P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak) 397 (PLP)

Mr. Ahmad Saeed Kirmani, presumably a ' member of the opposition, approached the High Court of West Pakistan for a writ of Quo‑warranto, Mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, declaring the election of the Speaker of the 20th May 1956 to be null and void, directing Choudhri Fazal Elahi to prove his lawful authority to function as Speaker and directing Choudhri Fazal Elahi and the Secretary of the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly to enable Mir Muhammad Bakhsh Talpur and Mr. Varyani "to cast their votes according to their free will for the lawful election of the Speaker of the Assembly". Mr. Varyani and Mir Muhammad Bakhsh Talpur supported the petition with affidavits, the one saying that he was forcibly dragg ed to the `Ayes' lobby and the other that he was forcibly detained by some Government Members, and thus prevented him from voting. Affidavits were filed by a number of persons on the opposite side, and the learned Judges dealt with the cases on the basis of these affidavits, the record of the proceedings of the House, and evidence given on solemn affirmation by the two tellers in the `Ayes' lobbies, being offices of the Assembly, and by Mr. Mumtaz Hassan Qizalbash. The case was heard by a full Bench of five Judges and the main judgment was delivered by S. A. Rahman, C. J. with whom Abdul Aziz Khan and Ortcheson JJ agreed while Kayani J and Shabir Ahmad J wrote separate notes of their own opinions. In the result, the petition was dis missed. The petitioner has not appealed but the Central Govern ment of Pakistan presented a petition to this Court for Special Leave to Appeal in order to examine the correctness of the views expressed in the judgments delivered in the High Court upon the question of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 170 in relation to proceedings of a Provincial Assembly, in the light of the provision in subsection (1) of Article 89 of the Constitution that: "the validity of any proceedings in a Provincial Assembly shall not be questioned in any Court". These views will be dealt with in detail later. It was urged in the grounds of appeal that the interpretation put upon Article 89 by the High Court was unsustainable, and was liable to give rise to great difficulties in the operation of the Constitution. The words used to express this fear, in ground No. 9 are as follows: ‑ "That the learned Judges have, on the other hand, in coming to their conclusions, completely lost sight of the innumerable difficulties, complexities and frustrations that might result if the door was opened to litigation in Courts by or at the instance of adventurous politicians regarding the validity of the proceed ings either in the Provincial Assemblies or in the National Assembly". In granting special leave, emphasis rims placed upon the question as to whether the view expressed in the three judgments by their, learned Judges who wrote them were "in accordance with the text and the spirit of the Constitution". The learned Attorney‑General appearing for the Central Government of Pakistan has been unable to satisfy us that that Government has locus standi to pursue this appeal. The entire set of facts out of which the case arose was confined to the Provincial Legislative Assembly. They do not in any way whether directly or indirectly touch the Central Legislature i.e., the National Assembly, much less the Central Government, which is a wholly distinct entity. The argument that the immunity given to proceedings of a Provincial Assembly under Article 89 has been conferred upon proceedings of the National Assembly in precisely the same terms under Article 56 does not serve to provide for the Central Government any such interest in the present proce edings as would make that Government a proper party in the case. The rights which are affected by the observations of the learned Judges of the High Court, should they be put into opera tion in any subsequent case, are not rights of the "Provincial Government much less the Central Government, but are distinctly and separately the rights of the Provincial Assembly. Should the corresponding rights possessed by the National Assembly ever be in danger, we feel no doubt that that Assembly is competent to assert those rights in modes known to law including the lex et consuetudo Parliament, and may thus succeed in obtaining a definitive decision from the Courts. But there is no doubt whatsoever that it would altogether be out of the way for the National Assembly to attempt to bring itself into the present proceedings for the purpose of having in advance, a declaration of its own rights under Article 56, when the matter in dispute before the Court is as to the rights of a Provincial Assembly under Article

89. And as for the Central Government, the efforts of the Attorney‑General to establish any direct interest on behalf of that Government in the present proceeding's have been wholly unfruitful. The appeal is therefore liable to dismissal on this short ground. We have, however, had the advantage of hearing the Attorney‑General supported by the Advocate‑General of West Pakistan on behalf of the Speaker of the West Pakistan on Provincial Assembly. At the same time, the case is one of great importance, from this point of view, namely, that the learned Judges of the High Court have, by their observations, raised de novo a very ancient controversy between the Courts and the superior Assemblies, in a manner which is liable to give rise to misconcep tions and perhaps to lead to those injurious results which have been indicated in ground No. 9 of the grounds of appeal, quoted above. Upon examination of the question, with the valuable aid of materials collected and set out in chronological order, with great clarity in May's, Parliamentary Practice, this Court is in a position to state the correct principles governing the resolution of the apparent conflict between Article 170 of the Constitution and the relevant provision of Article

89. It is necessary and desirable from every point of view that that opinion should be stated, in order to the more harmonious working of the Constitution. The subject relates to the sphere of Parliamentary privilege. This expression has been defined as "the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House collectively as a Constitutional part of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceeds those possessed by other bodies or individuals". It is added that "this privilege, though part of the law of the land, is to a certain extent an exemption from the ordinary law." (May, page 41). With special reference to the House of Commons, which being a popular House, is more akin to a Provincial Legislative Assembly in Pakistan than the House of Lords, the Parliamentary privilege has been defined as "the sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual members as against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary Courts of law and the special rights of the House of Lords." (May, page 41). There is a long history behind the formulation of the doctrine as applied to the House of Commons, which had a fiercer and more prolonged struggle for the assertion of its own privileges than had been necessary for the House of Lords, which had always been a body exercising judicial jurisdiction of pre‑eminent nature. One of the difficulties against which the House of Commons had to struggle was that the House of Lords was the ultimate Court of Jurisdiction, and by submitting its domestic affairs to the jurisdic tion of the ordinary Courts, it inevitably assumed a position of permanent inferiority to the Souse of Lords. Consequently the House of Commons had to struggle not only against the Crown and the Courts, but also against the House of Lords, and in the course of the struggle, it sought for a considerable time, the special protection of the King for its customary rights. In the course of repeated efforts to assert its rights, its claims became, in the words of May, "hardened into legally recognised privileges". This development may be placed in the late fifteenth century, but the claims were by no means universally accepted during the three ensuing centuries. In the words of May, "not until the nineteenth century was equilibrium reached and the limits of privilege prescribed and accepted by Parliament, the Crown and the Courts". In the meantime, however, as far back as the, year 1704, it was settled by a resolution of the House of Lords, assented to by the House of Commons, that "neither House has any power by any vote or declaration to create to themselves new privileges, not warranted by the known laws and customs of Parliament". A few years earlier, by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, the privilege of the Houses of Parliament were assured to them by the following declaration: "Freedom of speech and debate or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or place outside Parliament". In the course of the years, this declaration in so far as it related to the proceedings of Parliament came to be accepted as recognising `.`the right of each House to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings", which position was asserted before and accepted by the Courts in the case of Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1), where Stephen, J. made the following observation :‑ "I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of her Majesty's Courts in its administration of that part of the statute‑law which has relation to its own internal proceedings". In that case also, the exclusive jurisdiction of the House was declared to cover the determination "of a right to be exercised within the House itself and in particular the right of sitting and voting". As regards the meaning of the expression "proceed ings", reference is made by May to a number of definitions. One of these definitions is contained in a report of a Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts in the year 1938‑39 and reads as under :‑ "It covers both the asking of‑ a question and giving written notice of such question, and includes every thing said or done by a Member in the exercise of his functions as a Member in a committee of either House, as well as every thing said or done in either House in the transaction of Parliamentary business". Another quotation from a Canadian judgment is given on the same page (page 62) from which a fair impression of the meaning of the expression "proceedings" may be obtained. It reads as follows : "I desire it to be understood, however, that I do not hold that a Member of Parliament is not amenable to the ordinary, courts for anything he may say or do in Parliament. I merely say he is not so amenable for anything he may say or do within the scope of his duties in the course of Parlia mentary business, for in such matters he is privileged and protected by lex et consuetudo Parliament." The possibility of things being said or done in Parliament which are within the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts is here clearly envisaged and is further clarified in a passage on page 63 of May's book in the following words: "It may prove to be true that things said or done In Parlia ment, or some of them, are not withdrawn from the course of criminal justice. But, is so, that is because they do not form part of proceedings in Parliament." The limitations which the privilege of Parliament in regard to its own internal proceedings imposes upon the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is the subject of a very careful study in Chapter IX of May's book which is headed "Jurisdiction of the Courts in matters of Privilege" where a careful account in chronological form is given of the long course of conflict which, so far it is relevant to the present case, rests with the acceptance of the limitation in regard to internal proceedings of the Houw ef (1) 12 Q. B. D. 273 Commons, so clearly expressed in the case of Bradlaugh v. Gossett, cited above. That litigation covered the years between 1880 and 1885, but the matter had been before the Courts from a much earlier date. May cites a case in the year 1452 of one Thorpe, then Speaker of the House of Commons who had been imprisoned at the suit of a Royal prince and the House of Lords had confirmed the order of imprisonment although Judges had advised that he was entitled to his release. In approaching the matter, the Judges displayed a spirit of hesitation and extreme respect for the autho rity of Parliament which is happily no longer evinced in countries where a proper equilibrium between the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary has been established in the form of Parliamentary Government according to the British pattern. In Thorpe's case, the Judges noted that never before had the Judges been asked to adjudicate upon the privilege of the "High Court of Parlia ment" which was so high and so mighty "that it makes and unmakes law". They also pleaded that they were ignorant of the determination and knowledge of the privilege of the "High Court of Parliament". In discussing the expression "High Court of Parliament" which frequently appears in the relevant literature of the times, May observes that while the House of Lords has always been and still remains a true Court, from which there is no appeal, the claim of the House of Commons to this high estate was more doubtful, and so was asserted and accepted in stages. He remarks that "it was probably owing to the medieval inability to conceive of a constitutional authority otherwise than as in some sense a Court of justice that the Commons succeeded in asserting their right to commit offenders on the same terms as the Lords". The conception of a law of Parliament was also of very early origin. As far back as the year 1330, it 'was claimed on the basis of lex parliament that members of the Houses had a right to be tried exclusively by their respective Houses and were not to be punished in any inferior Court for their conduct in Parliament. That right is no longer either claimed or recognised to the same extent, but a further branch of the lex parliament, namely, that each House has the right collectively to discuss subjects of its own choice without reference to the King, and that individual members in debate can speak their mind with immunity, is generally recognised and accepted at the present time. Then, in 1664, in .the case of Member of Parliament named Evelyn, who had pleaded privilege in an action, Bridgman C. J., foreshadowing the ultimate resolution of the conflict of jurisdic tion, asserted the power and duty of the Courts to determine questions of Parliamentary privilege arising in a manner incidental to their proper jurisdiction, denied that Parliamentary decisions on privilege were necessary conclusive, but at the same time admitted that Parliamentary jurisdiction was exclusive over matters arising ab intra. In 1682, two Judges of the King's Bench made a similar admission under circumstances of considerable personal distress. There one Topham, Serjeant‑at arms of the House of Commons, had effected the arrest of a person, and in an action by the arrested person, had pleaded privilege which the King's Bench disallowed. Thereupon the House of Commons declared the judgment to be illegal, and in violation of the privileges and rights of Parliament. In pursuance of the declaration, they sent for the Judges and having heard their explanation, directed that they should be imprisoned. It is noteworthy that in face of personal peril, while justifying themselves on other grounds, the Judges admitted that "when the entire matter is transacted in the House, it would have been proper to plead such matter to be outside the jurisdiction of the Court." Passing over some very strongly contested cases relating to the exclusive claim of jurisdiction by the House of Commons over questions concerning the right to vote at a Parliamentary election, mention may next be made of the case in 1811 of Abbot, then Speaker of the House of Commons, who had directed imprisonment of one Burdett pursuant to the order of the House of Commons, and was defendant in an action for trespass which was dismissed. The judgment was maintained up to the House of Lords on the ground that the House of Commons had acted within its powers and that these powers were no more than those enjoyed by the Superior Courts. At the same time it was envisaged as possible that "Cases might arise in which the Courts would have to decide on the validity of a claim of privilege". A case more directly in point arose in 1836. The Parliamentary Publisher, namely Hansard was sued for libel in relation to publication of certain papers by order of the House of Commons. Hansard pleaded privilege, and in support, the Attorney‑General argued that "the High Court of Parliament" was a Supreme Court, and its law was a separate law, and further either House was com petent to declare, with finality, on any question of Parliamentary privilege. Four Judges rejected the plea. Deman. C. J., asserted the right of the Courts to decide whether a claim of privilege was within the jurisdiction of the House claiming it, whether the question arose directly or incidentally, denied the doctrine of ignorance of the law of Parliament, and while admitting that the "High Court of Parliament" was Supreme denied that either House by itself enjoyed an eminent power to bring a matter within its privilege by mere declaration. Nevertheless all the Court Judges were agreed that "over its own Internal proceedings, the jurisdiction of the House was exclusive". It is of interest to note that this case continued for several years to have repercus sions of a somewhat alarming character such as commitment to prison by the House of Commons of the Plaintiffs, who had obtained decrees, as well as against Sheriffs who had acted to recover under the decrees obtained in repeated actions. The matter was not concluded until an Act was passed in the year 1840 giving protection to Parliamentary Papers published under autho rity. Finally, mention may be made of the case of Bradlaugh referred to above, who had been elected a member of Parliament, but to whom the House refused the right to take an oath and directed its Serjeant‑at‑arms to exclude him from the House until he shall engage not to further disturb the proceedings of the House. The disturbance arose directly from the refusal of the House to allow Bradlaugh to take the oath, which he was entitled under the law to take. Nevertheless the Queen's Bench refused relief to Bradlaugh against the denial of his rights by the House of Commons, holding that "the order under which the Sergeant acted related to the internal management of the procedure of the House over which the Court had no jurisdiction. That was declared as far back as the year 1884; a. considerable time before the first steps were taken for the introduction of the Indian sub continent to the ways and modes of Parliamentary self‑government. The conclusions reached by May as a result of examination of the whole course of authority is expressed on page 173 follows :‑ "So far the position reached seems capable of being briefly stated as follows. The jurisdiction of a House of Parliament over its own internal proceedings is exclusive ; but the Courts claim jurisdiction over matters of privilege which affect the rights of persons exercisable outside Parliament". Over the rest of the field of, privilege as claimed by the House of Commons, there is yet no' unanimity, so that it is possible for writers on constitutional law to say that "there may be at any given moment two doctrines of privilege the one held by the Courts, the other by either House, the one to be found in the Law Reports, the other in Hansard and there is no way of resolving the real point at issue should the conflict arise". In a summary of the conclusions to be reached on the basis of the decisions in the cases cited, May points out at page 174 that while Parliament which consists of the Sovereign and the two Houses is supreme, this is a legislative supremacy and is without effect upon the privilege jurisdiction of either House acting singly; that since it has been agreed since 1704 that neither House can itself add to its privileges, Parliamentary privilege is objective and its extent is' ascertainable, and conse4ently, belongs to the law of Parliament which is a part of the law of the land. ‑The Judges are therefore bound to take judicial notice of Parliamentary privilege. The Courts have also recognised certain exclusive jurisdictions of the Houses in .the field, of privilege, of which only one is relevant namely that "the control of each House over its internal proceedings is absolute and cannot be interfered with by the Courts". This is the background which must be borne in mind in construing the provision in Article 89 of the Constitution that: "the validity of ,any proceedings in a Provincial Assembly, shall not be questioned in any Court". The Article specifies a number of other privileges, which it is not necessary to mention here in detail. It will be sufficient to say that so far as they go, they are., precisely in line with the development of the same .privileges in relation to the British Parliament. Thus, subsection (4) of article 89 protects the publica tion of Parliamentary Papers by or under the authority of a Provincial Assembly, which was the position reached in England as a result of the actions against Hansard as far back as 1840. 1 consider that in a similar way, the protection granted to proceed‑, ings in a Provincial Assembly against interference by the Courts, is to be understood, and given its full content by reference to the historical development of that right, through some six centuries of contention, in relation to the House of Commons. I feel no hesitation in thinking that this provision was introduced into the Constitution with a full knowledge of the extent to which the House of Commons had succeeded in establishing its privilege against the jurisdiction of the Courts, in relation to its own internal proceedings. In this view of the matter the question before the High Court, and which alone the High Court could properly investigate, was‑are the proceedings whose validity is impugned fairly within the meaning of the expression "internal proceedings of the Provincial Assembly"? To that question, it is plain that there could only have been a single answer viz, in the affirmative. Everything that happened of which complaint was made in the case happened in the Chamber of the House, under the very eye of the Chairman. It happened in the course of a division, which was essentially and peculiarly a proceeding of the Legislative Assembly. The division was taken for the purpose of electing a Speaker, a matter, which was wholly and exclusively a concern‑of the Legis lative Assembly. A division involves voting by Members, and by members only; it can‑only be carried out within the Chamber of the House. These are proceedings, which form part of the very essence of Parliamentary activity. In the course of the division questions of contention were raised, and these were supported by arguments of partisans addressed to the Chairman in due form, after which the Chairman informed himself by such means as were available regarding the true facts of the incidents alleged. As has been seen above, in dealing with these questions, the Chairman followed' the established‑ practice of the Speaker of the House of Commons. After giving his decision on all points of contention, the Chairman announced the result of the division, as it was his duty to dog under rule 63 of the West Punjab Legislative Assembly Rules Sub‑rule (6) of the same rule reads as follows: "The announcement by the Speaker of the result of voting by division shall not be challenged". In the view, which I have taken, this rule, which has statutory force, being made under power conferred by the Constitution, must be given the force of a law declaring that the announcement of the result of voting by division once made by the Speaker is not to be challenged in any Court of law. It is of course amenable to correction, for instance, if a Member votes who has a direct pecuniary interest in the question, his vote may be disallowed on a substantive motion carried by the Assembly subsequently. At pages 403 to 407 of May's Parliamentary Practice, there are discussed ways and means by which errors occurring in divisions may be corrected, and the votes of uncounted members may be allowed: In the same discussion will be found a reference to the' case of a Member who through inadvertence votes in the wrong lobby. The rule is that the vote is to be counted in the lobby in which such a Member presented himself, despite his intention to go to the other lobby, which clearly points to the fact that the choice of the Member becomes determined once for all when he presents himself in a particular lobby. On consideration of all the facts, as they appear in the case, I feel no hesitation in concluding that the proceedings in question were wholly within the privilege of the House, and wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Courts. These aspects, which appear to me to be the essential and true aspects from which the matter in dispute required to be examined, do not appear to have been placed before the learned Judges in the High Court. The leading judgment shows that the question of conflict between the relevant privilege embodied in Article 89, and the power of a High Court under Article 170, was regarded as a matter of pure construction, which was attempted by reference to the earlier provision in the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to the privileges of Provincial Assemblies, and certain .hypothetical cases upon which Counsel were asked to state their opinions. As to the previous provisions, it must be remembered that they were applicable to Assemblies functioning under alien rule. The historical background of the provision in Article 89 is not dealt with in any one of the three judgments, and it is therefore not surprising to find therein expres sions such as the following :‑ (1) "the so‑called proceedings of the Assembly in this case should not be described as proceedings within the meaning of Article 89 at all, because they were vitiated ,by coercion, duress and mala fides", to which the answer given was (2) "the proceedings do riot appear to be vitiated by any coercion, duress or mala fides:" (Judgment of S. A. Rahman, C. J.) The learned Chief Justice expressed himself upon the general question in the following words: "I have formed the opinion that in a proper case, the writ jurisdiction of this Court would be legitimately invoked where for instance, the so‑called proceedings in the Assembly are really outside the purview of the Constitution Act." This statement taken by Itself is unexceptionable, provided it is clearly understood that any proceedings which can fairly be described as "internal proceedings" relating to the proper business of the House are wholly outside the corrective jurisdic tion of the High Court. The means of correction, which are contemplated by a Constitution providing for a form of Parlia mentary government are, in matters of this kind involving coercion or mala fides, exclusively of a political kind. The very high authority vested in a ‑ Provincial Legislative Assembly which can make and unmake law is to be exercised by the method provided in Article 88 of the Constitution namely by the method of decision "to be taken by a majority of the Members present and voting". It appears to me to be unconceivable that a decision so taken, where the division of 'Members of the House is on party lines, can be subjected to examination and either confirmation or rejection by the Courts, without one of two extreme dangers arising to the integrity of the very fabric upon which the Cons titution is based. Either the authority of the Legislative Assembly, which is to be asserted by the fact of a majority of the Members being in favour of a proposition, will be irretrievably destroyed in the process, should the Courts prevail, or in‑ the alternative, the authority and the whole standing of the Courts will be incurably diminished, and the high position which is given to them in the balance of powers within the Constitution, will be prejudiced in such a way, as to render their functioning nerveless and even possibly of danger to the body politic, were they ever to attempt to resolve disputes between contending political parties inside the House, on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. The Constitutional provision being that an Assembly shall function by the method of recording majority votes, and the recording of such votes being governed by statutory procedure which makes it entirely an internal proceeding of the House, it is to be regarded as a requirement of the Constitution that the manner of procurement of such a majority within the House shall not become the subject of scrutiny and determination by the Courts. I hope I can say without disrespect that not only in this country, but in every country where Parliamentary government is in operation, not only in past ages when, such actions, which good) man and true might have judged un-conscionable, could be said to be "begotten by the inequity of the times", but even in the present day it is impossible to expect that decisions taken in an Assembly shall always be based upon pure opinions, founded exclusively on the merits of any proposition that is brought forward, with reference only to each Member's conception of what constitutes the public good, aided by advice contained in noble speeches delivered on both sides. It is probably more true to say that such a condition is to be expected only in a small number of cases, but on the contrary, by and large, the methods which are resorted to in order to obtain a decision by an Assembly, particularly where the' balance between two parties in high conten tion with each other is a very close one, will often be found to be unsuitable for exposure in the light of day. In so saying, I say no more than that the general outlook and temper, in relation to things moral as well as material, which is evinced by Members of an Assembly, will ordinarily govern the methods by which that Assembly is brought to,the point of taking its decisions. These decisions are as definitive and carry the same authority as the decisions of the absolute monarchs of early times, whose least whim, governed by desires which were more often vicious than virtuous formed the law for the entire people. Le Roi le vault is a cry from Norman times in English history, which still echoes, though with a different music, in the corridors of Parlia ment. I conceive that a present day Court which undertakes to control the decisions of a Legislative Assembly taken by an internal proceeding, on the basis of its own view of what constitu tes justice, equity and good conscience, faces no less bleak a prospect of success than the Courts which have attempted to control the vagaries of majesty in times long past. Absolutism was finally controlled by the development of political power in the people, expressed through their Assemblies, which in due time achieved sovereignty. To assail the pre‑eminence of a popular Assembly may therefore prove to be a first step in the retracing of history. It is on that ' basis that, with respect, I consider that the view of the learned Chief Justice that: "in a proper .case the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could be Legitimately invoked where for instance, the so called proceedings in the Assembly are really outside the purview of the Constitution Act," is stated too broadly and is. apt to lead to dangerous misconcep tions. I do not propose to embark on the equally dangerous task of attempting to say in what particular cases, proceedings within an Assembly could possibly fall within the jurisdiction of the Courts. The question is so intricate, and its resolution is fraught with such grave dangers to the internal structure of the Constitution of the country, that it must be left to be decided in relation to the facts of a particular dispute when it arises, and then it must be decided upon a consideration not only of the wording of the Constitution, but with a full comprehension of all the phases of history which form the background of that Constitution. It is desirable that I should notice certain observations occurring in the judgment of Kayani, J. There is for instance the following passage: "I cannot bring. My-self to hold that any provision in the Constitution was intended to divert the Court from the path of justice, equity and good conscience. The Constitution represents the will of the people, and the will of the people is to be construed in favour of justice, equity and good conscience. Of all Parliaments and Assemblies in the world, the privilege of practising fraud and coercion, or of acting with malice, was certainly not to be reserved for the Assemblies of Pakistan, as though it were a fundamental right of the people". With great respect, and bearing., in mind that I have already expressed my opinion above' on this point, it seems to me that to invoke principles of justice, equity and good conscience as known to the Courts and as applied by the Courts to the resolu tion of matters lying between individuals or between individual subjects and the State, into the formation of majorities for the purposes of a decision by an Assembly, is to ignore the realities of the matter and involves a risk of grave injury to the compromise, represented by the Constitution, between the great powers, whose equilibrium inter se is the only guarantee of the freedom and well being of the country. All the evils to which the learned Judge has referred in the passage cited above have appeared from time to time in the functioning of popular Assemblies all over the world. The modes of correction of such matters, appearing in the conduct of a body, which is uncontrollable by any other body or authority in the State, can only be applied by that body itself. It may be that for this purpose, the Courts must wait until a change of outlook, or the appearance of conscience, supervenes. It is obvious that no such change of outlook or birth of conscience can be brought about by any action within the competence of the Courts. It is upon those grounds that, speaking with respect, it is impossible for me to give my assent to the following further proposition laid down by the learned Judge: "In short, I do not recognise a proceeding as an Assembly proceeding if it is ,found oil' coercion, fraud or bad faith." If a proceeding is an internal proceeding of a Provincial Legislative Assembly and relates to its proper business, then under Article 891, it must be recognised as such by the Courts, and the Courts must refrain from interfering with it. In the judgment of Mr. Justice Shabir Ahmad also, there are observations to which the same effect, as those reproduced above from the judgment of Kayani J. From among these passages I select the following for citation viz :‑ "I have no hesitation in holding that Courts are not power less with regard to examining the validity or otherwise of the proceedings in the Assembly, and that, if the facts alleged in the present case were established, Article 89 of the Constitu tion will have been of no avail to the respondents." I have already stated above the reasons which in my view invalidate the second proposition contained in the above passage, and with respect to the learned Judge; I need say no more regarding his view than that I find it impossible to agree with it. But, since in the result the learned Judges dismissed the writ petition, as it was their ‑duty to do upon a true appreciation of the jurisprudence of the matter, there is no occasion for inter ference by this Court. I would therefore dismiss this appeal but would make no order as to costs. MUHAMMAD MUNIR, C. J.‑I agree. SHAHABUDDIN, J. ‑I agree. A. H, Appeal dismissed.