P L D 1975 Lahore 499 (PLP)

The petitioner is a sitting member of the National Assembly of Pakistan and belongs to the Opposition. He holds a valid passport. He avers that he is a patient of chronic diabetes and on the advice of the doctors wanted to proceed to United Kingdom for medical check‑up and proper diagnosis of his disease. He applied to the State Bank of Pakistan in Form 'P' for grant of foreign exchange. The State Bank gave the necessary sanction and after that the petitioner purchased a return ticket for London which was booked by Lufthansa Air Lines Flight No. 695, scheduled to leave Karachi on 24th of October 1973, at 4‑10 in the morning. The petitioner reached Karachi Airport at about 2 a.m. on that date and presented his ticket at the LUFTHANSA counter for completion of formalities and booking of luggage. A seat was allotted to him in Flight No. 695 which was to leave Karachi for Frankfurt. The flight, for some reasons, was delayed for about an hour. On his way to the Departure Longue he presented his passport to the Immi gration Official who refused to stamp it unless he bad consulted other Immigration Officers. The petitioner was asked to wait till a decision was taken. Since the plane was to leave in a short time, the petitioner insisted that the passport should be returned to him duly stamped. He was, however, told that the Immigration Officers were in communication with the Ministry of Interior at Islamabad. The passport was not returned to the petitioner in time with the result that the flight in which his seat was booked left. He was, how ever, assured that his seat shall be booked on the next available Flight to London. The petitioner after his vain attempts to contact any Immigration Officer came ultimately in touch with Syed Abdul Qadir. Inspector Immigration and enquired from him the reasons for what had happened to him. The Inspector, after some reluctance, stated in writing that the passport of the petitioner was with the Immigration Officials and the Special Branch be contacted, later in the day, for finding out the reasons for which he was prevented from leaving the country. The petitioner at 10 a.m. went to the office of the S. P. Special Branch, Karachi, and was told by the said officer that he had been prevented from leaving the country by the orders of the Ministry of Interior of the Government of Pakistan. The S. P. expressed his inability to return the passport to him.

2. The petitioner then filed this writ petition submitting that he was a national of Pakistan and was free to travel abroad. It is his allegation that because of his opposition to the policies of the Government and of the persons heading the Government, he had been illegally prevented from taking his journey abroad. According to him it was one of the series of malicious missiles directed against him by the official agencies. He in this connection attached Annexure'A' with the writ petition giving a detail of criminal cases and other coercive proceedings brought against him, his wife, his brother, his nephews, Mrs. Tajammal Hussain, the wife of his nephew, Ch. Muhammad Shaft, his cousin and brother‑in‑law and some other persons connected with him, since April 1972. A reading of this document does indicate that cases were registered and coercive measures taken against the petitioner and other persons mentioned therein by the Government or other official or semi‑official agencies in quick succession and they had to turn to Courts of law for relief.

3. It is the contention of the petitioner that as a citizen of Pakistan he does not fall within the category of persons who had to obtain a No‑Objection Certificate from the Government for his journey abroad. It was urged that the action of the Government had curtailed the liberty of the petitioner in violation of the provisions of the Constitution. It was further urged that the action had been taken in violation of the principles of natural justice as he bad not been informed of the grounds thereof. A declaration has been sought an the following terms: (i) that the act of the authorities in preventing the petitioner from leaving the country is without lawful authority; and (ii) that the respondent be directed to return his passport.

4. In their written statement, the Ministry of Home Affairs denied shy knowledge of the allegations of victimisation of the petitioner and the members of his family and other persons connected with them. The case of ‑the respondent was that the exit of the petitioner from Pakistan was stopped :under sub‑rule (1) of Rule 31 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and the mere sanction of the `P' form, without obtaining a written permit from the .Interior Division of the Federal Government or on their behalf from the Home Department of the Provincial Government, could not entitle him to ,take his journey abroad. The written statement went on to say that the Immigration Authorities prevented the petitioner from proceeding abroad for the reason that he was not in possession of the exit permit as required under the law. In justification of the act of taking away the passport of the petitioner, it was stated that the Immigration Officer suspected the correctness of the entries on the passport of the petitioner and took it into possession for verification. It was further said that the Provincial Government had since been informed that the passport was no more required and the petitioner may collect it from them at any time. It was denied that the action of the respondent was in violation of the principles of natural justice or the respondent Government were obliged to give any reasons for it as Rule 31, referred to above, did not require the Government to give any reasons for their action or communicate the same to the petitioner. The allegations of male fides were also denied. It was finally said that the petitioner could apply to anyone of the two authorities i e., the Central Government or the 'Provincial Government, for grant of permit.

5. It appears to be necessary to state here the gist of the various orders ;passed from time to time under Rule 31 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, which says that the ,Government may order that a person or a class of sons may not leave Pakistan without first obtaining a permit from the specified authority. The first order was promulgated by a cipher telegram addressed to the chief Secretaries, Lahore. Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi an 21st of December 1971. It was stated in this telegram that it had been decided with immediate effect that until further orders no citizen of Pakistan excepting members of .official delegations, and students permitted to go abroad for education under usual condition should leave Pakistan. On the same day, an continuation of this cipher telegram, letter No. 1/5/7t‑Pass (Int.)‑II was addressed from the Home Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan to the Home Secretaries of all the Provinces. The above communication was substituted by Central Government order S. R. O. No. 630/(1)/71, dated 23rd of December 1971, which said that no citizen of Pakistan or a person of Pakistan origin holding British passport could leave the country except persons belonging to the sixteen categories mentioned therein. The policy appears to have been radically modified by letter No. 1/5/71‑Pass (Int)‑II, dated 24th of October 1972, from the Interior Division, addressed to the Secretaries of the Home Departments of all the Provinces in Pakistan. " By this letter it was decided that the general ban on exit from Pakistan should be lifted with effect from 1st of November 1972, and from that date "the citizens of Pakistan" will be able to go abroad if they fulfil the State Bank Regulations, without No‑Objection Certificates or exit permits from the Central or the Provincial Government, except Government servants or employees of autono mous and semi‑autonomous bodies". It was further stated that restrictions. on travelling, abroad will continue to be in force in respect of a small number of persons whose exist from the country is regarded as "injurious to the national interest". The names of such persons were included in Appendix 1‑V, attached to the letter. It was conceded that the petitioner's name was not in this list.

6. It is, therefore, evident that on 24th of October, 1973, when the petitioner was prevented from taking his journey abroad and was deprived. of his passport by the Immigration Official on duty, the only pre‑condition for his proceeding abroad was the sanction of `P' Form by the State Bank. which he had duly obstained. The petitioner, therefore, could not, in the light of the instructions, that were applicable on the relevant date, be stopped from taking his journey abroad. A perusal of the relevant file of the Central Home Ministry, which was produced in Court, however, shows that Mr. Abdul Wahab, Deputy Secretary gave a note on 23rd of October 1973, on the file that the Additional Secretary of the Interior Division desired that the exit of Ch. Zahoor Elahi, M. N. A. should be banned and his name included in the list of persons debarrad from going abroad.. He directed that the usual action be taken at once. The case was marked to the Section Officer of 'No‑Objection Certificate Branch' who drafted an order and sent it on to the Deputy Secretary for his signatures. It was suggested in the note of the Section Officer that instructions banning the exit of Ch. Zaboor Elahi may issue after the Deputy Secretary had signed the order. Deputy Secretary thereafter signed the order and the case came back to Mr. Wasi Ahmad, Section Officer, on 24th of October 1973. His note of that date shows that instruction had been issued to all the concerned agencies. It was further suggested in that note that the Deputy and Secretary (C) may show the file to the Additional Secretary. The Deputy Secretary Mr. Abdul Wahabs submitted the file to be Additional Secretary on the same day stating that in view of his order indicated in para. I of the note, the exit of Ch. Zahoor Elahi,. M. N. A., had been banned under Rule 31 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. and necessary instructions bad been issued to all concerned. The Secretary thereupon wrote the following order: "There are criminal cases pending against him and I have already informed the Ministry." It is, therefore, clear that there is no written order by the Additional Secretary containing any data on which the impugned order could have been passed and on which his subordinate could act. There was no application:, of mind by the Additional Secretary to the fact as to whether there was any, justification for stopping the exit of the petitioner front Pakistan. The Section Officer drafted the order and the Deputy Secretary signed it acting on the oral direction of the Additional Secretary. The only indication of the reason on which the order is sought to be justified came after the order had been authenticated and necessary intructions for implementation thereof had been issued when the Additional Secretary wrote that there were criminal cases pending against the petitioner and that the Minister had been informed about this.

7. The Defence of Pakistan Rules have been framed under section 3 of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The Ordinance was promulgated for providing special measures to ensure the security, the public safety and the Defence of Pakistan and for the trial of certain offences. It is also mentioned in the preamble that this law was being made in the national interest of Pakistan and in relation to the security of the country. Section 3 of the Ordinance gives the rule‑making powers to the Central Government for ensuring the security, the public safety and the interest and Defence of Pakistan etc. Subsection (2) without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1) enumerates the number of subjects on which the Central Government may frame rules. Clause (xii) of subsection (2) of section 3 reads as under: "the control of persons entering, departing from, or travelling in Pakistan, and of foreigners residing or being in Pakistan." It has, therefore, among other things to‑ be seen whether the impugned order was passed in order to achieve the objects of the Ordinance for the security,. the public safety and Defence of Pakistan.

8. Mr. Asif Sajjad Jan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, compared the language of clause (xii) of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance with the relevant portion of rule 31 which reads as under: "Rule 31.‑(1) The Central Government may by order, make provision for securing that, subject to such exemptions as may be provided for in the order, any person for the time being in Pakistan or any class of such persons, shall not‑ (a) proceed from Pakistan to a destination outside Pakistan except under the authority of a written permit granted in such form and manner and by such authority or person as array be specified in the order; (b) for the purpose of proceeding to a destination outside Pakistan leave Pakistan elsewhere than at such place as may be specified in the order. (2) (3) (4) .. (5) . It was submitted that the words "time being" as used in Rule 31 applied to foreigners and other temporary residents of Pakistan and could not have covered the case of the residents of Pakistan. He suggested that if the intention was to cover by this rule the residents of Pakistan or people of Pakistan origin, the rule‑making authority should have explicitly said that, instead of using the phrase "for the time being in Pakistan". I have considered this argument and I find that it has no substance., The meanings of the phrase "time being" came in for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Iftikharud Din v. Muhammad Sarfraz P L D 1961 S C

595. The conten tion raised there was that the use of this phrase in section 1 of Martial Law Regulation No. 72 was meant to cover the past transactions and excluded future transactions. Supreme court repelled the contention and held that the words for the time being do not necessarily refer to the past may well have reference to what may happen in future. Their Lordships quoted from stroud s Judicial Dictionary, Where the meanings of the words "time being" are thus stated: "The phrase "for the time being" may according to its context m the time, present, or denote single period of time but its general sense is that of time indefinite and reference to an indefinite state of facts which will arise in the future and which may (and probably will) vary from time to time." The words "time being" therefore can be safely said to have reference to an indefinite pan of time and an indefinite state of facts. The rule‑making authority did not purposely use any rigid phrase because by doing so they could have circumscribed their powers. The phrase "for the time being" in my opinion has not been used in any exclusive sense and is intended to cover‑residents of Pakistan including foreigners and those who were temporarily residing in Pakistan.

9. It was next urged that the liberty of the petitioner in proceeding abroad was curtailed without any reasonable cause or without any legal sanc tion and the action of the Government was, therefore, ultra vires, oppressive and malicious. The learned counsel cited Abut A'ala Maududi v. State Bank of Pakistan P L D 1969 Lah. 908 and strongly relied upon the opinion of Muhammad Akram. J. that travel abroad was a part of the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. It was further submitted that an order unsupported by reasons was no order in the eye of law. Reliance in this connection was placed on Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri PLD1969SC14., The learned counsel also assailed the stand of the respondent that it was not called upon to give any show‑cause notice for the impugned action as against the weight of authority. He quoted from the judgment of Cornelius, J. in Abut A'ula Maududi v. The Government of West Pakistan PLD 1964 S C 673 to assert that even in cases of emergency an ex post facto enquiry is necessary to comply with the rule of natural justice.

10. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the learned Deputy Attorney‑General, countered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner by asserting that the word "liberty" as used in Article 4 of the Constitution did not include the right to travel abroad and that there being a law in the shape of rule 31 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, which imposed pre‑conditions on the exit of a person or a class of persons present in Pakistan for the time being, there was no violation of the Constitution. He also asserted in conformity with the pleadings of the respondents that no show‑cause notice was necessary in this case and that the respondent was under no obligation to give any reasons for the prohibitive order as the Rule did not contain any requirement to that effect. The learned Deputy Attorney‑General relied on $be majority judgment of the Karachi High Court in Sharifuddin Pirzada's case P L D 1973 Kar. 132 for the proposition that no show‑cause notice was necessary and the order made under Rule 31 was within the competence of the Central Government. In order to show that travelling abroad was not a right guaranteed by the Fundamental Rights, be, apart from relying on the majority judgment in the above Karachi case, also took his stand on the judgment of Muhammad Gul, J. in Syed Abut A'ala Maududi's case wherein his Lordship agreed with the conclusions arrived at by Muhammad Akram, J. but took a different view from that of his brother Judge who had opined that to travel abroad was a Constitutional right of a citizen, subject of course to reasonable restrictions.

11. According to Blackstone Commentaries, Volume 1, page 134 which was quoted by Muhammad Akram, J. in Abut A'ala Mauduai's case "personal liberty" consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course of law. It also appears from the observation made at page 924 of the precedent case that the Supreme Courts of Ceylon and India bad held that there should be no unreasonable restrictions on a person's right to proceed abroad.

12. The word "liberty" does not only denote immunity of a person from incarceration, confinement, detention or restraint but also carries with it a wider meaning of a citizen following fully his course of action in matters of his private life including travel abroad. If the Constitution givers intended to give a limited connotation to the word "liberty" in clause (a) of sub‑Article (2) of Article 4, the word "body" would not have followed the word "liberty". Article 9 of the Constitution is beaded "Security of Person" and says that no person shall be deprived or life and liberty save in accordance with law. The presumption is that the Constitution‑giving body ordinarily uses the same word at various places in the same sense. The word "security" according to the dictionary meanings, means the "thing that guards and guarantees". The beading of this Article, therefore, does not circumscribe its operation to the safeguarding of the personal liberty from illegal attacks in a limited physical sense but on the other hand ensures the liberty of a person in the same large sense in which it is mentioned to Article

4. The American Supreme Court found by a majority in Kent v. Dukes 357 U S 116=2 L Ed 1204 that travelling abroad was a part of the liberty of a citizen and right of exit was a personal right covered by the word "liberty." In my view, travelling abroad is a part of the personal libery of a citizen and in the absence of a law imposing reasonable restrictions, he has a right to leave the country and re‑enter it.

13. In any case, travelling abroad is permitted by the laws of this country. Clause (b) of sub‑Article (2) of Article 4 of the Constitution contains a solemn declaration that no person shall be prevented from or be hindred in doing that which is not prohibited by law. A person is, therefore free to travel abroad unless law says otherwise. Rule 31 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules is being pressed into service as a provision of law which has put an embargo on this right of the petitioner. The question is as to what is the extent of the applicability of this law and whether the case of the petitioner is covered by it. I have given above the history of the various orders that were made under this Rule from 23rd of December. 1971, onwards. In the first instance, there was a complete embargo on the citizens of Pakistan or of Pakistan origin to leave the country. Certain exceptions were made thereafter and as to the rest, it was said that they could not leave the country without obtaining a "No‑Objection Certificate". At the time when the petitioner wanted to embark upon his journey there was no restriction o the citizens of Pakistan except a small number of persons "whose exit fro the country could be regarded as injurious to the national interest. It is conceded that there was a list of 3,000 such persons appended to the letter dated 24th of October, 1972, but Ch. Zahoor Elahi's name was not mentioned therein. The petitioner was, therefore, free to travel abroad without sub mitting to the necessity of asking for "No‑Objection Certificate" till the morning of 24th of October, 1972, when he was deprived of his passport an stopped from boarding the plane for which he had been given a boarding card.

14. The case of Sharif‑ud‑din Pirzada P L D 1973 Kar. 132 is not very helpful to the learned Deputy Attorney‑General. This case was instituted when there was a general embargo on the citizens of Pakistan to travel abroad and the representative character of the petitioner therein was questioned by the Central Government while he claimed that in spite of ceasing to be the Attorney‑General of the Country, he still continued to be a representative of the country on Sub‑Commission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities constituted by the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations. It may also be pointed out that the main argument in that case proceeded on the vies of Rule 31 and the necessity of setting up of a machinery for considering the cases of persons who were to apply for a "No‑Objection Certificate." The petitioner's case is, quite distinguishable from the above case.

15. I have narrated above the circumstances in which the order was. passed against the petitioner on the eve of his departure from Karachi. It was an oral direction by the Additional Secretary of the Interior Ministry which was acted upon by Mr. Abdul Wahab, Deputy Secretary of the Division who issued the impugned order on 23rd of October, 1973, and the file came before the Additional Secretary after the order has been passed and instructions bad been issued to all concerned to stop the petitioner from. leaving Karachi for his travel abroad. The petitioner during the hearing filed an affidavit dated 12th of November, 1973, swearing that he had presented an application to the Home Department of the Provincial Govern ment enquiring from them the nature of instructions issued to them by the Central Government against the petitioner. According to this affidavit the official concerned informed him that they had received some instructions but they were not prepared to give him a copy of these instructions unless the Central Government permitted them to do so. It also transpired during the arguments that a fresh list of persons had been prepared on 20th of December 1473, in which the name of the petitioner was included at No.

62. This inclusion should ordinarily have no effect on the case of the petitioner because it was done during the pendency of this writ petition and because again no reasons have been given at the bar during the arguments in this case, for the inclusion of the name of the petitioner in this list. The Central Government has failed to indicate as to on what evidence the petitioner was considered as a person having intention of action of adversely against the national interest of Pakistan. The mere fact that a number of cases were registered against him may or may not be a good reason for placing the restriction on him, but the file does not contain any discussion to that effect. It was not even argued by the learned Deputy Attorney‑General as to in what way the going abroad of the petitioner would have injured the national interest of Pakistan. He did not take the stand that any of the cases registered against the petitioner or any member of his family contained evidence to that effect.

16. The argument of the learned Deputy Attorney‑General that tile absence of any express requirement in Rule 31 to give reasons for their action absolves the Government or for matter of that any of its functionaries from the responsibility of giving reasons, finds an effective answer in authentic books on Judicial Review and in the judicial Pronouncements of foreign countries and our own Supreme Court. It is stated in para. 209 of "The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies" by Forrest G. Ferris and Forrest G. Ferris. Jr. (1926 Edn.) that the discretion must be exercised reasonably and honestly, and not arbitrarily or capriciously, or in bad faith. Similarly, it is observed at page 279 in "Craies on Statute Law" (1971 Edn.) that the powers must be properly exercised i.e. bona fide, with judgment and discretion and without negligence. It was held in Galloway v. Corporation of London 2 De G J & S 638 that the exercise of public powers given to a Corporation by an Act of Parliament are at all times to be exercised bona fide and with judgment and discretion. In Westminster Corporation v. London & North Western Railway 1905 A C 426 it was held that a public body invested with statutory powers must act in good faith and must act reasonably. In Abul A'ala Maududi v. Government of West Pakistan the Supreme Court was examining the legality of the action taken against the Jamaat‑i‑Islami by the Government under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. Cornelius, C. J. dealing with the argument that the formation of opinion by the officer concerned was enough to involve the denial of the judicial function of a superior Court, observed that the absence of express requirement of reason able grounds has never stood in the way of the British Courts interfering to review judicial action. It was further observed at page 716 of the report that in such cases the power of judicial review where the decision is neither just nor reasonable, are available to all Courts which exercise authority in conformity with British Common Law such as the Courts in Pakistan do in relation to matters which are not expressly governed by statute or other law. In Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri PLD 1969 S C 14 Hamoodur Rehman, C. J. dealing with the same argument ,observed as under: "The question, however, that still remains to be considered is as to whether the reasonableness of the action can be examined when the statute itself does not require the authority to act upon reasonable grounds but leaves him to act upon his own subjective satisfaction. In view of the provisions of Article 98 of the Constitution I am of the view that that degree of reasonableness has at least to be established which has been indicated in the case of Abdul Baqi Baluch. Other wise if an authority could protect himself by merely saying that he believed himself acting in pursuance of a statute then what would be the material upon which the Court could say that it was satisfied that the detention or impugned action had not been taken in an unlawful manner." His Lordship further observed "A person acting in pursuance of a statute cannot 6e said to be acting bona fide if he has no reasonable ground for believing that the statute justifies him in what he does. If the case. therefore, is one where there are no grounds or the grounds are such that no reasonable person would have acted on the supposition that he was acting under the authority of the statute, then that is a case in which the Court would in exercise of the power under Article 98 of the Constitution declare the act to have been done in an unlawful manner."

17. The donees of the public power must act fairly and reasonably before arriving at a conclusion adverse to the interest, liberty or reputation o a citizen. The mere existence of a law enabling the public functionaries t impose restraint on the liberty of a citizen is not enough to justify the action taken thereunder. A public functionary cannot take a portion of disabling provision of law and label a citizen with it without giving as reasons for his action. The word "Law" as used in Article 4 of our Constitution does not only mean the letter of the law but it also carries with it the necessary implication as to how that law is to be implemented. It is he that the duty lies on a public functionary who exercises the public power, to act with reason and with fairness. I may in all humility and with the greatest respect seek support for this view from the pronouncement of the learned Chef Justice of Pakistan in the case of Begun Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri's case PLD1969SC

14. His Lordship observed: "Law is here not confined to statute law alone but is used in its generic sense as connoting all that is treated as law in this country including even the judicial principles laid down from time to time by the superior Courts. It means according to the accepted forms of legal process and postulates a strict performance of all the functions and duties laid down by law. It may well be, as has been suggested in some quarters, that in this sense it is an comprehensive as the American "due process" clause in a new garb."

18. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the Deputy Attorney‑General, submitted) that the Additional Secretary had applied his mind to the facts of this case. The Additional Secretary had given a brief two line note after the order had been issued that there were criminal cases pending against the petitioner. It is however indicated that the exit of the petitioner from the country will be injurious to the national interest. Even during the arguments it was not pointed out that the facts in any one of those cases pointed towards that direction. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record a statement showing that out of ten cases pending against the petitioners, the High Court had stayed proceedings in five subsequent to the institution of applications for quashment of proceedings. In the other cases. the petitioner was granted bail. It is not possible to decide positively the question of mala fides and political vendetta raised on the basis of the registration of a number of cases against the petitioner and member of his family. as most of the cases are pending decision, but that does not debar me from holding that it has not been shown that the facts in any one of these cases were relateable to the object of the law under which the impugned action was taken against the petitioner.

19. Raja Muhammad Anwar next urged that the petitioner was not entitled to any show‑cause notice. The application of the principle of audi alteram partem is not confined only to judicial or quasi‑judicial proceed ings. According to S. A. de Smith there is a duty to observe the rudiments, of natural justice for a limited purpose for the exercise of functions that are not analytically judicial but are administrative. It was held in In re : R. H. K. (an infant) (1967) 2 Q B 630. "It was the duty of an Immigration Officer to tell would be immigrant that he had doubts about the latter's age and to give him a fair chance to allay them." Whenever any executive action is taken against the property, interest or reputation of a person he has a right to know what are the reasons for which that action is taken. The Supreme Court in Abul A'ala Maudadl's case held by majority, per Chief Justice Cornelius, S. A. Rehman and Kaikaus, JJ. That even where exigencies of a situation require prompt action, the person or persons affected have a right to know the reasons for the action and to get an opportunity to put their side of the case before the authority concerned, after the order had been passed.

20. The record does not show that there was any ground for passing the impugned order. The order was passed in great haste and in a rather unconventional manner. The officers concerned in passing the impugned order showed neither responsibility nor reasonableness.

21. We cannot concede this power to the executive that they may without giving any reasons and without calling upon the citizen concerned to show cause, attach a serious blemish to him as a citizen of Pakistan and still claim that they are under no obligation to give reasons for their action or to afford an opportunity to the person concerned to show cause against the such an action.

22. It has not been shown that the impugned order had any relation whatsoever with the objects enumerated in the Ordinance. Rule 31 was promulgated for the achievement and the furtherance of these objects. !t could not have been the intention of the Legislature in delegating powers to the Executive under Rule 31 to invest them with unbridled powers to stop the travel abroad of a citizen for any reason that they deem fit. The order has to be relateable to the objects of the law under which it has been passed. The petitioner was proceeding abroad for reasons of health and it has not been shown that this reason was without foundation.

23. I may say that where public power is to be exercised, especially, in derogation to the liberty of a citizen, the order so directing has to be based on reasonable grounds. There is a duty cast on the public functionary passing such an order to act impartially and reasonably. The three organs of the sate in a Federal Constitution, as that of ours, have to look hospitably to each other's functioning and every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to the actions of a co‑ordinate Branch of the Government, but the acceptance of a mere general assertion by officials of the Executive of the bona fide performance of their duty, as an adequate justification for curtailing the liberty of a citizen, would fail to meet the constitutional requirements. In such cases, it is the duty of the superior judiciary to review the action of the Executive, otherwise the constitutional guarantees given to the citizens would be vain and illusory.

24. The result is that I declare the order dated 23rd of October, 1973, banning the exit of the petitioner from the country and ail subsequent actions taken on the basis thereof, to be without lawful authority. I make a similar declaration in respect of the subsequent order dated 200 of December, 1973, by which the name of the petitioner was included among the persons on whom restrictions had been placed in respect of their travel abroad. Since the Government offered to give back the passport to the petitioner, he can ,receive the same. The costs of this petition shall be paid by the respondent Government. K. B. A. Petition accepted.