1989 PLP 544 (MLD)

Suit No. 1158 of 1996

18. This suit pertains to Metro Garden constructed on Plot No. GRE-216, Manikji Street, Garden Quarters, Karachi. As of earlier suit, all the 9 plaintiffs in the instant suit have pleaded their innocence and good faith. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that they have acquired physical possession of the project in question in the month of August, 1996 for which they have filed copies of sub lease alongwith the plaint; that they are residing in these flats and are paying electricity, gas, water and other conservancy charges to the concerned departments; that on 8-9-1996 officials of defendant K.B.C.A. visited the site and threatened the plaintiffs with demolition of the building. The further case of the plaintiffs is the same as of the plaintiffs in Suit No. 934 of 1996. In the instant suit the defence of the K.B.C.A. is identical as of the earlier mentioned suit. In this case, initially the plan approved was for ground + 1st floor for residential bungalows but contrary to that the construction of a commercial building was done by the builders after obtaining order of status quo from the Civil Court. It is denied by the K.B.C.A. that the plaintiffs are in physical possession of the premises as the same was attached by the SDM and nobody was found to be in possession of the same. It is pleaded that the K.B.C.A. wants to pul down and remove unauthorised and illegal construction; that the instant suit is collusive proceedings filed by the plaintiffs on the instructions of the builders; that the suit is without cause of action and, therefore, it is prayed that the suit as well as interlocutory application may be dismissed.

19. With this, I have come to the conclusion of narration of the facts of each case. Now, I will discuss the case of the parties on the point of grant or refusal of interim injunction. On 24-11-1996, while hearing applications for interim injunctions filed under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., by the plaintiff in Suit No. 1158 of 1996, two issues were framed, whereafter office was directed to fix all such cases where in similar circumstances suits were filed by the al lottees/purchasers of different flats and shops and were seeking interim injunction against K.B.C.A. Parties in all those cases were also put under notice. Following are the two points: (i) Whether a builder is legally competent and authorised to deliver physical possession of a flat to an allottee or purchaser in view of the prohibition appearing in subsection (2) to section 6 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, without first complying the same. (ii) What is the legal consequence of delivery of physical possession or execution and registration of sub-lease in violation of section 6(2) of Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979.

20. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that they being innocent citizens have invested their life savings in purchase of suit premises and, therefore, they are bona fide purchasers. This argument was further pressed on the ground that the officials of K.B.C.A. and builders have acted in collusion which resulted in purchase of these suit premises by the plaintiffs. It was submitted that in many cases, the plaintiffs are holding registered sub-lease in their favour and, therefore, they are not liable to be dispossessed from the suit premises so far as their title subsists. It was strenuously argued that such sub lease or any contract, written or implied, is not hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. Reliance was also placed on section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In alternate, it was argued that there is a provision for imposing penalty in case of any deviation or violation of the approved building plan and, therefore, the K.B.C.A. can seek imposition of such penalties through the forum provided under the Ordinance, 1979. It was additionally submitted that in the city of Karachi there are other illegal and unauthorised constructions for which no action was taken by the K.B.C.A. or which were subsequently regularised and, therefore, it was argued that any action against the present plaintiff will amount to discrimination which would be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, 1973. Mr. Partab Rai has referred to the cases Karachi Catolic Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mirza Jawad Baig (PLD 1994 Kar. 194) and Mansoor v. Tassadaq Ahmed Khan and 27 others (PLD 1995 Karachi 197). Mr. Neil Keshav, in addition to what Mr. Partab Rai has relied, referred to the case Federation of Pakistan v. Public-at- Large (1988 SCMR 2041). Mr. Munir A. Malik and Mr. Meraj Ahmed have also argued the same points on behalf of plaintiffs.

21. Mr. Aziz Malik, Advocate who has appeared for defendants/builders has supported the case of plaintiffs. It was argued by him that the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act is no bar to the sub-lease executed between the builders and the allottees. Reliance was placed on Regulations 20 and 26 of the Building Regulations. He has further argued that there is no specific prohibition in the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 prohibiting execution of sub lease between the owners and the builders or that if such agreement is executed, it would be illegal and void and, therefore, it was further argued that section 23 of the Contract Act does not come into play. He has also referred to the cases Muhammad Amin v. Karachi Building Control Authority (1992 CLC 691) and Noor Muhammad and another v. Building Control Authority and 2 others (1992 CLC 729).

22. On behalf of K.B.C.A., Mr. Sabir Hussain Kizilbash, Mr. Iqbal Memon and Mrs. Zahida Naqvi, Advocates have argued. Their main stress was on the point that since the buildings in question were raised and constructed in violation of the approved plan, the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief of prohibitory injunction; that the plaintiffs have not come with clean hands and are in collusion with the builders; that in several cases, the builders were not impleaded as defendants; that the plaints are liable to be rejected as no mandatory notices were issued by the plaintiffs as provided under section 20(9) of the Ordinance, 1979; that any allotment or delivery for possession in violation of section 6 or 12 is illegal and void. Mr. Naimur Rehman, Advocate who has appeared in two suits on behalf of intervener, namely, Shehri has supported the case of K.B.C.A. and contended that in several suits buildings have neither been completed nor any completion certificate has been issued and, therefore, delivery of possession or execution of any document is violative of the provisions of the Ordinance, 1979. He has pointed out that in Suit No. 865 of 1996 the regularisation plan was rejected by the K.B.C.A. vide its order dated 16-5-1996. He has placed reliance on the case of Mst. Sardar Begum Farooqi and 6 others v. Rashida Khatoon and 2 others (1990 CLC 83) and the case of Abdul Razzak v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others (PLD 1994 SC 512).

23. In order to appreciate the arguments of all the parties, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant provisions of Sindh Building Control, Ordinance, 1979 as well as section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872:-- Relevant Provisions of Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979. "

6. Approval of plan:--(1) No building shall be constructed before the Authority has, in the prescribed manner, approved the plan of such building and granted no-objection certificate for the construction therefore, on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. (2) No building mentioned in subsection (1) shall be occupied by any persons or shall be allowed by the builder to be occupied, before the Authority has, on application of the occupant or owner, issued occupancy certificate, in such manner as may be prescribed. 7-A. Violation of certain provisions.--Where the provisions of sub section (1) of section 6 are violated the building may without prejudice to any other action including sealing of the building or ejectment of the occupants be ordered by the Authority or any officer of the Authority authorized in this behalf to be demolished, at the cost of the builder in the case of public buildings and the owner in other cases.

12. Sale of buildings.--(1) No builder shall sell or advertise for sale any buildings, through any audiovisual aids or any other means before he has obtained approval in writing of the Authority, and he shall mention such fact in the advertisement which will further specify all such details about the building as may be prescribed. (2) The approval granted by the Authority under subsection (1) shall be displayed at a conspicuous place in the office of the builder, if any, and at the site of the building. (3) The builder shall not entertain and register any application made in response to the advertisement under subsection (1), if it is in excess of the number of housing units provided in the building.

19. Penalty.--(1) Whoever contravenes any provisions of this Ordinance, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a terms not exceeding if the offence is a continuing one, further fine not exceeding five hundred rupees for each day after the date of the first commission of the offence. (1-A) The Authority or any person authorised by it in this behalf may compound any offence under this Ordinance or such terms and conditions as may be prescribed: Provided that no offence relating to building works commenced or carried out in violation of the approved plans shall be compounded. Section 23 of the contract Act

23. What considerations and objects are lawful and what note.--The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless.--it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. " (Emphasis added.)

24. One of the first objections raised by the plaintiffs was that since the defendants have not pleaded illegality of the contract entered between the plaintiff and the builders the same cannot be considered at this interlocutory stage. I am of the view that this objection is not sustainable on the grounds, firstly, that this question was framed by the Court itself and, secondly, that the plaintiffs have based their claim on this agreement through which they are claiming their ownership in the suit premises and have prayed for interim injunction against the K.B.C.A. It is this contract which determines their status and entitlement to the suit property. Therefore, it does not matter whether the defendants have pleaded the illegality or not. (If any reference is needed, see the cases of Sewsagar Avasty v. Satyanarain Sah and others (AIR 1960 Patna 145) and Sita Ram v. Kunj Lal (AIR 1963 Allahabad 206). In support of their case, reliance was placed by the plaintiffs on the case of Karachi Catholic Cooperative Housing Society Limited (PLD 1994 Karachi 194) where a learned Division Bench of this Court while considering the implication of section 202 of the Contract Act and section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, held that the change of possession of the suit property is, in fact, an act of part performance which admittedly creates a legal right in favour of the persons to whom the property was transferred. In that case the question for consideration was whether a property transferred on the basis of a general power of attorney, transfers the title to the purchaser. In the instant case the question of transfer of property between a transferor and a transferee is not involved as the plaintiffs are not seeking any relief against the builder/seller but they are claiming their right against the K.B.C.A. on the basis of an agreement entered between them on the one hand and the builders on the other hand. Reliance was also placed on the case of Mansoor v. Tassaddaq Ahmed Khan and 27 others (PLD 1995 Karachi 197) which again involves question of applicability of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rule laid down by a learned Division Bench in that, case is of no help to the plaintiffs. Mr. Neil Keshav, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has placed reliance on the case of Federation of Pakistan 1988 SCMR 2041 where several provisions of Contract Act were interpreted by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, when it was observed that while framing section 23 of the Contract Act, the Injunctions of Islam were not kept in view. It was held that there may be such contracts which though are not contrary to the provisions of section 23 but are against Injunctions of Quran and Sunnah. The Federal Government was directed to amend this section by 15-2-1989. It is pertinent to note that section 23 of Contract Act was not declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The Federal Government was directed to make amendments in section 23 whereby all such agreements which though qualified to have a lawful consideration should also be treated to be void, if found contrary to the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, the rule laid down by the Shariat Appellate Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court does not lend any support to the plaintiffs. In the case of Muhammad Amin (1992 CLC 691), it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that the penalties provided under section 7-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 contemplate action for violation of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Ordinance, 1979 and since the building in that suit was constructed prior to promulgation of the said Ordinance, it was further held that no action can be taken against it or its owners. At present this is not the case of the plaintiffs that the buildings were raised prior to the year 1979. Mr. M. Aziz Malik has also referred to the case of Noor Muhammad (1992 CLC 729) where a learned Single Judge held that the provisions of the Ordinance, 1979 are applicable prospectively and not retrospectively and that construction of any building already completed prior to promulgation of the Ordinance would not attract provisions of section 7-A. Again this is not the case of the plaintiffs in the present suits and, therefore, this case is also of no help to the plaintiffs.

25. Mr. M. Naimur Rehman, who has appeared on behalf of Intervener, namely, Shehri has referred to the case of Mst. Sardar Begum Farooqi and 6 others (1990 CLC 83) where a Division Bench of this Court, comprising of Ajmal Mian, CJ., and Mukhtar Ahmad Junejo, J. (as their lordships then were) held that the object of a status quo order is to maintain the subject-matter of the suit and not to alter it or to create a new situation. It was further held that the order of status quo passed in that case did not authorise respondent No. 1 to continue with the unauthorised construction of a multi-storeyed building in place of a residential Bungalow of ground plus one and that its object was to prohibit respondent No. 2, namely, K.B.C.A. from demolishing the unauthorised construction which had by that time already been raised. Section 7-A of the Ordinance, 1979 also came up for interpretation where it was observed by the learned Division Bench of this Court as follows:-- "A plain reading of the above section shows that when a building is constructed in violation of the provision of section 6, i.e. without the approval of the plan or in deviation of the plan, respondent No. 2 has the power to seal the building or eject the occupants of such building demolish the same at the cost of the builder. We are inclined to in spite of the above provisions and in spite of the above it was not prima facie proper on the part of the have booked any flat/fats in favour of third persons.

26. My attention was also invited the case of Abdul Razzak v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others (PhD 1994 SC 512) where several provisions of Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 1979 in reference to Ordinance, 1979 came up for consideration. Following observation of the Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court is relevant for reaching conclusion on the point presently under discussion:-- ....The High Court after referring to the relevant regulations, concluded as under the object and the consideration for the rule requiring minimum open _spaces to be left in any building are thus to ensure safe and hygienic conditions of living for the citizens in general They do not concern anY one individual alone.' The regulations contained in Chapters 7 and 8 ruelating to drainage and sanitation and fire precautions are similarly intended to ensure healthy and safe living for the public in general." (Emphasis added).

17. We are inclined to concur with the above conclusion of the High Court. We may observe that the discretion given to the Authority under section 19 of the Ordinance or under Regulation No. 16 to compound an offence or discretion given by Regulations Nos. 20 and 25 is subject to the well-settled principle of legal jurisprudence that discretion is to be exercised fairly and reasonable and not at the cost or prejudice of third parties. We may also point out that there is marked distinction between a criminal liability under section 19 of tae Ordinance and a civil liability under the Regulations to rectify irregularity/breaches. The authority may compound criminal liability but it cannot regularise a breach of the Regulations which is of the nature which has changed the complexion or character of the structure which was originally intended to be erected or of the plot. In such cases, it can be said that the authority has no discretion in fact and law. The plot in dispute was intended to have residential bungalow, it was not earmarked as flats' site . (Emphasis added.)

27. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, makes all such agreements void, the object or consideration of which is unlawful. There are several instances incorporated in section 23 and under its illustrations which further envisage that where the agreement is forbidden by law or if it defeats the provisions of any law or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or if the Courts regard it as immoral or if it is opposed to public policy falls within the category of void agreements. It was strenuously argued on behalf of plaintiffs that nowhere in section 6, in particular, and nowhere in the provisions of Ordinance, 1979 the builders are forbidden to enter into any agreement with the purchaser prior to completion of construction and, therefore, the agreements between allottees and builders are not hit by the provisions of section 6(2) of the Ordinance 1979, which view is not correct. One of the condition provided in section 23 of the Contract Act is that if any contract is of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of law then such agreement is unlawful and void. In the instant case, there is a specific prohibition imposed on the builders that no building as mentioned in subsection (1) to section 6 shall be occupied by any person or shall be allowed by the builders to be occupied by any person or unless on an application of the occupant or owner the Building Control Authority has issued occupancy certificate in a prescribed manner. Therefore, in order to obtain permission to occupy any building or its portion by any occupant or owner the first requirement is that such building should have been constructed strictly in accordance with the approved building plan as provided under section 6(1) of the Ordinance, 1979. The second condition of grant of permission to occupy a building is that an occupant or owner must have obtained occupancy certificate from the Building Control Authority. In the present case, the defendant/KBCA has successfully established that all the buildings were raised in clear violation of the approved building plan. The plaintiffs were not able to show that prior to occupying their respective flats/shops, either they or any of the builders obtained occupancy certificate from the K.B.C.A. In my view this provision was enacted in order to keep check on the illegal and unauthorised construction and to ensure that all the buildings are raised strictly in accordance with section 6(1) of the Ordinance, 1979. It may be due to this reason that under subsection (4) to section 6, the Building Control Authority was empowered to grant permission after it is satisfied that the building so constructed is consistent with the approved plan. It, therefore, settled that where a possession of any building or l its portion is delivered by a builder to an occupant, even through a written agreement, but without first obtaining occupancy certificate from the K.B.C.A. for a building which admittedly was constructed in violation of the approved building plan, it will amount to an agreement to defeat the provisions of Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979.

28. In several reported cases of our High Courts as well as of Indian High Courts, section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 was considered. In Gauri Datt Pandey v: Bandhu Pandey and others (AIR 1929_ Allahabad 394), it was held by a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act is to be read in the light of the Contract Act and that a contract, which is void because it was forbidden by law, does not become valid if the parties act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the said contract. In Mafizuddin Khan Choudhry v. Habibuddin Sheikh and another (AIR 1957 Calcutta 336), it was held by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court after making reference to some thirteen (13) reported judgments that a person who is not the holder of the licence, where under the statutory provision a licence was to be taken before an article can be sold by any person, held that such person is not entitled to get a decree for recovery of money from the Court as allowing the claim of such person would amount to violating the statutory provisions made restricting the sale of such commodities to certain persons. In the case of Sita Ram (supra) the question involved was prohibition of movement of Gur under the Gur Control Order, 1946; the contract so entered was declared to defeat the provisions of the Gur Control Order in the following words:

"(7) Mr. Hari Swarup, appearing or, behalf of the appellant, contended that the contract which was attempted to be enforced by the plaintiff was in the teeth of the provisions of the Control Order and whatever quibbing the plaintiff resorted to he could not get over the patent fact that his quibbings were merely vain attempts at defeating a provision of law. It was pointed out that under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act if the consideration or object of an agreement was of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat some provision of law then such at: agreement was unlawful. There can be no doubt that the agreement in the present case was of such a nature that if it was permitted to pass muster it would put at naught the provisions of the Gur Price Control Order. The contract in the instant case was certainly tainted with all that anti-social desire against which the Control Orders attempted to fight . . . . "

29. This Court has also considered legality of an agreement, the consideration of which is unlawful and void. In the case of Iqbal Hasan Burney and another v. Ameen Tareen (PLD 1967 Karachi 840), one of the issues was whether the contract made by the party for printing the copies was in violation of section 23 of the Contract Act as the same was forbidden by section 7 read with section 56 of the Press and Publication Ordinance, 1960. It was held that the contract to print as well as the alleged contract to bind and deliver the copies of publication became illegal when the condition precedent for authentication was not fulfilled. In the case of Abdul Razzak v. Karachi Development Authority (1991 CLC 1591) after referring to a portion of commentary from the Law of Contract (IIIrd Edition) by Shaukat Mehmood and after referring to the case reported in Kola Parti Venkatarareddi v. Kolaparti Peda Venkat Achalam (AIR 1964 AP 465), this Court held that every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void and that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless, inter alia, it is of such nature that, if permitted it would defeat the provisions of any law or that the Court regards it as opposed to the public policy. Appeal filed against this view of a learned Single Judge of this Court was upheld in the appeal by a learned Division Bench of this Court (See HCA-112 of 1991 Abdul Razzak v. KDA). Recently, Lahore High Court has held an agreement to finance prosecution of two suits for pre-emption to be contrary to public policy and, therefore, void. See Inayat Ali Shah v. Anwar (1995 CLC 1907). In the case of Riaz Ahmed v. Dr. Amtul Hameed Koser and 8 others (1996 CLC 678), it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that an agreement directed to finance or otherwise encourage litigation involving one person extending assistance to another in consideration of sharing in the prospective spoils of litigation being opposed to public policy was, therefore, found an unenforceable contract in line with the prohibition contained in section 23 of the Contract Act. Resume of all the case-laws above clearly indicates that where an agreement is made, even in absence of any clear prohibition in the law to execute such agreement, but if permitted to apply it would amount to defeat any provision of law or it is against public policy then, it is clearly permissible to a Court not to enforce it. In the circumstances of all these suits, I am of the considered view that since the plaintiffs were not able, prima facie, to show that their possession were not intended to defeat the provision of Ordinance, 1979, therefore, the equity does not lie in their favour. It is pertinent to observe that if the provisions of section 6(1) and (2) are read in conjunction with section 7-A of the Ordinance, 1979, it makes compliance of the subsection (2) to section 6 mandatory. In both subsections (1) and (2) to section 6 the word 'shall' has been used and the consequence for its non -compliance has been provided in section 7-A which includes any action including sealing of the building; ejectment of the occupants and demolition of the building at the cost of builder. It may be seen that the authority has been empowered to take all these actions "without prejudice to any other action" which, in my view, includes penal action as provided under section 19 of the Ordinance, 1979. All these three provisions of Ordinance, 1979 are fully attracted in all these cases. It is not denied that the person from whom the plaintiffs have acquired right of possession were builders who are defined in section 3(c) of the Ordinance, 1979 which means a person or body of persons including a society engaged in construction of a building on contract either as owner or grant of the owner for the purpose of transferring such building on hire or sale or on the basis of ownership. However, from this definition all such persons engaged as masons or other artisans have been excluded: The term "building" has been defined in section 3(d) of the Ordinance, 1979 as any building or part thereof including all fittings and fixtures, installations, signs and display structures of the building. Only those buildings were excluded from this definition which are to be notified by the Building Control Authority. Therefore, all the buildings involved in these suits are buildings within the meaning of aforesaid definition and, therefore, strict compliance of the provisions of section 6(1) and (2) was required to be made by the builders as well as occupiers. I am fortified in my view by the cases of Abdul Razzak and Sardar Begum as discussed earlier.

30. It is settled law that in order to obtain an interim injunction of prohibitory nature, a plaintiff is required to show that he has a good prima facie case; that the balance of convenience is in favour of grant of injunction and that E in case of refusal, such plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury. In order to prove a good prima facie case, the plaintiff's in the present suit were required to show that there is a prima facie existence of legal right to retain the possession of suit premises and that there is a threatened infringement of their legal rights on the part of the defendants. (See Muhammad Matin v. Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy PLD 1983 Karachi 387). I have already held that these sub leases or any other agreements, written or implied, tentatively appear to have been executed in order to defeat the provisions of Ordinance, 1979, and thus, these transactions of sale/purchase may fall within the prohibition of section 23 of the Contract Act. Therefore, the case of the plaintiffs goes out of the concept of good prima facie case. On the point of second ingredient i.e., balance of convenience, it was successfully established by the K.B.C.A. that all buildings involved in these suits were raised in glaring violation of the approved building plans; that such buildings were raised, in many cases, after obtaining the order of "status quo" from the Civil Courts and in violation of these orders of status quo. Therefore, in my tentative opinion, it would be public-at-large in the first place, and secondly the civic agencies who have to suffer great inconvenience for the buildings constructed in violation of the approved plans and Building Regulations. Hence, the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the grant of interim injunction. As far as the question of irreparable loss and injury is concerned, suffice to observe that the plaintiffs are entitled to seek recovery of their invested money from the builders in addition to the damages/compensation, if permissible from such Builders and/or K.B.C.A.

31. As a result of the above discussion, all the above fifteen (151 applications filed in the suits mentioned above are dismissed with the following observations:

(i) That the K.B.C.A., before taking any action as contemplated under section 7-A of the Ordinance, 1979 will afford personal hearing to the builders and/or affectees and would extend sufficient/reasonable time to comply direction, if any, issued under section 7-A to the occupants/affectees. The allottees may not have a legal right to occupy the property at present but may have a legitimate interest in the outcome of a decision and, therefore, ought to be heard on the basis principle of natural justice, which has attained prime consideration in general administrative matters as well as injustice delivery system. (ii) That the Chief Controller of Buildings, K.B.C.A., shall ensure early institution of criminal proceedings against the contravenors, builders, or K.B.C.A. officials, whoever they may be, as provided under section 19 of the Ordinance, 1979. For the said purpose, the Chief Controller shall submit his reports, month-wise, to the Registrar of this Court. (iii) The Member, Inspection Team (MIT) is directed to look into the matter that how different suits, the subject-matter of which are construction of G buildings involving lacs of rupees, are being filed before the Civil Courts of the first instance when prima facie, valuation of these suits appears to be above Rs. 5,00,

000. The MIT is further directed to issue necessary guidelines to the Civil Judges in this regard after obtaining leave from the Hon'ble Chief Justice. (iv) It is regrettable to note that the Courts are not receiving necessary and proper assistance from the K.B.C.A. in effective disposal of the cases arising out of building construction disputes. Apparently, one of the reason is the shortage of Law Officers at the K.B.C.A. It was informed, during the hearing, that there is neither any Law Office nor any place for the Law Officers to sit and work within the premises of K.B.C.A. Building. It is humanly impossible for four Law Officers to conduct approximately fifteen hundred suits pending on the original side of this Court. It is, therefore, earnestly desired that the strength of Law Officers with other facilities of para legal assistance be immediately increased. Let this matter be placed before the Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh. Office is directed accordingly. A.A./M-244/K Applications dismissed.