P L D 1953 Lahore 188 (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, J.

Notices were issued in this case to Mr. S. M. Haq, Mr. Ghias Muhammad and Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, Advocates of this Court, under clause 8 of the Letters Patent to show cause why they should not be dismissed from practice or otherwise dealt with for signing a petition for special leave to appeal to the Federal Court (hereinafter referred to as the petition) in Fazal Elahi etc. v. The Crown containing inter alia the following passages t- (a) "The Hon'ble Judges were not legally justified in accepting the suggestion of the Crown for the re-examination of the doctor in appeal. This step was taken to fill a gap in the prosecution case as well as to justify another judgment of the High Court, which was reversed by the Federal Court in Ali and Bashir v. Crown (P L D 1952 F C 71)". (b) "The remarks of the Honourable Judges betray a lack of the knowledge of elementary principles bearing on the administration of criminal justice. They seem to ignore the basic fact that an accused person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty and that the interests of what they call society can be safeguarded best by protecting the honour and liberty of a subject in accordance with the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence". These passages were prima facie considered to constitute con tempt of this Court and to amount to "reasonable cause" within the meaning of clause 8 of the Letters Patent. Written statements were put in on behalf of the three advocates in response to the notices. Mr. S. M. Haq, in his written state ment, declared that the object of taking the two grounds of appeal, to which objection has been taken, was to seek redress from the Federal Court and that there was no intention of scandalising or showing disrespect to this Court. In respect of ground (b), mentioned above, it was recited that there was no intention to distinguish between the Honourable Judges and their judgment and that the respondent did not realise that such a distinction could be drawn on the language till it was pointed out by the Court on the first date of hearing. As soon as this had been done, the respondent had hastened to express his regret. In paragraph IV, the contention was raised that, inasmuch as the charges against the respondent related to his conduct while discharging his duties in the Federal Court, that Court had the exclusive jurisdiction to call upon him to answer the charges. In the last paragraph, it was originally stated that, if the language employed in the grounds of appeal was found by this Court to be offensive, the respon dent expressed his deep regret and tendered an apology for its use, as it was not his intention to use, or to permit the use of, any disrespectful language. On being pointed out that this was a conditional apology, the respondent amended this paragraph so that in its final form it reads as follow:- "That as the language employed in the grounds of appeal is considered by this Honourable Court to be offensive the respondent expresses deep regret and tenders an unqualified apology for its use, as it was not his intention to use or to permit the use of any disrespectful language." Mr. Ghias Muhammad, in his written statement, admitted that he had signed the petition having been engaged as an advocate in the case at a late stage, after the petition had been drafted and typed. He alleged that the petition had been brought to him by the attorney, duly typed, and also, probably, signed by the Senior Advocate, Mr. S. M. Haq. The attorney appeared to be in a hurry and the respondent just signed it, trusting that it would be perfectly in order, as Mr. S. M. Haq, who had drafted the grounds, was a senior lawyer. He sub mitted that there could be no question of his having an inten tion to scandalise this Court and he expressed sincere regret for his lapse in not taking more care when signing the petition in the above-mentioned circumstances and thus laying himself open to the charge. He added that he had profound respect for this Court. Mr. Muhammad Siddiq had acted as attorney for the purpose of the petition. He had engaged Mr. S. M. Haq, Senior Advocate of the Federal Court, and Mr. Ghias Muhammad, Advocate for the Federal Court, as advocates in the case on the instructions of his clients and he stated that he had merely acted as an attorney for that purpose and not as an advocate of this Court. He pointed out that, as an attorney of the Federal Court, it was not his duty to draft or settle the grounds of the petition, that being the function of the advocate of the Federal Court. He had merely subscribed his signatures to the petition as an indication of his being the attorney in the case and it did not imply, according to him, that he, in any way accepted responsibility for the grounds which were taken therein. He added that, if he was mistaken in the conception of his duty as an attorney, he expressed his deep regret and promised to be guided in future by whatever may be determined to be his duty. He disassociated himself from the language used in the grounds of appeal. At the hearing before us, Mr. Manzoor Qadir appeared on behalf or Mr. S. M. Haq, Mr. Bashir Ahmad for Mr. Ghias Muhammad and Mr. Mahmood Ali for Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, while the Advocate-General was represented by his assistant, Mr. S. A. Mahmood. Ch. Nazir Ahmad Khan as well as Mr. Yaqub Ali Khan, also addressed us as amicus curiae on behalf of the Bar Associations. It was not denied on behalf of Mr. S. M. Haq that the version given by Mr. Ghias Muhammad was correct. Mr. Haq in fact stated at the Bar that he had drawn up and settled the grounds of appeal in the petition for special leave, including the two grounds which had been objected to Mr. Bashir Ahmad, on behalf of Mr. Ghias Muhammad, said he had no instructions to argue the point of jurisdiction raised on behalf of Mr. S. M. Haq and Mr. Muhammad Siddiq. His stand merely was that his client had acted somewhat negligently in signing the petition, without having read it and that he had not intentionally associated himself with the grounds in question. Mr. Manzoor Qadir, at the outset, stated that he was not there to justify what he described as the "unhappy language" of the grounds in question and that the privilege of counsel in preferring a ground of appeal before a Court competent to entertain it, was not absolute. But he contended that if the ground urged by counsel was for the advancement of the cause pending before the appellate Court, was believed to be relat able to matters on which adjudication was invited and was not so completely without foundation as to negative the presump tion that it was made in good faith, counsel was protected. If, however, there was a transgression of the limits thus specified, it was submitted that the appellate Court, before which the matter was pending, alone had jurisdiction to decide whether the grounds offended against the principles mentioned above or not and, by implication, therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court to take action against the advocate concerned would be barred. On this view, even if the grounds taken in the appel late Court were malicious, entirely unnecessary or irrelevant and scandalous in their nature, the jurisdiction of this Court vesting in it under clause 8 of its Letters Patent, would be ousted. It was frankly conceded, however, that no direct or indirect authority covering the point involved could be cited in support of the proposition urged on behalf of Mr. S. M. Haq and Mr. Muhammad Siddiq. None of the learned counsel attempted any justification of the language used in the two grounds under consideration. The doctrine of implied ouster of jurisdiction was sought to be derived from the general principle dictated by public policy that counsel should be allowed full liberty, without fear of penal action, in pursuing the cause of their clients before competent Tribunals. Reference in this connection was made to Munster v. Lamb (L R 11 Q D B (1883) 588). That was a case of defamation against an advocate for words spoken with reference to, and in the course of an enquiry, before a judicial Tribunal and it was laid down that even assuming that the words in question were uttered maliciously, and not with the object of supporting the case of his client, and were absolutely unjustifiable in respect of the person defamed, the counsel's conduct was covered by the rule of absolute privilege under common law. It was con ceded, at the same time, that though this rule had been followed by some of the High Courts in India, later, judicial opinion had evered round to the view that the rule was not applicable in this Sub-Continent in the face of the provisions of section 499 of the Penal Code, which depart materially from the English Law on the subject. The following authorities are fairly representative of the earlier view:- Sullivan and Norton ((1887) I L R 10 Mad. 28 (F B) ); Pachaiperumal Chelliar v. Dasi Thangam ((1908) I L R 31 Mad. 400 (D B)); In re P. Venkata Reddy ((1913) I L R 36 Mad. 216 (F B)); Re Muthusami Naldu ((1914) I L R 37 Mad. 110 (D B)); Maharaj Kumar Jagat Mohan Nath Sah Deo v. Kalipada Gosh ((1922) I L R 1 Pat. 371 (D B)) and Anthony Udoyar v. Velusani Thever (A I R 1928 Mad. 469 (S. B)). The later view, and if I might say so with respect, the sounder view, was adopted in:- Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De ((1921) I L R 48 Cat. 388 (F B)): T. F. R. Me Donnell v. King-Emperor (A 1 R 1925 Rang. 345 (D B)); Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripursundari Ammal (A I R 1926 Mad. 906 (F B)); Nirsu Narayan Sinha v. King. Emperor (A I R 1926 Pat. 499 (D B)); M. Banerjee v. Emperor (A 1 R 1927 Cal. 823 (D B)); Tulsidas Amanmal Karani v. S. F. Billimoria (A I R 1932 Bom. 490 (D B) and Muhammad Tagi v. M. A. Ghani (A I R 1943 Lah. 97 (S B)). In these authorities, it was held that the privilege enjoyed by counsel is of a qualified nature, though, as a matter of public policy, it was also ruled that there ought to be a pre sumption of good faith raised in favour of an advocate who acts on the instructions of his client. The citing of rulings relating to cases of defamation would obviously be an inapt procedure in a case of the present kind. Their Lordships of the Federal Court in the course of their judgment in Fazal Elahi's case pointed out the distinction between Munster v. Lamb (Supra) and the present case, though they did not express any final opinion upon the ques tion, considering that the proceedings had already been commenced and were pending in the High Court against the advocates. Even if indirect assistance is sought from these authorities, is clear that no unqualified privilege can be spelt out of them in favour of advocates pleading the cause of their clients before judicial Tribunals. On the other hand there exists authority to the contrary. In the case of Dwarka Parshad Mithal (1) a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court issued a warning to members of the legal profession that they were under no duty to their clients to make grave and scandalous charges against either Judges or the opposite parties, as they were not mere agents of the persons who paid them but were acting in the administration of justice. They were, consequently, bound to exercise their independent judgment and to conduct themselves with a sense of personal responsibility. If they failed to act with reasonable care and caution, they would be unfit to enjoy the privilege conferred on them by law. Similar views were expressed in re S. A. Mukhtar (A I R (1929) Pat. 151 (F B)). A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in re A. Second Grade Pleader (I L R (1928) 51 Mad. 798 (F B)) went so far as to lay down that misconduct in a legal practitioner is not confined to the making of charges of bribery against a judicial officer, which he knows to be false. It is also misconduct to make charges which, he must know, he has no reasonable prospect of substantiating. That the privilege of counsel does not extend to making reckless statements or unfounded charges of impropriety against Judges, in the course of judicial proceedings, is a proposition well-settled and, indeed, not seriously contested on behalf of the respondents. Reference, may usefully be made in this connection to In the matter of W. S. Day, Vakil (A I R 1925 All. 565 (F B)); Sukh Dev Raj v. Emperor (A I R 1932 Lah. 485 (F B)); In the matter of Sham Lal, Advocate, H. C. Lahore (A I R 1932 Lah. 502 (FB)); In the matter of, K., a pleader and another (A I R 1934 Pat. 598 (S B)) and In the matter of an Advocate Cawnpore (A I R 1935 All. 425 (S B)). The contention however is that, although this Court would normally have jurisdiction to take action against advocates of this Court under clause 8 of the Letters Patent for any reasonable cause, which might include contempt of this Court whether committed in the face of the Court or elsewhere, the position is altered when the impugned pleadings are submitted in a superior Court like the Federal Court. It is argued that till the Federal Court had decided whether the legal limits within which freedom of expression on the part of advocates is circumscribed, have been transgression or not, this Court would have no jurisdiction to take up the matter and that, in any case, it would not take effective action in so far as the advocates were acting as advocates of the Federal Court. It is pointed out that in such a case of trans gression, the Federal Court itself could have taken appropriate action to safeguard the honour and dignity of this Court and this, by implication, as a measure of public policy, raises a bar against the jurisdiction of this Court. It is not denied that this Court has power to punish an advocate for contempt of Court in respect of acts done by him either in a private or in a professional capacity. The rule about Barristers under English Law is the same vide paragraph 693 at page 510 of Volume II Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition. The difference according to learned counsel, is introduced because of the fact that the act complained of takes place in relation to proceed ings before a superior Court. Our attention was also invited to rule 29 of Order IV of the Federal Court Rules, 1950. The rule is as follows:- "Where on the complaint of any person or otherwise, the Court is of opinion that an Advocate has been guilty of misconduct or of conduct unbecoming an Advocate, the Court may take such disciplinary action against him as it may deem fit, and may report him to his own High Court." This rule, if anything, clearly indicates that the jurisdiction to take action against an advocate of this Court vests exclusively in this Court and in no other Court. The word "Advocate" occurring in rule 29 obviously means an advocate of the Federal Court by virtue of the definition of "Advocate" given in rule 2 of Order I of the Federal Court Rules. Their Lordships of the Federal Court, therefore, could be expected to take action against advocates of that Court qua their conduct in that capacity, but if any action was called for against advocates of this Court, a reference is clearly visualised to this Court. It was urged that at least till the Federal Court had considered the matter and given a finding that the conduct of the advocates in question called for disciplinary action, this Court would not be able to move in the matter. With all respect for the opinion of the learned counsel, I am unable to comprehend how this involves the question of jurisdiction. It may, perhaps, be reasonably contended that, as a matter of propriety, this Court should stay its hand till the appellate Court, before whom the case is pending, has expressed its opinion one way of the other on the question. But the matter is really academic in the present case, as Their Lordships of the Federal Court have thought it fit not to express their opinion on the conten tions raised in this case. In these circumstances, the danger of a conflict of opinion between this Court and the Federal Court cannot be pressed into service to support the argument of ouster of jurisdiction. I am frankly unable to appreciate the nature of conditional jurisdiction which would, on this view, be possessed by this Court. It is inconceivable that if the Federal Court had, in a hypothetical case, inadvertently not taken up the question of misconduct of counsel in respect of proceedings pending in that Court, the undoubted jurisdiction of this Court would be taken away qua advocates of this Court merely on that account. If the Federal Court has also to remit to this Court the question of suitable action against an advocate of this Court, it is idle to argue that, on a supposed doctrine of implied repeal, resting on no statutory provision, this Court is divested of its jurisdiction to any such contingency as is envisaged by counsel. Both Mr. Yaqub Ali Khan and Mr. Nazir Ahmad Khan expressed the opinion that rule 29 of Order IV of the Federal Court Rules did not adversely affect the disciplinary jurisdiction possessed by this Court over its own advocates. This jurisdiction being there, any questions that arise in the exercise of that jurisdic tion would also fall to be determined by this Court, and, consequently the question, whether the grounds objected to were couched in proper language, must be decided by this Court. Any finding in this respect, arrived at by this Court, may possibly be subject to the final decision of Their Lordships of the Federal Court, in case an appeal is taken to that Tribunal. In my humble judgment, there is no warrant for the view either in authority or in well-recognized principles that this Court cannot take action against an advocate in respect of B something done or intended to be done before the Federal Court, which brings this Court into contempt. The parallel may not be exact but an analogy indirectly supporting the view herein expressed may be derived from the judgment of a D. B. of this Court in Re Jiwan Lal Gauba in C. M. Nos. 546 and 599 of 1936, decided on 18th December 1936. In that case Jiwan Lal Gauba had applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and the grounds of appeal, attached to the application, being malicious and scandalous in nature, were held to constitute contempt of this Court. The grounds were obviously intended to be put before the Privy Council. Mr. Manzoor Qadir also put forward the far-fetched plea that by taking disciplinary action against its own advocates, this Court may be withholding its aid to the Federal Court, against the provisions of action 213 of the Constitution Act. In case this contention is acceded to, the absurd corollary would seem to follow that if this Court allows an unbridled license to its advocates to cast wholly baseless, unjustifiable and defamatory or scandalous aspersions on Judges of this Court, in the course of pleadings in the Federal Court, it would, in some peculiar sense, be aiding the Federal Court. I am unable to subscribe to such a proposition. As regards effectiveness of the action open to this Court, against Advocates in cases of this nature, I apprehend that the orders that can be passed, would prove sufficiently efficacious, so far as their position qua advocacy in this Court is concerned and the possibility that the advocate might repeat the contempt before the Federal Court, need not deter us from doing our duty. Mr. Yaqub Ali Khan as well as Mr. Nazir Ahmad Khan as amicus curiae merely stressed the need of guaranteeing the maximum of liberty to counsel in the conduct of cases so that the integrity and independence of the Bar is not prejudiced. Mr. Yaqub Ali Khan referred us to the comment of Oswald in his well known book on Contempt, at page 54 of the third Edition, to the effect that "an over-subservient Bar would be one of the greatest misfortunes that could happen to the administration of justice in England". It would, however, be pertinent to quote from the same author a few sentences occurring on the same page of the Book. Oswald says: "To a certain extent also the same indulgence which is shown to suitors in person is extended to advocates, though the latter have less excuse for infringing the rules of propriety ". And in all ordinary matters an advocate must, even more than ordinary persons, since he has a special privilege to practise the law, conform himself to the usages of the Court and the rulings of the Judge". I am quite conscious of the great importance of securing to counsel the enjoyment of independence and ample latitude in the performance of their difficult duties in Courts, and in my opinion, this Court should vigilantly and zealously safeguard the privileges of the Bar in this behalf. It must not be forgotten, however, that where are privileges there are also corresponding obligations, and liberty should not be allowed to degenerate into licence. While enrolled as advocates in this Court, a high standard of loyalty and decorum may be legiti mately expected of them and they would constantly remain subject to the superintendence and disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court. I am also aware that in criminal matters the Federal Court, as successors of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, will presumably interfere only in certain exceptional circumstances, and, therefore, special grounds have to be made out by counsel, such as those laid down in Arnold and The King-Emperor (L R (1914) 41 Ind. App. 149). No one would think of taking C exception to any legitimate grounds of appeal that may be necessary to be urged in respect of a judgment of this Court, in the Federal Court. This Court would certainly have no desire to shut out any such grounds open to a litigant or his counsel, but it cannot, at the same time, view with equanimity any attempt to lower its dignity or to bring it into contempt. This is not a matter of personal prestige with the Judges who have the honour to belong to this Court. It is really because such unjustifiable conduct would tend to shake public confidence in the capacity of this Court to administer justice that action would have to be reluctantly taken against an offending advocate. The foundations of justice cannot be allowed to be shaken by anything said or done by an advocate of this Court, in or out of the precincts of this Court. Whether he is at the material time functioning as an advocate of this Court or acting in some other capacity makes little difference to the incidence of disciplinary jurisdiction. Reference inter alia may be made to, In the matter of a pleader (I L R (1933) 55 All. 148 (D B)), In the matter of a Mukhtar (I L R (1920) 42 All. 86 (G B)), In the matter of a Mukhtar (9 P R 1902 (D B)) and Emperor v. Kenkatrad (I L R (1922) 46 B 973). The view is inconsonance with the common law of England-see para. 693, para. 510) Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. II and Fuller's case (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 41, 43, Ex parte Parter, (1864) 9 Cox's Cr. Case 544 and The King v. Skinner (98 Eng. Rep. 529). I now come to the two grounds on the basis of which notices were issued to the respondents. Ground (a) apparently attributes a motive to the Judges who were responsible for the decision in Fazal Elahi's case in this Court. It ascribes to them the desire to fill a gap in the prosecution case and to justify another judgment of this Court which was reversed by the Federal Court in All and Bashir v. Crown (P L D 1952 F C 71). It would have been legitimate to say that it was necessary for this Court to discuss the case of Ali and Bashir v. Crown while dis posing of Fazal Elahi's case. In so far as, however, this ground makes an insinuation that the Judges were partial towards the prosecution and had an ulterior motive not connected with the decision of Fazal Elahl's case in discussing Ali and Bashir' case the advocate responsible for this ground would seem to be imputing judicial dishonesty to the Judges of the highest tribunal in this Province. I may refer in this connection to the well-known maxim, De Fide Et Officio Judicis Non Recipitur Quaestia, Sed De Scientia Sive Sit Error Juris Sive Faeti-the honesty and integrity of a Judge cannot be ques tioned but his decision may be impugned for error either of law or of fact. In my opinion, therefore, this ground was objectionable, as it was calculated to attribute improper motives to the Judges of this Court in the discharge of their judicial duties. The second ground appears to be still more indefensible on the language used. It has not been urged before us that there was any necessity for the advocates to make out that the Judges, who decided Fazal Elahi's case in this Court, did o not possess a knowledge of the elementary principles bearing on the administration of criminal justice. This would be attributing rank inefficiency to the Judges of the highest Court in the Province, and public confidence in the judicial capacity of this Court would not long survive the impression created that the Judges of this Court did not even know the first principles of law. Such an allegation would clearly bring this Court into contempt and would furnish reasonable ground for action under clause 8 of the Letters Patent. It is all very well for the respondents to say now that they had no intention to scandalise this Court or to bring it into contempt. The words, however, speak for themselves and are not susceptible of any other reasonable interpretation. More important than what was said is the question how it was said and in what form. I fail to see how it would have advanced the cause of the clients of Mr. S. M. Haq and Mr. Ghias Muhammad to suggest that the High Court was being manned by utterly incompetent persons. This, therefore, appears to me to be a fit case in which this Court should take notice of its contempt involved in these grounds. Mr. Manzoor Qadir at first suggested that the Privy Council might itself have criticised High Court judgments in compar able language but he was unable to cite before us any case in which this might have happened. He drew our attention to two cases reported as English and Scottish Jt. Coop. Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax Act Assam (1948 L R 75 1 A 196=P L D 1948 P C 203) and Shibaprasad Singh v. Sirish Chandra (A I R 1948 P C 293), as containing samples of the language employed by that august tribunal while reviewing judgments in appeal. In the first case Their Lordships merely said: "The learned Chief Justice has also failed to notice that tea grown on estates which belongs to the appellant Society, was not tea which the members could correctly describe as "their own tea". At another place the Board expressed themselves as follows:- "There was in the case no finding about the motive and the learned Chief Justice has assumed it; but motive is altogether irrelevant." In the second case it was said: "The learned Chief Justice has overlooked the provisions of section 72 of the Contract Act." Learned counsel might well emulate such graceful and dignified language. The case of Mr. Muhammad Siddiq appears to be dis tinguishable from that of the other respondents. The grounds were admittedly drawn up and settled in this case by Mr. S. M. Haq. Mr. Ghias Muhammad seems merely to have signed them mechanically as a junior Advocate. Mr. Muhammad Siddiq signed the petition in token of his being an attorney in the case. Rule 28 of Order IV of the Federal Court Rules provides that "no Advocate shall act as Attorney nor Attorney as Advocate in any circumstances whatsoever." Rule 2 of Order XXII reads as follows: "A petition for special leave to appeal to the Court shall state succinctly and clearly all such facts as it may be neces sary to state in order to enable the Court to determine whether such leave ought to be granted, and shall be signed by the counsel who attends at the hearing or by the party himself if he appears in person. The petition shall deal with the merits of the case only so far as is necessary for the purpose of explaining and supporting the particular grounds upon which special leave to appeal is sought." It will be seen that this rule requires that the petition shall be signed by the party or his counsel and not by the attorney. The same rule applies to petitions for special leave under the Privy Council (Abolition of Jurisdiction) Act, 1950, vide Order XLIV, rule 6 of the Federal Court Rules. In the Second Schedule to the Rule, it is specified in Part II that certain fees would be payable to junior advocates for drawing up pleadings or to senior advocates for settling pleadings in consultation with junior advocates. There is no mention of an attorney in that connection. The Fourth Schedule, at page 48, specifies payments to which an attorney may be entitled. There is no item in this Schedule showing that an attorney has any connection with drawing up or settling a petition for special leave. Order XXVII of the Rules deals with petitions generally. Rule 3 of that Order lays down that all petitions inter alia should bear the name and address of the attorney on it. It would thus appear that an attorney need not sign a petition for special leave at all. He has merely to indicate by any means, e.g. even a rubber stamp, that he is the attorney in the case and his address has also to be given. It is further contended on Mr. Muhammad Siddiq's behalf that a solicitor would be protected by the advice given by counsel in England and the same rule would be applicable in respect of attorneys in this country, as they occupy a corresponding position vis-a-vis advocates, These considerations certainly have force. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that Mr. Muhammad Siddiq had, in the circumstances of this case, no responsibility for the grounds to which objection has been taken and that he need not have signed the petition for special leave, as he did. I am consequently inclined to discharge the notice in his case. However reprehensible the negligence of Mr. Ghias Muhammad may be, it is clear that he had also not deliberately associated himself with the offensive grounds set out above. No deliberate intention to commit contempt of this Court could consequently be attributed to him. His offence, if any, is of a technical nature, and I consider that it would be sufficient if in his case the Court records its strong disapproval of his conduct and warns him to be careful in future. The case of Mr. S. M. Haq stands on entirely different footing. He has assumed full responsibility for the language he has employed, though he has disclaimed all intention to commit contempt of this Curt, or to scandalise this Court. He has, however, expressed his unqualified regret for the language in which the two grounds are couched. This no doubt op.-rates as a partial mitigation of his conduct. He is, however, a senior counsel with considerable experience at the Bar and a higher standard of rectitude and propriety would normally be expected of him than in the case of a novice. He has, moreover, held high office as District and Sessions Judge for a number of years. It is difficult to say that he has acted with a full sense of responsibility in the matter, considering, his background of experience and standing at the Bar. In his case, therefore, I consider, it is necessary to take a more strict view. In my opinion, he should be suspended from practice for three months. MUHAMMAD JAN, J.

I agree. SHABIR AHMAD, J.

I agree. A. H.