1973 PLP 379 (PTD)

"The tax is upon "income, profits and gains", and it is not tax on gross receipts. With this fact in view, each section which deals with one of the first five heads specified in section 6 contains, where necessary, specific provisions for the necessary deductions and allowances to be made for the purpose of arriving at the taxable balance." Thus, the proper rule would appear to be this‑that nothing should be treated as being charged to tax until by process of computation laid down by the Income‑tax Act, 1922, the status of income, profits and gains emerges. In other words, what is taxable under the Act is something capable of being processed by the machinery of computation contained in Chapter III of the Act for inclusion in what the Act describes as the "total Income" of an assessee.

8. The next salient feature which stands out is that for a receipt to be taxable under section 10 of the Act, it must be a receipt In respect of an existing business, profession or vocation capable of being processed to profits or gains by the method of computation laid down by section

10. This is clear from the language employed in subsection (1) of section 10 under which tax shall be payable by the assessee under the head "profits and gains of a business, profession or vocation" in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation "carried on by him." The italicized words exclude from the operation of this section a business, profession or vocation which has been discontinued. The real import of section 10 (1) is to make, subject to tax, profits and gains which arise from the carrying of any business, profession or vocation. The continued existence of a source of profits in the accounting year is the condition of chargeability. There has teen judicial controversy on the question whether the correct construction of the expression "carried on by him" in section 10 (1) means: (i) that the business should have been carried on at any time during the accounting year, that is, the previous year, but not necessarily throughout the year; or (ii) the business, profession or vocation should be carried on at the time its profits and gains are received. Stone, C. J., in his dissenting judgment in In re : Kamdar took the view that the second construction was the correct one, and we are of the view that this opinion cannot be easily rejected, but we do riot consider it necessary to express any final opinion on this point in the present case, as the question does not strictly arise in the shape in which it presented itself before the learned Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kamdar s case. But there can be no dispute with the proposition that, to charge the profits and gains of the business, profession or vocation, to income‑tax during any particular accounting year, the business, profession or vocation must at least have been carried on during some part of the accounting year, though not necessarily throughout the year. The continued existence of the source of profits during the accounting year is necessary, and a business which is nonexistent during the whole of an accounting year is an extinct business and cannot be taxed. The same principle would apply to income which comes under the residuary head (v) other sources, and section 12 of the Act. As regards salary, interest on securities and income from pro perty, it cannot seriously be contended that tax would continue to be charged under these heads, even if the assessee has ceased to be in service or to own securities or property. We must bear in mind the provisions of section 4 (1) of the Act which provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the total income of any previous year of any person includes all income, profits and gains from whatever source derived. Section 6 enumerates the sources of income into six categories noted above. This of necessity requires that, when the receipt comes, this D source should be in existence. If the source is one of the sources enumerated in section 6 and the receipt has the attributes of such source, but the source itself is not in existence, then the receipt cannot come within the "total income", for which provision is made in section 4 (1) of the Act. More so, because such receipt cannot be subjected to computation in the manner for which provisions is made in the Act, The words "carried on by him" cannot mean carried on by the assessee at any time. Either these words mean carried on by the assessee at the time the receipt comes in or carried on by the assessee in the accounting year which is under assessment. If the view was taken that the words "carried on by him" mean carried on by the assessee at any time, then it would not be possible to find a terminal point at all and In such cases even if the business, profession or vocation was, in fact, discontinued, so long there was a single outstanding payment. the business, profession or vocation would still be "carried on" by the assessee. If so, then in any future assessment in the accounting year in which an outstanding payment is received the assessee must be entitled to permissible allowances, deductions and set‑off mentioned in section 10 (2) and section 24 of the Act, including interest on capital borrowed for the purpose of business, profession provocation and depreciation allowances, in order that his total income might be computed under the Act. But this cannot be the meaning of the words "carried on by him", as, otherwise, the revenue would be compelled not only to deduct all permissible allowances Including depreciation allowances from the receipt, but also, if the deductions exceed the amount received in any future year, then to allow set off of the loss against other heads of income under section 24 of the Act, but this course, as the decided cases would show, has generally not been permitted by the Revenue. Therefore, a receipt cannot be assessable to tax unless it be a receipt from an existing source, that is, an existing business, profession or vocation capable of being processed to profits or gains by the method of computation laid down 1n the Act. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to section 25 of the Act, under which, if any business, profession or vocation to which subsection (3) of this section is not applicable, is discon tinued in any year, an assessment may be made in that year on the basis of the Income, profits or gains of the period between the end of the previous year and the date of such discontinuance, in addition to the assessment, if any, made on the basis of Income, profits or gains of the previous year. Thus, the Act itself solves the problem of a business, profession or vocation which is discontinued by making an express provision for assessment on the basis of the income, profits or gains received between the end of the previous year and the date of discontinuance, and, if the method of accounting adopted by the assessee is cash basis, then by reason of the provisions of section 13 of the Act, tire assessment in case of discontinuance can be made only on the basis of cash system, that is, on income, profits and gains actually received by the assessee.

9. Another salient feature which stands out from the review of the relevant provisions of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, referred to above, is that the Act does not define "income", though the Act has artificially extended this word to include several receipts which may not have attracted the nomenclature of "Income". Yet it is not difficult to comprehend the meaning and scope of "income" which is a word of every day use, and which most businessmen and persons in profession have no difficulty to understand. The question of the meaning of "income" came for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Company (A I R 1932 P C 138). According to their Lordships, "Income" in the Income‑tax Act connotes a periodical monetary return "coming in" with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. Their Lordships likened income pictorially to the fruit of a tree, or the crop of a field and said that it is essentially the produce of something which is often loosely spoken of as "capital", but capital, though possibly the source in the case of income from securities is in most cases hardly more than an element in the process of production. This definition of "Income" was followed by Lord Russell of Killowen in Gogal Siran Narain Singh v. C. I. T. ((1935) 3 I T R 237) though his Lordship added an important qualification that in these words anything which can properly be described as income is taxable under tie Act unless expressly exempted. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council consider ed thin question again in Kamakahya Narain Singh v. C. I. T. ((1943) 11 I T R 513). Lord Wright speaking for the Judicial Committee said : "Income, it is true, is a word difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precised general formula. It is a word of the broadest connotation . . . . . . . Sir George Lowndes speaks income being likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree, or the crop of a field. But it is clear that such pictorial sense cannot be used to limit the broad character of income. Income is not necessarily the recurring return from a definite source, though it is generally of that character. Income again may consist of a source of broad receipts as it generally does in the case of professional earnings. The multiplicity of forms which income may assume is beyond enumeration." Thus, the effect of the definition of "income" given by the Privy Council in The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Company has been somewhat modified by these two subsequent decisions. But in our view these two decisions do not take away the essential element Inherent in the nature of "income". Though it may be that income may not necessarily be a recurrent return, yet it should be capable of recurring, even if only in the sense that it is related to transient circumstances. Thus, Lord Greene. M. R., observed in Asher v. London Film Productions Ltd. (1944 K B 133): "The payments are annual payments in the sense that they have that recurrent quality which is the distinguishing marls differentiating an income payment from a capital payment for these purposes. You can have an annual payment under this rule (rule 21, now section 170, I. T. A,, 1952), even though it happens by some accident or other to fall due in one year only. The question is has It the necessary periodical or recurrent quality ?" Thus, the recurrent quality should be present in the receipt. Though it may not necessarily be a recurrent return, it should be capable of recurring. Further, a receipt which has this recurrent quality, should be placeable under one of the heads of income enumerate) in section 6 of the Act. Section 4 (1) speaks of total Income from "whatever source" derived. The expression "whatever source" has reference to section 6 which enumerates the sources of income. The applicability of section 4 (1) is made subject to the other provisions of the Act,' and one of these provisions is section 6, which should therefore be deemed to control the expression "whatever source" used in the sense that this expression is relatable to the sources section 4 (1) enumerated in section

6. If a receipt cannot be placed under any of the beads in this section, then it is not inaudible in "total income".

10. On a review of the decided cases, we find that there is now judicial consensus that the source of the receipt, that is, business, profession or vocation should be in existence before the receipt which is attributable to it is charged to tax. In Bennett v. Ogston ((1928‑31) 15 Tax Cas. 374), Rowlatt, J., stated the rule as follows: "When a trader or a follower of a profession or vocation dies or goes out of business and there remain to be collected sums owing for goods supplied during the existence of the business or for services rendered by the professional man during the course of his life or his business, there is no question of assessing those receipts to Income‑tax; they are the receipts of the business while it lasted, they are arrears of that business, they represent money which was earned during the life of the business and are taken to be covered by the assessment made during the life of the business, whether that assessment was made on the basis of bookings or on the basis of receipt . . . . . . . : This question next came to be considered in England in Purchase v. Stainer's Executors (Leslie Boward's case). The assessments on Leslie Howard, the famous film actor, had been made under Case II of Schedule D on earning basis, that is, on accrual basis Under Schedule D of the English Income‑tax Act, tax is charged in respect of the annual profits or gains arising or accruing from any property whatever . . . . . . and (b) all interests and moneys, annuity and other annual profits or gains not charged under Schedules A, B, C, D and E, and not specially exempted from tax. Schedule D is divided into six cases as follows : "Case I‑tax in respect of any trade carried on in the United Kingdom or elsewhere; Case II‑tax in respect of any profession or vocation not contained in any other Schedule ; Case III‑tax in respect of‑ (a) any interest of money, whether yearly or otherwise, or any annuity, or other annual payment, whether such pay ment is payable within or out of the United Kingdom, either as a charge on any property of the person paying the same by virtue of any deed or will car otherwise, or as a reservation out of it, or as a personal debt or obligation by virtue of any con. tract, or whether the same is received and payable half yearly or at any shorter or more distant periods (but not including any payment chargeable under Casa VIII of Schedule D), and (b) all discounts ; and (c) profits on securities bearing interest payable out of the public revenue, other than such as are charged under Schedule C ; Case IV‑tax in respect of income arising from securities out of the United Kingdom, except such income as is charged under Schedule C ; Case V‑tax in respect of income arising from possessions out of the United Kingdom; "Case VI‑tax in respect of any annual profits or gains not falling under any other Case of Schedule D and not charged by virtue of . . . . . . . Schedule B, Schedule C or Schedule E." The dispute in Leslie Howard's case related to the share of profits, which was expectedly payable by him in respect of future exploitation of certain films. In the Court of Appeal, Jenkins, L. J., observed as follows: "Mr. Howard unfortunately died and his profession was thereby discontinued. This brought to an end the liability of the profits of his profession to tax under Case 11 of Schedule D . . . After the discontinuance of the profession, they (the profit) could not be taxed under Case II of Schedule D, as profits of any subsequent period for the very reason that they were earnings of a profession which had been discontinued, receipts after such discontinuance . . . . . . . ." The learned Lord Justice then put the question in this form: "Whether in a case in which a person carrying on a pro fession performs professional services for remuneration . . . . . to be received from time to time over a period, and dies or otherwise discontinues his profession before the whole of such remuneration has been received, the liability to tax in respect of such remuneration (whensoever received) is exhausted by his assessment to tax on the profits of his profession down to the date of such discontinuance under Case II of Schedule D ?" The learned Lord Justice gave an affirmative answer and expressly placed reliance upon the dictum of Rowlatt, J., in Bennett v. Ogston and stated that in the view he took, shares or receipts or profits paid to the executors after the death of Mr. Howard should tae regarded simply as remuneration, professionally earned by him in his lifetime and, as such, on the principle stated in Bennett v. Ogston, not liable to tax in their (executors) hands. The case went to the House of Lords, where a greater emphasis was laid upon the contention of the Inland Revenue that the payments were taxable in the hands of the executors under Case III or Case VI, which is a residuary group, but the general principles propounded by Jenkins, L. J., were affirmed. Lord Simonds, L. C., said: "It appears to me wholly irrelevant that they (the sums) were not payable until after his death and equally so that they were not and could not be quantified until after that event. They retained the essential quality of being the fruit of his professional activity. If in all the circumstances it was not possible to bring the sums into account in the years in which they were earned, . . . . . . the result is not to change the character of the payment but to exhibit that some professional earnings may escape the Income‑tax net."

11. The question was again raised in the Court of Sessions in Scotland in D. & G. R. Rankine v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue ((1950-52) 32 Tax. Cas 520). This case related to a firm of civil and mining engineers, who, for many years, had been assessed on profits computed on "cash basis". On 11th July 1944, the business was discontinued. Substantial fees earned before that date were received after the discontinuance. The Revenue re‑opened the assessments for the years 1942‑43 and 1943-44 and made additional assessment on "earnings", or "accrual" basis so as to make the fees received after discontinuance of the profession chargeable to tax. But the rule formulated by Rowlatt, J., in Bennett v. Ogston was rigorously affirmed. Dealing with the computation of profits on cash basis or on earning basis (that is accrual basis), the Lord President (Cooper) made the following observations: "Needless to say it makes little or no difference over a period of years whether professional gains or profits ate computed on an earnings basis or on a cash basis so long as an established business continues to be carried on as a going concern and Income‑tax rates remains fairly constant. Absalom v. Talbot 1944 A C 204 Per Lord Akin at page 217 (26 T C 166 at p. 192). It is when the business Is discontinued (as mu3t happen sooner or later in every profession or vocation involving personal services) that the matter acquiries significance. From the stand point of strict accountancy practice I have no doubt that the earning basis is always the theoretically ideal method of computing the profits and gains of any business, vocation or enterprise‑the credits and debits being brought into the accounts of the appropriate year and if need be readjusted on the principles summarised by us in Spencer & Co. (32 T C 111 1950 S C 345). But the ideal is not always capable of realisa tion. There will sometimes be great practical difficulty in putting a value upon credit items at a time when they are only future or contingent or perhaps conjectural and a like difficulty may even arise in connexion with bad or doubtful debts‑311, of which may necessitate suspense accounts and troublesome readjustment and re‑opening of accounts when credits or debits mature or become ascertainable in account‑a difficulty conspicuously illustrated in the Excess Profits Tax cases. In the case of some familiar vocations instanced in argument the difficulty may become virtually insuperable. In all such cases no objection has been taken or could be taken to the commonsense practical expedient of discarding the earnings basis in favour of the cash basis as the method of computation affording in the circumstances the beat practicable approxi mation to the desired result. But the cash basis involves risks both to the Inland Revenue and to the taxpayer. The Inland Revenue run the risk of a discontinuance of the business. The tax‑payer runs the risk of prolonged disability from the practice of his profession or vocation during which his earnings cease while sums earned in the past continue to be received . . . . . . . ." The Lord President further placed reliance on Leslie Howard's case and then proceeded to state as follows: "Here there is no question of Case III or Case VI, and it must be Case II or nothing. Here the only basis of past computations has been the cash basis and this factor, on so far as it affects the result, seems to make the present case a fortiori on the Leslie Howard ease. The Inland Revenue knew or ought to have known a dozen years ago that the Coal Act, 1938, must cause a temporary but very large inflation of the business of most mining engineers, and specific intimation of this was actually sent by the appellants' accountants to the Inspector of Taxes in the beginning of 1943. If at that point the Inland revenue had insisted upon a transfer from the cash to the earning basis of computation, I do not consider that their demand could have been resisted. They did not do so. Matters were left on the cash basis until, eighteen months later, the firm expired before a large part of the outstanding fees had been ascertained, or at least collected. I cannot reconcile with the principle formulated by Rowlatt, J., the claim by the Inland Revenue that they are still free to go back as far as the six‑year time limit still permit, in order, by means of additional assessments under Case II, to re‑open the past assessments by which it appears to me that the tax liability of the now defunct firm has been exhausted. In the words of Rowlatt, J. (15 T C at p. 378) the past earnings of the firm are "taken to be covered" by the past assessments made upon them. Nor am I dismayed by the complaint that upon this view substantial sums will be untaxed. As Lord Simons, L. C., observed, "some professional earnings may escape the "Income tax Net". Moreover it is well to recall that Income‑tax is a tax on income and not on receipts, and that a person's taxable income of any year is in truth an "artificial sum arrived at by the application of a host of technical rules which may produce a result differing appreciably from the ordinary popular conception of that person's income." It should be noted that under the English Income‑tax Acts, the option is of the Revenue whether to assess the profits on cash basis or on "earnings" (that is accrual basis). It was in exercise of this option that the Revenue sought to re‑open the assessments made before the discontinuance of the profession, so as to bring the substantial fees received after the discontinuance within the computation for tax on "earning;." or on "accrual" basis, but the Court of Sessions held that the profession, the receipts whereof had been computed for tax purposes on cash basis before discontinuance, having been discontinued, the fees received after such discontinuance were not liable to be assessed to tax, and, on this principle, the assessments made previous to discon tinuance could not be re‑opened. In our Act, section 13 does not give any option to the Revenue as it is expressly provided is this section that income, profits or gains shall be computed for the purpose of sections 10 and 12 in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. In the same Judgment, Lord Keith took the view that the receipts which came after the discontinuance of the profession may be something in the nature of windfall.

12. The question of chargeability to tax of receipts attributable to a discontinued business, profession or vocation has presented itself in one form or the other before the Courts both in Pakistan and in India. We would, therefore, do well to make review of the decisions of the cases in which this question has come up for decision. We shall first refer to the Privy Council decision in Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Company. The respondents in this case acted as distributing agents of the Burma Oil Company and the Anglo Persian Oil Company, in addition to carrying on their other businesses. The respondents' agency of the Burma Oil Company was terminated on 31st December 1927, and that of the Anglo Persian Oil Company on 30th June 1928. From the Burma Oil Company, the respondents received in the early part of 1928 a sum of Rs. 12,00,000.00 as compensation for cessation of the agency. In August 1928, the respondents received ids. 3,25,000.00 from the Anglo‑Persian Oil Company as compensation for loss of the business of agency. These two receipts were taken by the income‑tax Officer in computing the assessable income of the respondents for the relevant year Into account as profits or gains of their business in the year ending 31st December 1928. It was contended by the Revenue that the sum were chargeable under the head "business" of section 6 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee referred to section 2 (4) and section 10 'of the Act. Section 2 (4) defines business to include any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. Under section 10 of the Act tax Is payable by an assassee under the head business in respect of profits or gains of any business carried on by him. Their Lordships observed that underlying each of the words in section 2 (4) and section 10 of the Act. is the fundamental idea of the continuous exercise of an activity, that is, tax Is payable by an assessee in respect of the profits earned by a process of production and that the sums received by the respondents for cessation of their agency can be taxable only if they are the produce, or the result, of their carrying on the agency of the Oil Companies in the year in which they were received by the respondents: For the Revenue, it was contended that the responded is did, in fact, carry on business throughout the year. Their Lordships noted that this business was independent of the business of distributing agencies which had ceased, and therefore the sums received by the respondents for cessation of these agencies had no connection with the continuance of the respondents' other business. Thus, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that, to be taxable, the receipts should be from the carrying on of the business in the year in which then were received. In South Indian Industrials Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax. Madras ((1935) 3 I T R 11) the assessee's business included the businesses of spinning and weaving mills, cement, brick and tile works, rice mills and foundry and holding of shares in a jute company. The assessee carried on these various businesses till 1925, but from that year onwards it was merely existing to dispose of its various concerns and did not do any trade, except to receive dividends on the jute shares. In the year in account, the assessee received Rs. 1,40,000.00 by way of dividends of these shares, against which sum the assessee claimed to set off Rs. 1,59,489.00, being the loss said to have been sustained in the rice mills, cement works, brick and title works and the foundry, Including a sum of Rs. 37,015.00 odd as depreciation. The question came before the High Court of Madras whether the assesses was entitled to set off against the dividend income the losses sustained in other concerns. The Court held, firstly, that the various concerns of the assessee were separate businesses: secondly, section 10 of the Income‑tax Act only deals with businesses that are being carried on and not businesses which had ceased to be carried on, and accordingly the assessee was not entitled to set off the losses sustained in businesses which had ceased to be carried on against the dividend income, and that the losses were in the nature of capital losses. This rule was followed by the High Court of Lahore in a Full Bench decision in the B. C. G. A. (Punjab) Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab ((1937) 5 I T R 279). Din Muhammad, J., speaking for the Full Bench, said that an assessee cannot set off the losses of a business which had been discontinued before the year of account against the profits and gains of a current business. The Madras Court considered this question again in O. Rm. Om. Rm. PL. Muthukaruppan Chettiar and others v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madras. In this case, a firm of money‑lenders was dissolved on 11th January 1939, after which date no business was transacted beyond that involved in the realization of the assets. Between this date and 26th March 1939, some assets of the business were realised. For the accounting year ending 13th April 1939, the assessee, who was a partner in the firm, claimed to set off a certain amount representing the loss arrived at by deducting the sums realised in the course of winding‑up from the value of the assets as shown in the books of account. The Court held that this loss could not be treated as trading loss to the year of the account, because the firm had ceased to carry on the business on 11th January 1939, and all realisations took place after the date. Referring to section 10 of the Income‑tax Act, the Court said, relying on the Privy Council decision in The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Company that as the loss was not incurred either in or for the carrying on of the business of the partnership, It was‑ not deductable under section

10. Here it may be noted that the loss had occurred before the end of the accounting year during part of which business had, in fact, been carried on. Still, the claim to set off this loss against the profits of that year was held inadmissible. The ratio decidendi of these cases is that a business lose, which is a loss attributable to business which has been discontinued before the accounting year ceases to be a business loss and is in the nature of capital loss, and therefore cannot be set off against the profits of the businesses carried on during the accounting year. On this principle, profits and gains which are the fruits of a business or profession or vocation, but are received during an accounting year in which such business or profession or vocation was not at all carried on, cease to be profits and gains of such business, profession or vocation and acquire a character of capital receipts since the source to which they are attributable had become extinct when they came in the; bands of the assessee. The question presented itself in a more direct form in a Full Bench decision at Karachi, The Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Phillips Holzman A. G. Ameejee Valeejee & Sons, Karachi ((1968) 17 Taxation 67). In this case, the assesses, a registered firm, carried on contract work and also owned a ginning factory, which was let out from time to time. During the relevant accounting year, no business was carried on by the assessee, except selling the factory and machinery. The Income: tax Officer invoked the provisions of the second proviso to section 10(2) (vii) of the Income‑tax Act and charged to tax the difference between the original price and the written down value of the machinery and the factory. The Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal overruled the contention of the Department that this surplus should be deemed to be the profits of the relevant year on the reasoning that no business was done in the relevant year of account nor was the plant or machinery used during any part of that year. On reference, the Full Bench held that the condition precedent laid down in section 10(1) that the business must be carried on in the year of account before any item is treated as income is implicit in the second proviso to clause 7 of subsection (2), and since no business was done by the assessee in the relevant year of account, nor was any machinery or plant used during any part of that year, the surplus was not chargeable to tax. We may here refer to two decisions of the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal itself, wherein quite a contrary view was taken from that adopted by the Tribunal in the present case. In (1962) 5 Tax. 171.) (Trib.), the assessee carried on indenting and import business. For the import business the assessee maintained account on mercantile basis, but for the indenting business on cash basis. The business was discontinued after 31st May 1951. The assessee realised some outstanding commission in the financial year 1952‑53 to 1955‑56, during which years the assesses did not do any business at all, the source of these commissioners having become extinct. The Tribunal held that that since the amounts of the outstanding commissions were received in the years in which the assessee had not at all carried on any business, trey did not constitute his income liable to tax either under section 10 or under section 12 of the Income tax Act. In a later case (1964) 10 Tax. 26 (Trib.) the question was whether a sum realised by an Income‑tax practitioner after dissolution of his firm was chargeable to tax. In this case, a firm of Income‑tax Practitioners, which had two partners, was dissolved with effect from 1st October 1957, each of the two partners then starting his separate practice. In terms of the deed of dissolution, the outstanding fees were to be divided amongst the partners in the ratio laid down 1n the partnership agreement dated 10th November 1950. During the assessment proceedings of one of the partners for the charge year 1960‑61, the Income‑tax Officer came to know that the other partner had received a sum of Rs. 7,500.00 after dissolution of the firm on account of the firm's outstandings. Accordingly, the Income tax Officer brought this sum of Rs. 7,500.00 to tax in the hands of that other partner also who, however, did not accept this assessment and went in appeal. The Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal held that it was the firm which had earned the disputed amount and the chargeability of the amount to tax was hit by section 10(1), in that it was not an Income from a continuing business. The receipt was held to be in the nature of capital receipt.

13. Even in India, the Supreme Court has taken the view that receipts attributable to a business, profession or vocation, which come in after the end of the accounting year, in which such business, profession or vocation has ceased, are not chargeable to tax. We would refer to The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madras v. Express Newspapers Ltd. ((1964) 53 I T R 250). In this case, the Free Press Co., which was carrying on the business of publishing certain newspapers, transferred the right to print and publish those newspapers to the Express Newspapers Ltd. on August 31, 1946 and let out its machinery and assets to the latter with effect from September 1, 1946. On October 31, 1946, the Free Press Co. went Into voluntary liquidation and the liquidator was directed not to carry on the business of the company. The liquidator confirmed the transfer of the machinery and assets to the Express Newspapers Ltd. on November 1, 1946, the sale yielding a profit to the Free Press Co. of Rs. 6,08,666.00, comprising Rs. 2,14,090.00 being the difference between the original cost and written down value of the machinery, and Rs. 3,94,576.00 being the amount in excess over the original cost. As the Press Co. was dissolved later and was struck off the register of companies, the Express Newspapers Ltd. was assessed, as the successor of the Free Press Co., under the proviso to section 26(2) of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, on these two amounts. the Indian Supreme Court held that the profits so yielded were not chargeable to tax, as the profits were earned when the business was not carried on by the assesses during the accounting year, and therefore fell outside the provisions of section 10(1). In coming to this conclusion, the Court observed: "Under section 3 of the Act, income‑tax shall be charged for any year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the total Income of the previous year of every assesses; under section 6, one of the heads of taxable income is "profits and gains of business, profession or voca tion"; under section 10 (1), the tax under that head is payable in respect of profits or gains of any business carried on by the assesses during the accounting year. The main condition which attracts all the other subsections and clauses of the section Is that the tax shall be payable by an assesses in respect of the profits or gains of business, etc., carried on by him. The crucial words are "business carried on by him". If the profits or gains were not earned when the business was being carried on by the assessee during the accounting year, they would fall outside Vie provision of section 10(1). For instance, if the machinery was sold after the business was closed or when the business was under "liquidation, it would not be appro priate to bold that the profits gains earned by the sale were in respect of the business that was being carried on by the assesses." Continuing further, the Court stated that : "to bring the sale proceeds to charge the following conditions shall be fulfilled : (1) During the entire previous year or a part of it the business shall have been carried on by the assesses; (2) the machinery shall have been used In the business; and (3) the machinery have been sold when the business was being carried on and not for the purpose of closing it down or winding it up If these were the conditions for the applicability of the said proviso, the sale of the machinery in the instant case having taken place after the business was closed and daring the winding up proceedings, it would fall outside the scope of the said proviso and therefore the first item is not assessable to tax."

14. Another view which can forcefully be taken is that the receipt which came in the hands of the assesses under the award, mentioned above, is in the nature of realisation of assets of a discontinued business of a dissolved firm. Such realisation of assets does not ordinarily constitute business or trade. In The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. The "Old Bushmills" Distillery Co. Ltd. (1), a company which carried on the business of whiskey‑distilling went Into liquidation, and the liquidator sold off the stock of whiskey In parcels during the period of about two and a half years. He had stopped the manufacture of whiskey after about seven months. But he failed to sell the stock of whiskey in bulk and, therefore he made small purchases of spirit for blending and of bottles and casks in order to facilitate the sale of whiskey in parcels. It was held that the liquidator was merely realising the assets of the Company and was not engaged In any trading operations. For this view, reference may also be made to a case of the Indian jurisdiction, The Liquidators of Pursa Limited v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bihar (2). In this case, the assesses‑company carried on the business of growing sugarcane and manufacturing and selling sugar. In the year 1943 it negotiated for the sale of the factory and other assets with the object of winding up the company. It received a firm offer on August 9, 1943, and concluded the agreement of sale on December 7, 1943. Between August 9, 1943, and December 7, 1943, it never used the machinery and plant for the purpose of manufacturing sugar or for any other purpose except that of keeping them fn trim and running order. In the assessment of the company to Income‑tax for the accounting period from October 1, 1943 to September 30, 1944, the income‑tax authorities treated the surplus made by the company on the sale of the buildings, plant and machinery as profits under proviso (2) to section 10(2) (vii) of the Act. The Court rejected the contention of the Revenue that the excess was taxable as profits on two grounds, namely, ((1928) 12 Tax Cas. 1148) the sale of the machinery and plant was not an operation in furtherance of the business carried on by the company but was a realisation of its assets In the process of gradual winding up of its business which eventually culminated in the voluntary liquidation of the company, and ((1954) 25 I T R 265) even if the sale of the stock of sugar be regarded as carrying on of business by the company and not a realisation of its assets with a view to winding up, the machinery or plant not being used in the accounting year at all and in any event not having had connection with the carrying on of that limited business during the accounting year, section 10(2) (vii) could have no application to the sale of any such machinery or plant. This view was reiterated by the Indian Supreme Court in a later decision, The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Kerala v. The West Coast Chemicals and Industries Ltd. ((1962) 46 I T R 135). It is necessary to refer here to an English decision on which reliance was placed by the assessee in the orders of the Income‑tax Authority. This case is I. R. Commissioner v. Oban Distillery Co. Ltd. ((1933) 18 Tax Cas, 33). But this case is clearly distinguishable. Here the company, which was under liquidation had, before cowing under liquidation, contracted to provide storage accommodation in return for rents. It was held that the rents received after the liquidation were assessable to tax. But this view was taken not on the ground that the liquidator was creditor, but on the ground that the rents in question were receipts of the trade, which had been carried on by the company. This decision, therefore, is of no assistance to the Department.

15. Thus, the receipt in question is not assessable to tax as profits and gains under section 10 of the Income‑tax Act, firstly, because the receipt is not in the nature of profits or gains from a continuing business, but is the outstanding of a business which has been discontinued, and was not at all carried on during the accounting year in which it was received and made chargeable to tax, that is, the source to which it is attributable was extinct during the whole of the accounting year; and, secondly the receipt of the amount of the award, referred to above, and the necessary efforts put in by the assessee in this connection cannot be said to constitute business or trade, as this receipt was merely realisation of the assets of a discontinued business and the efforts put in for this purpose merely constituted a process to realise these assets.

16. The next question is whether the receipt in question can be treated as income under the residuary bead 'V' of section 6 of the Income‑tax Act as income from other sources. The Tribunal has so treated this receipt under the influence of the observations of Chagla, J., in Kamdar's case ((1946) 14 I T R 10). We would refer to Chagla, J.'s observation later in this judgment. First, we may note the nature of the classification of the various sources of income in section 6 of the Act. Income is placed under the several heads in section 6 according to the character of its source, so that appropriate rule may be provided for computing income under each of these heads. In effect, section 6 describes various kinds of profits, that is, profits derived from business as distinct from investments and securities or from property. It is not the intention of section 6 merely to list the heads of income. Thus, Sir George Rankin made the following observation on the nature of this classification in Isis judgment in The Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Chunilal B. Mehta ((1938) 6 I T R 521) "The effect of section 6 is to classify profits and gains under different heads for the purpose of providing for each appro priate rules for computing the amount; its language is `shall be chargeable . . . . . . in the manner hereinafter appearing. One of the heads is 'business', which as a Lead of income stands alongside salaries, interest on securities, professional earning and other sources. Thus, the classification of income is according to the character of the source . . . . . But the list of 'heads' in section 6 is a list of sources . . . . . . not in the sense of attributing the income to one property rather than another, one business rather than another, but only In the sense of attributing it to property as distinct from investment . What is to be learnt from an examination of the language of subsection (1) of section 4‑income, profits and gains described or comprised fn section 6 from whatever source derived‑is that section 6 is intended as describing different kinds of profit . . . : The character of section 6 is indicated by the language employed in that section and in the following sections, that is, sections 7 to 12‑B, wherein the language used is "the tax shall be payable under the head . . . . income, respect of". The fact that different and distinct heads of income, profits and gains are classified as "salaries", "interest on securities", "property", "business, profession or vocation", "other sources" and "capital gains" is Indicative of the legislative intention to make those several heads of income, profits and gains mutually exclusive of each other, so that if an item of receipt falls under one particular head, then for the purpose of computing the income for charging of tax, the particular section dealing with that head will have to be looked at. If a receipt has the attributes of one particular head, then it has to be charged to tax only under the section relating to that head and not under any other section relating to any other head. There is, therefore, no justification to place an income, falling under one head, under another head if it Is not chargeable under the computing section relating to the former head. Neither the language of section 6, nor that of section 12, which deals with the residuary group "other sources" warrant such conclusion. The words "if it is not included under any of the previous heads" in section 12 have reference to income and not to an hand of income. Under what head an income should be placed would depend on the character and nature of the income. Section 12 does not provide that income which escapes taxation under any particular head should be assessed to tax under the residuary head "other sources". To take a different view would mean that placement of income under a particular head would either depend on the time when it is received, or according to the method of accounting maintained by the assessee. The result of this proposition would be that if an assessee keeps his account of business on the cash basis, than his income would fall under the fourth head if it was received in a year in which the business was being carried on, but if it is received in a year in which the business has not been carried on, then the income would assume a different character and would fall under the residuary head "other sources". But, as we have said, there is no justification in the language of section 6 or of section 12 to treat an income as falling under one head it it is received at one time, but to treat an income of an entirely different character falling under a different head if it 9s received at another time, thereby making the placement of the Income under a particular head dependent on the act of the assessee, that is, when the assessee chooses to receive it. Another difficulty in accepting the Department's contention would be that if the assessee maintains his account on mercantile or "accrual" basis, then the income would fall under the fourth stead, but, if lie maintains his account on cash basis, then under the residuary head "other sources". If this proposition was accepted, then the method of accounting adopted by the assessee would decide the character and nature of the income. But, again, the language employed in sections 6 and 12 does not warrant such interpretation. If a receipt is the fruit of business, professional or vocational activity, then it must be placed under the fourth head irrespective of the time when it was received and the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The view we have taken finds support in two English cases which we shall refer to here. The first of these cases is Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry, ((1930) 15 Tax Cas. 266). Under the English Income‑tax Act, Schedule 'A' makes provision for tax In respect of property in lands, tenements, etc. capable of actual occupation, and Schedule 'D', as has been noted above, makes provision for tax in respect of the annual profits or gains from any kind of property whatever and in respect of all interests of moneys, annuities and other annual profits or gains, not charged under Schedules A, B, C or E. The division of Schedule D In six cases has been noted above. In Salisbury House Estate Ltd. v. Fry, the assessee was a limited company formed for the purpose of acquiring lands and houses. There were 800 rooms in Salisbury House, which were let out to tenants. The company was assessed to income‑tax under Schedule A upon gross valuation of the premises. But, as the actual rent received was higher, the Revenue sought to assess income again under Schedule D. In the House of Lords, Viscount Dunedin said: "Now, if the income of the assessee consists in part of real property you are, under the statute, bound to apply Schedule A." Lord Atkin observed as follows: " the dominance of each Schedule A, B, C and E over its own subject‑matter Is confirmed by reference to the sections and rules which respectively regulate them in the Act of 1842. They afford a complete code for each class of income, dealing with allowances and exemptions, with the mode of assessment, and with the officials whose duty it is to make the assess ment . . . . . . I find no ground for assessing the taxpayer under Schedule D for any property or gains which are the subject‑matter of the other specific Schedules." Pointing out that Schedule D is a residuary schedule and all schedules are mutually exclusive, the noble Lord stated that: " . income derived by a trading company from invest ment of its funds, whether temporary or permanent, in Government securities must be taxed under Schedule C, and cannot for the purposes of assessment under Schedule D be brought into account." Proceeding further Lord Atkin stated as follows : "I find it difficult to say that companies which acquire and let houses for the purposes of their trade, such as breweries in respect of their tied tenants, and colleries and other large employers of labour in respect of their employment, do not let the premises as part of the operation of trading. Personally I prefer to say that even If they do trade in letting houses their income so far as It is derived from that part of their trading must be taxed under Schedule A and not Schedule D." The question whether a receipt not placeable under one head, can be brought to tax under another head again directly came before the House of Lords in (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Stainer's Executors (Leslie Howard's Case ((1950‑52) 32 Tax Cas. 367). In this case, the well‑known actor, Leslie Howard, was assessed to tax under Case II of Schedule D. After his death, a question arose whether his executors were assessable to income‑tax on certain sums which had been earned by him in the course of his profession as film actor and producer but which fell due for payment after his death and which were sought to be made chargeable to tax either under Case III or under the residuary Case VI. It was held that the source of payments which fell due after the death of Mr. Howard were the fruit of his professional activity, and therefore could not assume the character of payment either under Case III or the residuary head which came under Case VI. Lord Simonds, L. C. after approving the observation of Rowlatt, J., in Bennett v. Ogston (reproduced above) stated as follows: " . . . . . it appears tome that the issue is confused by raising in general terms the question whether professional remuneration may in certain circumstances assume a different character for tax purposes when the tax‑payer is dead or has retired. At least the case of Asher v. London Film Production Ltd. (1944) 1 K B 133, is no authority for such a proposition. In that case there was no question of the same sum assuming a different quality in changing conditions. I am content to assume that there may be "such a case, though I find it difficult to imagine. But here I cannot see how or where the change takes place. The source of these payments was the professional activity of Mr. Howard: it was never anything else. It Is true that his remuneration took the form of annual payments which, if other conditions were satisfied, might fall within Case Iii, But other conditions were not satisfied, for Ex‑Hypothesi the source of the remuneration was the exercise of a profession falling within Case II." Lord Asquith of Bishopstone also approved the observation of Rowlatt, J., and expressed himself in these terms : "It seems quite clear that the payments whose liability to tax Is In issue were exclusively the fruit or aftermath of the professional activities of Mr. Leslie Howard during his lifetime. This was as a matter of historical fact their source and their only source. The fact that he died before some of this fruit had been garnered or its amount could be ascertained cannot alter that historical fact. He and he alone had done every thing necessary to provide the harvest." and the noble Lord therefore agreed that the payments in question were not assessable to tax.

17. As we have said above, the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal, in the case before us, placed reliance upon the observa tions of Chagla, J. in Kamdar's case that a receipt attributable to a discontinued business, profession or vocation may be made assessable to tax under section 12 of the Income‑tax Act relating to the residuary head of sources of income. Now, this case was actually decided on the finding that profession was In fact carried on by the assessee in the year under assessment. What had happened was that Mr. Kamdar carried on the business of a furniture dealer as well as professional practice as a consulting engineer. On 15th February 1938, he sold his business, his practice of consulting engineer also having discontinued by this date. A sum opt Rs. 12,302.00 was received by him after 15th February 1938 for outstanding professional fees earned previous to January 1, 1938. Mr. Kamdar's accounting year was the calendar year. The question before the Bombay High Court was whether the sum of Rs. 12,302.00, having been received in the year during which the profession of consulting engineer had been discontinued, but was carried on for part of the year, was assessable to tax. Stone, C. L.‑held that the amount was not chargeable to tax as It was rec`61ved when its source, that is, the profession of consulting engineer, was not in existence. Kania and Chagla, JJ., however, held that the amount was chargeable to tax as it was received in the accounting year during pact of which Mr. Kamdar had actually carried on his profession of consulting engineer. Chagla, J. in his separate judgment, further observed that the amount could also be made assessable to income‑tax under section 12 under the residuary group of income from "other sources". But this view of Chagla, J. has not found favour in the later decisions in India. We would refer to the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in The United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. The. Commissioner of Income‑tax, West Bengal ((1957) 32 I T R 688) in which it was held that the sources of income enumerated in section 6 of the Act are mutually exclusive, so that if an item falls under one particular head, then it has to be assessed to tax in accordance with the section dealing with that head and under no other section. This view was reiterated by the Indian Supreme Court in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody v. S. A. L. Narayan Row, Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay City ((1966) 61 I T R 428) in which Chagla, J.'s observations were expressly overruled. This case was that of an Advocate who was elevated as Judge of the High Court of Bombay, whereupon he ceased to carry on his profession. Various fees for professional work done were outstanding then, but were received after his appoint ment as Judge in the year during no part of which he had carried on the profession of Advocate. These receipts were assessed to tax under the residuary section 12 of the Act. Referring to Chagla, J.'s opinion in Kamdar's case the majority of the Indian Supreme Court observed that this opinion was not supported by reasons and that apart from Kamdar's case, there was no authority to support, the contention of the Department that the receipts would be income falling under the residuary head and charged to tax as such. Dealing with the Revenue's contention that if any receipts could not be brought to tax under the head of business, profession or vocation, they must, therefore, fall under the residuary head, the majority of the Court observed as follows: " . This argument assumes, in our view, without justification, that an income falling under one head has to be put under another head If it is not chargeable under the computing section corresponding to the former head. If the contention of the Revenue is right, the position would appear to be that professional income of an assessee who keeps his account on the cash basis would fall under the fourth head if it was received in a year in which the profession was being carried on, but it would take a different character and fall under the residuary head if received in a year in which the profession was not being carried on. We are unable to agree that this is a natural reading of the provisions regarding tier; heads of income in the Act. Whether an income fails under one head or another has to be decided according to the common notions of practical men for the Act does not provide any guidance in the matter. The question under which head an income comes cannot depend on when it was received. If it was the fruit of professional activity, it has always to be brought under the fourth head irrespective of the time when it was received. There is neither authority nor principle for the proposition that an income arising from a particular head ceases to arise from that head because it Is received at a certain time. The time of the receipt of the income has nothing to do with the question under which particular head of Income it should be assessed." Proceeding further, the majority of the Court observed that total income, as defined in section 2(15) of the Act means the amount of profits and gains referred to in subsection (1) of section 4 computed in the manner laid down In that Act, that is, computed for the purpose of chargeability under one of the sections from 7 to 12‑B, and that the receipts in the case before the Court could only be computed for chargeability to tax, if at all, under section 10 as income under the fourth head, but that if the receipts cannot be brought to tax by computation under that section, they would not be included In "total income" as that expression is understood in the Act for the purpose of chargeability. At another place, the following pertinent observa tion was made by the majority of the Court :‑ "We think it right also to observe that if the receipts in the present case could be treated as income from the residuary source, the position would be most anomalous. We have earlier said that if that were so, the placing of an income under this head would depend on the act of the assessee, it would depend on the time when the assessee chose to receive it. That we conceive is not a situation which the Act con templates. But there is another and stronger reason to show war ins Act did not contemplate it. Suppose the assessee had kept his accounts on the mercantile basis. He would then have been charged to tax on these receipts in the year when the income accrued which must have been a year when he was carrying on his profession as an Advocate. It could not then have been said that the receipts should be taken under the head "other sources". If we are to accept the contention of the Revenue, we have to hold that the method of book keeping followed by an assessee would decide under which head a particular income will go. If the Revenue is right, the income of the assesses would go under the fourth head if the method of accounting was mercantile and it would go under fifth head if the accounting was the cash basis. We are wholly unable to take the view that such can be the position under the Act. The heads of income must be decided from the nature of the income by applying practical notions and not by reference to an assessee'a treatment of Income." As regards the character of section 12, the majority expressed his views in the following terms: "It now remains to see whether section 12 justifies a view contrary to that which we have taken. It lays down the rules for computation of income under the head "other sources". It says that tax under the head "income from other sources" shall be payable In respect of income of every kind which may be included in the total income if not included under any of the preceding heads. It seems to us clear that the words "if not included under any of the preceding heads" which refer to the heads considered in sections 7 to 10‑refer to income and not to a head of Income. Section 12, therefore, deals with income which is not included under any of the preceding heads. If the income is so included, it falls outside section

12. Whether an income is included under any of the preceding heads would depend on what kind of income it was. It follows that if the income is profits and gains of profession, it cannot come under section

12. Section 12 does not say that an income which escapes taxation under a preceding head will be computed under it for chargeability to tax. It only says‑and this is most important‑that an income shall be chargeable to tax under the head "other sources" if it does not come under any other head of income mentioned in the Act. Section 12 therefore does not assist the contention of the Revenue that professional income which cannot be brought to tax under section 10 may be so brought under section 12."

18. It now remains to take note of some further decisions upon which reliance has been placed by the Department, and that is, The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madras v. P. R. A. L. Muthu Karuppan Chettiyar. Now, In this case, the assessee was a partner in money‑'ending business in Colombo. On dissolution of the firm, he wag paid his share of profits in Columbo, but interest on capital contributed by him amounting to Rs. 38,305.00 was paid to him in Madras. The question arose whether this sum received in British India as interact on capital was a capital receipt or income assessable to tax. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that this receipt was in the nature of income but ratio decidedni is that this amount was already of the assessee's even before the dissolution of the firm and did not cease to be his own dissolution. This decision would, therefore, not apply in cases where the receipts come from third parties and which cannot be said to have become the assessee's moneys when his business or profession is discontinued. In The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay City II v. National Syndicate the question was whether the assessee was entitled to deduction of certain sums under section 10(2) (vii) of the Income‑tax Act. The Indian Supreme Court held that the assessee was, in fact, entitled to the deduction claimed by him as his business had, in fact, been carried on during the year of account. We have failed to understand how this decision has been applied by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal to the case before us. In The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Oban Distillery Co. Ltd. as we have noted above, the storage rent had become due to the company before it went into liquidation, the account of the company being maintained on "accrual" basis. Therefore, the rents received by the liquidator and which were assessed to tax had already been earned and become the company's property before it went into liquidation. This case also has no application to the question at issue before us. The decision in O. Rm. Om. Rm. Pl. Muthukaruppan Chettlar and others v. Commissioner of Income tax, Madras is actually against the contention of the Department, in that loss incurred in the gale of assets after the dissolution of the firm was disallowed on the ground that it was in the nature of capital loss which was incurred after the closure of the business, and was, therefore, not incurred in or for the "carrying" on of the business, which had already ceased, even though the loss had taken place in the year during part of which the business had actually been carried on. Thus, except the observations of Chagla, J. in Kamdar's case none of the decisions relied upon by the Assessing Officer and the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal support the conclusions reached by them, and as regards Chagla, J.'s observation, this, as we have noted above, has been expressly overruled by the several decisions of the Indian jurisdiction to which we have already referred.

19. Lastly, the question is what is the character of the disputed receipt. According to Lord Keith in D. and G. R. Rankine v. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue several receipts are in the nature of windfall for which provision is made in section 4 (3) (vii), that is, any receipts not being receipts arising from business or the exercise of a profession, vocation or occupation which are of a casual and non‑recurring nature or are not by way of addition to the remuneration of an employee, are excluded from the "total income" as this expression is used in subsection (1) of section 4 and fn section 2(15) of the Income tax Act. The words "casual" and "non‑recurring" have some times been treated as equivalent of "windfall". If, therefore, Lord Keith's observation is accepted, then the disputed receipt would be in the nature of a casual and non‑recurring receipt. On the other hand, according to the role laid down is The South Indian Industrials Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madras, The B. C. G. A. (Punjab Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Punjab and O. Rm. Om. Rm. Pl. Muthukaruppan Chettiar and others v. The Commissioner of Income‑tax, Madras and according to the decision of the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal Itself in (1964) 10 Taxation 26, such receipt is in the nature of capital receipt. On either view, the receipt is neither assessable to tax nor even income includible in "total income" as this expression is used in section 2(15) and section 4(1) of the Act. Accordingly, our answer to the question referred to this Court by the Tribunal as held by us try short order dated 27‑4‑1973, is in the negative, that is to say, the amounts received by the assessee after discontinuance of his business or profession or vocation or occupation are neither taxable income nor income. Reference answered in negative.