection, we may usefully quote the observations of Chagla, C. J., in the case of Jayashankar Mulshankar v. Mayabhai Lalbhai. (A I R 1959 Bom. 122). The question before the Full Bench in that case and the present question before us are identical. Chagla, C. J., observed as follows: "Now, before considering the authorities which were cited at the bar, it would be perhaps better to look at this section itself and to see what is the true position under that section on an interpretation of that section in the light of the language used by the Legislature. Section 12 (2) provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, (and I am using the material words) the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from shall be excluded, it is well settled that the time requisite is not the time actually taken but it is the time properly required. The question that raises certain amount of difficulty is whether the time that is required for preparing a decree is a time of which it could be said that it is a time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree. Two views are possible. One view is that the time taken for preparing the original, of which a copy is to be obtained, must necessarily be the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the original. This view puts greater emphasis on the expression `reguisite' than on the expression `obtaining' used in this subsection. The other view is that unless the appellant takes some step in order to obtain a copy of the decree, it could not be said that the time, which expired before he took that step was a time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. In other words, although the decree was not ready, if the appellant did not apply for a copy, the time taken for preparing the decree could not be excluded, because the appellant had not taken any step for obtaining the decree. In our opinion, equal emphasis should be placed on both the expressions used in this subsection. What has got to be excluded is the time which is properly required, and the time which has got to be so excluded is the time which is necessary for obtaining a copy of the decree. It is difficult to understand why the action on the part of the appellant in applying for a copy of the decree should be a decisive factor in considering whether time should be excluded under this subsection or not. It is also difficult to understand why an appellant should apply for a copy of a decree which is non‑existent and which has not yet been prepared or signed by the Judge. It would seem that if the appellant had applied for a copy of a decree which was not ready, then the time taken up to prepare the decree would have been excluded, but merely because he did not apply for a copy that time should not be excluded. "It seems to us that it is rather futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original could be given to him. From this it does not follow that the whole of the time required for preparing the decree should necessarily be excluded in every case. We may have a case where the preparation of the decree is entirely left to the Court, where is the intervention of the parties is not at all necessary, and all the time spent for the preparation of the decree is the result w of what the Court has got to do and the various steps that the Court has to take. In a case like this, it may be that the whole time would have to be excluded. But we may have a case where the intervention of the party is necessary in order to prepare the decree. Various steps might have to be taken by the parties or their lawyers before a decree could be ready and before it could be signed. In a case like this the Court would have to consider whether any of the time taken up for the preparation of the decree could be attributed to the fault or negligence of the appellant. If any of the time could be so attributed, then that time could not be excluded under section 12 (2). A case like this frequently arises on the Original Side of this Court where decrees have got to be drawn up by solicitors, where drafts are considered, where various appointments are to be made with the Prothonotary and so on and so forth. "Therefore, a question like this as to whether the whole of the time is to be excluded or not would become more material on the Original Side than perhaps on the Appellate Side where decrees are drawn up more by the Court than with the Assistance of the parties or through the intervention of the parties. Even In the Districts if it is established that by a rule of practice of the Court lawyers have to sign decrees before the draft of a decree is put up before the Judge for his signature, then if any time has been unduly taken up by the lawyers in signig the decree, such time might have to be excluded. Therefore, apart from authorities, with which we shall presently deal, the view we take on a construction of this section is that the time properly taken for the preparation of the decree and the time which elapses between the pronounce ment of the judgment and the signing of the decree should be excluded under section 12 (2), Limitation Act. We advisedly use the word `properly' because it is not necessarily the whole of the time that must be excluded in every case. If it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that in any particular case the whole of the time was not properly required for the purpose of preparing the decree, then such time as was not properly required would not be excluded under section 12 (2), Limitation Act." To the arguments that have been quoted above, we would like to add that, if, according to the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council In Pramatha Nath Roy's case, the appellant, even during the interval that passes between the application for a copy of the decree and the delivery thereof to him, is not entitled to the benefit of the time which he himself had consumed and over which he had control, then conversely, he must be entitled to claim exclusion of such time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree over which he had no control as such time will also be "requisite" for the purpose of obtaining such copy. Inasmuch as, In the present case before us, the appellant had no control in the drawing up and signing of the decree, he is entitled to claim benefit of the whole of such period which has been taken by the Court and its officials in making the decree ready for the purpose of making a copy thereof, namely, by drawing up and signing it. It will make no difference if the application for a copy of the decree is made after the signing of the decree. We may also point out that according to the decision in Bechi's case, the appellant was entitled to the entire period, which was actually taken In drawing up and signing the decree. Mahmood, J., did not import into his decision the qualification introduced by the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Roy's case. The Privy Council decision must be taken to mean that, even with regard to the interval that passes between the application for a copy of the decree and the signing of the same, the appellant is entitled only to such time over which he bad no control when it is the duty of the parties to get the decree drawn up, that is to say, it must be held that even during the period between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree the appellant is not entitled to the exclusion of any time which he had himself wasted when it is for him to take steps in order to get the decree drawn up. The Privy Council, however, in Pramatha Nath Boy's case, made its observations with reference to the period that was taken between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree in a case, on the Original Side of the High Court, where parties are required to get the decree drawn up. In Bani Madhub Mitter's case, Patheram, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, held that when a suitor was unable to obtain a copy of the decree from which he had appealed, by reason of the fact that the decree was unsigned, he was entitled, under section 12 of the Limitation Act, to deduct the time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree in computing the period for presentation of the appeal although he applied for a copy of the decree after the same was prepared and signed. This is one of the earliest authoritative decisions on the question before us. The opposite view was expressed in Bechi's case. Decisions on this question are innumerable and the Courts that decided this question have followed either the view taken by Patheram, C. J., in Bani Madhup Miller's case or that taken by Mahmood, J., in Bechi's case. The Calcutta decision was given in the year 1886 and the judgment of Mahmood, J., in the Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court was pronounced in 1890. After the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Boy's case and J. N. Surly's case the pre ponderance of the views of the various High Courts of this sub‑continent favoured the view taken In Bani Madhub Miller's case. We have already noticed the decision of the Bombay Full Bench in Jayashankar Mulshankar's case. A decision of a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Gabriel Christian v. Chandra Mohan Missir (A I R 1936 Pat. 45) has overruled another decision of the same High Court In the case of Jyotindranath Sarkar v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd (A I R 1921 Pat. 175) and has held that the time that passes between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree is "requisite" time within the meaning of sub‑section (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act and Is available to the appellant even when he had applied for a copy of the decree after it had been prepared and signed. Courtney‑Terrell C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench has held as follows: "The difference of opinion has arisen over the construc tion of the words in section 12 subsections (2) and (3) the time requisite for obtaining copy of the decree appealed from' and the choice is between two alternative constructions depending upon whether (a) the proper emphasis is upon the word 'requisite' so that the meaning is 'the time which would have been necessary in any case' or (b) whether the emphasis should be upon the word 'obtaining' with the result that the meaning is as though the words were 'the time actually employed by the appellant' and hence that no time preceding the application for copies by the appellant can be considered. In our opinion, the former of these alternatives is the correct construction and that it is correct is shown by the observa tions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 6 Rang. 302 (J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar Firm)=55 I A

161. The result is that no period, which may be under the control of the appellant between the date upon which judgment is pronounced (which is the date of the decree under the Civil Procedure Code) and the date on which the appeal was filed can be considered as the time requisite within the meaning of section

12. In most cases the decree of the trial Court follows upon the judgment without the parties being required to do anything in the interval; and in such cases the appellant will be entitled to the exclusion of the time between the judgment and the decree. In exceptional cases, such (for instance) as cases of partition and mesne profits, the drawing up of the final decree may depend upon the filing of the necessary stamp paper or court‑fees; in such cases the exclusion of time in favour of the party who is to file the court‑fees will depend upon the circumstances, but other parties to whom no responsibility attaches for the delay will be entitled to exclude the time." A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Secretary of State v. Sm. Parijat Debi (A I R 1932 Cal. 331) has again reiterated the view taken in Bani Madhup Mitter's case in the light of the observa tions of the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Roy's case. In making the order of reference Rankin, C. J., has observed thus: "The fact that the decree was not in existence and could not therefore be copied, entitles the appellant to deduction of the time which elapsed before the decree was completed. His right to deduction does nit depend upon his filing an application for a copy at a time when there is no possibility of copying It. Pramatha Nath Roy's case (49 I A 307) lays down a qualification of the rule in Bani Madhup's case (I L R 13 Cal. 104). That qualification is that the appellant must be diligent in taking steps to have the decree or order drawn up. But there is no rule which disentitles an appellant to exclude time which elapses between the making and the drawing up of an order by reason merely of the fact that his application for a copy was not filed prior to the drawing up." Approving the aforesaid view, C. C. Ghose, J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, has observed as follows: "The appellant is, as of right, entitled to the exclusion of such time as is properly required for the drawing up of the decree or order, assuming that no part of the delay, if any, is due to his default. In other words, if the delay in obtaining a copy is due to the laches of the appellant, he cannot claim the benefit of this provision for exclusion of the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. "Prior to the decision in the case reported In J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar (55 I A 161) the rule, as understood by the profession on the original sides was as stated by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment in the case of Sarat v. Upendra Nath A I R 1927 Cal. 623=I L R 54 Cal. 481 at p. 482 (of 54 Cal.): 'These decisions show (i) that a copy of the order must be applied for within 20 days of its being pronounced and (ii) that it will be of no avail to apply for such copy unless within the 20 days a requisition to draw up the order has been given either by the appellant or by some other party to the cause.' "The law being now as stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, the real point for consideration is whether or not on the facts of this particular case, any part of the delay beyond the prescribed period was due to the default or laches on the part of the appellants. Before 1st June the order in the present case was not in existence for the purpose of obtaining a copy ; the order, it is true, was signed by the Registrar on 20th May but no copy could be available until the 1st June, because it had not been filed till that date. The appellants who had applied for a copy on the 18th May would, in my opinion, clearly be entitled to deduction of time, which elapsed before the order was completed. There was no delay or laches on their part. And as regards the period between the 2nd June and 9th June no question arises or could possibly arise. "In my opinion, the decision of the Full Bench in Bani Madhub's case I L R 13 Cal. 104, which was referred to with approval by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Pramatha v. Lee 49 1 A 307, is still the law so far as appeals from the original side are concerned, subject of course to what has been stated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Pramatha Nath v. W. A. Lee 49 I A 307 and J. N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar 55 I A 161." We have ourselves received guidance from the two decisions of the Privy Council cited above in construing the word "requisite" as used in the phrase under our consideration and for no other purpose because a judgment Is an authority only for the points mooted and decided. (See A I R 1940 P C 230 at 234 and 1901. A C 495 at 506). But the Full Bench decisions quoted above have also borrowed light from the aforesaid Privy Council cases for their actual decisions on the point before them, obviously relying on the observations of Lord Halsbury in (1901) I A C 495 at 506, to the effect that "every judgment must be read as applicable to the facts proved or assumed to be proved". The fact proved in 49 1 A 307 was that the High Court had excluded under subsection (2) of section 12 of the Limitation Act the time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing or the decree minus such time which the appellant himself had wasted and had found that the appeal was barred. In the case of Kahn Chand v. Gurdit Singh a Single Bench of the Lahore High Court followed the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bani Mauhup Mitter's case. In Abdul Salam's case a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court overruled the decision in Kahn Chand's case on a point which is not material to the point under consideration. In the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Aspi (P L D 1960 Kar. 562), S. A. Haq, J., has observed at pages 566‑567 of the report as follows "It Is clear that what section 12 of the Limitation Act permits is the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree and a copy of the judgment. The period elapsing In between the date of the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree is excluded for the reasons that It must necessarily elapse before a copy of the decree can be granted. If during the same period an applica tion for obtaining a copy of the judgment has also been made, then the period which is common in both cases, can only be deducted once for the reasons pointed out by Bennett, J, i.e., upto the signing of the decree the period of limitation is already standing still, and does not start to run again until the interruption is over. From the date of the judgment upto the date of the signing of the decree the time stands interrupted. If during this period there is another inter ruption due to the presentation of an application for a copy of the judgment or decree, such an interrpution cannot have the effect of making the time run backward, so as to give the applicant the benefit of double deduction." In the case of Arun Chandra Swami v. Md. Mujib Chowdhury (A I R 1555 Assam 129) a Full Bench of the High Court of Assam by a majority decision held that the time occupied between the pronouncement of judgment and the preparation and signing of the decree would be regarded as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree and should be excluded as such in computing the period of limitation prescribed by Article 156 as the appellant was not responsible for such time and the question whether the appellant applied for a copy of the decree prior to its preparation or signing was not considered to be material. The Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in 1 L R 13 Cal. 104 and in A I R 1932 Cal. 331 was approved and followed. In the case of Thakur Jadubir Singh v. Thakur Sheo Naresh Singh (A I R 1944 Oudh 154) a Division Bench of the Chief Court of Oudh, following another decision of the same Court in the case of Yusuf Ali Khan v. Muhammad Kazim Ali Khan (A I R 1940 Oudh 173) held that, where the decree or order was drawn up without reference to the parties, the party appealing was entitled to the exclusion of the time between the date of the judgment and the date on which the decree was signed. The date the application for a copy of the decree was regarded as a material question. In the judgment that was delivered in Yusuf Ali Khan's case it was observed: "Another aspect of the questions which has to be borne in mind 1s that till the decree is signed no copy thereof can be issued and there is no legal obligation In a litigant to apply for a copy of the decree which has not been signed and of which no copy can be issued because it has not come into existence for want of signature. The failure of an appellant to make an application for copy prior to the signing of the decree is entirely Immaterial in view of the consideration mentioned above. In our opinion there is nothing ‑In section 12, limitation Act, which says that time requisite is not so because an applica tion for copy has not been made." The opposite view has been expressed in Abdul Wahed's case on the authority of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bechi's case. We have already discussed that case and we need not repeat the same here. In this connection, we propose to notice a decision of a Full Bench of the West Pakistan High Court in the case of East and West Steamship Company v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd. The question before the Full Bench was "Whether for purposes of the limitation period provided for an appeal, an appellant is entitled to the deduction of the period taken in the preparation and signing of the decree even if he has not filed an application for a certified copy of the decree before the expiry of ninety days from the date of h the decree, which Is the ordinary period of limitation provided for appeals to the High Court under Article 156 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act? In other words, is the time taken in such a case between the date of the judgment and the signing of the decree to be considered as time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree within the meaning of that expression as used in section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act?" Sajjad Ahmed Jan, J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, answered the question in the negative and held that no period antecedent to the application for a copy of the decree was time requisite under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. In doing so, the learned Judge gave the following reasons for arriving at the decision: "(1) If the legislature had intended to allow the time spent in the preparation of the decree, nothing would have been easier than to express that intention by using the words "date of signing of the decree" Instead of `date of the decree'. (2) While the preparation of a decree Is the task of a Court and its staff, the application to obtain a copy of it is a matter which rests in the hands of a person who needs a copy and even if a decree is considered not to be in existence unless it is signed, there is nothing to stop a person wanting to file an appeal against it, to bring the decree into existence or to expedite its existence and that is where the words time requisite for obtaining a copy' assume their pointed significate." Furthermore, the reasons for the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bechi's case were adopted and followed. With regard to the first reason in the judgment pronounced by Jan, J., as quoted above, ft is obvious that the Intention of the Legislature, as we have already stated above, is that time should begin to run from the date of the decree which is the date of the judgment. When the legislature intended to allow a party to have, under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the benefit of exclusion of that time which 1s not within his control and which must elapse between the date of the delivery of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree, it need not have necessarily provided that the period of limitation would run from the date of the sighing of the decree. The Article of the Limitation Act, which makes the period run from the date of the decree, makes a provision distinct from that of section 12 of that Act. If the relevant Article had provided that the period of limitation would run from the date of the signing of the decree, then invariably in every case it would have so run, irrespective of the fact whether, as in the Original Side of several High Courts, it is for the parties to take steps for the preparation of the decree or not. It has been authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council that the appellant is not, under section 12, entitled to that period or periods of time, which he has himself wasted in the course of such preparation. From the cases, which we have cited above, it is clear that the appellant is entitled to the period between the date of the judgment and the date of signing of the decree minus such period or periods which he has himself consumed through his own negligence or inactivity. If the relevant article of the Limitation Act had provided that time would begin to run from the date of the signing of the decree, then the appellant would ‑ invariably in every case be entitled to the time that has passed between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree, irrespective of the fact that he himself has been guilty of prolonging the said period through his own fault, in those cases where he exercises control over the preparation of the decree. It is, therefore, clear that it is one thing to allow a period of exclusion of time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree as "time requisite" within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act and a completely different thing to lay down that time would run from the date of the signing of the decree, as provided by the articles of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. Secondly, in the East & West Steamship Company's case, it has been observed that there is nothing to stop a would be appellant "to bring the decree into existence or to expedite its existence" by applying for a copy thereof. One would ask, is ft correct to say that in all cases the party brings the decree into existence? Normally, under the Civil Procedure Code, in the Mofussil, the decree is brought into existence by the Court and its officers and the parties have nothing to do with the drawing up and signing of the decree. Is it also correct to say that a party can expedite the signing of the decree by a premature application? As a matter of fact, the general practice in the Subordinate Courts is that an application for a copy of the decree is usually not entertained until the decree has been signed by the Court. Even if such application is entertained, it will have no effect in the preparation and signing of the decree. It would not, therefore, be correct to assume that it is incumbent on a party to rouse the Court and its officers into a consciousness of their duty by putting in an application for a copy of the decree prior to its preparation. The reason why the period between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree is excluded under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act is, that the appellant has no control over that time which, of necessity, must, elapse before he can obtain a copy thereof and, which must, therefore, be considered as "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree." With regard to the reasons for the decision in Bechi's case, we have already discussed the same and we need not repeat the same here. The cases which have followed the decision in Bechi's case have placed a very great emphasis on the appellant's own efforts to obtain a copy of the decree. This effort does not necessarily begin with making of an application for such copy. When, as in the Original Side of various High Courts, a duty is cast on the parties to get the decree drawn up and signed, the appellant's effort to do so must form a part of his exertions to obtain a copy of the decree for which he may apply after the same is drawn up and signed. Then again, where in the case of a decree in the mofusil Courts, he has no part to play in getting the decree drawn up and signed, he may, from time to time, enquire whether the decree is ready for the purpose of its being copied and, on obtaining the information that ft has been signed, if he applies for a copy thereof, would it be correct to say that he has made no efforts to obtain the decree prior to his application for it ? The answer would be the same if he awaits the signing of the decree and then applies for the same. How Is the Court to assume that he has made no efforts to inform himself as to whether the decree has been signed? There fore, there is no basis for saying that the appellant's effort to obtain a copy of the decree and, therefore his right to claim exclusion under section 12 of the Limitation Act, begins with his application for a copy. It would be noticed that, whereas the West Pakistan High Court Full Bench in the above‑mentioned East & West Steam ship Company's case discussed a number of cases which have taken the contrary view, it did not discuss the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jayashankar Mulshankar's case, given in a very well considered judgment (if we may so say with respect) by Chagla, C. J. We may refer to another decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Keshab Sugar Works v. R. C. Sharma (A I R 1951 All. 122), where the decision in Bechi's case, came to be re‑examined, and Malik, C. J., in delivering the main judgment in which the majority of the learned Judges concurred, held that Bechi's case had settled the law for the Province over which the Allahabad High Court has jurisdiction and that ever since the year 1890, when Bechi's case was decided, that decision had been uniformly and consistently followed in that Province. Thus he based his decision primarily on the doctrine:" Curses Curiae est lex curiae", that is, the practice of the Court is the law of the Court. But Agarwala, J., dissented from the majority decision of the Full Bench and has observed (p. 138). "It is also possible to take a more lenient view of the words. 'Obtaining' refers to the final act of acquiring. It no doubt implies applying for the copy at some stage. But the emphasis is not on applying which word is not at all used in the section. The emphasis is upon the final act of acquiring and the query is what is that time which must be deemed necessary for completing the final act of acquiring the copy." "Requisite means 'required by circumstances or the nature of things necessary, indispensable' Murray's Oxford New Dic tionary. 'Time requisite' Is not the same thing as the time 'taken' or even time 'required.' It means time indispensably required according to the circumstances of the case. "Again acquisition of a copy of a decree or order can only be made after the decree or order has been prepared, and some time will necessarily be taken in preparing the copy. Therefore 'time requisite' in getting a copy of the decree or order implies time necessarily spent in preparing the decree or order and then in preparing its copy. The filing of an application for a copy before the decree is prepared does not seem to be an essential ingredient of the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order'. This, to my mind, is made clear by the word 'for' in the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order'. "Those who take a narrower view, read the word 'for' as If it was 'in', though they may do so unconsciously. If the expression were 'time taken in obtaining a copy', the narrower view was the only view possible. But the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy' is not the same thing as 'time taken, by the appellant in obtaining a copy'. The word 'for' Implies for the purpose of 'or' in respect of'. And, therefore, time necessarily taken before a copy can be issued, may legiti mately be said to be 'time requisite' for the purpose of acquir ing a copy. "Again, the use of the word 'requisite' (which is an adjective and not a past participle, like the word 'taken') shows that it does not necessarily refer to the activity of the appellant, but that the `requisiteness' has reference rather to the circumstances of the case. "To my mind, therefore, the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order means the time which, of necessity, must expire before a copy is obtained. This time must consist of two periods‑time necessarily spent in the preparation of the decree, over which the appellant had no control, and time necessarily spent in the preparation of the copy, over which, again, the appellant had no control. "To my mind, the view that no time would be requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree before an application had been made, therefore, is to strict an interpretation and is not war ranted by the language of the section" We are. In complete agreement with the aforesaid observations of Agarwala, J., which faithfully represent our view on this question. Thus, for reasons, we have fully set out in this judgment, we respectfully differ from the views expressed in East & West Steamship Company's case by the West Pakistan High Court as also from the decision on this question taken by the Allahabad Full Bench In Bechi's case. We, therefore, hold that an appellant is entitled to claim exclusion of the period between the date of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree, over which he has no control and which must necessarily elapse, as "time requisite" for obtaining a copy thereof under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act irrespective of the question as to whether the appellant has applied for a copy thereof prior to or after the signing of the said' decree. We may add the rider that, when he makes an application for a copy of the decree under subsection (2) and also one for a copy of the judgment under subsection (3) on different dates, he would not be entitled to claim twice the overlapping period In obtaining copies of the judgment and decree. (See I L R 47 All. 509). The view that we have taken above can also be supported on another ground based on principles, which apply to the con struction of statutes. The golden rule is that a statute must be construed according to the plain meaning of the words that are used in it. No authority is needed for this proposition. We may, however, refer to 36 I A 148 at 166 and 67 1 A 416 at

426. When the meaning of the words is clear and plain, Courts cannot refuse to give effect to the same on equitable consideration or on the ground that such construction would cause hardship to the appellant. See 62 I A 80 at 86 and 59 I A 283 at

288. But if the words are ambiguous or capable of two interpretations, a beneficial construction ought to be given in order to give the party a right to proceed with the appeal rather than to bar his remedy. On this point Courts In this sub‑continent have consistently given an interpretation in favour of the right to proceed. In the case of Anantaram v. Inayat Ali Khan (A I R 1920 Lah. 447 at 448‑49), an interpretation in favour of the right to proceed has been given. In a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court in the case of Sundar v. Salig Ram (9 I C 300 at 302); a construction favourable to the appellant was given. Similarly, the Madras High Court in the case of Seshayya Chetty v. Rolla Subbadu (I L R 54 Mad. 445 at 454), held the same view. The Bombay High Court in the case of Collector of Broach v. Bajaram Laldas (I L R 7 Bom. 542 at 545), held in favour of the right to proceed. In the case of Umiashankar Lakhmiram v. Chotalal Vajeram (I L R 1 Bom. 19 at 22) the same view was taken. In the case of Abdul Karim v. Islamun Nisa Bibi (I L R 38 All. 339 at 345), the Allahabad High Court held that a Court ought not to adopt a construction, which has a restricting and penalising operation if a liberal view is possible. In the case of Asaram v. Darba Mal (A I R 1929 Lah. 513), a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, consisting of Shadi Lal, C. J., and Broadway, J., has held that unless a suit clearly falls within the ambit of the articles, the decision should be in favour of the continuance of the suit. In the case of Prochal Meteh v. Emperor (I L R 40 Cal. 239 at 243) it has been held that when there is a doubt as to whether the appellant is entitled to a longer or a shorter period of time, the Court should give the appellant the benefit of the longer period. In the case of Latifunnessa v. Dhan Kunwar (I L R 24 Cal. 382 at 384) it has been held that, in construing the words of the Limitation Act, the Court is bound to give them liberal interpretation In favour of the right to proceed. In the case of Thakur Vishwanath Singh v. Mahabir Prasad (A I R 1937 Nag. 305 at 308) it has been held that the provisions of the Limitation Act have to be interpreted as liberally in favour of the decree‑holder as the circumstances of the case and the pro visions of the section would allow. In In re: North Ex‑parte Hasluck ((1895) 2 Q B D 264 at 270) Lord Esher, M. R., has observed as follows "A fair rule of construction seems to be that where the com putation is to be for the benefit of the person affected as much time should be given as the language admits of, and where it is to his detriment the language should be construed as strictly as possible." Bearing in mind the above proposition, we find that two views are possible with regard to the phrase, "time requisite for obtaining a copy." One view is that no time antecedent to the application for a copy of the decree is time requisite within the meaning of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. This view places a very great emphasis on the word "obtaining." Another view is that, if one would place equal emphasis on the words "requisite" and "obtaining", then that time which has passed between the date of the judgment and the date of the signing of the decree and which Is not within the control of the party, is time requisite in the above sense and it is Immaterial whether such time that has elapsed is entecedent or subsequent to the application for a copy of the judgment or decree, as the case may be. If equal emphasis is given upon the word "requisite", then one should remember that implicit in the connotation of the word itself, which is a "strong word", is the fact that it has a great force in its application. The second view stated above is in consonance with the dictum of Lord Esher, M. R., in In re: North Ex‑parte Hasluck, to the effect that, where the computation is to be for the benefit of the person affected, as much time should be given as the language admits of. We may point out that in computing the period of limitation, one should take, as observed by Beaumont, C. J., in A I R 1937 Bom. 162, the date of the delivery of the judgment as the starting point and the date of the presentation of the appeal as the g final point and then add to the period fixed by the relevant article of the Limitation Act the allowances to which the appellant is entitled under the relevant section. This is how in actual practice the period of limitation may be computed. Coming to the fourth and the last question, it is clear from what we have stated above that the decision in Abdul Wahed's case is not correct, in so far as it holds that no time antecedent to the application for a copy of the decree between the pro nouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree is "time requisite" under section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. Furthermore, the decision that the appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of that section unless he applies within thirty days from the date of the judgment, is also not correct; but, in so far as it holds that the period of limitation would begin to run from the date of the judgment, which is the date of the decree, the decision is correct. We may also point out that, although it was held that time would begin to run from the date of the decree, the learned Judges, in fact, in another portion of the judgment, proceeded on the assumption that such time would begin to run from the date of the signing of the decree. This is not consis tent with the judgment itself. As to the decision in Falan Chandra Saha's case, it will be seen that It merely followed the decision in Abdul Wahed's case, and, therefore, this decision also is not correct. Thus our answers to the questions formulated above are as follows:‑ Question No. 1.‑The date of the decree is the date when the judgment was pronounced. Question No. 2.‑Yes. Question No. 3.‑Yes, provided that, when it is necessary for the appellant to take steps for the preparation of the decree he will not be entitled to the time wasted by him. Question No. 4.‑No, except in so far as Abdul Wahed's case has held that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment. Since the reference to this Full Bench has been made under rules 1 and 2 of Chapter VII of the High Court Rules, the appeal itself is before us for final decision inasmuch as the reference is in respect of an appeal from an appellate decree. In the case before us the trial Court delivered the judgment on the 30th of April, 1956, and the decree was signed on the 11th of June, 1956. An application for copy of the judgment was made on the 18th of May, 15o, and another application for a copy of the decree was made on the 21st of May, 1956. The copy of the judgment was ready on the 26th of May, 1956, any the copy of the decree was ready for delivery on the 13th of June, 1956. The appeal was filed In the Court of the District Judge on the 13th of July, 1956. The day on which the judgment was pronounced (30th of April, 1956) is to be excluded in the first instance under section 12 of the Limitation Act. Then a period of forty‑four days, i.e., forty‑two days from the 1st of May, 1956, to the 11th of June, 1956, when the decree was signed, plus a further period of two days upto the 13th of June, 19 56 when the copy of the decree was ready for delivery, is to be added to the period of thirty days prescribed under Article 152 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. Thus the appellant' will get a total period of seventy‑four days only. The time taken for the copy of the judgment (18th of May, 1956, to the 26th of May, 19561 and part of the time taken for the copy of z the decree (21st of May, 1956 to the 11th of June, 1956) cannot be allowed twice over as these overlapping periods are already included within the period from the 1st of May, 1956 to the 13th of June, 1956 which Is the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree. Taking seventy‑four days as the period of limitation, after computation in terms of Article 152 read with section 12, the last date for filing the appeal before the District Judge was the 13th of July 1956. The appeal has been filed on this date and must, accordingly, be held to be in time. With regard to the merits of the appeal, we would like to observe, as already stated above, that the suit was for specific performance of a contract to sell certain lands to the; plaintiff described in a number of khatians. The contract was in respect of certain shares of the defendants in the said lands. The Courts below have, from the documents and evidence adduced by the parties, ascertained the price at which the lands would be sold. Furthermore, by reference to the khatians the lands to be sold to the plaintiff could also be ascertained. It was argued before us on behalf of the defendant‑appellants that the contract was unenforceable in the sense that the price as well as the quantum of the land could not be ascertained from the agreement. From the records of this case and the judgment delivered by the learned Subordinate Judge it is patent that there is no substance in this point. We have seen that both the price as well as the quantum of the lands could be ascertained from the terms of the agreement between the parties, the relevant khatians as well as the evidence in the trial Court. The real contest between parties appears to be whether, according to the contract of sale, a Kani of land was to be measured by a Nal of 7 cubits, which was the case of the defendants, or whether the same would be measured by a Nal of 8 cubits, as contended by the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserted in the plaint that a Nal of 8 cubits would be the standard of measurement and this assertion was not denied by the defendants in their written statement. On this point the learned Subordinate Judge, in the judgment that he has pronounced, has observed as follows: "The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants does not appear to be sound to me. In paragraph 1 of the plaint plaintiff in an unambiguous language stated that the defendant No. 1 contracted to sell 'khas' lands at its. 1,500 per 'kani', which is measured with a 'Nal' of 8 cubits. This statement of the plaintiff In the plaint has not been denied by the defen dants in their written statements. The C. S. Khatians show the measurement of the 'khas' lands and the net profits from the tenanted lands. The appellants at the time of trial made out a case in the lower Court that the contract for sale was according to a Kani of land measured with 'Nal' of 7 cubits. The learned Munsif did not accept such case of the defendants at the time of trial and I think the learned Munsif was right to do so. There is a provision in the contract for measurement of the lands and it was the duty of the defendant No. 1 to measure and give delivery of possession of the lands to the plaintiff on acceptance of the due price. The appellant cannot take advantage of his own default. From the evidence, cir cumstances and probabilities the measurement of a 'Kani' of land as prevalent in the country was accepted by the learned Munsif and I find no difficulty in enforcing the contract. In the result I find that the contract in question is not vague and uncertain though the measurement of a 'Kani' of land with 'Nal' is not stated." The concurrent decision of the Courts below on this point is against the defendants. On behalf of the respondent plaintiff Mr. Azizul Islam has argued that, since this appeal was preferred by the defendants the contract for specific performance was already enforced and a conveyance has already been executed and registered by the Court itself in pursuance of the decree passed in his favour. This statement of Mr. Islam has been supported by an affidavit filed in this Court along with the registered deed and we accept the same. We, therefore, hold that there is no substance in this point and, in any view of the matter, the contract having been specifically enforced by the Court, this point has lost Its significance. In this back ground Mr. Moinul Huq, appearing on behalf of defendant‑appellant did not press any further point before us on the merits of the case. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is dismisse

9. We make no order as to costs of this appeal, but the plaintiff respondent will be entitled to his costs in both the Courts below. Asir, J.‑I agree. SATTAR, J.‑I agree. A. H. Appeal dismissed.