P L D 1961 Supreme Court 403 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑This appeal against an award of the Industrial Tribunal in Dacca is brought before the Court on the basis of special leave granted to the appellant, the Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited, the principal opposite‑party being the Employees' Union of the Company. Since the appeal was admitted, there has been a compromise between the principal parties which covers all points as to pay scales and allowances and other facilities, leaving only one point of dispute remaining between the parties which they have left for decision by the Court. That point has reference to the seventh dispute which is worded as follows :‑ "Coverage of salesmen and canvassers under accident, insurance policy or extension of the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act to these employees." The Company has strongly protested against the reference of this question to the Tribunal on the ground that it did not constitute "an industrial dispute" within the meaning of that expression as used in the Industrial Disputes Act, viz.:‑ "any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non -employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person." The Company had insisted that salesmen in their concern were not within the definition of "workmen" contained in the Act, which reads as follows :‑ "any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during the dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of Pakistan or in the Police." The "Union on the other hand had insisted that salesmen were within the meaning of the' expression "workman". Evidence was led as to the duties performed by the Company's salesmen and the nature of the service expected of them and certain decisions from the Indian Courts on the question were examined at great length by the Tribunal who came eventually to the conclusion that it was "now a well‑settled principle of law that the real test as to whether an employee is workman or not is the nature of duties performed by him", and went on to say :‑ "He will be a workman if the duties performed by him are manual or of clerical nature and not otherwise." He then observed that the evidence showed that salesmen were expected "to display qualities of initiative, intelligence and correct speculation, 'and for doing that they have been given some independence in their own line of action" and therefore their duties did not appear to the Tribunal "to be of mechanical or routine description as the duties of a clerk are". He referred in this connection to the decision of an Indian Court in the case of Lever Brothers (India) Limited (1950 L L J 469), and after some further discussion and reference to a number of other Indian cases viz., The Caltex (India) Limited (I L L J 79) and the Bombay Mutual Life Assurance Society (I L L J 203), he finally came to the conclusion that salesmen were not workmen. The Union had however contended that at any rate salesmen fell within the meaning of the expression "any person" occurring in the definition of "industrial dispute", and evidence was led in the case as to whether the workmen could be said to have 'a "direct and substantial interest" in the terms of service of the salesmen in the establish ment. This test was taken by the Tribunal from a reported decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (A I R 1958 S C 353). Other cases from the Indian jurisdiction were cited to the effect that an industrial dispute may be raised by workmen against their employer regarding the terms of employ ment of a person, who need not necessarily be a workman. After some discussion, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the expression "any person" refers to "any of the employees regarding whose employment and non‑employment, terms of employment or condition of labour, a dispute arises". That obviously is too broad a definition, having regard to the earlier cases on which the Tribunal was relying, but he proceeded then to consider whether the workmen were not directly and substantially interested in the working conditions of salesmen and he came to the conclusion that there was such an interest upon the following ground :‑ "In view of the fact that the workmen employees have .got substantial interest (not ideological or philosophical) in the matter of condition and terms of employment of salesmen which posts the workmen employees, specially the clerks do legitimately hope to fill up when occasion arises." Accordingly, the Tribunal found himself clothed with jurisdiction to deal with the seventh issue which has been reproduced above, and gave an award thereon, which the Company now challenges. The details and the merits of this award have not been mentioned or discussed before us, and the entire argument has turned upon whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction upon an initiative taken by the workmen to revise the serving conditions of salesmen in this establishment. The Union by their concise statement do not appear to challenge the finding of the Tribunal that salesmen are not workmen within the meaning of the Act, and the point has not been raised or pressed before us. I consider that it admits of no doubt, that persons who are engaged exclusively in the field of distribution through proper agencies of the products of the Company, are not assimilable either to the group of worker whose manual' labour contributes to that product, or those of the clerical establishment who perform the paper work connected with the operations of the Company. The work of salesmen is in a wholly different category from manual work or clerical work, and I feel no hesitation in agreeing with the decision of the Tribunal upon this point, namely, that salesmen do not fall within the' definition of "workmen." The other point, namely, whether salesmen are included within the expression "any person" so that a dispute might arise between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, concerning the serving conditions of the salesmen, presents greater difficulty. It appears to me almost impossible to conceive of a dispute arising bona fide between one employer and another regarding the working conditions of the salesmen entertained by one of them. Similarly, to imagine that one set of workmen in an establishment like the appellant Company can be at loggerheads, in any genuine fashion, with another set of workmen in the same establishment, over the working conditions of the Company's salesmen, seems impossible. If such dispute were indeed raised, it could only be by some oblique process contrived to bring about abuse to the machinery of the Act. The question which I find to arise in the case is whether dispute raised by workmen against their employers for the benefit of a class of employees who fall in a totally different category from themselves, is not similarly to be regarded as an abuse of` the machinery of the Act. The point of direct and substantial interest, particularly in the manner in which it has been taken by the Tribunal, does not appear to me provide a sufficient or safe guide to the resolution of this question. It is stated before us in argument that the promotion of some exceptionally good clerks to become salesmen is not at all a matter of routine, but is a matter of selection, by reason of special ability in the incumbent. Similarly it is said that a number of one‑time clerks in the Company are now employed ‑as officers in the Company, but the Company would strongly deny that this fact by itself gives the clerks any "direct or substantial interest" in the serving conditions of officers of the Company. The case of clerks being allowed, on account of the special notice taken of a few of them, to aspire to posts of salesmen is, it is submitted, precisely similar. The essential thing to remember is that these are totally different categories, so that there is no normal exchange of personnel between them, nor is there a connection by any direct line of promotion between them. Other instances besides those furnished by the appellant Company can easily be imagined, where, if the principle of "direct or substantial interest" to be conceded in the manner in which it has been applied by the Tribunal, the workmen will be given al handle or lever by which they could bring up before Tribunals for adjudication, matters which go to the very essence of the structure' of the Company at the highest level. The workmen may develop a preference for a particular Director and may raise a dispute as to his emoluments, or the kind of house or car with which he is provided. They may go to the length of demanding that a particular Director should not be removed or permitted to resign from the Board. They may take the initiative to improve or reduce the emoluments of a Manager or an Assistant Manager or a Labour Supervisor, and all these actions will be calculated interferences with the working and structure of the Company at a level with which the workmen have no concern. It may be that salesmen are closer to the workmen in matters of salary and status, but that is not of the essence. What is essential is that there should be no abuse permitted of the provisions of the Act. It is undeniable that the main principle of the Industrial Disputes Act is to supply means by which overall harmonious relations may be maintained in the field of industry, not only between employers and their workmen, but between workmen and workmen in the same establishment, and even, between employers and employers in the same industry, or perhaps even in other industries. These categories relate to differences at three different levels, but all of them are addressed to the same overriding necessity, that disputes which had arisen among these two categories, viz., of employers on one side and workmen on the other, should be harmoniously composed through the intervention of an independent Board or Tribunal, and sometimes by reference to a Court. Any action by employers which tends to divide their workmen into groups with divergent interests and to set them against each other would be proper matter for correction by a Tribunal, on the basis that harmonious relations among the workmen in a single establishment is essential to the successful working of that establishment, and in a larger view also to the success of the industry concerned. For a similar reason, it seems to me that the Act must be so operated as to avoid the creation at the instance of the workmen of a rift within the body of the employers themselves, as well as within that structure or organisation which is placed above the body of the employees whose work is in the manual or clerical field. The directory organisation of a Company set above the category of the workmen may be defined as the organisational superstructure and the question may then be posed as follows, viz. can the workmen be permitted to raise as a point of dispute between themselves and the company, matters relating to other employees or persons who are included in that superstructure? To me it seems that to allow this liberty is to open the door to a great variety of abuses of which the effect must necessarily be a process opposite to that which is the overriding purpose of the industrial Disputes Act, namely, that it must result in the break up of harmonious relations within the superstructure, to the detriment of the Company by imperilling its very existence. The interest of workmen who derive their livelihood from the Company lies in doing nothing which would tend to disturb the functioning of the Company at the higher levels. It is not for them to exercise, or seek to exercise, control over the constitution of the superstructure. When therefore the workmen take it up as a matter of dispute with the top organisation of the Company that they should improve or otherwise modify the serving conditions of persons who are included in the organisational superstructure, qua the workmen, they are in fact being induced to break down the integrity of that organisation altogether. Since persons employed in the superstructure are not permitted by the Act to raise their own disputes with the Company directly, it is plain that any effect by the workmen on their behalf, the object of which is to utilize for such persons the machinery of the Act, can only be for a purpose for which it is expressly not available. In this aspect of the matter the expression "direct and substantial interest", particularly as it has been interpreted by the Tribunal, can only be misleading and injurious in its effect. A Director who is not popular with his fellow Directors may by promise of improvement of conditions, induce the workmen to raise the matter of his further retention by way of an industrial dispute. A particular officer whose work has been disapproved by the Company may similarly intrigue among the workmen to bring up his case before an Industrial Tribunal. Once such a process is started there would be no end to it. In all such cases the workmen could claim a "direct and substantial interest", by virtue of a promise of a quid pro quo for their initiative towards such an ordering of conditions in the superstructure as cannot be brought about within the Act, by the persons who stand to gain , advantage thereby. I can imagine no greater abuse of a statute than from the granting of such a liberty. While it is evident that the expression "any person" in the definition of "industrial dispute" cannot be confined to persons included in the category of workmen, having regard to the scope of the disputes specified in the same definition, I am clear in my view that workmen cannot be permitted to raise as an industrial dispute with their employers questions affecting the service conditions of any employee in the same establishment who belongs to a superior category, distinct from and, in a sense, above the body of manual and clerical workers, who are collectively described as "workmen". The settlement of the service conditions of such employees is to be effected freely, within the scope of the law of contract, and is not susceptible of control through the instrumentality of the Industrial Disputes Act. For these reasons I would hold that a question of the serving conditions of salesmen is not a question which could validly have been referred to the Tribunal, and I would therefore set aside; the award of the Tribunal on this point. The other points in dispute between the parties having been resolved by means of a compromise which has been placed on the record, I would dispose of this appeal by directing that the compromise be placed on the record and that it should supersede in detail on the points with which it deals, the award given by the Tribunal, and that the award of the Tribunal in favour of salesmen under dispute No. 7 should be set aside. I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. A. RAHMAN, J. ‑This appeal by special leave raises the question of the true construction of "industrial dispute", as defined in clause (k) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question has arisen in the following circumstances. The Government of East Pakistan, Commerce, Labour and Industries Department, made a reference under sections 7 and 10 of the Act to a Tribunal, constituted by Mr. A. Awal, of a dispute between the Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and the Pakistan Tobacco Company Employees' Union. The matters in dispute between the parties were incorporated in a schedule to the Reference and were categorised under seven heads. The Tribunal gave its award which was notified by the Government in the Gazette, dated the 14th of March 1960. The Company challenged the award in respect of certain decisions of the Tribunal by a petition for special leave to appeal which was granted. When the appeal came up for hearing, it was stated on behalf of the appellant that there had been a settlement of all points of difference between the parties, except for one issue. The Tribunal had held that "salesmen" in this Company were not "workmen" within the definition of that term, as embodied in clause (s) of section 2 of the Act. He went on to hold, however, that their conditions of service could form the subject of an "industrial dispute" between the Management and the workmen. The question raised before us, therefore, is whether the benefit of the award could be extended to "salesmen" in spite of the fact that they had not been held to be "workmen" them selves. The Union have not challenged the decision of the Tribunal that "salesmen" are not "workers". The appeal, therefore, must proceed on the assumption that that decision is correct. The only question teat falls for determination is whether they are comprehended within the expression "any person" occurring in the definition of "industrial disputes." The definition of "industrial dispute" in the Act is in the fol lowing terms : ‑ "2 (k) `industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is con nected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person." The learned Tribunal has taken the view that the expression "any person", occurring at the end of section 2 (k) must be understood in a limited sense, so as to mean a workman or a non‑workman employed by an industry in whose employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or conditions of labour, the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest and with whom they have, under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. As it was found that the workmen employees could legitimately aspire to fill posts of salesmen by selection, whenever the occasion arose, in the opinion of the Tribunal they must be deemed to have substantial interest (not merely ideological or philosophical) in the matter of conditions and terms of employment of salesmen. Such a matter was, therefore, held to be within the definition of an "industrial dispute". For this view, the learned Tribunal mainly relied on two decisions from the Indian jurisdiction, one rendered by the Bombay High Court and the other by the Supreme Court of India, published as Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate Tribunal) etc. (A I R 1953 Bom. 325) and Workmen of Dumakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dumakuchi Tea Estate (A I R 1958 S C 353 V. 45, C. 57). At one place in the award, the learned Tribunal has expressed himself as follows. "The relevant words in section 2 (k), connected with `any person' are employment or non‑employment; terms of employment and conditions of labour. So it seems to be that. `any person' should be any of the employees regarding whose employment and non‑employment, terms of employment or condition of labour, a dispute arises." This proposition appears to be too widely worded arid even the learned counsel for the Employees' Union, Mr. K. Hossain, was unable ‑to support it. Reading, however, the decision of the Tribunal as a whole on this point, it becomes clear that the learned Tribunal was of the opinion that before such a dispute could be termed as an "industrial dispute", a community of interest between the workmen as a class and the person concerned should exist and the workmen as a whole should have a direct substantial interest in the conditions of labour of that person. Mr. Fazlur Rahman, who appeared for the Company, criti cised the decision of the Tribunal on the ground that even on the test adopted by the Tribunal, any dispute concerning the conditions of work of "salesmen" would not be an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of the Act. He has pointed out. that, according to the evidence on the record, the workmen in this establishment cannot claim as of right to be promoted to posts of salesmen. All that is admitted on behalf of the Management is that; while considering candidates for posts of salesmen, workmen‑employees of the factory may be considered along with outsider candidates, and other factors being equal, preference is given to workmen of the factory. At the same time, it is emphasized that this means a process of pure selection and not automatic promotion. In the circumstances, it is strenuously argued that the workmen cannot be said to have a direct or substantial interest in the conditions of work or terms of employment of salesmen. In my opinion, the argument has force The mere possibility that one of the workmen may be selected to fill up the post of a. salesman, should such a chance arise, in competition with outsider candidates, cannot be pressed into service for claiming that workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest in the terms of employment of salesmen. Some of the workmen may be more ambitious and after improving their qualification may even aspire to higher posts. It would be difficult then to draw a line anywhere with confidence. In. my humble judgment, the appeal should succeed on this short ground. The question, however, of the exact connotation of the expression "any person", occurring in the definition of "industrial dispute" is likely to arise frequently and it seems necessary, therefore, to make some comments to elucidate it. That the words "any person" are not used in their dictionary sense in the definition of "industrial dispute" and cannot be interpreted to include just "any person" in the wide world, is all too obvious. The expression his to be interpreted in the context in which it occurs and in the light of the scheme and general provisions of the Act. Clearly, therefore, the expression is subject to some limitations and the words cannot be construed in their widest amplitude and generality. It would be absurd to assume that the workmen can raise a dispute with the Management of their establishment, concerning a person who has not even the remotest connection with that establishment and with regard to whom the Management would not be in a position to grant any relief whatever. In such a case, one party to the dispute, namely, the employers, could not be said to be interested at all in the contentions raised and the question qua them would be purely academic. In order, therefore, that a dispute about the terms of employment or conditions of service of a person should turn into an "indus trial dispute" it seems necessary that there should be a genuine dis pute or difference 'between either employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and work men in respect of that matter. We are here concerned with a case of a dispute between employers and workmen. It would be difficult, in my opinion, to visualise comprehensively all the circum stances which would bring a dispute within the purview of "industrial dispute." Some general indications, however, can be given for confining the discussion in a particular case, within certain limits. In the' context of a dispute between employers and workmen such as existed in the present case, one obvious restriction that comes to mind is that the employers should be in a position to grant relief in respect of that dispute. That would seem to lead to the inference that the person about whom the dispute is raised must be either an employee or an ex‑employee or a prospective candidate for employment in the establishment concerned. To what further restrictions this categorisation may be subject, is a question of some nicety and difficulty. One line of approach may be that the words "any person" should not be allowed to comprehend a member of the Management itself, that is, an employee, who ranks above a workman. There ought to be a real nexus between the "employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour" of such a person and the terms of employment or conditions of labour of the workmen themselves, if they are to be a party to the dispute. Some assistance may perhaps be gained in this respect by a consideration of the provisions of the Act as a whole. Under the Act, out of the employees, only workmen, can be parties to a dispute. Other employees cannot raise an "industrial dispute" in respect of their conditions of service, directly. It would, in my opinion be going against the spirit of the Act if what they cannot directly is permitted to be done indirectly through a Union of workmen. On this view, a non‑workman employee or an ex‑employee of that category or a prospective candidate for such an employment would appear to be excluded from the definition. The reason for the use of the words "any person" in section 2 (k) may be that it was intended to cover a workman, who has been unjustly dismissed by the Management just before a par ticular dispute arose between the employers and workmen, or even to cover cases of persons whom the Management might seek to employ as workmen on conditions which might have adverse repercussions on the conditions of service of workmen already employed in the establishment. These prospective workmen may be brought within the establishment to serve as a leave for weakening the collective bargaining power of the Workers Union and this disruptive process affecting the workers' solidarity may occasion an "industrial dispute" of a tripartite character. It may involve a dispute firstly between employers and old workmen and secondly between the old workmen and the new workmen drafted into the establishment. This would then illustrate a dispute "between workmen and workmen" in the words of section 2 (k). It may be noticed that the definition of "workman" in clause (s) of section .2 of the Act, includes for the purpose of proceedings under the Act in relation to an "industrial dispute", a workman discharged during that dispute but not one who might have been discharged earlier than the dispute itself, although his dismissal may itself have led to the dispute. Such a previously discharged workman or a person sought to be brought in as a workmen, would be within .the ambit of the expression "any person". But essentially they ought to 'have some kinship to workmen as they may be ex‑workmen or potential workmen. I derive support for this view from the scheme of the Act itself. Section 3 of the Act provides for "Works Committees" for industrial establishments, consisting of representatives of employers and workmen, but not of other employees of the establishment. Section 4, 5, 6 and 7 which relate to the appointment of Conciliation Officers, Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Inquiry and Industrial Tribunals for the settlement or adjudication of "industrial disputes", do not afford much light in elucidating this problem as they use the term "industrial dispute" and to invest that expression with a restricted meaning in these sections, would perhaps be begging the ques tion. But section 3 provides a significant pointer to the objective aimed at, namely, the safeguarding of interests of two principal parties, viz. employers and workmen and suggests that an "industrial dispute" ought to concern employers on one side and workmen or ex‑workmen or potential workmen on the other. This would be consistent with the definition of "industrial dispute" being confined on the side of employees to workmen alone as a party. Some support is also lent to the argument by the provisions of section 18 of the Act which declares that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an award declared by the appropriate Government to be binding under subsection (2) of section 15, shall be binding on all parties to the "industrial dispute" and all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute. These parties in my judgment can only be employers or workmen perhaps ex‑workmen. I find it difficult to envisage that under clause (b) of subsection (1) of this section, an employee above the category of workmen, can be summoned as a party to the proceedings in a dispute, considering that such a person cannot be, of his own volition a party and cannot in his own right raise an "industrial dispute" himself. The provisions of sections 22, 23 and 26 of the Act relating to prohibitions of strikes and lock‑outs also contain references to "workmen" as distinguished from the total body of employees of an industrial establishment wherever coercive collective action on the part of labour to counteract adverse moves from the side of Capital, is mentioned. Section 33 of the Act too protects "workmen" from discharge, dismissal or other punishment, under certain contingencies, the during pendency of conciliation proceed ings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an "industrial dispute." The main emphasis, therefore, appears to be laid in the Act on the protection of collective interests of workmen rather than of other employees who, it is supposed, would be capable of safeguarding their own interests, under the law relating to service contracts. The adoption of the formula of direct or substantial interest of "workmen" in the service conditions of the person concerned, as a test of the existence of an "industrial dispute", might confront us with complex situations wherein it may not be possible to lay down a rational rule of `thus far and no further." A workmen may in a particular case consider the retention of a member of the Management, who may be sympathetic to their demands for enhanced emoluments, in the service of the company concerned, although the company may find it against its interests on other grounds to continue such a person in its employ. It would be difficult in such circumstances to argue that‑the workmen had no "substance interest" in the employment of that person. That would however mean that the workmen would be established to interfere; in the composition of what may be described as the Management portion of the establishment, and would amount to dictation to the company in matters which, are left to be regulated by the freedom of contract under the general law. In the absence of any clear indication in the Act that this freedom of contract, obtaining under the general law in respect of employees above the grade of workmen, can be interfered with through the machinery provided by the Act, I would be reluctant to put an interpretation, on the words "any person" in the definition of "industrial dispute", which might bring about such a result, so to speak, by a side‑wind. With all respect to the Judges, who were responsible for the decisions cited from the Indian jurisdiction, therefore, I am inclined to think that the test of "direct or substantial interest" of the workers may not be found to be a satisfactory one. The other suggested restriction of community of interest between workmen and the person concerned, stands on a surer basis and the view I am disposed to take of the scope of the expression "any person" would seem to be in consonance with this idea. I am unable to conceive of a case of dispute between "employers and employers" unless it be one bearing on the terms on which "workmen" may be employed in separate units of a particular industry. One ambitious employer, anxious to drive out others from the field of competition may give excessively favourable terms to workmen and attract most of that category to his own establishment. Even in such a case the dispute would be in respect of the category of "workmen." The words "which is connected with the employment or non -employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour" occurring in the definition of "industrial dispute" import another limitation on the scope of that term. This restriction would also appear to accord well with the suggestion that the term " any person" comprehends "workman" or "ex‑workmen" or "prospective workmen" and no other class of employee and raises no hurdle in the way of acceptance of the view expressed above. As salesmen have been found to be not workmen, in my judgment, the decision of the Tribunal requires to be set aside so far as it has been made applicable to salesmen in view of the above discussion. I would, therefore, allow the appeal, but in the circumstances would leave the parties to bear their own costs. FAZLE AKBAR, J.‑I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed to be delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice. I respectfully agree with the reasoning and conclusions recorded in that judgment, but as the question raised in this case is of considerable importance in the matter of industrial relations between the employer and the employee, I should give my reasons in my own words. The main question for consideration in this appeal is the true scope and effect of the expression "any person" occurring in the definition clause 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (herein after referred to as the Act). This question has arisen under the following circumstances. There was a dispute between Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. and its workers as represented by Pakistan Tobacco Company Employees' Union in a number of matters and it was referred to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. One of the questions before the Tribunal was whether the workmen of the Company are competent to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of the salesmen of the Company and whether the Tribunal is competent to adjudicate upon such a dispute. The Tribunal has found that salesmen are not workmen within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal, however, in view of the expression "any person" in section 2 (k) of the Act came to the following conclusions :‑ "Taking into consideration the different views about `any person' in the definition, and all other matters my decision is that although the salesmen may not be workmen employees of this ‑industry, the case of the salesmen regarding terms and conditions of service may be raised as an Industrial Dispute by the workmen employees or their union as they have done in this case. In view of the fact that the workmen employees have got substantial interest (not ideological or philosophical) in the matter of condition and terms of employment of salesmen which posts the workmen employees, specially the clerks do legitimately hope to fill up when occasion arises." The learned counsel for the appellant Company has argued that the salesmen not being workmen their case is not one of an "Industrial Dispute" under the Act and the Tribunal has, there fore, no jurisdiction to give any relief to them. In support of his argument he has relied on the decision in the case of Workmen of Dumakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dumakuchi Tea Estate (A I R 1953 Bom. 325). On the other hand the learned advocate for the Union has contended that by section 2 (k) of the Act the subject‑matter of Industrial Dispute has not been restricted only to workmen and clerks but it is also available with regard to the right of any person. Section 2 (k) defines Industrial Dispute as follows :‑ "2 (k) `industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of the labour, of any person. Now the question is: Shall the words "any person" be read as an expression confined to workmen. The learned Advocate for the Union has contended that the words "any person" is an expression of wide connotation and there is no reason why this expression should be interpreted in the terms of workmen. It seems to me that the above interpretation would be wholly repugnant to the spirit of the Act. The Act is intended to bring about in the interest of Industrial peace and economy a fair and satisfactory adjustment of relation between employer and employee in a variety of fields . of activity. A liberal interpretation of the words "any person" will have the effect of making the Industrial dispute very wide. If workmen are permitted to raise a dispute with regard to the right of any person who is not connected with the industry in that event the provision of the Act relating to conciliation and arbitration will not be available between the disputants as they will not belong to the same industry. Furthermore, it will have the effect of bringing the remedy under the Act within the reach of person for whom the Act was never intended. For example the workmen may go on strike over discharge of the Manager of the Industry. Such instances may be multiplied to illustrate that adoption of a wide connotation of the expression "any person" will defeat the purpose of the Act. The question, therefore, will be : Shall it be permissible not to stick to the ordinary meaning of the words "any person." It is no doubt true that meaning should be ascertained from the words employed in the definition, but set up and context are also relevant for ascertaining what exactly meant to be conveyed by the expression used in the Act. As observed by Lord Atkinson in Keats v. Lewis M. Con solidated Collieries Ltd. (1911 A C 641). "In the construction of a Statute, it is of course, at all times permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the R time the Statute was passed, and to the evils which as it appear from its provisions it was designed to remedy." A similar view appears from the following passage in Maxwell's Book on Interpretation of Statutes (7th Edition page 166) :‑ "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that when the language used by the Legislature admits of two constructions the Court should not adopt a construction which would lead to an s absurdity or obvious injustice but should adopt that construc tion which appears to be most in accord with reason and justice." Now the purpose of the legislation enacted in the Industrial Disputes Act is to settle disputes that arise between the workers and the Management which if not settled would result in a strike or lock‑out and dislocation of business essential to the life of the country. Provisions have, therefore, been made in the Act for Works Committee, Conciliation Officer, Board of Conciliation, Court of Enquiry and industrial Tribunal to achieve peaceful settlement of industrial dispute. Workman has been defined in section 2 (s) as follows : ‑ "Section 2 (s).‑`Workman' means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government." The above shows that the Act gives a restricted meaning to the workman. I have already stated that the provisions of the Act are mostly intended to confer benefit to the workman class. Now if the industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (k) is read in the context of the other provision of the Act one must come to the unhesitating conclusion that the dispute must be connected with the employment, or non‑employment or the terms of employ ment or with the conditions of labour of a person who must belong to the class of workmen Such an interpretation seems to be intelligible and consonant with reason. I am, therefore, of opinion that the expression any person" in section 2 (k) of the Act is to be interpreted in' the term of workmen. For the reasons stated above, I am unable to accept the contention that industrial dispute is not confined to workmen, but it also extends to anybody employed by the industry so long as his case is sponsored by the workmen. I have already pointed out that such an interpretation cannot be accepted because that would create incongruity and repugnancy with the other provisions of the Act. In this case the finding of the Tribunal is that the salesmen are not workmen. Nor can it be said that the workmen have any direct or substantial interest in their employment or non‑employ ment. The dispute with regard to their terms of employment cannot, therefore, be regarded as an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Act. B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.‑I am in respectful agreement with my Lord the Chief Justice that the question regarding the conditions of service of salesmen is not an industrial dispute. I am of opinion that for restricting the application of "industrial dispute" it is not necessary to place any limitations on the words "any person" in section 2 (k). I would permit "any person" to mean any person and I would hold the present dispute beyond the preview of industrial dispute on the ground that a `dispute' or `difference' can only refer to a matter relating to the rights of the parties. The words `dispute' and `difference' have a very well known connotation in the ordinary law relating to arbitration and I see no ground for not adopting a similar connotation in case of an industrial dispute. It will be proper to state here the difference between an ordinary arbitration and a proceeding before an industrial Tribunal. The arbitrator like a Court simply determines what the rights of the parties are. He neither purports to grant nor can he grant to a party any right which it does not possess, If an arbitrator were, for instance, to find in a case of inheritance that one of the heirs is entitled under the relevant law to one third shares of the estate of the deceased he could not on equitable grounds convert that one‑third to one‑half. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is however entirely different. The Tribunal does not discover what the rights of the parties are. If he were simply to do that he would never be able to help the workmen because the rights of the workmen are based on contract and cannot go beyond the terms of the contract. The Tribunal possesses a jurisdiction by which it alters the terms of the contract and grants to parties rights which they do not possess under the law on what it considers to be just and equitable grounds. Truly speaking, there are no fetters at all on the discretion of the Tribunal to vary the conditions of service. Some general principles on which the Tribunals should act are found in decided cases but they have no binding force as precedent and the jurisdiction of Tribunal, subject of course to the jurisdiction of any appellate authority remains supreme. In the case of an ordinary arbitration clause which provides that any dispute or difference shall be referred to an arbitrator the dispute or difference necessarily involves the assertion of a right in one of the parties to the dispute or difference as against the other. If there be an arbitration agreement between A and B, A cannot raise a dispute that C has a right against B; the dispute must necessarily be as to the right which A claims as against B. On the same apology if workmen want to raise an industrial dispute against the employer it is necessary that they should claim same right in themselves as against the employer or should complain of some un-justice or wrong done by the employer or apprehended from him. The word `right' in this connection means a right 'which the workers claim in equity in view of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to give equitable relief and does not mean a right which already exists. Injustice and wrong have a similar implica tion. The workmen cannot make the conditions of service, or the employment or non‑employment of any person a matter for reference to the Tribunal unless they are able to contend that if the demand is not met they will not suffer an injustice. If the workmen demand that the conditions of service of a person who is not himself a workmen be altered they would not be claiming a right for themselves nor complaining of any injustice done to them and this could not be called a dispute or difference between them and the employer. The employment or non‑employment of another person may however indirectly affect the interests of the workmen, and the question will arise whether they can in such a case raise an industrial dispute. For instance, the workmen demand that a particular doctor be employed because he is a good doctor. Will this be an industrial dispute? The reply is that it is not an industrial dispute because the right of the workmen which they can claim in enquiry is to have efficient medical aid and not to have a particular doctor employed. If the medical aid they are receiving is inefficient they can raise a dispute for securing better aid but that is all. They cannot insist on the employment of a particular person. Similarly, if the doctor who attends is inefficient and they raise a dispute that he be removed their real dispute is that they should have better aid. The same doctor may acquire efficiency and then there could be no objection to his employment. There will be one case where the non‑employment of a person may be injustice done to the workmen though that person is not himself a workman. That is where the services of that person have been terminated on account of his activities in connection with a workmen's, union. In such a case the workmen are entitled to raise a dispute because it is wrong done to the workmen themselves. In the present case, I am unable to see what right in equity the workman can be claiming against the employer when they want the conditions of service of salesmen to be changed. The mere fact that they stand a chance of being promoted as salesmen does not imply that a wrong will be done to them, if the service conditions of salesmen are not changed. The present dispute should be excluded from the purview of industrial dispute on the simple ground that to permit such a dispute would amount to the raising by an indirect method of a matter which the Lagislature has deliberately excluded. The Industrial Disputes Act envisages only the resolving of disputes between workmen and employers. If we were to accept the principles that because the workmen stand a chance of being promoted to higher posts the conditions of service of the holders of those posts could also form the subject matter of disputes before the Tribunal, we would be unduly extending the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act. I am of the opinion that even if the promotion .to the post of salesmen was not by selection it would not be open to the workmen to make the conditions of service of salesmen the subject‑matter of reference to an industrial tribunal, I would allow the appeal. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.--This appeal, by special leave is directed against an award of the whole‑time Industrial Tribunal, East Pakistan. The appellant which is a public limited company carrying on business as manufacturers and dealers in tobacco throughout Pakistan, has a sales branch at Dacca for the whole of East ,Pakistan wherein some 89 workers are employed, of whom only ten are salesmen. Originally, the appellant was registered as a private limited company in the year 1947 when it took over the business of the Imperial Tobacco Company of India. It was converted into a public limited company only in the year 1955 but before its incorporation as such public limited company its employees 'at Dacca had informed themselves into a trade union and obtained registration as such in the year 1951. Ever since then they have been periodically preferring demands against the company which, in accordance with its settled policy of co‑operation, invariably settled them by mutual agreements. The last of such agreements made on the. 22nd of February 1957, was to remain in force for a period of two years with effect from the 1st of January 1957, and thereafter could only be terminated by giving three months' notice in writing. But before the expiry of the said period of two years the Union, on the 30th of September 1958, gave formal notice of its intention to submit a revised memorandum of grievances on the expiry of the agree ment. Such a memorandum was in fact submitted on the 31st of January 1959. The appellant in conformity with its policy commenced conciliation proceedings, waiving all technical objec tions, but on this occasion its efforts did not prove fruitful and ultimately the Province of East Pakistan (respondent No. 2 herein) made a reference of the dispute to the Tribunal (respondent No. 3 herein) by a Notification in the Dacca Gazette of the 1st of December 1959. A list of demands was appended to the said Notification as a schedule thereto specifying some seven demands including, inter alia, introduction of pay scales and grades, revision of the systems of calculation of dearness allowance and overtime for "all categories of employees" and the coverage of salesmen and convassors under accident insurance policies. In these proceedings before the Tribunal the appellant raised a preliminary objection as to its jurisdiction to adjudicate in respect of the conditions of employment of its sales staff on the ground that salesmen were not workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, as such, no dispute relating to them or their conditions of service or employment could form the subject‑matter of an industrial dispute which could not be either referred to or adjudicated upon by the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld upon the evidence adduced before it that salesmen did not fall within the ambit of the definition of work men given in clause (s) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, as the nature of their work was neither manual nor clerical ; but it nevertheless held that having regard to the very wide definition of an industrial dispute given in clause (k) of section 2 of the said Act a dispute with regard to the terms and conditions of employ ment of salesmen could be raised as an industrial dispute by the workmen employees or their union as had been done in the present case. Upon this finding the Tribunal made its award on the various demands referred to it in respect of all categories of employees including salesmen. This award was published by the Provincial Government in the Dacca Gazette, Extraordinary of the 14th March 1960. It is against this award that the appellant has come up on appeal with the leave of this Court which was granted on the 19th of May 1960, for consideration of all the points raised in the petition for special leave. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the appellant and its employees represented by their Union (respondent No. 1 herein have compromised on all except one of the issues, namely, as to whether salesmen (since designated as sales supervisors) come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The only question for decision in this appeal, therefore, is as to whether salesmen come within the definition of workmen given in clause (s) of section, 2, if not, then as to whether a dispute relating to the terms and conditions of their employment can fall within the ambit of an industrial dispute as defined in clause (k) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed to be delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice in this matter and although I am in respectful agreement with the conclusion arrived at by him I would like to indicate my own reasons for reaching the same conclusion as they are somewhat different. Clauses (k) and (s) of section 2 of the said Act are in these terms : ‑ "(k) `industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen or between worken and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person (s) `workman' means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any. industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that disputes, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of Pakistan or in the Police." In view of the definition of `workman' quoted above it is unneces sary to speculate as to the category of persons who may be appropriately described as workmen in the etymological sense of the word, for, the legislature has made it clear that for the pur poses of this particular statute only those engaged in "manual or clerical work" are to be treated as workmen if they are not em ployed in the naval, military or air service of Pakistan or in the Police. The only extension that has been made of this category, by the use of the word "includes", is that a person within the above category is to be treated as a workman notwithstanding that he may have been discharged during the pendency of an industrial dispute. As to whether a person does or does not fall within this category is necessarily a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence in each case. In the present case the Tribunal has upon an elaborate and detailed examination of the evidence come to the conclusion that the salesmen in the employ of the appellant do neither manual nor clerical work, skilled or unskilled, in the sense of the above definition. It is not for this Court to go behind this finding of fact, which appears to be supported by sufficient evidence on the record as to the nature of the work of these salesmen. This conclusion is furthermore neither perverse nor arbitrary and cannot, therefore, be disturbed by this Court. The next question that falls to be considered is as to whether a dispute as to the terms and conditions of employment of such salesman can nevertheless become an industrial dispute within the ambit of the definition given above. This question is not alto gether free from difficulty. It appears that there is some difference of opinion the Courts in India as to the interpretation of the terms of the said definition. The first part of this definition indicates the parties between whom an industrial dispute may arise and the second part purports to set out as to what can be the subject‑matter of such a dispute. Worded as this latter part of the definition is, it would in its ordinary grammatical sense mean that any dispute which is con nected with the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of "any person", no matter who he is, may become an industrial dispute if it is raised between the categories of persons mentioned in the first part of the said definition. Read in this wide sense it is possible for the workers of any particular industry to raise an industrial dispute with regard to employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment of the conditions of labour of even a person not in any way connected with the said industry or even a person em ployed in the naval, military or air service of Pakistan even though he has been expressly excluded from the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is easy to multiply such absurd instances to which such a wide and literal reading of the words of this defini tion may logically lead. But it is sufficient for the present purposes to say that the Legislature could not possibly have intended such absurd consequences and, therefore, the words of this definition must of necessity be read in some limited sense. The question is as to what extent should the meaning of the words "any person" be limited or restricted. The Tribunal has accepted the limitations indicated in the case of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (AIR 1958 S C 353) by the Supreme Court of India, namely, that the expression "any person" in this clause means a person "in whose employment or non‑employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest." Applying this test it has discovered such direct and substantial interest of the workmen concerned in the present case from the fact that it is possible for clerks in the employ of the appellant to be chosen by a process of selection for employment as salesmen. The decisions of the Indian Courts wherein the words "any peson" have been interpreted in the wide sense without any limitation appear to have been influenced in no small measure by certain observations of Viscount Simon, Lord Chancellor, in the case of National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation (1943 A C 166, 176) to the following effect :‑ "If there can be a trade union to which the higher grades of officers of a municipal corporation can belong, it does not seem an impossible use of language to say that a dispute concerning their conditions of service may be a trade dispute." The question under consideration in the said case was as to whether a dispute relating to the emoluments of such officers of the local authority concerned could form a trade dispute within the definition of that expression in the English Industrial Courts Act of 1919 which is almost identical with the definition in section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, except the words "between employers and employees" do not occur in the definition given in the English Statutes.. Although the observations of the noble Lord Chancellor would apparently seem to support the wider construction, a more careful reading of the judgment would indi cate that the said observations were not based upon the construc tion of the expression "any person" but upon the ground that such a dispute was also a dispute between employers and workmen. What has been overlooked in these Indian decisions is that a "workman" under the said Industrial Courts Act means "any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer whether the contract be by way of manual labour, clerical work, or otherwise". In view of this definition it was held that such higher grade officers came within the above category of "workmen" and a dispute relating to the conditions of their employment was a trade dispute within the meaning of that Act. Neither this test nor the test of the existence of a community of interest between the workmen and the person whose conditions of employment are sought to be raised as an industrial dispute seem to me, however, to furnish an appropriate guide for the determination of the limitations to be put upon the said words. It is not difficult to imagine that a community of interest even of the nature which can be described as direct or substantial may well develop between a workman and a member of the managerial staff of an industry for a variety of reasons. Thus an intriguing member of the executive staff may for his own personal advancement bring about such a community of interest by promising to the workmen under him better terms and conditions of employment or better conditions of labour in return for their support in his own cause. In my view, once it is conceded that some limitations, ort restrictions must be placed upon these wide words the limitations must be sought for within the framework of the statute itself. The Industrial Disputes Act is a special statute designed to give certain extraordinary benefits to certain categories of persons employed in industries and for bringing about peace in the relations of em ployers and‑employees in industrial undertakings. It arms the Provincial Government with wide powers for compelling employers and workmen to submit their disputes and differences to concilia tion and in the event of such conciliation failing, to compulsory adjudication by Industrial Tribunals set up for the purpose. I arms such Industrial Tribunals with powers which may even extent to the remaking of contracts between workmen and their employers or compelling an employer to employ a particular workman. The award of the Tribunal is furthermore enforceable by the penal process. To that extent, therefore, the statute certainly drasti cally abrogates or curtails the right of ' an employer under the general law of the land governing the relationship of master and servant. Such an act should, in my opinion, be construed with reasonable strictness and not be given a meaning wider than the words used will justify when read together with the other provision of the statute keeping in view its scheme and purpose. Reading the definition of `industrial dispute' in this manner it seems to me that the first and most obvious limitation that must of necessity be put upon the subject‑matter of the dispute is that an employer cannot possibly fall within the scope of these words, for, it is patent that there can be no dispute with regard to his employ ment or non‑employment or terms of employment. The next limitation that seems to be indicated is that it must be a dispute which the parties thereto are capable of settling or, if it has been adjudicated upon, then of implementing the award given in respect thereof. Thus it is clear that the words "any person" referred to in the said definition must in the first instance be limited to persons employed in the concern or industry between whose workmen, and employers or workmen and workmen the dispute is raised. To hold otherwise would be grossly unfair to the Legislature, for, it cannot be reasonably believed that any Legislature would manifest such a harsh and capricious intent' and force a person to perform what is impossible. Thus it is manifest that an employer `A' cannot settle a dispute with regard to the employment or non-employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour of an employee under employer B'. The next logical limitation, in my view, should be that no one should be permitted to do indirectly what he cannot do directly, for, that would be perpetrating a fraud upon the statute itself. Thus a person who could not directly raise a dispute with regard to his employment or non‑employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour should not be allowed to have that dispute raised indirectly as an industrial dispute through the instru mentality of others falling within the category or persons who may properly be parties to an industrial dispute. Thus the terms and conditions of employment of a member of the managerial staff cannot form, in my opinion, the subject‑matter of an industrial dispute within the meaning of this section, as he could never have under the Industrial Disputes Act raised such a dispute. To permit him to, do so, therefore, would amount to placing a further restriction on the freedom of contract enjoyed under the general law by his employer, even though the Legislature had not done so. The scheme of the Act does not contemplate the total abrogation of the law of contract or the law relating to master and servant, but it seems merely to restrict that right in the case of a limited category of persons. It seems to me that the use of the words "any person" in clause (k) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act is in this sense to be limited to the category of persons who fall within the general category of workmen and these particular words have been used merely to indicate that the category may compromise within it is discharged workman or a workman to be, and were not intended by the Legislature to embrace any other category of employees. Non‑workmen are, therefore, in my opinion, not included within the words "any person." For these reasons I would accept the appeal of the appellant to the extent that the award made by the Tribunal in the present case in favour of the salesmen should be set aside. The rest of the award should be disposed of as prayed for by both the appellant and the respondent Union herein in terms of the com promise filed in this Court. I would also make no order as to costs. The award of the Tribunal in Favour of salesmen under dispute No. 7 is set aside. The other points in dispute between the parties having been resolved by means of a compromise, we direct that the compromise be placed on the record and that it should supersede, in detail on the points with which it deals, the award given by the Tribunal We leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Order accordingly.