PLD 1961 (W (PLP)

BASHIR AHMAD, J.‑This order will dispose of the proceedings against Mr. Sikandar Bakht respondent, a pleader practising at Lahore, for professional misconduct which are covered by Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 541 and 542 of 1955. The com plainant in both these proceedings is one Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani. It will be useful at the outset to reproduce the charges framed against the respondent which bring out clearly the case against him and on which evidence has, also been led by the parties. The charges read as under :‑ ` You Mr. Sikandar Bakht, Pleader, Lahore, are hereby charged as follows :‑ (1) That on 26‑6‑1950,. you were convicted of an offence under section 292, Pakistan Penal Code by Khan Mian Abdul Hakim, Special Railway Magistrate, Lahore, for having published an obscene book entitled AURAT KA MARKAZ SHAWAT but in spite of the above‑mentioned conviction; you stated in para. 5 of your petition dated 28‑11‑1953 (which you submitted to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore for being enrolled as a Pleader), as follows : `That he has never been convicted of any offence by any Criminal Court of law.' (2) That after being enrolled as a Pleader, you are still carrying on the business of printing; publishing and selling books including obscene books, such as AURAT KA MARKAZ SHAWAT & RAMOZ-E-SHADI etc And you are also running the following business concerus as a proprietor :‑ (1) Anjuman‑i‑Ishtarakat‑i‑Ama (2) Rahnuma Book Depot (3) Film Guide and this you are doing without obtaining ‑the necessary per mission of the High Court. (3) That you have behaved unprofessionally by using filthy language towards Mr. Manzur Husain and Mr. Muhammad Anwar by reason of the fact that they had appeared as counsel for Dr. Bashir Ahmad. (4) That on 26‑4‑1954, in the Court of Ch. Muhammad Siddiq, Magistrate 2nd Class, Lahore, where a complaint under sections 504, 332, P. P. C. filed by Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani against you was fixed for hearing, you addressing the com plainant uttered the following words in the presence of the reader of the Court and others :‑ (5) That on 8‑2‑55, when the above‑mentioned complaint was being heard by Mr. Ghulam Jillani, Magistrate 2nd Class, Lahore and you were cross‑examining the complainant Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani, you said the following words, or words having similar import, to the complainant in the presence of the Magis trate and others :‑ AGAR SHADI KA DAFTAR NA KHOLTA TO TUMAHRI LARKIYAN, MAYAIN, BEHNAIN KAHAN JATEEN That since the above constitute professional misconduct you are called upon to show cause why you should not be punished or removed from practice." Charge No. (5) was later on amended so as to read thus : "That on the 8th of February 1955, you said in the Court of Mr. Ghulam Jillani, Magistrate, either AGAR SHADI KA DAFTAR NA KHOLTA TO TUMAHRI LARKIYAN, MAYAIN, BEHNAIN KAHAN JATEEN or AGAR YAHAN SHADI KA DAFTAR HOTA TO TUMAHRI LARKIYAN, AB TAK BAIGAIR SHADI NA REHTEN or words 'to that effect."

2. The first two charges relate to Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 541 of 1955, and as both these charges are inter‑connected, they shall have to be dealt with together. The facts material to these charges are that the respondent was enrolled as a Pleader on the 28th of November 1953 and in para. 5 of the Petition which he presented for that purpose he had stated : "That he has never been convicted of any offence by any criminal Court of law." It is said the above statement is untrue, for on the 26th of June 1950, a conviction under section 292 of the Pakistan Penal Code was actually recorded against him. Exh. P. 7 is the judgment of the trial Court by which the respondent was convicted and, there fore, so far as his conviction goes, it stands conclusively established on the record. In the face of this conviction, the statement in para. 5 of his petition stating that he had never been convicted of any offence by any criminal Court of law must be found to be a false averment, on the basis of which the respondent secured hi licence. The petition also contained the averment that the respondent was not carrying on any business, but it is alleged the he was carrying on business before he applied for enrolment and continued to carry on the business even after his enrolment. The statement in his petition for enrolment, therefore, that he was doing no other business or that he had no previous conviction against him were false averments which, it is urged, constitute pro fessional misconduct within the meaning of section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. The respondent admitted that a con viction was recorded against him but it rested on his plea which was based on an assurance that nothing serious will flow from the conviction. In fact, he denied his guilt in the first instance, but gave in on the assurance and had a conviction recorded on confession. Whatever may be the reasons which prompted the respondent to confess, the bald fact remains that he had a conviction against him, and he could not, if he were truthful, have stated that there were none. In his written statement he has ascribed the mis‑statement to lapse of memory, and it remains merely to be seen it the context whether such a lapse could reasonably be inferred. The theory of lapse appears to us to be a clumsy attempt to cover up the mis‑statement. It is inconceivable, that the conviction recorded against the respondent could have slipped from his memory.

3. The next question which falls for determination is whether the respondent was doing any business when he applied for enrolment and after he was enrolled. The respondent has denied having done any business during the material period. The respon dent was admittedly proprietor of Rahnuma Book Depot (here inafter referred to as the Depot) and author of some books before he was enrolled as a pleader. The case of the respondent is that one Mst. Nur Jahan had taken over the going concern, The actual business, with which he had severed all connection, was handled by one Matin Sharif. In order to establish the allegation that the respondent has been doing business a number of witnesses have been examined by Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani to proves this charge and it will be necessary to refer to their evidence in some detail. P. W.

6. Sultan Mahmud, a clerk of the Rehabilitation Department, stated that the premises on the Nisbet Road, where the Depot was situate, stood allotted in the name of the respondent. The respondent admitted that this was so and, therefore, this particular aspect of the cage need not detain us long. P. W. 7 Muhammad Gani, town Inspector of the Post Office, stated that the Depot held a licence for business reply post‑cards till 1953 when on failure to pay for the necessary permit it was discon tinued. The respondent applied for its renewal on the 10th of October 1953, when a new number was allotted on that application. (The respondent admits that the application which is placed on the record was made by him. The respondent according to the witness, had on the 28th of November 1953, written to the Postmaster. Lahore intimating the fact of handing over the Depot to Mr. Muhammad Husain and that tinder his instructions all the money orders meant for Rahnuma Book Depot were to go in the account of lust. Nur Jahan. There was a further direction that all the money orders meant for the Depot were to be delivered to Pakistan Industrial Co‑operative Bank Ltd. to the credit of Mst: Nur Jahan. This application is Exh. P. W. 7/l. (The respondent admits the authorship of the application and also that it bears his signatures). A day earlier, Mr. Sikandar Bakht had sent an intimation (Exh. P W. 7/2) to the effect that he had made over the Anjuman‑i‑Ishtarakat‑i‑Ama to Mst. Nur Jahan and all the money orders addressed to that Idara were also to go in her account in Pakistan Industrial Co‑operative Bank Ltd., Bank Square, Lahore. (The respondent admits the authenticity of this document as well). The respondent, according to this witness, was allotted, Post Box No. 8 which still stands in his name. Nothing has been brought out in cross‑examination which would shake the veracity of this witness or establish that the respondent was not connected with this activity. Abdul Alim (P. W. 10) has deposed to the effect that he ordered a book called "Ramooz‑e -Shadi" from Rahnuma Book Depot some time in 1954 and received the V. P. P. On opening the book he found a passage entitled "aurat ka aurat se hamal" and considering the publication to be obscene he went to the office of Rahnuma Book Depot with a view to return it. He was attracted by a prominent board on the shop of the complainant which fell on the way and stepped in to find out where the office of Rahnuma Book Depot is. The complainant directed him to the office of the Depot and requested the witness to purchase for him a copy of the book "aurat ka markaz‑shahwat"., for which he gave them a sum of Rs.

3. The respondent was at the Depot, and when asked for the book he hesitated for a short while. The witness then introduced himself as the purchaser of his other book "ramooz‑e‑shadi" and it was only then that he gave the book for which he charged a sum of Rs. 4 as its price. The wrapper of the book "ramooz‑e‑shadi" is Exh. P. 2 in the case. An answer by the respondent to a query addressed to him whether there was a girl available with him for marriage was also sent along with the V.P.P. and is exhibited as P. 3 in the case. The witness was subjected to cross‑examination but his testimony remains unshaken. Khair . Din, Overseer. Postman, was deputed to verify whether the latter Exh. P. W. 7/ 10 was by the respondent. He contacted the respondent at 10, Nisbet Road, who affirmed that the letter was from him. The verification appears in Exh. P. W. 7/10 at the place marked 'A' Muhammad Nazir Ahmad, a clerk from the Pakistan Industrial Co‑operative Bank, Limited, has deposed that Mst. blur Jahan had no account with the Bank previous to the 28th of November 1953. Exh. P. W. 13/1 is an application by her received by the Bank requesting for the opening of an account in her name. The applicant appears to have been introduced by the respondent who admits the application to be in his hand and also bearing his signatures. The specimen signature's of Mst. Nur Jahan also appear in the document and are attested by the respondent. The respondent admits that the attestation is by him. Exh. P.W. 13/3 is a latter of the same date by the respondent to the Bank which he admits to have been signed at the place marked 'A' and by Matin Sharif at the place marked 'B'. The address of Mst. Nur Jahan as shown in the Bank books is 10, Nisbet' Road, Lahore. She is described only in her individual name without any further description. Several cheques have been exhibited as having been drawn on her account, which were received by the respondent. There are a large number of similar cheques drawn by Mst. Nur Jehan but all of them had been cashed by the respondent. The respondent denied having signed Exh. P. W. 13/8, which, according to him, was signed by his brother Shah Jahan Bakht. The other cheques are admitted to him to bear his signatures. The account, according to the respondent, was opened by Matin Sharif in the name of Mst. Nur Jahan for the respondent's benefit as it would assure regular payment of whatever was due to the respondent. The respondent when severing his connection with the Rahnuma Book Depot had made an arrangement, under which he was to give on credit some books to Matin Sharif and when they had been paid for, he was to supply more, and thus receive the payment. The books published by the respondent cost him about Rs. 15,000, which he had sold to Matin Sharif but‑retained the control of the books, as stated above. The respondent later improved his position by stating that he had not sold the whole stock en bloc and only made over a few books to Matin Sharif only when the previous stock with him had been sold and paid for. Exh. P. W. 13/9 which consists of thirty‑nine leaves is a copy of ledger account of Mst. Nur Jahan from the bank. It opens on the 28th of November 1953, and ends on the 29th of January 1957. Except for a cash payment of Rs. 10 with which the account was opened and two local cheques of Rs. 315‑3‑0 and Rs: 345‑10‑0, the rest of the credit entries represent amounts received by V. P. Ps. and money orders. Ala Muhammad (P. W. 14) then Postman in Beat No. 36, carried all the mail addressed to Rahnuma Book Depot as it fell within his beat and delivered, as stated by him, all the V. P. Ps. and money orders to. Sikandar Bakht whom he identified in Court as the owner of Rahnuma Book Depot. It was in the year 1954 that he was told by the respondent of his having made over the Depot to Matin Sharif and instructed him to deliver the refused V. P. Ps. to him. The proceeds from the money orders and V. P.Ps. were, as instructed, paid to the Bank. He was, as instructed by Matin Sharif, to make over the mail in future to clerks and failing them the refused V. P. Ps and the letters were to be delivered by him to the respondent. He had received no formal instructions from the post office to deliver the mail to Matin Sharif or his appointees and he did so only on the verbal instructions of the respondent. The refused V. P. Ps. which he delivered to the respondent related to .the books sent from the Depot. According to this witness. Matin Sharif lived at 31, Dinga, Singh Building and did the business of carpet cleaning. This place also falls within his beat. During all this period he delivered his mail at that address. He continued to deliver the mail for the Depot at 10, Nisbet Road, Lahore, and had no occasion to deliver it to Matin Sharif at his personal address. Baqir Husain Postman worked as a postman. for about four years front 1951, and testified to the delivery of the mail and the refused V.P.Ps. from the Depot to the respondent and never to Matin Sharif at 10, Nisbet Road, Lahore, during the four years that he worked on this beat. On being enrolled as a pleader, the respon dent asked the witness to deliver these parcels to his clerks. Allah Ditta was one of them, and he delivered these packets to him. The witness admits that Matin Sharif reported against him on the 26th of April 1956. He had returned only ten refused packets instead of eleven which he should have done. The witness was also confronted in cross‑examination with Exh. D. 4, a list of refused V. P. P. articles, where the sender's name figured as Sikandar Bakht though he had delivered Exh. R. 2 to Mr. M. A. Khan. According to the witness, the letter was a clerk employed by the respondent to whom under his instructions the parcels had been delivered. The witness also stated that the other ten refused V. P. Ps. were returned by him to the respondent and not to Matin Sharif. Nur Muhammad, Postman (P. W. 16), used to deliver letters addressed to the Depot in the letter‑box which was put up on the door at 10, Nisbet Road, Lahore, of which the respondent was the proprietor and no other, to his knowledge. P. W. 18 is Mst. Nur Jahan herself. She has categorically denied having purchased the Depot, but deposed to being a member of the Anjuman‑i‑Ishtarakat‑e‑Ama. The respondent was her husband's friend and on being involved in proceedings for pro fessional misconduct beseeched her to sign certain blank papers for opening an account in' the Pakistan Industrial Co-operative Bank Ltd. in her name. She signed the papers but had nothing to do with the business: She denied having written to the Pakistan. Industrial Co‑operative Bank Limited to open an account in her name or to having signed the application Exh. P. W. 13/1 for that purpose. She disowned the specimen signatures also, which accompanied the petition. She disowned having instructed Sikandar Bakht to transfer the account of Idara‑e‑Anjuman and Rahnuma Book Depot in her name or to sign cheques Exhs. P. W. 13/4 to 8 or deposited or withdrawn any amount from the aforesaid account in the Bank. She admitted having signed two or three cheques at the instance of Sikandar Bakht. Her cross‑examination merely emphasised that she was never a free agent and was merely a tool in the hands of the respondent. She compromised with that position, for on her husband's death there was opposition from his relatives and she was forced to elicit his support. Some questions were asked in the cross‑examination conveying indecent innuendo, but it brings out nothing substantial to shake her testimony. P. W. 19 is a clerk in the office of the Rationing Controller, Mcleod Road, Lahore, who proved appli cation Exh. P. W. 19/1 dated the 3rd of August 1956 by Rahnuma Book Depot. A permit (Exh. P. W. 19/2) for the purchase of paper and card‑board was issued on that application, which is duly signed by the person to whom it was delivered. A similar application (Exh. P. W. 19/3) for the issue of a permit for the purchase of art paper and ordinary paper of which Exh. P. W. 19/4 is an office copy, was made and permit issued, and its ‑validity later extended up to the 4th of February 1957, on an application Exh P. W. 19/5. The last application was presented by the respondent himself. The witness had endorsed the appli cation for orders of the Rationing Controller. The permit was received by the respondent; and there is a note to that effect in Exh P. W. 19/5‑A. The witness deposed to frequent visits by the respondent to his office for getting permits for the purchase of cycle, coal, sugar etc. The cross‑examination does not shake the quality of his evidence and we see no reason to disbelieve it. Sharif Matin (P. W. 20) is the alleged vended of the Depot from the respondent. He states to have purchased it for a sum of Rs. 1,

000. The work was to be done in partnership with Mst. Nur Jahan and one Muhammad Husain was to work as its Manager. He has stated to have purchased the whole of the concern though the stock of books remained the property of the respondent. When the Depot received orders for books, he pur chased them from the respondent and supplied the books to the customers. The good will of the concern had been sold by him two and a half years before to one Nazir Husain, who in turn sold his interest one Inam Ullah and at the time of his making the statement he was only a working partner in the Depot. He paid ten per cent, of the sale of the books sold through V. P. Ps. to Mst. Nur Jahan, and after defraying other expenses the residue was appropriated by him. The profits of the local sales were similarly appropriated by him and nothing was paid out of it to Mst. Nur Jahan. For sometime the proceeds of the V. P. Ps. in the name of Rahnuma Book Depot were credited into the Pakistan Industrial Co‑operative Bank Ltd, and Mst. Nur Jahan did not at any time issue a cheque in his favour to enable him to receive the proceeds of V. P. Ps. Ordinarily the amount of these V. P. Ps. went to Sikandar Bakht towards payment of the price of the books. The witness states that he had shifted the Rahnuma Book Depot from 10 Nisbat Road to Royal Park and that he had sent an intimation to that effect to the postal authorities and since then the mail is being delivered to him at that address. The witness also admits having made an application (Exh. P. W. 7/11) in which he stated that as he had no independent office, his clerks would be occupying a corner of the verandah of the respondent's office. The witness also admitted the authenticity of notice Exh. P.W.20/1 published in the `ANJUM' dated the 24th of August 1957 on his behalf in which he has stated that his association with the Rahnuma Book Depot was purely on non‑commercial basis and that he had handed over the concern to a nominee of the respon dent. In cross‑examination the witness had tried to explain his association on non‑commercial basis as implying that the business was subject to the dictation of Mr. Sikandar Bakht who could refuse to appoint a person even if the witness was to employ him and he could deliver books only at the pleasure of the respondent and that when the witness desired to pass on his interest, he was bound to accept his nominee as the respondent was not bound to supply books, to any other concern against his wishes. It was for this reason, according to the witness, that he did not make any profit and this is what he meant by gher munfiat bakhsh in the notice published by him. In face of the overwhelming evidence discussed above, it is apparent that the witness was working in tile interest of the respondent and was subject to his dictation and his association with the business was more nominal than real. The pith and substance of the evidence leads one to the conclusion that it was only a nominal arrangement. The true control continued to repose in the respondent, who also appropriated the profits. The testimony of this witness, therefore, does mot in any sense affect the quality of the evidence as discussed above. P. W. 21 is Shah Jahan Bakht, a real brother of the respondent. He was an employee in the Depot up to January 1957 and till then, as stated by him, the respondent was the absolute owner of the concern Sharif Mateen being a friend of the respondent at times represented himself at this instance as owner of the Rahnuma Book Depot to Government authorities. This witness was to attend the Court on Monday, but he failed to appear and in answer to a question by the Court he stated that the respondent had ruthlessly dealt with him and denuded him of all that he had and in that context his absence from Court on Monday was not wilful. In cross- examination an infructuous attempt was made to connect him with Mr. Hashmi, Advocate, who is said to be inimical to the respondent. At any rate, there is enough material on the record to indicate that the relations of the brothers are strained and it will not be safe to record a finding on‑his testimony. We would, therefore, exclude his evidence for recording a conclusion on the allegations made against the respondent.

4. Doctor Bashir Ahmad Haqqani went into the witness‑box to support the case as discussed above and also on the other charges. He was subjected to a searching cross‑examination which had for its aim to condemn him as a man of no substance or to establish that he was not a duly qualified homoeopath or that Mr. Manzur Hussain, Mr. Anwar' Shah, Mr. Mazhar‑ul‑Haq Bhatti and Qazi Jalal‑ud‑Din, Advocates, were his friends and interested in supporting him in spite of the truth lying in the other direction. After reading his statement, there is little room for doubt that the relations between the parties are extremely strained, but nothing has been elicited from him in cross‑examina tion which would detract the value of the testimony of the witness on the two charges as discussed above. It would be factually correct to state that he interested himself in digging up the facts on which the first two charges are framed not for the public good but to give vent to private vendetta ; but that does not affect the finding that the respondent did actually misconduct himself in making the false representations that he did.

5. In rebuttal the respondent has examined Siddiq Ahmad who was in 1953, employed as an officiating Accountant in the Pakistan Industrial Co‑operative Bank Ltd. Lahore, and deposed to Mst. Nur Jahan's putting her signatures on Exhs. P. W. 13/1, P. W. 13/2, and P. W. 13/3, and also that she occasionally visited the Bank and was seen by him signing some cheques on some other occasions. The witness was unable to state with any exactitude that the account of the Rahnuma Bank Depot was transferred in Mst. Nur Jahan's name at her instance or at the instance of the respondent or that the proceeds in the Bank represented the money realised from the V. P. Ps. meant for Rahnuma Book Depot or what cheques, if any, were encashed by Mst. Nur Jahan. His statement is inconclusive and can con stitute slender foundation for rejecting the testimony of other witnesses who have deposed to the contrary. Khurshid Anwar is R. W.

2. He was proprietor of United Trade Centre from 1952 to 1957 and deposes that Sikandar Bakht, the respondent, was never its partner. The record of this concern even after its being wound up remained with the respondent. The originals of letters Exhs. R. W. 2/1 and R. W. 2/2 were sent in Exhs. R. W. 2/3 and R.W. 2/4, but he was unable to state as to what happened to them when they were received back by the respondent. R. W. 3 is Agha Amir Hussain who had worked under Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani since 1947 as Honorary Sub‑Editor of "RAZ‑I‑HAYAT", a monthly magazine published by him. He has said nothing which has any bearing on the present enquiry. R. W. 4 is Agha Muhammad Yaqub who is an attesting witness to the agreement Exh R/8 which was signed by Matin Sharif, S. M. Bakht and Mst. Nur Jahan in his presence though it had already been written and signed by them. He was accidentally there when the aforesaid document was drawn. R. W. 5 is Sikandar Bakht himself who denied being the author of the obscene book which was written by a friend who used his name without his permission. He was prosecuted for the aforesaid publication and was not even examined under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code but since the failure to observe the statutory provision would have resulted in the trial being vitiated, the trial Magistrate assured him that he will inflict only a punishment of a small fine which would not affect him and he, therefore, allowed a sentence of fine being recorded against him and for this reason in the application for enrolment as a pleader, he thought that this was of no con sequence. He also states that there was a great rush of work before the typist, for there were several candidates who wished to get their enrolment forms typed out, and in that hurry he omitted to mention this fact. He stated that he had, as stated in an earlier part of this judgment, sold Rahnuma Book Depot to Matin Sharif, and relies on Exh. P. W. 7/1, which contains the original instructions issued to the Postmaster and Exh. R/13 which is an office copy of the instructions given to the Postmaster as also to Exh. R/8, the agreement of partnership between Matin Sharif and Mst. Nur Jahan, who had taken over the business before he joined the legal profession. Anjuman‑i‑Ishtarakat‑i‑Ama, accord ing to the witness, stopped functioning in November 1953 but still the respondent took the precaution of asking the postal authorities to deliver any amount of V. P. Ps. to Mst. Nur Jahan and not to him. He did not have any connection with the sale and publication of the book entitled "Film Guide" and expressed his inability to produce certain documents which he had written to Mr. Rizvi, Postmaster, Lahore. He had no concern whatsoever with the V. P. Ps. mentioned in Exhs. P. W. 7/4, P. W. 7/5, P. W. 7/6, P. W. 7/7, P. W. 7/8 and P. W. 7/9. He admitted having received V. P. P. letters enclosed in Exhs. R. W. 2/3 and R. W. 2/4, but these, he alleges, were received by him on behalf of his clients and not as a partner in that concern. He deposed to Mst. Nur Jahan accompanying him to the Bank and drawing up the necessary documents. This is about all that he has stated with reference to the two charges that we have dealt with so far.

6. After surveying the entire evidence on the record, the conclusion is irresistible that the respondent never discontinued the business of printing, publishing and selling books, including obscene books, or sever his connection with the Depot. He con tinued as its sole proprietor. There is no adequate proof that the respondent was paid a sum of Rs. 1,000 by Sharif Matin as price of the Depot or as contribution to capital by him in the new partnership said to have been set up between him and Mst. Near Jahan. The activities connected with the Depot were almost exclusively by the respondent. The financial interest in the books throughout remained his. The financial control in essence also remained with him. The evidence of Sharif Matin also confirms the same conclusion. Mst. Nur Jahan has made a clear breast of the whole affair. The postal authorities who dealt with the matter recognised no one other than the respondent as its owner. It is also equally clear on the evidence that he kept his association alive in the Anjuman‑i‑Ishtarakat‑i‑Ama and the Film Guide. There is little room for doubt on the premises that the respondent never severed his connection with business. The averment in the petition for enrolment that he was doing no business must be held to be false. He was in business before the enrolment and continued even after he was enrolled as a pleader, The charge against the respondent on these two counts stands amply proved and we hold accordingly.

7. This brings us to the consideration of charge No.

3. The facts necessary to appreciate the charge are these. The respon dent, along with one Rashid Ahmad, was being prosecuted under sections 352 and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The complainant was represented by Mr. Manzur Husain, Advocate, who had to withdraw from. the .case because of the attitude of the respondent. The reason for his withdrawal, as stated by him, was that the respondent abused him whenever they crossed each other and four days earlier he was abused filthily in the District Bar Room in the following words :‑ and then referring to him the respondent is alleged to have stated : This was in the presence of Mr. C. R. Aslam, Advocate, who had witnessed the occurrence. The evidence .on the point consists of Sayyad Muhammad Anwar, Advocate who was. sitting in the Bar Room with Mr. Manzur Husain and two other lawyers. It was then that the respondent blurted out that there were `haramzadas' among lawyers who accepted cases against fellow‑lawyers. The outburst was understood to be levelled against the witness and Mr. Manzur Husain who too had been engaged in the case by the complainant. He deposed to another incident when he encountered him and used rough language, but he did not re member exactly what he said. There was yet another encounter at the tuck shop when Mr. Mazhar‑ul‑Haq Bhati was also there. The respondent started talking about his own case and said "madar chod" an abuse directed against him, and threatened to avenge himself on such lawyers who appeared against him. There way yet another incident when the case against the respondent had concluded and the witness had even argued the case that the Court directed the written arguments to be put in. The witness went to the Bar Library with the complainant when the respondent walked in. He was furious and pointing towards him said : "Why has this man brought that quack here." On being told that he required his help, there was a scene in the Bar Library. The respondent lifted a chair to strike the witness who, in self‑defence, gave him fist blows, having received a blow in the head by the chair. They were separated by the lawyers who were present. In cross‑examination the testimony of this witness remains unshaken. Mr. Mazhar‑ul‑Haq Bhatti, Advocate, (P. W. 9), has deposed that the respondent did use the words "madar chods" and "behn chods" against the lawyers who appeared in cases against other lawyers in the presence of Mr. Muhammad Anwar (P. W. 8) who had also appeared for the complainant. Mr. Muhammad Anwar (P. W. 8) was also there at the time and was asked to remember the incident as he may be required to testify the incident. We are impressed with the evidence. The next witness is P. W. 11 Khwaja Sultan Ahmad, Advocate and a member of the District Bar. He deposes to the fact that Sayyad Manzur Husain's photograph had appeared in some newspaper and the respondent observed in his presence when Mr. Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, was also there, that Sayyad Manzur Husain appeared a "qizvani". On being asked as to what the expression meant, the respondent said, "son of a bitch". This was said in the presence of Mr. Manzur Husain. The res pondent said in the same strain that there were some people who wrote books on law without knowing anything about law. The reference was to Mr. Manzur Husain who is said to have written some books on law. The incident led to an exchange of hot words between the respondent and Mr. Manzur Husain and Mr. Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, when the witness left. The respondent had, according to the witness, also come with the statement that some bloody fools and bastards among the lawyers accepted cases against brother lawyers. In cross‑examination nothing has been elicited to detract the value of the testimony of this witness.

8. Mr. C. R. Aslam, Advocate, was examined as a Court witness. He was alleged to be present during the incident at the tuck shop. He had no vivid recollection of the incident. He stated that the respondent did say something against lawyers in an offensive tone but he could not recollect the exact words used. He, however, disowned the expression "haramzadas" having been used on that occasion. '

9. After going through the evidence bearing on charge No. 3 we have no hesitation in holding that the charge stands proved against the respondent.

10. We are left now to consider charge No.

4. In order to appreciate the evidence bearing on this charge, it is necessary to state that Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani had brought a complaint under sections 504 and 352 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the respondent which was pending in the Court of Ch. Muhammad Siddiq, Magistrate. The Magistrate, it is alleged, was not present in Court and the respondent, on seeing Dr. Bashir Ahmad Haqqani, addressed him in the following words:‑ The respondent denied having said so and Professor Naseeb Ahmad (P. W. 3), Physical Director, M. A. O. College, Lahore, has appeared in support of this charge. The respondent, as stated by him, repeated the sentence trice, and referred to the complainant. The reader of the Court was led to ask the respondent to leave the Court room, for use of such language was not permitted in Court. The witness was there to get his photograph attested for a passport, but it could not be done as the Magistrate was not there. He never had it attested again, for he gave up the idea of applying for a passport. In cross‑examination it was suggested that since the Ahlmad of another Court was a brother of the witness, a fact admitted by him, he could not have been in that Court for having his passport attested. There is nothing in his testimony to suggest that he was in any sense partial to the res pondent or hack any reason to depose falsely against him. The next witness bearing on this point is P. W. 5 Abdul Majid who was, at the relevant time, reader to Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, C: S. P. Some time later the Magistrate arrived and the com plainant did bring this fact to the notice of the Magistrate as well. In cross‑examination nothing was elicited which would be of any assistance to the respondent. This allegation is supported by the complainant himself who has appeared as P. W. 22 in the case.

11. In rebuttal the respondent, besides himself, has produced Mr. Habib Ismail Bajwa, Advocate, as R. W.

5. He stated having accompanied the respondent towards the end of the year 1954 to the Court of Mr. Muhammad Siddiq, Magistrate, who, the respondent considered, was hostile to him. He was to be a witness in case anything untoward happened. The Magistrate was not present and so he came away. Nothing had happened so long as he was there. In his cross‑examination the fact has been brought out that he was not quite sure whether he accompanied the respondent in November or December or how long he remained there and also whether he came away with the respondent, or, finding that the Magistrate was not there, came back alone. His evidence, therefore, is insufficient to displace the weight of the evidence of the witness discussed by us earlier. The evidence of the witness does not affect the evidence led by the complainant. We would accordingly hold charge No. 4 proved against the respondent.

12. It remains now only to deal with charge No.

5. The facts which need be stated are that in the case under sections 504 and 352 of the Pakistan Penal Code against the respondent and Rashid Ahmad the complainant whilst in the witness‑box was being cross‑examined by the respondent in the Court of Mr. Ghulam Jilani, Magistrate, Lahore. The respondent posed the following question:‑. "Have you seen the name‑board outside my house which is double the size of the name‑board outside your house?" The complainant replied: "I have seen a board but I have not noticed whether it was double the size of my board or, even bigger in size; but I recollect that before your present name‑board was put up there, there was another board of a marriage bureau." The respondent is alleged to have retorted that had he not opened marriage bureau there, the female folk of the witness would have gone unprovided. The respondent denied having said anything of the kind. In support of this charge, Mr. Ghulam Jilani, Magis trate, was examined as P. W. 1 who has supported this charge. In cross‑examination the respondent tried to show that the Magistrate belonged to Batala as also the complainant, but this fact stands disproved on the present record. The complainant comes from Amritsar and not from Batala; but even if he did, it did not in any manner detract from the quality of his evidence, and we have no reason to disbelieve him. Mr. Khaqan Babar has appeared as P. W. 2 and supported the facts as mentioned in the charge. What he stated is that the respondent said:‑ "If I had not opened a marriage bureau all yours (women) would have remained unmarried." In cross‑examination the fact was brought out that he and the complainant belonged to Batala. We have no reason to doubt the veracity of this witness for this circumstance alone. Mr. Manzur Husain, Advocate (P. W. 4), apart from the com plainant deposed in support of this charge. We are; however, of the view that there are some extenuating circumstances of telling nature so far as this particular head of the charge is concerned. An attempt had been made to show that the‑respondent was running a brothel under the garb of a marriage bureau and a document has been placed on the record to prove that proceedings were taken against him under section 330 of the Corporation Act, 1941, but were ultimately dropped on a compromise with the residents of the mohalla. The question posed by the complainant viewed in this context leaves little room for doubt that in referring to the marriage bureau he was insinuating the running of a brothel by the res pondent. The reply was thus provoked by the complainant, which would render the accusation as resting on slender foundation. We lave thus no hesitation in holding that the evidence on the record amply establishes all the five charges.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent, Sayyed Mahmud Shah, did not seriously contend against the conclusions deducible from‑ the evidence on the record. The main attack by him against the latter three charges was in the legal plane. These charges, in the estimate of the learned counsel, were not concerned with the professional activities of the respondent and were thus outside the ambit of section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. The plea calls for an examination of some cases cited at the Bar.

14. In support of his plea, the learned counsel for the respon dent cited a case as In the matter of Jogendra Narain Rose (5 C W N 48), in which action was taken against the respondent, who was a Pleader, on these facts. He was a defendant in a case and was represented by another counsel. Some documents were required to be produced and on their production, in the presence of the Court, he accused some officials of the record room for having been bribed and for having tempered with those documents. The trial Judge proceeded' against him under section 13 of the Act and the District Judge recommended to the High Court that he be removed from the rolls. It was contended before the D. B. composed of Maclean Chief Justice and Banerajee, J.; who heard the reference, that the case did not fall within the purview of clause (f) of section

13. The plea prevailed arid clause (f) of section 13 was interpreted to be limited by the preceding clauses on the principle of ejusdem generis and was held to, refer only to cases analogous to misconduct in the discharge of professional duties. The same point was raised in another case in the matter of Purna Chunder Pal (I L R 27 Cal. 1023) on these facts. The Mukhtar, who was proceeded against, had been dismissed from Police service. He qualified for law later and had himself enrolled as a Mukhtar suppressing the fact of his dismissal. A certificate of good character accompanied his application for enrolment. The case came up before a D. B. consisting of Mr. Justice Ghose and Mr. Justice Rampini. There was difference of opinion between the learned Judges. Mr. Justice Ghose interpreted clause (f) as limited by the preceding clauses. Mr. Justice Rampini took the opposite, view holding that the expression "any other reasonable cause" was not limited by the preceding clauses and the cause mentioned, need not have reference to the professional activities of the person against whom action is proposed. The case went before Mr. Justice Hill who concurred with Rampini, J. and affirmed the conclusion that clause (f) was general in character and was in no sense limited by the preceding clauses. The learned Judge also held that a person could be removed or suspended from practice for an Act, which preceded his enrolment if it could form the basis of his removal or suspension if the act had been done after he had been enrolled.

15. For a proper appreciation of the point of law involved it will be necessary to reproduce a few provisions of law, which have a direct bearing on the subject. Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, as it originally stood before certain amendments were made in the year 1896 omitting the last portion which is not material to this case, was as follows :‑ "The High Court may also, after such inquiry as it thinks fit, suspend or dismiss any pleader holding a certificate as aforesaid who takes instructions in any case except from the party on whose behalf he is retained, or a private servant of such party, or some person who is the recognised agent of such party within the meaning of the C. P. C., or any pleader or mukhtar holding a certificate as aforesaid, who is guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty, or for any other reasonable cause." Section 36 of the Act ran as follows :‑ "Whoever commits any of the following offences :‑ (a) solicits or receives from any legal practitioner any grati fication in consideration of procuring or having procured his employment in any legal business ; (b) retains any gratification out of remuneration paid or delivered or agreed to be paid or delivered to any legal practitioner for such employment ; (c) being a legal practitioner tenders, gives or consents to the reten tion of any gratification for procuring or having procured the employment in any legal business of himself or any other legal practitioner, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both." By Act XI of 1896, section 36 was rescinded and the subject -matter of the section was incorporated in section 13 which ran as under :‑ "The High Court may also, after such inquiry as it thinks fit; suspend or dismiss any pleader or mukhtar holding a certificate as aforesaid‑ (a) who takes instructions in any case except from the party on whose behalf he is retained, or some person who is the recognised agent of such party within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, or some servant, relative or friend authorized by the party to such instructions, or (b) who ins guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty, or (c) who tenders, gives or consents to the retention, out of any fee paid or payable to him for his services, of any gratifica tion for procuring or having procured the employment in any legal business of .himself or any other pleader or mukhtar, or (d) who, directly or indirectly, procures or attempts to procure the employment of himself as such pleader or mukhtar through, or by the intervention of any person to whom any remuneration for obtaining such employment has been given by him, or agreed or, promised to be so given, or (e) who accepts any employment in any legal business through a person who has been proclaimed as a tout under section 36, or (f ) for any other reasonable cause." The effect of the amendment was to convert touting from an offence to an unprofessional conduct which would from the subject‑matter of charge under section 13 of the Act. The amendments effected, however, did not result in any change by the Legislature in the language of section 14 of the Act, the relevant portion of which reads :‑ "lf any such pleader or mukhtar practising in any subordinate Court of in any revenue office is charged in such Court or office with taking instructions except as aforesaid or with any such misconduct as aforesaid, the presiding officer shall send him a copy of the charge and also a notice that on a day to be therein appointed such charge shall be taken into consideration * * *" The learned counsel for the respondent in this case adopted the reasoning of Mr. Justice Ghose for the contention that the principle of ejusdem generis would apply in the construction of clause (f) of section 13 of the Act. It is vehemently urged that section 14 deals in terms with the taking of instructions in contravention of section 13 of the Act and the misconduct men tioned therein. If section 13 was intended to receive a liberal construction, there would have been consequential changes in section 14 of the Act. The argument misses, as will be examined later, the full effect of amendments introduced in 1896. The question has to be canvassed in the light of the following principles which are well established.

16. As stated by the Judicial Committee in Attorney‑General for Ontario v. Mercer ((1883) 8 A C 767 at p. 778), "It is a sound maxim of law that every word in a statute ought prima facie to be construed in its primary and natural sense, unless a secondary or more limited sense is required by the subject or the context." In Anderson v. Anderson ((1895) 1 Q B 749) and Re Haynes, Knapp v. Haynes ((1950) 2 A E R 879), Lord Esher M. R. avid Lord Evershed M. R. have laid down the rule that there must be a category before the principle of ejusdem generis could be pressed into service. The ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution and not pushed too far, as in the case of many decisions, which treat it as automatically applicable, and not as being, what it is, a mere presumption, in the absence of other indications of the intention of the Legislature. The modern tendency of the law is to attenuate the application of the rule of ejusdem generis. Before the principle could be invoked, there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply no to different objects of a widely differing character but to something, which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply, and if the words are clearly wide in their meaning they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association with other words. We proceed now to examine the point in the light of these principles.

17. Section 36 of .the Act was deleted by the amending legislation and its contents incorporated as distinct clauses in section 13 of the Act. Previously in terms of section 36, touting and securing of custom by illegal gratification was made an offence. As a result of the amendment it ceased to be so and was henceforth to form the basis of action for unprofessional conduct. It is in this setting that the plea calls for examination. There can be little doubt that each clause of section 13 deals with a whole subject which comprises the genus complete in all other respects. There is no overlapping of the subjects or mixing up of the genera. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that clause (f) of section 13 cannot be given any restricted connotation because of the preceding clauses and is not affected by the principle of ejusdem generis.

18. A brief reference to some later cases seems necessary. Before a F. B. of five Judges, including Maclean C. J., as LeMesurier v. Wajid Hussain (I L R 29 Cal. 890), the case in In the matter of Jogendra Narain Bose (I L R 59 Cal. 709) came up for consideration. Maclean C. J. was also a party to this case. On mature consideration he resiled from the opinion previously expressed by him and fell in line with the view that the words "other reasonable cause" may be fairly read in their ordinary and literal sense and need not be confined to reason able cause of the same description or class as is referred to in the preceding portion of section

13. In a later D. B. ease of the same High Court reported as I L R 59 Cal: 709, the view expressed in Jogendra Narayan Bose's case was expressly dissented from.

19. In the following cases :‑ (i) Crown v. Jatindra Mohan Roy A I R 1950 Dacca 3. (ii) Saifullah Khan v. Emperor 9 P R 1902. (iii) Crown v. Lehna Singh 18 P R 1915. (iv) In re : Kolhatkhar 6 N L R 129. (v) In the matter of a Pleader I L R 26 Mad. 448. (vi) D. J. of Kistna v. C. Hanumanulu I L R 39 Mad. 1045 and . (vii) Narendra Nath Das v. Siva Kumar Jha 5 Pat. L J 601. the construction placed by the later decisions of the Calcutta High Court has been approved. In re : Maung Ba Kyin Bar‑at‑Law (A I R 1924 Rang. 114) the High Court merely affirmed view that it had very wide discretion in the exercise of its disciplinary powers to take action for misconduct other than professional of a pleader. The final word on the subject is of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case Shankar Ganesh Dabir v. Secretary of State for India (I L 49 Cal. 845), where action had been taken against the legal practi tioner for organised resistance to payment of taxes. Their Lordships of the Privy Council interpreted "any other reasonable cause" as not confined to professional activities alone. All the Courts in the pre‑partition India have adopted this view. It is too late in the day for the learned counsel for the respondent to have urged that "any reasonable cause" was limited to professional misconduct alone and this Court had no jurisdiction to take action against other unprofessional acts. Before parting with this part of the case it may be useful to refer to two pronouncements of the Supreme Court on this subject.

20. In Sardar Ali v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan (P L D 1956 S C (Pak.) 274) which was a case under clause 8 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court which empowered the Court to remove or suspend from practice an advocate of the Court on "reasonable cause" (the expression) was interpreted to be wider in its meaning and going beyond the fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duty envisaged by clause (b) of section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. Their Lordships ex pressed the view that there may be conduct other than professional which may be a reasonable cause for the removal of an Advocate's name from the rolls of the Court. In Ch. Muhammad Hasan Khan v. Judges of High Court. West Pakistan (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 210), the principle was reaffirmed that certain types of gross misbehaviour by an Advocate, although unconnected with his professional work, may serve to found an order of removal or suspension.

21. Some other cases cited by the learned' counsel for the respondent need only a passing reference. They are against him so far as the plea of action under clause (f) being limited to professional misconduct alone, is concerned and are relevant only on the quality of the action taken in those cases. In In the matter of S., a Pleader, Ranghunathpur (A I R 1936 Pat. 1), a Pleader was running two businesses, the business of a pleader and the business of an insurance agent though nominally through his brother. It was held that such a practice was highly injurious to the interests of the profession and the interests of the public, and he was found guilty of professional misconduct, being suspended from practice for six months. In another case as In the matter of an Advocate of Ghazipur (A I R 1935 All. 1023), a lawyer was charged with running business in partnership, which he denied. On evidence it was found that he was working in partnership. Their Lordships expressed their disapproval and suspended him for six months. In Inre: Kali Prosamo Bose (7 I C 623), two pleaders were convicted under section 150 read with section 144 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,000 each. The citation is not relevant as it was covered by section 12 of the Act, but is a useful guide for the dictum that in cases such as these the question that falls for/ determination is whether a pleader is fit to continue to be an h officer of the Court. The lawyers involved were of some standing and had actually paid the fine of Rs. 1,000 which was levied on each. A lenient view was taken and they were suspended for a period of three months.

22. The material point for determination in each case is the nature of misconduct and its bearing on the competence of legal practitioner to discharge his duties towards his client and the Court of which he is an officer. It is universally recognised that the legal profession is an honourable profession which is limited to a select few to practise. It is limited to persons who are duly qualified and about whose integrity and character there is satisfac tory evidence and who are in consequence permitted by the Court to adopt that profession. The restriction imposed is dictated by necessity. A lawyer, as placed, enjoys active confidence of his client who has to unburden all his secrets to him and even to depend for his life on the faith that his counsel will conscientiously and honestly defend him. It is in this setting that the conduct and character of a lawyer is subject to scrutiny by the Court which clothed him with the necessary power to practise the profession. He is, no doubt, human like other human beings subject to the frailties to which human flesh is heir: The Court does not expect from him angelic behaviour but he can never be relieved from the obligation to conduct himself in a manner as would inspire con fidence both in the client and in the Court. Lapses of lawyers are at times unduly magnified and that for the reason that the public expects from them a high standard of rectitude and a still higher sense of duty. This can be no matter of regret. It could more appropriately be a matter of pride. We do not, however, think that every lapse of counsel calls for action. A casual losing of the temper per se will not be actionable. It is only in cases where a counsel oversteps the limits of decency and acts in an outrageous manner and the act is by no means isolated but is suggestive of a course of conduct and behaviour which renders the interests of the clients in his hands unsafe and also considerably impairs his utility as an officer of the Court that the case for an action under the Legal Practitioners Act could be said to have been made out. It is in this context that we have to assess the conduct of the respondent.

23. We have found that though convicted under section 292, P. P. C., the respondent stated in his application for enrolment that he had never been convicted of an offence by any criminal Court. The application was solemnly affirmed by him. A lawye as constituted is under an obligation to see that no evidence, which to his knowledge, is perjured, is tendered and he is never relieved from that obligation. The case is certainly worse when he is an author of a false statement himself. The respondent has sinned against sin by supporting one lie by another. We have found on the evidence that the respondent was carrying on the business of printing, publishing and selling books, including such obscene books as auart ke markaz‑e‑shahwat, moh laine karaz and ramooz‑e‑shadi and also he was running business concerns under the name and style of Anjuman‑e‑Ishtarakat‑e‑Ama, Rahnuma Book Depot and Film Guide. He denied all these allegations and strove hand to. disprove them which makes the case worse against him. We have found that the respondent did use filthy language against the complainant and his counsel Mr. Manzur Hussain and Mr. M. Anwar, which forms We subject‑matter of the fourth charge against him. His attitude on this part of the case is equally worse. So far as the fifth charge is concerned, we are of the view that the complainant will largely share the blame with the respondent for the remarks were self‑invited and if that were the only case against him we could not have been persuaded to take action This is an unfortunate case in which the respondent had landed him self in difficulties and in trying to surmount one difficulty he had landed himself in another. The case is no doubt the outcome of extremely strained relations between the parties but the respondent, as a member of the legal profession, should have been alive to the realisation that behaviour such as this cannot but receive our severe condemnation.

24. The question what order would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case has given us much anxious thought. The respondent has misconducted himself for a number of years. His behaviour in Court has been far from satisfactory. Instead of reverting to truth he has persisted in substantiating false position. There have been no visible signs of remorse even during the course of the lengthy trial. The obscene and filthy language employed by him appears to fit in with his temper for he has seen nothing reprehensible in the use of such language. On the contrary he appeared to exult in its use. We are prepared to concede, as already observed by us, that lawyers as human beings can lose their temper and such comparatively innocent lapses are to be treated with megnanimity and not to be made the subject- matter of an action against them. The frame of the society in which we live is certainly relevant in that context. But the facts proved against the respondent are of a character which seriously jeopardize the dignity and honour of the legal profession. No person can be permitted to abuse the privilege which the status of a lawyer confers upon hint. Any activity which has the tendency of deterring a counsel or witness from the discharge of his duty or forces upon him an attitude which is against the best traditions of the profession cannot be too severely condemned. We have in vain looked for extenuating circumstances in this case. We are constrained to record our conclusion that it is a part of the technique of the respondent to use foul means for securing his end. It is with extreme reluctance that we have refrained our selves from striking off his name from the pleaders' rolls anxious though we are to impress on those who continue in that pro fession or those who propose to join it to bear in mind that the honour and dignity of the profession will not ire suffered to be sullied by persons who are ill‑suited to remain in or join the profession. We think the most lenient order in this case will be to suspend the licence of the respondent for a period of five years, and we order accordingly. A. H. Licence suspended.