P L D 1976 Lahore 1115 (PLP)

This appeal is directed against an order dated 9‑9‑1971 passed by Mr. Aqeel Ahmad Khan, Civil Judge, Ist\ Class, Rawalpindi by which he dismissed an application submitted by the appellant under section 20 of the Arbitration Act praying for a direction to the respondent to file the Arbitration Agreement between the parties and for appointment of an Arbitrator. The petition was dismissed in view of section 69 of Partnership Act on the finding that there was a partnership between the appellant and one Imdad Hussain in the business of firm Nazir Hussain & Co. and this partnership had not been dissolved:

2. During the pendency of this appeal was enforced an Act known as Capital Development Authority (Abatement of Arbitration Proceedings) Act, 1975, section 3 of which provides for the annulment and abrogation of all agreements between the C. D. A. and the contractors providing for reference to Arbitration of any dispute if such agreement relates to the execution of any project and works or to the supply of any goods or labour or to the performance of any obligation. This section also provides for abatement of other arbitration proceedings.

3. The learned counsel for the respondent argued on the basis of this provision of law that the appellant's application under section 20 had ceased to be maintainable in view of the provisions about the abrogation or annul ment of the arbitration agreement. He also urged that the proceedings started on the basis of that agreement has abated under the provisions of clause (d) of subsection (1) of the above section. This section is reproduced below for the proper appreciation of the point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent "

3. Agreement of proceedings before arbitrators etc.‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, or any order of a Court or any agreement,‑ (a) any provision in an agreement entered into before the coming into force of this Act by or on behalf of the Authority and a contractor relating to the execution of any project or works or to the supply of any goods or labour or to the performance of any obligation, providing for reference to arbitration of any dispute arising out of the agreement or any term or condition thereof shall stand abrogated and annulled and be of no effect ; (b) all arbitration proceedings in pursuance of any such agreement as is referred to in clause (a), whether the reference to arbitration was made by consent of the parties thereto, by order of a Court or otherwise, pending before an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire immediately before the coming into force of this Act shall forthwith abate and, save as hereinafter provided, shall be of no effect ; (c) any award made by an arbitrator. arbitrators, or umpire in pursuance of any such agreement as is referred to in clause (a) shall, unless the award has been made the rule of the Court, or partly or wholly implemented or acted upon, stand annulled and be of no effect, and any proceedings in respect of such award, if pending immediately before the coming into force of this Act shall abate (d) all proceedings in relation to an application made to a Court for referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant to an agreement referred to in clause (a) shall abate, and any order made by a Court on such application referring the dispute to arbitration shall be of no effect ; and (e) any dispute referred to arbitration the proceedings whereof have abated by reason of the provisions of this section shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. (2) The fees to be paid to an arbitrator, arbitrators or an umpire in respect of proceedings which have abated or an award which has been annulled under subsection (1) shall, unless mutually agreed to by such arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, the Authority and tae contractors, be of such amount, and shall be payable by the Authority or the contractors, or in such proportion by the Authority and the contractors, as the Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter of the dispute referred to arbitration may determine on application made to it in this behalf by the arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire, as the case may be. (3) In determining the fees to be paid to an arbitrator, arbitrators or an umpire under subsection (1), the Court shall take into consideration the stage of the proceedings before the arbitrator, arbitrators or the umpire, as the case may be, at which such proceedings abated under this section t Provided that the fees so determined shall in no case exceed the fees agreed upon by the Authority and the contractors at the time of making the reference to arbitration or at any time thereafter and consented to by the arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire, as the case may be.

4. It is not denied that the appellant is a contractor whose case is affected by this Act, since the agreement of arbitration is a part of the agree ment for execution of the Capital Development Authorities' project or work known as "Construction of Northern Carriage Way off

1. J. Principal Road from inter‑section of Islamabad Highway and Murree Road to Sewerage treatment plant". The learned coups‑l for the appellant however, challenged this law as ultra vices of the Constitution for the following reasons t‑ (i) The provisions of Article 37 of the Constitution in clause (d) are that the State shall ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice. The provisions of this Act relegate the parties to a position where they have to get the settlement of their dispute through the agency of Courts of law which take a long time in disposing of matters pending before them and for invoking whose jurisdiction a large amount of court‑fee has to be paid at every step whether of suit or of appeal. (li) Under Article 173 all the contracts are required to be expressed to have been made in the name of the President and the present agreement has been executed in accordance with similar provisions under the abrogated Constitution of 1962. The sanctity of this agreement is lost by this Act. (iii) Act of Parliament should be prospective in nature and should save substantial and vested rights. The arbitration clause in the agreement vests the parties with one such substantial and vested right. This right cannot be lightly taken away by resort to legislation. (iv) The legislation is extremely discriminatory since it singles out some contractors of only one Corporation i.e. the Capital Development Authority for depriving them of the facility of speedy justice through arbitration. It also discriminates between contractors of the same Corporation also since the Act of 1975 does not apply to and affect contracts between the C. D. A. and foreign companies.

5. None of these arguments have appealed to me. Article 37 is in Chapter 2 of Part II which deals with "principles of policy". Article 30 in that Chapter provides that the validity of a law shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not in accordance with the principles of policy. The appellant cannot be allowed to challenge the validity of the law on the first ground. Moreover the promise to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice cannot be interpreted as a promise to allow litigants to set up tribunals of their own choice in preference to or overriding the Courts of the country. No provision of the Constitution has been shown to me which may bar the authority of the Parliament to pass a statute annulling or abrogating the agreement taking out the jurisdiction of the arbitrators or passing a law effecting the existing substantive and vested rights. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution which controls and limits the plenitude of legislative powers, the parliament is sovereign in legislative sphere and can make any law affecting rights, or creating obligations, prospective or retrospective. There are some constitutions which provide against making a retroactive law or making a lam affecting vested rights e.g. Constitution of El. Salvador 1950 ; Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, 1940 ; Constitution of the United States of Brazil, 1946 ; Political Constitution of the United States of Mexico, 1917 ; Political Constitution of the Republic of Honduras, 1936 ; Constitu tion of the Republic of Haiti, 1950 ; Constitution of the Republic of Peru, 1933 ; Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay, 1940 ; Constitution of the Republic of Panama, 1946 ; Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua, 1950 and Constitution of Norway, 1814. Similarly S. 1. (10) of Article III of the Constitution of Phillippines, 1935 provides against passing of any ex post facto law or a law impairing the obligations of Contract. But the Constitu tion of Pakistan does opt so curtail the legislative sovereignty of the Parliament I only Article 12 provides against retroactivity but that is applicable only to legislation making an act or omission punishable which was not punishable at the time of commission of act or omission or providing for a penalty greater than or of a kind different than the penalty prescribed for the offence at the time when the offence was committed. The first three points, therefore. have no force.

6. The last point deals with the equality clauses in Article 25 of the Constitution. This clause is as follows :‑ 25(1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. (2) ......... (3) .........

7. This Article deals with apparently two distinct prohibitions against discrimination. One is equality before the law and the other is equal protection of law. The question is whether these two phrases are co‑extensive or they vary in significance. No authority has been brought to my notice in which the scope of these phrases might have been considered, and decided. In Jibendra Kishora v. Province of East Pakistan (P L D 157 S C (Pak.) 9), the question whether the two expressions had the same meaning or bore different connotations was not pursued by their Lordships since the learned counsel for the appellant stated that he was not invoking this part of the declaration in support of his case. In Zain Noorani v. Secretary National Assembly (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 46), it was first urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no practical difference between the two expressions as they both aim at equal status, but later on submitted that there was a difference. He gave an illustration. It was however considered unnecessary to discuss this subject at any length in view of the concession that mere differentiation or inequality in treatment does not amount to discrimination.

8. The phrase 'equal protection of the laws' had its origin, as held in the case of Jibendra Kishore, in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and as such has been interpreted in innumerable cases decided by the Supreme Court of that country and the same interpretation has been adopted by the Courts in India and Pakistan. In Loulsvile Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman (P L D 157 S C (Pak.) 9), the following principle was propounded :‑ "The equal protection clause, like the due process of law clause, is not susceptible of exact delimitation. No definite rule in respect of either, which automatically will solve the question in specific instances, can be formulated. Certain general principles, however, have been established in the light of which the cases as they arise are to be considered. In the first place, it may be said generally that the equal protection clause means that the rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, and that it applies to the exercise of all the powers of the State which can affect the individual or his property, including the power of taxation. It does not, however, forbid classification ; and the power of the State to classify for pur poses of taxation is of wide range and flexibility, provided always that the classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike'. That is to say mere difference is not enough: ,the attempted classification `must always rest upon some difference' which bears a reasonable and just 'relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. Discriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision." Professor Willis dealing with the 14th amendment of the United States ‑Constitution explained the equality clause as follows :‑ "The inhibition of the Amendment . . . . . was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating the hostile legislation. It does not take from the States the power to classify either in the adoption of police laws, or tax laws, or eminent domain laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. Similarity, not identity of treatment is enough. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis . . . . . . Many different classifications of persons 'have been upheld as constitutional. A law applying only to any person or one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it."

9. Cooley in Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition, Vol. II (vide pages :803 to 813) explains the principle of equal protection of 'the law. He says that "those who make the laws are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court and the countrymen at plough. This is a .maxim in constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority and binding force of legislative enactments". He explains the principle of classification . as follows :‑ "Laws public in their objects may, unless express constitutional provision forbids, be either general or local in their application ; they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend to all citizens, or be confined to particular classes, as minors or married women, bankers or traders, and the like. The authority that legislates for the State at large must determine whether particular rules shall extend to the whole State and all its citizens, or, on the other hand, to a sub‑division of the State or a single class of its citizens only. The circumstances of a particular locality, or the prevailing public sentiment in that section of the State, may require or make acceptable different police regulations from those demanded in an other, or call for different taxation and a different application of the public moneys. The Legislature may, therefore, prescribe or authorise different laws of police, allow the right of eminent domain to be exercised in different cases and through different agencies and prescribe peculiar restrictions upon taxation in each distinct municipality, provided the State constitution does not forbid. These discriminations are made constantly ; and the fact that the laws are of local or special operation only is not supposed to render them obnoxious in principle. The Legislature may also deem it desirable to prescribe peculiar rules for the several occupations and to establish distinctions in the rights, obligations, duties, and capacities of citizens. The business of common, carriers, for instance, or of bankers, may require special statutory regulations for the general benefit, and it may be matter of public policy to give labourers in one business a specific lion for their wages, when it would be impracticable or impolitic to do the same for persons engaged in some other employments. If the laws be otherwise unobjectionable, all that can be required in these cases is that they be general in their application to the class or locality to which they apply ; and they are then public in character, and of their propriety and policy the Legislature must judge." "But a statute would not lie constitutional, which should prescribe a , class or a party for opinion's sake, or which should select particular individuals from a class or locality, and subject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others in the same locality or class are exempt." He proceeds to say :‑ "Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim of the law, and if special privileges are granted, or special burdens or restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the Legislature designed to depart as little as possible from this funds mental maxim of Government."

10. In the case of Jibendra Kishore the Supreme Court of Pakistan summed up the concept of Equal Protection clause in the following words :‑ "Equal protection of law means that no person or class of persons shall, be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes, in like circumstances, in their lives, liberty and property and in pursuit of happiness. The guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons shall be treated alike,.. under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed" The Supreme Court of India in State of Bombay v. F. L. Balsara (AIR1951SC318 ) enuncia ted certain propositions, which may be paraphrased as follows :‑ (1) "Equality" does not mean that every law must have universal applica tion for all persons who are not by nature, attainment, and circums tances, in the same position ; the varying needs of different classes, require separate treatment. (2) "The State' may classify persons for legitimate purposes. (3) "Every classification is likely to produce some inequality ; the mere‑ production of inequality is not enough to invalidate a statute. (4) If the law deals equally with the members of a well defined class. it is not obnoxious if it does not apply to other persons. (5) A classification must be based on a real and substantial distinction,. bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved ; the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. (6) A statute is presumed to be constitutional ; a Legislature is presumed to understand and appreciate the needs of the people ; its laws are presumed to be directed to problems made manifest by experience. Discrimination is presumed to be based on adequate grounds. (7) The presumption may be rebutted by proof that, on the face of the statute, it hits a particular person or class, and there is no classification or no difference peculiar to that individual or class. Equal protection of law ensures a guarantee that all persons shall be treated alike. Its aim is to procure equality of rights, privileges, and capacities, to] have "one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court and tile country man at plough", to remove prerogatives of birth, or privileges or distinctions by reasons of race, birth, social class, sex, religion or even political ideas. Its object is that the privileges or immunities of the citizens in regard to their life, liberty, property, opportunity of employment and pursuit of happiness shall not be abridged. Tile protection extends to the enjoyment of civil and political rights and the performance of public duties and political rights. This does not however mean that the Legislature shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, or the varying needs of different classes requiring separate treatment. As observed in the case of Zain Noorani "mere differentiation or inequality in treatment does not amount to discrimination in contravention of Article 5 (similarly worded Article in the Constitution of 1956) and that the Article prohibits only unreasonable or arbitrary differentiation, having no rational basis with reference to the legislation."

11. In the case of Jibendra Kishore their Lordships traced the origin of the "Equality before the Law" clause to Dicey. It was observed that this expression was first used by that "celebrated English Constitutional writer, as one of the three aspects of his doctrine of the Rule of Law, long after the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to it were adopted." The meanings in which the expression was used by Dicey was thus explained "As propounded by him the theory of "Equality before the law" means that no man is above the law, but that every man whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunal. In other words, that every official is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen, and if he commits a tort, he is liable for it in the ordinary civil Courts."

12. Wade and Phillips explain in their Constitutional Law (5th Edition page 56) the meaning in which Dicey used the expression "What the rule of law requires is that powers should be defined by law and that any abuse of power or other wrongful act by public officers should be subject to control by the Courts in the same way as any wrongful act committed by a private citizen. The orders of the crown or of a superior officer are no defence to a prosecution for a crime or a civil action in respect of tortious injury. This is what Dicey meant by "Equality before the law."

13. Dicey has thus used the expression "Equality before the law" in the sense that,‑ (a) no man is above the law, (b) powers should be defined by law (c) every man, whatever be his rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, and (d) every official is under the same responsibility for every act done with out legal justification as any other citizen, and if he commits a tort he is liable for it in the ordinary Courts. The sense in which primarily the expression is used is that of equal justice. It is in this sense that Jennings used it in his law of the Constitution (3rd Ed. page 49). He treated the expression as meaning that "among equals the law should be equal and should be equally administered, that like should be treated alike". He explained that "the right to sue and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action should be the same for all citizens of full age and understanding and without distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political influence." In his book Justice and Adminis trative Law (3rd Edition, pp. 368, 369) Robson deals with the concept of equality before the law in connection with the theory of "Judicial Impartiality". He writes "No less important than consistency as an attribute of the judicial spirit, and intimately connected with it in some ways, is the tendency toward equality. Inequality before the law was the principle which prevailed in former ages. These were recognised differences of liablity varying with the rank, age, and sex of the offender. But the marks of justice according to law in the modern sense are generality and equality. The rule of law applies to the whole generality of citizens and all men are equal before the law. This does not mean that every one has similar rights, or a right to the same things ; but all rights of the same kind are equal as between different individuals." He cites the following illustrations to elucidate this doctrine :‑ (1) Every purchaser who has been fraudulently deceived as to the goods which he has bought must be treated alike: there must be no discri mination between them on grounds of religion or personal attrac tiveness, or wealth, or nationality, or excellence at golf. (2) All petitioners for divorce must be subjected to the same rule of law. (3) Adultery cannot be excused in one respondent because of his laudable war record, or because he and the judge have a mutual friend. He then says that "This disinterested treatment of each, member of a legal category on similar lines, regardless of race, religion, antecedents, physical appear ance, intellect, public spirit, or occupation is the foundation of judicial impartiality." These principles which have been collected in support of judicial impartiality can be applied to the interpretation of the phrase "equality before the law" In the the context of the prohibition against making a law inconsistent with that equality. But even this concept of equality before the law does not envisage that all laws must apply to all citizens. This is explained by Wade and Phillips at p. 55 of this above mentioned book "Equality before the law does not mean that the powers of the private citizen are the same as powers of the public official." This point was illustrated by the comparison between the power of arrest possessed by police constable which are wider than those of private citizens. It was stated that "it is not contrary to the rule of law that special powers should be given to public officers to enable them to perform their public duties". Similarly "it is not inconsistent with the principle of "equality before the law" that, as we have seen, certain groups of the community, e.g. soldiers and clergy are subject to laws which do not affect the rest of the community, because the laws apply to all members of a particular calling. They are subject like others to the general law though they incur additional liabilities as well as privileges by reason of their calling."

14. The theory of equality before the law also allows and recognises categorisation and classification because as Wade and Phillips recognize that law may be made to cater to the needs of certain groups of the community or members of a particular calling. Thus while defining the powers of public officers privileges may be granted to them which may extend to rendering them immune from being sued or prosecuted for anything done by them in due discharge of their duties or in exercise of their legal functions. These privileges and immunities are sometimes "conferred solely to ensure the impartial administration of the law and . . . . . . cannot be recognized as qualifications of the rule of law" Immunities are likewise granted to the rulers of other States and their diplomatic agents. They are justifiable on account of International Law obligations. It may be possible to justify privileges in the executive in times of emergency on the principles of "executive necessity".

15. That the concept of equality before the law recognises categorisation or classification is clear from the treatment of this principle by Robson. At page 372 of "Justice and Administrative Law" Third Edition he says :‑‑ "The notion of equality before the law is like the tendency towards consistency, not confined to judicial proceedings, but extends to many spheres of scientific thought and administrative activity. The very idea of a law involves the conception of a rule or principle which applies universally over a given field . . . . . . . . . . . . . This is particularly noticeable in the realm of public administration. The whole system of Government administration in England today relies on an equality of treatment being meted out, and a potential equality of service being rendered, by the executive agent to all who fall within a particular category. The late Lord Passfield has pointed out that modern democracy must, cater essentially for minorities ; but the multiplication of categories does not prevent, and may actually promote, equality of treatment within each category. The law itself insists upon administrative equality. In the granting of licences to enable motor buses to ply for hire, for example, a local authority was required to act judicially and 'must treat all applicants alike'. This does not mean that all applicants are entitled to obtain licences, but that all are entitled‑to have the same criteria applied to them, in short, to be taken on their merit, and not disqualified on account of irrelevant considera tions." The portions underlined* by me in this quotation make out my point that the principle of equality before the law envisages classification which, no doubt, must be reasonable and rot arbitrary. This is what was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Zain Noorani's case :‑ "It was not disputed that for the application of either of the principles equality between the parties concerned is (not ?) essential, that mere differentiation or inequality in treatment does not amount to discri mination in contravention of Article 5 (of the 1956 Constitution) and that the Article prohibits only unreasonable or arbitrary differentiation having no rational basis with reference to the legislation." In Ataur Rahman v. The State (P L D 1967 S C 23) and A. R. Niazi v. Pakistan (P L D 1968 S C 119) and others, the two expressions appear to have been assumed to be co‑extensive. In the first case it was observed that the protection against prosecution without previous sanction of the appropriate Government conferred on public servants was discriminatory. In the later case evacuee trust property was considered to be a separate class of property. The finding of discrimination in one case and of rational classification in the other was based on both the clauses i.e. 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection before the law'.

10. It will be evident from the above discussion that both the phrases i.e. "equal protection before the law" and "equality before the law" envisage that‑ (a) rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances regardless of race, religion, antecedents, physical ap pearance, intellect, public spirit, political views, wealth or occupation. (b) all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed, (c) powers should be defined by law, (d) Every man, whatever he, his rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the land and amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals or Courts, (e) Equality or equal protection permit reasonable classification and mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not amount to discrimination. Apparently these two clauses appear to be co‑extensive. The line between the two concepts if there be any, is very thin. In Surya Pal Singh v. U. P. Government (A I R 1951 All. 674), it was held that the two expressions cannot be considered to be synonymous ; the expression 'equality before the law' may be defined as the equal subjection of all persons to the ordinary law o1 the land while the other expression means the protection of equal laws. But respectfully speaking this is a distinction without distinction. That equal subjection of all persons to the ordinary law is also included in the 'Equal 'Protection' clause is clear from the view of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Jibendra Kishore that "the guarantee of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed". Cooley said while explaining Equal Protection clause that there must be one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court and the countrymen at plough. This is nothing but equal subjection to law.

17. Both these phrases were used in the Universal Declaration of Humat Rights, But it appears that long before that declaration the purpose sough to be achieved by the two phrases has been achieved in the United State: by the Equal Protection clause while in a number of other countries it has been achieved by the inclusion in their constitutions of the Equality before the law clause. These are the Constitutions of Belgium, 1831 ; Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 1847 ; Constitution of the Grand Dutchy of Luxemberg, 1868, Constitution of Monaco, 1911 ; Form of Government of Finland, 19119 ; Constitution of Eire, 1937 ; Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay, 1940 and Constitution of the Republic of Cuba, 1940. It is not necessary to mention a number of other constitutions which were framed and promulgated in and after the middle of the forties of the century.

18. The two phrases being overlapping if not co‑extensive in character, 1 same principle of classification will be kept in view while judging the o ,vines of the Act of 1975. This principle has been elaborately 'discussed) recently in Brig. (Reid.) F. B. All v. The State (P L D 1975 S C 506). It was held that "the principle is well recognised that a State may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and make laws applicable only to persons or objects within a class. In fact almost all legislation involves some kind o ,classification whereby some people acquire rights/or suffer disabilities which others do not : What, however, is prohibited under this principle is legislation favouring some within a class and unduly burdening others. Legislation affecting alike all persons similarly situated is not prohibited. The mere fact that legislation is made to apply only to a certain group of persons and not to others does not invalidate the legislation if it is so made that all person subject to its terms are treated alike under similar circumstances. This is ..considered to be permissible classification".

19. Applying this principle to the present case it will be seen that to categorise Pakistani contractors who have entered into an agreement with the Capital Development Authority for execution of any project or work or for supply of any goods or labour or for performance of any obligation, as a class is permissible classification and does not invalidate the legislation since this law treats all persons belonging to this class alike. It does not favour some within the class and unduly burden others. The fact that some firms have been left out of this classification to form a different class does not make this legislation arbitrary on account of the implications of International law as well as the international agreements between Pakistan on the one hand .and the countries of origin of those firms on the other.

20. The object of annulment of arbitration agreements appears to be to avoid loss to the Capital Development Authority from the latent misconduct of the arbitrators in allowing big and unreasonable claims of the contractors which it is not possible to prove in a Court of law on the limited grounds of section

30. Arbitration Act. Existence of error apparent on the face of the award `is no doubt a ground for setting aside the award but this ground is of no availing a case where the award does not give any grounds. The classification cannot, therefore, be said to be arbitrary, and the Act is Intra vires of the Constitution.

21. The arbitration agreement having been annulled by the Act of 1975, the application of the appellant for reference of his dispute with the Capital Development Authority to arbitration becomes incompetent in law. The proceedings before this Court abate. The appeal is accordingly disposed of as having abated. The only remedy open to the appellant is to file a civil suit for recovery of money claimed by him. There will be no order as ~to costs. S. A. A. Appeal held abated.