P L D 1968 Lahore 800 (PLP)

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, J.‑

This Full Bench has been constituted to return an answer to the following two questions:‑ (1) Is the sale by a Receiver of the property of an insolvent a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court; in other words, does such a sale amount to an enforcement of the order of adjudication? (2) Whether sale of land assessed to land revenue belonging to an insolvent and carried out in pursuance of the provisions of section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act amounts to a sale by an order of a Civil Court or of a Revenue Officer? The circumstances which led to this reference to a Full Bench are these. One Malik Jai Ram Das, Pleader of Lyallpur was adjudicated an insolvent on the 2nd October 1934. The Official Receiver having exhausted the other property of the insolvent wished to recover the debts still outstanding from the insolvent by taking proceedings under section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act against the agricultural land owned by him. A declaration under section 68 of the Code oaf Civil Procedure had been made in this Province on the 4th of September 1939 and in view of this declaration the Receiver had no other alternative but to submit a statement to the Court of the debts outstanding against the insolvent and request the Court to forward this statement to the Collector for realising a sufficient amount from the agricultural land of the insolvent by exercise of powers conferred upon him by rules 2 to 10 of Schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure. From the 21st of May 1940 to December 1940, the matter of the sale of the agricultural land remained pending between the Court and the Collector. Eventually the Collector decided to raise the amount towards payment of the debts outstanding against the insolvent by sale of his agricultural land and in pursuance of that decision he effected a sale of the share of the land belonging to the insolvent in favour of Mst. Rup Devi, the present appellant, for a sum of Rs. 1,

800. The sale was confirmed by the Collector on the 26th of May 1941 and a sale certificate was granted to the purchaser on the 14th of July 1941. On the 22nd of August 1942, Matwal Chand the brother of the insolvent brought the present suit for possession of the land sold by the Collector to Mst. Rup Devi by pre‑emption on payment of the price realised by the Collector. This suit was resisted on a number of pleas and inter alia it was pleaded that the sale was not pre‑emptible in view of the provisions of section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. This issue was. found in favour of the defendant and the suit was dismissed by the trial Judge on the 18th of February 1943. The decision dismissing the suit was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge but was reversed on second appeal by a learned Single Judge, who held that the sale was pre‑emptible and decreed the claim as laid. A certificate was, however, given under clause 10 of the Letters Patent for preferring a Letters Patent Appeal and this was so preferred by the defendant. This appeal was heard in the first instance by a Bench of which I was a member, and it was referred to a Full Bench in view of the conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether sales by an Official Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act were made by him in. enforcement of an order of adjudication, or were made by him, in his capacity as an owner of the property which vested in him under the statutory provisions of section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The further point whether a sale by the Collector, after the matter has been sent to him by the Court under the provisions of section 60, is a sale by an order of the Revenue Officer in execution of an order of the Court, or of the Revenue Officer, also required an authoritative decision and. this was also included in the order of reference. Before attempting any answer to the questions formulated and referred by the Division Bench, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the statute that bear on the question. Section 3, sub‑clause (s) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act is in these terms:‑ "Sale shall not include‑ (a) a sale in execution of a decree for money or of an order of a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court or of :a Revenue. Officer, (b) the creation of an occupancy tenancy by a landlord, whether for consideration or otherwise." The right of pre‑emption means the right of a person to acquire agricultural land or village immovable property or urban immovable property in preference to other persons and it arises in respect of such land only in cases of sales. As a sale in execution of a decree for money or of an order of a Civil Court or Revenue Court "or of a Revenue Officer is excluded from the definition of the word `sale' in the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, it is obvious that no right of pre‑emption arises in respect of such a sale. It may be observed that the law of pre‑emption in this province before the year 1905 was contained in the Punjab Laws Act, IV of 1872. Section 9 of that Act enacted that "the right of pre‑emption is a right of the persons hereinafter mentioned or referred to, acquire in the cases hereinafter specified immovable property in preference to all other persons. It arises in respect of sales (whether under a decree or otherwise) of immovable property and of foreclosures of rights to redeem such property" All kinds of sales were, therefore, pre‑emptible under the law as it stood before the enactment of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, II of 1905. Clause (5) was inserted in section 3 of this Act and it said that " `sale' shall not include sales in execution of a decree or order of a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, or of a Revenue Officer". This clause was construed by a Bench of the Punjab Chief Court in Nawab and others v. Tikaya Ram and others (40 P R 1911) as excluding a sale made in execution of a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale from the operation of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. It was suggested in that decision that a sale effected in execution of a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale is not a voluntary sale in any sense of the term and being in execution of a decree was exempt from pre‑emption under section 3, sub‑clause (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. The Act was amended in the year 1913 and clause (5) of section 3 was also altered in view of the observations made in the case above mentioned. Instead of the words "sale shall not include `sale in execution of a decree' the following words were substituted sale shall not include a sale in execution of a decree for money." The exemption, therefore, contained in section 3, sub‑clause (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act in favour of a sale in execution of a decree or order of a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, or of a Revenue Officer, has stood in the law since 1905 with the slight modification stated above. At the time when section 3, sub‑clause (5) was enacted in the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, II of 1905, the law in respect of the insolvents' estate in this province was also contained in certain provisions of the Punjab Laws Act, IV of 1872. Section 27 of this Act enacted that "the property of the insolvent shall be sold or administered, under the direction of the Court, either through the: agency of its own officers or of assignees to be appointed by the Court, in the manner most conducive to the interest of the creditors, and the proceeds shall be divided rate ably amongst them." This section makes it quite clear that the property of an insolvent could be sold under the direction or the order of the Court and the Insolvency Court being a Civil Court, it seems that a sale of the insolvents' property in the exercise of the insolvency jurisdiction of the Court under the Punjab Laws Act, IV of 1872, was a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court, or, in other words, in pursuance of that order, and was, therefore, exempt from Pre‑emption under sub clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. It may be mentioned that before the year 1907, the law governing the matter of insolvents' estates was also contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1682, and under that Code the insolvents' property vested in the Receiver in the same manner as it vests under the Provincial Insolvency Act, section 28, in the Court or in the Receiver. The insolvency provisions contained in the Punjab Laws Act, IV of 1872 and the Code of Civil Procedure were repealed by the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907. This Act was subsequently repealed by the Act of 1920 which is the statute in operation at the present moment. Section 16 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, III of 1907, in sub‑clause (2) enacted as follows:‑-- "On the making of an order of adjudication the whole of the property of the insolvent, save insofar as it includes such particulars (not being his books of account) as are exempted by the Code of Civil Procedure or by any other enactment for the time being in force from liability to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, shall vest in the Court or in a receiver as hereinafter provided and shall become divisible among the creditors . . . . ." Section 21 of the same statute is in these terms:‑-- "(1) In any local area in which a declaration has been made under section 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is in force, no sale of immovable property paying revenue to the Government or held or let for agricultural purposes shall be made by the receiver; but, after the other property of the insolvent has been realised, the Court shall ascertain (a) the amount required to satisfy the debts proved under this Act after deducting the monies already received, (b) the immovable property of the insolvent remaining unsold, and (c) the incumbrances (if any) existing thereon, and shall forward a statement to the Collector containing the particulars aforesaid; and thereupon the Collector shall proceed to raise the amount so required by the exercise of such of the powers conferred on him by sections 322 to 325 of the said Code as be thinks fit, and subject to the provisions of those sections so far as they are applicable, and shall hold at the disposal of the Court all sums that may come to his hands by the exercise of such powers. (2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect any provisions of any enactment for the time being in force prohibiting or restricting the execution of decrees or orders against immovable property and any such provisions shall be deemed to apply to the anforcement of an order of adjudication made under this Act as if it were such a decree or order." In section 42 it was laid down that where an adjudication is annulled, asp sales and dispositions of property and payments duly made and all acts theretofore done, by the Court or recd per shall be valid . . . . . Sections 27 and 28 of the Act of 1920 have been substituted in place of section 16 of the Act of 1907. Section 27 provides that "if the Court does not dismiss the petition, it shall make an order of adjudication, and shall specify in such order the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge." Section 28 (2) enacts that "on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver as hereinafter provided, and shall become divisible among the creditors, and thereafter, except as provided by thus Act, no creditor to whom the insolvent is indebted in respect of any debt provable under this Act shall during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings have any remedy against the property of the insolvent in respect of the debt, or commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court may impose". Substantially the provisions of the Act of 1907 have been re‑enacted in the Act of 1920. Section 21 of the Act of 1907 has been replaced by section 60 of the Act of 1920 without any material alteration. Section 37 replaces section 42 and gives the consequences of the annulment of an adjudication. Two other sections of the Act of 1920 bear on the questions that have been referred for decision to the Full Bench. Section 59 states the duties and powers of the Receiver and it is enacted sell therein that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Receiver may sell all or any part of the property of the insolvent. He can act in the matter of the sale without the previous leave of the Court. Section 58 provides that "where no Receiver is appointed, the Court shall have all the rights of, and may exercise all the powers conferred on, a Receiver under this Act." The only other provision of the law that requires to be mentioned is section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enacts that "the Provincial Government may declare, by notification in the official Gazette, that in any local area the execution of decrees in cases in which a Court has ordered any immovable property to be sold, or the execution of any particular kind of such decrees, or the execution of decrees ordering the sale of any particular kind of, or interest in, immovable property, shall be transferred to the Collector." In view of the proclama tion made under this section, the question of the sale of agricultural land belonging to an insolvent could not be decided try the Receive. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Receiver under section 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act in the matter of the sale of the insolvent's property has been taken away in respect of lands paying land revenue and owned by the insolvent. The Receiver has no power at his own initiative to effect sale of the agricultural land belonging to the insolvent; nor does the Insolvency Court possess this power. The only authority conferred on the Insolvency Court and on the Receiver by the statute is that they may submit a statement to the Collector giving the details of the indebtedness of the insolvent and the amounts still due from him and request him to exercise the powers given to him under Schedule III and raise the amount required to discharge the debts. Reference at this stage may also be made to some of the provisions of Schedule III under which the Collector acts in such matters. Paragraph 7 of Schedule III runs thus:‑ "Where the amount to be recovered and the property available have been determined . . . . . the Collector may‑ (a) if it appears that the amount cannot be recovered without the sale of the whole of the property available, proceed to sell such property; or (b) if it appears that the amount with interest (if any) . . . . . may be recovered without such sale, raise such amount and interest (notwithstanding the original order for sale) (i) by letting in perpetuity or for a term, on payment of a premium . . . . .; or (ii) by mortgaging the whole or any part of such property; or (iii) by selling part of such property; or (iv) by letting on farm, . . . . . ; or (v) partly by one of such modes, and partly by another or others of such modes." Paragraph 10 of the Schedule Provides that "Where the Collector sells any property under this Schedule, he shall put it up to public auction in one or more lots, as he thinks fit, and may‑ (a) fix a reasonable reserved price for each lot; (b) adjourn the sale for a reasonable time whenever, for reasons to be recorded, he deems the adjournment necessary for the purpose of obtaining a fair price for the property; (c) buy in the property offered for sale, and re‑sell the same by public auction or private contract, as he thinks fit." The first question for consideration is to determine the scope of section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and to precisely ascertain the meaning of the words employed by the statute. It was contended on behalf of the vendee that a sale of the insolvent's property by the Official Receiver is a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court, It was further contended that in any case, so far as this case is concerned, the sale having been made by the Collector it is a sale in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent, however, argued that a sale by the Official Receiver is wholly outside the purview of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act.. He urged that the clause was inapplicable where a sale was not effected in execution of an order of a Civil Court or of a Revenue Officer and that the sale by the Official Receiver of an insolvent's property in exercise of his powers under section 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, or by the Collector in pursuance of a statement sent to him under section 60 of the Act, could not be said to be a sale in execution of any order of any Court or officer, because in neither of the cases mentioned above any execution proceedings are actually pending. It was said that where a Receiver sells property belonging to an insolvent, he sells as a person who is vested with the ownership of the property and he sells in the same capacity or status in which the insolvent himself. would have sold if permitted by law to do so, and that when a Collector in exercise of his powers under Schedul ; III sells property, he does not sell it in execution of any order of a Court, but sells it himself in discharge of a duty enjoined on him by the statute. In other words, it was suggested that the Receiver's sale is an act of the Receiver as an owner and a Collector's sale is an act of the Collector in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the statute and therefore such sales are outside the scope of section 3, sub‑clause (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. The learned counsel for the respondent laid emphasis on the word "execution" used in' this sub‑clause and strenuously urged that this word had been used in the technical sense in which it is usually understood in the Code of Civil Procedure. He contended that no proceedings can be properly described as execution proceedings and no sale can be said to be a sale in execution of a decree or order unless it is initiated by an application under Order XXI, rule 10, or Order XXI, rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The presentation of an application for execution is a condition precedent for a proceeding which can be properly called an execution proceeding and where property is sold by the Court or an officer in proceedings which cannot be properly described as execution proceedings, sub clause (5) of section 3 does not exempt the sale from the scope of a pre‑emption suit. This limitation interpretation that the learned counsel for the respondent wished to place on the provisions of this sub‑clause was resisted on behalf of the appellant, and it was urged that the word "execution" in the sub‑clause should be given its dictionary meaning and no technical interpretation should be placed upon it. The learned counsel suggested that the word "execution" was synonymous with the words "in pursuance of", "in enforcement of", or with the words "in compliance with" and "in obedience to", and that a liberal interpretation should be placed on the language of sub‑clause (5) of section 3, in view of the fact that even a sale in execution of an order of a Criminal Court was exempt from the law of pre‑emption and that proceedings in a Criminal Court could never be initiated by presenting an application for execution of a decree or for execution of an order. Reference was also made by the learned counsel for the respondent to section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure which makes the rules relating to execution of decree applicable to the execution of various orders made by a Civil Court. A decision has, therefore, to be taken as to whether the contention raised on behalf of the vendee is a correct one or whether what has been said on behalf of the plaintiff respondent amounts to a correct interpretation of the phraseology employed in the sub‑clause in question. After a careful consideration of the provisions of law bearing on the point and the contentions raised on behalf of the parties respectively, I have reached the conclusion that the interpretation sought to be placed on this sub‑clause on behalf of the respondent is a narrow and an illiberal one and cannot be logically worked out even within the four corners of the language used by the draftsmen of the section. It is obvious that where property is sold in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer the proceedings are not initiated by an application under Order XXI, rule 10, or rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and if the interpretation suggested on behalf of the respondent is accepted, it would make a part of sub‑clause (5) redundant and superfluous. It is a well established canon of the construction of statutes that a construction should be placed on the language employed in a section which does not render any part of that q section or the words employed in that section superfluous or nugatory or wholly redundant. The interpretation, therefore, suggested by the respondent's counsel cannot be very seriously considered. Reference in this connection may be made to section 75 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, which provides that "when an arrear of land‑revenue has accrued . . . the Collector, with the previous sanction of the Financial Commis sioner, may, in addition to, or instead of, all or any of those processes, and subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, sell the estate or holding in respect of which the arrear is due." Section 76 lays down the procedure which has to be adopted in making the sale, and in section 79 the mode in which such sale has to be conducted is provided. A sale affected in pursuance of the provisions of section 75 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act by the Collector, who is a Revenue Officer as defined in the Act, for recovery of arrears of land revenue, is tot started by presenting any application under Order XXI, rule 10 or 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure and it cannot be suggested with any show of reason that a Revenue Officer is not selling the property in pursuance of a decision arrived at by himself that it is necessary to sell it to recover the arrears of land revenue. The sale is certainly in pursuance of the order made by himself. He himself is the authority ordering the sale and also the authority for executing the order made by himself, just as a Court passing a decree is the Court executing it. Mr. Shamair Chand when asked if he could cite any instance of a case where an order of a Revenue Officer in respect of sale of land has to be carried out by presenting an application for execution of that order, very candidly admitted that he could not think of any such case. The various statutes giving powers to a Revenue officer to make sales of property nowhere lay down that after an order has been made by him that the property be sold, he cannot effect the sale without an application for execution having been presented to himself or by himself. In these Circumstances, it is quite Blear that there is no such thing as a sale in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer In the sense in which the learned counsel for the respondent wishes to construe sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and the logical deduction from this circumstance is that either the mention of the phrase "Revenue Officer" in sub clause (5) is a superfluity or that some meaning has to be given to this phrase. Mr. Shamair Chand was forced to argue that the words "Revenue Officer" in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act had been unnecessarily used and the use of these words was wholly redundant and that there is no sale that can be contemplated in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer and which could be held to be exempt from the scope of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. The learned counsel in support of this argument placed reliance on the rules of interpretation of statutes given in Chapter IX of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, page

202. It is said in this Chapter that "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning . . . The rules of grammar yield readily in such cases to those of common sense." In my judgment the rule of interpretation cited by the learned counsel is wholly irrelevant so far as the construction of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 is concerned. The language of the statute is quite clear, and in express words and without any ambiguity in plain terms it says that sale shall not include a sale in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer. The draftsmen of this clause must be presumed to be fully aware of a number of sales that were conducted by Revenue Officers in pursuance of their own orders without the presentation of an application for execution, and it is, therefore, impossible to hold that the apparent purpose of the enactment is different from the one which the plain language used in the section suggests. The difficulty envisaged by the learned counsel completely disappears if the word "execution" is construed in a liberal manner and its dictionary sense. This word has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the General Clauses Act, and, therefore, there is no warrant for placing an interpretation on it which obliges a Court to hold that the plain provisions of the statute are to be treated as wholly redundant. The learned Single Judge against whose decision the Letters Patent Appeal out of which this reference has arisen, was taken, was considerably impressed with the contention raised on behalf of the respondent and observed that he was constrained to hold that the sale made bar the Collector cannot be said to have been made in execution of or in compliance with or in obedience to any order of a Civil Court; that there is no question of its having been made in execution of an order of a Revenue Court, nor could it be said to have been made in, execution of an order of a Revenue Officer. He considers that the sale was made under the statutory obligation imposed on the Collector and that a sale by a Receiver is similarly made in exercise of a statutory duty cast on the Receiver. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, it is difficult to estimate the view taken by him with the reasons given above. The matter may be further examined in the light of the language employed in sub‑clause (5) of section

3. It is enacted therein that `sale' shall not include a sale in execution of an order of a Criminal Court. Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure furnishes one illustration of such a sale. It runs thus:‑ "(1) The Court issuing a proclamation under section 87 may at any time order the attachment of any property movable or immovable or both belonging to the proclaimed person. (2) Such order shall authorize the attachment of any property belonging to such person within the district in which it is made; . . . . . (3) If the property ordered to be attached is a debt or other movable property, the attachment under this section shall be made‑ (a) by seizure; . . . . . (7) If the proclaimed person does not appear within the time specified in the proclamation, the property under attachment shall be at the disposal of the Provincial Govern ment; but it shall not be sold until isle expiration of six months from the date of the attachment and until any claim preferred or objection made under subsection (6‑A) has been disposed of under that subsection, unless it is subject to speedy and and natural decay, or the Court considers that the sale would be for the benefit of the owner, in either of which cases the Court may cause it to be sold whenever it thinks fit." This section visualizes a sale under the orders of a Criminal Court in certain circumstances and by the Criminal Court. itself. So far as I can see, this is an illustration of a case where in execution of an order of a Criminal Court the property is being sold and such sale would fall within the scope of sub‑clause (5) of section

3. The Code of Criminal Procedure in section 386 provides in certain cases for sales by the usual process of execution of decree and there the order of the Criminal Court is given the status of a decree and the Collector is described as a decree‑holder. It is difficult to hold that only sales under section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure come within the purview of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 and not sales made in persuance of the orders under section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So far as sales under the orders of a Revenue Court under the Punjab Land Revenue Act are concerned, there again it is not necessary drat irk all cases the sale should be effected icy taking chit execution proceedings as contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Code of Civil Procedure also mentioned certain sales of immovable property which need not necessarily be initiated ink the ordinary method in which execution proceeding are initiated tinder the Code of Civil Procedure. Order XL, rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that "where a receiver (a) fails to submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs, or (b) fails to pay the amount due from him as the Courts directs or (c) occasions loss to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence, the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell such property and may apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him and shall pay the balance (if any) to the receiver." Here the sale is clearly under the orders of a Civil Court and in execution of that order the Court proceeds to sell the property without the formality of taking out any execution proceedings like a decree‑holder. It cannot be suggested that a sale made in pursuance of the order of a Civil Court under Order XL, rule 4, would be outside the purview of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, because it is not a sale in execution of the order of a Civil Court, simply because it did not start with an execution application. The limited interpretation, therefore, that Mr. Shamair Chand wished to place on the word "execution" employed in sub clause (5) of section 3 cannot be reasonably accepted. In my view, the word "execution" as I have already stated, employed in this section should be liberally construed and should be given its ordi nary dictionary meaning, and if that meaning is given to this word in the sub‑clause, the decision of the points referred to the Full Bench is capable of an easy answer. In Murray's New English Dictionary, one of the meanings given to the word "execution" is "the action of carrying into effect (a plan, design, purpose, command, decree, task, etc.)". Another meaning given is "the enforcement by the sheriff, or other officer of the judgment of a Court; `the obtaining of actual possession of anything acquired by judgment of law'; chiefly, the seizure of the goods or person of a debtor in default of payment." If the word "execution" is given this meaning in sub‑clause (5) of section 3, then it lead. to the conclusion that a sale in "pursuance 'of", "in carrying) into effect" or in "enforcement of" an order of a Civil Criminal or Revenue Court, or of Revenue Officer falls within the purview of this sub‑clause and is exempt from the exercise of the right) of pre‑emption. In my judgment, the word "execution" employed in section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act should be given its normal dictionary meaning and should not be read in any technical or limited sense whatsoever. Pre‑emption is a very exceptional right and if the Legislature has thought fit to exclude sales held by public officials or sales held in a public Manner from the operation of this clause, then a very restricted meaning should not be placed on an exception of this kind. The view that I have expressed about the meaning of the word "execution in this sub‑clause of the Punjab‑Pre‑emption Act finds support from a Bench judgment of the Punjab Chief Court in the case of Piare Lal v. Ganeshi Lal and others (46 P R 1909). In that case a sale of immovable property by a Receiver under the direction of the Court, under section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was regarded as a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court within the terms of section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and consequently was held not subject to pre‑emption. It was observed that the words "in execution of an order" are synonymous with the words "in compliance with an order," or "in obedience to an order". It was further observed that the sale being under the direction of the Court, the Receiver acted in obedience to the order of the Court and the whole proceeding was under the specific orders of the Court and the sale was not subject to pre‑emption. The word "execution" is sometimes used in synonymous terms with the word "enforcement" though the latter word may in a certain context be used in a wider sense. Order XXI, rule 32, of the Code of Civil Procedure furnishes one instance of a case where it seems that the word "enforce" has been used as an alternative for the word "execution". This rule is in these terms:‑-- "(2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific performance or for an injunction has been passed is a corporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation or, with the leave of the Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and detention." The phrase "decree may be enforced by the attachment of the property of the corporation" means that a "decree may be executed by the attachment of the property of the corporation." Order XLV, rules 15 and 16, lay down the manner for enforcement, or in other words execution of orders of His Majesty in Council. Article 183 of the Indian Limitation Act lays down the period of limitation for enforcement of judgments, decrees or orders of the High Courts established by Royal Charter and of the orders of His Majesty in the Council. It was at one time contended that the word "enforcement" used in Article 183 of the Indian Limitation Act was of` a wider scope than the word "execution" employed in Article 182 of the same Act. This argument was considered by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in F. H. Pell v. M. Gregory (I L R 52 Cal. 828). At page 846 of the report Mr. Justice Rankin observed as follows:

"It is now contended, as I understand, that applications for final decree are not in the Subordinate Courts governed by Article 182, but that in the High Courts they are governed by Article

183. Indeed, it is from this position that the whole argument on behalf of the appellant proceeds. It is not easy to wedge so great a difference in result between the words `for the execution of a decree' and the words `to enforce a decree'. If a final decree for sale is necessary to dispose of the suit, the considerations applicable under Article 183, which allows for indefinite revivor, seem strangely out of place. I am content to say that as at present advised I am in no way satisfied that Article 183 does apply in a High Court to an application for final decree under Order XXXIV." In the observations cited above, it is implicit that the scope of Articles 182 and 183 is for all practical purposes identical and both deal with the execution of different kinds of degrees and judgments and that the word "enforcement" in the result has no greater scope than the word "execution". These observations of Rankin, J. were considered in a later decision of the same High Court In the case of Birendra Nath Basu Thakur v. Surendra Kumar Basu Thakur (I L R (1940) 1 Cal. 480). On page 492 it was observed as follows :‑ "It has, however, been urged before us by the respondents' Advocate that the language used in the first column of Article 183 is different from the language used in the first column of Article

182. The last mentioned Article contem plates, says he, only applications for execution of decrees not falling within Article 183 and no other application, while Article 183 contemplates not only such applications, i.e., for execution but applications of other kinds. This, he submits, is indicated by the use of the additional word 'enforce' used in the last mentioned Article. There is authority for the proposition that the word `enforce' is of wider import than the word 'execute'. The way in which an application to have a final decree under Order XXXIV, rule 5 on the basis of a preliminary decree passed by this Court in its Ordinary Original jurisdiction was sought to be distinguished by Sanderson, C. J. and Buckland and Mukerji, JJ. in Pell v. Gregory from an application for a personal decree under Order XXXIV, rule 6 after the sale of the mortgaged properties in pursuance of a decree of that Court, lends some support to the contention that the word `enforce' is of wider import than the word `execute'. The observation of Rankin, J. (as he then was) at page 846 of the report would, however, indicate that there is no substantial difference between the words `enforce' and `execute', an observation which gets support from the language of Order XXI, rules 31 and 32 and the marginal note and provisions of Order XLV, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Mention may also be made of the language employed in section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899. It is provided therein that an award made under the Act may be enforced as if it were a decree of a Court. The only meaning that I can place on section 15 of the Indian Arbitration Act is that an award may be executed in the same manner as a decree of a Court and the word "enforce" has been used as an alternative for the word "execute" as possibly it was more appropriate to use it in that context. Other instances can be mentioned where in a suitable context instead of the word "execute" the word "enforce" has been used and vice versa, but it is unnecessary for the purposes of this case to multiply instances of that kind, because it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent that in a number of cases the word "enforce" is synonymous with the word "execute". All that he contended was that in a number of cases it has a wider significance and it cannot be alternatively used for the word "execution". Even if that be so, the question is whether the word "execute" in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 cannot be read as synonymous with the words "enforcement", "pursuance" "in obedience to" an order of a Civil, Criminal, Revenue court, or a Revenue Officer, and cannot be given the dictionary meaning of carrying into effect the order of any one of the Courts or officers mentioned in the sub‑clause under consideration. After a careful con sideration of the various provisions of the law, I am forced to the conclusion that the word execution" used in sub clause (5) of section 3 has a wider meaning than was contended for on behalf of the respondent and that the exemption even in the section covers all cases of sales made in enforcement in enforcement, in obedience or carrying into effect the orders of a Civil Court, of a Criminal Court, of a Revenue Court, or of a Revenue Officer. Having placed an interpretation on the word "execution" in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, the next point that arises for decision is whether a sale of the insolvent's property during insolvency proceedings, is a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court or in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer, if it relates to his land assessed to land revenue. In other words, the question for consideration is whether the act of the Receiver in selling the immovable property of the insolvent in exercise of a statutory power under section 59, or a sale by the Insolvency Court in exercise of its statutory functions under section 58 of the Provincial insolvency Act, or a sale by the Collector in discharge of his statutory duties in pursuance of the provisions of section 60 of the Act, amounts to a sale in execution of, in pursuance to, or in enforcement or carrying into effect an order of adjudication. If the acts of the Court, or of the Receiver or of the Collector can be held to be acts in pursuance of, in obedience to, in enforcement of, or of carrying into effect the order of adjudication, then there can be no manner of doubt that in view of the construction that I have placed on the word "execution" mentioned in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, all sees conducted by these persons will fall within the ambit of this sub‑clause. On the other hand, if it is held that the act of the Receiver, the act of the Court or the act of the Collector are all statutory acts performed in pursuance of statutory powers and are not acts in obedience to, in pursuance of, or in enforcement of any order of the Court, then all these acts will fall outside the scope of the sub‑clause in question. In order to arrive at a correct decision of this matter, it is necessary, therefore, to consider whether it is apposite to describe the various acts above mentioned as being in pursuance of the order of adjudication. An order of adjudication amounts to a declaration of the insolvency of a certain person. It declares that so and so has been adjudicated an insolvent. Such an order on the face of it is not executable order, being merely declaratory in character, and if the statute had left the matter at that, it could have been safely held that no question can ever arise about the executability or inforcement of an order of adjudication or of its being carried into effect. Section 28, subsection (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act states the effects of an order of adjudication. The statute declares that on the making of an order of adjudication the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a Receiver as hereinafter provided and shall become divisible among the creditors . . . . . . A retrospective effect is given to the order of adjudication and it relates back to and takes effect from the date of the presentation of the petition on which it is made. The result of the language employed in the section is that the insolvent becomes divested of the property owned by him and its ownership vests for the purposes of the Act in the Court of a Receiver. Section 59 of the Act authorizes the Receiver to sell all or any part of the property vesting in him without any reference to the Court. The power conferred on the Receiver by this section is, however, limited by the following section

60. Subsection (1) of section 60 declares that in any local area in which a declaration has been made under section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no sale of immovable property paying revenue to the Government or held or let for agricultural purposes shall be made by the Receiver. The result of this provision is that the Receiver can only make sale of properties which are not assessed to revenue or are not held or let for agricultural purposes, in areas where a declaration has been made under section 68 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. A different procedure has been laid for the sale of such property and the powers of the Court or the Receiver have been thereby restricted. As regards properties which are outside the scope of section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act it was argued that the Receiver can sell them as owner, as these properties vest fn him and the power of sale in respect of them ha: been conferred on him as Receiver by the statute. It was contended that a sale by a person who is empowered to sell property vested in him is a voluntary sale in exercise of his own powers and is not made in execution of any order of a Civil Court, and therefore such a sale is subject to the right of pre‑emption. It was suggested‑that the Receiver when he sells property, does not effect the sale under pressure or in pursuance of any directions or orders of a Court, but he exercises his own discretion and can enter into a bargain without recourse to a public auction, and can privately sell the property. This argument is undoubtedly very attractive and finds support from the language employed in sections 28 and 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. I have always been attracted by this argument and have successfully taken it at the Bar. Even during the course of the arguments in this case I was considerably affected by it, but eventually I have reached the decision that the argument though attractive is unsound and must be repelled. The determining factor which has led me to repel this argument is the plain language employed by the statute itself which forces one to the conclusion that an order of adjudication is not one purely of a declaratory nature, as it seems to appear at first sight. Though the statute has declared in section 28 the effects of the order, it appears that all these provisions really mention the methods and modes in which that order is to be enforced. The appointment of a Receiver, the various duties and powers conferred on him and the Court for the purposes of administration and realisation of the property of an insolvent and for the purposes of its distribution amongst D the various creditors and decree‑holder are all matters in pursuance of and in enforcement or carrying into effect the order of adjudication. The statute in section 60, subsection (2) in plain and unambiguous terms declares that an order of adjudication is capable of enforcement and that whatever the Court or the Receiver does in pursuance of the order, it does so in carrying into effect the order of adjudication and in enforcement of it. Reference in this connection may be made to the language of subsection (2) of section 60, which to my mind settles the point conclusively against the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. This subsection already cited in an earlier part of this judgment is in these terms:‑-- "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect any provisions of any enactment for the time being in force prohibiting or restricting the execution of decrees or orders against immovable property; and any such provisions shall be deemed to apply to the enforcement of an order of adjudication made under this Act as if it were such a decree or order." The language employed by the statute negatives and repels the contention that an order of adjudication made under section 27 is purely of a declaratory character and is not enforceable. On the other hand, it firmly establishes the proposition that an order of adjudication is enforceable in the same manner as a decree or order of a Court. It is no doubt true that the scope of subsection (2) of section 60 is limited in its application to cases where the provision of restrictive laws relating to execution of decrees or orders against immovable property have to be applied. In cases of that kind an order of adjudication has been given the same status as if it were a decree or order of a Court and it has been mentioned that it is not enforceable against the immovable property of an insolvent where a decree against the insolvent in view of the restrictive provisions of certain laws would not be enforceable. By way of illustration reference may be made to section 16 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. That section runs thus:‑- "No land belonging to a member of an agricultural tribe shall be sold in execution of any decree or order of any Civil . . . . . Court . . . . ." The effect of subsection (2) of section 60 is that no land belonging to a member of an agricultural tribe can be sold in enforcement of an order of adjudication. By necessary implication the conclusion is obvious that certain properties belonging to the insolvent are saleable in enforcement of an order of adjudication while certain other kinds of properties which are subject to the restrictive laws of the province are not liable to sale in enforcement of an order of adjudication. It therefore follows from the words of the statute that an order of adjudication is being enforced when the property of the insolvent is sold either by the Court, by the Receiver or by the Collector and all these functionaries what ever act they perform they do so in enforcement of the order of adjudication and in pursuance of it or in carrying into effect this order. When the statute itself has described the order as enforceable, it is difficult to hold that it is merely declaratory in character and that whatever a Receiver or a Court does in exercise of its statutory duties does so in its own right and in fulfillment of its own duties and not in pursuance or enforcement of the order of adjudication. But for the language of section 60, subsection (2), it could be very plausibly and forcibly argued that the phrase "enforcement of the order of adjudication" was a misnomer. But that line of thought is ruled out by reason of the language of the statute itself. The view that I have expressed above is in accord with the whole scheme and tenor of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Though the property of an insolvent is vested in the Receiver, it is vested for the purpose of realisation of and making it divisible amongst the creditors after realisation. Section 56 deals with the appointment of Receivers and is headed by the words "Realisation of property". The appointment of a Receiver and the various acts which he is called upon to perform and the duties and powers conferred upon him by the statute are for the purpose of realisation of the property‑and this realisation is for the purpose of carrying into effect the order of adjudication‑and are in pursuance of that order. But for the order of adjudication neither the Court nor the Receiver nor the Collector would have any power whatsoever of selling the property of an insolvent. It is that order alone in pursuance of which the whole machinery of the Act comes into play, and if the matter is viewed in that light, it is obvious that there is nothing inherently wrong in saying that whatever a Receiver does in the matter of realisation of the property of the insolvent he does in execution or in enforcement or in pursuance of the order of adjudication. It is this order of the Civil Court the existence of which as an after effect gives birth to the Receiver and authorizes him to discharge the functions and duties that he is to discharge. The whole machinery of the law of insolvency is set in motion by the existence of this order and it is quite appropriate to describe the acts of the Receiver or of the Court or of the Collector in pursuance of this order as acts in execution or enforcement of the order of adjudication. The view that I have expressed finds support from a Bench decision of this Court in Mirza v. Jhanda Ram (I L R 12 Lah. 367). At page 379 of the report it was observed as follows :‑-- "But it is beyond question that he (the Receiver) derives his powers to sell, and indeed all other powers, from the order of adjudication, to which he owes his very existence. This order has to carried out in a variety of ways, one of which is the appointment of a Receiver and the performance by him of certain acts to administer the estate of the insolvent for the purpose specified in the Act. A sale of property under section 59, is, therefore, one of the modes in, and the Receiver the agency by, which the order is `enforced'. The hollowness of Mr. Batra's argument is exposed by his own admission, that ii in any particular case no Receiver is appointed and the Court takes upon itself the duty of administering the estate, a sale by it of the property of the insolvent will be in 'enforcement of the order of adjudication', but if a Receiver is reappointed under the Act a sale by him stands on a different and higher footing. The learned counsel when pressed in the course of the argument as to what meaning he would put on the expression `enforce ment of an order of adjudication' was driven to the suggestion, that it was intended to mean merely the `declaration' by the Court that the person concerned had been adjudicated insolvent. This interpretation is, however, not warranted by the plain wording of the section nor is it supported by any authority, and it was conceded that, if accepted, it would lead to various anomalies. After careful consideration I have no doubt that an act done by the Receiver in pursuance of the authority which he derives from the order of adjudication is nothing but an enforcement of the order of adjudication. It follows, therefore, that a sale by, him is subject to the provisions of section 16 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act." The learned counsel for the responder' argued that the Receiver cannot be said to be an agent in any sense of the term as it necessarily implies the existence of a principal. In my opinion, tile word "agent" has been loosely used in the quotation mentioned above and not in the sense in which it is used in the Indian Contract Act or in the law of agency. The opinion expressed by this Bench was later considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Dhani Ram v. District Official Receive, Amritsar (I L R 24 Lah. 242). In this case it was observed that the Receiver derives his authority to deal with the property of the insolvent from the order of adjudication and when he proceeds to sell it he is acting in enforcement of that order. The reasoning of Mirza v. Jhanda was approved. In my judgment, therefore, the acts of the Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act in the matter of sales of the insolvent's property are acts done in enforcement of the order of adjudication. The law has restricted the posers of the Receiver in respect of certain sales and regarding those sales the enforcement of the order of adjudication is in the same manner as the execution of decrees; while in other cases the order of G adjudication can to enforced by the Receiver by selling property under his own initiative. But in both cases the actions are in pursuance or in enforcement of the order of adjudication and even if he does effect a sale of the property of the insolvent lit his capacity as owner vested with it by the statute, that vesting of the ownership is also for the purpose of carrying into effect the order of adjudication. It may be mentioned that when the provisions regarding the insolvents estates were contained in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, and the property of the insolvent was sold under section 356 of that Code, such a sale was regarded as a sale in execution of a decree and was effected in obedience to the directions of the Court and it was held in this Court that such a sale fell under section 3, sub‑clause (5) (n) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and was not pre‑emptible. It is true that under section 351 of the Code of 1882, an order of adjudication was deemed to be decree in favour of each of the creditors for their respective debts. 'That provision was repealed by the Provincial Insolvency Act, III of 1907, and the order of adjudication was not given the status of a decree for all purposes, though it was give that status for the application of the restrictive laws in respect of sales of immovable property. The order of adjudication instead of being given the status of a decree and being executable has, however, been declared to be an enforceable order and the result of the change of language, in my opinion, has not brought about any substantial change in the law of Insolvency as it was enacted in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. The learned counsel for the respondent placed considerable reliance on certain observations contained in a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Basava Sankaran v. Garapati Anjaneyulu (I L R 50 Mad. 135). This Bench was presided over by five Judges. The facts of the case were that an application by a person to a District Court to be adjudicated an insolvent was referred by the Court to the Official Receiver for disposal; the latter adjudicated him an insolvent; the Court did not, however, pass an order appointing the Official Receiver as receiver of the insolvent's properties; the Official Receiver sold certain joint family immovable properties belonging to the insolvent and his son; the latter sued in a District Munsif's Court for a declaration that the sale of his share was invalid and for partition and delivery of his share from the vendees; pending the suit the District Court passed an order appointing the Official Receiver as the receiver of the insolvent's properties; on the vendees contending in the suit that the sale by the Official Receiver was validated by the subsequent order of the District Court appointing him Receiver of the insolvent's properties, the question arose whether the subsequent act of the Court validated the sale. It was contended in that case that the Official Receiver in selling the pro perty was acting as the agent of the Court and that the Court could ratify the unauthorized acts done by its agent and therefore the sale was valid as the Court had subsequently appointed the Receiver and authorized him to sell the property. The Full Court repelled this argument and held that the Official Receiver was not an agent of the Court and the theory of ratification applicable in effect to acts of an agent could not help the vendees. On behalf of the vendees it was claimed that the sale was valid in any case in view of the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section is in these terms :‑- "Where a person fraudulenty or erroneously represents that he is authorized to transfer certain immovable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsits . . . . The contention on behalf of the vendees was that In any case by the subsequent order of the Court appointing a Receiver in the case the property of the insolvent had become vested in the Receiver, though after he had sold it and therefore as the Receiver as transferor had acquired such property, the interest subsequently acquired passed to the transferee. Section 2, clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to affect any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. The result therefore, is that no person can derive any benefit from the provisions of section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act if the transfer is by operation of law or is by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. The question for decision before the Full Bench was whether the sale by the Official Receiver was a transfer by operation of law or by an execution of a decree or order of a Court falling under section 2, clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently section 43 of the Act was inapplicable to such a sale. By a majority the Full Bench held that the sale in that case was not a transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of Court and gave the benefit of the provisions of section 43 to the vendees. Krishnan, J. however, took the view that a sale by an Official Receiver is in the nature of a Court sale and that the Official Receiver's sale falls under the words "transfer by order of a Court of competent jurisdiction" in section 2, clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently section 43 of the Act is not applicable to such sales. The learned Officiating Chief Justice while dealing with this question observed as follows:‑- "It seems to me that a sale by an Official Receiver acting under the powers conferred by the Act and without any leave or sanction of Court being necessary stands in the same position as a sale by a person in whom property vests by law for the purpose of administration of an estate subject of course to such protection as the law allows to judicial officers acting in execution of their office. Though property vests in the receiver by operation of law, the transfer by him is a transfer by one party to another and cannot be said to be a transfer by operation of law in favour of his vendee. Viewing the sale in this light, I am of opinion that the present case falls within section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act." Mr. Justice Krishnan, however, expressed his opinion in ‑ the following words:‑ "I am inclined to think that Official Receiver's sales come within the words of section 2, clause (d). They are in the nature of Court sales and their validity really depends on the order of the Insolvency Court vesting the property in the Official Receiver and thus authorizing him to sell. The sale is a compulsory sale in invitum and the foundation of its validity is the order of Court . . . . . A similar point was raised before the Allahabad High Court with reference to a sale by the Official Liquidator and their Lordships were inclined to apply clause (d) to such a sale, though they did not expressly decide it." Mr. Justice Curgenven also expressed an opinion on this matter and it was as follows:‑ "There remains to be considered the effect of the words in execution of a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, and it would, I think, be unduly extending the meaning of these words to hold that a sale of property vested in the Official Receiver by order of the Court is in execution of that order. In one sense, no doubt, the sale is in pursuance of or 'in execution of the order, since such an order has ordinarily in contemplation a realization of assets by sale. But attaching to 'execution' the meaning which it bears in relation to judicial proceedings, I conclude that such a sale falls outside the scope of the exception." It has to be observed that the attention of their Lordships of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court was not drawn to the language employed by the statute in respect of the adjudication order and the sales by the Receiver in section 60, subsection (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. That subsection clearly supports the view that was expressed by Mr. Justice Krishnan and it is the language employed in this subsection which to my mind is the determining factor in the decision of this matter; and in view of the plain language of this subsection I am in agreement with the view of Mr. Justice Krishnan and I cannot accept the proposition laid down by the majority of Judges in that case. It seems to me that Mr. Justice Curgenven was also inclined to take the view that I have expressed if he had not placed too technical a meaning on the word "execution" used in section 2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act. In Ram Rattan v. Fazal Haq (I L R 21 Lah. 40) a single Judge of this Court again considered this matter and observed that a sale by a Receiver was certainly made in enforcement of an order of adjudication. Considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent on a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sheobanam Singh v. Kulsum‑un‑Nissa (I L R 49 All. 367). In that case a share in a village in which a custom of pre‑emption existed vested in the Official Assignee under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907, section 16, The Official Assignee sold the property and this' sale was pre‑empted upon under the terms of the Wajib‑ul‑arz and it wks held by their Lordships that the sale was pre emptible. At page 374 of the report their Lordships made the following observations:‑ Turning now to the second point, which affords the ground of judgment in the High Court. Their ratio decidendi is really contained in a single sentence: `Now in the circumstances of the present case, this being the custom it is clear that no co‑sharer has sold his share at all.' And again :

We find it impossible to hold the view that a village custom which refers only to a voluntary sale by one co‑sharer of his properly can in any way apply to the case of an involuntary sale carried out against his wishes by a Court through a Collector or an Official Assignee, or anybody else.' With deference to the learned Judges, it seems to their of all fps that this overlooks one of the fundamental principles of all arrangements for realization and distribution of a bankrupt s vary, but in all there is an official, be he called an assignee or any other name, and that official is by force of the he tale invested in the bankrupt's property. But the property in his is the property of the bankrupt exactly as it stood person, with all its advantages and all its burdens . . . It was pointed out that a sale in execution of a decree erred the property free from a claim of pre‑emption. The reason is simple. The Code of Civil Procedure arranging for sale under a decree mentions and deals with rights of pre‑emption and gives those who hold them certain rights. Now Whenever a statute deals with certain rights it is easy to conclude that it deals with the total ambit of those rights and haves nothing standing outside the provisions of the statute. An illustration of this doctrine may be found in the case of Attorney‑General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel. As an illustration of how there is no privilege of person may be taken the case of Collector of Futtahpore v. Syed Yad Ali where the Government as standing in right of a convict had to submit to the right of pre‑emption. Just, therefore, as if the conveyance had been made to an individual, that individual would have had at once the disadvantage and the privilege of the custom of pre‑emption, so the Official Assignee was in the same position and could only sell what be got." The proposition that whenever an Official Receiver sells he conveys only the right, title and interest of the insolvent is unassailable, the purchaser takes the property subject to all the advantages and all its burdens including the disadvantage that it may be pre‑empted upon provided that by some law such a. sale is not exempted from pre‑emption. Their Lordships in that case were not concerned and were not called upon to pronounce as to the scope of the exception contained in sub. clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. They had not to consider whether the sale by the Official Receiver in insolvency proceedings is a sale in enforcement of the order of adjudication passed by a Civil Court. The point that was urged before their Lordships was simply this: whether the sale by the Receiver was on the same footing as a sale in execution of a decree, as it was contended that sales in execution of decrees were not pre‑emptible. Their Lordships observed that the reason for exempting sales in execution of decrees from the custom of pre‑emption was simple and that was that the Code of Civil Procedure in Order XXI, rule 88, bad provided for a limited right of pre‑emption and that that provision must be taken to be exhaustive in regard to the exercise of any right of pre‑emption It has also to be observed that the attention of their Lordships of the Privy Council was not drawn to the language of section 21 of the Act of 1907 and as a matter of fact it was unnecessary to mention that provision because the High Court against whose order the appeal was taken to their Lordships of the Privy Council had not held that the sale by the Official Receiver was in enforcement of the order of adjudication. They had merely taken the view that a village custom of pre‑emption mentioned in the Wajib‑ul‑arz could only refer to voluntary sale by one co‑sharer of his property and could in no case apply to the case of an involuntary sale carried out against his wishes by a Court or through a Collector or an Official Assignee. Whether the sale was by the Court or by the Official Assignee, their Lordships held that such sales were pre‑emptible because the only exception to the exercise of the right of pre‑emption was a sale in execution of a decree. The scope of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council and any observations made by them must be limited to the facts of the case in which they were made. This is the view that their Lordships have expressed in a number of cases in respect of their own decisions. Any observations, therefore, contained in this judgment cannot be enlarged and made applicable to a case where the point for decision is as to the scope of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act read in the light of section 60, subsection (2), of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Neither of these provisions came up for consideration before their Lordships in the case of Sheobaran Singh v. Kulsum‑un‑Nissa. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council does not afford any assistance to the respondent in support of his contention and does not negative the proposition that the sale by an Official Receiver of the insolvent's property under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act is a sale in enforcement of the order of adjudication. I now proceed to consider whether the Full Bench decision of this Court in Gurbakhsh Singh v. Sardar Singh (I L R 16 Lah. 173) for a consideration of the soundness of which this reference to the Full Bench was made, lays down the rule of law correctly. It was held by the Full Bench that the act of an Official Receiver in selling the property of an insolvent is not an act in execution of the order of a Court, and is, therefore, subject to the right of pre‑emption. Such an act was held not to fall within the exception contained in section 3 (5) (a) of the Punjab Pre- emption Act. The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment in the case observed as follows :

"The Receiver is, under section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, appointed by the Court. By the same section the property of the insolvent vests in the Receiver. Section 59 of the same Act gives certain powers to the Receiver. One of these is the power to sell any part of the property of the insolvent. That he may do without leave of the Court. The same section gives him authority to do other things only by leave of the Court. By section 68 any person aggrieved by the action of the Receiver has a right to apply to the Court and the Court may affirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of. It appears to us, therefore, that the act of the Receiver in selling the property of an insolvent cannot be said to be an act in execution of an order of the Court. If it were such an act, there would then appear to be a right of appeal to the Court from its own order. It is argued, however, that the act of an officer appointed by the Court is the act of the Court itself; that indeed the Receiver is the agent and the Court is the principal in any transaction by the Receiver. We cannot agree. It is not true to say that the act of every person appointed by a superior authority is the act of that superior authority. It depends upon the terms of the appointment and the authority given to the person appointed. The Receiver is appointed by the Court, but the power of sale is conferred upon hire by the statute and not by the Court. Further, under section 28 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act the whole of the property of the insolvent vests in the Court or in a Receiver as hereinafter provided. "The property vests in the Court if the Court does not appoint a Receiver, but, if a Receiver is appointed, it vests in him. It appears to us, therefore, that the proper construction of all the relevant sections in the Act makes it clear that the Act does not make the sale of the property of an insolvent by the Receiver, a sale in execution of an order of the Court within the meaning of section 3, subsection (5) (a) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act of 1913." Reliance was placed for the observations quoted above on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court already noticed and on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Sheobaran Singh's case. It appears, however that the attention of their Lordships was not drawn either to the provisions of section 60, subsection (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act or to the decision given by a Bench of the Punjab Chief Court on this matter in the year 19C9, already cited in an earlier portion of this judgment; nor was their attention drawn to the observations of the Bench of this Court in Mirza v. Jhanda Ram. I have dealt with the question already at some length whether the sale by an Official Receiver is or is not a sale in enforcement of the order of adjudication and it is unnecessary to dwell further on this paint. For the reasons already given I am of the opinion, and I speak with great respect, that the point was not considered in all its aspects by the Full Bench in Gurbakhsh Singh's case and the most important provisions of the statute were overlooked. With great respect, therefore, to the learned Judges who decided that Full Bench case I would hold that this decision did not lay down the law correctly as to the scope of section 3, sub‑clause (5) (a) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act in the matter of sales of insolvent's property conducted by the Official Receiver in exercise of his powers under section 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Full Bench case has been followed in a number of decisions in this Court, but it is wholly unnecessary to mention those decisions as they were bound to follow the decision of the Full Bench once it had been pronounced. When the matter came before me while sitting with the learned Chief Justice in Division Bench, we considered that this decision required reconsideration in view of the observations contained in Mirza v. Jhanda Ram and subsequently adopted by a Full Bench in Dhani Ram v. District Official Receiver, Amritsar. In my judgment, therefore I L R 16 Lah. 173 must be overruled. The construction that I have placed on the language of sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and on the wording employed in section 60, subsection (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act is, it seems to me, in consonance with the intentions of the Legislature. At the time when this sub clause was incorporated in the Punjab Pre‑emption Act it is quite clear that sales in insolvency by the Court or Receiver were not pre‑emptible in view of the clear language of section 27 of the Punjab Laws Act, IV of 1872, and of the provisions of insolvency contained in the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, because sales by the Receiver were considered sales in execution of a decree as the order of adjudication was described as a decree and all the scheduled creditors were described as decree holders. The enactment of the Provincial Insolvency Act, III of 1907, and of the Act of 1920, in my opinion, did not effect any material change in the law so far as the sales by the Receiver or by the Court were concerned, as they were described to be in enforce ment of the order of adjudication. The result, therefore, is that in the exception contained in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act which covered sales by an Official' Receiver at the time when that exception was enacted in the' Act of 1905, continues to cover all such sales even if they are made under the Act of 1907 or the Act of 1920. It also seems to me that the interpretation that I hate placers on the respective provisions of law above‑mentioned saves all anomalies and inconsistencies which on a different interpretation are bound to arise. It was conceded by Mr. Shamair Chand, the learned counsel for the respondent, that if the word "execution" in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre, emption Act is not interpreted its the technical sense argued by him then the sale by the Insolvency Court in cases where no Receiver has been appointed would' be a sale in execution of the order of a Civil Court as the property would be sold by the order of the Insolvency Judge himself, It is not disputed that the Insolvency Court is a Civil Court: It is also conceded by Mr. Shamair Chand that on a liberal construction of the word "execution" contained in sub‑clause (5) of section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, the sale by the Collector in exercise of his powers under Schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a statement is submitted to him by the Insolvency Court under section 60, clause (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, would be a sale in execution of an order of the Revenue Officer, and that in both these cases the sale would be exempt from the right of pre‑emption. He, however, was not prepared to concede that a sale by the Receiver of property which was outside the scope of section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, in exercise of his powers under section 59, would also be a sale in enforcement of the order of adjudication. The learned counsel, therefore, in the result argued that if the Receiver sold property not covered by section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, then the right of pre‑emption could be exercised in respect of such a sale and that when the property was sold under section 58 by the Court itself in cases where no Receiver had been appointed, or where the sale was made by the Collector, in those cases the sale of the Insolvent's property would not be subject to the right of pre‑emption. It is a well‑established cannon of construction of statutes that so far as possible they should be construed in a manner which avoids inconsistencies and anomalies. All inconsistencies and anomalies are avoided if the acts of the Court in selling the property, the acts of the Receiver in effecting the sale of it and similarly the acts of the Collector in making sales under the schedule are all considered acts in enforcement of the order of adjudication or in other words in pursuance or in execution of that order. The construction, therefore, that I am placing on this clause has also the merit of avoiding anomalies which otherwise would arise in the law of pre‑emption. Having discussed the relevant provisions of the statute, I now propose the answer the questions that have been referred to this Fall Bench by the order of reference. My answer to the first question is that the sale by a Receiver of the property of an insolvent is a sale in execution of an order of a Civil Court, as such sale amounts to an enforcement of the order of adjudication. As regards the second question my answer is that in the first place the sale of land assessed to land revenue belonging to an insolvent and carried out in pursuance of the provisions of section 60 of the Provincial Insolvency Act amounts to a sale by an order of a Civil Court: in any case it certainly is a sale in execution of the order of a Revenue Officer. My reasons for answering this question in the two‑fold manner stated above are these. Section 60 lays down that "after the other property of the insolvent has been realised, the Court shall ascertain (a) the amount required to satisfy the debts proved under this Act after deducting the monies already received; (b) the immovable property of the insolvent remaining unsold; and (c) the encumbrances (if any) existing thereon; and shall forward a statement to the Collector containing the particulars aforesaid; and thereupon the Collector shall proceed to raise the amount so required by the exercise of such of the powers conferred on him by paragraphs 2 to 10 of the Third Schedule to the said Code as he thinks fit, and subject to the provisions of those paragraphs so far as they are applicable and shall hold at the disposal of the Court all sums that may come to his hands by the exercise of such powers". It seems to me that it is in pursuance of the statement sent to the Collector by the Court acting in enforcement of the order of adjudication that the Collector exercises his powers under Schedule III. Though the decision whether the property has to be sold or not is arrived at by the Collector, yet the Collector is merely the machinery provided by the Provincial Insolvency Act for recovery of the debts by sale of the property of the insolvent, and this machinery can only be brought into play by reason of the statement submitted by the Insolvency Court acting in enforcement of the order of adjudication. The sale, therefore, can be said to be a sale in enforcement of the order of adjudication. Be that as it may, it is quite clear that the Collector when he acts in exercise of his power under Schedule III has to determine by his own order whether he will sell the property or whether he can raise the amount required by the Insolvency Court by recourse to any of the other methods laid down in the Schedule from the property of the insolvent, and as soon as the Collector makes up his mind that the only method of recovery of the debts is by the sale of the property, he has to take a decision that the property should be sold and that decision amounts to an order by him as a Collector and when he proceeds to enforce that decision by putting the property to sale he acts in execution of his own order as a Collector. In other words, the sale is in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer. It was not seriously disputed that the Collector is a Revenue Officer while acting under the Schedule and in pursuance of section 60, subsection (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. That he is a Revenue Officer is beyond question. Section 3, subsection (6), of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act reads as follows:‑ "Any expression which is defined by section 3 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the meaning assigned to it in the said section." Section 3, sub‑clause (12) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act defines the word "Revenue Officer" as meaning a Revenue Officer having authority under this Act to discharge the functions of a Revenue Officer and section 6 of the same Act gives the classes of Revenue Officers, the Collector being one of the officers who falls in that classification. According to section 3 (10) of the General Clauses Act "Collector" means the chief officer in charge of the revenue administration of a district. It is, therefore quite clear that the Collector while making the sale acts as a Revenue Officer and he acts in execution of his own order and decision under the Schedule and therefore the sale of agricultural land belonging to an insolvent by the Collector is clearly a sale in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer and is thus not pre‑emptible. I would, therefore, return an answer to the reference by answering both the questions referred to the Full Bench in the affirmative. ABDUL RASHID, C. J.

I agree. ABDUL RAHMAN KT., J.‑

I agree with the answer given by my brother Mahajan to the second question referred to the Full Bench. It is not possible to read the word `execution' used in section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act as tantamount to `execution proceedings' taken in pursuance of an application for execution presented to a Court in accordance with Order XXI, rule 10/11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The term `execution' although well understood when dealing with the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be, while construing that term under section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, confined to the coercive processes employed by Courts in giving effect to their decrees or orders. The Revenue Officer referred in section 3 (5) (a) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act is not a Court and he has been designedly so described in order to distinguish him from a Revenue Court referred to in that M sub‑clause. It is not possible in my view to hold that the term `Revenue Officer' was superfluous as contended by learned counsel for the respondent. The power of sale, mortgage or letting of revenue paying immovable property has been conferred by statute on the Collector, and it is for him to decide as to what he would like to do in the circumstances. He alone has to decide whether he would sell or mortgage or give it or any portion thereof on lease. And once a decision has been taken for the sale of the whole or any portion of such property, any sale by him or by one of his Subordinate Officers will be in execution of that order. Such a sale would in my judgment fall within section 3 (5) (a) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act as being a sale in execution of an order of a Revenue Officer. I cannot, however, persuade myself to agree with the answer to the first question as given by my learned brother. It is true that by answering it in that manner we may be able to place sales by Official Receivers in the same line as sales by Courts and thus avoid what is regarded to be an anomaly by my brother. But we are not a Legislature and as interpreters our N plain duty is to construe the words of the statute according to the rules of grammar. It is not possible to depart from them when the language under consideration does not seem to be susceptible of another meaning, A Receiver or an Official Receiver when appointed by the Court does not derive his powers from the Court but from section 56 (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. When appointed, the estate of an insolvent vests in him for the purposes mentioned in, section 59 of the Act riot because these powers are delegated to him by the Court but conferred on him by the Statute. He is like an adopted son under the Hindu Law who, when adopted by a widow under the authority of her husband, inherits the property belonging to him not from the widow who had adopted him but independently of her from the husband to whom he had been adopted. In short, the Official Receiver inherits such powers as he possesses in consequence of the provisions of a section 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and not because he is acting as an agent of the Court. In fact the Court is declared by section 58 of the Act to have all the rights and the power conferred on a Receiver when none is appointed and ceases, like the Hindu widow, to retain them from the moment of his appointment and the estate comes to vest in him for certain purpose in the same manner as the widow is divested of her husband's estate from the moment she takes a boy in adoption. I am fully conscious that the whole of‑ an insolvent's estate does vest, in consequence of an order of adjudication, in a Receiver as soon as he is appointed and it does so with all its concomitant attributes and powers; but it cannot be overlooked that the Receiver has not been by law clothed with the power of sale of or of otherwise dealing with "immovable property paying revenue to the Government or held or let for agricultural purposes" belonging to an insolvent even if his debts have not been paid in full and money is still required for the purpose of satisfying his creditors. This cannot, however, be helped if the Legislature has in its wisdom taken jurisdiction to deal with the revenue paying immovable property away from the Court and conferred it on the Collector. This is the result which follows from the declaration made under section 68 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 on the 4th September 1939 under section 60 (1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Sub clause (2) of that section protects the restrictive provisions relating to execution of decrees or orders against immovable property such as contained in section 16 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act for as long as that and other similar enactments are in force and declares such provisions to be applicable to the enforcement of an order of adjudication made under the Provincial Insolvency Act. To the extent, however, that the Official Receiver possesses jurisdiction any act done by him e.g., a sale of insolvent's property which does not p require the permission or sanction of the Court, would be his act and not that of the Court and tae sale by him, cannot, therefore, be held to be a sale by the Court. I am fortified in this view by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sheobaran Singh v. Kulsum‑un‑Nissa and others. (I L R 49 All. 367) The head note brings out the point decided by their Lordships clearly, It reads:-- "When a share in a village in which a custom of pre‑emption exists has vested in the Official Assignee under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907, section 16, a sale by him is subject to the custom. An Official Assignee takes the property of an insolvent exactly as it stood in his person, with all its advantages and all its burdens." Section 16 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907 to which their Lordships were then referring corresponds to section 28 (2) of the present Act and the law as to the vesting of the insolvent's property in a Receiver on the making of an order of adjudication is exactly the same now as it was then. It was contended by Mr. Dunne before their Lordships that "in any case the custom (of pre‑emption) did not apply, as the sale was not by a co‑sharer and was involuntary." Commenting on this contention, their Lordships referred to the judgment of the High Court and observed as follows:‑--"Their ratio decidendi is really contained in a single sentence:‑ "Now, in the circumstances of the present case, this being the custom, it is clear that no co‑sharer has sold his share at all." "And again:‑ We find it impossible to hold the view that a village custom which refers only to a voluntary sale by one co‑sharer of his property can in any way apply to the case of an involuntary sale carried out against his wishes by a Court through a Collector or an Official Assignee, or anybody else." This view of the High Court was not accepted by their Lordships in the following words:‑ "(1) With deference to the learned Judges, it seems to their Lordships that this overlooks one of the fundamental principles of all arrangements for the realisation and distribution of a bankrupt's property. In every system of law the term may vary, but in all these is an official, be he called an assignee or trustee or any other name, and that official is by force of the statute invested in the bankrupt's property. But the property he takes is the property of the bankrupt exactly as it stood in his person, with all its advantages and all its burdens. The working out of the view taken by the learned Judges would lead to curious results. After all, in a custom of pre‑emption there is, so to speak, a debtor and creditor side: the debtor side is the obligation of the holder of the share to offer it to a co‑sharer; the creditor side is the right of the co‑sharer to buy. The property, if affected, would be somewhat less valuable than if it were free. But if the view of the learned Judges were right, the bankruptcy of A would have the double effect of forfeiting something belonging to B and of rendering the property of A more valuable in the hands of his Official Assignee than it was in his own. (2) It was pointed out that a sale in execution of a decree transferred the property free from a claim of pre‑emption. The reason is simple. The Code of Civil Procedure arranging for sale under a decree mentions and deals with rights of pre‑emption and gives those who hold them certain rights. Now when a Statute deals with certain rights it is easy to conclude that it deals with the total ambit of those rights and leaves nothing outside the provisions of the statute. An illustration of this doctrine may be found in the case of Attorney‑General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 A C

508. As an illustration of how there is no privilege of persons may be taken the case of Collector of Fattehpore v. Syed Yad All (1866 N W P H C R 33) where the Government as standing in right of a convict had to submit to the right of pre‑emption. Just, therefore, as if the conveyance had been made to an individual, that individual would have had at once the disadvantage and the privilege of the custom of pre‑emption, so the Official Assignee was in the same position and could only sell what he got." In my view this decision unequivocally answers the first question referred to us for opinion and is binding on us. But it has been distinguished by my brother Mahajan on the ground that their Lordships were neither construing section 3 (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act nor was their attention invited to section 21 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907 and because they were dealing with the right of pre‑emption given by the Code of Civil Procedure to a co‑sharer who had also along with a stranger made a bid for the property sold in execution of a decree. This may have been so, but does it really distinguish the under lying principle on which that case was decided by their Lordships from the present one. One might look at the reasons given by their Lordships in the first paragraph referred to above which had led them to differ from the judgment of the High Court. Finding that an official like an assignee "is invested in the bankrupt's property" by force of law, their Lordships held that "the property he takes is the property of the bankrupt exactly as it stood in his person with all its advantages and all its burdens". That was not all. It was brought out by their Lordships in the concluding portion of the first paragraph that if this were not so, the property in the hands of the Official Assignee would become more valuable as it would not be subject to the law of pre‑emption than it would have been if it had continued to vest in the insolvent who was by the law of pre‑emption, such as recognised by the Code of Civil Procedure, under an obligation to offer it to a co‑sharer before a sale to a stranger. In the second paragraph their Lordships adverted to the fact that the sale in execution of a decree was free from a claim of pre‑emption. But this was because the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure conferring limited rights of pre‑emption on the co‑sharers to get the property sold through Court on certain conditions were found to be exhaustive. By way of illustration their Lordships referred to two cases, the second of which showed that the Government had to submit to the right of pre‑emption as the convict whose property it had received would have been subject to that right. And then to the last sentence in the second paragraph which placed the Official Assignee in the same position as the person whose property had come to be invested in him. The decision of a Full Bench of five learned Judges in Basava Sankaran v. Parapati Anjaneyulu (I L R 50 Mad. 135) is also instructive. It was decided by the Full Court that the Official Receiver was not the agent of the Court and by a majority of four learned Judges that a sale by an Official Receiver in insolvency was not a transfer by operation of law or by or in execution of a decree or order of Court falling under section 2 clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act which is in pari materia with the words used in section 3 (2) (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act that we are called upon to construe. It may be as remarked by Krishnan, J. in his dissenting order that the sales by Official Receivers depend upon their validity on the order of adjudication passed by the insolvency Court. But does that order vest the property in them or is it in consequence of that order that they come to be possessed of the power of sale by law? Surely the latter and it would not be correct to regard them in the nature of Court sales. I find myself in respectful agreement with the decisions of the majority of four of the learned Judges of that Court. Relying on the language of section 60 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, it was contended by Mr. Mukand Lal Puri, learned counsel for the appellant, that the sale by the Official Receiver is in the enforcement or execution of the order of adjudication which is to be treated by virtue of that sub‑clause as a decree or order and hence outside the scope of sale as defined in section 3 (2) (5) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of a Division Bench in Mirza v. dhanda Rani (I L R 12 Lah. 367) where the contention by the counsel for the respondents in that case to the effect that "a sale by a Receiver of the property of the insolvent is not made in the enforcement of the order of an adjudication" was repelled in the following words:‑ "The argument is ingenious but entirely fallacious. It is true that the Receiver need not in all cases take the permission of the Court before selling the property of the insolvent, and in this and other matters re may act without reference to it. But it is beyond question that he derives his power to sell, and indeed all other powers, from the order of adjudication, to which he owes his very existence. This order has to be carried out in a variety of ways, one of which is the appointment of a Receiver and the performance by him of certain acts to administer the estate of the insolvent for the purpose specified in the Act. A sale of property under section 59 is, therefore, one of the modes in and the Receiver the agency by, which the order is `enforced'." It is true that a Receiver "derives his powers from the order of adjudication to which he owes his very existence." This is not, however, because the Court has authorised him to exercise or invested him with those powers but because he gets them as the result or effect of the order of adjudication which have been declared by law to flow from that order as soon as he is appointed. The illustration which I gave at the hearing would convey my meaning. One of the results of conversion from Islam under the Muhammadan Law is the dissolution of the marriage tie which a husband may not have intended on his apostasy or which a wife could not have in the; absence of any delegation by her husband effected. By the mere act of apostasy of a person, the marriage stands dissolved. The Receiver is not an agent of the Court but a creature of the Statute although the order of adjudication has to be enforced by him with the object of achieving the result for which it had been passed. The words `execution' and `enforcement' are not synonymous. The latter word is of wider import and expresses the object and not the method by which that object has to be achieved while execution refers to the methods employed to give effect to the decrees or orders (defined in the Code of Civil Procedure which is referred to in section 2 (2) of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and even otherwise well understood if the definitions in that Code are as such not held to apply; or if, used in the sense, of an act done in pursuance of or in obedience to the decree or order they (i.e., the decree or order) must have been in my view such as had directed the performance of the specific act or acts. Decrees for payment of money, for delivery of possession or for specific performance of a contract and orders for payment of costs of an adjournment, for the attachment of property of a witness under Order XVI, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, or for attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII, rule 6 of the Code are instances of frequent occurrence. So may the illustration of a sale effected in pursuance of an order to sell a property passed in execution of a decree or order be given as an illustration of my meaning, Since execution of a decree or order leads to its enforcement either wholly or partially, both of them may at times convey the same thing but that is not always so. In fact the order of adjudication in my way of thinking is not as such capable of execution. There is nothing in that order which has to be executed. It is declaratory in character. But it would be a meaningless order if it cannot be enforced when certain consequences are stated in the Insolvency Act to follow from that order and it is with the object of carrying out or enforcing those consequences that various powers are conferred on a R Receiver. The power to sell the insolvent's property under section 59 has therefore, been conferred on the Receiver to enforce the order of adjudication but it would not be correct to say that in using that power he is executing the order of adjudication or that he derived his powers from that order. It would have been more correct to say that he came to be invested with the powers over the estate of an insolvent by statute as a result or in consequence of the order of adjudication. Nor were the words `carried out' used by Tek Chand, J. with reference to an order of adjudication happy. They were ambiguous and could be used both for `enforcement' and for execution but the Legislature had used different words to convey different meanings. The word `execution' was employed by the Legislature with reference to decrees or orders against immovable property in section 60 (2) of the Insolvency Act and `enforcement' with reference to an order of adjudication s to which the protective or restrictive provisions of various enactments were declared to apply. The choice of these words was deliberate. It would not have been correct in my view to speak of execution of the order of adjudication although the expression `enforcement' of decrees or orders would have been correct. But that is because the word `enforcement' is of wider import and as the restrictive provisions referred to in this sub‑clause related to execution of decrees or orders the order of adjudication, although not otherwise in the nature of a decree or an executable order had to be declared of that character for that limited purpose. The use of both the words `execution' and `enforcement' in Order XXI, rule 83 (3), Civil Procedure Code, leads me to the same conclusion that they are not identically the same. It is with great deference to my brother, incorrect to suggest that the provisions contained in section 59 of the Provincial Insolvency Act are the "methods and modes" in, which the order of adjudication is to be enforced. The property of an insolvent comes to vest in a Receiver who has been specially mentioned in conjunction with `the Court' in section 28 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and the Receiver derives his powers from section 59 of the Act as soon as he is appointed. The powers conferred on him are not "the methods and modes" in which the order of adjudication is to be enforced but the "methods and modes" in which his own powers may be exercised in enforcement of, or with the object of giving effect to, the order of adjudication. But even if the powers of a Receiver are to be regarded as `methods or modes' of the enforcement of an order of adjudication, they are not exercised for the execution of that order but for the enforcement of that order. As to the decision of the Full Bench in Dhani Ram v. District Official Receiver (I L R 1943 Lah. 242) there appears to be no conflict in my view between this decision and the decision of the Fall Bench in Gurbakhsh Singh v. Sardar Singh (I L R 16 Lah. 173). The only two contentions advanced by the Official Receiver in Dhani Ram's case were:‑‑-- (a) that the exemption could not be claimed by the judgment debtor for attachment or sale of his residential house in accordance with the provisions of the Amending Act XII of 1940 by which a new clause (ccc) was added to section 60, Civil Procedure Code, as the property had vested in the Official Receiver in consequence of the order of adjudication passed in 1939 when it was not possible for the judgment debtor to claim such exemption, and (b) that in any event the exemption could not be claimed as the house had been mortgaged and the case, therefore, fell within the proviso to clause (ccc). Both of these contentions were repelled by Tek Chand, J. who had written the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench and rightly if I may say so with respect. The first contention was negatived as section 60 (2) was found to limit "the powers of the Receiver to deal with immovable property of the insolvent which has already vested in him if in regard to such property there exist certain restrictions or prohibitions under any enactment for the time being in force i.e., when the Receiver is proceeding to sell it." It was not necessary according to the learned Judge "that the restrictive or prohibitory law should have been in force at the time when the vesting order was passed." Similarly the argument that the Amending Act (XII of 1940) could not be applied to the property which had been vesting in the Receiver since 1939 as it "would be tantamount to giving retrospective effect to the Amending Act", was disallowed as the sale prohibited by the Act was being effected after it had come into force. But in coming to these decisions, the learned Judge referred to his judgment in Mirza v. Jhanda Ram and adverting to section 60 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act observed that it was "clear from these provisions that the Receiver derives authority to deal with the property of the insolvent from the order of adjudication and when he proceeds to sell it he is acting in enforcement of that order." have already dealt with Mirza's case and with great deference to the learned Judge I am not prepared to agree that the Receiver derives authority from the order of adjudication but really from the statute as a result or in consequence of the adjudication. I, however, respectfully agree that in exercising the power of sale, the Receiver is "acting in enforcement of that order." There was nothing else in that judgment to which any exception could have been taken. The second contention advanced before the Full Bench by the Official Receiver and the reasons given by the learned Judge in negativing that contention are not relevant. The decision of the Full Bench on the first question did not, it would be seen, rest on the argument whether the Receiver was deriving his powers from the order of adjudication or from the statute as a result of the order of adjudication and as it is not possible to construe a judgment like a statute. I would not have taken note of that observation in arriving at the conclusion that there was conflict between this and Gurbakhsh Singh decision. The decision of the learned Single Judge in Ram Rattan v. Fazl‑i -Haq (I L R 21 Lah. 40) who it may be observed was himself a party to the decision in Gurbakhsh Singh's case attempted to distinguish it by Saying that "it was a case under the Pre‑emption Act and the question of the effect of section 60 (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act did not arise and was not considered in that case." This was correct. But detached from the "provisions of any enact ment for the time being in force prohibiting or restricting the execution of decrees or orders against immovable property" which alone were made applicable by sub‑clause (2) of section 60 to the "enforcement of the order of adjudication" made under the Provincial Insolvency Act the observation that the sub‑clause "places a sale in enforcement of an order of adjudication on the same footing as the sale in execution of a decree or an order of a Court" was too general and cannot be defended. But the learned Judge was in that case dealing with section 16 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act which contained such prohibiting and restricting provisions as are referred to in section 60 (2) of the Insolvency Act and the observation must, therefore, be understood in that limited sense only. If so understood, this case does not help the contention advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that sales by Official Receiver and Courts stand on the same footing and must, therefore, have the same legal effect. It cannot be overlooked that a sale by Official Receiver is embodied in a sale‑deed and there is the same warranty of title in such a sale as there would be in a sale by a private individual. Sales through Courts have no such warranty and the purchasers are free to bid or not to bid at the T auction sales; but if they do, the Court does not guarantee that the persons whose property was being sold had any title or at least such as is stated to have been owned by them. I am not inclined to agree that the word enforced' in Order XXI, rule 32, Civil Procedure Code has been used as an alternative for the word `execution'. A woman not being treated as a chattel a decree for restitution of conjugal rights could not have been executed by the delivery of her person to the husband if it was in his favour and by forcing the wife to submit herself to all what a decree for restitution was passed for. The same is the case when a decree for specific performance of contract or a decree for an injunction are passed. They could not be executed but only enforced by putting the judgment debtors in civil prison or by attaching their property. The words `to enforce' in Article 183 of the Indian Limitation Act have been used so as to cover cases where judgments, decrees and orders are not merely for payment of money or delivery or possession of immovable property but also other judgments; decrees and orders as well e.g. those mentioned in Order XXI, rule 32, Civil Procedure Code. The word `enforcement' being of wider import would cover cases where decrees have to be executed although the word `execution' might not have covered cases where they had to be enforced. A decree could for instance be enforced by a private demand and satisfaction although it could not in that case be said to have been executed. Similarly an award could have been enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court but not being really a decree, it could not be strictly speaking executed. I am, therefore, of the view that the sale in execution of a decree for money or of an order of a Civil Court is not the same as the sale by a Receiver in enforcement or with the objects of giving effect to an order of adjudication and it is only the former which have been excluded from the definition of `sale' by the Punjab Pre‑emption Act and not the latter. I would for the above reasons answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. E. C. MARTEN, J.‑

I agree with my brother Abdur Rehman. G. D. KHOSLA, J.‑

I agree with conclusions arrived at by my brother Mahajan and the reasons therefore. This case will now be remitted to the Division Bench for final disposal. A.H. Reference answered.