P L D 1952 Lahore 258 (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑One of the points raised by Mr. Kaikaus on behalf of the respondent is that no revision is competent at all from an order of the D. J. passed on an appeal from a Rent Controller's order. In P L D 1949 Lah. 30, a D. B. of this Court took the view that such a revision is competent. Kayani J. referred this very question to a larger Bench‑in C. R. 158 of 1950, Salah‑ud‑Din v. Khadija Begum and a Full Bench was constituted to hear the reference. I was a member of that Bench. The revision petition was however withdrawn by the petitioner and the question raised could not be considered. I think the question is one of importance and needs an authori tative pronouncement from a Full Bench as doubt have been expressed about the correctness of the view take in P L D 1949 Lah. 30. The papers may therefore be placed before the Hon'ble C. J. Subject to orders of my Lord the Chief Justice, I refer the case to a F. B. JUDGMENT S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑By an application presented under section 13 of the Punjab Act VI of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the Rent Controller, Lahore, Mst. Fahmida Begum sought ejectment of the Chief Officer of the Corpora tion of the City, from certain premises situated in Street Chowk Muslim Ganj, Faiz Bagh, Lahore. The application was dismissed but, on appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, acting as the appellate authority under the Act, reversed the decision and directed the tenant to put Mst. Fahmida Begum in possession of the premises in question, within three months of the date of the order. The parties were left to bear their own costs. This order was challenged by a revision petition presented in this Court on behalf of the Corporation of the City of Lahore, through its Chief Executive Officer. The revision petition came up before me sitting in Single Bench. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. B. Z. Kaikaus on behalf of the respondent to the effect that an order passed by a District judge on appeal from a Rent Controller's order was not revisable bye this Court. The soundness of the view to the contrary taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Kishan Chand v. Nur Muhammad, P L D 1949 Lah. 30, was challenged. In view of the importance of the question involved I referred the case to a Full Bench subject to orders of my Lord the Chief Justice. A Full Bench has accordingly‑been constituted to hear this revision petition. The three questions that fall for determination on the contentions raised before us are :‑ (1) Whether a Rent Controller or an appellate authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, functions as a Court ; (2) Whether such a Court is subordinate to the High Court, so as to attract the revisional jurisdiction of this Court in respect of orders passed by it ; and . (3) Whether the Act is ultra vires the Governor by virtue of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 93. of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, was enacted by the Governor of the Punjab in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by a proclamation made under section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. By section 21 of the, Act, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941, was repealed. The avowed object of the Act was to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants there from, The word `Controller' is defined by clause (b) of section 2 of the Act, as meaning any person who is appointed by the Prov incial Government to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act. Section 15 (1) (a) of the Act provides that the Provincial Government may by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. Subsection (4) of this section lays down that the decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision. This express provision, it is clear, shuts out revisions against the order of a Controller or an Appellate Authority passed under the Act. It is, however, contended on behalf of the Corporation of the. City of Lahore, that this provision was ultra vires the Governor by virtue of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It is urged that the Governor could not take away or assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the High Court, and that the orders passed by the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority under the Act are liable to be interfered with in revision by this Court as they function as Courts subordinate to this Court. It seems necessary at this stage to make a rapid survey of the provisions of the Act. Section 1 gives the title, the extent and the date of enforcement of the Act. Section 2 defines various terms and expressions used in the Act. The definition of Controller' has been noticed above. Section 3 declares that the Provincial Government may direct that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall not apply to any particular building or rented land or any class of buildings or rented lands. Sec tion 4 enacts that the Controller shall, on application by the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land, fix the fair rent for such building or rented land, after holding such inquiry as the Controller thinks fit. The section details various points which have to be taken into consideration before determining the fair rent and allows certain increases of rent to be made, within certain defined limits, over what is termed as the basic rent. The latter rent is to be fixed after taking into considera tion the prevailing rates of rent in the locality, for the same or similar accommodation, in similar circumstances, during the twelve months prior to the 1st of January, 1939, and the rental value of such building or rented land if entered in the property tax assessment register of the local body concerned, relating to the period mentioned. Section 5 lays down that when the fair rent of a premises or land has been fixed under section 4, no further increase in such fair rent shall be permissible except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration has been carried out at the landlord's expense, and, if the building or rented land is then in the occupation of a tenant, at his request. This right of increase is also subject to certain limita tions. Section 6 debars the landlord from claiming or receiving any premium or other like sum, in addition to fair rent or any rent in excess of such fair rent, but he is permitted to stipulate for and receive in advance, an amount not exceeding one month's rent Any agreement for the payment of any sum in addition to rent or of rent in excess of the fixed fair rent, is declared by this section to be null and void. The rent which became due before the 1st of January, 1939, is, however, exempted from the purview of this provision. Sec, ion 7 similarly prevents the landlord from requiring the payment of any fine, premium or any other like sum, in addition to the rent, in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy. Section 8 entitles a tenant to recover any sum which he may have paid in excess of what is permissible under the Act, within the prescribed time. Section 9 gives the right to a landlord to increase the rent if after the commencement of the‑Act, a fresh rate, cess or tax is levied in respect of the rented premises, or if there is an increase in the amount of such a levy provided that the increase in rent shall not exceed the amount of the newly imposed rate, cess or tax, or the amount of the increase in such rate, cess or tax, as the case may be. Section 10 pro vides a remedy to the tenant if the landlord without just or, sufficient cause, cuts off or withholds any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Section 11 forbids the conversion of a residential building into a non‑residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller. Under section 12, if a landlord fails to make the necessary repairs to a building other then structural alterations, an order can be passed by a Controller, on an application being made by the tenant, that such repairs may be made by the tenant, the costs being deducted from the rent payable by him. Section 13 creates what may be termed as a statutory tenancy inasmuch as the tenant in possession of a building or rented land, by virtue of this section, cannot be evicted therefrom, in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of the Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section. It is only if the tenant is proved to have made default in the payment of rent by certain specified dates or has sublet the premises or a portion thereof, without the written consent of the landlord, or used the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased or has acted in a manner‑prejudi cial to the integrity or utility of the building or rented land or his conduct amounts to a nuisance to the occupiers of buildings in the neighourbood, or if he abandons the building for a. con tinuous period of four months without reasonable cause, provided the building‑ is situate in a place other than a hill station, that the Controller could make an order for eviction. The same section gives the right to the landlord to apply for possession of the premises if he requires it for his own use, subject to his satisfying certain specific conditions. If, how ever, the landlord does not himself occupy the premises within one month of the date of obtaining possession, the evicted tenant may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he should be restored possession. Section 14 embodies the principle of res judicata and enacts that the Controller shall summarily reject any application under subsection (2) or under subsec tion (3) of section 13, which raises substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in a former proceeding under the Act. Section 15 relates to the appointment and powers of an appellate authority and has already been noticed above. Sec tion 16 gives to an Appellate Authority or a Controller; the same powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance witnesses and compelling the production of evidence, as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1903. Section 17 provides that every, order made under section 10 or section 13, and every order passed on appeal under section 15, shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area, as if it were a decree of that Court. Section 18 empowers the Controller to call for such particulars in respect of a build ing or rented land as may be prescribed, from a landlord or a tenant. Section 19 penalises any contraventions of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 10, section 11 or section 18, but cognizance of an offence under this section is made subject to a complaint of the relevant facts, filed by or with the sanction of the Controller in writing. Section 20 empowers the Provincial Government to make rules, by notification, for the purpose of carrying out all or any of the provisions of this Act. Section 21 is the repealing section. This exhausts the provisions of the Act. In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of the Act, all First Class Subordinate Judges in the Punjab were appointed to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act, in the urban areas within the limits of their existing civil jurisdiction. In exercise of the powers conferred by subsec tion (1) (a) of section 15 of the Act, the powers of appellate authority under the Act, were conferred upon all District and Sessions Judges in the Punjab, in respect of the urban areas in their respective existing jurisdictions. I would first address myself to the question whether the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority appointed under the Act are Courts or not, and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether they are under the superintendence of the High Court. Mr. Mehboob Elahi, on behalf of the Corporation of Lahore, has drawn our attention to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Works Manager v. K. G. Hashmat, A I R 1946 Lah. 316. In that case the test for determining whether a certain Tribunal is a Court or not, were laid down by Sir Abdul Rashid, Acting C. J. It was held that one of the fundamental tests in this connection is whether a Tribunal exercises jurisdiction by reason of the sanction of the law or whether jurisdiction is given to it by the voluntary submission of the parties to a dispute. Another test mentioned was whether it can take cognizance of a lis and whether in exercising its functions, it proceeds in a judicial manner. Applying these tests the learned judges in that Full Bench case came to the conclusion that the authority appointed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, must be regarded as a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court so as to be under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. It was observed further that the fact that orders passed by the authority are described as "directions" rather than as decrees and that the 'authority' as such cannot execute its own decrees, cannot be regarded as conclusive. The learned judges sought support for their view from a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Mst. Dirji v. Smt. Goalin. A I R 1941 Pat. 65. In that case it was held that the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is a Court. After the decision of the Full Bench in that case, another Division Bench of Patna High Court ruled that the Court of such a Commissioner is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Mr. B. Z. Kaikaus, however, has contended that the analogy between the cases cited and that under consideration is not perfect inasmuch as under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, an appeal against a direction made by the authority appointed under that Act lies to the District Court, as such, by virtue of section 17 of that Act and the Patna case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that the Commis sioner appointed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under section 30 of the latter Act. These elements are wanting in the present case. It may also be pointed out that a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in H. C. D. Marhur v., E.1. Railway, A I R 1950 All. 80 held that the authority created under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, not being subjects to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, is not a Court subordinate to the High Court, within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision of this Court, in Works Manager v. K. G. Hashmat was referred to but not followed. A similar view prevailed in the Bombay High Court in The Manager, The Spring Mills Ltd. v. G. D. Ambekar and another, A I R 1949 Bom. 188 (D. ‑B). Mr. Mehboob Elahi next cited a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in K. Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. C. Koteswara Rao Garu and another, A I R 1924 Mad. 561. In that case, the decision of a District judge acting under the powers conferred upon him by the rules framed under the Madras Local Boards. Act, 1920, concerning election petitions, was held to be subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned judges pointed out that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court would depend on whether the judge referred to in the rules was acting as a Court or merely as persona designata. Reference was made in the course of the judgment to the observations of Lord Parker in National Telephone Company Ltd. v. Postmaster General, 1913 A C 546. These observations may be reproduced with advantage : ‑ " Where by statute, matters are referred to the deter mination of a Court of Record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same." These observations are not apt in the circumstances of the present case because the Act does not refer any matters to the determination of a Court of Record. Clearly the Provincial Government can, under the Act, appoint any person, whether a judicial officer or not, to act as a Controller or Appellate Authority with the added condition that for the latter office, "an officer or authority" must be selected. No exhaustive definition of a 'Court' is available in any of the statutes. In Shell Company of Australia Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1931 A. C. 275 the Prey Council enumerated some negative propositions in the following terms :‑ "(1) A tribunal is not necessarily a Court ill this strict sense because it gives a final decision. (2) Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. (3) Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. (4) Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. (5) Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. (6) Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body". Their Lordships further observed that the authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial powers. In that very judgment their Lordships referred to the definition or 'judicial power' given by Griffith C. J. in Huddart, Parket & Co. v. Noorehead, 8 C L R 330, 357, in the following terms :‑ " I am of opinion that the words 'judicial power' as used in section 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have, to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.'' It was pointed out that an administrative tribunal may act judicially; but still remain an administrative tribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly so called. Mr. Mehboob Elahi also relied on a Full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court in Muhammad Ibrahim Moola v. S. R. Jandass, A I R 1923 Rang. 94. In that case a Full Bench of. three Judges held that the first Judge of the Court of Small Causes acting under the provisions of the Rangoon, Rent Act, 1920, is a Court subordinate to the High Court, within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce dure: The ratio decidendi was that the Judge decides questions of civil rights in the same manner as a Court exercising civil jurisdiction would do, and must be regarded as a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. However, another Full Bench of four judges of the same Court in H. A. Aziz v. Kilyoboy, A I R 1927 Rang. 1 overruled this decision. It was held therein that the first judge of the Rangoon Small Causes Court, when exercising the powers vested in him by section 18 of the Rangoon Rent Act, 1920, exercises those powers not as a Court but as a persona designata and therefore, his decision thereunder is not subject to the revisional jurisdic tion of the High Court. A single judge of the Calcutta High Court in Allen Bros. Co. v. Bando & Co., A I R 1923 Cal. 169, held that the High Court has power of superintendence and revisional jurisdiction over the Rent Controller appointed under the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, inasmuch as the Controller, in discharging his duty under section 18 of that Act, functions as a Court of Justice. The following observations of the learned Judge (Rankin‑, J.) may "be reproduced with advantage :‑ The question is this: when a new and special jurisdiction is conferred upon any ordinary Civil Court so as to make it for certain limited purposes,' a Court of special jurisdiction, the powers and duties of which are defined by statute, has the High Court in the absence of any special provision conferring appellate jurisdiction in any form as regards those purposes, a right of superintendence arising out of the ordinary relation ship between the two Courts? As I understand the view of the Division Bench in H. C. Chatterjee v. L. B. Tirbedi, 1868 10 W. R. 341, they answer this question in the affirmative and I am in no way prepared to dissent. But the question at present is not solved by any reference even to this principle. From the Act of 1861, from the Letters Patent, and from the decisions, I draw this con clusion that it is not enough for the purposes of the Code or the Letters Patent which deal on definite principles with a regular order of Courts, that from the limited nature of powers conferred or from a mere comparison with other Courts, or from possible relationships thereto not yet subsisting, a new Court may be styled as an 'inferior Court'. An actual relationship to this Court must be established ; an existing thread of connecting authority must be disclosed". I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the second passage of this quotation. There appears to be no "existing thread of connecting authority" between a control ler or an Appellate Authority appointed under the Act and this Court in the present case. The first passage is not apt in the circumstances of this case as no existing Court can be said to have been invested with an additional jurisdiction. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kiran Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji A I R 1943 Cal. 247 found that the District Judge in exercising the powers under Para gaph 12, Bengal House Rent Control Order, 1942; does not act as a Court and consequently his orders are not revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure: It was held that a judge nominated to hear‑appeals under an order made by the Governor in the exercise of his executive and not his legislative powers, is only a superior executive officer and not a Court. In Tohur Sheik v. Monor anjan Roy, A I R 1947 Cal. 266 Lodge J. sitting in Single Bench took the view that the District Judge acting in revision under section 10 of the Bengal Alienation of Agricultural Land (Temporary Provision) Act (V of 1944), functions as a persona designata and not as Court, and, therefore, the High Court has no jurisdiction to revise an order passed by the District judge under the proviso to section 10 of that. Act. The judgment, however, does not contain much discussion on the point involved. The same provision of law fell to be construed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sm. Safura Bibi v. Isob Bepari, A I R 1947 Cal. 403. It was remarked that the scheme of section 10 seems to be that the jurisdiction of all Courts as Courts is excluded; without making distinction between their appellate and original jurisdiction, and the only jurisdiction conferred is that on the Collector in the first instance, and in the second place on the District judge, as a persona designata. The High Court, there fore, was held to have no jurisdiction to revise a decision of the District judge given under the proviso to section 10, at least where the matter was one which the Collector was empowered to dispose of under the Act. The relevant provision which was considered is in the following terms :‑ "Neither the High Court nor any Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in any matter which the Collector is empowered to dispose of under this Act: Provided that any person who is dissatisfied with any order of the Collector made under section 4 or subsection (1) of section 8, may within thirty days from the date of such order, apply in the prescribed manner to the District Judge for the revision of such order and the decision of the District judge thereon shall be final'". The decision apparently, therefore, depended on a con struction of the special provision which the learned judges were called upon to consider in that case. There are three other judgments of the Calcutta High Court, which may be briefly noticed. In Gopinath Shah v. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, A I R 1938 Cal. 220 (D. B.), an order of a Collector passed under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was held to be not revisable by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that even if the land Acquisition Collector can be assumed to be acting as a Court he was not a Court subordinate to the High Court. In Muhammad Abdullah Shah Chowdhury and others v. Giridhari Lal Mundra A I R 1938 Cal. 448 (1) (D. B.) it was held that an appellate officer appointed by the Local Government under section 40, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to revise an order passed by such officer. In Ram Krishna Sukul and another v. Ali Newaj and another, A I R 1938 Cal. 688 (D. B.) another Division Bench of the same Court expressed an identical opinion. It was observed that clause 16 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court does not cover Courts set up by a special statute for a special purpose and the fact that the special officer appointed under section 40 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1936, happened to be a Munsif, makes no ‑difference whatsoever in the case. In another Calcutta case reported as Sm. Suhashini Dass v. Mahandra Kumar Bose A I R 1947 Cal. 455 (D. B). an order passed by the District judge under paragraph 12 of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, 1943, on an appeal from an order passed by a Rent Controller, was held to be not revisable by the High Court, as the District Judge func tioned not as a Court but as a persona designata, and was thus merely a superior executive authority. Mr. Mehboob Elahi sought to reinforce his arguments by reference to two Madras rulings reported as C. K Ramasawami Goundan v. Mathu IJelappa Goundan and others, A I R 1923 Mad. 192 (D. B.) and A. K. G. Ahmad Thambi Maraicair v. V. S. Basava Maracayar A I R 1923 Mad. 254 (S. B.). In the first case a District judge or Subordinate Judge acting under section 57 of the Madras Local Board Act, 1920, was found to be a Court as contrasted with a persona designata, but apparently this authority is distinguishable on the facts from the present case. The District Judge and Subordinate judge were given jurisdiction under the relevant rules as the presiding officers of their respective Courts and it was also provided therein that in several cases a judge may direct any Court subordinate to him to hold an enquiry. In the second case it was decided that a Court dealing with an election enquiry held under the Madras Election Rules framed under the Madras District Municipalities Act; functioned as a Court subordinate to the High Court. The learned judge professed to follow as unreported decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court without much discussion. On the other hand Mr. B. Z. Kaikaus cited M. Abdul Wahid Sahib v. Dewanjee Abdul Khader Sahib, A I R 1947 Mad. 400 (S B), Chinniah Thevar v. F. M. Badsha A I R 1948 Mad. 439 (S B), and S. Rajam Ayyar v. Pavanambal, A I R 1949 Mad. 787 (S B). In all these three cases it was held that the District Judges and Subordinate judges invested with the papers of appellate authorities under section 12 of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, (XV of 1946), functioned as persona designata and not as Courts subordinate to the High Court. The provisions of that Act appear to be in part materia with those of the Act under con sideration. A Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Keshas Ramchandra v. Municipal Borough, Jalgaon, and others, A I R 1946 Born. 64 held that a judge acting under section 15, Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, is not a Court but a persona designata and the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to revise his order under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned judge followed the previous Division Bench judgments of the same Court, one of them being Jagmohan v. Venkatesh A I R 1933 Bom. 105. In Muhammadi Steamship Co. Ltd., Karachi v. Underwood Typewriter Co. P L D 1951 Sind 35 (D B) it was held that a Rent Controller appointed under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947, is merely an administrative officer and cannot be regarded as a Court subordinate to the High Court. The relevant provision that fell to be construed in that case enacted that the Provincial Government may by general or special order direct that the powers of revision conferred upon it shall, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, be exercisable by a person not below the rank of a Judge, Small Causes Court. It was also provided that an order made by the Provincial Government, and subject to the provisions of that section an order of the Controller, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. It was observed by the learned Judges that the Provincial Government could not be regarded as a Court as it was empowered to delegate its powers of revision not merely to. a judicial Officer but to any Executive Officer of the required rank. It followed that the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, when nominated by the Provincial Government to exercise its powers under section 20 of the Act, was not Court. In Mirza Adamkhan v. Tikamdas Wadhumal and another A I R 1939 Sind 165 a Division Bench of the Sind Chief Court held that where new tribunals are constituted to determine new questions under new Acts, the tribunals so constituted by and for the purposes of those Acts, unless the contrary is expressly enacted so necessarily implied, are special tribunals and the Judges when they are named must be regarded as persona designata and not Courts. It was found that the judge of the Karachi Small Causes Court acting under sections 16 and 17 of the Karachi City Municipal Act, 1933, did not function as a Court. Mr. Mehboob Elahi drew our attention to two Nagpur authorities published as Shrinivas Laxmanrao Pophali v. Superintendent Government Printing Press Nagpur A I R 1945 Nag. 94 (S B) and Debidutt Dube v. Central India Electrical Supply Co., Ltd., Lahore A I R 1945 Nag. 244 (S B). Both were cases under the payment of Wages Act. In the first case an order passed by a Subordinate judge under the Act was held revisable on the ground that the word 'final' used with reference to that order in the Act, did not exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the second case, a District Court acting under section 17 of the Act was held to be subordinate to the High Court. These rulings do not afford much assistance to the arguments advanced by Mr. Mehboob Elahi, as in the first case the point calling for deter mination here was not raised or discussed, and in the second case, the Tribunal concerned was the District Court and as such prima facie under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. It is significant that a query was raised in the second case as to whether the authority appointed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is a Court or not, and whether it is subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the question was left unanswered. Reliance has, however, been mainly placed on behalf of the Corporation, on the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Kishen Chand and Co. v. Nur Muhammad P L D 1949 Lah. 30. In that case Sharif and Cornelius, JJ. held that the Controller under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, must be regarded as a Court and further that he was subordinate to the High Court and subject to its revisional jurisdiction. The ratio of the decision by Muhammad Sharif, J., was that as the Controller under the Act exercised, all powers of a Civil Court he must be regarded as such, With all respect I venture to think that the proposition was too broadly stated. The Controller under the Act appears to have certain specific powers of a Civil Court and not all powers appertaining to such Court. For instance, a Controller has no power to issue an injunction or to appoint a receiver. It is also clear that the Controller has been invested with a limited jurisdiction under the Act and he cannot try all kinds of suits as the Civil Court does. It may be conceded that the Controller exercises jurisdiction by reason of the sanction of the law and not by the voluntary submission of the parties to a dispute. He is also concerned with the determination of what may be termed as justiciable issues and the disputes coming up before him are of a civil nature. But these factors do not conclusively establish, a tribunal to be a Court though their absence would clearly negative such a proposition‑See Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of, Taxation 1931 A C 275 which has been discussed above. From the premises that the Controller must be regarded as a Civil Court an inference was drawn by Muhammad Sharif, J., that as such Court, he must be sub ordinate to the High Court and subject to its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. Reference was made to this decision in the Full Bench case Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Mian Nur Hussain, P L D 1949 Lah. 301. In that case it was held by a majority of the judges composing the Bench that the Election Petition Commission constituted under the Government of India (Provincial Election) Corrupt Practices and (Election Petitions) Order, 1936, Part III, is not a Court Subordinate to the High Court. Writing the majority judgment in that case, my Lord the Chief Justice observed as follows :‑ "The other learned judge, Muhammad Sharif, J., I res pectfully venture to suggest, went too far when he laid down the rule that a Civil Court, meaning by such Court any Court which is engaged in the determination of disputes of a civil nature, is, as such, always subordinate to the High Court and subject to its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 or section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act . . . ." In another passage in the Full Bench case, the learned Chief justice expressed himself as under :‑ "I cannot accept the broad and unqualified proposition that once it is held that an officer, authority or functionary is exercising the functions of a Court in relation to rights that may be called 'civil' that officer, authority or functionary must be held to be Subordinate to the High Court. The result of any such finding would be that all Courts which adjudicate upon the civil rights of subjects whether in cases between the subjects themselves or between the State and the subject, will be subordinate to the High Court and this will bring within the sphere of subordination not only the Revenue Courts which admittedly decide civil disputes between the parties but also the Income‑tag authorities which determine the subject's liability to the State. One clear indication of subordination has always been held to be that the Court whose subordination is in question is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. A Court may also be subordinate to the High Court even qua matters which are not subject to the High Court's appellate power if these matters have been entrusted for adjudication to an admittedly Subordinate Court as a Court and not the Presiding Officer of such Court as a persona designata." In the Division Bench judgment Muhammad Sharif, J. appears to have adopted the opinion that special rights were not created by the Act, for the determination of which. a special tribunal was constituted to follow a special procedure. The right, according to the learned Judge, was already there and only its determination had been made speedy and some restraint had been placed upon the powers of the landlords to evict tenants, without reference to the 'Controller' under the Act. Cornelius, J. however, observed that some of the provisions of the Act created new rights which did not exist previously. He also considered that sections 4, 10 and 11 of the Act really appertain to executive rather than judicial functions. With due deference to the opinion of Muhammad Sharif, J., it seems to be clear that the Act does create new rights. The act creates a statutory tenancy for the protection of tenants who cannot be evicted except in certain specified contingencies and this is a departure from the position under the general law. The freedom in regard to fixation of rent has also been severely curtailed by the Act. Cornelius, J., explained the reasons which influenced him in the Division Bench case, in the course of his judgment in the Full Bench case. At page 330 of the published report, the learned Judge has remarked as follows :‑ "I have also in that case examined the question of subordi nation of a Controller to the High Court, and in coming to the conclusion that the Controller was subordinate, I have relied on two principal circumstances, namely, firstly that by Notification of the Provincial Government, only sub ordinate judges who were already amenable to the superintendence of the High Court, were appointed to be Controllers, and that the additional functions so conferred upon them were to be regarded as extension of their ordinary jurisdiction to which incidents attaching to their ordinary jurisdiction, including a revision by the High Court, would attach, and secondly that even if the Controllers were to be regarded as functionaries with special jurisdiction, since that jurisdiction was of a strictly limited kind and since it lay within a sphere of the civil jurisdiction and the statute did not provide that these functionaries should be final judges of the limits of their own jurisdiction, the function of deciding whether in a particular case they have exceeded their jurisdiction, must necessarily fall to be performed by the High Court". In this connection it would also be useful to refer to the observations of my Lord the Chief Justice in the Full Bench case at page 348 :‑ "Nor can I agree with the view taken in some of the cases e.g., Abdul Razak v. Kuldip Narain, 214 I C 59 ; Arjun Bautara v. Maharaja Krishna Chandra Gajanti Naravan Deo, 21 Pat. 1942 (1) and Kokku Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Chintlachervu Koteswara Rao Garu, 47 Mad. 369 that sub jection to the High Court, if by subjection is meant subordination, is a necessary and inseparable incident of all Tribunals of limited jurisdiction, because the existence of the limit pre‑supposes a higher authority to determine and enforce it and an inferior Tribunal cannot be permitted to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction or to trespass beyond those limits without some power to check." At pages 350‑51 the learned Chief Justice has pointed out that the cases referred to really related to the question of issuing prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari to inferior Courts. From the mere fact that Civil Courts are competent and it is for them alone to determine the question whether a special Tribunal has acted within jurisdiction or ex ceeded its limits, it does not follow that a Tribunal with res tricted jurisdiction is subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though that section contemplates, in the words of the learned Chief Justice, "some of the well‑recognised cases where a prero gative writ would issue in England, and the jurisdictions of the High Court in England and that of the High Courts in Pakistan to interfere in revision are analogous, it is a mistake to suppose that these two jurisdictions are identical and do not differ in their scope and character or that the High Courts in Pakistan will interfere in revision whenever a writ would go in England." The authority of the Division Bench ruling, there fore, appears to have been greatly shaken by the majority judgment in the Full Bench case referred to above. The question came to be considered by a Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court recently in Pitman's Shorthand Academy v. B. Lila Ram & Sons, A I R 1950 E P 181. The learned judges in that case expressed the view that the Rent Control ler and the Appellate Authority appointed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, do not constitute Civil Courts subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court; and, therefore, their orders are not subject to revision by the High Court. The Division Bench judgment of this Court mentioned above was cited and dissented from in that case. An analysis of the authorities cited at the Bar would indicate that, generally speaking, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked in respect of orders of tribunals where either a limited right of appeal to the High Court existed from the decision of that' Court or where existing Courts which were held subordinate to the Court had their jurisdiction enlarged by conferment of additional powers or where the High Court interfered with the decision of the inferior Courts under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. In most cases, the distinction was drawn whether the authority or tribunal acted as persona designata or a Court. In this connection Mr. Mehboob Elahi invited our attention to the observations of Fazal Ali J. in Dirji v. Goalin A I R 1941 Pat. 65 (F B) to the effect that there is no real antithesis between the expressions `persona designata' and 'Court'; even a persona designata may be a Court. Whether he is a Court or not depends upon his powers and the functions which he has to dis charge. No exception can be taken to this proposition. The dis cussion about persona designata does not appear to have much relevancy in the present case, as the Act makes no reference to Subordinate Judges or District judges at all. The question really is whether under the Act, the Controller and the appellate Authority can be described as Courts and, secondly, if the answer is in the affirmative, whether they are Courts subordi nate to the High Court, for the purposes of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 44 of the Punjab Courts Act. The statute itself does not seek to enlarge the existing jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts. That was undoubtedly the position under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941. Section 4 of that Act expressly enacted that when under the provisions of that Act, any question arose for the determi nation of a Court or any order was to be made by a Court, such question shall be determined of such order made by the Court having cognizance of the suit or proceeding, if any, in relation to which such question arises or such order is to be made: The jurisdiction under that Act was, therefore, vested in the ordinary Civil Courts. The 1941 Act was, no doubt, couched in almost similar terms as the 1947 Act, but for the first time, the latter Act created the two functionaries known, as the Controller and the Appellate Authority. The very fact that a departure was made from the old position existing in the 1941 Act, makes the intention of the Legislature clear that the ordinary Courts were not henceforth to take cognizance of the dispute envisaged by the Act. Under the 1947 Act, any person could be appointed a Controller and any officer or authority as the appellate authority by a notification to be issued by the Provincial Government. In issuing such notification, the Pro vincial Government could not be said to be exercising legisla tive functions and could not, therefore, confer additional jurisdiction on Subordinate judges or District judges by these notifications. Even though, therefore, all Subordinate Judged and District judges have been invested with the relevant: powers under the Act, the inference by no means follows than they are to function as Courts. The Controller does not appear to be armed with all the powers of a civil Court under the Act and, therefore, does not seem to be bound by all ‑the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar is the position with regard to the appellate authority. They can make such enquiry "as they deem fit" in each case. It cannot be said therefore, that they are hidebound by the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The word "Controller" is used in the Act in contradistinction with the expression "Court", in sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Act, and orders of a Controller are to be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court, under section 17. Only a limited principle of res judicata is embodied in section, 14 of the Act. In the first instance, therefore, the Controller' and the Appellate Authority do not appear to be intended to act as Courts, and even if it be assumed that for certain purposes they may be regarded as Courts, in view of the special provisions of the Act and the absence of any indication of a link with the High. Court, the conclusion is irresistible that they are by no means Courts subordinate to the High Court so as to attract its revisional jurisdiction. The contention was raised that the Act itself was ultra vires the Governor. by virtue of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 93 of‑ the Government of India Act, 1935. This proviso is in the following terms :‑ "Provided that nothing in this subsection shall authorise the‑Governor to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend, either in whole or in part, the operation of any provision of this Act relating to High Courts." The Act, however, merely creates new Tribunals for the adjudication of certain disputes between landlords and tenants and by its enactment, the Governor cannot be said to have assumed to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the High Court, nor can he be said to have suspended in whole or in part, the operation of any provision of the Constitution Act relating to High Courts. It will be conceded that the Governor in exercise of his powers of legislation under section 93, could have repealed the 1941 Act, He cold have also enacted the 1947 Act if the proviso was not in any manner contravened. I am unable to hold that the Governor's act was vitiated by any such contravention. The argument, it seems to me, really begs the question and could only be regarded as valid if by some law, all Courts or tribunals, whatever their character, would ipso facto come within the purview of the supervisory powers of the High Court, as soon as they are established. This is clearly not the position. The cases discussed above reveal a preponderating balance of authority in favour of the proposition that special tribunal created under circumstances analogous to those obtaining under the Act of 1947, would not be Courts and in any case, would not be Courts subordinate to the High Court. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the order passed by the Additional District judge in the present case cannot be revise by this Court. I would, consequently, dismiss the petition, but in view of the difficult nature of the questions involved, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. A. MUHAMMAD JAN, J.‑I agree. M. KHURSHID ZAMAN, J.‑I agree. A. H. Petition dismissed.