P L D 1967 Lahore 836 (PLP)

This judgment will dispose of two writ petitions bearing W. P. No. 492/R of 1963 and W. P. No. 557/R of 1965. W. P. No. 492/R‑63

2. In Mauza Gujranwala Chhavni there is situated a garden known as Sham Daswala Garden. In this garden or near it is located a piece of land bearing Khasra No. 262/3 containing an area of four Kanals. The case of the petitioners is that this piece of land is not a part of the garden. They further aver that out of this field number one Kanal was allotted to petitioner No. 1 under No. 262/3/1 and another area of 1 Kanal and 15 Marlas was allotted to petitioners Nos. 2 to

4. Petitioner No. 2 is son and petitioners Nos. 3 and 4 are daughters of petitioner No.

1. For this purpose the petitioners rely upon Annexure B/1 and B/2 and to show their entitlement, (to claim agricultural land) they rely upon entitlement certificates Annexures A/1 to A/4. The allotment was confirmed .to the petitioners on 16‑10‑1960. About one year thereafter respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal (Annexure "C") to the same Court which had made or confirmed the allotments. This was returned to him for presentation to a proper Court vide Annexure C/l. It was then filed in the Court of Deputy Settlement Commissioner who accepted it on 3‑1‑1962 vide his orders Annexures C/2, and "D" and gave the area to respondent No. 3 as an ordinary land. The petitioners on 7‑2‑1962, filed a revision before the Addl. Settlement Com missioner (Land). When the revision petition came up for hearing it transpired that the land had been cancelled by the Garden Allotment Committee from the name of respondent No. 3 and had been allotted to respondent No. 4 on 1‑2‑1962 (vide Annexure "H") as a garden, and, therefore, the Addl. Settle ment Commissioner held that the revision had become infructuous and dismissed the same on 8‑11‑1962 vide Annexure "G". The petitioners thereupon filed the present writ petition in this Court wherein they challenged the orders, dated 3‑1‑1962 (Annexures C/2 and "D" passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner allotting the land to respondent No. 3 as an "ordinary land."), order dated 1‑2‑1962 (Annexure "H") whereby the land had been allotted by the Garden Allotment Committee respondent No. 5 to respondent No. 4 as a garden, and order dated 8‑I1‑1962 (Annexure "G") whereby the Addl. Settlement Commissioner had held the revision of the petitioners as infructuous.

3. To complete the chain of event, it may be mentioned that Qazi Munawwar Hussain respondent No. 3 filed an appeal against the order dated 1‑2‑1962, which was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner on 30‑7‑1964, whereby he treated the said land again as an ordinary land and gave the same to him. Field No. 262/3 or its sub‑field No. 261/3 is the subject‑matter of W. P. No. 492/R of 1963, while the same field numbers along-with Khasra Nos. 1 and 2 are involved in W. P. No. 557/R of 1965. The petitioners in W. P. No. 492/R of 1963 contend that the field numbers claimed by them do not constitute the part of the garden known as Sham Daswala Garden and their transfer to respondent No. 3 is illegal; because if the land of these numbers is treated as an "ordinary land", the petitioners have preference over him. The petitioner in W. P. No. 557/R of 1965, however, says that the aforesaid field number as also the other field numbers like 1 and 2 constitute a compact block of garden and should be transferred to him.

4. The resume of the facts given above will show that the orders, which the petitioners have challenged in this writ petition, have already been set aside in the higher hierarchy of Settlement Department ultimately on 30‑7‑1964. The present writ petition does not challenge that order and from that point of view it has become infructuous. When confronted with this situation the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that I should permit him to amend the writ petition so as to enable him to challenge the order, dated 30th of July 1964. The present writ petition was filed on 14‑2‑1963 and even though the petitioners were aware of that order, they took no steps to challenge the same. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that his clients were not aware of the order, dated 30‑7‑1964. I am not prepared to believe this bare statement of the petitioners. The petitioners were aware of the litigation in the form of the order of the Garden Allotment Committee, dated 1‑2‑1962, and they never exercised any vigilance to follow that up or to know as to where it has ended. If permission is granted to amend the writ petition, at this stage, then it is likely to create com plications and difficulties, because whereas the other parties had been doing so but the petitioners never pursued or challenged the order, dated 1‑2‑1962, in the higher hierarchy of the Settlement Officers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act of 1958 (hereinafter called the Actor Act). The petitioners instead rushed to this Court and, on the other hand, the other parties went through a separate litigation which ended in order dated 30‑7‑1964. It will thus be seen that the petitioners themselves are responsible for the situation in which they find themselves.

5. For the reasons given above, the present writ petition is dismissed as having become infructuous. There‑ will be no order as to costs.

6. Mr. Mirza, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that as I was remanding the case in the other connected writ petition, his clients may also be directed to be joined in the proceedings before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. I cannot give any such direction in the course of this writ petition but the petitioners may put in an appropriate application before the Chief Settlement Commissioner who I am sure will deal with the same in accordance with law. This order by itself will be no bar on the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to deal with this request of the petitioners in accordance with law. W. P. 557/R of 1965

7. This writ petition is by Abdul Karim Wagey who was respondent in the above‑mentioned W. P. No. 492/R of 1963. To continue the chain of facts onward from the stage stated in para. 3 above, it may be pointed out that against the order, dated 30‑7‑1964, mentioned earlier, Abdul Karim Wagey petitioner applied to the Settlement Commissioner to give him a certificate for filing a revision before the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 19(1) of the Act. The Settlement Commissioner granted the requisite certificate on 24‑10‑1964. The said certificate reads as follows "Certified that a question of law is involved in the above cited case decided by me vide my order, dated 30‑7‑1964, which is whether this was a garden which could be allotted by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner." Thereafter Abdul Karim Wagey petitioner filed a revision bearing No. 616/J in the Court of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Chief Settlement Commissioner dismissed the said revision in limine without hearing him on 2‑11‑1964. His order is a short one and reads as follows:‑ "Petitioner has no case. Revision petition rejected. Record may, however, be sent for to ascertain whether respondent has secured area in excess of entitlement `local limit'." Against the aforesaid order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Abdul Karim Wagey petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

8. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner is illegal for two reasons namely. (a) that the petitioner had obtained a certificate of fitness from the Settlement Commissioner for filing a revision petition and after having obtained that certificate he had secured a right to file a revision petition. The learned Chief Settlement Commissioner could not have dismissed such a revision petition without giving an audience to the, petitioner, and (b) that the order of the learned Chief Settlement Com missioner does not give any reason or any ground as to why be was rejecting the revision of the petitioner, even though the Settlement Commissioner had certified that the case involved a question of law.

9. As regards the contention at (a) above, in my opinion. it has a great force. My reasons for accepting this contention are as follows:‑ (i) No doubt section 19(1) of the Act, so far as relevant for the purpose of the present case, authorised the Chief Settlement Commissioner to invoke his revisional jurisdiction suo motu but at the same time it granted a right to a party con cerned as well to move into the matter. The right of a party, however, was circumscribed by two limitations, namely, (a) that the application should be filed within sixty days, and, (b) the petitioner should have obtained a certificate from the Settlement Commissioner concerned that the case involved a question of law. After these two conditions were fulfilled then it became incumbent upon the Chief Settlement Commis sioner to decide and give his own views on the point of law involved or its attending circumstances. The remedy though called a revision, turned into a sort of a substantive or a vested right of a statutory appeal. It being well‑settled that no order should be passed prejudicial to the vested right of a person without hearing that man, it would be essential for the Chief Settlement Commissioner to give an audience to the petitioner and not to dismiss the revision petition in the secrecy of his Chamber. The principle which I have stated, was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45, where the question arose as to whether the right of appeal under Sind (Requisition of Land) Act (XLVI of 1947), carried with it any inherent right of personal audience and hearing, and the Supreme Court held, that the right of appeal being a vested right, the maxim Audi afteram partem applied to it, and the appeal could not be disposed of in Chamber without giving a right of a personal audience to the appellant, because if that hearing. was not given, it would tentamount to destroy his vested right m his absence. The ratio decidendi of that case was that where the remedy given by statute is of the nature of a vested or a substantive nature then that will carry with it the implied warranty of a personal audience. Since, in this case, I have held that after the certificate of the Settlement Commissioner‑that the case involved a question of law, it became a vested right of the petitioner to get his case adjudicated upon by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, it follows that this right carried with it a right of personal audience as well. (ii) I am aware of the general distinction which exists between an appeal and a revision. As laid down in Laxmandas v. Chunnilal and others A I R 1931 Nag 17 firstly, an appeal is a substantive right created by statute and the powers of a Court of appeal are contemporaneous with those exercised by the Court of original jurisdiction. Even when an appeal is dismissed, the appellate Court exercises its jurisdiction. On the other hand, revision jurisdiction is discretionary, and when an application for revision is dismissed the substantive order is of the lower Court and not the order passed in revision. Secondly, under the general law as for example, section 115, C. P. C., a revision lies only in those cases where no appeal lies. Now applying both these tests to the revision under section 19(1) of the Act, it will appear that here the revision is open in all cases that is even those where an appeal may also lie. Thirdly, as I will be presently showing in the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment, since in such revisions the Chief Settlement Commissioner, cannot dismiss them without assigning reasons or without writing a speaking judgment in the case, therefore, where he properly dismisses a revision, the substantive order will be that of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and not of the Subordinate Authority. In other words even where the Chief Settlement Commissioner may dismiss a revision petition he will still be called to have exercised his jurisdiction. The revision under section 19(1) of the Act, is, therefore, vitally different on the above three principles from the revisions under the general law. This revision, in substance, partakes more of the character of an appeal (or to be more precise a second appeal) and a right of a personal audience can well be implied in it. The nature of a similar revision came up for examination before the Supreme Court in Tahir Ali and others v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court and another P L D 1963 S C

147. That was a case of a revision under Karachi Rent Restriction Act (VIII of 1953), and in it a question arose as to what was the real nature and scope of the revision and though called a revision was it not really in the nature of an appeal so as to attract the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908. The following passage in the judgment of Fazle‑Akbar, J., who wrote the leading judgment, at page 149‑151 is quite instructive:‑ "It was contended on behalf of the appellants that in view of the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the time during which they were procuring a copy of the order of Rent Controller was not to be reckoned as part of the period of 30 days which was prescribed by subsection (1) of section 15 of the Act. To this it was answered on behalf of the respondents that section 12(2) was not attracted to revision. Hence the short question for consideration in this appeal is whether the expression `appeal' in section 12(2) has been used in a restrictive sense so as to exclude a revision petition. Upon construction of the word `appeal' used in section 12(2) there has been divergence of judicial opinion. Some of the Courts in India adopted a restricted construction of the word `appeal' and laid down emphatically that it does not include revision. On the other hand some of the Courts construed the expression in a broader sense. There is, however, plainly no such preponderance in either direction so as to render it clear that there is any settled course of decisions on this question, The word `appeal' has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. In Wharton's Law Lexicon 'appeal' has been defined as 'The judicial examination of the decision by a higher Court of the decision of an inferior Court'. In The Attorney‑General v. H. J. Sillem and others 11 E R X H L C 703 Lord Westbury described an appeal in these terms: 'An appeal is the right of entering a Superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error‑of the Court below'. Story in his work on the Constitution (Vol. II) has pointed out that the characteristic of an appeal is a revision of a judicial proceeding of an inferior Court so that the mode in which the power is exercised is wholly immaterial. In the ease of Nagendar Nath De v. Suresh Chandra, De 59 I A 283 the question as to what amounted to 'an appeal' under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act arose. The following observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in that case are both suggestive and significant: 'There is no definition of 'appeal' in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, is an 'appeal' within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent.' This view also finds support from the observation of the Judicial Committee in Raja of Ramnand v. Kamid Rowthan and others 53 I A

74. Their Lordships while referring to civil revision Petition observed: 'From the judgment an appeal in the form appropriate to such a case from the Munsif's Court, i.e., a Civil Revision Petition was preferred to the High Court of Madras.' From the above it is clear that the remedy which has been given to the aggrieved party by way of revision does not differ in essence from a right of appeal. It is true that under the Code of Civil Procedure a distinction has been made between a 'revision petition' and 'an appeal'. Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure a revision petition only lies where an appeal does not lie. But here we are dealing with a revision petition which had been filed under a special Act, namely, Rent Restriction Act, 1953. It cannot be said that the special Act deals with revision petitions in the same sense as it is used in the Code of Civil Procedure. 1n this Act, before the amendment of 1962, there was no provision for appeal. The only remedy available to an aggrieved party against the order of Rent Controller was to file a petition before the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Karachi, to whom the power of revision had been delegated by the Central Government.'. At the relevant time subsection (1) of section 15 read as follows 'The Central Government may on an application to be made within 30 days of any order made by the Rent Controller under this Act call for the record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order and as to the regularity of the proceedings, if any, in which the order was made, and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, and may stay the order of eviction pending the hearing and disposal of the matter.' Thus the revision provided in the above subsection has all the characteristics of an appeal. In other words the revisional power under this Act is not subject to any specified restric tions like those mentioned in section 115, C. P. C. It is, therefore, clear that the word 'revision' in this Act has not been used in the same sense as what is technically known as a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Respectfully following the above law I hold that since in the instant case the revisional power under the Act is not subject to any specified restrictions like those mentioned in section 115, C. P. C., it is more skin to an appeal or a second appeal rather than a revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. (iii) The revision, according to section 19(1) of the Act, lies against the orders of a Settlement Commissioner, an Addl. Settlement Commissioner, a Deputy Settlement Commis sioner or an Asstt. Settlement Commissioner. In case it is against orders of a Settlement Commissioner or an Addl. Settlement Commissioner, then it is to be accompanied by a certificate from them that the case involved a question of law. In case of revision against orders of a Deputy Settle ment Commissioner or an Asstt. Settlement Commissioner, no such certificate is needed. In such cases, therefore, revision will be in the nature of a first appellate jurisdiction. If in those revisions a right of personal audience is not to be denied, there is no justification to deny it in cases of certified revisions. (iv) Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act reads as follows :‑ "Appearance by Counsel or Agent. ‑Any person who is entitled or required to attend before the Chief Settlement Commissioner or any other authority in connection with any proceedings under this Act, otherwise than when called upon to attend personally for examination on oath or affirmation, may attend or be represented by his duly authorised agent, and any application, or memorandum in appeal, review or revision or otherwise, may be presented by a counsel or such agent. Explanation :‑In this section 'counsel' means an Advocate or Pleader or any person entitled or allowed to plead in any civil Court." A perusal of the above section will show that a revision petition can be filed and presented by a counsel. Now it is a general rule that when right is given to file or present a petition through a counsel or to let a counsel appear or act on behalf of his client in any proceeding, then it implies the right of audience as well to that counsel. This section, therefore, lends a clue to the point that when a revision could be presented through a counsel‑that is a person who is an Advocate or a Pleader or any person allowed to plead in any Civil Court‑it carried with it the incidents of a personal hearing as well. (v) The revision petition under Rule 8 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Rules, 1959, was to be technically drafted like ordinary civil matters. This rule reads as follows:‑ "

8. Appal, Revision or Review:‑(1) Every memorandum of appeal and every application for revision or review shall be in writing and shall set forth, concisely, without any narrative or argument, the grounds of appeal, revision or review, as the case may be and such ground shall be numbered con secutively and the memorandum or application shall be signed and verified by the person presenting the same. (2) Every memorandum of appeal and every application for revision or review shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against or sought to be revised or reviewed and shall bear Refugee adhesive or D. P. adhesive stamp of rupees five." This Rule goes to suggest that the revision was to be written in a legal and artistic way. It was to state merely the grounds and was to be verified. These are all incidents more akin to an appellate sort of jurisdiction than strictly revisional as con templated in section 115, C. P. C. In these circumstances, it is, therefore, reasonable to hold that a right of a personal audience is well implied in such a revision. (vi) Against an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, a revision lies to the High Court under section 21 of the Act. This section reads as follows:‑ "2l. Power of revision by the High Court.‑(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner involving a question of law may, within sixty days of the order, file a petition for revision to the High Court." "(2) A petition filed under subsection (1) shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court, and in respect of such petition the provisions of section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall, so far as may be, apply." A perusal of this section will show that such a revision will be heard by a Bench of two Judges. It is well‑known that High Court never dismisses a case even in limine without hearing the petitioner concerned in support thereof. It will, therefore, be anomalous to hold that though the High Court is required to must hear the petitioner before dismissing a revision petition, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was not bound to hear him. If personal hearing is contemplated before the High Court, then there is no reason as not to expect it from the Chief Settlement Commissioner when both High Court and he are‑(so far as relevant for the present case)‑embarked upon the same task, namely, to adjudicate the point of law about which a certificate was also given by the Settlement Commissioner. (vii) Since against orders of a Settlement Commissioner and an Addl. Settlement Commissioner, a revision was maintainable if they certified that the‑case involved a question of law, it implies that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was to give his own adjudication upon the relevant point of law. It is reasonable to hold that a right of personal audience should be implied to a petitioner‑(which of course he may exercise through his counsel)‑so that the Chief Settlement Commis sioner is well‑assisted on the point of law which be is required to thrash out and which can further be brought before the High Court for scrutiny. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, as the past history has shown, was a man more from the administrative and executive side of the Government than from the judiciary. He could not be considered well‑versed with the intricate questions of law arising under the Act, and it is reasonable to hold that a right of audience was available to a petitioner before him, so that he may get assistance from legal experts, that is Advocates on the points involved and thus maintain confidence in the litigating public that their case was being properly attended to and also at the same time pass a well‑assisted correct Judgment. There are numerous cases where appeals and further remedies are available when a certificate of fitness is granted by the subordinate Court con cerned. To quote for example sections 109, and 110 of C. P. C. or clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It has never been held that after the grant of those requisite certificates the higher Courts can throw away the matter in the secrecy of their Chambers without hearing the petitioner or without giving him any audience. There is no jurisdiction to deny the right of audience to a petitioner in the case, as the present, where on principle no difference can be found from the examples just given by me.

10. As regards the point at (b), formulated in Paragraph 8 above, I am of the view that this again has a great force. Firstly, because even though the revisional jurisdiction may be discretionary or even though the Chief Settlement Commissioner may have the power to dismiss a revision petition summarily, but since the case (so far as relevant here), came up before him on a certificate that it involved a question of law, it was incumbent upon him to decide the said question of law and give his own views about the same, for otherwise the very purpose of obtaining or granting a certificate would be frustrated. In this behalf it appears to me that after the certificate, the proceedings (so far as relevant for the present issue), partake the character of a case stated or a reference made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for inviting his own views on the point of law arising therein. Such proceedings or reference, it is obvious, cannot be dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner with a sort of a summary order as for example. "No ground to interfere, dismissed", or "that the order of so and so appears to be correct and reasonable and I‑ do not find any ground to differ from the same, dismissed". Such like orders can hardly be said to properly dispose of a matter. In Mst. Bibi Jan and others v. Miss R. A. Monny and another (P L D 1961 S C 69), the Supreme Court had the occasion to observe as to when appeals could be summarily dismissed. It held that when an important question of law is involved, justice demands that appeal should not be summarily dismissed and even in cases of summarily dismissal, if any, it was necessary for the Court to write a judgment. Applying this principle to the facts and the circumstances of the present case, the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated 2‑11‑1964, which has been reproduced earlier in Para. 7 of this judgment, is clearly an illegal order and cannot be allowed to stand because it is just a summary order containing no ground in its support. Rather if the view which I have taken is correct that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was required to answer and decide the point of law arising in the case, then he has failed to perform his duty which vested in him by law when he did not answer that question. He will have to be commanded, therefore, to re‑decide this case afresh in accordance with law. Secondly, the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, is subject to examination by the High Court under section 21 of the Act, in accordance with the provisions of section 98 of the C. P. C. which is a provision relevant to cases in appeals heard by a Division Bench and which lays down as to what pro cedure is followed, when there is a difference of opinion between the Members of a Division Bench. Now it is well‑settled that if a judgment or an order of a subordinate Court is amenable to scrutiny by a higher forum, then the subordinate Tribunal must write down the grounds in support of its view so that the higher Tribunal is in a position to know and appreciate the same if the reasons or grounds are not given, then it is obvious that the remedy of challenging that order will become futile. It has been held in Messrs Faridsons Limited, Karachi and another v. The Government of Pakistan and another (P L D1961 S C 537) that it is no use giving a party a right of appeal when the grounds on which the impugned judgment is based are not told to him, because then he would not be knowing as to what grounds he has to frame and what arguments he has to advance and what arguments or points he is required to meet. Same was the view in The Government of East Pakistan v. Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan (P L D 1966 S C 286) where there was a right of making a constitutional representation against an order of detention. The Supreme Court held that unless the grounds of detention were disclosed to a detenu, what representation should he make, because, without those grounds, the most he could do was to go and just stand by before the higher authorities. I will refer to these cases in detail in the subsequent pages of this judgment in some other context as well. In my opinion, therefore, while dealing with a certificated revision under section 19(1) of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was bound to answer the question of law involved in the case and also to give reasons and grounds in support of his own view or judgment. In the instant case, since the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner does not purport to do or satisfy any of these things, it is an order without lawful authority and of no consequence against the petitioner.

11. When confronted with this situation the learned counsel for the contesting respondent argued that the petitioner had another remedy of filing a revision under section 21 of the Act to this Court and since the petitioner had not filed that revision the present writ petition was not maintainable. For this proposition he placed reliance upon a decision of Supreme Court in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 403 of 1966, decided on 4‑10‑1966. The facts of that case are that the allotment of one Muhammad Latif was cancelled by the Addl. Settlement Commissioner exercising the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 10 of the Act on the ground of fraud. Muhammad Latif filed a revision petition before the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner, who dismissed the same on the ground that since the Addl. Settlement Commissioner had exercised the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, a revision against that order was not maintainable before him. Muhammad Latif did not challenge that order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 21 of the Act, in the High Court but after a lapse of over one year filed a writ petition in the High Court bearing No. 241/R of 1963. My learned brother Abdul Kadir Sheikh, J., dis missed the same on the ground of laches. The relevant portion of the order of the learned Single Judge on this point was as follows:‑ "There is great force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner ought to have availed of the remedy provided to him by the statute itself, before approaching this Court under Constitutional Jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution. According to the certified copy produced, the petitioner was in possession of the copy of the order dated the 8th of December 1961 passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the 24th of April 1962. There is no explanation why he filed the petition after about nine months when the remedy available to him bad expired in the meanwhile. The petition, therefore, clearly suffers from laches." Muhammad Latif filed on L. P. A. bearing No. 401/1966 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mushtaq Hussain and A. R. Sheikh, JJ., on 17‑5‑1966. The learned Judges wrote as follows:‑ "Learned Judge in Chambers dismissed the petition on account of laches. We have no reason to differ with his Lordship." "Dismissed." Against the aforesaid orders Muhammad Latif went up in Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed his petition on 4‑10‑1966. The actual relevant passage in the order of the Supreme Court reads as follows: "The petitioner allowed that period to elapse, and never applied for revision, but over a year later, moved the Rich Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. The grounds for rejection of his writ petition, viz., that he had not pursued the legal remedy open to him, and having allowed the time limit appropriate to that remedy to expire, had moved the High Court after a lengthy delay, are perfectly valid. We dismiss this petition." A perusal of what has been reproduced above will show that the High Court refused to interfere with the matter mainly on the ground of laches and it was that view of the High Court which was maintained by the Supreme Court. The order of the Supreme Court, when read in the context of the circumstances, explained above shows, that it was never intended to be laid down that when a person has another remedy as for example of revision, and that remedy is not availed of, then in all circumstances, the writ jurisdiction could not be invoked. The main factor which weighed in that case was the delay of about nine months or one year and not the mere existence of the remedy of revision. It is a well‑settled principle that where the judge ment of a Tribunal contains no reasons so as to form the subject‑matter of a proper appeal or where the judgment has been given without hearing the person concerned and is in this way in excess of jurisdiction, then with regard to such judgments the remedy of appeal has never been considered to be an adequate remedy. If authority be needed reference can be made to R. V. Wandsworth Justices Expart Read ((1942) 1 All E R 56), where Humphreys, J., wrote as follows : "In my judgment, if a person can satisfy this Court that he has been convicted of a criminal offence as the result of a complete disregard by the tribunal of the laws of natural justice, he is entitled to the protection of this Court. I entirely agree with the description by Viscount Caldecote, L. C. J., of the proceedings of the justices in this case as being a denial of justice to the accused person, who was prevented from taking any part in any discussion, if there was any, as to the rights or wrongs of the matter, and was never heard or called upon in his own defence. That being so, the only other question is whether or not there is some other remedy which, in the language of SHORT AND MELLOR'S CROWN OFFICE PRACTICE, is equally convenient, because there is no doubt ample authority for saying that this Court will not grant orders of certiorari or mandamus where there is some other course equally open to the applicant. For the reasons which Viscount Caldecote, L. C. J., has stated, it must be apparent to anybody knowing the facts of this case that the remedy by way of case stated did not exist in this case. It would be ridiculous to state a case upon the only question of law which arose, I take the view that this was not a case which was ever intended to be the subject of appeal to quarter sessions either. Quarter sessions, it is true, may hear appeals on questions of law, but primarily quarter sessions exist in their appellate jurisdiction for the purpose of dealing with disputed questions of fact. The appellant in this case would have gone to quarter sessions and said: I appeal against my conviction, I do not know why I was convicted. I cannot tell you what it was that actuated the justices. I cannot say that any wrong evidence was heard, because no evidence was given on the subject, and my real complain is that I do not know any of these things. My complaint is that I was never heard'. That would be the one matter which would come before quarter sessions. One can understand the London County Council, who were the prosecutors, saying: 'If only you had gone to quarter sessions, we should have had the opportunity of putting our house in order and of giving there the evidence against you which we never attempted to put before the justice'. There is no reasons why a person who has been wrongly convicted without evidence should assist the prosecution to go to some other tribunal, at which, it may be, the necessary evidence will be adduced. I think that the appellant is perfectly entitled to come to this Court and say, upon precedent and authority: `I was convicted as the result of a denial of justice, and I ask for Justice, which can be done only by the quashing of that order'." The case quoted above was of a Criminal Law but the principle laid down in it is of a general application on the question of the adequacy of another remedy as a bar to writ jurisdiction. A similar proposition arose in the case of M/s. Faridsons Limited, Karachi and another v. The Government of Pakistan and another where the licence of the Company was cancelled without hearing that Company and without indicating in the order, the grounds for which the cancellation had taken place. In the relevant Act there was a remedy of filing an appeal against that order, but without availing of that remedy Messrs Faridsons filed a writ petition in the High Court. An objection was taken that in the presence of a remedy of appeal, a writ petition was not maintainable. This argument was repelled and Cornelius, J., (as then his Lordship was) wrote as follows:‑ " . . . . Under the law, the Chief Controller when refusing or cancelling registration is required to record his reasons for his action in writing. This requirement is clearly of direct importance to the possibility of an appeal. Where the reasons given are wholly vague, the appellate authority would necessarily be hampered in discharging its function. In fact the Chief Controller appears to have acted upon secret information of a nature which he apparently considered could not be made public, for which reasons he refrained altogether from giving any reasons. The reasons by which he was moved may or may not be good, but one result is plain, namely, that by not expressing them the appellate provision was rendered futile for the purposes of a proper appeal and a valuable right of a vested nature was taken away from the injured party,"

5. A. Rahman, J., at page 553 while dealing with the same subject held as follows:‑ "In these circumstances, it seems plain that the impugned orders suffer from the initial defect that they communicated no `reason' to the person concerned, leaving him to con jecture why the adverse order had been passed against him. No effective appeal could be lodged to the Central Govern ment against such an order. The observation of the learned Judges of the High Court to the effect that no elaborate statement was necessary because in appeal, the Central Government would examine the record of the Chief Controller to test his decision, seems to me, with all respect, to over simplify the situation. Without knowing the real grounds of the decision, how could the appellants controvert them before the appellate authority?" To the same effect is the principle laid down in the Queen vs Thomas and others ((1892) Q B D 426). In that case there was an appeal to the quarter sessions in the matters in question and yet mandamu was granted. Deciding the case Hawkins, J. said:‑ "It has been argued that this matter is only the subject of an appeal to quarter sessions. It is quite possible that there might have been good grounds for an appeal if the grounds of the decision had been announced to the applicant, and in that case a `mandamus' would not be granted for there would be an adequate remedy by appeal. That rule, however, as to the grant of a 'mandamus' is not inflexible or applicable in cases of this kind, where a person does not know the grounds of the decision against him and how to shape his appeal." In concurring in the opinion expressed by Hawkins, J., Wills, J., said :‑ "It has been argued that this case is distinguishable from Reg v. Sykes' 1 Q B D 52, on the ground that in the latter case there was no right of appeal, whereas in the present case there is a right of appeal, and that, therefore, an appeal is the proper and effectual remedy and a 'mandamus' ought not be granted. I do not agree that this distinction exists, at any rate so as to apply to the present case, where the applicant would have to appeal without knowing what were the grounds of the decision against her, and would not, therefore, be in the same position upon an appeal as she would have been if the grounds bad been stated‑under which circumstances the remedy by appeal would not be as satisfactory and effectual as the remedy by 'mandamus'." In The Government of East Pakistan v. Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan a question arose as to whether the detenu who had a remedy of filing a representation to the Government but did not avail of that could file a Writ Petition in the High Court about his detention. It was held, that to file an effective representation the man should have been provided with grounds of his detention and in the absence of the disclosure of the grounds the filing of a representation could be of no avail. S. A. Rahman, J., at pages 317‑318 of the report held as follows:‑ "What facts can be revealed will, of course, depend upon the circumstances of each case. But they must, in any event, be such as would enable the person in question to make an effective representation as a total suppression of all material facts would render the constitutional safeguard illusory. The very object of making a provision for the detenu making a representation, in the Constitution, would be defeated if he is to be told that Government has in its possession grounds for his detention none of which it could reveal and he might if he chose, make a representation as best as he can. The detenu being absolutely in the dark about the reason of his incarceration could only stand and stare and say nothing." Respectfully following the above law I hold that in the instant case, since the judgment of Chief Settlement Commissioner did not contain any reason, the remedy under section 21 of the Act, could not be an adequate remedy. This is further so, because as indicated earlier the Chief Settlement Commissioner has not even heard the petitioner. In such circumstances, certiorari or mandamus is the appropriate remedy and not the regular institution of a revision under the relevant Act. The Supreme Court decision quoted by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent is, therefore, distinguishable from the facts and the circumstances of the present case. Firstly, because in the said case the Chief Settlement Commissioner had heard Muhammad Latif whereas in the present case he has not heard the petitioner. Secondly, in the Supreme Court's case, the Chief Settlement Commissioner did give some reason (right or wrong is a different matter for passing the judgment which he did), while in the instant case, the Chief Settlement Commissioner has given no reason whatsoever. Thirdly, in the case before the Supreme Court there was a delay of about one year or nine months while in the present case the revision petition in the High Court could have been instituted by the petitioner by 4th of April 1965, and he has instituted the present writ petition on 28‑4‑1965. The delay in the present case, therefore, is not of the same magnitude as it was in the case before the Supreme Court. Fourthly, the im pugned order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in the instant case is at the face of it, for the reasons already indicated, in excess of his jurisdiction while there was no such consideration in the case of Muhammad Latif mentioned above.

12. The upshot of the above discussion is that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, dated 2‑11‑1964, is declared to be without lawful authority and is hereby quashed. The case is remanded to the learned Chief Settlement Commis sioner for fresh decision in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner. Since this will be a pending case, the change in law, which has done away with the revisional jurisdiction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner will not affect it. This is true of the General Clauses Act as also under the authority of the Supreme Court reported in Ghulam Mohi -ud‑Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore and others (P L D 1964 S C 829). The parties shall bear their own costs. K. B. A. Order accordingly.