P L D 1976 Lahore 355 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.‑On 25th July 1975, respondent No. 1, Sh. Shaukat Ali, the then President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association,,. addressed some of the members of the Rawalpindi Bar Association and scandalised the High Court and its Judges. On this Mr. Habib‑ul‑Wahab Elkheiri, Advocate Rawalpindi, filed an application bearing Criminal Original No. 58/1975 under Article 204 of the Constitution bringing those facts to the notice of this Court and alleged that Sh. Shaukat Ali had committed gross contempt of this Court, therefore, action may be taken against him in accordance with law. Mr. Habib‑ul‑Wahab Elkheiri also filed a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Rawalpindi Bar Association supplied to him by the Secretary of that Association in support of his application. Our learned brother Zaki- ud‑Din Pal, J. on 6‑8‑1975 issued notice in the application to Sh. Shaukat Ali to show cause as to why action should, not be taken against him for having committed contempt of this Court. In view of the importance of the matter the learned Single Judge referred the case to the learned Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. The Chief Justice, therefore, constituted a larger Bench of seven Judges and fixed the hearing for 22nd of September 1975.

2. After the issuance of notice to respondent No. 1 in the case, there appeared an advertisement in various newspapers under the caption "Lawyers Unite" and its relevant portion is reproduced below :‑ "The following Resolution moved by the Executive Committee was unanimously passed in a widely attended joint meeting of the High Court Bar Association and Lahore District Bar Association held in High Court Bar premises today. Considering the notice of Contempt of Court issued to Mr. Shaukat Ali, the President of High Court Bar, the Meeting resolved that after hearing the address of the President and his statement made at Rawalpindi on 25th of July 1975, it is clear that it does not amount to contempt. If it does, the Members of the Bar assume responsibility and nominate the Ex‑Chief Justice Mr. Bashiruddin Abmad Khan and the Ex‑Attorney‑General Haji Ghias Muhammad to place the viewpoint of the Bar to the Bench to avoid, confrontation and settle with honour and dignity." The resolution was given wide publicity in the various newspapers and was shown as having been published under the signatures of Izharul Haque, respondent. The publication amounted to an expression and publication of opinion on a matter which was sub judice before the High Court in Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975 and prima facie constituted contempt of this Court. Therefore, notices of contempt were issued to the different newspapers and Izharul Haque, respondent in that case which was registered as Criminal Original No. 60 of 1975.

3. The main case (Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975) against Sh. Shaukat Ali came up before the larger Bench on 22‑9‑1975 when the respondent filed his written statement controverting the allegations and denied the speech attributed to him in his address to the members of the Rawalpindi Bar Association. It was decided that evidence in the case be recorded by us, in Division Bench on 29‑9‑1975.

4. In the meantime the case against Izharul Haque respondent came up for hearing before a Full Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mushtaq Hussain and Muhammad Akram, JJ., on 23‑9‑1975 and he was found guilty of contempt of this Court for having published the advertisement in a number of newspapers containing an expression of opinion in a matter which was sub judice before this Court, in the form of proceedings ‑for contempt of Court started against Sh. Shaukat Ali in Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975. Izharul Haque was, therefore, awarded simple imprisonment of six months and fined Rs. 2,000; failing the payment of the amount he was ordered to undergo further imprisonment of two months.

5. On 27‑9‑1975 Izharul Haque was released from jail in pursuance to ,the bail allowed to him by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on appeal against his conviction and sentence. After his release respondents Nos. 1 to 4 alongwith some others took out a procession which started from the District Bar Association, passing along Urdu Bazar, Ganpat Road, Anarkali Bazar. ,entered upon Shahrah‑i‑Quaid‑i‑Azam and ultimately dispersed at the gate of the Lahore High Court. The procession carried a number of placards and banners which contained the following inscriptions :‑ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Lawyers unite against corruption. (8) Crust corruption; and (9) Shooting on our President condemned. All these inscriptions can be clearly deciphered from the photographs of the procession, which are placed on record in the form of Annexures "B/1" to "B/6" and admitted by the respondents.

6. The then Advocate‑General laid information before this Court in the form of the above petition, on 30‑9‑1975. It is alleged in this petition that the taking out of the procession, the placards and certain slogans uttered by the processionists constituted gross contempt of this Court. The allegations and the annexures enclosed therewith disclosed a prima facie case against the respondents for having committed contempt of this Court. We, therefore, issued notices to them to show cause as to why they should not be punished for it.

7. In this case Sh. Shaukat Ali respondent did not contest the notice and tendered his apology. But the remaining respondents appeared before us and raised a number of pleas to which we shall presently refer. Before proceeding further it is necessary to mention here that the raising of the offensive slogans set out in Annex. `A' attached to the petition, attributed to the respondents, was denied by them. We, therefore, decided to leave our that part of the case and have confined ourselves to the admitted facts before us in this petition.

8. It is common ground before us that the respondents took out the procession in question in the circumstances narrated above displaying the various placards and banners. In this connection the remaining respon dents 2 to 4 pleaded in defence that the taking out of the procession and the displaying of the placards and banners in the circumstances of this case did not constitute contempt of this Court. But the defence set up by some of these respondents is contradictory. One of their main pleas before us was to the effect that all these placards and banners were not at all directed against the High Court and were addressed to the administrative and executive authorities of the Government in power. Therefore, the first and foremost question before us is to find out as to whether the procession and the placards and banners were in fact directed against the High Court or not.

9. In this connection we may reproduce below from the written statement dated 6‑11‑1975 filed by Sh. Shaukat Ali respondent "I do not want to contest the proceedings. I am extremely sorry and tender unqualified apology. I have profound respect for this learned Court and place myself completely in its merciful hands." Afterwards also on 25‑11‑1975, while further clarifying his position, he made the following statement on solemn affirmation before us :‑ "I admit to have joined the procession carrying the placards, photographs (Exhs. B‑1 to B‑6). I also admit that this tantamounted to contempt of this Court. I have, therefore, tendered unqualified apology. As a matter of fact the apology which I tendered on the very first day i.e. 6th of November 1975, also meant the same thing." This unequivocal statement by Sh. Shaukat All respondent amounts to the admission of guilt on his part. He was at that time the President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association and had led the procession. It leaves no room for doubt that the taking of the procession and the placards and the banners were all directed against the High Court and constituted contempt of this Court.

10. Riazul Hassan, respondent No. 4, admitted that at the relevant time when the procession was taken out, the contempt case (Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975) against Sh. Shaukat Ali was pending in this Court. He also admitted that Izharul Haque respondent had been convicted by a Full Bench of this Court in Criminal Original No. 60/75 on 23‑9‑1975. In yet another case in Criminal Original No. 78 of 1975 Sh. Shaukat Ali was served with a show‑cause notice and he tendered his unqualified apology in the case for having committed contempt of this Court. In all these cases one or, other of the respondents figured as the chief actor in the drama played in quick succession, with no other object but to defame and scandalise the superior Courts of this Country. All along these Courts were made the target of their concerted attack to shake and undermine the confidence of the people in them. Similar proceedings (Criminal Original No. 72 of 1975) had to be started against Riazul Hassan respondent also for having made an offensive speech before the High Court Bar Association towards the end of August 1975. There is yet another case (Criminal Original No. 73 of 1975) in which, on 18‑9‑1975, the Editor, Printer etc. of the weekly Lail‑o- Nihar were found guilty and convicted for contempt of this Court in defaming and scandalizing the High Court and its Judges by maliciously publishing a highly mischievous article and by distortion of facts.

11. In case the reply of respondent No. 4 is read, as it should be, in the background of these facts then there is no room left for any doubt in our minds that the procession and placards/banners in question were directed against the High Court which was the main target of their attack. Izharul Haque respondent was convicted by this Court for contempt. On appeal against the order the Supreme Court allowed bail to him. He was actually released on bail on 27‑9‑1975 and admittedly this was made the occasion for the procession itself in which these placards and banners were publicly displayed. One of them was Long live Sheikh Izharul Hague Advocate." At the hearing before us at no stage it was even suggested that he had rendered any signal service to the Association and the reason for the procession thus taken out is not far to see. He was made a hero for having defied the law and committed contempt of this Court along with few of the lawyers shown in the photographs (Annex. B‑1 to B‑6), while by far an overwhelmingly large majority of the lawyers chose to disassociate with them by staying away. Another banner displayed in the procession was the lawyers should be allowed protection against contempt of Court." The so‑called protection was sought against the Courts and it conveyed the suggestion as if the lawyers were aggrieved against any tyrannical treatment at the hands of the Courts. Another banner prominently displayed in the procession was stop nepotism and malpractices." In at least two of the photographs (Annexe B‑3 and B‑5) this banner and the other banners with are both prominently displayed." Now the procession was taken out by the lawyers and some of them were in robes. By their very profession they are concerned with the working of the Courts. The occasion for this procession was the bail allowed by the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting Izharul Haque fat its contempt. The news about the repeated attempts made by some of these lawyers to scandalise the superior Courts, beginning with the mischievous speech made by Sh. Shaukat Ali as President of the Lahore High Court Bar at Rawalpindi on 25th of July 1975, were given wide publicity and appeared in the Press along with the proceedings taken by the Courts in that connection from time to time. The irresistible conclusion from all these put together is that the procession, the placards and the banners were directed against the High Court as their target of attack and protests. The other placard and banners were merely meant to buttress their attack in this direction. We are, therefore, satisfied that the procession, the placards and banners under consideration were all directed against the supreme Courts in general and this Court in particular. There is no truth in the plea set up by the respondents that the procession, placards and the banners were merely directed to combat against the anti‑social elements corroding the Government in power and the ailments of the society in general.

12. The photographs (Annexe. B‑1 to B‑6) go to show that the four respondents were wearing garland and actively participated in the procession which was led by them. They are shown in an open jeep at the head of the procession and Hakam Qureshi respondent has a loud speaker in his hands. Some of the respondents were in robes. They all paraded through some of the busiest roads in the city with no other object but to scandalise this Court and tarnish its fair name. All this constituted gross contempt of this Court of the worst type. It was a calculated attempt on the part of the respondents to bring this Court and its Judges, in relation to their office, in hatred, ridicule and contempt.

13. Here we may dare say that the protest staged against the High Court through this procession and the insinuations that those placards and banners conveyed, were altogether reckless. There was no truth whatever in any of those thoughtless invectives and baseless imputations. It all started with the speech made by Sh. Shaukat Ali in the Bar at Rawalpindi on 25th of July 1975, where he made disparaging and offensive remarks against the superior Courts and its Judges. This led to the application made by Mr. Habib‑ul‑Wahab Elkheiri, Advocate, Rawalpindi, for contempt of this Court against him. Accordingly this Court issued notice to him to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt of this Court committed by him. On this some of the members of the Lahore High Court Bar Association took it upon themselves to pass a resolution justifying his action in making the speech and assuming the responsibility for it. The resolution was given wide publicity in the Press relating to a matter which was sub judice in this Court. As this act of Izharul Haque was without any scruples and in complete disregard of the law, he was convicted for contempt of Court committed by him. He went up to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court and was allowed interim bail. On this the respondents took out the procession in question forming the subject matter of this petition against them. During the course of hearing in the main case against him, Sh. Shaukat Ali also committed contempt of this Court in the face of the Court. Eventually good sense prevailed on Sh. Shaukat Ali who was the root‑cause of all this trouble. He tendered unqualified apologies in each and every case against him. He made a clean breast of it and admitted that the imputations made by him In his speech delivered at Rawalpindi were false, incorrect and wholly without foundation. This should have satisfied all those who were misguided that they were not at all justified in taking up the cudgels on his behalf. In this connection we can only deplore that the respondents 2 to 4 have failed to see the reasons even after they had learnt about the truth from the mouth of their the then President, if indeed they were not aware of it in the beginning and had been misled. In Taj Din and others v. The State (P L D 1975 S C 490) arming The State v. Taj Din and others (P L D 1972 Lah. 434) taking out of a procession with contemptuous placards against a Judge of this Court was held to be grossest contempt.

14. It was argued before us that the conduct of the respondents was protected under the Explanation to clause (2) of Article 204 of the Constitution. This Article reads as follows "(1) In this Article, "Court" means the Supreme Court or a High Court. (2) A Court shall have power to punish any person who‑ (a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any order of the Court ; or (b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge in relation to his office into hatred, ridicule or contempt ; or (c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Court ; or (d) does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court. Explanation.‑Fair comment made in good faith and in the public interest on the working of the Court or any of its final decision after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, if any, shall not constitute contempt of the Court. (3) The exercise of the power conferred on a Court by this Article may be regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court." It will be appreciated that scandlisation of a Court or doing of anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge in relation to his office into hatred, ridicule or contempt is one of the species of contempt. All that the Explanation, above reproduced, lays down is that a fair comment in good faith and in the public interest on the working of the Court or any of its final decision after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, if any, shall not constitute contempt of the Court. This reliance by the respondents on the Explanation in itself presupposes that their acts and deeds were directed against the High Court as contemplated in Article

204. The protection afforded by the Explanation is available only if (a) the acts and things complained of amount to fair comments ; (b) they were made in good faith] (c) in the public interest; and (d) on the working of the Court. The procession, the pla cards and the banners in question, by no stretch of imagination, can be taken as fair comments. It shall be a sheer travesty of facts to construe the banners and the placards displayed in the procession as fair comment. on the working of the Court. Those disparaging remarks were neither fair nor made bona fide. There was a complete lack of good faith exhibited by taking out of the procession in revenge on the occasion of the bail allowed to Izharul Haque in a matter which was sub judice before the Supreme Court. Nor was it meant to serve any public interest. Rather it was a naked attempt made to undermine the public confidence reposed in the superior Court b thus scandalising it. Looked at from whatever angle, the acts and deeds of the respondents were not covered by the Explanation to Article 204 (2) of the) Constitution.

14. To justify their actions the contesting respondents placed reliance on fundamental right of "freedom of speech and expression" contained in Article 19 of the Constitution. This lays down that "every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the Press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence." The defence taken has no merit. It may be mentioned that the right is itself subject to the law of contempt. In other words the right to freedom of speech and expression does not extend to the grant of a licence to the citizens to commit contempt of Court. In this connection Article 19 of the Constitution is in a way subject to Article 204 which now codifies the law of contempt of the superior Courts. It contains, if we can say so, constitutional safeguard against any attempt to scandalise the Court or under. mine its dignity in public interest. The law of contempt of Court and the necessity for it is fully recognised in the countries practising the Anglo American System of administration of justice. This is a necessary concomitant of our system of administration of justice in force in this country.

15. A lot has been said in the textbooks on the difference between the law of contempt as practised in U. S. A., on the one hand, and as practised in England, India and Pakistan, on the other band. Basu in his "Com mentary on the Constitution of India" 4th (1961) Edition, Volume one, at page 558 has observed that "the American law differs from the English and the Indian and the difference in attitude is primarily due to the fact that Judges, in the U. S. A., are not even supposed to be detached from public life as in England or India." The learned author goes on to add that "the American attitude towards press comments on pending trials thus differs seriously from the English, and American Courts have refused to curtail freedom of the press in this respect, even though instances there are where new trial bad to be ordered owing to a hostile atmosphere having been created by unrestrained press publicity on the pending charges." Munir in his "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", 1975 Edition, at page 163 says that "in the United States, clear and present danger to the orderly operation of the Court is the test of the scope of the constitutional guarantee, and tire question in applying the clear and present danger test is whether the publication bad the effect of directly interfering with or influencing the orderly and impartial administration of justice and, therefore, the operation of the law of contempt there is much more limited‑(16 C. J. S. Constitutional Law, 213 (P L D 1972 S C 39)‑than in Pakistan where anything having a tendency to inter fere with the due course of justice is treated as contempt." We have no intention to go deeper and dilate upon the differences. But for the purpose of this case it is sufficient to mention here that in Pakistan the law of contempt stands codified and enshrined in Article 204 of the Constitution itself. Under Article 204 (2) (b) any person who scandalises the superior Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring it or a Judge in relation to his office into hatred, ridicule or contempt is punishable for contempt of the Court.

16. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents then argued that Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion. It was submitted that the respondents in taking out the procession and displaying the placards against this Court were quite within the protection extended to them under this Article, inas much as, according to their religion‑(Islam)‑they bad every right to take out the procession and indulge in displaying the placards even though it amounted to contempt of this Court. They went to the extent of submitting that in Islam there was no contempt of Court or of Qazi and every person has a right to criticise their acts. In this connection Riazul Hassan, res pondent No. 4 relied on his own article (Annex. R 4‑10) published by him on 22‑10‑1975 during the pendency of this case. He supplemented his views on the subject by a further written statement in Urdu. The precise objection was repelled by the Supreme Court in Ashfaque Ahmad Sheikh v. The State P L D 1972 S C

39. At pp. 47‑49 the Court observed that: "Learned counsel then raised certain objections on the legal plane. The first of these objections is that under the Islamic Law every person has a right to criticise the judicial and other acts of the Qazi and there is no provision in that law for punishing the critic for contempt of the Qazi or his authority. It is submitted that no codified law of contempt can be inconsistent with the Principles of Policy concerning Islam as contained in Principle of Policy No. 1 in Chapter 2 of the 1962 Constitution. The Principle of Policy No. 1 in the said Chapter 2 runs thus `No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah and all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. The law of contempt as contained in Article 123 of the 1962 Constitu tion‑‑(which corresponds with Article 204 of the present Constitution) ‑according to the learned counsel, is repugnant to the Islamic Law and has therefore no validity. This contention has no force whatever. Clause (2) of Article 8 of the Constitution, which finds place in the very Chapter 2 relating to the Principles of Policy, is a complete answer to this contention. The said clause (2) runs thus: `The validity of an action or of a law shall not be called In question on the ground that it is not in accordance with the Principles of Policy, and no action shall lie against the State, any organ or authority of the State or any person on such a ground.' Besides, Article 4 of the Constitution is also against the, contention of the learned counsel. This Article runs thus `Obedience to the law is the basic obligation of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan'.' Now, Article 123 of the 1962 .Constitution which lays down the law of contempt is bound to be obeyed by every citizen and every person residing within Pakistan. The contention of the learned counsel as to the alleged invalidity of the law of contempt as codified in Article 123 is therefore clearly fallacious. Even under the Islamic Law, one is to obey all persons in authority who necessarily include the Qazi. This is enjoined in the Holy Qur'an as is evident from the following 'Ayats SURA ALNISA 4 "(God doth command you to render back your trusts to those to whom they are due 1 and when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice; verily how excellent is the teaching which He giveth you ; For God is He who heareth and seeth all things. O ye who believe ; Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day; that is best and most suitable for final determination)."

17. Allama Abul `Ala‑Maudoodi in his "Tafheem‑ul‑Qur'an' in inter preting the verse 58, Chapter 5, Part 5 (reproduced above) has laid emphasis that it is the first and foremost Article forming the Constitution of an Islamic State and forms the basis of the religious, social and political set up in Islam. The Muslims are enjoined to obey God, and obey the Apostle and "those charged with authority among you." According to Allama Maudoodi the term (allo-al-ammar) includes all those charged with the administration of the affairs of the Muslims as a body and these also include Judges of the Court charged with the duty to administer justice. This is sufficient to belie the 1 contention advanced before us that the Judges are not entitled to the respect due to them and that in Islam there is no contempt of Court.

18. We may also add that the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion i4, as Article 20 itself shows, "subject to law, public order morality". Munir in his "Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan" at pages 166‑167 has said that "the right of freedom to propagate religion has to be exercised subject to the requirements of public order and safety it does not extend to the doing of acts which are a crime under the law. Wrongs, practised in the name of religion are not protected by the Constitution pro viding for the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, The fact that an act is done only as a matter of religious worship will not protect a person from the consequences if such an act has been prohibited by law Freedom of religion does not mean that acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society may go unpunished be cause of what some particular group may call religion, and religious liberty does not protect one who conceives of a God and the worship of such God in a manner which may endanger the lives of members of the community in which he lives. The right to worship is not a right to disturb others in their worship, and a religion may by its teachings interfere with the process of Government. Everything which may be equally an exercise of religion is not required to be tolerated and the right to exercise religious freedom ceases where it overlaps and transgresses the rights of others.

19. There does not appear to be anything Un‑Islamic about the contempt of Court laws. Indeed before u3 the respondents failed to cite any verse from the Holy Koran or the Traditions of the Holy Prophet (may peace be upon him)‑in support of their contention to the effect that the judicial acts of a Kazi in office could be allowed to be criticised in public. In this connection we have no intention to enter upon a lengthy discussion in reply to the pamphlet issued by respondent No. 4, as this is neither the place nor the occasion to deal with it‑though we have made certain relevant observations in that respect in later part of this paragraph. We have no hesitation in agreeing that in Islam contempt of the Holy Prophet‑ (may peace be upon him) is the greatest sin visited by capital punishment. But from this it does not necessarily follow that there is no such thing as contempt of Court in Islam and that its concept is Un‑Islamic. Respondent No. 4 has also referred to an incident during the time of Ameer‑ul‑Momineen Hazrat Umar (may God be pleased with him). As Khalifa he also used to administer justice. A person from among the public raised an unfounded objection and asked as to how it was that he was wearing a shirt made out of two lengths of cloth against one length of cloth that he got as share out of the Bait‑ul‑mal. On this Hazrat Umar (may God be pleased with him) called upon his son to reply to the objection. He then explained that actually he gave his own length of cloth that he got as his share, to his father to complete his shirt. This historic event highlights the fact that in those days the Khalifa, an executive head of the Muslim State was fully and freely accountable to the people. But, in our respectful opinion, it does not prove that any criticism was at all raised against Hazrat Umar in relation to his office, as the head of the judiciary as such or against any of his judicial pronouncements. This distinction between the two capacities is well recognised and must be borne in mind. In this context the protection against adverse criticism does not extend to a Judge in his personal capacity or his private dealings. But disparaging criticism of matters connected with his judicial function and dignity as a Judge is not permitted. In his article (copy Annex. R. 4/10) respondent No. 4 has expressed the opinion that in Islam the judgment delivered by a Kazi was not above criticism by the learned. In this connec tion he inter alia referred to some criticism levelled by Imam Abu Hanifa against the judgments by the famous Kazi Abu Ali Layla, who served on the beach for 33 years. Imam Abu Hanifa was a great juris consultant and founder of Hanfi School. He was known for his independent views and original thoughts. There is no doubt that his fatwas commanded great respect and were binding on the Courts. It is in "Siratun‑Nauman," on page 104, that once Kazi Abu Ali Layla was much annoyed by Imam Abu Hanifa's criticism of his judgment and he complained to the Governor of Kufa, that the great Imam should be stopped from doing so. Accordingly the Governor issued his order with which the Imam complied. In all fairness respondent No. 4 was expected to have at least referred to this incident which he has, for reasons best known to him, failed to do in dealing with the subject. Moreover in this connection the Courts in this country have never claimed any absolute privilege against criticism of their judgments. As already discussed above in the Explanation to Article 204 of our Constitution it is expressly laid down that "fair comments made in good faith and in the public interest on the working of the Court or any of its final decision after the expiry of the period of limitation for appeal, if any, shall not constitute contempt of the Court." In this connection we also find that there is a basic fallacy in the entire approach by respondent No. 4 to the contempt of Court laws as practised in this country. It is not that the reason behind these laws in force in this country is that the Judges are "innocent' or that the Judges, like the King of England, can do no wrong. After all the Judges are human being first and Judges afterwards and to err` is human. They are subject to their own code of conduct and the laws) applicable to them. As will be seen hereinafter the proceedings for punishing contempt are taken not with a view to protect either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court but with a view to protect the public, to maintain the majesty of law. Any vicious propaganda against them in public is likely to shake the confidence of the people in the cause of the administration of justice itself.

20. Before parting with this subject we may as well reproduce here from the Farman sent by Hazrat Umar to Kazi Shurayh :- "Umar wrote to him, that if a case is presented to him which is treated in the Koran then decide accordingly, and don't go against the Koranic injunctions, and if such a case is presented to him which is not treated in the Koran, then follow it in the Hadith and decide accordingly, bat if a case is presented to him about which there is no provision in the Koran and Hadith, then look for its solution in the Ijma'ul Umat and follow that decision. However, if such a case is presented to you about which there is no precedent in the Koran and Hadith, and not even decided by anyone before you then you may decide it according to your own judgment after due care and caution. I approve of such a course." See 'A Dissertion on the Administration of Justice of Muslim Law' by Al‑Haj Muhammed Ullah Ibn S. Jung, 1926, page 21). In the absence of anything to the contrary in the Holy Koran and the tradi tions of the Holy Prophet and the precedents on the subject, the Kazi or the Judge is free to decide according to his own judgment and there is nothing un‑Islamic in the contempt of Court laws, their sole object being to uphold the digits of the Courts and the Judges. It is well‑known that Hazrat Umar (may god be pleased with him) appointed such judicious and capable persons as Kazis that they were universally respected throughout the Muslim World.

21. We may now turn to some of the objections raised by Hakam Qureshi respondent It was contended that in the photograpahs B/1 to B/6 participation of certain other lawyers was distinctly visible but the petitioner has failed to imp leaded them as respondents and this petition suffers from non joinder of necessary parties. He further submitted that this petition suffers from laches and delay inasmuch as it was filed three days after the procession was taken out and from this circumstance he wishes us to infer that this petition was not made in good faith. But there is no force in any of these contentions. This petition was filed by the then Advocate General and if he, in his own wisdom, picked up the ring leaders of the procession only, this did not mean, that it was incompetent for his not p proceeding against the rest This rather shows that in so doing he acted with restraint and exercised his sound discretion in the matter. He had no personal malice against the contemners before us and none was even pleaded or suggested before us at the hearing. Simply because the petition was filed after a lapse of threw days from the date of the procession does not speak of any lack of good faith on the part of the then learned Advocate‑General. Another grievance made was that he had not obtained the prior sanction of the Provincial Government before the institution of this petition and was, therefore, not maintainable. No law, or any authority was cited before us in support of this objection. Rather it is well known E that even a private person can lay information before the court in such a matter which concerns it and is free to follow its own procedure. It was suggested before us by Mr. Ashraf Falahi learned Advocate for respondent No. 4 that this complaint against the respondents was filed by the Advocate General simply because the Government of the day did not like that anybody, much less the lawyers, should raise their voice against corruption and that with a view to suppress the voice thus raised in collusion with the Govern ment, the petitioner has filed the present petition. He referred to various Annexures filed by him in the form of R/4 to 10 to show that in Press many a voice were raised against corruption which made it uncomfortable and dis turbing for the Government. But in the circumstances of this case the sugges tion is fantastic and altogether devoid of any force. This in its very nature destroys the earlier plea set up to the effect that the petition was bad as it was not filed with the approval and sanction of the Government. The Government of the day cannot, or, as a matter of fact no Government, if it hopes to survive, can ever afford to encourage corruption either directly or in directly. In these circumstances to attribute to any Government a sinister design of this nature is far‑fetched and preposterous. It was next argued that in the formal notice issued to the respondent mention was made only of the offensive slogans but no mention was made about any of the placards. As such, the notice was defective and hence the present proceedings too were not maintainable. The contention has no force. The application moved against the respondents is sufficiently comprehensive and contains all the material allegations on which it is based. On the application moved before it and the allegations contained therein, on 1‑10‑1975 this Court ordered the issuance of the show‑cause notice to the respondents. It was actually served by the office to apprise the respondents about this application moved against them. Therefore, any deficiency in the notice was at best a clerical omission only, not material totally the fate of this petition of which they had full and sufficient notice during the course of the proceedings before us. The respondents did not dispute the material facts that they had taken out the procession in which the placards and banners (Annexs. E/1 to B/6 were displayed. They, were in no way prejudiced at the trial by this defect in the notice served on them and had sufficient notice of all the allegations against them. In these circumstances the plea raised by them does not merit any serious considera tion. It was next contended that the petitioner did not quote any relevant provision of the law under which this petition was filed. The mere failure to quote the law in the petition was immaterial especially when it was quite clear to the respondents at the hearing that it was a petition under Article 204 of the Constitution, with reference to which, as our judgment shows, they fully argued their case before us at length and in all details.

22. Another objection raised by Hakam Qureshi was that the power to punish for the contempt of a High Court is conferred on it by Clause (2) of Article 204 of the Constitution. In Clause (3) it is laid down that "the exercise of the power conferred on a Court by this Article may be regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court". It was, therefore, argued before us that since after the promulgation of this Constitution, no law had been made to regulate the exercise of power conferred by this Article and as no rules have also been framed, therefore, Article 204 was a dead‑letter and lying dormant to confer any power on this Court to punish a contemner. The plea raised has no merit. Clause (3) simply talks of regulation of the exercise of the power conferred on this Court and does not make the power conferred by Clause (2) dependent upon the existence of the aforesaid law or the rules. A similar objection was raised in Ashfaque Ahmad Sheikh v. The State but was repelled by the Supreme Court.

23. The primary purpose of the punishment for contempt of Court and its Judge is the vindication of the public authority and the majesty of the law. According to Halabury's Laws of England (third Edition), Volume 8, para. 9 at page 7, proceedings for punishing contempt are taken not with a view to protect either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from repetition of the attack but with a view to protect the public and specially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the Tribunal be undermined or impaired. The grave men is an endeavour to shake the confidence of the public in the Court. It is not from any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals that insults to Judges are not allowed, but because there is imposed upon the Court the duty of preventing any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. Woodroffe J. in Re : Motilal Ghose (ILR45Cal.169 ) observed that in such cases the Court does not seek to vindicate any personal interest of the Judges, but the general administration of justice, which is the public concern. For all the reasons discussed above and in the larger interest of administration of justice we hold the respondents guilty of having committed gross contempt of this Court and convict them accordingly.

24. Now turning to the question of sentence, we have given our serious thoughts to the same. In this connection, to complete the narration of the relevant events, it may be pointed out that in Criminal Original No. 58 of 1975, Sh. Shaukat Ali, contemner, tendered an unqualified apology for his offending speech delivered in the Rawalpindi Bar. It reads as follows "I do not want to contest the proceedings. I am extremely sorry for the things done and said by me. I withdraw my statements and give an assurance that I shall be more careful in future. I have profound respect for the learned High Court. I tender unqualified apology and place myself completely in the merciful hands of this learned Court. He supplemented the above apology by a further statement before the Full Bench on 12‑11‑? 975, which reads as follows You had said in your written apology : "I do not want to contest the proceedings. I am extremely sorry for the things done and said by me. I withdraw my statements What did you precisely mean by this ? A.‑By that I meant that the statements which I made before the Rawalpindi Bar, and are attributed to me, were false, incorrect and wholly without foundation." In the face of that apology the Full Bench by its (short) order dated 31‑11‑1975 bound down Sh. Shaukat Ali for good behaviour for a period of two years. While that case was still in progress Sh. Shaukat Ali appeared before us at the hearing on 29‑9‑1975, he filed his additional written‑statement and also made oral utterances before us in Court constituting a further contempt of this Court in view of the Court, for which he was served with the show cause notice. In that also he later tendered his unqualified apology, which reads as follows "I do not want to contest the proceedings. I am extremely sorry for the things done and said by me. I have no hesitation in stating that inquiries have revealed that things said by me about the learned Chief Justice and this Court were wholly without foundation. I withdraw my statements and give an assurance that I shall be more careful in future. I have profound respect for the learned High Court. I tender unqualified apology and place myself completely in the merciful hands of this learned Court. (2) I offer apology to the learned Chief Justice personally also." Sh. Shaukat Ali also gave an interview to a monthly journal 'Dhanak' which was published in its issue of August 1975, wherein he made disparaging remarks against the Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan. The Supreme Judicial Council issued notice of contempt to him in that connection. He was found 'guilty and was bound down for good behaviour for one year after he had tendered an unqualified apology. In 1971 while respondent No. 1 was serving as a Judge of the High Court, he was charged for mis conduct in the discharge of his duties, in re : The President v. Mr. Justice Shaukat Ali (PLD1971SC585). During the course of the scrutiny of his assets before the Supreme Judicial Council too he behaved similarly and committed its contempt and it was only when he was warned of stern action that better sense prevailed on him and on his apology the proceedings were dropped, and it was held that he bad acted in a manner wholly unbecoming of a Judge. It is deplorable to find that respondent No. 1 has developed a tendency or, shall a say, the habit to commit repeated contempts of the superior Courts in the Country and then after he is faced with the dire consequences to beg for apology and throw himself entirely at the mercy of the Court. In Sub‑Judge, First Class, Hoshangabad v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar (A I R 1940 Nag. 407), at pages 408, column 2 and 409, column 1, as it was held that "An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of their offences. It is not an additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who have been wronged. It is intended to be evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong‑doer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a Court of justice. But before it can have that effect it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest, and even if wisdom dawns only at the appellate stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally before the arguments begin and before the person tendering the apology discovers that he has a weak case and before the Judge (when that happens, as it did here) has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology ; it ceases to be the full, frank, manly, confession of a wrong done which it is intended to be. It becomes instead the cringing of a coward shivering at the prospect of the stern hand of justice about to descend upon his head. It then deserves to be treated with the contempt with which cowards and bullies who do not hesitate to threaten others and to impugn their honesty and character without the slightest foundation and who cringe and wail when their own safety is at stake, are treated. How ever, I do not intend to make a point of this case because of the misconception which is prevalent in these parts about the meaning, nature and effect of an apology ; nor of course am I intending to lay down any universal rule or to ignore the proviso to section 3, Contempt of Courts Act of 1926. I refer to the matter in these strong terms only fn order that there should be no misconception about apologies in the future and about the practice in respect of the tendering of them, and in order that there should be no possible mistake about my meaning and attitude. Mere lip service to a formula without any contrition of heart will not do."

26. Before imposing the punishments on the respondents in this case, we would. like to add here that it has been really painful for us to sit in judgment in this case. The respondent No. I was the President of the Lahore High Court Bar and respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are its office‑bearers. Respon dent No. 2 is the President of the District Bar at Lahore. We find that by indulging into this scandalous, wanton and reckless criticism of the superior Courts, they have not only earned bad names for themselves but also brought a slur on their respective Associations. The Lahore High Court Bar is the foremost and premier Bar in the Country. Needless to add here that its interest and welfare and that of the members of the honourable profession, has always been dear to us, the Chief Justice and Judges of this Court. Indeed most of us on the Bench, including the two of us, belonged to this profession and were drawn from this very Association which has every reason to be proud of the contribution made to this Court and the sacred cause of administration of justice. We have no hesitation in acknowledging that without the willing cooperation rendered by the respectable members of this Association our task in the administration of justice in the Province would have become much more difficult, if not impossible. All of us on both sides are wedded to the cause of justice. Therefore, it is necessary that while practising law, they should also learn to respect law. For our part, we have done nothing more than to enforce law without fear or favour and ill‑will or malice, as we are duty‑bound to do under our oath of office.

27. The apology in order to be acceptable must be sincere with the awareness and remorse on the part of the contemner that he has done some thing wrong and was genuinely repenting for it. It should show contriteness of the mind coupled a peninent heart within him. Sh. Shaukat Ali respondent has tendered his unqualified apology in this case before us. We are inclined to believe and hope that, although tendered late, it is sincere. We do not wish to convey any impression that this Court has been severe or vindictive in dealing with him. In our opinion, however, his apology does not completely purge him of the contempt. We have anyhow taken a lenient view of the case and allowed him latitude in the sanguine hope that he will improve upon himself and shall scrupulously avoid and desist from committing any further contempt of the Courts established by law in the Country. On all these considerations he is sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and fine of Rs. 1,000.00 (Rupees one thousand) only failing payment he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months.

28. Respondents Nos, 2 to 4 have not, at any stage throughout these proceedings before us, tendered any apology. They have even failed to avail of the ample opportunity allowed to them to make amends. Hakam Qureshi went so far as to state that he shall not beseech mercy and Riazul Hassan did not have any regret for his conduct. The attitude of Izharul Haq in Court before us was no better. Though they have every right to chalk out their own defence and adopt any course they like, but we have not been able to appreciate their obstinate demeanour and attitude in Court before us. It is a pity that they have no remourse for what they have done. It is time that they should do some heart‑searching within them. We are thus constrained to impose upon them punishment of simple imprisonment for a period of four months and fine of Rs. 1,000.00 (Rupees one thousand only) each, failing the payment of the fine each of the defaulters shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. Mr. M. Anwar, Advocate, as amicus curiae ably assisted us with hard work in this case and appeared before us for a number of hearings. The respondents Nos. 1 to 4 shall also pay costs of Rs. 500.00 (Rupees five hundred only) each, which they shall deposit in Court for payment to the amicus curiae. The fine and costs should be deposited in Court within a week. They should be given A Class in Jail. S. A. H. Contemners sentenced accordingly.