P L D 1969 Dacca 803 (PLP)

M. R. KHAN, J.‑The petitioner Mrs. Momtaz Malik was the owner of parts of C. S. Plots Nos. 52, 56 and 67 of Mouza Barabo under P. S. Tejgaon, Dacca.. The area of these lands is '44 acre. These lands were first requisitioned under section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 for a scheme known as `Mohammadpur Model Town' and were subsequently acquired for the same purpose under section 5 of the said Act. As the compensation proposed to be paid for the lands was not acceptable to her, she made an application to the Provincial Government for referring the matter to an Arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Accordingly, an Additional Sub ordinate Judge of Dacca was appointed Arbitrator in the matter'. In the arbitration proceeding, the petitioner claimed Rs. 37,525 as compensation. After hearing the parties, the Arbitrator, by his order dated 24‑9‑63, made an award assessing the compensa tion payable to the petitioner at Rs. 10,767 as against the sum of Rs. 37,525 claimed by her. Deducting the sum of Rs. 2,522 already paid to her the Arbitrator made an award for Rs. 8,245 in her favour. Being aggrieved by this award, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the High Court under section 7 (f) of the said Act, valuing the appeal at Rs. 26,75 3' which is the difference between the amount claimed by her and the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. The memorandum of appeal was presented with a fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 and was classified as a First Miscellaneous Appeal, being F. M. A. T. No. 1418 of 1963. The Stamp Reporter of the High Court, however, took the view that this appeal should have been classified as a First Appeal from a decree and ad valorem court‑fee of Rs. 2,432.50 should have been paid on the memorandum of appeal under section 8 of the Court Fees Act. As the petitioner did not agree with this view. the Stamp Reporter, acting under the provisions of section 5 of the Court Fees Act, referred the matter to the Taxing Officer, who is the Registrar of the High Court After perusing the report of IM Stamp Reporter and giving a hearing to the learned Advocate of the petitioner, the Taxing Officer, by his order dated 26‑5‑5, accepted the reference made by the Stamp Reporter and ordered to classify the petitioner's appeal as First Appeal and directed the petitioner to pay the deficit court‑fee within three weeks. The decision of the Taxing Officer was final under section 5 of the Court Fees Act. As the matter appears to be one of general importance, the Taxing Officer, in pursuance of section 5 of the Court Fees Act, could have referred it to the final decision of the learned Chief Justice or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice might have appointed. But the Taxing Officer did not make any such reference. Being placed in such a situation, the petitioner made a petition to the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution (hereinafter called writ petition), challenging the legality of the decision of the Taxing Officer with regard to the court‑fee payable on her memorandum of appeal against the Arbitrator's award. This Court summarily dismissed the petition as non maintainable on the ground that the decision of the Registrar of the High Court in his capacity as Taxing Officer was a decision of the High Court itself. Against the High Court's order dismissing the writ petition summarily, the petitioner obtained leave for appeal to the Supreme Court. As the result of the appeal, the order of the High Court summarily dismissing the writ petition was set aside and the case was remanded to this Court for disposal in accordance with law. In remanding the case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, however, observed that the point involved in the case is not free from difficulty. After the remand, a Division Bench of this Court issued a Rule on the Taxing Officer the sole respondent to show cause why his order, dated 26‑5‑65 should not be declared to have been passed without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect. Mr. T. H. Khan, the learned Senior Government Pleader appeared in the case to Oppose the Rule. Having regard to the divergence of opinions of different Superior Courts on the point at issue and considering that the matter is one of general importance, the Division Bench desired that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench. Accordingly, this matter came up before this Special Bench. We have heard at length Mr. Moiaul Huq, the learned Advocate for the petitioner and ‑Mr. T. H. Khan, the learned Senior Government Pleader. The petitioner s contention is that the Arbitrator's award in this case is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree and as such her memorandum of appeal against the award is liable to be stamped with the fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 under Article I1 of the Second Schedule of the Court Fees Act. On the other hand, the contention of the learned Senior Government Pleader is that, in view of the provision of section 8 of the Court Fees Act, ad valorem court‑fee is payable on the memo randum of appeal and that the amount of ad valorem court‑fee is to be calculated according to Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. Thus the sole question that arises for determina tion in this case is that the question of proper mount of court -fee payable on the memorandum of appeal presented by the petitioner against the Arbitrator's award. To be more precise, the question is whether fixed court‑fee under Article 11 of Schedule 11 or ad valorem court‑fee under Article 1 of Scheduled I of the Court Fees Act is payable on the memorandum of appeal. In order to deal with this question, it would be useful to look into the scheme of the Court Fees Act as in force in East 'Pakistan. The Act is divided into seven chapters which, as indicated by their heading, purport to deal with different subject‑matters. There are three Schedules appended to the Act. Of them, Schedule I prescribes ad valorem court‑fees, whereas Schedule 11 prescribes fixed court‑fees on different classes of documents. Chapter I consisting of sections 1, 1‑A and 2 is preliminary. Chapter II contains sections 3 to

6. Of them, sections 3 to 5 deal with fees on documents presented in the High Court. Section 3 deals with levy of fees on the original side of the High Court, whereas section 4 is concerned with fees on documents filed, exhibited or recorded in the High Court in its extraordinary original (both civil and criminal), appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Section 6 contained in Chapter It. on the other hams, deals with fees on documents presented in other Courts and in public offices. Chapter III relates to computation of fees payable in certain classes of suits and appeals. The other Chapters of the Court Fees Act do not appear to be relevant for our present purpose. Of the several sections in Chapter 11, the most relevant sections for the present purpose are sections 4 and

6. Section 4 provides that no document of any of (tic kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule to the Court Fees Act as chargeable with fees shall be " filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by the High Court in any case coming before it in the exercise of its extraordinary original (both civil and criminal), appellate or revisional jurisdiction unless in respect of such document there b.4s been paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document. Similarly, section 6 forbids the filing, exhibition etc. of any of the documents mentioned in the First or Second Schedule to the Court Fees Act in any other Court or in any public office unless in respect of such document there has been paid a fee as indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document. Thus it is clear that the charging provisions for levy of court‑fees on documents presented in the High Court or other Courts and in public offices are contained in sections 4 and 6 of the Court Fees Act, read with the Schedules I and It thereof. The Court Fees Act was enacted in the year 1870. The drafting of this Act does not appear to be scientific, and it suffers from defects and anomalies. This gave rise to difficulty in the interpretation of its provisions. As a result, divergent decisions were made by superior Courts in many a case. In Chunilal v. Sheo Charan Lal (47 All. 756) the Allahabad High Court said: "The difficulty is really due to the circumstances that the amendments of the Court Fees Act have not kept pace with the amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure." In Krishna Mohan Singh v. Raghunandan Pande (I L R 4 Pat. 336) the learned Chief Justice of the Patna High Court said "The wording of this Act is in some respect certainly unscientific and difficult to interpret and its interpretation has been the subject of a multitude of decisions in the Courts." There are instances of anomalies in the Court Fees Act. For example, an appeal to the High Court under a special statute against the decision of a statutory functionary like the Arbitrator, as in this case, does not come under any of the jurisdictions of the High Court mentioned in section 4 of the Court Fees Act, inasmuch as the Arbitrator is a persona designata and does not function as a Court. In this connection, it is noticed that Article 1 of Schedule I speaks of presentation of memorandum of appeal to a Civil or Revenue Court, but not to the High Court in its extraordinary original appellate or revisional jurisdiction. For these reasons, one may possibly argue that no court‑fee is payable under Article 1 of Schedule I on an appeal presented to the High Court against an award of a statutory functionary like an Arbitrator who does not function as a Court. However, in the instant case, the petitioner does not contend that no court‑fee is payable on her memorandum of appeal. It was observed in A I R 1925 Pat. 392, A I R 194b Lah. 280 and A I R 1932 Cal. 346 that documents presented in a High Court are not excluded from the operation of Article 1 of Schedule I. Next, section 5 gives power to the Taxing Officer to decide if any fee is payable and, if so, the amount of such fee. But section 5 does not provide if the Taxing Officer has, like Courts, jurisdiction to determine the valuation of the subject- matter of the suit or appeal. Again, according to the definition in section 2(4) of the Court Fees Act, `suit' includes an appeal from a decree except in section 8‑A. According to this definition, section 7 of the Court Fees Act which deals with suit includes appeals also. But clause (iv) of section 7 expressly mentions memorandum of appeal. This may give rise to a misunderstanding if suits mentioned in the other clauses of section 7 do or do not include appeals. Lastly, written statement pleading a set‑off or counter‑claim, though mentioned in Article 1 of Schedule I, is not mentioned in section 17, whereas plaint and memorandum of appeal are expressly mentioned in that section. The purpose of giving these instances is to emphasise that there being anomalies in the Court Fees Act, in construing a particular provision of that Act all other provisions thereof should be taken into consideration, so that the anomaly, if any, may be reconciled. In the case reported in 18 C L J 308 at page 316‑17, Mr. Justice Mukherjee said: "The question raised is of considerable nicety and by no means, free from difficulty, which is attributable to the fact that the Court Fees Act has been amended piecemeal from time to time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In my opinion, true mode of interpretation of statute like the Court Fees Act, which has been repeatedly amended, is not to consider individual sections, but to take them as a whole and to give effect to the legislative intent upon a particular matter." Let us now turn to the point raised in this case. It appears that memorandum of appeal finds mention in sections 7, 8 and 17, Article 1 of Schedule 1 and Articles 5, 11, 17, 20 and 21 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. Sections 7 and 17 and Articles 5, 17, 20 and 21 of the Second Schedule are obviously inapplicable to the memorandum of appeal under consideration here. This leaves section 8, Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule II alone in the field. Article 11 of Schedule II runs thus. Number Proper fee

11. Memorandum of appeal. When the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree and is presented. (a) (b) (c) to a High Court. Rs. 6'25 Section 8 of the Court Fees Act on which Mr. T. H. Khan, the learned Senior Government Pleader relies reads as follows:‑ "

8. Amount of fee payable under this Act on a memo randum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purpose shall be computed according to difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." Obviously, section 8 is not a charging section in itself. This section only provides a basis for determination of an appeal against an order relating to compensation for acquisition of land for public purposes, but does not itself prescribe court‑fees. Left to itself, this section cannot fetch any as court‑fee, In order to determine the court‑fee payable in a given case it is essential to take the aid of the applicable Article of the Schedules I and 11 of the Court Fees Act. Mr. T. H. Khan, however, made a feeble attempt to show that section 8 is in itself a charging section and will govern the present case. According to the express provisions of sections 4 and 6, a document is chargeable with fee only when such document is specified in either of the Schedules I and Ii of the Court Fees Act and not otherwise. I am, therefore, unable to agree that section 8 is a charging section. Even the decision of Rankin, C. J. in Re: Anandalal Chakrabarty and others (35 C W N 1103===A I R 1932 Cal. 346) on which Mr. T. H. Khan placed so much reliance in support of his contention that ad valorem court‑fee is payable on the memorandum of appeal in this case, does not support that section 8 is a charging section. In the cited case, Rankin, C. J. accepted the contention that section 8 of the Court Fees Act is not in itself a charging section and that it only provides a rule for computation of fee payable under the Act in a certain classes of cases. His further observation in that case is that the charge in a case governed by section 8 is imposed by Article 1 of Schedule I. There is no dispute that the Court Fees Act is a taxing statute. It is not necessary to cite decisions in support of this view. Suffice it to refer to the following observation of our Supreme Court in the order of remand made by it in this case: "The main object of the Court Fees Act is to secure revenue for the benefit of the State. It prescribes the fees which are to be paid in respect of documents to be used in Courts, how the fees to be paid thereon are to be ascertained and how the sufficiency of such fees are to be determined. It is thus, in every sense of the term, a fiscal enactment." Thus the Court Fees Act being a fiscal statute, no fee under that Act can be levied unless there is a charging section where under fee is leviable. Therefore, in order to levy court‑fees, section 8 of the Court Fees Act must be read with Article 1 of Schedule I, which prescribes ad valorem court‑fees on a certain classes of documents including memorandum of appeal. Article 1 of Schedule I is as follows: Proper fee. Proper Fee Plaint, written statement pleading a set‑off or counter‑claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) or of cross‑objection presented in Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned section

3. When the amount or value of the sub ject‑matter in dispute does not exceed seventy‑five rupees, for every five rupees or part thereof, of such amount or value in etc . . . . . Provided that the maximum fee leviable on a plaint or memoran dum of appeal shall be fifteen thousand rupees. Fifty‑six Paisa. Thus, Article I of Schedule I is subject to one Exception and one Proviso. This Article, on account of the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring therein, applies to those cases only which are not otherwise provided for in the Court Fees Act. Obviously, the said expression is an Exception to Article t of Schedule

1. The Proviso is that the maximum ad valorem fee payable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall not, in any case, exceed fifteen thousand rupees. When section 8 of the Court Fees Act is not in itself a charging section and when that section by itself cannot fetch court‑fees, the same must be read with Article 1 of Schedule I including its Exception and Proviso. In other words, section 8 cannot be considered in isolation, ignoring the other provisions of the Court Fees Act, particularly when section 8 ‑is not a charging section and requires the aid of some other provision of that Act (i.e. Article 1 of Schedule I) for the levy of court‑fee on a memorandum of appeal. The important thing to be considered in connection with the point at issue is as to the nature of the award made in this case. The Arbitrator appointed under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948 (East Bengal Act No. XIII of 1948), though a judicial officer, does not function as a Court and is a persona designata. In contrast, a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is made to a Court and the award made under such reference, in view of section 26(2) thereof, is a decree. Thus the East Bengal Act No. XI1I of 1948 substantially differs from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As regards the nature of the award, the East Bengal Act No. XIII of 1948 nowhere provides that the award made by the Arbitrator shall be deemed to be a decree or an order having the force of a decree. But it is only in rule 9(17) of the Rules made under the East Bengal Act No. XIII of 1948 that it is provided that the award of the Arbitrator shall be enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a decree of the Civil Court and the Arbitrator shall be deemed to be a Court. This Provision in the rule does not make the Arbitrator's award under the East Bengal Act No. XIII of 1948 a decree or an order having the force of a decree. The question of execution of an award arises only after the award has been made. Therefore, the mere executability of the award in pursuance of the rule 9 (17) does not alter the nature of the award and make the award either a decree or an order having the force of a decree. This view is amply supported by the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Official Liquidator v. Mir Qureshi (A I R 1945 Lah. 146). To the same effect is the view taken by the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in the cases of Sohanlal v. Province of Bengal (50 C W N 820), Hirji Virji v. Government of Bombay (A I R 1945 Bom. 348) and In re: Venkataratnam (A I R 1941 Mad. 639). Mr. T. H. Khan concedes that the Arbitrator's award made in the present case is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree, although the award is executable under the rules. Thus the memorandum of appeal presented by the petitioner in the present case is a memorandum of appeal not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act expressly provides that a fixed court‑fee of Rs.6.25 is payable on a memorandum of appeal when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree and is presented to the High Court. Hence, Article 1 I of the Second Schedule is apparently applicable to the petitioner' memorandum of appeal. But this does not immediately resolve V the point at issue, because the rival section 8 and Article 1 of Schedule I are also applicable to memorandum of appeal. As both Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule II cannot apply to a memorandum of appeal at the same time, it is necessary to determine the kind of memorandum of appeal attracted by either of the said two Articles. In order that court‑fee may be leviable, section 8, for the reasons already stated, must be read with Article 1 of Schedule I. Now, Article 1 of Schedule I prescribes ad valorem court‑fee on plaint, memorandum of appeal etc. not otherwise provided for in the Court Fees Act. The expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" which operates as an Exception to Article 1 of Schedule 1, is significant and cannot be overlooked in a case coming under section 8 of the Court Fees Act, because it is Article 1 of Schedule I and not section 8 is the charging provision. In other words, Article 1 of Schedule I along with the words "not otherwise provided for in this Act", must be construed and given effect to in all applicable cases including a case covered by section

8. This will be in accord with the rules of interpretation laid down by our Supreme Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1957 (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 219) to the effect that effect should be given to every part and every word of the statute and that the Courts should avoid a construction which renders any provision meaningless or inopera tive and must lean in favour of a construction which will render every word operative rather than one which may make some words idle and nugatory. The Proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I runs thus: "Provided that the maximum fee leviable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be fifteen thousand rupees." It can never be urged that this proviso prescribing the maximum ad valorem fee shall not apply to an appeal contemplated in section 8, that is, an appeal of an aggrieved claimant against an award for compensation for acquisition of land. When this proviso prescribing the maximum ad valorem fee applies to an appeal contemplated in section 8, there can be no reason why the Exception to Article 1 of Schedule I provided by the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" which, in effect, is in the nature of a proviso, shall not equally apply to an appeal envisaged in section

8. Section 8 of the Court Fees Act provides a basis for determination of valuation of an appeal for levy of ad valorem court‑fee. Likewise, section 7 of the same Act provides basis for determination of valuation of different classes of suits and appeals for levy of ad valorem court‑fee (appeal being included in the defi nition of 'suit'). Thus both sections 7 and 8 stand on the same footing. This was also the view of Rankin, C. J. in the case report ed in In re: Anandalal Chakrabarty and others. Mr. T. H. Khan concedes that these two sections stand on the same footing. 1n his view, section 8 may be even treated as yet another clause of section

7. It is obvious that section 7 requiring ad valorem court‑fees must be read with Article 1 of Schedule I subject to the Exception and the proviso as aforesaid, otherwise at least Article 2 of Schedule I, for the reason stated hereinafter, may be meaningless. That being so, there is no reason why section 8 which stands on the same footing as section 7 should not be similarly read with Article 1 of Schedule I subject to the same Exception and Proviso. Hence, in applying section 8, read with Article 1 of Schedule I, the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring in that Article should always be given effect to. In order to give effect to the said expression, it is necessary to determine its real import. It is only the Schedules I and II of the Court Fees Act that prescribe court‑fees payable on different classes of documents, but the sections of the Court Fees Act do not. It, therefore, reasonably follows that the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring in Article 1 of Schedule I really means that Article 1 of Schedule I shall apply only when there is no other Article in Schedules I and II to govern a particular case. The said expression has been construed accordingly by Oldfield, J. in the Allahabad Full Bench case of Raghobir Singh v. Dharam Kaar (1 L R 3 All. 108). If, however, it is taken that the expression "not otherwise provided in this Act" also relates back to sections 7 and 8, then, the same would rebound and go back to the Schedules I and II for the reason that court fees are prescribed by these Schedules alone and not by the said two sections. Article 11 of Schedule II applies to a memorandum of appeal when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. The implication of this Article is that there is some other Article in either of the Schedules I and II, which prescribes fee for a memorandum of appeal when the appeal is from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. That Article is clearly the general Article 1 of Schedule I and not any of the Articles 5, 17, 20 and 21 (they also mention memorandum of appeal), because these Articles concern appeals of special kind. Thus, it is quite clear that Article 1 of Schedule I applies to a memorandum of appeal when the appeal is from a decree or an order having the force of a decree, but Article 11 of Schedule 11 is attracted when the appeal is from a decision which is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. It is true that Article 1 of Schedule I does not itself state whether or not the decision appealed from is to be a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Accordingly, it may possibly be contended that this Article is wide enough to embrace every kind of memorandum of appeal including an appeal from a decision which is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree. But any such wide interpretation of Article 1 of Schedule I will give rise to a conflict between that Article and Article 11 of Schedule II inasmuch as the latter Article is clearly expressed to be applicable to memorandum of appeal when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. 1n fact, no conflict is there between Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule II. When Article 1 of Schedule 1 itself provides that this Article shall not apply in a case where some other Article is applicable, here is hardly any scope of conflict between the said two Articles, It is a well‑recognised rule of construction that where there is an apparent conflict between two provisions of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to harmonise them and to place such construction on them as shall avoid a conflict (Refer. P L D 1957 S C 219 and A I It 1961 S C 420) A harmonious construction of Article I of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule 11 is possible if it is construed that the former Article applies only to a memorandum of appeal when the appeal is from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Such a construction will render Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule II mutually exclusive without any possibility of any conflict between them. It hag inn held in a number of cases that a memorandum of appeal requires ad valorem court‑fee under Article 1 of Schedule I only when the decision appealed against is a decree or has the force of a decree. Reference may be made to the cases reported in A I R 1934 All. 14, A I R 1938 All. 97, A I R 1932 Oudh 224, A I 1( 1934 Lah. 958 and 37 C W N

227. In contrast, a memorandum of appeal presented to the High Court by a workman against the decision awarding compensation to him under the Workmen's Compensation Act requires fixed court‑fee under Article 11 of Schedule 11, the decision not being a decree or an order having the force of a decree (Refer. A I R 1944 Oudh 83). The upshot of all the above discussions is that ad valorem court‑fee is payable under Article I of Schedule I on a memorandum of appeal (including an appeal envisaged in section 8 of the Court Fees Act) when the appeal is from a decree or an F order having the force of a decree, but fixed court‑fee is payable on a memorandum of appeal under Article 11 of Schedule II when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the I force of a decree. In the present case, the memorandum of appeal is from an award which, as already stated, is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Accordingly the petitioner's memorandum of appeal, in my opinion, requires fixed Court Fee of Rs. 6.25 under Article 11 of Schedule

11. In a similar case where an award for compensation for acquisition of land was not a decree or an order having the force of a decree, the High Court of Bombay held in the case of Hirji Virji v. Government of Bombay, that fixed court‑fee is payable on an appeal by the claimant against such award. This decision was followed by the last Punjab High Court in the case of Kanwar Jagat v. Punjab State (A T R 1957 Pb. 32). As against this, Mr. T. H. Khan cited the cases reported in 35CWN 1103,50CWN820,63CWN325, AIR 1926 Lah. 343 and A I R 1939 All 127, in support of his contention that ad valorem court‑fee under Article 1 of Schedule I is payable on the petitioner's memorandum of appeal. Of the cited cases, the case reported in 35 C W N 1103 is the case on which Mr. T. H. Khan placed the greatest reliance. In this Calcutta. case, the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal functioning as Court made an award in favour of Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. alone, although the Zamindars Anandalal Chakraborty and others made a claim in respect of a portion of the award money. The Zamindars preferred an appeal to the High Court of Calcutta against the Tribunal's decision refusing to apportion the award money. The Taxing Officer referred the matter under section 5 of the Court Fees Act for a decision on the question of court‑fee required on the memorandum of appeal. In the reference, Rankin, C. J., the then Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, took the view that ad valorem court‑fee was payable on the memorandum of appeal. Having regard to the facts of the cited case, it appears that section 8 of the Court Fees Act was not at all applicable in that case inasmuch as the appellants did not claim any sum in excess of the money awarded, but merely asked for apportionment of the award money, This was taken notice of by Rankin, C. J. Accordingly, he took the view that if section 8 were to apply ad valorem court‑fee would be payable on the memorandum of appeal. In taking this view which is in essence an obiter dictum, the learned Chief Justice conceded that section 8 provides only a rule for computation of fee payable in a certain class of cases, but is not in itself a charging section and that the charge in a case coming under that section is imposed by Article 1 of Schedule I. The learned Chief Justice then stated that an assumption is there under section 8 for ad valorem charge and as such the charge in an appeal coming under that section shall invariably be ad valorem charge. With very great respect to the learned Chief Justice, I would say that in a taxing statute like the Court Fees Act no such absolute conclusion can be drawn merely on the basis of an assumption G underlying the provision of section 8 of that Act‑particularly when that section, even according to the learned Chief Justice, is not a charging section. Section 7 and section 8 of the Court Fees Act as conceded by the learned Chief Justice, stand on the same footing. That being so, an assumption in favour of ad valorem charge is as much there under section 7 as under section

8. But it may be illustrated that any such assumption under section 7 may render another charging provision nugatory. For example, section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act provides that in suits for the possession of land, buildings or gardens, ad valorem charge is payable on valuation of the subject‑matter of the suit. Obviously, this ad valorem charge is to be calculated at the rates prescribed by Article 1 of Schedule

1. Now, suits for possession as mentioned in section 7 (v) apparently means suits for possession of all kinds including a suit for possession brought within six months of dispossession, that is, a suit for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. But Article 2 of Schedule I has made an exception in that in a suit for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the court‑fee payable is other than that prescribed by Article 1 of Schedule

1. In such a suit for possession, Article 2 of Schedule I applies because of the Exception contained in the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring in Article 1 of Schedule I. If section 7 (v) be not read subject to this Exception, Article 2 of Schedule I will be nugatory. When section 7 operates subject to the said Exception, there could be no reason why section 8, which stands on the same footing as section 7, should not be read subject to the same Exception. In interpreting a taxing statute, the Court must look squarely at the words of the statute as a whole and look for the charging provision that authorises the levy of tax ; tax cannot be levied merely on assumption (Refer. A I R 1961 S C 1047). Section 8 of the Court Fees Act not being a charging section does not alone hold the field exclusively and cannot be applied without taking into consideration the charging provision of Article 1 of Schedule I. Schedule I prescribing ad valorem fees is not an arithmetical table and does not serve as a mere ready‑reckoner for calculation of the amount of fees ; it contains substantive provisions in that the Articles mentioned therein prescribe ad valorem fees on different classes of documents attracted by those Articles. While Rankin, C. J. accepted that the charge in the case before him was imposed by Article 1 of Schedule I, he did not construe the meaning of the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act", occurring in the said Article and consider its consequences. In my opinion, however, the charge being one created by Article 1 of Schedule I, that Article should be construed first to see if a memorandum of appeal is covered by it or not. If Article 1 of Schedule I attracts a memorandum of appeal, then, it is to be seen whether the memorandum of appeal is one falling under section 7 or section 8 of the Court Fees Act. If it falls under either of the said two sections, then, ad valorem fee is to be computed on the basis of valuation provided by either of those two sections, as may be applicable. The approach made by the learned Chief Justice thus appears to be different from the approach as stated above. He proceeded on the basis, that, in view of section 8 of the Court Fees Act, there shall always be an ad valorem charge on an appeal against an order relating to compensation, irrespective of the consideration whether or not the award appealed against is a decree or an order having the force of a decree. This approach made all the difference. I think that the proper approach is to consider the charging provision first, namely, Article I of Schedule I, including its Exception and then to impose ad valorem court‑fee if the award appealed against is a decree or an order having the force of a decree or to impose H fixed court‑fee under Article 11 of Schedule II, if the award appealed against is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree. The Bombay and the East Punjab High Courts considered the decision of Rankin, C. J. in the cases reported in A I R 1945 Bom. 348 and A I R 1957 Pb. 32, but those High Courts took the view different from that of Rankin, C. J. on the ground that the award in those cases was not a decree or an order having the force of a decree. It is significant that in an earlier case, namely, the case of Harish Chandra Chatterjee v. Bhabatarini Debi (8 C W N 321), which, like the case, decided by Rankin, C. J. in 35 C W N 1103, was also a case for apportionment of award money, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that the order appealed against not being a decree, court‑fee was payable in the appeal under Article 11 of Schedule 11 of the Court Fees Act. At any rate, the award involved in the case decided by Rankin, C. J., in view of section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, was the award of a Court and not of a persona designata as in the present case. It is true that in the remaining cases cited by Mr. T. H. Khan, namely, the cases reported in 50 C W N 820, 63 C W N 325, A 1 R 1926 Lah. 343 and A I R 1939 All. 127, it was held that ad valorem court‑fee was payable in an appeal by the claimant against an award, but in none of those cases the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring in Article 1 of Schedule I was construed and given effect to. Hence, the decisions in those cases have no pursuasive value greater than that of the decision of Rankin, C. J. in 35 C W N 1103. I do not say that section 8 of the Court Fees Act is nugatory, this section, read with Article 1 of Schedule i, applies in a case where the appeal is against an award for compensation which is either a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Nor do I say that an order relating to compensation shall have to be an `order' of a Civil Court within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code because an order grant ing compensation, depending on the provisions of the applicable statute, can be made by a public officer also, as in this case. Section 8 which must be read together with Article 1 of Schedule I, and Article 11 of Schedule II cannot stand together. I have tried to reconcile these provisions. In doing so, I have taken into consideration all the applicable provisions and Articles and have preferred not to consider section 8 in isolation, that is, independently of the other relevant provisions of the Court Fees Act. This is in conformity with the well‑settled principle that an Act should be construed as a whole. Having so construed the Court Fees Act, it appears to me that section 8, in the face of the Exception to Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule II, is not an absolute enactment of universal application and does not provide an inflexible rule. This may be illustrated thus. Suppose, an awardee of compensation, in consideration of his having voluntarily abandoned a part of the compensation claimed by him initially or in consideration of his having received advance compensation in part, as in this case, under the compulsory provision of section 5‑B of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, values his appeal against the award at a figure less than the difference between the amount claimed and the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. Can it be said that even in such an appeal ad valorem fee shall be payable exactly on the amount of the difference between the amount initially claimed and the amount awarded because section 8 says so? We may take yet another example. The Proviso at the end of the second column of Article 1 of Schedule I is that the maximum fee leviable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be fifteen thousand rupees. Now, if the difference between the amount of compensation claimed by an awardee and the amount awarded is so high that at the rates prescribed in Article 1 of Schedule I, the total amount of court‑fee exceeds fifteen thousand rupees, can it be said that on a memorandum of appeal in such a case there shall be paid court‑fee in excess of fifteen thousand rupees because this is the requirement of section 8? The answer in both these examples clearly appears to be in the negative. Thus, section 8 is not an absolute enactment of universal application. Section 8, as it is, may have its sway and take effect invariably in all appeals against order relating to compensation, whether or not the awards appealed against are decrees or orders having the force of decree, if and only if the following conditions, are satisfied, namely, (i) section 8 is a charging section, and court‑fee is capable of being levied under that section without the aid of Article 1 of Schedule I, (ii) Article I of Schedule I is not a charging provision and is a mere arithmetical table for calculating the amount of court‑fee in given cases, and (iii) the possibility of application of Article 11 of Schedule II in the case of an appeal against an award not being a decree or having the force of a decree, is ruled out altogether. For the reasons discussed hereinbefore, these conditions, I am afraid, cannot be said to be satisfied at all. An award under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act not being a decree is not a property and is not therefore capable of being assigned or transferred. Although an award under that Act has been made executable under the Rules made thereunder, its effectual execution is doubtful inasmuch as the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution have not been expressly applied thereto. Thus, it appears that the awardee gets only an award of compensation on paper in lieu of his real property. If he intends to convert the award into property for being able to assign or transfer it, he shall, of necessity, have to bring a suit on the basis of the award even if his appeal to the High Court against the award succeeds, because the High Court's decision in the appeal against an award is not a decree either. In case of a suit on the basis of the award, ad valorem fee will have to be paid. This will mean payment of ad valorem fees twice over in respect of the same award‑once on the memorandum of appeal against the award and then on the plaint of the suit for converting the award into a decree. Payment of ad valorem fees twice over in respect of the same award was not likely to be the intention of the Legislature. An appeal under section 7 (f) of the East Bengal Act against an award can be preferred by both the person interested and the Government. Obviously, section 8 of the Court Fees Act does not make any distinction between the person interested and the Government as regards court‑fee payable in such an appeal. Even then, the Government, as stated by Mr. T. H. Khan, has been always paying fixed court‑fee in appeals against awards for compensation. This speaks for itself. In this connection, one significant difference between the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the East Bengal (Emergency Requisition of Property Act may be appropriately mentioned, here. Under the express provision of section 9 of Land Acquisi tion Act, a person interested in the land is required to state, among others, the amount of compensation claimed by him. This was also the provision of section 9 of the former Land: Acquisition Act, 1870. But the East Bengal Act nowhere requires the person interested in the land to state the amount of compensa tion claimed by him. Section 7 (d) of the East Bengal Act merely requires both the Deputy Commissioner and the persona interested to state "what in their respective opinions is a fair amount of compensation." Thus, the East Bengal Act not having required the person interested to state the amount of compensation claimed by him, there may not be an occasion for determination of the difference between the amount of compensa tion claimed and the amount awarded so as to apply section 8 of the Court Fees Act, unless the person interested goes beyond the scope of the statute and, of his own accord, claims a definite sum by way of compensation. The person interested, according.: to the scheme of the East Bengal Act, is not bound to claim a definite amount of compensation and may, in his appeals against the award, make a simple prayer for assessment of fair, and equitable compensation by the High Court. In such a, case, one may pose a question if section 8 of the Court Fees Act, does really apply. There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves: consideration. It is a well‑recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that a fiscal enactment should be construed strictly and whenever there is an ambiguity, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the citizens. Again, if two equally reasonable; constructions are possible, then, the construction favourable to the citizens should be preferred. It is not necessary to cite authorities in support of this well‑recognised principle, and h would like to remain content by citing the decision of our Supreme Court reported in P L D 1961 S C 375 and that of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court reported in A I R. 1946 Lah.

280. From what has been discussed above, it cannot be said` that section 8, read with Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees. Act admits of one interpretation and one interpretation alone;: an alternative interpretation, in view of the nature of the order appealed against (here an award not being a decree or having; the force of a decree), is equally possible on stronger reasons. The alternative interpretation is that effect that in an appeal: against an award for compensation ad valorem court‑fee is payable if the award is a decree or an order having the force of a decree,, and fixed court‑fee is payable if the award is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree. This interpretation is more favourable to the citizens. It is also in this view of the matter that in the instant case the petitioner's memorandum of appeal is liable to be charged with fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 under Article i 1 of Schedule 11 of the Court Fees Act. Thus the decision of the Taxing Officer requiring ad valorem court‑fee on the petitioner's memorandum of appeal is not ill ~t accordance with law and illegal. In the result, the Rule is made absolute, and it is declared that the decision of the Taxing Officer is illegal and of no legal effect. Having regard to the nature of the point of law involved in this case, there shall be no order as to costs. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑The petitioner, Mrs. Momtaz Malik, calls in question the order of the Taxing Officer of this Court refusing to accept an appeal presented by her on a fixed court -fee of Rs. 6.25 paisa and requiring her to pay deficit court‑fee thereon. Petitioner's land was requisitioned under section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948, and thereafter acquired under section 5 of the Act. She refused to accept the compensation fixed by the Acquiring authority and applied to the Arbitrator for an award under sub‑clause (i) of clause (aaa) of section 7 of the said Act. The petitioner claimed a sum of Rs. 37,525 for the acquired land but the Arbitrator allowed a sum of Rs. 10,

767. She, however, felt that the Arbitrator should have accepted her claims for the remaining sum of Rs. 26,

758. The petitioner, therefore, preferred an appeal valued at Rs. 26,758 to this Court under section 7 (f) of the said Act but paid a fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25. The Registrar acting as Taxing Officer of this Court agreed with the Stamp Reporter that such an appeal is to be classified as First Appeal and ad valorem court‑fee paid thereon. He accordingly directed payment of deficit court‑fee. This application under Article 98 of the Constitution was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court as non‑maintainable but on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded it for hearing on merits. Thereafter this Special Bench was constituted to hear, and determine this question of public importance. Mr. Moinul Huq, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submits that his clients claim to pay a fixed court‑fee is founded on Article 11 of the Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870. It is urged that the present appeal is preferred under clause (f) of section 7 of the said Requisition of Property Act which is in the following terms "An appeal shall lie to the High Court against an award of an arbitrator except in cases where the amount thereof does not exceed an amount specified in this behalf by rule made by the Provincial Government." It is, therefore, submitted that this appeal is not directed against. a decree or an order having the force of a decree and such an appeal is to be stamped with the fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 under Article 11 of the Second Schedule of the Court Fees Act. Mr. T. H. Khan, learned Senior Government Pleader, submits that the impugned order requiring payment of ad valorem court‑fee derives its validity from the provision of section 8 of the Court Fees Act and the fee is to be calculated under Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are what may be called, charging sections, for they provide that the documents specified in the First or Second Schedule of the Court Fees Act shall not be accepted by the Courts specified in the two sections unless court -fee indicated for such a document is paid. At this stage I should read the material part of Article 1 of Schedule I which is as follows: Ad valorem Fees. Plaint written statement pleading a set‑off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) or of cross objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in section 3 ............... ............... ............... .............. ............... ............... It will, therefore, be seen that a document called a memorandum of appeal finds place in Article 1 of Schedule I. It is however to be noticed that a memorandum of appeal spoken of in this Article is one for which there is no other provision in the statute. In other words, if there is such a provision in this statute, Article 1 of Schedule I shall not apply to that Memorandum of Appeal by reason of the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act". I should now refer to the material part of Article 11 of Schedule Il which reads as follows: Memorandum of appeal. (a) (i) ............ (ii) ............ When the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree and is presented. (b) .............. (c) To a High Court Six rupees four annas This Article speaks of a memorandum of appeal which is not directed against a decree or an order having the force of a decree, In order to see whether the petitioners memorandum of appeal comes within Article 11 of Schedule II, I have to see if the appeal is directed against a decree or an order having the force of a decree. The award of an Arbitrator as contemplated in the Requisi tion of Property Act is not a decree inasmuch as the Arbitrator, although a judicial officer, is not a Court but a persona designata. He has been specifically appointed by the Provincial Government by a notification published in the official Gazette under sub clause (b) of section 7 of ‑the said Requisition of Property Act. The decision of the Arbitrator is, therefore, an award but not a decree. A decree means the formal expression of an adjudica tion by a Court by which rights of the parties are finally determined by that Court. In the case of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, a person dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Collector may ask for reference to the Court which means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless a judicial officer is specially appointed for the purpose. Again, it is provided in subsection (2) of section 26 of the Land Acqui sition Act that "Every such award shall be deemed to be decree." Although under the Land Acquisition Act award is of a Court, a specific provision was necessary to treat it as a decree. There is no such provision in the said Requisition of Property Act. It is also not an order having the force of a decree for there is no provision to that effect in the Requisition of Property Act. It is true rule 9(17) of the Rules framed under the said Act says that an award of an Arbitrator shall be enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a decree of a civil Court. This rule merely lays down a procedure to enforce the order. It is not thereby given the attributes of an "order having the force of a decree." This view finds support in the case of a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Official Liquidator v. Mir Qureshi (A I R 1945 Lah. 146). In that case it was observed by Sale, J. that there is a distinction both real and practical "between an order that has by statute the force of a decree and an order that may by statute be enforced in the same manner as a decree." It was further observed by the learned Judge: "An order that is given by statute the force of a decree is an order that proprio vigore stands as a decree whatever the consequence, whereas an order that may by statute be enforced as a decree is an order that may be of little or no effect, proprio vigore, and only becomes effective, when executed by the method by which a decree may be executed. In other words, it is mere shadow unless and until life is infused into it by an application for execution." I am in respectful agreement with the above observation. It will therefore be clear that the appeal preferred in this case is not from "an order having the force of a decree." It would therefore appear that the petitioner's memorandum of appeal is "not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree." The fixed. court‑fee can be paid for such a memorandum of appeal if it is presented to one of the Courts mentioned against Article I1 of Schedule II. One such Court is a High Court. The memorandum of appeal in this case has been presented to a High Court. I would therefore appear to be a memorandum of appeal contemplated under Article 11 of Schedule II. But, before I reach a firm conclusion in this behalf I have to consider the provision of section 8 of the Court Fees Act. I read it now "The amount of fee payable sunder this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensa tion under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." Section 8 also would be prima facie applicable to the memorandum of appeal presented by the petitioner for, it is directed against an order relating to compensation under the Requisition of Property Act which provides for acquisition of property for public purposes. The petitioner has, moreover, filed an appeal claiming in fact "the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed" by her. These provisions therefore create anomaly and raise doubt, and make the question complicated all the more. It seems to me that Legislature has failed to express its intention clearly in the matter. I am not unmindful of principle that a special provision applies to the exclusion of a general one. But the special provision has to apply clearly in order to bring it out of the ambit of the general provision. I have just seen that general provision clearly applies to this appeal. In order to exclude this appeal from the operation of the general provision, the special provision has to apply in clearest terms specially when it affects the rights of a citizen; and in view of the ad valorem court‑fee being payable under the special provision, its ‑misapplica tion may result in denial of justice. In the case of a clear provision question of hardship would not arise at all. The specific provision, namely, section 8, is not a charging section. It lays down a method of computation. In order to carry it into effect, the Legislature ought to have made a clear provision in this behalf. Section 8 by itself cannot govern this memorandum of appeal. Some other provision is necessary to come to its aid. That provision is Article 1 of Schedule I. I have just dealt with Article 1 of Schedule I and found that the present appeal does not come within its purview. In order to accept the argument of Mr. T. H. Khan, I have to disregard the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" occurring in Article 1 of Schedule I and it is not permissible to do so. It has already been indicated that this memorandum of appeal is covered by Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. It is true section 8 raises a doubt about its applicability. The cardinal principle of interpretation of a fiscal statute like the Court Fees Act is that a construction beneficial to a citizen has to be given in case of ambiguity. This principle of interpretation is as old as the hills. Section 8 of the Court Fees Act occurs in Chapter III which deals with "Computation of Fees," and not being charging section, it is difficult for it to stand by itself. Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act cannot be applied for the reasons already assigned. I would at this stage recall that section 8 of the Court Fees Act was considered by a Full Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Krishna Mohan Sinha v. Raghunandan Pandey (I L R 4 Pat. 336). In that case Mallick, J. observed : "I agree with the learned Chief Justice that section 8 does not raise any difficulty. When that section was first enacted, appeals in certain Land Acquisition cases lay to Courts other than the High Court and the inclusion of the section in Chapter III of the present Act merely means in the event of the former jurisdiction of these latter Courts being restored, the court‑fees shall be computed in accordance with the section. The section does not in terms provide for fees on a memorandum of appeal to the High Court and in my opinion the charging section for such appeals still remains section 4 of the Act." This observation supports the contention that section 8 is not a charging section. In the case of Re: Ananda Lal Chakraborty and others (A I R 1932 Cal. 346), Rankin, C. J. took the view that section 8 of the Court Fees Act ‑which provides that an appeal against an order shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant excludes in terms the operation of Article 11 of the Schedule Il to such cases. The learned Chief Justice observed: "the provisions of section 8 involving as they do that the fee in the class of cases dealt with is an .ad valorem fee are themselves sufficient to exclude any question of Article 11 of Schedule II being made applicable to such cases." Learned Chief Justice further observed: the object of section 8 His not to impose an ad valorem charge it assumes that that has already done." It has been argued that the assumption made is not justified by the legislative provisions. Section 8 would have governed the situation had it not required the aid of Article 1 of ‑Schedule I of the Act. It may be incidentally pointed out that when that judgment was pronounced in 1932, Chapter III in which section 8 occurs was headed "Fees in other Courts and in public ‑offices." This heading has been inserted in Chapter II in 1935 ‑and the heading of "Computation of Fees," occurs in Chapter III by the same amending Act of 1935. Speaking with utmost respect, I would say that having regard to this weighty pronouncement I would have hesitated to take a different view had I not 'been confronted with the difficulty in applying Article 1 of Schedule I by the presence of the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act." Wadia, J., however, distinguished the case of Ananda Lal ,Chakraborty in Hirji Virji Jangbari v. Government of Bombay (A I R 1945 Bom. 348) on the ground that the award of the Tribunal constituted under :the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 was deemed to be award of ‑the Court under the Land Acquisition Act and as such it was a ,decree. An appeal against a decree is at once excluded from Article 11 of Schedule II: Ambiguity is apparent in the relevant provisions discussed above. Legislature has failed to express its intention clearly. A beneficial construction has to be given. In a doubtful case, a citizen whose properties have been taken away by a drastic Act which also provides for ouster of jurisdiction of civil Courts cannot be burdened to pay ad valorem court‑fees. To impose ‑such a burden, plain words are indeed necessary. Even in the .case of two equally reasonable constructions, one favourable ,to a citizen has to be preferred in a fiscal statute. I am, therefore, of opinion that the petitioner's claim to pay a fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 paisa under Article 11 of Schedule II for the appeal preferred by her is sustainable in law. I, therefore, agree with the order proposed to be made by my learned brother M. R. Khan, J. In the result, I make the rule absolute without any order as to costs and declare that the impugned order of the Taxing Officer is illegal and of no legal effect. A. H. KHAN, J.‑A Rule nisi was issued under Article 98 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan calling upon the respondent, the Taxing Officer (Registrar, High Court, Dacca) to show cause why his order dated 26‑5‑65 in F. M. A. T. No. 1418 of 1963 should not be declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. As an important question of court‑fee is involved in the matter, S. D. Ahmed and A. Hakim, JJ. who issued the Rule being of opinion that the matter should be heard by a larger Bench, this present Bench was constituted for disposal of the matter . The facts of the case giving rise to the present application briefly are that certain lands of the petitioner were acquired under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1945 in L. A. Case No. 30 of 1958‑59 for a scheme known as Mohammadpur Model Town and as the petitioner was not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, she filed an application for appointment of an Arbitrator under the aforesaid Act and she claimed Rs. 37,525 as compensation. The Arbitrator, however, awarded compensation of Rs. 10,767 only. Being dissatisfied with the award the petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal in this Court valuing it at Rs. 26,758 the difference between the amount claimed and amount awarded, and paid a fixed court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 on the memo. of appeal, the amount fixed as court‑fee payable on a memorandum of appeal under Article 11 of Schedule 11 of the Court Fees Act. On a reference by the Stamp Reporter under section 5 of the Court Fees Act, the Registrar as. Ex‑Officio Taxing Officer decided that ad valorem court‑fee was payable under the provisions of section 8 of the Court Fees Act read with Article 1 of Schedule I of the Act. The present petition is directed against the said decision. The question at issue involves the interpretation of section & of the Court Fees Act, hereinafter called the Act, read with Article 1 of Schedule I and Article 11 of Schedule 11 of the Act Section 8 is in the following terms: "the amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandums of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to‑ the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant." The first column of Schedule I prescribing ad valorem court fee is as follows: "Plaint, written statement pleading a set‑off or counter‑claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) or cross‑objection presented to any Civil, oar Revenue Court except those mentioned in section 3.." The second and third columns of an Article 1 lay down the scales of ad valorem fee for different amounts of valuation. Article 11 of Schedule II provides for the different amounts of fixed court‑fee payable for "Memorandum of appeal when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a, decree" and fixes a court‑fee of Rs. 6.25 for such a memorandum whom presented to a High Court. There is no controversy that the memorandum of appeal in the present case is not against a decree or an order having the force of a decree. That being so, it may well fall under the Article 11 of Schedule II of the Act. But if the Memorandum is also found to fall under section 8 of the Act read with Article 1 of Schedule I then the specific provision regarding "Memorandum of appeals against an order relating to compensation under any Act" in section 8 of the Act should prevail. Now the reasons advanced as to why such an order for compensation should not fall under section 8 are as follows: (1) That the word `Order' in the expression "an order relating to compensation under any Act" in section 8 means an order of the Civil Court as defined in section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code. (2) Article I of Schedule I prescribes ad valorem court‑fee at the scales set forth therein, in respect of plaint, written statement pleading a set‑off or counter‑claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) or cross objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in section

3. It is contended that because of the expression "Not otherwise provided for in this Act", in Article 1 of Schedule I, its provision is not attracted in the present case, as Article 11 of Schedule II provides for court‑fee at fixed rate for memorandum of appeal from an order like the one in the instant case which is not a decree or order having the force of a decree. As regards the first point, namely, that the word `Order' in section 8 should be read as an order as defined in section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code, this definition restricting the meaning of the word to an order passed by a Civil Court not being a decree, could possibly be imported into section 8 of the Act if the Civil Procedure Code and the Court Fees Act, were Acts in pari materia. But these two Acts cannot be called so, as they do not deal with the same matter. In this connection I may refer to the following paragraph from Craies Statute Law, 5th Edition at page 125: ‑ "(a) Statutes in pari materia.‑Where Acts of Parliament are in pari materia, that is to say, are so far related as to form a system or code of legislation the Rule as laid down by the twelve Judges in Palmer's case is that such Acts are to be taken together as forming one system and interpreting and enforcing each other." At page 127 of the same authority it is stated as follows: ‑ "In a recent case Evershed, L. J. said, `It is a rule of interpretation of statutes that it is permissible to call in aid for the construction of words and phrases used in one Act meanings given to them in an earlier Act in pari materia ......... The Rent Restriction Act cannot be regarded as in pari materia with the real property Legislation of 1925 and counsel was unable to cite any instance where a word or phrase in one Act of Parliament, having either technical or non‑technical import was to have the technical meaning supplied by the definition in another Act not in pari materia with the first, without any cross‑reference to latter Act'. " Now, apart from the fact that the two Acts before us are not in pari materia, the very phraseology of section 8 of the Act makes it clear that its provision embraces any order for payment of compensation for acquisition of land by Government for public purposes under any Act. One of the cardinal principles of interpretation of Statutes is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature that can be gathered from the Statute, reading the words of the Statute in their natural and ordinary sense where they are clear and unambiguous. The very first introductory lines of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edition are as follows: ‑ "A statute is the will of the Legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded, `according to the intent of them that made it'. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature. The object of all interpretation of a statute is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or impliedly, by the language used, so far as is necessary for determining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it." There appears nothing in the words of section 8 which, reading it in its plain and natural meaning, could justify the exclusion of its provisions in case of a memorandum of appeal from an order not being a decree of a Civil Court or not having the force of a decree. It is, argued in the next place that the expression "not otherwise provided for in this Act" in Article 1 of Schedule I of the Act bars the application of that article to a memorandum of appeal against an order which is neither a decree nor having the force of a decree, inasmuch as court‑fee payable in respect of such a memorandum is provided for in Article 11 of Schedule II. But as against this, we have to consider that it is specifically provided in section 8 of the Act that the court‑fee payable on a memorandum of appeal from an order relating to compensation under any Act shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. This unmistakably shows that the amount of court‑fee payable on such a memorandum is to be ad valorem and is to be assessed on the difference between the two amounts mentioned above, and therefore Article 11 of Schedule II which provides for a fixed court‑fee cannot be attracted at all. Further, the expression, "not otherwise provided for in this Act" in Article I of Schedule I cannot, to my mind, be interpreted as a provision barring the application of the provisions of section

8. Sections 4 and 6 of the Act provide that except as provided in section 3, no document of any kind specified as chargeable in the First and Second Schedules of the Act shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in Courts of Justice etc. unless in respect of such document there has been paid a fee of amount not less than that indicated in either of the said Schedules as proper fee for such documents. Thus sections 4 and 6 impose the court‑fee to be paid on document. Section 7 lays down the mode of computation of the value of suits and appeals for the purposes of court‑fee and according to section 7 the court‑fee payable in suits and memos. of appeals covered by that section is to be ad valorem on the amount as determined as the value of the suit or memorandum of appeal according to rule laid down in section

7. Section 8 of the Court Fees Act is on the same footing as section 7 in respect of memorandum of appeal against an order for payment of compensation in respect of compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes. The expression in Article I of Schedule I "not otherwise provided for" obviously does not refer to suits and memorandum of appeals specifically provided for in the Act and just as suits and memos. of appeals covered by section 7 specifically provided for payment of ad valorem court‑fee in respect of cases covered by it. So also section 8 specifically provides for payment of ad valorem court- fee in respect of memos. of appeals against orders relating to payment of compensation for compulsory acquisition of land under any Act. Further, to argue that section 8 provides for ad valorem court‑fees only when the order for payment of the same is a decree or has the force of a decree is to argue that the provisions of section 8 in the Court Fees Act is super fluous, because while Article 1 of Schedule I provides for memorandum of appeals from a decree or order having the force of a decree, Article 11 of Schedule II provides for a memorandum of appeal against an order not being a decree, or not having the force of a decree. As pointed out by my learned brother Mr. M. R. Khan, J. there are many anomalies in the Court Fees Act. If any difficulty is felt in applying Article I of Schedule I to all orders for payment of compensation under any Act because of the expression "not otherwise provided for", in Article 1, then this should be treated as another instance of anomaly, instead of interpreting the provisions of section 8 as superfluous and thus rendering it altogether nugatory. The Legislature, it is to be assumed, knew the difference between an order, and a decree or an order having the force of a decree. It is, therefore, to be taken to have used the expression "order for compensation under any Act" in section 8 within the intention of covering all classes of orders. Further, the Legislature in enacting section 8 of the Act providing for payment of ad valorem court‑fees assumed that it was to be paid under provisions of Article I of Schedule I, as there is no other Article that might be applicable. In view of all this, I am clearly of the opinion that the expression is "not otherwise provided for in Article 1 of Schedule I" does not stand in the way of application of the provisions of section 8 even to the class of memorandum of appeals against orders for payment of compensation which might otherwise fall under Article 1 I of Schedule II. Let me now discuss some of the decisions relied upon by the learned ‑ Advocates. I begin with those that support the view expressed by me. The first and foremost among them is a decision by Rankin, C. J. of the Calcutta High Court, as he then was, in the case In re : Ananda Lal Chakraborty and others (35 C W N 1104). In that case, there was an appeal to the High Court from an order of the Tribunal functioning under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, in which the correctness of the total amount awarded as compensation was not questioned but it was claimed that the appellant should have been awarded a portion of it and it was held by Rankin, C. J. that the appeal was governed by section & and Article 1 of the Schedule I of the Court Fees Act and ad valorem court‑fee was payable on the amount claimed by the appellant. The above case has been sought to be distinguished from the present case, by saying that section 8 was not strictly applicable to that case in any way. It was also argued before the learned Chief Justice too that section 8 applied only to a case where the appeal challenged the correctness of the total amount awarded. This contention was overruled by him and it was observed inter alia as follows: ‑ "The section dealing with the amount of fee payable makes a comparison between two things‑the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. It appears to me to be reasonably clear that the comparison can be only between the amount awarded to the appellant and the amount claimed by the appellant. There can be no comparison between the amount awarded to a number of persons and the amount claimed by one individual representing his individual interest. In the present case the appellants have been given nothing by way of compensation. They claim a substantial sum. It is clear, therefore, that if section 8 applies the amount of court‑fee is to be computed according to the amount of their claim in the present case." Two other contentions were raised in the case before Rankin, C. J.; one of which was that section 8 comes within Chapter III of the Act and Chapter III is headed "Fees in other Courts and Public Offices" and so section 8 does not apply to an appeal to the High Court at all. It has, however, been conceded before us, and I think rightly conceded, that section 8 is applicable in case of an appeal also before the High Court. Secondly, it was contended that section 8 is not a charging section and that you can give no force to section 8 unless you can find a charging section somewhere in the Act under which it can be applied. At the hearing in the present case also such a contention has been put forward before us. Regarding this contention that section 8 is not a charging section, the learned Chief Justice observed thus: "First of all by section 4, so far as the Appellate Side of the High Court is concerned, the charges contained in the First and Second Schedules are imposed. By section 6, so far as other Courts are concerned, the charges contained in the same two Schedules of the Act are imposed." He further observed: ‑ "It is clear enough that section 8 necessarily involves that there is ad valorem charge laid down under section 4 or section 6 and contained in the First Schedule . . . . . . ." There is also this further observation at page 1107: ‑ "The provisions in section 8 involving as they do that the fee in the class of cases dealt with are ad valorem fee, are themselves sufficient to exclude any question of Article I 1 of Schedule II being made applicable in such cases." It will be observed from the above that Rankin, C. J., found no difficulty in the application of section 8 of Article 1 of Schedule I in spite of the expression "not otherwise provided for" in this Act. In construing the provisions of section 8 read with Article 1 of Schedule I, the learned Chief Justice did not think it at all necessary to consider whether the Tribunal's order which was an order and not a decree, had the force of a decree or not, as in the face of section 8, his Lordship had no doubt that ad valorem fee was chargeable under Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. It should be mentioned here that the learned lawyer, Dr. Banerjee who appeared for the respondent before Rankin, C. J. had contended that the case was governed by Article 11 of section 2 as the order in question was neither a decree nor an' order having the force of a decree. It is further to be noticed that under section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, the award was to be deemed to be the award of the Court under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thus though in fact the award in the case before Rankin, C. J., had the force of a decree, the learned Chief Justice based his decision on the view that having regard to the specific provisions of section 8, the question whether the memorandum in the case before him could be attracted by the provisions of Article 11 of Schedule II did not arise at all. In the case of Sohan Lal Bahty v. Province of Bengal (50 C W N 820) which arose out of an award under the Defence of India Act, Lodge, J. sitting singly held that though the award was neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree, section 8 of the Act was applicable and not Article 11 of Schedule 11 of the Act. In the case of Prem Chand v. Emperor (A I R 1926 Lah. 343) it was held that section 8 of the Court Fees Act being a special provision, over rides the general provision of Schedule II, Article 17(iv), relating to appeal to set aside an award. The latest case of the Indian Jurisdiction relied upon by the learned Senior Government Pleader is that of Satya Charan Sur v. Staff of West Bengal (63 C W 14 325). It was a case of an appeal from an award of an Arbitrator functioning under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immov able Property Act (XXX of 1952). It was held in that case by Banerjee, J. that an order under section 8 of the Act though neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree, is yet an order under the said section and ad valorem court‑fee is payable. The learned lawyer for the appellant in that case strongly relied upon the ruling in Hirji Virji Janbari v. Government of Bombay (A I R 1945 Bom. 348). Mr. Moinul Huq, learned Advocate for the petitioner before us has also placed great reliance on the latter decision. Banerjee, J. dissented from the view taken by Wadia, J. in the aforesaid case of Hirji Virgi Jangbari and observed at page 333 as follows: ‑ "With great respect I dissent from the judgment of Wadia, J. Section 8 of the Court Fees Act does not use the expression "order" simpliciter but uses the expression "order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force." That being so, there is no reason why an order in section 8 of the. Court Fees Act must be treated as an order under section 2(14), Civil Procedure Code. It is true that Arbitrators appointed under section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act do not sit as Courts in the same sense as the Tribunals do under the Improvement Act. But status of arbitrator is not of any relevancy. The real question is whether an award by an Arbitrator issued under section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act is "an order relating to compensation." In my opinion an order made under section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act is not a mere expression of an opinion. It is an order directing the competent authority to pay to the person found entitled to payment of compensation." Let me, now discuss some of the cases relied upon by Mr. Moinul Huq, the learned Advocate for the petitioner. One of the cases cited by the learned Advocate is the case reported in I L R 12 All.

238. The subject‑matter of this case was the amount of court‑fees payable on a Memorandum of Appeal from an order under section 214 of the Indian Companies Act and it was held that an order under section 214 of the Act is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree, and consequently an appeal from such an order was covered by the provision of Article 11 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The next important case relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is the case of Kanwar Jagat Bahadur Singh v. The Punjab State (A I R 1957 Ph. 32) where it has been held that an award of compensation made by an arbitrator under the Requisitioning and. Acquisition of Immovable Property Act is not a decree nor an order having the force of a decree within the words used in Article 11 of Schedule II, Court Fees Act, and hence, an appeal preferred to the High Court against such an award under section 11 of the Punjab Act would be governed by Schedule Il, Article 11 and not by Schedule I, Article

1. This decision by a Division Bench is contrary to that of Banerjee, J. in the case of Satya Charan Suer already discussed above. In this case the learned Judges appear to have come to the above decision on the ground that: ‑ " . . . for a matter to be brought within section 8 there must be an order as defined in section 2(14) of the Act, and as the present case is not such an order . . . . . . Section 8 is inapplicable." To the same effect is the decision in the case of Hirji Virji Jang bari v. Government of Bombay to which I have already referred. In this case N. J. Wadia, J., too was of the view that the word "order" in section 8 of the Act means an order as defined in section 2(14), Civil Procedure Code, namely, the formal expression of a decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. The learned Judge also referred to the case reported in I L R 1939 All. 142, in which case also the word "order" in section 8 Court Fees Act, was taken to mean an "order" as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. With great respect to the learned Judges who held the view that the term in section 8 of the Act must be given a restricted meaning, I find no cogent reason for doing so. For the reason already discussed I find that the clear intention of the Legislature in enacting section 8 of the Act was to make ad valorem court‑fee payable in respect of a memorandum of appeal against every "order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force" and effect must be given to that intention. I am also clearly of the view that the intention being clear and there being no difficulty in giving effect to it, in respect of any order under any act, the question of reconciliation of the provisions of section 8 read with Article 1 of Schedule I, with those of Article 11 of Schedule II of the Act does not arise, nor does any question of giving the citizens the benefit of any reasonable doubt in the interpretation of a fiscal statute properly arise. Accordingly, with great respect, I am unable to agree with the views expressed by my learned brothers and in the result I discharge this Rule without any order as to costs. It is declared that the order of the Taxing Officer requiring ad valorem court‑fee on the petitioner's memorandum of appeal is illegal and of no legal effect. Rule made absolute,