P L D 1965 Supreme Court 90 (PLP)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑This certificated appeal arises out of a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution filed by the respondent herein in the High Court of East Pakistan for challenging the validity of an order issued by the appellant University on the 3rd of April 1964, under the signature of its Registrar expelling the said respondent for a period of two years. There is on dispute as to the facts that gave rise to this proceeding in the High Court and they may be briefly stated as follows:‑ The respondent, who was a student of the University in the Second Year M. A. Economics Class and resident of Salimullah Muslim Hall, was invited to attend the Annual Convocation of the University of Dacca held on the 22nd of March, 1964, in his capacity of an elected member of the Dacca University Central Students Union. A group of the students of the University was opposed to the Chancellor presiding over the Convocation and had attempted on the 16th of March, 1964, to have a resolution for boycotting the Convocation, approved by the general body of students at a meeting held in the old Arts Faculty Building of the University. This meeting, however, ended in a pandemonium, as a large section of the students were opposed to the resolution and were in favour of participating in the Convocation. On the morning of the 21st of March, i.e. the day before the Convocation, the two opposing groups of students actually came into clash over the Convocation issue and Police help had to be requisitioned to keep the peace. On the 22nd of March 1964, i.e. the Convocation day, after the guests and the Graduates had all assembled in the pandal and the procession of the Chancellor and the Professors of the University had begun to move into the Convocation pandal, a group of students started creating disturbances. They shouted slogans, asked the students to boycott the Convocation and attempted to obstruct the passage leading to the pandal, so that the procession may not be able to move and even started throwing about chairs. The disturbances were of such a violent nature that many of the Graduates assembled for receiving their Degrees had to take shelter, out of fear, in the adjoining Chemistry Department Buildings and Police had to intervene to make it possible for the Convocation to be held. The situation took a more alarming turn later in the evening when some 400 to 500 persons, variously armed with hockey sticks and mosquito‑net stands, assembled in the compound of the Iqbal Hall shouting slogans to attack the inmates of the Salimullah Muslim Hall who had supported the holding of the Convocation. Again, timely Police intervention prevented the situation getting out of hand. But in view of these happenings the University was also closed for an indefinite period to prevent the situation from worsening. The University authorities, not unnaturally, took a serious view of the whole situation and decided to take action against those who were responsible for the disturbances in the Convoca tion pandal. For this purpose, on the 25th of March 1964, the Registrar of the University issued a confidential circular to all teachers who had been assigned duties at the Convocation pandal requesting them to send detailed reports mentioning the names of the persons involved, as it was felt that they having been posted within the pandal were in a better position to know what actually happened and how the disturbances originated. It is to be noted that the object for which the report was called for was, as stated in the circular, as follows:‑ "It is necessary to make a thorough enquiry into the whole matter in order to find out who were actually responsible for the disturbances." In response to this Circular "more than 40 teachers and officers" of the University submitted written reports out of which one was submitted by Dr. M. Ahmad, the Provost of the Salimullah Muslim Hall. He claimed to have recognised the respondent, who was a resident of his Hall, as one of those who were taking "direct action" in the disturbances and had actually shouted slogans "asking students to leave the pandal and boycott the Convocation". The respondent was named as a miscreant only in the report submitted by Dr. M. Ahmad and not in the report of any other teacher or officer and there too the only allegation against him was that he was seen amongst the group creating disturbances and shouting slogans. These reports were placed before the Residence Health and Discipline Board of the University at its meeting held on the 31st of March 1964. This meeting was presided over by the Vice Chancellor himself and Dr. M. Ahmad, who was a member of the said Board in his capacity of Provost of Salimullah Muslim Hall, was also present at the meeting. The relevant portions of the minutes of this meeting are as follows:‑ III. Considered.‑The reports of . University officers and teachers on duty in the Curzon Hall premises and of Provosts and Proctor on the disturbances in connection with the 38th Convocation held in 22‑3‑

64. The Board took a serious view of the acts of indiscipline, misconduct and rowdyism committed by a number of students on this occasion. The findings and recommendations of the Board of Discipline are as follows:‑ 5 . The Board found the following students guilty of serious breach of discipline and Recommended unanimously.‑That they be expelled from the University with immediate effect for a period of 2 (two) years:‑ (1) . . . . . . (2) . . . . . . (3) Zakir Ahmad, II M. A. (Bcon.) Roll, S. 292, son of Mr. Sujat Hossain. (4) . . . . . . It may be noticed that the minutes do not disclose if any explanation was called for from any of the students against whom action was proposed to be taken or that any of the students was heard or questioned. Action was presumably taken on the basis of only the reports. These minutes were later placed before the Syndicate of the University and the action proposed by the Board was approved by the Syndicate at its meeting held on the 1st of April 1964. Thereafter, action was taken by issuing the impugned notification of the 3rd of April 1964, giving effect to the resolution of the Syndicate and a copy of the said notification was also served on the respondent on the 6th of April 1964. The respondent challenged the validity of this order of expulsion and caused a notice to be served upon the University through his lawyer on the 15th of April 1964, in which the allegations made against him were denied and it was, inter alia, contended that the order was illegal and void and of no legal effect for the following amongst other reasons:‑ "(a) Adverse findings relating to the character and conduct of my client has been made and penal action taken against him without any show‑cause notice being issued on him or any opportunity being afforded to him to appear and be heard with a view to controverting the allegations against him, in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. (b) . . . . . . (c) . . . . . . (d) The said purported order of expulsion is mala fide, as the allegations on which the order has been made are based on no materials for holding that the said client did what is alleged herein to have been done by him. (e) . . . . . . As no response was received to this notice the respondent caused the petition, out of which the present appeal arises, to be moved in the High Court on the 19th of May 1964, and obtained a rule calling upon the University to show cause in the matter. This rule came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court and was heard for 3 days but the Bench concerned, by its order of the 23rd of June 1964, directed the records to be placed before the Chief Justice of the said Court, as it was felt that the petition raised questions of such importance that it should be heard by a Special‑Bench preferably of five Judges. A Special Bench of five Judges was, accordingly, constituted to hear this petition. The case was argued before the Special Bench for five days and a large number of points were canvassed. It is not necessary to refer at this stage to all these points, for, the main ground upon which the High Court has by its unanimous judgment allowed the petition and declared the order of the University issued on the 3rd of April 1964, so far as it relates to the respondent's expulsion from the University, void and of no legal effect, is that the order was made in violation of the rule of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem. It appears that an objection in the nature of a preliminary objection was also raised in the High Court on behalf of the University to the effect that since the University was neither a "local authority" nor "a person performing in the Province any function in connection with the affairs of the Centre, the Province or a local authority" within the meaning of clause (2) of Article 98 of the Constitution, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the respondent. But this contention was repelled, as the High Court was of the view that the University was a local authority within the meaning of this Article. It was held to be "an authority which is legally entitled to, or has been entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a local fund". From this judgment and order the University of Dacca has, after obtaining a certificate under sub‑clause (a) of clause (2) of Article 58 of the Constitution, preferred this appeal and Mr. Manzur Qadir appearing on behalf of the University has urged only the following three points before us (1) That the University is neither a person nor a local authority within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitution, (2) that in matters of internal discipline of a body or authority, such as the Police force or the army or an educational institution that depends upon the maintenance of strict discipline for its very existence the rule of audi alteram partem is not applicable, and (3) that, in any event, the present is a case where, even if this Court, is . satisfied that the rule applies and has not been complied with, the High Court should have exercised its discretion in favour of the appellant. Thee first point, though wised, has not been seriously pressed for, the learned counsel has himself felt that it would be difficult to argue that the University was not a person performing in the Province of East Pakistan functions in connection with the affairs of that Province. A person has been defined in the General Clauses Act as including "any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not", and the University of Dacca has been defined in subsection (1) of section 3 of the Dacca University Ordinance (No. XXIII of 1961) as follows:‑ "3 (1) The first Chancellor and Vice‑Chancellor of the University and the first members of the Syndicate and the Academic Council and all persons who may hereafter become such officers or members, so long as they continue to hold such office or membership, are hereby constituted a body corporate by the name of the University of Dacca." .. It is clear from this definition that the University is an associatio of persons who have 'been constituted by the statute into a body corporate and, therefore, the University comes well within the definition of a "person" given in the General Clauses Act. Again under Article 242 of the Constitution a "person" is defined as including any "body politic or corporate". As such even under this definition the University comes within the category of a . "person" under the Constitution. The next question that arises is whether it is performing any function in connection with the affairs of a Province. The University has been set up, as stated in section 4 of the Dacca University Ordinance, to provide, inter alia, for instruction it] various branches of learning and to make provision for research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge, to affiliate and disaffiliate colleges, to prescribe courses of studies, to hold examinations and to grant and confer diplomas, degrees and other academic distinctions. Its purpose, therefore, is to impart education at higher levels in the Divisions of Dacca and Chittagong and in the district of Bakerganj in the Khulna Division. It is clear, therefore, that it is performing functions within the Province of East Pakistan which are connected with one of the affairs of trial Province namely, education. It is also patent from a perusal of the provisions of the Dacca University Ordinance that the Provincial Government has considerable power to control and regulate the activities of the University both directly and through the Chancellor who is also the Governor of the Province. Thus under section 8 the Provincial Government has the right to cause an inspection to be made of the University, its buildings, laboratories and equipment and of any institution associated with the University as also of the examinations, teaching and other work conducted or done by the University and to issue through the Governor such directions to the University as it may think fit. Again, under section 11 the Governor as the ex officio Chancellor of the University, may pass such orders as he considers necessary if he is satisfied that exceptional circumstances seriously interfering with the normal activities of the University exist. Such orders are binding on the University. In almost all matters an appeal lies from the decision of the University and the authorities of the University to the Governor as Chancellor of the University. Again, whenever a question arises as to whether any person is entitled to be a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter has, under section 44 of the Ordinance, to be referred to the Chancellor whose decision is final. It is difficult. therefore, to resist the conclusion that the University is a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Province, namely, education. Under section 421, furthermore, the annual accounts and balance‑sheets of the University have to be submitted to the Provincial Government for the purposes of audit and the Government scrutinises the audit report which must also be submitted to Government. The bulk of the University's revenue comes from Government grants and the Governor appoints its Vice‑Chancellor. The control of the Government over the affairs of the University is as complete as it can be Thus the University is not only a "person" within the meaning that term in the General Clauses Act and the Constitution but it is also a "person" C of the category referred to in Article 98 of the Constitution and, therefore, it is without any doubt amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under that Article. The next point urged by Mr. Manzoor Qadir is that the rule of natural justice embodied in the maxim audi alteram partem cannot have universal application. It can be observed only as far as practicable. To apply it to the cases of institutions where the maintenance of discipline is essential in the interest of the institution itself might result in creating an impossible situation. It is urged that there is a difference between bodies or authorities like Government Departments exercising powers which might result in depriving other persons of their rights in property or other vested rights and institutions which by their very nature depend upon internal discipline. Thus, it is said, it would create an impossible position if the Courts began to interfere with the discipline of Police Forces, armies and other similar bodies which by their very nature are disciplined services. The foundation of this argument is an observation made by Goddard, C. J., in the case of Ex parte: Fry ((1954) 2 All E R 118). In that case a fireman in the county of Glamorgan fire brigade, who had refused to carry out the order of a leading fireman to clean the uniform of the Assistant Divisional Officer, was charged for disobedience to orders and after a departmental enquiry had been conducted by the Chief Officer of the fire brigade was found guilty and administered a caution. He moved for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the Chief Officer. The application was dismissed and the learned Lord Chief Justice of England in his judgment observed as follows:‑ "It seems to me impossible to say, where a chief officer of a force which is governed by discipline, as is a fire brigade, is exercising disciplinary authority over a member of the force, that he is acting either judicially or quasi judicially. It seems to me that he is no more acting judicially or quasi judicially than a schoolmaster who is exercising disciplinary powers over his pupils." This order was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal but only on the ground that it was a fit case in which the discretion of the Court ought not to be exercised in favour of the applicant for the following reason:‑ "The applicant is a member of a service which is of great public importance. For the good of that service and of those who are employed in the service, the Secretary of State has made regulations so that their position may be ascertained and there may be as few difficulties as possible. There is 'a complete code'. If a man feels that he is ordered to do something which he ought not to be ordered to do, lie can raise the matter in the way that I have said, but if, instead of doing that, he deliberately sets out to disobey the order given to him by a superior officer, he is only making difficulties for himself and for the whole of the service, and that is something which he ought to realise. Again, in the ordinary case of discipline which is dealt with by the chief officer, there is an appeal under the Fire Services (Discipline) Regulations, 1948, Reg. 9, to the fire authority. In the circumstances, of the present case there was no appeal (Reg. 8 (5)), because the punishment inflicted was only a caution, but there are ways and means of bringing to the notice of the fire authority in a proper case the conduct of one who has to preside over a disciplinary Tribunal of this kind if it is thought right and proper that that should be done. In the circumstances I do not think that the Divisional Court ought to have granted the relief which the applicant sought, nor do I think that this Court should do so." In making the observation first quoted the learned Chief Justice had relied upon an earlier decision of his own in the case of Rex v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ex parse : Parker ((1953) 2 All E R 717) In that case the Commissioner of Police as a licencing authority had in exercise of the powers given to him by paragraph 30 (1) of the London Cab Order, 1934, revoked the licence of a cab driver and had directed him to appear before the Licencing Committee where he was to be confronted with two Police Constables who had made complaints against him. This directive, however, contained also an instruction that the licence was to stand revoked unless anything transpired before the Committee which, in their opinion, might lead the Commissioner to alter his decision. The driver actually appeared before the Committee, denied the allegations and asked for permission to call witnesses in support of his own case. This was refused and the Committee reported to the Commissioner that nothing had transpired which might influence him to alter his decision. The licence, therefore, stood revoked. A writ was applied for by the cab driver for quashing the order of revocation on the ground that the enquiry before the Committee was not held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, as the Committee had refused to allow him to call witnesses in his defence. Goddard, C. J., held that while exercising the power of revoking the licence the Commissioner was not exercising a judicial or quasi‑judicial function, and observed as follows:‑ "He was exercising what I may call a disciplinary authority, and where a person, whether he is a military officer, a police officer or any other person whose duty it is to act in matters of discipline, is exercising disciplinary powers, it is most undesirable, in my opinion, that he should be fettered by threats of orders of certiorari and so forth, because that interferes with the free and proper exercise of the disciplinary powers which he has. In this case the applicant was given a chance, by cross‑examination of or confrontation with the police officers, of extracting some fact which, if it was brought to the notice of the Commissioner, might have influenced him before his decision was actually promulgated through the mouth of the Assistant‑Commissioner." It will be observed that in both these cases some form of enquiry was made and the person sought to be affected was told what the charges were against him and given an opportunity to show cause, although the procedure adopted was not in every respect one that a Court or a Tribunal sitting as a Court would have adopted. In the case of the fireman Fry the Presiding Officer had interrupted the accused's friend during the development of his arguments and closed the proceedings. In the case of the cab driver the Enquiry Committee had refused to allow him to call witnesses in his defence. It may well be that in these circumstances the Courts in England have taken the view that the discretion of the Court should not be exercised in favour of the person praying for an order in the nature of a certiorari, as the substance of a fair trial had already been received by the applicant. The observation of Goddard, C. J., which was in the nature of an obiter, appears to have been followed by some Indian Courts also in cases concerning disciplinary action against students by Universities and educational institutions. The cases to which our attention has been drawn are of Ram Chander Roy v. University of Allahabad and others (A I R 1956 A11. 46) and 4molak Singh and others v. Punjab University, Solan (AIR 1957 H P 31). In the Allahabad case the facts are very much like the facts of the case before us. There also a group of students, who had decided to boycott the Chancellor of the University, started shouting slogans when the Chancellor came to paritcipate in the Convocation. This subsequently led to a clash in the University Building with a rival group of students who were in favour of the Chancellor. The University set up an Enquiry Committee but the terms of reference of this Committee were limited to the demonstration staged against the Chancellor in the Convocation Pandal and did not include the subsequent attack in the University building upon party shouting slogans against the Chancellor. This Committee caused notices to be served upon the students concerned including the petitioner in that case. He appeared before the Enquiry Committee and denied the charges. The Committee thereafter recorded evidence of a number of witnesses and permitted some students to cross‑examine those witnesses but no such opportunity was given to the said petitioner. He was, however, rusticated from the University for four years. He moved the High Court for a writ for quashing the order of rustication and, inter alia, contended that since he had been given no opportunity to cross -examine the witnesses, the order ought to be set aside, as it had been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. Rejecting this contention the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court expressed themselves as follows:‑ "Firstly, we are not convinced that, in a case where a head of an educational institution takes disciplinary proceedings, it is necessary that he must give an opportunity to the student to cross‑examine the witnesses who may be examined by him in order to satisfy himself that an occasion had arisen for taking disciplinary action against him. In matters of discipline, the head of an educational institution does not act as a judicial or quasi judicial Tribunal. The disciplinary authority vested in any officer or the head of an institution is a power which is absolutely necessary for and ancillary to the exercise of administrative functions in that capacity." Then quoted with approval the observations of Goddard, C. J., referred to earlier. In the next case four students, who had created disturbances in an examination hall because they considered the question paper to be unduly stiff, had been disqualified for one year by the University authorities under the regulations of the University without being given any show‑cause notice, as they were found to be the ring‑leaders. There also it was argued that since these students had not been afforded any opportunity of showing cause before action was taken against them, the order had been made in contravention of the principles of natural justice. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh did not accept this contention and held, relying on some other decisions of the same High Court, that it was not necessary to give a personal hearing to a student against whom action was intended to be taken, for, in the very nature of things the University cannot be expected to hold a trial. In the first case an enquiry had actually been held and during the course of the enquiry, as was proved by the production of the records of the enquiry, the students including the petitioner had been heard and questioned at length by the Enquiry Committee. It further appeared that the petitioner had in his answers, at one stage, admitted that he had shouted slogans in the Convocation pandal, although he later resiled from this position. In the case from Himachal Pradesh, no doubt, no show‑cause notice was at all given. It was said by the High Court that since the regulations of the University did not provide for the issue of such show‑cause notices to an examine before taking action against him, the University was not bound to issue such show cause notice. Mr. Manzoor Qadir has adopted the reasonings of these decisions and has contended that the interests of discipline in educational institutions transcend the interests of natural justice. He urges that the maintenance of discipline in institutions of this nature would become impossible if the Courts were to insist that in each and every case a prior opportunity of showing cause must be given before any action is taken, particularly, since a student who enrols himself in a University to receive education places himself under the disciplinary powers of the authorities of the University. He cannot as such claim as of right that proceedings can be taken against him only by adopting the procedure of a judicial enquiry. The High Court has not accepted the reasonings of these cases but has preferred to follow the principles enunciated by the Judicial Committee in the case of the University of Ceylon v. Fernando ((1960) 1 All E R 631). In that case it was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the University that the principles of natural justice were applicable but it was contended that those principles had been duly complied with. The facts of the case discloses that a detailed enquiry had been held on the basis of a complaint made by another candidate to the effect that the respondent before the Privy Council had acquired prior knowledge of certain questions at an examination. The only grievance of the said respondent there was that the witnesses examined against him were not questioned in his presence and hearing and thus he was denied the opportunity to cross‑examine them. In those circumstances the Judicial Committee observed after reviewing earlier authorities that:‑ "The Vice‑Chancellor was not bound to treat the matter as if it was a trial, had no power to administer an oath and nee not examine witnesses, but could obtain information in an way he thought best. It seems to their Lordships to follow that, inasmuch as the Vice‑Chancellor, when the alleged often under clause 8 was brought to his notice, was not bound to treat the matter as a trial but could obtain information about it in any way he thought best, it was open to him if he thought fit to question witnesses without inviting the plaintiff to be present. But, while there was no objection to the Vice -Chancellor informing himself in this way, it was undoubtedly necessary that, before any decision to report the plaintiff was reached, he should have complied with the vital condition postulated by Lord Loreburn (In Board of Education v. Rice (1911) A C 18 ) which, adapted to the present case, may be stated as being to the effect that a fair opportunity must have been given to the plaintiff to correct or contradict any relevant statement to his prejudice." It will be observed from the cases referred to above, that apart from the decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court none of the other decisions fully support the contentions advanced by Mr. Manzoor Qadir on behalf of the University. Indeed, in all other cases it appears that an enquiry of some kind was in fact held and the students against whom action was proposed to be taken were questioned by the appropriate authority. There is also a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Depa Pal v. University of Calcutta (A 1 R 1952 Cal. 594) which was cited before the Himachal Pradesh High Court but was not followed. In this case it had been observed that:‑ "In cases where breaches of discipline are detected by the Invigilators or other officers present in the examination hall and candidates concerned are expelled from the hall or are otherwise dealt with, question of any enquiry or investigation upon notice to the candidates may not arise. But where no case of breach of discipline is actually detected but subsequently upon examination of the answer papers the Examiners come to entertain suspicion about adoption of unfair means by particular candidate or candidates and the Examination Board has to consider such cases and come to a determination as to the nature of the offence committed and has to apportion the penalty which can properly be inflicted upon the delinquents, it is only fit and proper that the party arraigned should have an opportunity to defend himself and to offer an explanation, if any. To brand a candidate with the stigma of adoption of unfair means at the examination or in other words finding her guilty of dishonesty or misconduct and thereby causing an irreparable injury to the character and reputation of such candidate, without giving him or her any opportunity to explain, is contrary to all notions of justice and good sense.' This principle has since been approved by the Supreme Court of India also in the case of Board of High School v. Ghanshyam (A I R 1962 S C 11 10) as being the correct view. Mr. Manzoor Qadir has sought to distinguish this last decision on the ground that cases of punishment for unfair means employed at examinations stand on a somewhat different footing. According to him in such cases the candidate by submitting himself at the examination makes the University Authorities final Judges not only regarding the quality and merit of his answers but also on questions of misconduct in the course of the examination. In principle, however, we see no distinction. In both cases maintenance of discipline is in issue, whether it is in the examination hall or in the class room or outside the class room within the University Campus. Where such misconduct is discovered in the examination hall itself by the invigilators or is committed in the view of the authority empowered to punish, it may be possible to urge that there is, in such cases, no necessity of giving any show‑cause notice, for, the student concerned knows the wrong that he has committed and is punished immediately by the authority concerned. But where action is proposed to be taken ex post facto after investigation on the basis of evidence subsequently collected from other persons or sources it is difficult to appreciate how a fair and impartial decision can be arrived at without also knowing the other point of view that the student concerned may have to put forward. It is for this reason that the necessity of issuing a show‑cause notice or of calling for an explanation arises. This Court has already had occasion to point out in at least three cases, namely, in thee cases of the Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohirab Katrak (PLD 1959 S C (Pak.) 45), Faridsons Limited v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 537) and Abdur Rahman v. Collector and Deputy Commissioner, Bahatwalnagar and others (PLD 1964 SC 461) that in all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice have to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting "the person or property or other right of the parties concerned." This rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal document; whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness. In the present case, as we have already pointed out, there is no dispute that action was proposed to be taken ex post facto. The confidential circular issued by the University on the 25th of March 1964, calling for reports itself stated that it was necessary "to find out who were actually responsible". There is also no dispute that not only was no hearing given‑ to the respondent in the present case but that he was also not given any show‑cause notice or any other kind of opportunity to submit any explanation, written or oral. Indeed, the University in its counter‑affidavit maintains that "there was mo necessity of serving any show‑cause notice to him, as he had no cause to show having himself committed the breach of discipline which was well known to him in the presence of all". This statement is, of course, not supported by the circular issued on the 25th of March, for, there the position taken up, is that information is required to find out who were responsible. Again, so far as the present respondent is concerned, he has been identified by only one of the 40 teachers as having participated in the disturbance. It is difficult, therefore, to appreciate how it can be said that the respondent concerned had committed the disturbances in the presence of all of them. In these circumstances. two questions arise as to (1) whether the University acted properly in taking disciplinary action against the said respondent and (2) whether in doing so they were required to act with that degree of minimum fairness which is embodied in the principles of natural justice. From a careful review of the decisions cited before us it appears that wherever any person or body of persons is empowered to take decisions after ex post facto investigation into facts Which would result in consequences affecting the person, property or other right of another person, then in the absence of any express words in the entactment giving such power excluding the application of the principles of natural justice, the Courts of law arc inclined generally Ito imply that the power so given is coupled with the duty to act in accordance with such principles of natural justice as ma.1y be applicable in the facts and circumstances of a given case. What these principles of (natural justice are it is not possible to lay down with any exactness, for, they have been various, defined in various cases, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of the University of Ceylon v. Fernando Tuker, L. J., said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk ((1949) 1 All E R 109) "the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject‑matter that is being dealt with, and so forth." Nevertheless, the general consensus of judicial opinion seems to be that, in order to ensure the "elementary and essential principles of fairness" as a matter of necessary' implication, the person sought to be affected must at least be made aware of the nature of the allegations against him, he should be given a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement putting forward his own case and "to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice." Of course, the' person, body or authority concerned must act in good faith, but it would appear that it is not bound to treat the matter as if! it was a trial or to administer oath or examine witnesses in the) presence of the person accused or give him facility for cross‑examining the witnesses against him or even to serve a formal charge‑sheet upon him. Such a person or authority can obtain information in any way it thinks fit, provided it gives a fair opportunity to the person sought to be affected to correct orb contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to him. In other words, "in order to act justly and to reach just ends by just means" the Courts insist that the person or authority should have adopted the above "elementary and essential principles" unless the same had been expressly excluded by the enactment empowering) him to so act. In saying this we are not unmindful of the necessity of main taining discipline in educational institutions or other institutions or departments where the maintenance of discipline is essential for the orderly conduct of the institution or department concerned, nor are we unmindful of the fact that persons in charge particularly of educational institutions must be given the full authority to correct those placed in their charge in the same manner as a parent or guardian would be able to do. But even so, we find it difficult to accept the contention that they must also be freed from the necessity of acting in a manner which excludes every reasonable possibility of unfair action being taken. This can only be achieved by observing certain formalities which have been designed to assure the minimum essential principles of justice and fairness, by at least telling the person sought to be punished or condemned what are the allegations against him and by giving him a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant statement to his prejudice. In the present case, it is patently clear that this was not done. The respondent was afforded no opportunity of any kind whatsoever to submit any explanation or put forward his version. We are not suggesting that either the authorities of the University or the Provost who reported against the respondent , did so with any ulterior motive, nor is their good faith in question' here but we are not satisfied that the University in so acting upon the solitary report of only one of the teachers concerned without giving the respondent any opportunity to put forward his own point of view or to submit any explanation acted in a manner which can be said to have reasonably excluded all possibilities of an honest mistake having been made. We are, therefore, in agreement with the High Court that the order of the University must be set aside and the University should be directed to act in the manner indicated above, if it is still of the view that action should be taken against the respondent. We are not impressed by the argument that such interference by Courts of law with orders passed by educational institutions in the interest of maintenance of discipline would defeat the very purpose for which these institutions exist or that it would stultify the powers of the authorities in charge of educational institutions or prevent them from taking any action against students' misconduct. The Universities and educational institutions generally are armed with abundant powers of disciplinary action against the recalcitrant students and the Courts are, in no way, minded to deprive them of their powers but all that they are entitled to insist upon in the interest of fairness is that the minimum requirements of fairness must be observed by them before such action is taken, for, it is equally important to remember that unfair action may cause greater harm to the prestige of the heads of educational institutions who are expected to be in loco parentis to the students and may seriously undermine the authority which they claim to possess over the students placed in their charge. It remains now to consider the last point urged by Mr. Manzoor Qadir, namely, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court of East Pakistan acted rightly in exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent. The power of issuing orders and discretions under Article 98 of the Constitution is, no doubt, discretionary and it cannot be disputed that the discretion must like all other judicial discretions be exercised in accordance with reason and on sound judicial principles. But having regard to the facts of the present case which disclose a total disregard of even the rudiments of natural justice, it can hardly be said that there was any scope left for the High Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the University. The action of the University, as has been pointed out above, was so patently arbitrary that it could not possibly be upheld. For these reasons we have no hesitation in our minds that this appeal must be dismissed and we accordingly dismiss the same. But having regard to the special circumstances of this case we make no order for costs. A. H. Appeal dismissed.